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ON RELIGION AND THE CHURCH

Scholastic-Dogmatic Lectures

De Religione et Ecclesia — sixth edition, Prato, Giachetti, 1905

English translation

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Title Page · 4
Preface · 4

Disputation I — On Religion in General

Article 1. The genuine notion of religion is handed down · 6
Article 2. Whether it is necessary to admit some religion · 9
Article 3. Whether religion is necessary to society · 14
Article 4. Whether it is indifferent to profess any religion whatever · 21
Article 5. Whether divine revelation is possible · 34
Article 6. Whether divine supernatural revelation is necessary · 43
Article 7. Whether all knowledge of religious truth can be attributed to the continual progress of reason, revelation being excluded · 51
Article 8. The character of the notes of revelation and their necessity are sketched · 59
Article 9. Whether miracles are possible · 63
Article 10. Whether there is in miracles a force of proving that for whose confirmation they are done · 74
Article 11. Whether prophecy is possible, and what is its force of proving · 83

Disputation II — On Christian Revelation

Article 1. Whether the four Gospels and the Acts of the Apostles are authentic books · 94
Article 2. Whether the truth of Christian revelation is confirmed by miracles · 106
Article 3. Whether by the resurrection of Christ the truth of the Christian religion is demonstrated · 114
Article 4. Whether the divine origin of the Christian religion is rightly proved from its propagation and conservation · 123
Article 5. Whether Christian revelation is contained only in written books, or also in unwritten traditions · 137
Article 6. Whether the writings of the Holy Fathers are means of conserving and knowing divine traditions · 152
Article 7. Whether the consensus of Theologians and the sense of the faithful exhibit certain testimony of divine tradition · 162
Article 8. What the use of Scripture and Tradition is in Theology · 169

Disputation III — On the Institution and Constitution of the Church

Article 1. Preliminary Notions are Handed Down · 179
Article 2. General Survey concerning the Constitution of the Church · 183
Article 3. Whether Christ is the immediate author of the Church, and gave her the form of a true society · 188
Article 4. Whether, from Christ's Institution, the Church is Essentially Visible · 197
Article 5. What End Christ Set Before Himself in the Institution of the Church · 206
Article 6. Whether the Church of Christ Is a Legal Society and Ethically Necessary · 210
Article 7. Whether, From Christ's Institution, the Church Is an Unequal Society · 218
Article 8. What Form of Government Christ Instituted in the Church · 228
Article 9. Whether, From Christ's Institution, the Church Is a Perfect Society · 235
Article 10. What the Relation of the Church Is to the Remaining Societies · 239
Article 11. Which Persons Are Members of the Church · 250

Disputation IV — On the Properties and Endowments of the Church

Article 1. Whether the Church of Christ Ought to Be One · 262
Article 2. Whether the Church of Christ Ought to Be Holy · 282
Article 3. Whether the True Church of Christ Ought to Be Catholic · 289
Article 4. Whether the True Church of Christ Ought to Be Apostolic · 297
Article 5. Whether the True Church of Christ Is Indefectible · 305
Article 6. Whether, and What Sort of, Authority Is to Be Attributed to the Church of Christ · 311
Article 7. Whether the true Church of Christ ought to be infallible · 320
Article 8. What Is the Object of Infallibility · 328
Article 9. Which Is the True Church of Christ · 338

Disputation V — On the Visible Head of the Church

Article 1. Whether Christ Instituted in Blessed Peter the Primacy Over the Universal Church · 348
Article 2. Whether the Primacy of Peter, from the Institution of Christ, Ought To Be Perpetual, and in Whom It Resides · 374
Article 3. What the Force and Nature of the Primacy of the Roman Pontiff Is · 395
Article 4. Whether the Jurisdiction of Bishops Proceeds from God Immediately, or Through the Mediation of the Roman Pontiff · 417
Article 5. The Principal Heads of Doctrine Concerning Councils are Touched Upon · 424
Article 6. Whether an Infallible Magisterium Is to Be Attributed to the Roman Pontiff · 433
The Analytic Index · 467
Imprimatur · 499

Title Page

ON RELIGION AND THE CHURCH

SCHOLASTIC-DOGMATIC LECTURES

WHICH WERE DELIVERED BY

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FORMERLY IN THE PONTIFICAL GREGORIAN UNIVERSITY

PREFECT OF STUDIES AND PROFESSOR OF THEOLOGY

SIXTH EDITION

IHS

PRATO

FROM THE BOOK-PUBLISHING HOUSE OF GIACHETTI, SONS AND COMPANY

1905

Preface

I. What, according to the divine economy instituted by our Lord, are the roles of the Church when there is question of knowing revelation, I think is unknown to no one from those things which, in the treatise On Faith, we disputed in the preceding year. For we said that the magisterium of the Church is the most obvious means, and the means most adapted to the nature of the matter, by which the existence of revelation becomes certainly known; that, apart from the Church, anyone is unequal to attaining the deposit of revelation integrally; finally, that the one Church can propose to men, by an authentic magisterium, the genuine understanding of revelation.

II. In these things we included whatever pertains to the rule of faith, which they call the proximate rule. These things, however, as we noted there, could not be established unless we held as certain that the divine Church exists, endowed with all the prerogatives and gifts with which Christ loved to adorn Her, and especially with that perennial charism of infallibility, by which, being enriched, in the place of Christ Himself, she would never cease to enlighten every man until the consummation of the age. The things

therefore, which there we assumed as established, here we have attempted, according to our powers, to unfold and to corroborate with the strongest arguments.

III. Nor was the labor to be confined within these limits. It was necessary to begin from religion itself; from there, when the general questions concerning it had been completed, we made our way to revelation. After we had established its possibility, its necessity, and its very existence, we strove to show that the Christian religion alone is true. Thus, while we took care to refute the errors of atheism, naturalism, and rationalism, widely spreading in our age, we came by a ready course to the Church, since She is the Christian religion itself existing in the concrete.

IV. In this twofold treatment, namely of religion and the Church, we have not ceased to listen to the magisterium of the Church Herself, as it becomes known especially from the encyclicals, allocutions, and Syllabus of the Supreme Pontiff Pius IX, and also from the Vatican Council. The true and integral constitution of the Church had to be carefully set forth, and Her prerogatives and rights had to be defended from the assaults of adversaries; and this, indeed, in such a way that we would assail not

only the perverse errors of heretics, but also the opinions of certain men whom, Catholics in name only but in reality most hostile enemies of the Church, you would rightly and deservedly call such. When at last we narrowed our discourse to the visible head of the Church, nothing was of greater importance to us than that we should have the Constitution "Pastor Aeternus" as the norm and rule of the matters to be treated. Accordingly, we endeavored to examine its individual chapters in order, to explain them with lights gathered from every side, to strengthen them with the firmest arguments, and also, with what force was possible, to defend them against all the attacks of adversaries; so that, in this whole part of our treatment, we may seem to have presented, as it were, a commentary on that constitution.

V. It is scarcely necessary for us to indicate that those things which were disputed in the preceding year were of no small assistance to us. For there we said many things concerning the office of the Church and of reason in the matter of faith, which are also suitably referred here; there we met many objections which we judged it necessary to cast down in that place, and which this year it was possible only to indicate, referring readers there for a fuller explanation of the same. We did this deliberately, lest the bulk of this treatment grow too much; and yet we could not be briefer. For very many questions presented themselves which it was right neither to omit altogether nor, considering the gravity of the matter, to dispatch in a briefer discourse.

VI. Finally, to those reading these disputations of ours it will certainly be clear that we have so used, when there was occasion, the authority and doctrine of all the greatest theologians, and especially of Suarez and Bellarmine, but above all of the chief of all, Saint Thomas, that sometimes we have copied their very words. This was done deliberately; for, as we noted in our preceding treatises, "we thought regard should be had for those for whom those authors cannot be at hand; also because the things which are heard as handed down by so many and such great men are received with greater reverence; and finally, and especially, so that the minds of young men may gradually become accustomed to their way of treating questions and to their accustomed language, and thus, with the help of the Master, after they have overcome the first difficulties which occur in turning them over, they may more easily thereafter, when the course of theology has been completed, be drawn to approach those sources." Nevertheless, as was fitting, we have by no means neglected the works of more recent authors; indeed, to all these, whose names you will find cited here and there in the course of the treatment, we give very many thanks from this very beginning of the work, frankly confessing that we have profited very greatly from their labors and doctrine.

VII. And, lest I detain the readers longer, one thing I ask again and again: that if they gain any profit from this elaboration, either for leading back into the fold of Christ those who are situated outside the Church, or for confirming in the true love of the Christian religion those who are obedient to the Church, they would refer all of it, as received, solely to the Supreme Bestower of every gift.

Disputation I — On Religion in General

Article 1. The genuine notion of religion is handed down

1. Religion, if you consider the etymon of the word, is taken chiefly in three ways. For - 1) Lactantius (*Divine Institutes*, book 4, chapter 28) derives the name of religion from *religando*, "binding again"; because it is proper to religion to bind men anew, through knowledge and love, to the Supreme Divinity, to whom they are already bound by dependence, whether with respect to being or with respect to the other goods received from Him. "By this bond of piety," he says, "we are bound and tied again to God; whence religion itself received its name." - 2) Cicero (*On the Nature of the Gods*, book 2, chapter 28) derives that name from *relegendo*, "reading over again"; because it belongs to a religious man often and repeatedly to meditate upon, and to turn over in his heart, the things which pertain to God and His worship, as though by reading them again on repeated occasions. Lactantius rejects this Ciceronian etymon; for, immediately after the words cited, he adds: "not, as Cicero interprets it, from *relegendo*." - 3) Augustine (*City of God*, book 10, chapter 4) judges that the name religion arose from *religendo*, "choosing again," because men strive through religion to acquire again God, whom they lost through sin. Nevertheless, the common etymon of Lactantius is strongly approved, which St. Augustine himself used (*On True Religion*, final chapter), when he said: "Let religion bind us again to the one omnipotent God."

2. With respect to the thing itself also, religion does not have only one signification. For sometimes it is taken broadly; and then, as St. Augustine observes (*City of God*, book 10, chapter 1), "according to the Latin usage of speaking, not of the unskilled only, but also of the most learned, religion is said to be owed to human relationships of kinship, affinity, and any sort of close connections." Hence there is religion toward parents, friends, superiors, and so forth; compare Forcellini, who in his lexicon enumerates fourteen different acceptations of religion, and illustrates all of them with examples from approved authors.

3. But if religion is taken strictly, as is agreed among authors both pagan and Christian, it expresses an order only to God. Hence St. Thomas (II-II, q. 81, a. 1) first repeats and approves the saying of Tully: "religion is the virtue which offers ceremony and worship to a certain superior nature, which they call divine"; and then, after reporting the various etymologies of religion, he concludes: "whether religion is said from frequent re-reading, or from the repeated choosing of that which was negligently lost, or whether it is said from binding again, religion properly imports order to God. For He is the one to whom we ought principally to be bound as to an unfailing principle, to whom also our choice ought continually to be directed as to the ultimate end; Him also, by neglecting through sin, we lose, and by believing and professing the faith we ought to recover."

4. Nor is it an objection that it is read in James 1:27: "Religion clean and undefiled before God and the Father is this: to visit orphans and widows in their tribulation, and to keep oneself unstained from this world." This, I say, is not an objection; for, as St. Thomas observes in the same place, reply to the first objection: "Religion has two kinds of acts: certain acts proper and immediate, which it elicits, through which man is ordered to God alone, such as sacrificing, adoring, and other things of this sort; but it has other acts which it produces by means of the virtues over which it commands, ordering them to divine reverence, because, namely, the virtue to which the end belongs commands the virtues to which belong the things that are for the end. And according to this, visiting orphans and widows in their tribulation is posited as an act of religion by way of command, though it is an act elicited by mercy. But to keep oneself unstained from this world belongs to religion commandingly, while elicitingly it belongs to temperance or to some virtue of this sort."

5. Therefore, whether the etymological account or the common acceptation is considered, religion expresses a certain bond joining man to God; and therefore its essence cannot be better

known than by a perfect understanding of that same bond. In truth, although between God and man there is an infinite distance, nevertheless man is joined to God by the closest bond. For just as man cannot exist without God, so, once he exists, he cannot be ordered to any other than God Himself as to the ultimate end, and he must necessarily be subject to Him.

6. Hence a twofold bond joining man to God can be distinguished: one physical, the other moral. The first consists in the physical relation by which all creatures, rational as well as lacking reason, depend upon their Creator and governor. The other, however, consists in this: that creatures endowed with reason and freedom are subject to God as to their ultimate end, to their holy Lawgiver, and to their just judge. Religion properly consists in this moral bond. Now anyone sees that this relation of man to God rests upon truths to be known by the intellect, and is completed in duties freely to be fulfilled. And from this arises the distinction of religion into theoretical and practical, which ought to be regarded not as two religions, but as two parts of one true and integral religion. The sum of truths which clearly and accurately determine the relations between God and men is called theoretical religion; the sum of duties which are deduced from the aforesaid relations and are prescribed to be fulfilled is called practical religion.

7. From these things it is not at all difficult to gather the true definition of religion. Yet, in order that it may be proposed more clearly, in accordance with the received custom- (1) From these things it is already plainly evident that materialists and fatalists overturn religion from its foundations, although they misuse the name of religion. For even though "all agents must act for an end... nevertheless," says St. Thomas (I-II, q. 1, a. 2), "it must be considered that something tends by its action or motion to an end in two ways. In one way, as moving itself to the end, as man does. In another way, as moved by another to the end; as an arrow tends to a determinate end from this, that it is moved by the archer, who directs his action to the end. Therefore those things which have reason move themselves to the end, because they have dominion over their acts through free choice, which is a faculty of will and reason. But those things which lack reason tend to the end through natural inclination, as though moved by another, but not by themselves, since they do not know the account of the end... And therefore it is proper to rational nature that it tend to the end as though acting itself, or leading itself, to the end; but to irrational nature, as though acted upon or led by another, whether to an apprehended end, as brute animals are, or to an end not apprehended, as those things which entirely lack cognition." following the received custom, we say that religion can be considered objectively, according as it is in itself; and subjectively, according as it resides in the man who professes it. Taken objectively, religion is "the sum of truths and duties determining the moral relations between God and men." Subjectively, religion is "a virtue residing in a man both acknowledging and fulfilling those relations; or it is the very adherence to the aforesaid truths, and the performance of the aforesaid duties."

8. Hence religion taken generally extends more broadly than religion as it is some special virtue. For the former includes all truths and duties which in any way tend toward the service of God; but the latter is "a moral virtue inclining man to render due worship and honor to God on account of His excellence." By this definition the formal object of this virtue is clearly expressed; whence St. Thomas (II-II, q. 81, a. 4) says: "Since virtue is ordered to the good, where there is a special account of good, there must be a special virtue. But the good to which religion is ordered is to render due honor to God. Now honor is owed to someone by reason of excellence. But to God there belongs a singular excellence, inasmuch as He transcends all things infinitely according to every mode of excess. Hence special honor is owed to Him. Just as in human affairs we see that different honor is owed to different excellences of persons: one honor, indeed, to a father, another to a king, and so with others."

9. And to this point return the other definitions of religion which are customarily brought forward. Thus, for example, St. Augustine (*City of God*, book 10, chapter 1) defines religion as the worship of God. This definition, however, if it is restricted to true religion, can rightly be expressed in these words: "The due worship of the true God." This St. Thomas embraced when he said: "Religion is the virtue

by which due honor and worship are rendered to the true God." For every worship either exhibited to the true God in an undue manner, or exhibited to one who is not the true God, must be judged not religious but superstitious; for true religion requires both the due manner and the due object. Others define religion as "man's free dependence upon God"; for since this dependence is the chief duty of man toward God, containing all other duties in itself, and necessarily supposing the truths concerning God as existing, creating, and so forth, upon which it is founded, it includes religion both practical and theoretical; and therefore this definition agrees very well with the other handed down by us.

10. Concerning the divisions of religion, it will be enough to indicate the principal ones. Religion is usually divided - 1) into true and false. True religion is that which has a true estimation and faith concerning God, and exhibits to Him true and legitimate worship; and it can be defined: "The certain rule and manner of worshiping God, by virtue of which we can please Him in this life and attain eternal happiness in the next." False religion is to be called that which teaches false things concerning God, or pays Him adulterated worship. - 2) Religion is divided into natural and revealed. Natural religion is that which reason alone, left to itself, is fitted to dictate, and to which nature inclines; or it is the collection of principles and duties pertaining to the worship of God, insofar as they can become known by natural light and can be physically fulfilled by natural power. Revealed religion is that which rests upon, and becomes known by, an extraordinary and supernatural, or non-owed, manifestation of God. This, however, is supernatural simply, namely even with respect to the object, if the object itself exceeds the powers of created intellect and the exigency of human nature; but it is supernatural only in a certain respect, if the manner in which the object is manifested is non-owed, but not the object itself. In this second sense, natural religion in fact is also supernatural; for although it could be known by a natural means, nevertheless, the matter considered historically, it was not discovered from the beginning through a natural means, but was manifested by God through revelation. Hence, historically speaking, and by reason of the means, religion is only one, namely supernatural; and this, on account of the diversity of objects which it includes, is distinguished into natural, positive, and simply supernatural religion. 3) True revealed religion, according to its different epochs and states, is divided into the primitive religion, which was given to Adam and the Patriarchs; the Jewish, which was given by God through Moses to the Jews; and the Christian, which was manifested by God through Jesus Christ to the whole human race.

11. From the given notion of true religion, certain false opinions of some men can at once be rejected. And I. The pseudomystics reject every speculative religion, asserting that it consists essentially in the bare and simple practice of exterior works. This error is not new, but was already flourishing in the age of St. Augustine among the pagans, who kept saying: What does it matter to us to believe? It is enough to act well. Namely, they separated knowledge from works, theoretical religion from practical religion, and they judged that anyone, even if he thought badly concerning the truth, could attain salvation. This error, however, was renewed among the Protestants; for since each of their sects boasted that it possessed the true doctrine of Christ, and for that reason almost innumerable questions and dissensions arose among them, while there was no authority capable of defining the matter, some thought to put an end to disputes of this sort by locating the essence of religion in good exterior works, pronouncing and inquiring nothing as to whether the truth existed rather with this sect than with that one. This error was then strengthened by that absurd philosophy which admits no objective theoretical truth. God Himself exists insofar as He is apprehended as existing; concerning Him, however, nothing certain is held as to whether He truly exists outside the mind or not. Consequently, religion too has no objective or dogmatic part, but only a practical part.

12. But indeed, how far this opinion departs from the truth anyone sees for himself. For - 1) either the matter is being dealt with among those who acknowledge the fact of revelation; and these indeed cannot reject theoretical religion unless they transgress the first duty of religion, namely by refusing

faith to God speaking; besides, they cannot preserve the law revealed by God, and compose their life according to the norm of revelation, unless they adhere in mind to the revealed precepts and truths. Or the matter is being dealt with among those who admit only natural religion; and these also cannot rightly arrange their life and worship God practically unless they know the end to which they are ordered, the means to that end, the law which they are to keep, and so forth. But these and similar things are so many truths pertaining to natural religion. 2) Surely the worship exhibited to God by exterior operations principally implies that the will, following the good in those operations, be rightly ordered to God. But the will cannot embrace the good unless it has been known beforehand; nor will man act rightly unless he completes in deed that which the intellect dictates to be good. Therefore practical religion supposes and necessarily includes religious doctrine itself. 3) Hence all who are not willingly blind have seen that moral science supposes metaphysics and rests upon it. Suppose, for example, that you deny that God exists, that He is Creator and supreme Lord, that we are endowed with freedom, that the soul is immortal, and the other things of this sort: how will God be able to be worshiped, free dependence upon Him to be exercised - in a word, practical religion to be observed?

13. Nor II. is the opinion of those men less absurd who place religion "in immediate consciousness, or in a certain spiritual sense of absolute dependence upon God." For 1) the feelings of a religious soul presuppose knowledge of the truths pertaining to religion, by which they are aroused. If they are feelings of joy and gratitude, they prerequire the idea of a benefit received, of the existence of some being from whom it is received, and of man's dependence upon that being. Likewise, if the feelings are those of sadness, these arise from the apprehension of a future evil, either namely from fear of God the avenger, or from the very evil which is already tormenting. But how can the essence of religion be constituted in feelings of this sort? Unless you hold in mind that God exists, that He is the giver of good things, and that the same God, according to His justice, repays rewards to the good and punishments to the evil, you will not conceive those feelings of gratitude or sadness. 2) Religion is man's free dependence upon God. But feeling is not free; for it is not in our power, once the object has been proposed, that feelings not arise from the intuition of the true, the good, and the beautiful. The impious man sometimes admires virtue, even if speculatively he may seem to deny it, namely by denying that good is distinguished from evil.

14. III. We pass over in silence - 1) the opinion of the materialists, who constitute religion in a certain material sense, taking its origin from the impression of sensible things, and which they call the religious instinct: where spirit, intellect, and will are lacking, as we have warned, a moral bond is impossible. - 2) The opinion of the pantheists, who say that religion consists in the sense of the infinite: for whatever formula they employ, since they deny a personal God really distinct from man, they cannot admit man's true dependence upon God, or true religion. 3) The opinions of those who seem to admit religion only by an abuse of words; in reality, however, they utterly destroy it. Thus Renan says that religion is "an aspiration toward an ideal world," and that God is "a category of the ideal." Let him who can understand, understand. All these opinions, and others of this sort, are so evidently absurd that we would waste time in vain if we delayed in their refutation. 8 DISP. I. ON RELIGION IN GENERAL.

Article 2. Whether it is necessary to admit some religion

15. What we properly investigate in this article is whether there is in man a moral necessity, or obligation, of professing religion. We have nevertheless placed a more general title before it, so that those things which are treated more fully by others as distinct questions might be included briefly. For some are accustomed to ask - 1) whether any religion exists. Now if the moral necessity of professing religion is shown, it must necessarily exist. 2) They also ask whether religion is necessary to man by a necessity as it were physical, insofar as he cannot be well without religion. But if the moral obligation of professing religion, flowing from the very nature of man, is shown, religion must certainly be called necessary in that sense; for what is natural to man is necessary to him. - 3) It is usual to ask whether religion

is useful to man; and they attempt to show its utility by various arguments. They say, for example: a) the more religious men are, the more they love one another and take care not to harm one another; indeed, they are solicitous to bring mutual help to one another. b) To all men exposed to calamities, diseases, pains, and evils of every kind, religion is of the greatest consolation; for it brings it about that we either hope to be freed from them by divine help, or that we bear them patiently, expecting from God the reward of patience. Let the just be compared with the impious. If both should suddenly be deprived of goods, possessions, children, friends; indeed, if it should happen that they are betrayed by friends, deserted by parents, assailed with injury by all, and especially by those upon whom one has conferred benefits, what will happen? etc. But these and similar arguments, which are easily found by all, are only secondary; for the true and principal utility which comes to man from the profession of religion is that which arises from the execution of law and from adherence to God as the ultimate end. Therefore it will be enough for us to confirm the obligation of professing some religion by those arguments from which the existence, utility, and necessity of religion flow, as it were, of themselves.

16. Moreover, we are not yet here dealing with revealed religion, but with some religion in general. For this reason the question is set up against most turbulent men, who, as the Supreme Pontiff Pius IX says (*Allocution Maxima quidem*, June 9, 1862, from which propositions 3 and 56 condemned in the *Syllabus* were taken), "as worshipers of perverse doctrines, babble that the laws of morals do not need divine sanction, and that it is by no means necessary that human laws be conformed to natural right or receive from God the force of obliging; and therefore they assert that no divine law exists. Furthermore, they dare to deny every action of God upon men and the world, and rashly affirm that human reason, with no respect whatever had for God, is the sole arbiter of true and false, of good and evil, and that the same human reason is a law to itself, and by its natural powers suffices for caring for the good of men and peoples."

17. Hence it is plain that in the present question we are dealing - 1) against atheists: since they deny the existence of God, who is the object of religion and worship, they must deny every religion. - 2) Against pantheists, who, under whatever form they defend their error, finally agree in this, that they confound man with God; and therefore, since man cannot be both inferior and superior with respect to himself, they deny every dependence upon God, or every religion. 3) Against materialists, who, if they deny only the existence of spirit in man, as we have said, by that very fact deny the knowledge of God and free dependence upon Him; but if they deny the existence of spirit of any kind, they remove from the midst God Himself, the object of religion and worship. 4) Against fatalists, who reject divine providence and human freedom. 5) More directly against absolute indifferentists, who neglect religion as a thing altogether indifferent and in no way necessary. And among these must be numbered those who proclaim man's absolute independence, the absolute autonomy of reason, and the absolute liberty, as they say, of conscience. We have said absolute, because there are certain milder indifferentists who indeed acknowledge the necessity of some worship toward God, but nevertheless teach that it is lawful for anyone to profess whatever religion he pleases; against these we shall treat below.

18. But the arguments by which the doctrine to be established is confirmed disclose the true foundations of religion; hence they also overthrow the errors of those who seem to acknowledge some religion, but remove its true foundation. It is proved false, for example, what the eudaemonists assert, namely that religion is necessary only because it is a necessary means to happiness; for God must be worshiped by us not only because He is good to us, but also and chiefly because He is good in Himself. The doctrine of Machiavelli is proved false and most impious, according to whose opinion religion is required only as a necessary means for obtaining external security in the civil state.

19. These things, therefore, having been noted beforehand. Section 2. The proposed question is solved. PROP. I. - 1. From principles known by natural light it is clearly shown that there is in

man a moral necessity of professing religion; 2. nor can moral obligation exist or be conceived without religion. Therefore they wander from the truth who so establish the autonomy of human reason that they teach it to be the sole arbiter of good and evil, and to be a law to itself.

20. Proof of the first part. I. Man is bound to act according to the right order of nature, since the first principle of morality is "preserve order." But according to the order of nature, man depends totally upon God, by whom he was created. Therefore he is bound to act with this dependence. Now just as any being whatever is bound to act in a manner consonant with its nature and with the powers or faculties which are in it (for faculties are proximately ordered to operation and are an indication of the will of the Creator), so man, endowed with reason and free will, ought to exercise free operation with reason going before. But religion consists in man's free dependence upon God. Therefore. See Taparelli (*Natural Right*, vol. 1, c. 9).

21. Genuensis speaks excellently on this matter (*Metaphysics*, p. 7, c. 5, Section 20): "This dependence between us and God constitutes a necessary relation, from which it further follows that we owe Him service and religion. Wherefore, as man cannot exist except from God, so it is absurd that he should live without knowledge and worship of his Author. In one word: our religion toward God necessarily follows upon the nature of God and our own." Surely obedience is owed by an inferior to a superior or lord; but no one is more man's lord than God, since He obtains dominion over man as the craftsman over the work of his hands, as Creator over creature; therefore. Feelings of gratitude are owed to a benefactor; but God is the supreme bestower of all goods. Reverence and love are owed to a father; but God is most eminently man's father. Honor is owed to a king; but God is the supreme king, King of kings and Lord of lords, immortal King of the ages, to whom honor, power, and glory are owed.

22. II. Man is bound to pursue his ultimate end; for it is easily shown that the first principle of morality, "preserve order," is equivalent to another: "act according to the end appointed for you by the Creator," since the discussion concerns the moral order, which is taken only from the end. But the ultimate end of man, as is proved in philosophy, is God (see St. Thomas, *Contra Gentiles*, book 3, c. 17). Therefore man is bound to tend toward God. But he cannot accomplish this unless he knows both God and the means which lead to Him, and accommodates his operations to this knowledge. Therefore man is bound to perform this. But if he performs this, he already acknowledges and fulfills the moral relations which exist between himself and God, in which, as we have said (n. 7), religion consists. Therefore.

23. Wherefore unbelievers, who attempt to despoil man of religion, are opposed to the perfection and happiness of man himself. They are opposed to his perfection indeed; for man does not attain it unless he attains his good, nor is he supremely perfect unless he attains his supreme good. But the supreme good of man is his ultimate end. "That to which," says St. Thomas (*Contra Gentiles*, book 3, c. 16), "something tends when it is outside it, and in which it rests when it has it, is its end. But each thing, if it lacks its proper perfection, is moved toward it, as far as lies in it; but if it has it, it rests in it. Therefore the end of each thing is its perfection. But the perfection of anything is its own good. Each thing therefore is ordered to the good as to an end." See also chapter 3. - They are opposed also to man's happiness. For man's happiness consists in the ultimate end, in the possession of which alone he rests. But the ultimate end cannot be anything except God, who created, provides for, and preserves all things. Now man acknowledges God as ultimate end when he acts on account of Him and worships and glorifies Him; and this is done through theoretical and practical religion. Therefore man, just as, lacking theoretical religion, he lacks the due knowledge of the ultimate end toward which he ought to tend and of the means which lead him to it, so, lacking practical religion, cannot perform those things upon the right execution of which his eternal happiness depends.

24. III. Religion is ordered to rendering due honor to the true God. But in order that someone be held worthy of honor, it is required that he shine forth with excellence; and God is infinitely

excellent, for He who by the nod of His will established all things from nothing must contain, formally or virtually, all perfections with eminence. On the other side, in order that someone render this due honor to God, he must possess intelligence, by which, being able to contemplate the divine excellence, he can be carried into admiration of it and be subject to it; and of this sort is man's nature. Therefore, when the nature both of God and of man is considered, the bond of religion necessarily arises. But the bond which rests upon such an objective foundation then has as many titles as there are divine attributes. For whether you consider God's wisdom or infinite holiness, or His supreme dominion or justice, or divine providence, it is impossible that God not demand from intelligent creatures that subjection and dependence which, according to the objective order, is owed to Him and of which rational creatures are capable.

25. IV. From the common sense of nature, which becomes known 1) in natural inclination, manifested in that instinct by which, when danger threatens, man is impelled to pray to God: this testimony we can call, with Tertullian, the testimony of the soul naturally Christian, or at least naturally religious. "This soul," he says (*Apology*, c. 7), "although pressed down by the prison of the body, although hemmed in by depraved institutions, although weakened by lusts and concupiscences, although enslaved to false gods; nevertheless, when it comes to itself again, whether from excess or from some illness, names God, for this reason alone, because this one God is properly true, good, and great. And 'what God shall have given' is the voice of all. It also invokes Him as judge: 'God sees,' and 'I commend it to God'... O testimony of the soul naturally Christian." 2) From sacrifices. For sacrifices are found among all peoples. Among all, indeed, sacrifices of animals were in use; but among certain fiercer nations even human sacrifices were sometimes offered, especially in the greatest public calamities. Christianity abolished all sacrifices of living beings, and especially human sacrifices; nevertheless, it substituted for them the unbloody sacrifice of Jesus Christ. 3) From explicit testimonies. Thus, for example, Plutarch (*Against Colotes the Epicurean*) says: "And if you go through the lands, you may find cities lacking walls, letters, kings, houses, wealth, coinage, ignorant of gymnasia and theaters; but no one has ever seen a city lacking temples and gods, which does not use prayers, an oath, an oracle, which does not sacrifice for good things, which does not strive to avert evils by sacred rites. But I think a city could more easily be founded without soil than a state cohere or stand with religion and the gods utterly removed." Julian (*Letter to Heraclius*): "Before instruction we are all persuaded that there is some deity, that we must look to Him, that we must hasten to Him; and I believe our souls are so related to God as things endowed with sight are to light." Cicero (*Oration for Flaccus*): "Each city has its own religion. Nature, indeed, knows how to venerate God; nor is there any man who lacks a law which commands this." And in the *Tusculan Disputations* (book 1, c. 13): "This seems to be brought forward as the firmest reason why we believe that there are gods: that no nation is so savage, no one of all men so monstrous, that an opinion of the gods has not imbued his mind. Many think wrongly about the gods, for this is usually brought about by a vicious custom; nevertheless all judge that there is a divine force and nature. Nor indeed does the conversation or agreement of men bring this about; the opinion has not been confirmed by institutions, nor by laws. But the agreement of all nations in every matter must be thought a law of nature." And in *On the Nature of the Gods* (book 1, n. 23) he reports: "Protagoras of Abdera, indeed... a sophist perhaps the greatest in those times, when he had put this at the beginning of his book, 'Concerning the gods I cannot say either that they are or that they are not,' by order of the Athenians was driven out from city and territory, and his books were burned in assembly." 4) The impious themselves, who would wish to abolish every religion, lest they seem to be opposed to the whole human race, speak everywhere of religion, although they pervert its genuine idea. Therefore one may say here what Cicero observes concerning the existence of God (*On the Nature of the Gods*, Section 5): "And so it is agreed among all men of all nations. For it is innate in all, and as it were engraved in the mind, that there are gods. What they are like varies; that they exist no one denies." Now one of the reasons for which they judge that religion must be bidden farewell is that, they say, it has made men fanatics. Therefore men are so far from being indifferent with respect to religion that rather they make very much of it! 5) But Bayle strives only ineptly to weaken this common

consensus of the human race by saying that it must be attributed to man's indolence. For Cicero had already responded to this and similar exceptions in the same place (Section 2): "An opinion so stable would not remain, nor would it be confirmed by length of time, nor could it have grown old together with the centuries and ages of men. For we see that other fictitious and vain opinions have vanished with length of time... For time destroys the inventions of opinions; it confirms the judgments of nature. And so, both among our own people and among others, the worship of the gods and the sanctities of religions exist day by day greater and better." This argument could be illustrated at greater length; see, among others, Valsecchi (*On the Foundations of Religion*, etc., vol. 1, cc. 8-10).

26. Proof of the second part. I. With the concept of the true God, Creator of man and of all things, as is easily plain from the arguments given for the first part of the thesis, religion is intimately and necessarily connected. Therefore the arguments which prove that no moral obligation exists when God is removed also prove that it is destroyed when religion is removed. Hence: Every obligation is founded upon some law; but law emanates from a legislator endowed with authority and power, for it is "a certain ordinance of reason for the common good, promulgated by him who has care of the community." Therefore, if law does not exist, moral obligation does not exist either; hence the Apostle says (Rom. 4:15): "where there is no law, neither is there transgression." But, when God is removed, no legislator endowed with authority exists. For just as, when necessary being is removed, contingent being cannot exist, so without a first, absolute, and independent legislator, a second and dependent one cannot exist.

27. St. Thomas explains this argument excellently in this way (I-II, q. 93, a. 3): "In all ordered movers it is necessary that the power of the second mover be derived from the power of the first mover, because the second mover does not move except insofar as it is moved by the first. Hence in all those who govern we see the same thing: that the account of governance is derived from the first governor to the second governors, just as the account of those things which are to be done in a city is derived from the king, through a precept, to the lower administrators; and also in the arts, the account of artificial acts is derived from the architect to the lower craftsmen, who work by hand. Therefore, since eternal law is the account of governance in the supreme governor, it is necessary that all accounts of governance which are in lower governors be derived from the eternal law." But accounts of this sort belonging to lower governors are any other laws besides the eternal law. Hence all laws, insofar as they participate in right reason, are to that extent derived from the eternal law; and on this account Augustine says in book 1 of *On Free Choice*, chapter 6, near the end, that in temporal law there is nothing just and legitimate which men have not derived for themselves from the eternal law.

28. II. When God, the true source of moral obligation, has been removed, they substitute human reason for Him. But human reason cannot be the supreme source of moral obligation. For: 1) A nature which is not independent does not have an independent faculty; but human nature, created, contingent, finite, is essentially dependent. Therefore reason also, which is its faculty, must be dependent. But that which by its own nature is dependent cannot be the supreme source of obligation, since it itself is subject to that upon which it depends. Therefore. 2) The office of reason is not to produce its object, but to know it; and therefore it supposes that object and must be conformed to it, in order that it be true and right. Therefore, if human reason knows and reports moral obligation, it does not produce that obligation, but rather supposes it. 3) No one can be morally obligated except by his superior. But human reason is not superior to man. Therefore. 4) If human reason, as the supreme source of moral obligation, were to command or forbid something, it would do this freely or necessarily. But if it did this freely, the essential distinction between virtue and vice, good and evil, would be destroyed; nor would there be any action intrinsically good or evil, which certainly is opposed to common sense. But if it did this necessarily, it would be bound antecedently to its own command, and therefore it would not be the supreme source of obligation. Perhaps they will say that reason is indeed bound antecedently to its own command, but is bound by the objective

order itself of things. But truly - 1) when God is removed, in what is founded the immutability, necessity, and universality of the essential order of things? - 2) Who obligates us to conform our operations to the essential and objective order of things? - 3) The principal obligations which arise from the objective order of things are certainly duties toward God; if nevertheless human reason can shake off the yoke of God (this is what those who deny religion do), what obligation at last will stand safe? 5) The pagans themselves acknowledged truths of this sort, which nevertheless recent unbelievers, in the clearest light of Christian revelation, pretend to ignore. Hence Cicero (*On the Laws*, book 2, chapter 4): "This, therefore, I see," he says, "was the opinion of the wisest men: that law was neither something thought up by the talents of men, nor some decree of peoples, but something eternal, which governed the whole world by the wisdom of commanding and forbidding. Thus they said that that first and ultimate law was the mind of God, compelling or forbidding all things by reason; from which that law which the gods gave to the human race is rightly praised. For it is the reason and mind of the wise man, suitable for commanding and for deterring." And a little later he says: "For it was reason proceeding from the nature of things, both impelling to right action and calling away from fault; and it does not finally begin to be law when it has been written, but when it has arisen; and it arose together with the divine mind. Wherefore true and chief law, suitable for commanding and forbidding, is the right reason of supreme Jove."

29. III. The matter can be confirmed from the consequences of the impious doctrine which we oppose. For since, when God and religion have been removed, human reason would be unequal to founding moral obligation, they finally came to this: that some placed the source of all honesty and obligation in the heaping up of riches, or in utility; others in pleasure; others in the right of the physically stronger; and all utterly lost the notion of right. Hence propositions 58, 59, and 61 were condemned in the *Syllabus*: 58. "Every discipline of morals and all honesty ought to be placed in heaping up and increasing riches in any way whatever and in satisfying pleasures." 59. "Right consists in a material fact, and all duties of men are an empty name, and all human facts have the force of right." 61. "Successful injustice of fact brings no detriment to the sanctity of right." Namely, while they too greatly extolled the force and rights of reason, by the just judgment of God they were compared with unwise beasts and were made like them! But to pursue these things belongs to another place.

Article 3. Whether religion is necessary to society

30. There have not been lacking, nor are there lacking, men who, although they acknowledge the necessity of religion for the individual man, nevertheless deny it for society; indeed, they judge that it exercises no salutary influence upon society. They think, namely, that society can stand safe without religion, and that a commonwealth, although atheistic and bound together by no bond of religion, can be ruled and governed securely. They have fashioned the absurd and impious hypothesis of an atheist leading a virtuous life, attracted by the beauty of virtue alone and by the approval of his own conscience. They have said that the end of civil society, which they placed in mutual concord and peace among citizens, can be obtained without religion, from natural honesty alone.

31. What these men had dreamed, a certain Robert Owen, born in the village of England whose name is Newton, in the preceding century attempted to bring into act. Gifted with talent and endowed with rather notable efficacy in acting, he applied his mind much to the reading of books, and especially to industry. Imbued with the ideas of impious philosophism, he undertook to found and establish a society without religion, solicitous only for material goods and the enjoyment of bodily things. But truly, by the most disastrous outcome which befell a society of this sort, he was compelled to desist from his proposal. 18 DISP. I. ON RELIGION IN GENERAL.

32. The true origin of this error lies hidden in the philosophical atheism of the last century. For since unbelievers wished to strip man of religion, at first they attempted to accomplish this

directly and with all their strength. But when the matter by no means yielded to their desires, they endeavored to attain the same end by an indirect way. And so they undertook to separate religion from the public administration of affairs, with this design indeed: that, once religion had been removed from the governing part, the whole of society would at last stand without religion. For they foolishly persuaded themselves that religion would be torn out by the roots from the hearts of all if public profession of religion once ceased.

33. But in the present time they proclaim not only that religion is by no means necessary, indeed that it is useless to society; but in addition they contend that neglect of social religion is especially conducive to the good of society. Wherefore the Supreme Pontiff Pius IX (*Encyclical Quanta cura*, December 8, 1864) proscribed this proposition, the first in order: "The best constitution of public society and civil progress altogether require that human society be constituted and governed with no respect had for religion, as if it did not exist, or at least with no distinction made between the true religion and false religions."

34. Indeed, in the same encyclical the most wise Pontiff briefly indicates the worst consequences of this impious principle. "For," he says, "where religion has been removed from civil society and the doctrine and authority of divine revelation repudiated, even the genuine notion of justice and human right itself is darkened by shadows and lost, and material force is substituted in place of true justice and legitimate right. From this it is clear why some, with the most certain principles of sound reason entirely neglected and set aside, dare to shout that the will of the people, manifested by what they call public opinion or in some other way, constitutes the supreme law, freed from every divine and human right, and that in the political order accomplished facts, by the very fact that they have been accomplished, have the force of right."

35. As is plain to the reader, the Supreme Pontiff teaches that these evils follow both - 1) from religion being neglected; and 2) from revealed religion being neglected. But we leave this second point to be treated below, for we are not yet dealing with revelation. These things, therefore, having been set down beforehand, Section II. The proposed question is solved. PROP. II. - Religion, which is the sole foundation of right and justice, is so necessary to civil society that society cannot stand safe without it. Therefore those who attempt to introduce political atheism substitute material force for true justice and legitimate right; and, under the appearance of civil progress, they are truly contriving the ruin of society.

36. Proof I. Civil society cannot stand safe without the duties of justice, fidelity, mutual love, and so forth. But these duties cannot stand safe without religion. Therefore civil society cannot stand safe without religion. Proof of the minor. - 1) Those duties cannot stand safe without true moral necessity, or obligation. But when religion is removed, every moral obligation collapses, as we have said (n. 26). Therefore. - In truth, just as the existence of God the Creator necessarily brings with it the duties of religion, so the denial of religion leads directly to atheism. But if you deny that God exists, you must also deny the existence of the eternal law; for this is nothing other than the highest and supreme account of the governance of all things, existing in the divine mind, moving and directing all things to their due end. But when the eternal law is removed, any law whatever is immediately destroyed; for every law is derived from the eternal law, and from it has all its force of obliging. And again, when every law is removed, every obligation is removed. Therefore, when religion is removed, every obligation is removed. But anyone sees that society cannot stand without moral order, just as it cannot stand among brute animals, in whom moral order cannot have a place. 2) Those duties of justice, fidelity, mutual love, and so forth cannot stand safe without a sufficient sanction. But when religion is removed, a sufficient sanction is lacking. For it is impossible that all good and virtuous citizens should receive rewards from society, and the wicked, punishments. For a) often the honorable actions of the good remain unknown to men, or at least do not come to public notice in such a way that they become known to the administrator of the commonwealth. More

numerous are the acts which are performed privately than those which are performed publicly; yet it cannot be denied that from good acts, even private ones, very many goods accrue to the community. b) Even granted that all honorable actions are known by the governor of society, they are often subject to the envy of others, attacked by calumnies, and thus merits are depressed. Hence it happens very often that the good themselves prefer to be unknown rather than known. Conversely, many among depraved men escape punishments either by money, or by frauds, or by plots, and by other deceitful means. Therefore not all the good are presented with reward, nor are all the wicked struck with punishments. Therefore, when religion has been removed, citizens lack an effective means by which they may be drawn to the observance of laws and restrained from transgressing them. c) Surely punishments sanctioned by laws scarcely suffice where religion flourishes; what, then, would it be without religion? Especially, once religion has been removed from the midst, who will set the end of society for himself in the public good rather than in private good? Who will prefer common peace and concord to his own utility? What could restrain the rulers themselves? For they are not subject, at least coercively, to the law made by themselves. Wherefore Tully wrote (*On the Laws*, book 1, n. 15): "But if justice is obedience to written laws and the institutions of peoples, and if, as the same men say, all things are to be measured by utility, then he who thinks that this matter will be profitable to himself will neglect the laws and break through them, if he can. Thus it happens that there is no justice at all, if it is not by nature; and that which is established on account of utility is overturned by another utility." d) Without religion, there is no trust in witnesses; and yet an oath has always been held as the most efficacious means for binding faith and ending controversies. Hence the Apostle says (Heb. 6:16): "Men swear by one greater than themselves, and the end of all their controversy, for confirmation, is an oath." And Cicero (*On Duties*, book 3, c. 31): "Our ancestors wished no bond to be tighter for binding faith than an oath. The laws in the Twelve Tables indicate this, the sacred laws indicate it, treaties indicate it, by which faith is bound even with an enemy; the examinations and censures of the censors indicate it, who judged concerning no matter more diligently than concerning an oath." And (*On the Laws*, book 2, c. 7): "Who would deny, when he understands how many things are confirmed by oath, how great for safety are the religious sanctions of treaties? How many has fear of divine punishment called back from crime, and how holy is the society of citizens among themselves, when the immortal gods are interposed both as judges and as witnesses?" - e) Hence all the ancient lawgivers, such as Pythagoras, Solon, Lycurgus, Anacharsis, and so forth, established religion as the foundation of civil institutions and as the most efficacious means by which they would be observed.

37. II. The principal foundation upon which rests the moral necessity, for the individual man, of professing religion is his essential dependence upon God, as we have said (n. 20). But the same reason holds also for society, since it too was originally instituted by God for the good of man. Therefore. Explanation of the minor. We can consider two elements in society, namely the authority which presides and the multitude which is subject to it. Now he who has authority, or the superior, depends upon God not only as he is a man, but also as he is a superior; therefore also as superior he ought to profess his free dependence upon God, that is, religion. But if, acting as superior, he professes this dependence, the multitude ought to follow his impulse, or obey him; and the multitude, acting insofar as it is moved by the superior, truly exercises a social operation. Therefore a social profession of religion must be admitted. Hence St. Augustine (*Epistle* 185, otherwise 50, to Boniface) says: "He serves God in one way because he is a man, in another because he is also a king. Because he is a man, he serves Him by living faithfully; but because he is also a king, he serves Him by sanctioning with suitable rigor laws that command just things and prohibit contrary things: just as Hezekiah served by destroying groves and temples of idols, and those high places which had been constructed against the precepts of God... just as the King of the Ninevites served by compelling the whole city to placate the Lord... just as Nebuchadnezzar served by prohibiting all those placed in his kingdom from blaspheming God by a terrible law."

38. III. Civil society cannot stand safe unless authority directs and moves the multitude to pursue the common good. But it cannot perform this without religion. Therefore. The proof of the minor is first plain from what was said in the first argument; for when religion is removed, the moral force for efficaciously moving the multitude is lacking. But further: 1) The chief good is moral rectitude and virtue; but, when religion is removed, moral rectitude and virtue are destroyed; therefore. 2) Things which are from nature are ordered; but order cannot be had unless lower things are subjected to higher things. And thus the proximate end of civil society ought to be subjected to the ultimate end, which is the attainment of God Himself. Indeed, without this subordination authority could promote the immediate end in such a way that it would harm the ultimate end; in which case that end would cease to be a good, and would rather be an evil. But, when religion has been removed, authority cannot promote the proper end of civil society with this subordination to the ultimate end. Therefore.

39. This argument is taken from St. Thomas (*On the Governance of Rulers*, book 1, c. 14), where he says: "To govern is to lead that which is governed fittingly to its due end... but the same judgment must be made concerning the end of the whole multitude and of one man... Now the ultimate end of a gathered multitude seems to be to live according to virtue. For men are gathered together for this purpose, that they may live well together, which each one living individually could not attain. But the good life is according to virtue. Therefore the virtuous life is the end of the human gathering... If indeed this end could be reached by the power of human nature, it would be necessary that it belong to the office of the king to direct men to this end. For we suppose him to be called king to whom the highest governance in human affairs is committed." And in chapter 15: "But just as the life by which men live well here is ordered, as to an end, to the blessed life which we hope for in heaven, so whatever particular goods are procured through man, whether riches, or profits, or health, or eloquence, or learning, are ordered to the good of the multitude as to an end. Therefore if, as has been said, he who has care of the ultimate end ought to preside over those who have care of things ordered to the end, and to direct them by his command, it becomes manifest from what has been said that the king, just as he ought to be subject to the dominion and rule which is administered through the office of the priesthood, so he ought to preside over all human offices and order them by the command of his governance. But whoever is charged with perfecting something which is ordered to another as to an end ought to attend to this: that his work be congruent with the end."

40. Hence St. Augustine also writes (*Against Cresconius*, book 3, 57): "In this kings, as is divinely commanded them, serve God insofar as they are kings, if in their kingdom they command good things and prohibit evil things, not only those things which pertain to human society, but also those which pertain to divine religion. In vain do you say: let me be left to free choice. For why do you not proclaim that men should be left to free choice in murders and rapes and in any other crimes and shameful deeds? Yet that all these things be restrained by just laws is most useful and most salutary."

41. IV. In order that it may be better seen that political atheism substitutes material force for legitimate right and leads into the ruin of society, it will be useful to renew the argument in this way: without justice, as we have said, society cannot stand safe; but, when religion is removed, justice cannot stand safe. For justice must bring it about that to each one his right is rendered; therefore where right fails, justice also fails. But no right can be conceived without religion. For right is "an inviolable moral power of doing or obtaining something, or by force of which others remain obligated toward us." Therefore right in one person supposes obligation in another; otherwise it would be empty and illusory. Hence these two are said to be correlatives. But what power can there be in man, when God has been removed, from whom all things proceed? If there is no right of God over man, whom He created (and this, moreover, is what the impious who deny religion contend), what right of man can there be? What moral necessity can there be in others not to violate our right, if the origin of obligation is found in religion alone?

42. Therefore material force is substituted for the corrupted notion of right, unless society is at once utterly overturned. For there is no society where there is not unity in a multitude: "A commonwealth," says Cicero (*On the Republic*, book 3), "is the affair of a people; but a people is not every gathering of a multitude, but is a gathering associated by consensus concerning right and by communion of utility." But the principle of unity is authority, which has force for reducing a multitude into unity insofar as it has the right of commanding. When right has been removed, nothing remains except physical force for holding the multitude in unity. For if a compact is imagined, this compact itself has no force unless it first be established concerning the moral obligation of faithfully observing it. Compare Liberatore (*The Church and the State*, c. 2, art. 2).

43. SCHOLION. Since worship is nothing other than the exercise of religion, those things which demonstrate the necessity of religion also establish that worship is necessary. Yet for searching more deeply into the nature of worship, it will be useful to add a few things; a few, I say, because these matters are usually treated in moral philosophy.

44. And first, just as, as we have said (n. 8), religion can be taken for a special virtue, or in a broader sense, so worship is either taken generally for any honorable act tending of itself toward God, the ultimate end, and His glory; or properly and formally for an act of service exhibited to God on account of His excellence. Now St. Thomas notes (II-II, q. 81, a. 3, ad 2): "that by the same act man serves God and worships Him; for worship regards the excellence of God, to whom reverence is owed, but service regards the subjection of man, who by his condition is obligated to exhibit reverence to God. And all acts which are attributed to religion pertain to these two, because through all of them man protests the divine excellence and his own subjection to God, either by exhibiting something to Him, or also by assuming something divine."

45. But although worship can be exhibited to others besides God, since even in others some participated excellence can shine forth, nevertheless, since God's excellence is supreme and unparticipated (n. 7), the worship which is exhibited to Him is altogether of another and higher account. "Since servant is said in relation to lord," says St. Thomas (II-II, q. 81, a. 1, ad 3), "it is necessary that where there is a proper and special account of dominion, there there be a special and proper account of service. But it is manifest that dominion belongs to God according to a certain proper and singular account, because, namely, He made all things and because He holds the highest principality in all things; and therefore a special account of service is owed to Him." Hence also the worship exhibited to God is given a special name. For while the worship of the saints is called dulia, the worship of the Blessed Virgin, who stands forth among the saints, is called hyperdulia; the worship of God is properly called latria. "Latria," says St. Augustine (*City of God*, book 10, c. 1), "according to the usage by which those who established for us the divine utterances spoke, is called that service which pertains to worshiping God, either always or so frequently as to be almost always."

46. Now integral worship includes acts of a threefold order, namely of the mind, of the heart, and of the body. The first two kinds, since they pertain to the soul, constitute internal worship; but the third makes external worship. And so internal worship is "reverence and service exhibited to God by acts which remain in the soul"; but external worship is "the sensible expression and manifestation of internal worship." From this definition of external worship it is immediately plain that it must not be separated from internal worship; for one who performs acts of religion outwardly which do not at all agree with the internal acts is called not religious, but a hypocrite. Hence St. Thomas (I-II, q. 101, a. 2) says: "There is a twofold worship of God, interior and exterior. For since man is composed of soul and body, both must be applied to worshiping God; namely, so that the soul may worship with interior worship, and the body with exterior worship. Hence it is said in Psalm 83:3: 'My heart and my flesh have rejoiced in the living God.' And just as the body is ordered to God through the soul, so exterior worship is ordered to interior worship. Now interior

worship consists in this, that the soul be joined to God through intellect and affection. And therefore, according as the intellect and affection of the one worshiping God are rightly joined to God in diverse ways, according to this the exterior acts of man are applied to the worship of God in diverse ways."

47. Now external worship can be considered either in relation to the individual, and is called private external worship; or in relation to society, and is called public external worship. Hence private worship is that which a man exhibits to God in his own name. But public worship is not so called properly because it is exhibited publicly (private worship itself can be exercised in a public place), but because, with the minds and vows of the members joined together, God is honored in the name of society itself. Now the rites of public worship are in some way determined by God Himself. Hence, as St. Thomas teaches (III, q. 60, a. 5), before the written law "it was determined for them by an interior instinct by what sensible things they should make use for the worship of God"; in the Mosaic law a determinate public worship by which the Jews should worship Him was revealed by God; but in the Christian law certain things were determined by Christ, while in the rest the power of determining worship was given by Him to the Church.

48. These things having been touched upon concerning the nature of worship, anyone sees that the necessity of internal worship is clearly drawn from the arguments already given (n. 19 ff.); for if they prove anything, they show at least the necessity of this worship. Nor is there need here to demonstrate again the necessity of public or social worship; for this is sufficiently established from the arguments proposed above (n. 35 ff.). Surely, if the total dependence of individuals brings it about that they ought to serve God, is not society itself, a certain moral being, ordered by God? If benefits received by any individual whatsoever demand feelings of gratitude toward the benefactor, does not God confer very many benefits upon society, as society? If a society has received some signal benefit, it does not think that it has satisfied its duty unless, through delegates or the foremost men of the people, in the name of society itself, it gives thanks; should not a like account be had of benefits received from God? Hence among all nations some public worship has always flourished and does flourish: there exist priests, rites, sacrifices, and some signs which show public worship common to all; so that even pagan philosophers, who often mocked superstitious ceremonies in their heart, nevertheless confessed that the gods must be worshiped together with the people. It remains, therefore, that we add a few things concerning the necessity of external worship, even private worship.

49. Cardinal Toletus briefly shows this necessity in this way (on II-II, q. 84, a. 7): 1) External worship is necessary by reason of itself. For a) since man consists of soul and body, the whole of which is from God, it is fitting that he worship God by both parts; and just as the soul sins with the body, so by both it ought to worship God; and just as the body also will receive reward in the resurrection, so, etc. - b) We owe so much to God that we cannot in any way repay it. Therefore it is fitting that we serve Him in all possible ways, according to that saying: My bones have rejoiced in God. c) All other virtues have their exterior acts; therefore much more does religion, which is more excellent. d) Since men ought to love one another with fraternal charity, they need exterior worship which is common and known to all. On the contrary, once ceremonies are removed, each one withdraws into his own way. 2) External worship is necessary by reason of internal worship. For a) these exterior things contribute much to spiritual instruction; and therefore Christ gave us sensible sacraments, so that through them we might be instructed concerning the effect of the sacraments in the soul. b) It helps to excite the will to devotion, if someone is nevertheless disposed. c) It helps memory, for we retain things best through some exterior things. - d) It completes the perfection of spiritual things, that is, it causes them to be esteemed much more highly, as experience teaches; but spiritual things become cheapened where these things are not had. - Compare St. Thomas (*Contra Gentiles*, book 3, c. 119).

50. You will say I, with Thomasius: God does not need external worship, both because He is supremely rich and because He looks into the innermost feelings of the soul. Therefore external worship is not to be exhibited. The response is: the objection labors under a false supposition; for it supposes that the necessity of external worship is founded in God's need, whereas the arguments brought forward show something else. St. Thomas had already taught (II-II, q. 81, a. 7): "We exhibit reverence and honor to God, not on account of Himself, because He is full of glory from Himself, and nothing can be added to Him by a creature, but on account of ourselves, because namely through this, that we revere and honor God, our mind is subjected to Him; and in this its perfection consists. For any thing whatever is perfected by this, that it is subjected to its superior, just as the body by this, that it is vivified by the soul, and the air by this, that it is illuminated by the sun. But the human mind needs, in order that it be joined to God, the guidance of sensible things, because 'the invisible things of God are clearly seen, being understood through those things which have been made,' as the Apostle says in Romans 1:20. And therefore in divine worship it is necessary to use some bodily things, so that by them, as by certain signs, the mind of man may be excited to spiritual acts by which it is joined to God. And therefore religion has interior acts as principal, and as pertaining to religion through themselves; but exterior acts as secondary, and ordered to interior acts."

51. You will say II, with Kant, because he rubs up again the old little objection against prayer (in Oischinger, *Encyclopedic Dictionary*, t. 19, p. 473): at least no prayer is needed; for the omniscient God does not need us to set forth our necessities to Him. The response is: St. Thomas had also answered this objection, teaching (II-II, q. 83, a. 2, corpus): "By divine providence it is disposed not only what effects are to come about, but also from what causes and in what order they are to proceed. But among other causes, human acts are also causes of certain things. Hence men must do certain things, not so that by their acts they may change the divine disposition, but so that by their acts they may fulfill certain effects according to the order disposed by God; and it is the same also in natural causes. And the like is also true of prayer; for we do not pray for this reason, that we may change the divine disposition, but that we may obtain that which God has disposed to be fulfilled through prayers, namely, so that men by asking may deserve to receive what almighty God disposed before the ages 28 DISP. I. ON RELIGION IN GENERAL. to give before the ages." And in reply to the first objection he adds: "It is not necessary that we offer prayers to God in order that we may manifest to Him our needs or desires, but so that we ourselves may consider that in these things recourse must be had to divine help."

52. You will say III. It is read in John 4:23: "The hour comes, and now is, when true adorers will adore the Father in spirit and in truth." I respond: 1) indirectly. These words cannot exclude external worship, since Scripture does not contradict Scripture. Now Christ Himself adored the Father with external worship both in the Temple and in the Garden, where, having bent His knees and having fallen upon His face, He prayed; He taught the Apostles to pray, and after the Ascension they went to the temple at the ninth hour of prayer, and "they were persevering unanimously in prayer," etc. 2) Directly, with Toletus: "I answer that Christ there taught the Samaritan woman two things. One is that that adoration was going to cease which took place both in Jerusalem and on that mountain; for she had tacitly asked which adoration was better. The other is that that adoration was to be transformed into a certain spiritual adoration; and it is not repugnant to this that it take place in a place or in a temple, and with our exterior ceremonies. For all this is still spiritual adoration; for our ceremonies are assumed for a twofold reason: first, because they are effects of an abundance of internal devotion; second, to excite internal devotion. But this does not remove the spirituality of adoration. Just as the exterior confession of faith is spiritual, although it is made by the voice, so also is praising God with the mouth, as Christ did: 'I confess to Thee, Father,' etc. In this, therefore, our ceremonies differ from Jewish ceremonies: that the Jewish ceremonies were assumed on account of those very ceremonies, insofar as they were figures of future mysteries; and this is what Christ wished to say to the Samaritan woman." Besides, the impious do not acknowledge the authority of Scripture; and the Reformers themselves would be condemned by its authority, for they use external worship. But discussion of these

matters will return where we treat of the visibility of the Church.

Article 4. Whether it is indifferent to profess any religion whatever

53. The things which we have disputed thus far sufficiently show the necessity of some religion, whether in relation to the individual man or to society; and therefore they sufficiently overthrow the impious system concerning absolute indifference in religious matters. But, as we indicated (n. 16), besides the absolute indifferentists there are others, milder, who are also customarily called relative indifferentists; against these we now begin to fight. Their error consists in this: although they acknowledge the necessity of some worship toward God, "nevertheless they hold that various religions are equally good and useful, and that in any one of them man can be saved." The roots of this error seem chiefly to be: 1) rationalism, which, too greatly extolling the force and rights of each man's private reason, attributes to it a sort of supreme judgment concerning the truth or falsity of religion; but since men differ greatly among themselves, they reduce religion to a kind of system. - 2) Ignorance or obstinate denial of the true foundation of the obligation of professing religion; once this has been removed, they teach that religion must be accommodated to the character of the climate and to the customs of peoples. Therefore one and the same religion cannot be everywhere and always.

54. A twofold relative indifferentism must be distinguished: one universal, the other particular. The first includes all religions which are in the world, and proclaims them equally good and useful for eternal salvation. The other admits that some religion in the world is true and that the others are false; but because any given religion has its own sects, into which it is divided, it judges that there is no essential distinction between the religion and its sects. Thus one who admits the Christian religion as true, by force of indifferentism, judges that each person can be saved in his own sect, or that all Christian sects are useful for obtaining eternal salvation. The refutation of particular indifferentism is sought both from what was said in the treatise On the Virtues (disp. 2, a. 7; and disp. 4, a. 3), and from what must be said when the discussion will be about the Church; therefore we scarcely touch here upon those things which directly attack it.

55. Moreover, the Supreme Pontiff Pius IX often denounced this deadly error. Thus, in the encyclical letter *Qui pluribus* (November 9, 1846), after enumerating various errors, he adds: "To this belongs that horrible system, and one most opposed even to the natural light of reason itself, concerning the indifference of any religion whatever; by this system those crafty deceivers, after removing every distinction between virtue and vice, truth and error, moral rectitude and baseness, invent that men can attain eternal salvation in the worship of any religion whatsoever, just as if there could ever be any sharing of justice with iniquity, or fellowship of light with darkness, and agreement of Christ with Belial." And in the encyclical letter *Singulari quidem* (March 17, 1856), after he reproved absolute indifferentism, he adds: "From that most base form of indifferentism, indeed, there is not very far distant that system concerning the indifference of religions, erupted from darkness, by which men alienated from the truth, adversaries of the true confession, forgetful of their own salvation, teaching things mutually opposed, and never having a settled judgment, admit no distinction among the diverse professions of faith, mix peace indiscriminately with all, and contend that the harbor of eternal life lies open to all from any religion whatever. For it is of no concern to them, although they treat different matters, so long as they conspire to overthrow the one truth." And in the allocution *Maxima quidem* (June 9, 1862): "Since, however," he says, "they dare perversely to derive all truths of religion from the native force of human reason, they then attribute to each man a certain, as it were, primary right, by which he can freely think and speak about religion, and exhibit to God that honor and worship which, according to his own pleasure, he thinks better."

56. Hence we have the following propositions condemned in the *Syllabus*: 15. "It is free for each man to embrace and profess that religion which, led by the light of reason, he shall have thought true." 16. "Men can find the way of eternal salvation in the worship of any religion whatsoever, and can

attain eternal salvation." 18. "Protestantism is nothing other than a diverse form of the same true Christian religion, in which it is given to please God equally as in the Catholic Church."

57. Tolerantism, or religious tolerance, differs little or in no way from relative indifferentism; yet it is twofold: religious tolerance properly so called, or dogmatic tolerance, and political or civil tolerance. The first is "the express or tacit profession of the truth of all religions and all sects, by which, namely, each person holds that all religions or sects are equally true and good, and therefore all are equally salutary for man." The other is "a disposition of laws by which the public exercise of worship is permitted, or even equal protection is promised to the external profession of any religion whatsoever." As anyone sees, dogmatic tolerance is the same thing as relative indifferentism.

58. But the same error is also usually proposed under the name of liberty of conscience, or liberty of worship; and it is useful to explain these formulas briefly. For Tacitus had already observed in his time (*Histories*, book 4, c. 73) that "liberty and specious names are often put forward as a pretext, and no one has ever desired another's servitude and domination for himself without making use of those same words." And so - 1) liberty is wrongly confused with independence; for liberty exists even in creatures which, as we have said, are intrinsically and essentially dependent. Nor can conscience be called independent, since by its nature it is subject to the law which it applies to particular cases. See what we said in the treatise On the Infused Virtues (nn. 1020-1023). - 2) Liberty properly expresses exemption from necessity and from force; hence it comes about that one who is free has it in his power to determine himself to one thing or another, or has the faculty of choosing. If there is some intrinsic principle determining the will to one thing, liberty from necessity ceases, which is liberty properly so called; if the principle determining to one thing is extrinsic and contrary to the inclination of the subject, liberty from coercion ceases. Both of these kinds of liberty are called physical. - 3) If the extrinsic force binding the will to one thing is not physical but moral, such as law is, the will is said to lack moral liberty, or to be obligated to do or omit something, although it is physically free for either option.

59. Here it must be noted that a principle determining the will antecedently to one thing, or obligating it, can determine or obligate it according to the right tendency of the subject; and this is the true perfection of liberty. Or it can determine or obligate it against that tendency; and this is the imperfection of liberty. For the perfection of liberty, like that of any being, consists in the attainment of the object toward which it naturally tends. But liberty is not some faculty distinct in us; rather it is radically the intellect and formally the will itself. Therefore the object toward which it naturally tends, and by which it is fitted to be perfected, is the very same as that toward which intellect and will tend. But the object of the intellect is the true; the object of the will is the good. Therefore liberty of pursuing the true and the good is its perfection; on the contrary, liberty of pursuing the false and evil is its imperfection. Hence God, Christ the Lord, and the blessed in heaven lack the faculty of choosing evil; and from this their liberty is more perfect than ours. In like manner, a law impeding the pursuit of truth, moral rectitude, and so forth, is contrary to true liberty, or to its perfection; but a law directing us to pursue the true and the good is an aid of liberty, promoting its true perfection. But it suffices to have touched upon these things for our matter, since they are usually handed down in metaphysics.

60. Therefore, these things having been set down beforehand, it is asked what they understand by the name of liberty who proclaim liberty of conscience and of worship. (1) "It does not pertain to the account of free choice," says St. Thomas (II Sent., dist. 25, q. 1, a. 1, ad 2), "that it should stand indeterminately toward good or toward evil; because free choice is ordered in itself to the good, since the good is the object of the will, nor does it tend toward evil except on account of some defect... And therefore where free choice is most perfect, there it cannot tend toward evil, because it cannot be imperfect. But this pertains to liberty of choice: that it can do some action or not do it; and this belongs to God. For the good things which He does, He can not do, and yet He cannot do evil." Compare also *De Veritate*, q. 22, a. 6. St.

Augustine had gone before him, who wrote (*Unfinished Work*, book 1, c. 103): "You are going to say, as I see, that God is pressed by necessity so that He cannot sin, who certainly neither can will nor does will to be able to sin. But rather, if it must be called necessity by which something must either be or come about, that is an altogether most blessed necessity by which it is necessary to live happily; and in that same life it is necessary not to die, it is necessary not to be changed for the worse. By this necessity, if even it must be called necessity, the blessed are not pressed down, but enjoy; for us, however, it is future, not present." We recited these things in the treatise On Grace, explaining the true concept of liberty; but they are repeated here not without fruit, for liberals, while they proclaim liberty, seem by no means to grasp its true notion and perfection. Certainly, 1) they are not treating of liberty from necessity; for who denies this liberty, which we most wretchedly behold with our eyes, of professing any religion whatever? - 2) Therefore they assert a certain moral liberty, namely exemption from law; and if indeed it is exemption from every law, even natural and divine, liberty of worship is one and the same error as relative indifferentism or dogmatic tolerance. 3) But if they assert exemption only from human law, whether ecclesiastical or civil, then the error of liberalism is had.

61. Therefore liberals (for followers of this system are called so by an abuse of the word) hold: 1) that there is in any man whatever, with respect to society, both civil and ecclesiastical, a right of professing the religion which he wishes; and therefore that the authority, whether civil or ecclesiastical, which would take away or diminish liberty of worship acts unjustly. - 2) Indeed, they add that liberty of worship, or political tolerance, is good in itself and of itself redounds to the good of society; and therefore it must be conceded absolutely and not only hypothetically, that is, with no account taken of the conditions in which some society is situated. - 3) Yet there are not lacking those who, mitigating this error, teach that although liberty of worship is to be conceded only hypothetically, nevertheless the present condition of the times is such that it is no longer expedient anywhere for the Catholic religion to be held as the sole religion of the State.

62. But what the Church thinks concerning liberalism is clear from the cited encyclical *Quanta cura* (December 8, 1864), where the Supreme Pontiff says: "From this false idea of social governance, they do not fear to foster that erroneous opinion, most destructive to the Catholic Church and to the salvation of souls, called a delirium by Our predecessor Gregory XVI of happy memory, namely that liberty of conscience and of worship is the proper right of every man, which ought to be proclaimed and asserted by law in every rightly constituted society, and that there is in citizens a right to every kind of liberty, to be restrained by no ecclesiastical or civil authority, by which they may be able openly and publicly to manifest and declare whatever concepts they have. But while they rashly affirm this, they do not think and consider that they are proclaiming the liberty of perdition." Hence we have the third proposition in order condemned in the same encyclical, which is as follows: "Liberty of conscience and of worship is the proper right of every man, which ought to be proclaimed and asserted by law in every rightly constituted society, and there is in citizens a right to every kind of liberty, to be restrained by no ecclesiastical or civil authority, by which they may be able openly and publicly to manifest and declare whatever concepts they have, whether by voice, or by print, or in another way." To this also pertain the following propositions condemned in the *Syllabus*, namely 77: "In this our age, it is no longer expedient that the Catholic religion be held as the sole religion of the State, all other forms of worship whatsoever being excluded." 78: "Hence it has laudably been provided by law in certain regions of Catholic name that men immigrating there are permitted to have the public exercise of each one's own worship." 79: "For indeed, it is false that civil liberty of every worship, and likewise the full power attributed to all of manifesting openly and publicly any opinions and thoughts whatever, conduces to more easily corrupting the morals and minds of peoples and to propagating the plague of indifferentism."

63. But truly, if the Church rejects the system of liberalism, she nevertheless acknowledges that some civil society can sometimes be situated in such circumstances that political tolerance not only can but even ought to be admitted; in which case it would be admitted hypothetically, that is, with those circumstances presupposed, but not absolutely. Cardinal Tarquini rightly warns, however (*Institutions of Public Ecclesiastical Law*, 4th ed., p. 67, note): "Nothing in this matter is to be decided without consulting the Supreme Pontiff, both because it concerns a most grave case regarding the state of the Church, about which only the Supreme Pontiff can judge, and because this civil tolerance is in itself prohibited by ecclesiastical laws."

64. But to one asking how liberty of worship, which in itself is illicit, can sometimes be conceded and ought to be conceded, the response is given with Cardinal Tarquini: "For a twofold reason, setting aside positive law, it is illicit: because it is wrong to cooperate with the superstition of heterodox persons; and because it is wrong to expose Catholics to the danger of seduction. From this it follows that, in order to make it morally permissible, those conditions are necessary which are commonly handed down by theologians for making cooperation with another's sin morally permissible, and for licitly exposing oneself to the occasion or danger of sin."

65. St. Thomas explains the matter in this way (II-II, q. 10, a. 11): "Human government is derived from divine government, and ought to imitate it. But God, although He is omnipotent and supremely good, permits some evils to happen in the universe, which He could prohibit, lest, if they were removed, greater goods would be taken away, or even worse evils would follow. Therefore also in human government those who preside rightly tolerate some evils, lest some goods be impeded, or even lest some worse evils be incurred, as Augustine says in book 2 of *On Order*, chapter 4, around the middle: 'Remove prostitutes from human affairs, and you will disturb all things with lusts...' But the rites of other unbelievers, which bring nothing of truth or utility, are not to be tolerated in any way, unless perhaps for avoiding some evil, namely for avoiding scandal or dissension which could arise from this, or an impediment to the salvation of those who, being tolerated in this way, are gradually converted to the faith. For on account of this, too, the Church has sometimes tolerated the rites of heretics and pagans, when there was a great multitude of unbelievers."

66. Becanus summed up the true doctrine integrally (*On the Theological Virtues*, c. 16, q. 4, a. 2), saying: "Concerning this matter it must be established thus: - 1) that liberty of religion is altogether illicit and repugnant to a divine precept; - 2) that it is harmful to the commonwealth; - 3) that it ought not to be commanded, approved, or introduced by any prince or magistrate, but rather, in every way, if it can conveniently be done, impeded and driven out; - 4) but if it cannot conveniently be impeded except with greater damage or some evil to the commonwealth, it can be tolerated for a time; - 5) and if it is tolerated in this way and brought into an agreement, faith must be kept. This is the opinion of Catholics." And he proves the last assertion thus (n. 11): "Faith must be kept in every licit and honorable agreement; but it is licit and honorable to tolerate liberty of religion in order to avoid a greater evil, and a Catholic prince can licitly and honorably make an agreement concerning tolerating it. Therefore, if he makes an agreement, he ought to keep faith."

67. Therefore by these things we have sketched the doctrine of the Church and the errors contrary to it. It remains that we vindicate that doctrine, at least as to its principal heads. For the sake of clarity, we have done this in distinct sections, rejecting - 1) dogmatic tolerance, and then 2) establishing the true doctrine concerning civil tolerance. Hence: Section II. Dogmatic tolerance is rejected. PROP. III. There is one true religion, which all men are bound to embrace and profess; and therefore the system concerning dogmatic tolerance is impious and absurd, by which to each person is attributed the right of thinking and speaking freely about religion, and of exhibiting to God that worship which, according to the variety of regions and peoples, or according to each one's own pleasure, he judges better.

68. Proof I. From the notion of religion handed down above (art. 1), it is clear that three things can be considered in religion, namely: 1) God, to whom worship and service are owed; 2) the rational creature, or man, paying to God the debts of religion; 3) the moral bond joining man to God. But from whatever head the matter is considered, religion is only one. Therefore. Proof of the minor as to the first part. For 1) as reason itself shows, God is not and cannot be anything except one; therefore, as far as He is concerned, the worship owed to Him is only one; and therefore there can be only one true religion. - 2) Worship is owed to God, even in the order of nature, because He is in Himself of supreme excellence, the first principle and ultimate end; but God is such always and everywhere in relation to all men. Therefore no worship except one is always and everywhere owed to Him by all men. 3) God, as Supreme Lord, has the right not only that He be worshiped, but that He be worshiped in the way in which He Himself wills. Therefore if, acting above nature, He Himself reveals this way, He is to be worshiped in that way. But God has revealed only one way in which He is to be worshiped, or one religion (this is clear against heretics, who admit Christian revelation, from those things which are handed down elsewhere concerning the unity of the Church and the unity of faith; against others, from the contradiction among various religions, of which we shall speak shortly). Therefore. Proof of the minor as to the second part. The foundation of religion on man's part must be placed, as we have said, in the very essential and total dependence of his nature upon God. Therefore, where there is one nature in species and the same dependence, there also will be one and the same religion. Wherefore, since nature is one in species in all men, of whatever time and place, all everywhere and always are bound to the same services of gratitude, subjection, and piety toward God. This reason holds even if some religion above nature is supposed; for just as God has the right to be worshiped in the way in which He wills, so man's duty is to satisfy that right. Therefore, if it is proved, as we said a little before, that the revealed religion which God proposes to all is one, all men are bound to embrace and profess that religion. Proof of the minor as to the third part. The bond joining man to God arises from God's right and from those things which are essential to human nature, and corresponds to these. Therefore, if from the side of God and of man religion is one, it will also be one from the side of the bond joining man to God. For a greater understanding both of this part of the minor and of the whole argument, it is useful first to distinguish absolute duties of religion from hypothetical ones. Absolute duties are considered in the order of the rational creature to God, with attention paid only to God's perfection and man's nature. But that order is necessarily expressed by certain truths (theoretical religion), from which certain general duties (practical religion) of man toward God flow of themselves. Truths and duties of this sort, since they are absolutely founded in the very essences of things, are necessarily the same for all men. But hypothetical duties can depend upon a hypothesis which affects all men, as, for example, would be the hypothesis of a public and universal revelation; and these duties also are common to all. Otherwise the absolute duties themselves would fail. Suppose that anyone could, according to his pleasure, embrace or reject revelation, perform or neglect the worship which it dictates: the absolute duty of adhering to the highest Truth, of obeying the supreme Lord, is destroyed; and this certainly pertains to the essential and absolute dependence of the rational creature upon God. Hypothetical duties, once the hypothesis has been verified, pass over into absolute duties. But if the hypothesis is particular, particular duties of religion follow. Thus, for example, someone by a vow which he has made can be bound to render something to God to which other men are not bound. Apply these things to the manner of manifesting internal worship: if some manner has been determined by God for all, all ought to agree in it; but as to other manners, the suitability of means to the end, and fidelity in the expression of truth, suffice, nor is it an obstacle if those manners are materially diverse. 38 DISP. I. ON RELIGION IN GENERAL. has been determined by God, all ought to agree in it; but as to other ways, the suitability of the means to the end and fidelity in the expression of truth are sufficient, nor is it an obstacle if those ways are materially diverse.

69. II. Religion is truth and justice: truth indeed proceeding from God, whether as author of nature or as author of the supernatural order, determining the relations of man to Him; justice,

because it inclines one to render to God what is due to Him. But truth is one, and on the contrary error is manifold; justice also is one, for something cannot at the same time be due and not due to God. Therefore.

70. In truth, the religions which are in the world are contradictorily opposed to one another; but from contradictories, only one can be true. Otherwise it would be true that the true God is only one, as monotheists hold; and it would be true that there are many true gods, as polytheists wish. It would be true that only natural religion is to be admitted, as rationalists teach; and at the same time it would be true that revealed religion is to be admitted. It would be true that Muhammad is the greatest of the Prophets, as the Muslims persuade themselves; and that he is a solemn deceiver, as all Christians and Hebrews hold him to be. Likewise, it would be true that Jesus Christ, or the Messiah foretold by the prophets, has come, as Christians profess; and it would also be true that He has not yet come, as the Hebrews think; that Jesus Christ Himself is true man and true God, as Catholics and almost all Christians believe; and that He is a mere creature, as the Arians once blasphemed, and as their followers, the Socinians, now blaspheme; that Jesus Christ founded one visible Church outside which there is no salvation; and that men can be saved outside the Church, etc. Imagine that religion must be accommodated to the character and customs of different regions. Therefore at Rome, for example, Christ must be believed to be the Son of God and adored; among the Jews, He must be believed to be an impostor and crucified; among the Turks, He must be believed to be the precursor of Muhammad and abjured!

71. You will say I: Judaism and Christianity are two opposed religions, as is said in the argument itself; and nevertheless Christians judge that Judaism in its own time was the true religion, just as now Christianity is true. I respond: Judaism and Christianity are not two diverse and opposed religions as to essence, but are only one and the same, inasmuch as their object is the same, namely Christ. But diversity and opposition exist only as to state and form. For Judaism rightly believed that Christ was going to come; whereas now, on the contrary, Christians rightly believe that He came long ago. Likewise, the moral precepts of the law have been confirmed in the Christian law; but the ceremonial precepts, since they were figures of Christ and of His Church, were rightly used so long as the reality had not yet come. Now, however, they would be badly used, since they would signify that Christ is still going to come. But concerning these things somewhat more fully when the discussion will be about the Institution of the Church.

72. You will say II: Many among the Protestant sects hold that men can attain salvation in any of them, provided they retain faith in Christ. Therefore not all religions are so opposed to one another that man can arrive at eternal life only in one. The response is: 1) Although the Protestant sects may seem to have this mutual tolerance, nevertheless all are equally hostile to the Catholic Church; and this confirms the truth of the latter. For since truth is one and error manifold (because there are many ways by which turning away from the true happens, and many modes by which it is attacked), it necessarily follows that all errors are opposed to truth, and that that revealed religion is true to which all opposed religions are opposed. - 2) Once the truth of the Christian religion has been admitted, it is easily shown that its faith ought to be one, that there is one Church in which all ought to profess it, and therefore one religion. 3) If Protestants truly think that anyone can be saved equally in any of their sects, why are they divided and subdivided day by day? If faith in Christ is enough, why do they exclude and attack the Catholic Church? 4) Finally, if it were considered that the Protestant sects are not mutually opposed, though nevertheless they are opposed to all other religions existing in the world, it would follow only that it is indifferent to belong to any one of them, which we seem able to concede to them without inconvenience; but it would by no means follow that it is indifferent to profess one of them or another religion, namely the Catholic.

73. III. Once the principle concerning the unity of true religion has been established, the foundation of dogmatic tolerance collapses. Nevertheless, it will be useful to attack it more directly. And first, if the matter is with heretics who retain Christian revelation, it is enough here to transcribe what Becanus briefly hands down (loc. cit., n. 3): "Certainly," he says, "in the Gospel there are many things

from which it is established that Christ commanded one faith and prohibited a varied and manifold one. First, He wished there to be only one Church, one fold, one baptism. But these things cannot stand without unity of faith. Second, He wished His disciples to beware of false Prophets; but in a manifold religion it is necessary that some be true Prophets, others false. Therefore, if these latter are to be excluded, one faith is to be retained, and a varied faith rejected. Third, He wished His Church to be perpetual, against which all the powers of hell cannot prevail; but it cannot be perpetual if there is not one faith of all, as He Himself testifies: 'Every kingdom divided against itself will be made desolate' (Luke 11:17). The Apostle confirms this in express words, Romans 16:17: 'But I beseech you, brethren, to mark those who make dissensions and offenses contrary to the doctrine which you have learned, and avoid them.' Galatians 1:8: 'Although we, or an Angel from heaven, should preach to you besides what we have preached to you, let him be anathema.'"

74. IV. But generally against all relative indifferentists we can argue thus: man is bound by the debt of religion toward God, and therefore - 1) to render service and servitude to Him as to his Author; - 2) to tend toward Him as to his ultimate end; - 3) to exhibit honor and reverence to Him as infinitely excellent (nn. 19-24). But once dogmatic tolerance has been admitted, man could not exhibit these duties to God. Therefore. Proof of the minor as to the first part. 1) In order that a servant exhibit due servitude to his lord, he ought to exhibit to him those duties which the lord wills; therefore, in order that man exhibit due servitude and service to God, he ought to worship Him in the way in which God Himself wills. But the indifferentism which we oppose establishes the contrary principle; it teaches that man can profess any religion whatever according to his own pleasure. Therefore. 2) In truth, as we have often already indicated, this belongs to man neither from the nature of the thing nor from God's concession: not from the nature of the thing, for in itself the right of determining the way of exhibiting service belongs to the lord; nor from God's concession, for who will say that mutually opposed religions honor God equally? Do truth and error, virtue and vice, honor God equally? Proof of the minor as to the second part. 1) Those who run by opposed roads cannot all arrive at the same terminus. But, once indifferentism has been admitted, men run by opposed roads, since the various religions existing in the world are opposed to one another. Therefore. 2) Man cannot attain his ultimate end unless he tends rightly toward it, fulfilling all the duties by which he is bound, and especially the duties toward God, which are the principal ones. But, once indifferentism has been admitted, men would not fulfill their duties toward God, for they would not exhibit to Him due service and servitude. Therefore. Proof of the minor as to the third part. 1) He cannot exhibit honor to God who professes those things which are repugnant to the divine attributes; for these things are rather injurious to God. But indifferentists profess those things which are repugnant to the divine attributes, since they profess that God is delighted by falsehood and truth, which is repugnant to God's veracity; they profess that evil and good equally please God, which is repugnant to divine holiness, etc. These things indeed follow if we keep in mind that true religion is both theoretical and practical (nn. 11 ff.), and that various religions are mutually opposed. 2) Surely, what would be the root of indifference? Does the indifferentist think that all religions are true? Then he would be insane, thinking that contradictories are simultaneously true. For he would admit these and similar things: that Christ is mere man and that Christ is God; that the Roman Pontiff is the vicar of Christ and that the same man is Antichrist, etc. Does he judge that one religion is true? Then he would be a hypocrite by approving all the rest equally. Finally, does he judge that none is true, but all are false? Then he would be impious toward God, harmful to society, and a hypocrite if he practiced any religion. See the objections in Perrone (*On True Religion*, part II, prop. 12). Section III. The true doctrine concerning civil tolerance is established. PROP. IV. 1. Unity in the true religion of itself conduces very greatly to the true good of civil society; 2. and the supreme authority has the right and duty of preserving and promoting it; 3. if, however, more serious evils should sometimes be feared from it, plurality of worships can be tolerated in order to avoid them. Therefore civil or political tolerance can be admitted not absolutely, but only hypothetically.

75. Proof of the first part. I. Society, as St. Augustine rightly said, is "a harmonious multitude of men." Therefore the greater the concord of the members among themselves, and of the multitude with authority, the more perfect society itself will be. But from religious unity greater concord is had. Therefore unity of religion of itself conduces to the true good of society.

76. In truth, unless there is an operation by which the members of society pursue some common good with joined powers, there is no social operation, nor can society itself stand. But society is among men; therefore social operation ought to be human. Human operation, however, ought to proceed from the will, and the will does not act except with the light of the intellect going before. Therefore unless there is a joining of wills and intellects, there will be no human social operation, nor will external social operation itself be able to stand safe, at least for a long time. Now intellects are joined only by knowledge of the same truth, just as union among wills consists in love of the same good; but religion teaches the highest truth and the highest good, and those things which lead to it. Therefore unless there is unity in religion, unity of minds, wills, and external operation will be lacking; the proper perfection of society will be lacking. Nor can it be said that the external operation of civil society does not depend upon religious truths. For religion orders to the ultimate end, and therefore to true perfection and happiness (nn. 22, 23); to the ultimate end and to the love of happiness all things are subordinated. Religion is the principal bond by which men are joined, for it is the source and origin of every obligation (nn. 26 ff.); therefore the influence of religion upon social operation is very great.

77. II. It is useful to propose nearly the same argument in a slightly different way, so that its force may be better perceived. Where unity of minds is lacking, or where disagreement of souls is present, there is the seed of disturbance. But where there is plurality of worships, or where unity of religion is lacking, unity of minds is lacking. Therefore where unity of religion is lacking, the seed of disturbance is present. But disturbance is an evil of society, tending toward its dissolution. Therefore.

78. In truth, 1) it is in the very nature of the human mind that, possessing truth, it wishes to propagate it; all the more because truth communicated to others is not lost, but increased. And the more ardent is the love of propagating truth, the greater the importance of that truth is and the more certainly it is possessed. "As to the moral change," says Guizot (*History of Civilization*, lecture 1), "which takes place in man when he acquires an idea... what is the need which takes possession of him? It is the need to make his sentiment pass into the external world," etc. But religious truth is of the greatest importance, as we have already often said; therefore the ardor for propagating it is greatest. But where there are several religions, they are indeed opposed to one another (nn. 75 ff.); if therefore each person wishes to propagate his own and persuade others of it, what disagreement of souls will not arise from this? 2) It is implanted in the human will, tending by its nature toward the good, that when it can do so without loss to itself, it desires to share that good with others. And that desire is more fervent the more highly the good which is possessed is valued. Indeed, it is man's duty toward others that he should wish for them the good which he wishes for himself, and, insofar as he can, procure it also for others. But the good to which religion orders is the highest good, on which eternal happiness depends; therefore the tendency of the human will to procure it for others also is greatest. (1) Hence Proudhon himself (*Confessions of a Revolutionary*) said: "It is surprising that at the foundation of every politics we always find theology." And Donoso Cortes (*Essay on Catholicism*, book 1, ch. 1) adds: "What is surprising is the astonishment expressed by these words. Is not theology the science of God, the ocean which contains and embraces all the sciences, as God is the ocean which embraces all things?" But where plurality of religions is present, each person opens to others the road which he himself follows for arriving at the highest good; but those roads are opposed to one another. Therefore. "Let there be as an example," says Becanus (*On the Theological Virtues*, c. 15, q. 6, n. 7), "the discord between Isaac and Ishmael in the family of Abraham; between Jacob and Laban in Mesopotamia; between Moses and his wife Zipporah, while they were setting out for Egypt. How, then, can peace and concord be hoped for in a whole

kingdom, province, or city, where there is the greatest discord of religion and faith? Julian the Apostate once saw this, who, when he wished to disturb and overthrow the Church of Christians, introduced liberty and variety of doctrines. Ammianus reports this, and from him Lipsius, in the book against the Dialogist concerning one religion." 3) Each person tends toward this: that he may free himself and the society of which he is a member from evils, even material evils, and may preserve his right, even as to material goods, safe and sound. But the most efficacious means of all for obtaining this is religion, upon which every moral obligation depends, and which alone firmly teaches the sanction which alone avails to keep men in duty (n. 36). Therefore each person ought to take care that religion remain intact. But which religion? If each person is permitted to profess the religion which he himself wishes, what security can we take from this? The followers of Muhammad, for example, think that they act holily and meritoriously if they betray Christians, despoil them of goods, and slaughter them! 4) Nor can these evils be avoided by saying that the civil authority can urge the principles of natural religion and punish those things which disturb public peace. For a) absolute civil tolerance is already restricted to revealed religion alone; and therefore atheism, pantheism, materialism, etc., would have to be proscribed. For what security is there if the existence of a spiritual nature, and hence of freedom, immortality, etc., is denied? b) The principal reasons by which they strive to establish this absolute tolerance are that the debt of religion is owed only to God, to whom alone an account must be rendered; that civil authority cannot impose on others a truth which it does not possess infallibly, etc. But if reasons of this sort prove anything, they are equally valid for natural religion. c) In order that there be security in the exercise of justice, fidelity, and so forth, it is not enough that only the supreme principles of natural religion be retained; but it is required that the consequences more closely regarding practice be equally admitted; and this, as we shall show below, is morally impossible without revelation. d) Since the absolute tolerantists defend their system in the name of liberty, does it not seem to contradict liberty more that men should be driven to put forth an external operation which conflicts with their principles, than to help them profess true principles? "For what is liberty?" says Tully (*Paradox* V). "The power of living as you will. Who, therefore, lives as he wills except he who follows right things, who rejoices in duty, for whom the path of living has been considered and foreseen; who obeys laws not because of fear, but follows and cherishes them because he judges this to be especially salutary; who says nothing, does nothing, finally thinks nothing, except willingly and freely; whose every plan and all the affairs which he manages proceed from himself and are borne back to the same; nor is there anything which has more power with him than his own will and judgment; to whom indeed even fortune herself, which is said to have the greatest force, yields, just as the wise poet said: 'For each, it is fashioned by his own character.' Therefore this falls to the wise man alone, that he do nothing unwillingly, nothing with grief, nothing under compulsion. Although this matter would need to be discussed in many words, nevertheless this is both brief and must be confessed: no one is free unless he is so disposed. Therefore all the wicked are slaves." 5) Hence even politicians, although from false principles, have confessed that unity of religion conduces to the true good of society. Thus, for example, Machiavelli (*The Mind of a Man of State*, book 1, c. 12, Section 4) says: "Those princes and republics which wish to maintain themselves uncorrupted must, above every other thing, maintain uncorrupted the ceremonies of religion and always hold them in veneration. For no greater sign can be had of the ruin of a province than to see divine worship despised." So also Rogier (*Journal des Debats*, April 17, 1844): "In good politics," he says, "is it not preferable to reunite into one body the diverse members of a country rather than perpetuate their division? A political body becomes a nation only insofar as it has a national soul." Compare Bergier (*Theological Dictionary*, s.v. Tolerance), where he reports testimonies of philosophers of all nations.

79. Proof of the second part. I. Society itself has the right and duty of professing and promoting the true religion (nn. 37 ff.). But true religion is one (nn. 74 ff.). Therefore it has the right and duty of professing and promoting the one religion. Now right is a moral power, and therefore according to right reason; therefore there cannot be given a right to profess false religions. Likewise, there cannot be given

a duty of pursuing evil; but all religions except the one true religion are evil.

80. II. The supreme authority is bound to promote the true good of society; but unity in the true religion contributes especially to the good of society. Therefore it is bound to promote and preserve this unity.

81. III. Civil authority is bound to protect the rights of subjects, and especially to defend the weak against unjust attacks by the stronger. But it would not do this if, in a society already possessing unity in the true religion, it permitted and protected plurality of worships. Therefore. - In truth, 1) what public vice does in the practical order, error does in the speculative order, which finally descends also to practice. But public vice is a scandal inducing the ruin of others, etc. 2) Just as abuse of force can have a place in the material order, so also in the moral order. Wherefore those who excel by greater talent, learning, and eloquence can easily harm the ignorant or the less educated by abusing these gifts. Therefore, just as society ought to protect the weaker against the more powerful who abuse their force in the material order, so also in the moral order. But it does not do this if, where unity in the true religion flourishes, it is permitted that each person be able to propagate false worships. Therefore it is plain how deservedly the Supreme Pontiff called this absolute tolerance the liberty of perdition.

82. IV. Against Catholic liberals the authorities of the Fathers can be added; since the Supreme Pontiff Pius IX, in the cited encyclical *Quanta cura*, says: "Contrary to the doctrine of the sacred Scriptures, of the Church, and of the holy Fathers, they do not hesitate to assert" that the best condition of society is that "in which the government does not acknowledge the duty of restraining, by established penalties, violators of the Catholic religion, except insofar as public peace demands." In truth, St. Augustine (*Epistle* 185, otherwise 50) writes: "When kings were not yet serving the Lord, but were still meditating vain things against the Lord and against His Christ, then impieties certainly could not be prohibited by laws, but were rather practiced... But after that began to be fulfilled which is written, 'And all the kings of the earth shall adore Him, all nations shall serve Him,' what man of sober mind would say to kings: Do not care in your kingdom by whom the Church of your Lord is attacked; let it not pertain to you in your kingdom who wishes to be religious or sacrilegious? To whom it cannot be said: Let it not pertain to you in your kingdom who wishes to be chaste or unchaste. Or is it a lighter matter for the soul not to keep faith with God than for a woman not to keep faith with her husband?" St. Gregory the Great (book 2, ep. 11) says: "For this purpose power over all men has been given from heaven to the piety of our lords, that those who desire good things may be aided, that the way of the heavens may lie more widely open, that the earthly kingdom may serve the heavenly kingdom." St. Leo the Great, writing to Turibius, says: "That severity has profited ecclesiastical gentleness, which, although content with priestly judgment, shrinks from bloody punishments, yet is aided by the severe constitutions of Christian princes, while those who fear bodily punishment sometimes have recourse to a spiritual remedy."

83. The thesis as to the third part does not need to be proved, both because it is attacked by no one, and because it is clear from what has been said (nn. 72 ff.). - Compare what Taparelli solidly and eloquently discusses concerning this whole question (*Natural Right*, vol. 1, disp. 4, c. 4, a. 2). Section IV. Difficulties are answered.

84. You will say I: Civil authority has no right of preserving or promoting unity in the true religion; therefore political tolerance must be admitted absolutely. Proof of the antecedent. Religion is a voluntary and free dependence upon God (n. 9); but such dependence necessarily supposes the adherence of the intellect to truth (n. 12). Therefore one who cannot preserve and promote unity in truth also has no right of preserving and promoting the unity of true religion. But civil authority certainly cannot do this, since it is not infallible, and the right of commanding others to give adherence of intellect cannot be understood without infallibility. Therefore. It is answered: 1) There are certain truths pertaining to religion which are evident by the natural light, and which according to nature itself are absolutely necessary for preserving order

in civil society: such, for example, is the Providence of God, which repays reward to the good and punishment to the wicked; the immortality of the soul, the existence of liberty, etc. According to the order of nature, society has the right and the duty of prohibiting anything from being put forward against those truths, since it has the right and duty both of preserving itself and of providing for the good of its members. 2) But that unity in the true religion, especially positive or supernatural religion, and therefore the perfection of society, cannot be obtained without infallible authority can be regarded as an indication that God did not create man for the natural order alone, but directed the natural order to the supernatural. For as St. Thomas says (II-II, q. 2, a. 3), "the perfection of the rational creature consists not only in that which belongs to it according to nature, but also in that which is attributed to it from a certain supernatural participation in the divine goodness." Wherefore, if God had left man without revelation and infallible authority, and had not provided in another way for the unity of which we speak, in that hypothesis such unity would have been impossible; but no one is bound to the impossible. Yet from this it does not follow that, once revelation and infallible authority have been given by God's goodness, and therefore once the possibility of obtaining unity in religion has been given, it still remains at one's discretion either to tend toward the perfection of society by promoting unity of religion, or to neglect it. In this case there would be no excuse on the side of inability. 3) If divine revelation and infallible authority exist, as we proved in the treatise *On the Virtues* (disp. 4, arts. 7 and 8), that authority is obligatory. But not only individual men, but society itself must profess the true religion (nn. 37-57). Therefore civil society itself must both embrace the religion revealed by God and be subject to infallible authority in those things which pertain to religion. Once, however, revealed religion has been accepted and infallible authority acknowledged, civil power would promote unity in religion not by prescribing, by its own authority, what must be believed, but by urging the obligation introduced by infallible authority. 4) Now below we shall prove that revelation has been made; that the Christian revelation is true; and that in the true Christian revelation there is infallible authority. Therefore now unity of the true religion both can and must be promoted through the mediation of this authority. Let us suppose, then, that the members, morally at least all of them, of some civil society are also members of the Catholic Church, and thus that the society itself pertains to the Catholic religion. From the proofs given in the thesis, the supreme authority of this society is bound to preserve Catholic unity. Taparelli explains all these things very beautifully (loc. cit., nn. 876-891).

85. You will say II: Civil society is altogether different from religious society, that is, from the Church, and has temporal happiness as its end; whereas the end of religious society is eternal happiness. But rights and duties are taken from the end, and those two societies ought not to be confused. Therefore civil society can do nothing in those matters which pertain to religion; and hence it has neither the right nor the duty of promoting unity. I answer by distinguishing: that the civil society of Catholics is distinct from religious society, or from the Church, I concede; that it is separated from it, I deny. Likewise, that the end of civil society is temporal happiness proximately and directly, I concede; ultimately and indirectly, I deny (n. 39). Compare also Cardinal Tarquini (*Public Ecclesiastical Law*, p. 47, 6th ed.). Since, in the hypothesis with which we are dealing, the members of civil and ecclesiastical society are the same, these two societies cannot be separated, but they are distinct, just as in man soul and body are distinct parts of him, yet not separated. Hence, just as the body must serve the soul, to which it is subject, and its operations, so civil society must assist religious society in its own way. The theologians everywhere have used this comparison: St. Thomas (II-II, q. 60, a. 6, ad 3); Suarez (*On Laws*, book 4, c. 9); Bellarmine, who (*On the Roman Pontiff*, book 5, c. 6), after citing the authorities of the Fathers, writes thus: "For as spirit and flesh stand in man, so those two powers stand in the Church. For flesh and spirit are, as it were, two commonwealths, which can be found both separated and joined. The flesh has sense and appetite, to which corresponding acts and proportionate objects answer, and the immediate end of all these is the health and good constitution of the body. The spirit has intellect and will, and proportionate acts and objects, and as its end the health and perfection of the soul. Flesh without spirit is found in brute animals; spirit without flesh is found in angels.

"From this it is plain that neither is precisely for the sake of the other. Flesh joined to spirit is also found in man; there, because they make one person, they necessarily have subordination and connection. For the flesh is subject, the spirit presides; and although the spirit does not mix itself into the actions of the flesh, but allows it to exercise all its actions as it exercises them in brute animals, nevertheless, when those actions hinder the end of the spirit itself, the spirit commands the flesh and chastises it, and, if there is need, imposes fasts and other afflictions, even with some harm and weakening of the body itself; and it compels the tongue not to speak, the eyes not to see, etc. In like manner, if some operation of the flesh, and even death itself, is necessary for obtaining the end of the spirit, the spirit can command the flesh to expose itself and its own things, as we see in the martyrs. "So entirely the political power has its own princes, laws, judgments, etc., and likewise the ecclesiastical power has its own bishops, canons, judgments. The former has temporal peace as its end; the latter, eternal salvation. They are sometimes found separated, as formerly in the time of the Apostles; sometimes joined, as now. But when they are joined, they make one body, and therefore they must be connected, and the inferior must be subject and subordinated to the superior. And so the spiritual power does not mix itself into temporal affairs, but allows all things to proceed as before they were joined, provided that they do not hinder the spiritual end or are not necessary for attaining it. But if any such thing happens, the spiritual power can and must coerce the temporal by every reason and way which shall seem necessary for that purpose."

86. You will say III: If civil society, possessing the true religion, has the right and duty of preserving and promoting unity of religion insofar as this promotes external peace and national unity, then a heterodox society also would have the same right and duty with respect to a false religion. But we reject this in a heterodox commonwealth; therefore we seem to use, as they say, a double measure. It is answered: 1) This objection falsely supposes that the same right belongs to truth and to error, whereas, on the contrary, no right can be attributed to error. For right is moral power, and therefore according to reason; and error is contrary to reason. 2) It is also falsely supposed that the only, or at least the principal, reason for promoting unity in the true religion is the external peace and tranquillity of civil society; whereas the principal reason is the obligation, with respect to individuals and societies, of professing the one true religion (n. 37), and consequently of hindering, "according as it shall have been possible," whatever stands opposed to it. When it is a question of false religion, that saying must rather be repeated: "I came not to send peace, but a sword"; for national dissension is a lesser evil than perseverance in error concerning religion, on which eternal salvation depends. 3) In this objection, as Tarquini rightly notes (op. cit., p. 68), "it is supposed that the same rights belong to error as to truth, at least under this title, that it does not think itself to be such; which is just as false as if someone were to say that the same rights belong to the insane, at least under this title, that they do not think themselves such, as belong to those of sound mind. But in this matter a threefold respect must be distinguished: the first in relation to the conscience of the Church, the second in relation to the conscience of heterodox persons, the third in relation to the thing itself, as it ought to be judged by some outsider. "As regards the Church, she is certain, not so much by her own opinion as by divine testimonies, that truth is in herself alone, and error in the other pseudo-religions, and that this pertains to an article of faith, against which she can do nothing. Hence for her there is no double measure, but the eternal law remains firm, which gives dominion to truth over error, and denies that there can be any participation of justice with iniquity, or any fellowship of light with darkness (2 Cor. 6:14). "As regards the heterodox, insofar as they remain in good faith, they will be in the same legal condition as the insane, to whom nothing is imputed from those things which they do in insanity. "Finally, as regards the thing itself, it has such marks that, at least in the external forum, no fair-minded person ought not to acknowledge the rights of the Church. For whatever may be the case concerning the internal good faith of heterodox persons, certainly this can be proved externally to no fair-minded person. For either they seriously, and with a right will, attend to the motives of credibility of the Catholic Church and to the marks of falsity of their own sect, or they do not attend, or they are unwilling to attend seriously and with a right will. If they in no way attend, or do not

attend duly, since their ignorance is either gross or even affected, it cannot coexist with good faith. But if they do attend duly, much less will it be possible to admit that they persist in their error with good faith... Whatever, therefore, may be the internal state of each heterodox person, concerning which God will judge, externally surely no fair-minded person will be able to judge that they are in good faith; whence every appearance of the accusation objected vanishes, that the Church uses a double measure. Yet not even in the hypothesis of their good faith would she use such a measure, since the true relation between herself and them, as has been said, would be the same as that which exists between the sane and the insane who think themselves sane."

87. You will say IV: If liberty of worships is granted, and the faculty of propagating diverse religious doctrines, no evil, and no slight advantage, will come from it. For truth has a stronger force than error, and virtue attracts more than vice; and truth and virtue, being disputed from every side and shining with a clearer light, will dissipate the darkness of errors and vices. It is answered: 1) Truth and virtue objectively and in themselves have greater force than error and vice; but not likewise subjectively, and as regards us. This is manifest to those who have faith from the things which faith teaches concerning the effects of original sin; to others it is clear at least from experience. For "the bewitching of vanity" (Wis. 4:12) "obscures good things, and the inconstancy of concupiscence perverts the understanding"; to which corresponds that saying: "I see the better things and approve them, but I follow the worse." Hence also St. Bernard (*On Consideration*, book 5, c. 1) says: "Where we are is the valley of tears, in which sensuality reigns and consideration is in exile; in which indeed the bodily sense freely and with power puts itself forth, but the spiritual eye, entangled, grows dark." 2) A kind of common sense confirms this truth. For if the proposed reason proved anything, it would equally show that liberty must be granted for every disgraceful crime. Yet in every rightly constituted society, the law takes notice of certain public offenses. Hence what we reported above from St. Augustine (n. 40) must be repeated here: "In vain do you say: I should be left to free choice (as regards religious matters). For why do you not proclaim that, in murders and in acts of debauchery and in any other crimes and disgraceful acts, men must be left to free choice? Yet that all these things be repressed by just laws is most useful and most salutary." 3) If any force were present in the argument to which we are responding, ought it not to be transferred to domestic society itself? Virtue and truth have a stronger force than vice and error; therefore parents, with no prudent care applied, will allow sons and daughters to read any books at all, even against faith and morals; to avoid no one's conversation and company; to go to any place whatever, etc. But not even those whom we are opposing conduct themselves in this way.

88. You will say V: God Himself leaves us liberty of professing the religion which we wish. How, then, will human authority compel us to retain one religion determinately? I answer by distinguishing: God leaves us physical liberty, concerning which there is no question, I concede; moral liberty, concerning which alone the matter is being discussed, I deny (nn. 65-67). Certainly, as is plain from what has been disputed above, God established a law by which we are bound to profess the true religion; and authority constituted by God, as it is said (Rom. 13:4), "is God's minister... an avenger unto wrath to him who does evil." Hence St. Leo the Great (*Epistle* 75), writing to the Emperor Leo, says: "You ought constantly to attend to the fact that royal power has been entrusted to you not only for the government of the world, but especially for the protection of the Church."

89. You will say VI: If political tolerance is denied, the peace and tranquillity of civil society is disturbed; therefore it must be granted. I answer by distinguishing the antecedent: of itself, I deny, as is plain from the demonstration of the thesis; accidentally, I subdistinguish: and then political tolerance would have to be granted hypothetically as a lesser evil, let it pass; absolutely, as good in itself, I deny. "The Author *On the Government of Princes* (book 1, c. 15)," says Tarquini (op. cit., p. 66), "removes every fear, where, in declaring this duty of princes, he adds that natural condition: 'according as it shall have

been possible.' Wherefore account must be taken of the circumstances of the commonwealth; if these are of such a kind that they prevent that thing from being furnished, that tolerance must be employed which is not rarely employed also in permitting other evil deeds, yet in such a way that the prince conduct himself negatively and passively; but he positively approves nothing that is contrary to the good of the Church."

90. You will say VII: Political intolerance in the matter of religion seems rather to alienate the minds of men from the true religion; for it is apprehended as a base domination, which is established by terror rather than by doctrine. It is answered with St. Augustine (*Epistle* 92, otherwise 48, to Vincentius): "But these things do not benefit some, you say. Is medicine therefore to be neglected because the disease of some is incurable? You attend only to those who are so hardened that they do not receive even this discipline. For concerning such persons it is written: 'In vain have I struck your children; they have not received discipline.' Yet I think that they were struck out of love, not hatred. But you ought also to attend to the very many concerning whose salvation we rejoice. For if they were terrified and not taught, it would seem like a base domination. Again, if they were taught and not terrified, hardened by the age of custom, they would be moved more sluggishly to take up the way of salvation; since many, whom we know well, when a reason had been given to them and the truth had been manifested by divine testimonies, answered that they desired to pass into the communion of the Catholic Church, but that they feared the enmities of wicked men... But when saving doctrine was joined to useful terror... we rejoice, as I said, concerning the salvation of many who bless God with us, because, when He fulfilled His promise by which He promised that the kings of the earth would serve Christ, He thus healed the weak." And below: "And yet you fear lest, when you are compelled to unity by imperial laws, the name of God be blasphemed longer by Jews and pagans; as if the Jews did not know how the first people Israel wished even by war to destroy those two and a half tribes which had received lands beyond the Jordan, when they thought that those tribes were separating themselves from the unity of their people. But pagans rather cannot blaspheme on account of the laws which Christian emperors have passed against worshippers of idols; and yet from them many have been corrected and converted to the living and true God, and are converted daily." - Compare the excellent things which Liberatore writes concerning this controversy (*The Church and the State*, ch. 1, arts. 4-7).

Article 5. Whether divine revelation is possible

91. From the things disputed thus far it is most clearly evident both that religion is necessary for man as an individual and for society, and that there is one true religion. But what is that true religion, since there exist in the world many religions disagreeing among themselves? In order that we may be able to answer this question, we must inquire into certain things concerning revealed religion; for since the principal division of religion is into revealed and natural religion, it must first be made known whether the one true religion is revealed, or whether we can be content with natural religion alone. Therefore let us begin from the possibility of revealed religion.

92. It would scarcely seem worthwhile to bring the possibility of revelation into question, since the fact itself of revelation is manifested by such evident signs, as will be clear below, that it is impossible for those considering them to deny its existence. Nevertheless, so many sophisms are heaped up by the impiety of the present day against the very possibility of revelation that we cannot in the least neglect this question.

93. First of all, it is useful to establish briefly the true idea of revelation. The documents of the Church on this matter are chiefly the following. The Vatican Council (*Dei Filius*, ch. 2) says: "The same holy Mother Church holds and teaches that God, the beginning and end of all things, can be known with certainty by the natural light of human reason from created things: for His invisible things, from the creation of the world, being understood by the things that are made, are clearly seen. Nevertheless, it pleased His wisdom and goodness to reveal Himself and the eternal decrees of His will to the human race by

another way, and that a supernatural one, as the Apostle says: 'God, who at sundry times and in diverse manners formerly spoke to the fathers in the prophets, last of all, in these days, has spoken to us in the Son.'" And (ch. 4): "This also the perpetual consensus of the Catholic Church has held and holds: that there is a twofold order of knowledge, distinct not only in principle but also in object; in principle indeed, because in the one we know by natural reason, in the other by divine faith; but in object, because besides those things to which natural reason can attain, mysteries hidden in God are proposed to us for belief, which, unless divinely revealed, cannot become known. Wherefore the Apostle, who testifies that God was known by the gentiles through those things which were made, nevertheless, when discussing the grace and truth which was made through Jesus Christ, pronounces: 'We speak the wisdom of God in a mystery, which is hidden, which God predestined before the ages unto our glory, which none of the princes of this age knew; but God has revealed it to us by His Spirit; for the Spirit searches all things, even the deep things of God.' And the Only-begotten Himself confesses to the Father that He has hidden these things from the wise and prudent and has revealed them to little ones... For divine mysteries by their own nature so exceed the created intellect that, even when revelation has been handed down and accepted by faith, nevertheless they remain covered by the veil of faith itself and wrapped, as it were, in a certain darkness, as long as in this mortal life we are pilgrims away from the Lord; for we walk by faith and not by sight." And (can. 2 on ch. 2): "If anyone shall say that it cannot happen, or is not expedient, that through divine revelation man be instructed about God and the worship to be offered to Him, let him be anathema." - And (can. 1 on ch. 4): "If anyone shall say that in divine revelation no true and properly so-called mysteries are contained... let him be anathema."

94. In order that these things may be understood, it should be observed that revelation, which according to the force of the word signifies the removal of a veil, properly imports "the manifestation of a hidden thing"; here, however, it is taken for "the manifestation of truth, whether that truth can or cannot be known from elsewhere." Hence revelation can be human or divine, according as man or God is the one who manifests the truth. Here the question is about divine revelation.

95. But divine revelation, considered with respect to the principle and the means by which truth is manifested, is usually distinguished into natural and supernatural. Natural revelation consists in this: that God manifests Himself to us while, through the exercise of the intellectual powers which are in nature, we rise from created things to the knowledge of God and of other truths which can be drawn from them by the natural light. And this is the knowledge concerning which the Church teaches: "God, the beginning and end of all things, can be known with certainty by the natural light of human reason from created things; for His invisible things, from the creation of the world, being understood by the things that are made, are clearly seen." But supernatural revelation is that by which God Himself directly discloses truths to men; namely, it consists in the manifestation of truths made by God to one or more persons, not through the natural development of intelligence, but through the formal speech of God Himself. And this is that knowledge concerning which the Church teaches that it pleased divine "wisdom and goodness to reveal Himself and the eternal decrees of His will to the human race by another way, and that a supernatural one, as the Apostle says: 'God, who at sundry times and in diverse manners formerly spoke to the fathers in the prophets; last of all, in these days, has spoken to us in the Son.'"

96. This supernatural divine revelation, which is revelation properly so called, insofar as it is considered on the part of God Himself revealing, we are accustomed to distinguish into immediate and mediate. That is, God is accustomed to address certain persons immediately, and thus to communicate truths to them immediately; then He uses these persons as His legates, who communicate the revealed truths to other men. To these latter, therefore, the revelation of God comes mediately.

97. Although it is not ours to determine the mode by which God speaks to men, nevertheless we can know various possible modes, according to which immediate revelation is distinguished into internal and external, or into sensitive, imaginative, and intellectual. For as St. Thomas teaches (II-II, q.

173, a. 2), "certain sensible forms are represented divinely to the mind of the prophet sometimes by means of the external sense, as Daniel saw the writing on the wall, as is read in Daniel 5; but sometimes through imaginary forms, either impressed wholly by God and not received through the sense, for example, if likenesses of colors were impressed in the imagination of someone born blind, or also divinely ordered from those things which have been received from the senses, as Jeremiah 'saw a boiling pot from the face of the north,' as is found in Jeremiah 1; or also by impressing intelligible species upon the mind itself, as is clear concerning those who receive infused knowledge or wisdom, such as Solomon and the Apostles." And (*Contra Gentiles*, book 3, c. 154), explaining these same things, he says: "Revelation takes place by a certain interior and intelligible light elevating the mind to perceive those things to which the intellect cannot reach by the natural light. For just as by the natural light the intellect is made certain concerning those things which it knows by that light, as concerning first principles, so concerning those things which it apprehends by supernatural light it has certainty. But this certainty is necessary in order that those things which are perceived by divine revelation may be proposed to others; for we shall not put forward to others with security matters concerning which we would not have certainty. But with the aforesaid light inwardly illuminating the mind, there are sometimes present in divine revelation certain external or internal aids of knowledge, such as some speech heard externally and sensibly, which is formed by divine power, or perceived through the imagination inwardly by God's action; or also something seen bodily and externally, formed by God, or also described inwardly in the imagination. From these a man receives knowledge of divine things through the interior light impressed upon the mind. Hence aids of this sort without the interior light do not suffice for the knowledge of divine things, but the interior light suffices without them."

98. Moreover, revelation of this sort, whether internal or external, as we have heard from the Vatican Council, is truly supernatural. For that is called supernatural which is not owed to nature (*On God the Creator*, n. 664 ff.); but that which exceeds the demand of nature is certainly not owed to nature. Now to human, that is, rational nature, it is indeed owed that it be able to arrive at truth; but for this nature has supplied means, namely the development and exercise of the intellectual powers, so that by inquiring and reasoning from creatures we rise to knowledge of the Creator. Therefore, that this knowledge is had through the immediate communication of God must be ascribed to grace. And so divine and supernatural revelation, with which alone we are concerned, can be described subjectively as "the manifestation of some truth made by God to man through internal or external speech, mediately or immediately"; but considered objectively, it is "the truth itself, or the complex of truths, manifested by a way not owed to the light of natural reason, or through the formal speech of God." These notions must be completed by the things which we gave in the treatise *On the Infused Virtues* (n. 326 ff.), where especially the concept of formal speech is explained.

99. These things, then, concern the genuine character of revelation. Now a few things must be set forth concerning its object. In general, this is of a twofold order, as the Vatican Council teaches. For by revelation there can be manifested both "those things to which natural reason can attain," and there can also be proposed "mysteries hidden in God, which, unless divinely revealed, cannot become known." Since there is a special difficulty concerning mysteries, it will help to explain their nature somewhat more carefully.

100. Mystery in general imports a hidden thing or truth. But things or truths can be hidden from us in many ways. For 1) some are hidden absolutely, others hidden in a certain respect. Those are called hidden absolutely which we can in no way attain by natural means; those are hidden in a certain respect which, although they cannot be known with certainty, are nevertheless known conjecturally by natural means, such as, for example, certain future free acts; or which cannot be known because of a defect of proposal, yet in such a way that there is some natural way of proposing them, such as, for example, the secrets of hearts, which nevertheless can be manifested to others by an external word. 2) Things or truths can

be hidden per se or accidentally. Those are hidden per se for whose knowing powers are altogether lacking in nature; those are called accidentally hidden for whose knowing natural powers are by no means lacking, but which cannot be known because of a difficulty hindering the exercise of those powers, such as, for example, the number of the stars. 3) Things can be hidden with respect to existence, whether they are, or with respect to essence, what they are. Those truths are called hidden only with respect to existence which we cannot discover without revelation, but which, once revelation is supposed, we are able to understand, such as, for example, certain positive institutions, as the authority of the Roman Pontiff. But those are hidden with respect to essence whose intrinsic reason, why and how they are, we do not understand even after revelation. Therefore mysteries properly so called, which the Vatican Council teaches to be contained in divine revelation, are "truths absolutely and per se hidden both with respect to existence and with respect to essence"; namely, truths which "by their own nature so exceed the created intellect that, even when revelation has been handed down and accepted by faith, nevertheless they remain covered by the veil of faith itself and wrapped, as it were, in a certain darkness."

101. From these things it is easy to understand what truth and what falsity lies hidden in that saying, as though in an axiom: "mysteries are incomprehensible." Certainly, 1) they cannot be called incomprehensible insofar as the words by which they are enunciated have no meaning, and therefore arouse no perception in the mind. For they are enunciated in words employed by the common usage of men, so that by concepts, indeed not proper but analogical, we understand what is revealed and therefore what is proposed for belief. Thus, for example, when this proposition is enunciated: in God there is one nature, and there are three persons; certainly we understand the terms and the connection of agreement between subject and predicate, and therefore in some way we understand what is to be believed. 2) Hence it is that, once revelation is supposed, we plainly understand the existence of the mystery of one nature and three persons in God. 3) What, then, is it that is not comprehended in a mystery, even after revelation of its existence? It is its innermost nature, or the intrinsic reason by which the predicate belongs to the object, or differs from it. In the aforesaid mystery of the Trinity, for example, we do not know why and how the three persons are one God. The agreement of the predicate with the subject is established in the case from authority, but its intrinsic reason is not seen through. It is true that knowledge of this sort is imperfect; but "it is, with incomparable happiness, more excellent," as St. Augustine teaches (*On Genesis according to the Letter*, book 5, n. 34), "to think piously of God from however small a particle, than to comprehend all those [created] things." And St. Thomas (*Contra Gentiles*, book 1, c. 5): "Concerning the noblest things, however imperfect a knowledge may be, it confers the greatest perfection upon the soul; and therefore, although human reason cannot fully grasp those things which are above reason, nevertheless much perfection is acquired for it if it at least holds them in some way by faith."

102. The things which we have set forth thus far sufficiently disclose what revelation is according to the mind of the Church, and what she properly teaches when she defines that "revelation even of mysteries is possible." Yet opposed to this doctrine is an error widely spread through the world in these times, which is usually called by the general term naturalism. Naturalists are so named because they too highly extol the powers of nature, or of human reason. For them human reason is fully sufficient for knowing all truths pertaining to religion; it is the sole source of these truths and the supreme norm of religion; no religion is approved except natural religion. Hence they reject every revelation, either because they judge it by no means necessary for the human race, but superfluous, or even because they proclaim it impossible. Some are accustomed to distinguish naturalism and rationalism, not because they differ essentially from one another, but because rationalism puts on a certain milder form, although it is no less injurious to Christianity. Naturalists, they say, admit only this: that God produced the universe of things and granted to men intellectual faculties through which He sufficiently provided for them, so that, using the powers of reason, from consideration of the universe they might acknowledge Him, acquire by their own labor the necessary religious cognitions, and perfect them more and more. But they deny every special

direction of God in the business of religion. Rationalists, however, admit some special providential care directing both peoples and individual men in the business of religion. For, they say, God impels them to seek truth through the powers of their own reason; and by the arrangement of His providence He both offers to individuals occasions of instructing themselves and raises up men endowed with sharper genius, who teach others also the truths which they themselves have known better. "Universal revelation," says Wegscheider (*Institutions of Christian Dogmatic Theology*, proleg., c. 1), "is that which is effected by the natural faculties of the mind and by the other aids of the whole nature of things, by which man is led to conceiving and cultivating knowledge of divine things. But particular revelation, and at the same time mediate, is that which is contained in the complex of things happening according to nature, by which, with God as author, certain men have been stirred up to know the true principles of religion, and, accommodated to the desires of peoples, to hand them on to others with remarkable success."

103. Although some seeds of rationalism are already found in the middle ages among certain teachers, nevertheless, properly, insofar as it is a religious system, this doctrine draws its origin from the errors of the Protestants. This indeed could be shown historically and philosophically; but as witness of this matter we have the Vatican Council, which says at the beginning of the constitution *Dei Filius*: "For no one is ignorant that the heresies which the Fathers of Trent proscribed, while the divine magisterium of the Church was rejected and matters pertaining to religion were permitted to the private judgment of anyone whatever, were gradually dissolved into multiple sects; and with these dissenting and contending among themselves, all faith in Christ at length was weakened among not a few. And so the sacred Bible itself, which before had been asserted to be the sole source and judge of Christian doctrine, began no longer to be held as divine, indeed to be numbered among mythical fictions. Then there was born and spread far too widely through the world that doctrine of rationalism or naturalism, which, opposing Christian religion in all things as a supernatural institution, strives with the greatest zeal that, Christ, who alone is our Lord and Savior, having been excluded from human minds and from the life and morals of peoples, the reign of mere reason or nature, as they call it, may be established." Compare *On the Infused Virtues* (n. 987).

104. And so the proper principle of the rationalists, from which they then infer many absurd consequences, is the sufficiency, and therefore the autonomy or independence, of reason. But as regards the present question: 1) Naturalists simply deny revelation. 2) Rationalists indeed seem to admit revelation, but only in name, since by the name of revelation they understand either knowledge through the natural development of natural faculties, or knowledge through a mind specially aroused by natural events. Therefore they reject supernatural divine revelation as described by us. 3) But both especially exclude all mysteries which surpass the grasp of human reason. 4) Finally, some attack the possibility of mediate revelation with peculiar arguments. Namely, they say that it is impossible for us to judge whether God has truly revealed to certain persons those things which are then transmitted to us by them; and hence that it is repugnant to divine wisdom to manifest His wills to us through other men. Thus, among others, Rousseau (*Emile, Profession of Faith of the Savoyard Vicar*).

105. From these things it is easily plain what must be established in order that the Catholic doctrine concerning the possibility of revelation may be defended entire. Hence: Section II. The proposed question is solved. PROP. V. Divine revelation, or the manifestation of truth through a means not owed to nature, whether 1. immediate or 2. mediate, must be called possible. 3. Indeed it is evidently shown that not only truths to which natural reason can attain, but also mysteries, or truths absolutely and per se exceeding the grasp of reason, can be contained within the range of supernatural revelation.

106. The first part is proved. I. In the act of revealing, three things can be considered: God who reveals; man who receives revelation; and the objects themselves which are manifested. Therefore, if there were any repugnance in revelation, it would have to be sought either 1) on the side of God revealing, or 2) on the side of man receiving revelation, or 3) finally on the side of the things

revealed. But none of these can be said. Therefore. The minor is proved as to the first part. 1) Indeed, why would God be said to be unable of Himself to reveal? Is it because He is ignorant of the truths to be revealed? That certainly is repugnant to His infinite knowledge. Is it because He lacks a means of manifesting the truths which He knows? That is repugnant to His infinite power. Finally, is it because He cannot Himself will to manifest truths? But God is unable to will only that which is repugnant to His attributes, to wisdom, holiness, etc.; and nothing of this kind is found in revelation, which rather can yield to the advantage of men and to the glory of God Himself. For if the manifestation of God through the light of reason procures these goods, why cannot the same goods be obtained when God manifests Himself in a supernatural mode? 2) These things are confirmed by rejecting the very reasons of repugnance which the rationalists assign. For first they say that God, by revealing, contradicts Himself, insofar as, since He has already given the natural light for knowing truths, He afterward wills that we know them through another means, namely through revelation. But this is nothing; for He could from eternity have willed that that twofold way of attaining truth should lie open. In this case there is no contradiction. In reality, he would contradict himself by revealing who acted otherwise than, or contrary to, what he had determined for himself beforehand. But God, by revealing, far from acting in a diverse or contrary mode, would act according as He had determined for Himself beforehand. Therefore, if He reveals, there is no contradiction in Him. Just as, therefore, from eternity God established the course of nature and the mode of natural knowledge, so also from eternity He decreed to communicate truths to man through supernatural revelation; and He harmoniously disposed this twofold order of both natural and supernatural knowledge. 3) Secondly, they say that it is unbecoming to the divine majesty that He should address such miserable creatures. But we are not always able to measure by our finite reason what becomes God or is unbecoming to Him. Indeed, in the case itself reason shows that it is by no means unbecoming to God to address men, especially in those matters which contribute to the due worship to be offered to Him, and to their good and happiness. It was not unbecoming to God to create man, and indeed for happiness; to care for him and to have providence over him. Therefore it is not unbecoming to Him to indicate to that same man a safe way by which he can arrive at the desired blessedness. The minor is proved as to the second part. For 1) man is endowed with the faculty of knowing and therefore is capable of knowing truth. But just as he can be instructed by other men, so much more can he be instructed by God Himself. Nor is there any doubt that man can become certainly conscious to himself of having obtained this divine instruction. For men are often accustomed to perceive the origin of their acquired cognitions, and they can affirm whether they learned this or that truth through oral instruction, or through a book, or through experience, or through rational reflection. Why, then, will man not be able to know certainly that he is being instructed by God Himself? Shall we say that every means is lacking to God Himself by which He may make us certain that He is speaking, when He Himself is the one who teaches us by formal speech? 2) But what the rationalists contend is absurd, namely that revelation is repugnant to the dignity of human reason. For if it is not unbecoming for man to be taught by man, why is it unbecoming for him to be taught by God, whose intellect is infinitely superior to every created intellect? From another side, the true dignity of human reason consists in the breadth and certainty of cognitions; but from revelation man learns many things which without revelation he would be ignorant of, and he is made certain concerning many things about which without revelation he would doubt. Compare the things said in the treatise *On the Infused Virtues* (nn. 1083-1085). The minor is proved as to the third part. For since truth is the object of the intellect, its manifestation is not repugnant to the nature of the intellect itself, but rather fitting to it. Whether the manifestation is made by God, or by man, by whom in fact we witness it being made; whether it is made only with respect to existence, or even with respect to essence, it will always be a certain manifestation of the truth itself, and therefore something congruent with its nature.

107. II. What man can do is to be attributed a fortiori to God, unless it involves imperfection. But man can manifest, and does manifest, his own thoughts to other men. Why, therefore, will God not be able to do so? Is it because this involves imperfection? But to be able to manifest concepts to

other beings endowed with intelligence is the same as to be able to communicate something of one's own knowledge, which certainly belongs to perfection. On the contrary, it belongs to imperfection not to be able to communicate it. Even among men, facility in communicating one's own concepts is judged a gift of God. Is it not better that God be able to make His will known than that He be unable? Surely this latter position confines the omnipotence of God within limits.

108. III. History is witness that the idea of revelation made divinely in an extraordinary mode for teaching men is most ancient and flourished among nearly all peoples. In order to escape the force of this common sense and consensus, rationalists derive it from the ignorance and stupidity of peoples, who are said to have ascribed to the influence of Divinity all effects whose causes they did not know. But in truth: 1) unless there were already a common persuasion concerning immediate and extraordinary divine communications, a rude people would not easily have risen from some marvelous effect to the immediate influence of divinity. 2) Moreover, the idea or persuasion of peoples concerning some divine revelation is a historical fact whose cause and origin must be determined not through mere speculation and, as it were, a priori, but rather from authentic monuments. But the most ancient monuments, especially the books of Moses, show that revelation was made early by God, indeed already to the first parents. Therefore the universal persuasion concerning divine revelation having been made must be derived from the fact itself, the knowledge of which, although greatly corrupted here and there, was propagated to peoples at least through oral tradition. The second part is proved. I. That which belongs to men and involves no imperfection must certainly be attributed to God. But men can disclose their concepts and wills to others both by themselves and through others. Therefore.

109. II. If mediate revelation were repugnant, this would be either 1) because certain knowledge of its truth cannot be had, or 2) because it is liable to corruption; the difficulties of the adversaries are reduced almost to these points. But that repugnance can be established from neither head. Therefore. The minor is proved as to the first part. For this difficulty would obtain if it were shown that no means is available to God by which He can make authentic and credible the revelation made by Himself to someone, and manifested through this person to others. But the adversaries have never proved that this means is lacking to God; indeed, that there are many means of this sort will be shown when there is discussion of the marks of revelation. Therefore. Surely if an earthly king can provide certain and authentic signs of the mission entrusted to his legate, why shall we deny that the supreme king and lord can accomplish the same thing with respect to His herald? The minor is proved as to the second part. 1) For this difficulty would have force if it were shown that God cannot in any way prevent this corruption. But this is both repugnant to God's omnipotence and would destroy all historical faith. Therefore. 2) If there were any force in this difficulty, immediate revelation, which we have already shown to be possible, would have to be called impossible a fortiori. In reality, as Perrone argues well (*On Religion*, part 1, prop. 2): "In the same way as men, entangled by desires, have abused the light of reason which shines upon all, and not a few have fallen into absurdities, so also they would abuse such a common revelation and would draw it down to give a fair appearance to every disgraceful thing, without ever being able to be accused of falsity. For individuals would affirm that they had received from God those things which would be nothing but delusions of their own mind, and there would be as many religions as heads, according as experience demonstrates to have happened in that which they themselves call primitive revelation. Wherefore this advantage also is had from mediate revelation, namely, that unity and agreement, which are the chief marks of true religion, arise from it, as also a public society and profession of men, and also a public bond of that society and profession. Otherwise, lest room be given to fraud, miracles and prophecies would have to be demanded from individuals; and how absurd that is, everyone sees." Compare the treatise *On the Infused Virtues* (n. 975 ff.). 3) This difficulty vanishes completely in the Catholic Church, which acknowledges an authority divinely instituted for guarding the deposit of revelation infallibly.

110. The third part is proved. If the revelation of mysteries were impossible, this would be either 1) because there are no mysteries, or 2) because, even if there are, they cannot be manifested to us by God; for to these all the evasions of the adversaries are reduced. But neither can be said. Therefore. The minor is proved as to the first part. For 1) an intellect endowed with greater power and perspicacity can know more things than another intellect of an inferior order and keenness; this is plain even among men. For no one will say that the uneducated understand all those things which a wise man reaches, or that they look into the reasons of things equally perfectly. But the divine intellect by its perfection infinitely exceeds any created intellect. Therefore it understands more things and better than any created intellect. Therefore there are truths known to the divine intellect which nevertheless escape the created intellect; these we call mysteries. "For of two persons," says St. Thomas (*Contra Gentiles*, book 1, c. 3), "of whom one intuits some thing more subtly by intellect than the other, the one whose intellect is higher understands many things which the other cannot grasp at all, as is plain in a rustic, who can in no way grasp the subtle considerations of philosophy. But the intellect of an angel exceeds the human intellect more than the intellect of the best philosopher exceeds the intellect of the rudest unlearned man... And much more does the divine intellect exceed the angelic than the angelic exceeds the human... Hence human reason does not suffice for grasping all things which an angel can grasp by natural knowledge, nor all things which an angel understands by his natural power." 2) The same Angelic Doctor proposes another argument thus (loc. cit.): "Since the principle of the whole knowledge which reason perceives concerning some thing is the understanding of the substance of that thing itself, because, according to the doctrine of the Philosopher (*Posterior Analytics* II, text comm. 2), the principle of demonstration is what a thing is, it is necessary that the mode of those things which are known concerning that thing be according to the mode in which the substance of the thing is understood. Hence if the human intellect comprehends the substance of some thing, for example of a stone or of a triangle, none of the intelligible aspects of that thing will exceed the faculty of human reason. This, however, does not happen for us concerning God. For the human intellect cannot by natural power attain to grasping His substance, since the knowledge of our intellect, according to the mode of the present life, begins from sense. And therefore those things which do not fall under sense cannot be grasped by the human intellect, except insofar as knowledge of them is gathered from sensible things. But sensible things cannot lead our intellect to this, that the divine substance be seen in them as to what it is, since they are effects not equaling the power of the cause. Nevertheless, from sensible things our intellect is led into divine knowledge, so that it knows concerning God that He is, and other things of this kind, which must be attributed to the first principle. Therefore there are certain intelligible divine things which are accessible to human reason; but there are certain others which altogether exceed the power of human reason." Hence Lactantius (*Divine Institutes*, book 3, c. 6): "Do not think that you know all things, which belongs to God; nor that you know nothing, which belongs to a beast. For there is something intermediate which belongs to man, that is, knowledge joined and tempered with ignorance." 3) How many things there are even among created things, concerning whose existence one cannot doubt, while nevertheless their innermost nature remains hidden. If we cast our eyes upon the things which surround us, we plainly see phenomena, for example, of electricity, of magnetism, of the attraction of bodies, etc., concerning which experience itself makes us certain; but no one will assert that their innermost nature and cause are perfectly known by us, although outstanding minds through the long course of centuries, and especially in our own times, have applied their attention to explaining them. If we turn our eyes to ourselves, we find certain mysteries in ourselves; for no one thus far has perfectly known, as to the mode in which they happen, those things which pertain to the threefold life by which we enjoy existence, although each person certainly perceives that they happen. The confessions of philosophers on this matter are read everywhere; compare, if you wish, Hettinger (*Apology of Christianity*, vol. 1, diss. 2-10). Now if this happens in things which fall under the senses, a fortiori we shall find mysteries in God, whose essence we do not behold, and concerning whose perfections we have only analogical concepts taken from creatures. "For," says the same holy Doctor (loc. cit.), "we are ignorant of very many properties of sensible things, and of those properties which we apprehend by sense, in many cases we cannot

perfectly discover the reason. Therefore much more is human reason insufficient to investigate the reason of that most excellent substance, transcending all intelligible things." The minor is proved as to the second part. For 1) we have proved universally the possibility of revelation; therefore even truths which surpass the power of human reason can be revealed. 2) In reality, the revelation of mysteries is chiefly attacked from this, that, as Christians admit, mysteries cannot be comprehended and are above reason. Hence the adversaries infer that, even if mysteries are revealed, nothing is understood by human reason, and therefore revelation of this sort is altogether useless. But this reason is of no moment. For once revelation of mysteries has been made, as we said (n. 100 ff.), they are understood with respect to existence; and although their innermost nature remains inaccessible, nevertheless, once revelation is supposed, we form some analogical idea of it. Hence the Vatican Council teaches: "Reason indeed, illuminated by faith, when it seeks diligently, piously, and soberly, obtains, God granting it, some understanding of the mysteries, and that most fruitful, both from the analogy of those things which it knows naturally, and from the connection of the mysteries themselves with one another and with the ultimate end of man."

111. You will say I: Superintelligible truths seem to involve contradiction; for if something is superintelligible, it has no proportion with intellect. But truth is said by relation to intellect. Hence, since every being is true, if superintelligible truths, that is, mysteries, do not have the character of truth, they are really nothing, or they are not. For above intelligence there can be nothing except contradiction or nothing; indeed every being can be understood. Therefore superintelligible truths do not exist. I answer: Truths superintelligible beyond every intellect do indeed involve contradiction; for they would be truths and would not be. They would be, as is said; they would not be, because, exceeding every intelligence, they could not be in any intellect. But when we say that mysteries are superintelligible truths, we are speaking of the superintelligible not absolutely, but relatively to created intelligences and according to the natural order. Hence we say that those truths are known by the divine intellect, and by revelation are manifested to us in some way.

112. You will say II: But there is no truth superintelligible relative to the human intellect; therefore the difficulty stands. The antecedent is proved. The object of the human intellect is being itself; but besides being there is only nothing. Therefore. I answer by distinguishing: that the object of the human intellect is knowable being according to the mode and degree of human intellection, I concede; knowable according to a higher mode and degree, I subdistinguish: if a higher aid is added, I concede; otherwise, I deny. Thus, for example, in the present state we do not know God naturally except from creatures. But creatures neither represent all the divine perfections, nor are those perfections which they do represent represented with that perfection by which they are in God. Therefore, if we are left to the powers of nature alone, there are many things which we cannot know concerning God; nor do we have a proper concept, but an analogical one, of those things which we know concerning Him. From another side, the power of God is not confined to the order of creation, so that He can effect nothing above that order; but if He effects something above that order, it certainly cannot be gathered from that order. Therefore, for those not seeing God intuitively, this cannot be established except through the free manifestation of God, or revelation. But the deeper solution of this difficulty is sought from the things handed down in metaphysics concerning the mode of our cognition; compare, if you wish, what we said in the treatise *On God the Creator*, when treating of the object of angelic cognition and of the possibility of the intuitive vision.

113. You will say III: Those things which are above reason are not conformable to reason; but those things which are not conformable to reason are against reason, and therefore nothing, since things which are repugnant are not. Therefore mysteries, which are said to be above reason, really are not. I answer by distinguishing the major: Those things which are above reason are not conformable to reason, that is, they are not drawn from principles known by the natural light, I concede; that is, they are shown to be contrary to principles known by the natural light, I deny. We demonstrated in the treatise *On the Virtues* (nn.

1048-1050) that there is no conflict between reason and faith. Anyone sees that the whole difficulty is founded on a miserable equivocation. (1) Bayle had proposed the same objection, saying: "The most orthodox admit that we do not know the conformity of our mysteries with the principles of philosophy. It therefore seems to us that they are not conformable to our reason. Now, what seems to us not conformable to our reason seems to us contrary to our reason, just as what does not seem conformable to truth; and thus why should one not say equally both that the mysteries are against our weak reason and that they are above our weak reason?" And yet Leibniz answered (*Discourse on the Conformity of Faith with Reason*, n. 68): "I answer... that reason here is the chain of truths which we know by the natural light; and in this sense the received axiom is true, without any equivocation. Mysteries surpass our reason, for they contain truths which are not comprised in this chain

Article 6. Whether divine supernatural revelation is necessary

114. The documents of the Church which we must keep before our eyes in this matter are chiefly these. The Vatican Council (*Dei Filius*, ch. 2), after handing down the true idea of revelation, adds: "To this divine revelation it must indeed be attributed that those things which in divine matters are not of themselves inaccessible to human reason can, in the present condition also of the human race, be known by all readily, with firm certainty, and with no admixture of error. Nevertheless, revelation is not to be called absolutely necessary for this reason, but because God, out of His infinite goodness, has ordered man to a supernatural end, namely to sharing in divine goods which altogether surpass the understanding of the human mind; since eye has not seen, nor ear heard, nor has it entered into the heart of man, what things God has prepared for those who love Him." And (can. 2 in the same chapter): "If anyone shall say that it cannot happen, or is not expedient, that through divine revelation man be instructed about God and the worship to be offered to Him, let him be anathema." To these must be added proposition 4 condemned in the *Syllabus*: "All the truths of religion derive from the native force of human reason; hence reason is the chief norm by which man can and ought to attain knowledge of all truths of whatever kind." Footnote continued from PDF page 87: "of truths; but they are not contrary to our reason and do not contradict any of the truths to which this chain can lead us. As for the question whether we know the conformity of our mysteries with our reason, I answer that at least we never know that there is any deformity or any opposition between the mysteries and reason; and since we can always remove the alleged opposition, if one calls that reconciling or agreeing faith with reason, or knowing their conformity, it must be said that we can know this conformity and this agreement. But if conformity consists in a rational explanation of the how, we would not know it."

115. In order that the Catholic doctrine concerning the necessity of revelation, which the Vatican Council proposed, may be rightly understood, let us first recall that the objects of divine revelation pertain to a twofold order. For some are "not of themselves inaccessible to human reason"; but others are those "which altogether surpass the understanding of the human mind." Now it is evident that revelation of truths of this latter order is absolutely necessary, once the elevation of the human race to a supernatural order and end is supposed. For an end of this sort, by the very fact that it is supernatural, can neither be found nor explained by the natural light of reason; and likewise the means of positive institution and supernatural means proportioned for attaining that end exceed the natural light of reason. Hence the Vatican Council said: "revelation is to be called absolutely necessary... because God, out of His infinite goodness, has ordered man to a supernatural end." "No one," says St. Thomas (*Contra Gentiles*, book 1, c. 7), "tends by desire and zeal toward anything unless it is known beforehand to him. Therefore, since men are ordered by divine providence to a higher good than human frailty can experience in the present life... it was necessary that the mind be summoned to something higher than our reason in the present can reach, so that thus it might learn to desire something and tend with zeal toward something which exceeds the whole state of the present life. And this belongs chiefly to the Christian religion, etc." But anyone sees that all these things

do not so much establish as suppose the necessity of revelation which unbelievers attack; for it is founded wholly on the elevation of man to the supernatural order, and that elevation can become known only from revelation.

116. We could indeed stop here, and not inquire further into the necessity of revelation. For since the Christian religion and the whole economy, as far as it goes, are exhibited as altogether supernatural, once the possibility of revelation and of the supernatural order has been demonstrated, it would suffice for the demonstration of the truth of the Christian religion to show that it in fact has a divine origin; this, as we shall see, is established from the criteria of revelation, or motives of credibility. Nevertheless, in order that we may overthrow the system of the rationalists from the foundations, and unfold the true doctrine completely, the necessity of revelation must be considered with respect to truths of the first order.

117. Therefore the question is restricted to those truths "to which natural reason can attain," and which accordingly "are not of themselves inaccessible to human reason." Indeed, here this very range of "natural truths" must be restricted. For 1) the question concerns truths not of themselves inaccessible to human reason, but pertaining to religion, or to the due worship to be offered to the true God, and to life rightly established in order to the ultimate end. For if the whole complex of rational truths were in question, whether they pertain to religion or not, it is too evident that without an entirely extraordinary charism they cannot be known; nor is there any necessity of knowing all truths of this sort; nor are they known or able to be known by revelation alone, which was made for all. 2) Nor is this knowledge of the complex of truths pertaining to religion considered here in relation to all and each individual man. For that all and each individual cannot attain that whole complex by the light of reason alone is almost as evident as the inability to know all natural truths simply. Nor do we determine how many and which are the truths which individual men could and ought to know without revelation, in such a way that ignorance of the rest would be excused in them on account of invincible ignorance; for invincible ignorance itself in the greatest part of men concerning truths necessary per se would exist as an argument for the necessity of revelation of those same truths for the whole human race. 3) Therefore the necessity of revelation of truths pertaining to religion is considered in relation to the human race viewed in common; and the proper question is whether these truths should be considered so manifest from intrinsic and objective principles that the human race in common does not need revelation in order to know them, or whether, on the contrary, revelation is necessary for this.

118. The substance of the knowledge of the aforesaid truths must be distinguished from the supernatural mode of knowing them. Now it is evident that the revelation with which we are dealing is, in the present order of providence, absolutely necessary by reason of the mode in which those truths must be known. For they must be known insofar as they are referred to the ultimate end, and in a mode proportioned to that end. But in the present order of providence the end is supernatural; therefore they must be known in a supernatural mode. But the proper mode of supernatural knowledge on the way is faith; therefore those truths must be known in such a way that they are believed by divine faith. But faith rests upon revelation, as we showed in the treatise *On the Infused Virtues* (disp. 2, art. 4). Therefore, in the present order of providence, the very truths pertaining to religion which are not inaccessible to reason, by reason of the mode in which they must be known, absolutely require revelation.

119. Therefore the question turns only on the substance of the knowledge; and accordingly we inquire "whether in the present order revelation of natural truths pertaining to religion is so necessary for the human race in common that without revelation they cannot be known." We say in the present order; for we would by no means deny that many other aids are available to divine omnipotence for relieving the defect of our nature. And therefore, even supposing the inability of the natural light, the necessity of this aid, which is revelation, would not necessarily follow. But since God, from those many aids, has already chosen revelation, once this choice is supposed, that is, in the present order, revelation is rightly

called necessary.

120. Now in this matter some err by defect, others by excess, while Catholic doctrine holds the middle way. For rationalists, if any seem to admit the possibility of revelation, deny absolutely and simply all its necessity, maintaining that the force of human reason left to itself is so great that it alone suffices for itself in those things which pertain to religion. "Rationalism," says Wegscheider (*Institutions of Theology*, section 7), "is that law or rule of thinking by which we judge that, in examining and judging all things whatever which are presented to us in life and in the range of every discipline, and also in the gravest matters which pertain to religion and morals, the norm of reason rightly applied, as the highest faculty of the mind, must be vigorously followed by us." And (proleg., c. 1): "The very nature of the human mind," he says, "and the idea of the Supreme Deity rightly formed exclude every necessity of supernatural revelation. For just as all other living things have been endowed with those powers by which they can attain the ends of their nature, so undoubtedly men, by the reason granted to them, surpass the remaining living things, and to them has been given the faculty of understanding and observing all those things which pertain to obtaining the highest ends of the human race, namely to preserving duties and cultivating religion... But whoever, with this supremacy of human reason despised, establishes that revelation, which is said to have been brought in a supernatural mode to certain men, has such authority that it must be obeyed without any doubt by some blind instinct or sense [elsewhere we proved that the assent of faith is neither blind nor from instinct], that person takes away and overturns the true nature of man."

121. Others, on the contrary, who are called Traditionalists, thought that revelation of natural truths pertaining to religion is absolutely necessary; or that without revelation man labors under a physical inability to know those truths, or to acquire any clear and certain moral notion. The philosophical refutation of this error is usually handed down in metaphysics, and can be read especially in Liberatore (*On Intellectual Knowledge*, V, 1). It will suffice for us to note these things. 1) The Vatican Council teaches that "God, the beginning and end of all things, can be known with certainty by the natural light of human reason from created things"; but if man labored under that physical inability, he truly could not know God, just as, if revelation were absolutely necessary for knowing God, He could not be known from created things by the natural light, contrary to that saying (Rom. 1:20), His invisible things through those things which have been made, etc., which the Council itself cites. 2) The Council itself teaches that revelation of truths which are not of themselves inaccessible to human reason is indeed expedient; but it immediately adds: "Nevertheless, revelation is not to be called absolutely necessary for this reason, but because God, out of His infinite goodness, has ordered man to a supernatural end." This certainly cannot be reconciled with a physical inability (1) Bonnetty, for example, had written (*Annales de philosophie chretienne*, 4th series, vol. 8): "when we have said that philosophy ought not to seek truth, by the word truth we have understood only the truths of dogma and morals necessary to believe and to practice, taught in philosophy, that is, the following truths: God and His attributes, man, his origin, his end, his duties, the rules of civil society, etc., etc." And D. Bautain, before he submitted, wrote to the Bishop of Strasbourg (1837): "What else does the assertion that man can demonstrate the existence of God and His infinite perfections by the arguments of reason alone mean, except that man can ascend to God by his own powers and know God without God?" These things correspond to that axiom, as it were, introduced by Lamennais: "all certainty rests on faith." Compare the propositions which the Sacred Congregation of the Index judged must be corrected (1843, 1844); this mandate was also confirmed (1864, 1866) by the Sacred Congregations of the Holy Office and of the Index. to know those truths without revelation. 3) Omitting other points, a natural faculty which could not be developed without supernatural aid would import confusion and would import destruction of both orders. For that faculty would demand that aid; but an aid for which there is a demand in nature is owed to it, or natural, not unowed, or supernatural.

122. Therefore, in Catholic doctrine, revelation of rational truths pertaining to religion, although it is not absolutely necessary, is nevertheless morally necessary. Before necessity of this sort is established, it needs to be declared briefly. And so the necessity of revelation cannot be conceived unless there is supposed in nature some inability to know the truths of which we are speaking. Therefore, according to the different character of the inability, the necessity also will be different. Now a twofold inability must be distinguished here, physical and moral. Physical inability properly consists in a physical defect of proportion between the faculty and the act, here between the human intellect and the knowledge of truths pertaining to religion. But that defect can arise from a twofold head, namely: 1) from a defect of the intrinsic power necessary for placing some act. Thus, for example, sense cannot have universal concepts; sight cannot perceive sounds, etc. 2) From a defect of some extrinsic condition necessary according to the physical laws of nature, so that the faculty can put forth its powers, or come forth into act. Thus, for example, in the present state of the union of soul with body, the due disposition of the senses is necessary so that the intellect can exercise the act of understanding; due distance or light is a necessary condition so that sight can reach some object. Yet the defect of a physically necessary condition is sometimes such that it can be removed; and then there will be physical inability temporarily, or accidentally. To physical inability corresponds physical necessity, on the hypothesis that the act must be placed.

123. But moral inability is had when a faculty, physically capable of some act, does not put it forth because of an impediment which, according to the morals and ways of men, is accustomed to hinder its exercise. Hence moral inability supposes physical power, and is founded solely on difficulties of the moral order which would impede its exercise. These difficulties can arise on the side of the knowing subject, on the side of the object to be known, or on both sides. But what the obstacles are which impede human reason from being able, without revelation, to know the complex of truths pertaining to religion will be clear from the demonstration of the thesis to be established. Finally, the very nature and foundation of this moral inability causes it to admit degrees; and thus it is greater or lesser according to the greater or lesser number and efficacy of the impediments. Compare what we said in the treatise *On Grace* (nn. 353-355; 378-381).

124. To moral inability corresponds moral necessity, on the hypothesis that the act must be placed. For when obstacles are so great that they hinder a faculty from some act for which it is physically capable, some extrinsic aid is necessary for that faculty, so that it can overcome the obstacles and come forth into act. But just as degrees are given in moral inability, so also there is a diversity of degrees in moral necessity.

125. Therefore, with these things set forth beforehand: Section II. The proposed question is solved. PROP. VI. So far is it from being the case that all truths of religion derive from the native force of human reason, that, even if the question concerns truths pertaining to natural religion, reason is morally unable to attain them. For in the present condition of the human race, they cannot be known by all readily, with firm certainty, and with no admixture of error, without revelation.

126. I. It is proved by the argument of St. Thomas (*Contra Gentiles*, book 1, c. 4), who at the same time shows the causes of the moral inability of which we speak. "This," he says, "must first be shown concerning that truth which can be accessible to the inquiry of reason, lest perhaps it seem to someone that, since it can be had by reason, it has been handed down in vain to be believed by supernatural inspiration. "Nevertheless, three inconveniences would follow if truth of this sort were left to the inquiry of reason alone. "One is that the knowledge of God would be present in few men. For very many are hindered from the fruit of studious inquiry, which is the discovery of truth, by three causes. "For very many are hindered from the fruit of studious inquiry, which is the discovery of truth, by three causes. "Some indeed are hindered because of an indisposition of temperament, from which many are naturally indisposed to knowing. Hence by no study could they reach this point, that they attain the highest degree of human knowledge,

which consists in knowing God. "Some, however, are hindered by the necessity of household affairs. For it is necessary that there be among men some who devote themselves to administering temporal matters; they could not spend so much time in the leisure of contemplative inquiry that they would reach the highest summit of human inquiry, namely, knowledge of God. "Some, moreover, are hindered by laziness. For for the knowledge of those things concerning God which reason can investigate, many things must first be known, since the consideration of almost the whole of philosophy is ordered to knowledge of God. For this reason metaphysics, which is concerned with divine things, remains the last to be learned among the parts of philosophy. "Thus, therefore, only with great labor of study can one arrive at the inquiry into the aforesaid truth; and few indeed are willing to undergo this labor for love of knowledge, for which nevertheless God has inserted a natural appetite into the minds of men. "The second inconvenience is that those who would arrive at the knowledge or discovery of the aforesaid truth would scarcely reach it after a long time, both because of the profundity of this sort of truth, for the grasping of which by the way of reason the human intellect is found fit only after long exercise; and also because of the many things which are required beforehand, as was said; and also because, in the time of youth, while the soul is tossed about by diverse movements of the passions, it is not apt for knowledge of so lofty a truth, but by becoming quiet it becomes prudent and knowing, as is said in the seventh book of the *Physics* (text comm. 20). Therefore, if only the way of reason lay open for knowing God, the human race would remain in the greatest darkness of ignorance, since the knowledge of God, which especially makes men perfect and good, would come only to certain few, and to these few only after a length of time. "The third inconvenience is that falsity is very often mixed into the investigation of human reason because of the weakness of our intellect in judging, and the intermingling of phantasms. And therefore among many persons those things which are most truly demonstrated would remain in doubt, while they are ignorant of the force of the demonstration, and especially when they see different things taught by different persons who are called wise. Among the many true things which are demonstrated, something false is also sometimes mixed in, which is not demonstrated, but is asserted by some probable or sophistical reason, which is sometimes reputed a demonstration. And therefore it was necessary that, through the way of faith, the truth itself concerning divine things be presented to men with fixed certainty. "Therefore divine clemency has provided salutarily that even those things which reason can investigate should be commanded to be held by faith, so that all might easily be able to be participants in divine knowledge, and without doubt and error."

127. Hence also Tully, lamenting this difficulty of finding truth, especially from perverse education and from prejudices, writes (*Tusculan Questions*, book 3, c. 1): "Now nature has given us little sparks, which we quickly so extinguish by bad morals and depraved opinions that the light of nature never appears... as soon as we are brought forth into the light and received, we are at once occupied in every depravity and in the greatest perversity of opinions, so that we seem almost to have sucked in error with the milk of the nurse. But when we have been returned to our parents and then handed over to teachers, then we are so imbued with various errors that truth yields to vanity and nature itself to confirmed opinion... But when there comes to the same point, as if some greatest teacher, the people and the whole multitude from every side consenting to vices, then we are plainly infected with the depravity of opinions and fall away from nature."

128. II. It is a public, universal, and constant fact that no people, whether barbarous or cultivated, so long as it was destitute of revelation, either because it lacked it from the beginning or because it rejected or corrupted it, offered to God a worship worthy of Him and avoided the most disgraceful errors against the principles of sound ethics. But this argues the moral inability of human reason to attain the complex of truths pertaining to law and religion without revelation, since no other constant and universal cause can be assigned for this constant and universal fact. Therefore. The major of this argument could be illustrated by many points; we shall select a few. And 1) certainly among the nations the Greeks and Romans stand out. Although they flourished in other sciences, disciplines, and arts, and in these reached a

more than moderate degree of culture, nevertheless concerning religion they were turning about in the greatest darkness and errors. Their creed did not propose one God, but gods and goddesses; and to these were attributed not only origin, dependence, and other human attributes, but also the most disgraceful crimes. What could they teach concerning worship to be offered to gods of this sort? This is all the more so because, erring concerning the providence of God, often devoted to fatalism, they ascribed to themselves the gift which is greatest, and therefore disfigured or even wholly removed the idea of divine remuneration. Behold what Cotta says in Tully (*On the Nature of the Gods*, book 3, c. 36): "All mortals indeed hold this, that they have external advantages, vineyards, harvests, olive groves, abundance of crops and fruits, and finally every advantage and prosperity of life, from the gods. But no one has ever referred virtue received to God. No doubt rightly; for on account of virtue we are justly praised and in virtue we rightly glory; this would not happen if we had that gift from God and not from ourselves... For who ever gave thanks to the gods because he was a good man?" With these Ovid agrees (*From Pontus*, book 2, ep. 1): "May the gods give you years; for the rest you will take from yourself; only let long times be given to your virtue." And Horace (book 1, ep. 18, to Lollius): "But it is enough to pray to Jove, who gives and takes away; let him give life, let him give wealth: I myself will prepare an even mind." Hence St. Augustine, although he celebrates certain natural virtues of the Romans in relation to other nations, nevertheless writes these things (*City of God*, book 5, c. 12): "Therefore the old first Romans... although, like other nations, with the single exception of the people of the Jews, they worshipped false gods and sacrificed victims not to God but to demons, nevertheless, greedy of praise, they were generous with money. They wanted immense glory and honorable riches. This they loved most ardently; on account of this they wished to live, for this they did not hesitate even to die; they pressed down other desires by the immense desire of this one thing." 2) Indeed, the chief men among the philosophers, Socrates, Plato, Cicero, than whom pagan antiquity knew nothing more sublime, privately mocked the gods, but publicly worshipped them, and said with one voice that in those things concerning religion established by ancestral custom, nothing was to be changed, and that no one of sound mind would ever undertake it. Socrates approved that response of the Delphic oracle, that the gods must be worshipped according to the institution of the city; and, when near death, he asked his friends to sacrifice for him to Aesculapius the rooster which he had vowed. Cicero agrees, writing (*On Laws*, book 2): "It has pleased us that the gods received from the fathers be worshipped... that, from the institutions of the pontiffs and haruspices, it is not to be changed with what victims sacrifice must be offered to each god." Seneca, in St. Augustine (*City of God*, book 6, c. 10), says: "We shall adore that whole ignoble crowd of gods, which long superstition has heaped together, in such a way that we remember that this worship pertains more to custom than to the thing itself." And (book 3, c. 12): "All these... and Plato himself thought that sacred rites should be performed for very many gods." On this passage Vives comments thus: "In the *Timaeus* he enumerates the gods Saturn, Ops, Juno, and the others as brothers and relatives among themselves. In the book *On the Republic* and *On the Laws*, he orders sacred rites and ceremonies to be performed for gods, demons, and heroes. But in the eighth and twelfth books *On Laws* he names those to whom the condition and happiness of the city must be commended by vows and prayers." We know that idolatry, with one almost single exception, was common to all peoples. Hence Horace (book 1, Satire 8) sang: "Once I was the trunk of a fig tree, useless wood; when the craftsman, uncertain whether he should make a bench or Priapus, preferred that I be a god. From then on I was a god." And Juvenal (*Satire* 15): "O holy nations, for whom these divinities grow in gardens!" 3) If the question concerns the immortality of the soul, Cicero (*Tusculan Questions*, book 1) says: "Those things which you wish I shall explain as I can; and yet not as though I were Pythian Apollo, so that the things I have said are certain and fixed, but as one little man from among many, following probable conjectures. For I have no point beyond which to proceed except that what I see may seem likely." In the same place he writes: "I do not know how, while I read them, I assent to those things by which the immortality of the soul is concluded; but when I have put down the book and have begun to think by myself about the immortality of souls, all that assent slips away." "I easily believed," says Seneca, "the opinions of great men, promising a most pleasing thing rather than proving it." Socrates himself, who had spent his

whole life in moral philosophy, spoke doubtfully about the future life in the last discourse which he had with his friends; this gave Tertullian occasion to write these things: "So all that wisdom of Socrates had then come from the deliberate purpose of studied equanimity, not from confidence in discovered truth." Now, as Cicero himself admits, "unless these things are held as certain, men must necessarily be occupied in ignorance of the greatest matters; and when these have been removed, or called into doubt, there can be no piety, no sanctity, no religion; and disturbance of life follows, and great confusion; even trust and the society of the human race, and justice, the one most excellent virtue, is taken away." 4) While thus erring concerning the primary truths of natural religion, what could they teach as regards morals? Plato commended community of wives; he permitted wandering intercourse or fornication. The exposure of infants, so cruel and so abhorrent from the natural love of parents, he not only did not disapprove, but even commended, where they were not well formed. Finally, in the feasts of Bacchus he does not condemn drunkenness. Aristotle wrote so obscurely about God that he has been held an atheist by many. With what foolish arguments he tried to confirm his new opinion about the eternity of the world! He does not reject abortions, nor cruelty toward infants; he excuses or even approves disgraceful and lascivious images of the gods. The Stoics were especially obscene in their writings. For them God was fiery; most defended a fatal concatenation of things; all approved fornication; they did not even shudder at incest most abhorrent from nature, the intercourse of father and daughter, of mother and son. How absurd their dogmas are! 5) But if various truths pertaining to religion were seen by philosophers both ancient and more recent, it must first be noticed that they taught them with an admixture of many errors, nor did they attain full certainty concerning them, namely that certainty which induces the persuasion necessary for morally establishing life. Moreover, no one is ignorant that revelation was made from the beginning to the first man and to the Patriarchs; that certain seeds of it, as all learned men concede, penetrated even among the nations; which is a fortiori true of Christian revelation. Hence Locke rightly wrote (*Reasonableness of Christianity*, chap. 14): "He who now completes long journeys commends his own strength, by which in so brief a space of time he has measured out so great a road. He ascribes the cause of such speed to the vigor of his own body, and does not consider how much he owes to those who cut down the woods, dried the marshes, built the bridges, and paved the road; if these had not been done, worn out long ago by the journey, he would have advanced only a little. There are many things which we have learned from infancy onward, so that, since now the notions of them are implanted in us and as if born together with us under the Gospel, we regard them as truths which cannot be attacked, easy to discover, easy to prove most evidently, not noticing that we would have doubted about them or been ignorant of them for a long time, unless revelation had disclosed them to us. And thus we are greatly bound to revelation even without knowing it." 6) But even after Christian revelation, those who deserted it brought again into the light the absurdities of the pagan philosophers. Materialism, observes Knoll (*General Theology*, part 1, section 58, c. 2), to which the theory of John Locke gave occasion, who derived all ideas from the senses, was developed in all its enormity by the author of the impious book *On the System of Nature*, whom some followed, denying the spirituality and immortality of the soul. David Hume and Bayle renewed the skepticism of the Pyrrhonists. Benedict Spinoza was the restorer of pantheism. Kant, having established the autonomy of practical reason, admits God only as Rewarder, but not as supreme Legislator, and altogether denies immediate duties toward Him, and by this paradoxical assertion itself overturns the right idea of religion. Those who came forth from Critical Philosophy, Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, etc., spoke of God in such a way that they seem to defend not theism, but autotheism, pantheism, or atheism. Besides, they propose such opinions as are more incomprehensible than all the mysteries of revealed religion, since they not only surpass reason but openly contradict it. Thus, for example, Fichte establishes the Ego, which posits itself and does not posit itself, as at once finite and infinite, absolute and relative, dependent and independent, and by arriving at the unknown point X becomes master of itself, etc. Schelling posits nature, subject to time, as eternal, and beholds and declares the origin or evolution of God from its obscure abyss! Hegel, having rejected the principle of contradiction, tries in his logic by a futile sophism to prove another principle, namely: being is non-being, and non-being is being! Valsecchi, among others, develops this argument

learnedly (*On the Foundations of Religion*, book 2, cc. 1-5). 7) Hence it is that the pagan philosophers themselves asserted the inability of reason to know with certainty the truths which concern the worship of God and the right establishment of morals. Lactantius had already collected their testimonies; but they can be seen in Bergier (*Theological Dictionary*, s.v. Revelation).

129. Wherefore, since, with revelation rejected, even the principal truths of natural law and religion are obscured or lost, the Supreme Pontiff Pius IX rightly taught (n. 34) that not only when every religion has been removed, but also when this doctrine of divine revelation alone has been repudiated, those evils follow for society which we demonstrated (nn. 36 ff.).

130. You will say I: The asserted necessity of revelation does not seem to cohere with the concept of divine justice and providence. For why would God have left men for so many centuries destitute of that means which is called necessary for the worship of God and the right establishment of life? It is answered: Those who object these things seem to suppose that, in Catholic doctrine, revelation began when the Word of God made flesh appeared to the world. But the matter is otherwise. For all monuments testify that God, at the very beginning of things, manifested Himself to men by revealing religious truths. God also kindly provided that this primitive revelation, renewed in the Patriarchs, be preserved and transmitted through successive generations. "Therefore let the complaints of those cease," says St. Leo (*Sermon* 3 on the Nativity, c. 4), "who, speaking against the divine dispensations with impious murmuring, complain of the lateness of the Lord's nativity, as though that which was carried out in the last age of the world had not been bestowed in former times. For the Incarnation of the Word conferred that what was to be done should be done; and the sacrament of human salvation never ceased in any antiquity. What the Apostles preached, this the prophets announced; nor was that fulfilled late which was always believed... Therefore God did not consult for human affairs with late counsel, nor with late mercy, but from the constitution of the world He instituted one and the same cause of salvation for all." But that men by their own fault lost or disfigured this precious deposit of truth must be charged to them and not to a fault of divine providence. In the same way, if a prince distributed to the poor means by which they could obtain necessary things for themselves, to be transmitted to their sons and grandsons, it would have to be attributed not to the prince, but to the fathers, if, rejecting the means received, they cast themselves and their children into want. Nor does the economy of divine providence stop here (compare *On Grace*, n. 838 ff.). For if any among men, without fault of their own, were ignorant of revealed doctrine, yet kept the natural law while cooperating with medicinal grace, God would not deny them the aids necessary so that they could arrive at faith. "If someone," says St. Thomas (*De Veritate*, q. 4, a. 11, ad 1), "nourished in the forests, or among brute animals, followed the guidance of natural reason in seeking good and fleeing evil, it is most certainly to be believed that God would either reveal to him by internal inspiration those things which are necessary to be believed, or would direct some preacher of the faith to him." But we have fully satisfied this difficulty in the treatise *On Grace* (n. 848 ff.).

131. You will say II: If man could not know truths pertaining to natural law and religion without revelation, revelation would be owed to man. But what is owed to human nature cannot be called supernatural (n. 104). Therefore. I answer by distinguishing the major: If man could not by physical power, I concede; by moral power, I subdistinguish: if there were another means proportioned to nature, I deny; if such a means were lacking, let it pass. In order that this solution may be understood, let us briefly note: 1) Revelation is not the only means by which God can relieve moral inability to know the truths of natural religion; rather, other means are available to Him, both internal and external, which are contained in the very order of natural providence. 2) Hence revelation would not be morally necessary, speaking simply, but only disjunctively, as we said, unless, namely, God by another providence were to provide for the moral possibility of acquiring this necessary knowledge. But since, in the present order of providence, God wishes to use not other supports but revelation, revelation is now necessary. 3) Nevertheless, it does not follow from

this that revelation is now not an unowed gift; for not only is it now directed to the supernatural order and end (n. 127), but also, considered in itself, it is a mode of knowing truth exceeding the demand of nature (n. 104), and therefore unowed to it. 4) But to one asking whether, in another possible order of providence, for instance in the state of pure nature, God would have relieved our moral inability by other supports of the natural order, the answer is that this indeed would have been very fitting to the providence of a good and wise God, as all admit; but that it certainly be clear to all that He would have had to do so is not established. For God can, they say, create and leave finite nature with the defects which naturally follow upon it; but the moral inability of which we are speaking, as is plain from the proofs given, naturally follows upon human nature itself. Nevertheless the more common opinion affirms that in the state of pure nature, if it had existed, other means of the natural order would not have been lacking for relieving the moral inability of man. Compare the things which we discussed more fully on this matter in the treatise *On the Grace of Christ* (nn. 396-403).

Article 7. Whether all knowledge of religious truth can be attributed to the continual progress of reason, revelation being excluded

132. The documents of the Church which bear on this point are chiefly recalled to these: 1) The Supreme Pontiff Pius IX (*Qui pluribus*, encyclical, November 9, 1846) says: "Nor surely with lesser fallacy would those enemies of divine revelation, extolling human progress with the highest praises, wish with rash and plainly sacrilegious daring to introduce it into the Catholic religion, just as if religion itself were not the work of God, but of men, or some philosophical invention which can be perfected by human methods. Upon those who so miserably rave falls very fittingly what Tertullian deservedly reproached to the philosophers of his own time, 'who brought forth a Stoic, and Platonic, and Dialectic Christianity.'" 2) Hence proposition 5 condemned in the *Syllabus*: "Divine revelation is imperfect, and therefore subject to a continual and indefinite progress which corresponds to the progression of human reason." 3) But the Vatican Council (*Dei Filius*, ch. 4) says: "For the doctrine of faith which God revealed was not proposed to human talents as a philosophical invention to be perfected, but was handed over as a divine deposit to the Spouse of Christ, to be faithfully guarded and infallibly declared. Hence that meaning of sacred dogmas also must perpetually be retained which holy Mother Church has once declared, nor must one ever recede from that meaning under the appearance and name of a higher understanding." 4) And (can. 3 in ch. 2): "If anyone shall say that man cannot be divinely elevated to knowledge and perfection which surpasses the natural, but from himself can and ought, by continual progress, finally to attain to the possession of all truth and good, let him be anathema."

133. In order that the state of the question may be well understood, a twofold error must be distinguished here. One is that of those who, while admitting revelation at least in name, so subject it to reason that it must be accommodated to reason. But since, they say, human reason lies under the law of continual progress, according to different ages it understands and explains revealed truths in different ways; and therefore, as science progresses, one must recede from the meaning of those truths once received. Against this error we do not dispute directly in the present question, both because it supposes revelation, whose existence has not yet been proved here, and because we sufficiently refuted it in the treatise *On the Infused Virtues*, where we also demonstrated true progress in faith (n. 515 ff.). The other error is that of those who introduce the progress of human reason for this purpose, that they may exclude the necessity of revelation which we established in the preceding thesis. For if, they say, any excellence appears in the Christian religion above preceding religions, it must be attributed not to revelation, but to the progress of reason; or if there was or still is any ignorance as regards religion, it must be dispelled not necessarily through revelation, but through the continual progress of reason itself. We undertake here to refute this error, with this purpose also, that the necessity of revelation may be better confirmed.

134. Nevertheless it will help to set forth certain things beforehand, so that the discussion may proceed clearly. And first, the word progress, derived from the verb *gradior* and the preposition *prae*, properly signifies a step or movement toward the forward part; whence Tully said (*On Duties*, book 1, c. 1): "and he is not ignorant of their advances and, as it were, anticipations." Therefore he progresses who proceeds further, just as he is said to regress who steps backward. But figuratively progress is taken for the fruit which we make while devoting effort to some matter: "The chief men of philosophy itself," says Cicero (*Tusculan Questions*, book 4), "could never have made such great progress in their studies without a burning desire." Hence also someone is commonly said to progress in letters, sciences, virtue, piety, etc., when he makes fruit in them or advances. From this signification of the word progress each person gathers: 1) that progress indeed imports movement or change, but that not every change is progress. For there can be movement which is not toward the forward part, by which we do not proceed further, which is not a change for the better. 2) That in every progress something is supposed which remains unchanged. For someone would not be said to progress, or to be moved toward the forward part, or to be changed for the better, unless he were the same one who before was behind and now is ahead, who now has himself better than before. This indeed is proper to any change properly so called. "It belongs to the nature of change," says St. Thomas (I, q. 45, a. 2, ad 2), "that something the same should have itself otherwise now and before. For sometimes it is the same being in act having itself otherwise now and before, as in movements according to quantity and quality; but sometimes it is the same being in potency only, as in change according to substance, whose subject is matter." And (*Contra Gentiles*, book 2, c. 12) he says: "In every change or movement there must be something having itself otherwise now than before; for the very name of change shows this."

135. Hence St. Augustine, who often teaches that all created things are subject to change, teaches at the same time that there is something in them which always remains the same. Thus, for example, he writes (*On Psalm* 121, n. 6): "What a body has is not the selfsame, because it does not stand in itself. It is changed through ages, it is changed through changes of places and times, it is changed through diseases and bodily defects; therefore it does not stand in itself. Heavenly bodies do not stand in themselves; they have certain changes of their own, even if hidden ones. Certainly they are changed from places to places; they ascend from the East into the West, and again go round to the East. Therefore they do not stand, nor are they the selfsame. The human soul itself does not stand. For by how many changes and thoughts it is varied, by how many pleasures it is altered, by how many desires it is struck and torn apart. The very mind of man which is called rational is changeable, nor is it the selfsame. At one time it wills, at another it does not will; at one time it knows, at another it does not know; at one time it remembers, at another it forgets. Therefore it does not have the selfsame from itself." These things indeed are directly about the change of all things, which at the same time indirectly, as is plain to the reader, show that something unchanged remains. But Augustine also teaches this other point directly more than once. Thus (*Soliloquies*, book 2, c. 12, n. 22) he says: "Indeed, the color of this body can be changed either by reason of health or by age, while the body itself has not yet perished. And this does not hold equally in all things, but in those things in which the things which are in subjects coexist, not so that the subjects themselves may exist. For in order that this wall be a wall, it is not made by this color which we see in it; since even if by some chance it should become black or white, or change some other color, nevertheless it would remain a wall and be called such." And generally (*On Eighty-Three Different Questions*, q. 46): "For ideas are certain principal forms, or stable and unchangeable reasons of things, which themselves have not been formed, and by this fact are eternal and always having themselves in the same mode, which are contained in the divine intelligence"; and the essences of things are assimilated to and correspond to the divine ideas.

136. With these things lightly touched on concerning the word and nature of progress, it must indeed be conceded that human reason is perfectible, and therefore can progress. For 1) even prescinding from revelation, by which it can learn truths, in those very things which human reason investigates by natural means it progresses first, as it were negatively, namely by rejecting errors which were

formerly mixed with truths already known. 2) Indeed, positive progress also must be admitted; for since we proceed from potency to act, and do not know all objects by intuition, but by the help of reasoning arrive gradually from known things at unknown things, it is impossible to see all truths immediately, and immediately to apprehend clearly and adequately those very truths which we do see. Hence St. Augustine, who in many places defends the immutability of truth, elsewhere excellently observes that the human mind, in relation to truth, can be in a different state. Thus, for example (*On John*, tract. 97, n. 1), he says: "Therefore those very things which concerning the eternity, truth, and holiness of God are said readily and openly without ceasing are understood well by some, badly by others, and by others are not understood. For he who understands badly does not understand. But by those very persons by whom they are well understood, they are seen by some less and by others better through the liveliness of the mind, and by no man are they grasped as by the angels." 3) But what we say of one man considered according to the different times of his life can also be said of many men, or of societies of men, insofar as they exist in successive times. For the truths which were already known by some generation will greatly profit the succeeding generation in the inquiry of truth. Namely, those truths are handed down to it as a certain inheritance, which by continual study it can increase and amplify.

137. But, once these things have been conceded, the question is: 1) whether progress of this sort of human reason is necessarily continuous; 2) whether it ought to happen in the same way in religion as in other matters; 3) whether progress in religion happens in such a way that, revelation being excluded, we arrive at every religious truth by the help of reason alone. This indeed is asserted by the rationalists of Germany and the eclectics of France.

138. And so behold their system in a few words. They take as a principle that the character of human reason is such that, just as in arts and sciences, so also in the knowledge and practice of religion, it continually progresses. But they suppose that the primitive condition of the human race was ruder and almost barbarous, and therefore that religion itself, from the beginning very imperfect, in the course of centuries continually put on new forms, always more perfect, and perhaps still puts them on, until, as philosophy progresses, religion itself is carried forward to the highest degree of perfection. Therefore they think that, in the first age of the world, religion, mixed with many errors, inclined toward fetishism; but with the passage of time, once errors had been rejected, it became purer. They judge that this happened especially by the help of philosophers and other wise men who, endowed with sharper talent, both knew better themselves and, aroused by a certain special providence, taught others religious truths.

139. Therefore one and the same natural religion, under a different form and perfection, according to the different cultivation of human reason and state of development, was relatively true; just as any worship whatever offered to God was, in its own time, good, legitimate, and praiseworthy. Accordingly, with no distinction made, they establish that fetishism, anthropomorphism, polytheism, dualism, Buddhism, Mohammedanism, and finally Christianity are different phases of natural religion, each of which claims truth for itself for the time in which it flourished or flourishes.

140. We do not deny, they say, that certain more excellent forms or phases of religion have existed; and therefore the highest praises must be attributed, and the greatest thanks given, to certain distinguished men who, cultivating religion beyond the rest, have deserved very well of the human race. Among these Moses, Zoroaster, Solon, Numa, Confucius, Socrates, Christ, and Muhammad stand out. Indeed, if you except Draper, who was not ashamed to prefer Mohammedanism to Christianity, they generally concede that in the progress of religion Christianity claims the first place for itself, as appearing more closely conformed to the innate laws of reason. Nevertheless, wholly forgetting the divinity of Christianity, they so equate it with the other religions that they deny that it bears before itself the perfect form of religion. For first, they say, the Apostles, being slower in talent, did not always rightly grasp the doctrine of Christ. Then neither the Apostles nor Christ Himself entirely put off the traditions of the Jews and the

fictions of the nations. Then finally Christ, as if by deliberate purpose, sometimes employed that method of teaching which is called accommodation. Yet this doctrine of accommodation, formerly common among rationalists, now most of them seem to have abandoned; for they prefer to consider Christ as one of the distinguished philosophers who, as he could, taught religious truths in his own time, yet, like the others, mixing many errors with them. I pass over those who have progressed so far that they deny the very real existence of Christ, judging that he represents only a mythical person.

141. Therefore the impious and equally absurd theory of the rationalists returns to this: that, every revelation being repudiated, they assert religion to be the work of reason alone; they ascribe its advancement and perfection solely to the successive development of reason; they acknowledge that form of religion which corresponds to the present cultivation of reason; and finally they accept Christianity understood and accommodated in this way. For otherwise, in their judgment, the Christian religion could no longer be approved by men who have already passed beyond the limits of adolescence.

142. Indeed all the authors of this impious system suppose the theory of relative and mutable truth, since they consider all religions, even those altogether opposed to one another, as relatively true and legitimate in their own age. But the French eclectics and the pantheists expressly assert that theory, and upon it as a foundation they build the mutability and progress of religion. According to these pseudo-philosophers, truth is reached by men not absolutely and as it is in itself, but only relatively and by a certain degree, as it were. For although objects are in themselves determined and fixed, nevertheless we attain only a little part of them, which corresponds more or less to absolute truth according to the general condition of progress of each age. Hence those things which are true, right, and holy at one time are found false and depraved in another age; and since this is true of truth generally, it must also be asserted by the same reason of religious truth. Compare, if you wish, the *Dublin Review* ("Mr. Mill's Denial of Necessary Truth," October 1871).

143. Therefore, with these things having been set forth: Section II. The proposed question is solved. PROP. VII. 1. Once divine revelation has been rejected, the human race cannot be recalled from ignorance of truths concerning natural law and religion by the help of philosophy or philosophers. Nor will the humanitarian progress fabricated by the rationalists help for this purpose: 2. if it is established as continuous, it contradicts history and experience; 3. if moreover it is transferred to religion, insofar as all religions are said to be diverse forms, successively more perfect, of one primitive religion, it is impious and absurd; 4. finally, if it is established under this title, that every truth is relative and mutable, it is not only absurd and impious, but also destroys the certainty of all human knowledge.

144. The first part is proved. I. In order that philosophers could teach religion to the human race, they themselves would first have to know with certainty the things which pertain to worship and morals. But the more excellent among the philosophers who were destitute of revelation or rejected it, as is plain from the preceding thesis, fell into the most disgraceful errors. Therefore. And indeed true religion cannot be except one (nn. 68 ff.); but philosophers could not teach one religion, since among them there was always the greatest disagreement. Certainly no school of philosophers held the entire truth; and even those schools which deserved best concerning moral discipline, such as the Academy, the Lyceum, and the Porch, went off into the most absurd opinions. Lactantius graphically sets forth the ignorance of the philosophers (*Epitome of the Divine Institutes*, c. 40): "There are innumerable sayings and deeds of the philosophers by which their foolishness can be refuted. And so, since we cannot enumerate all, a few will have sufficed. It is enough that it be understood that the philosophers are teachers neither of justice, which they did not know, nor of virtue, about which they lie. For what would they teach, who often confess their own ignorance? I pass over Socrates, whose saying is well known. Anaxagoras pronounces that all things are surrounded by darkness. Empedocles says that the paths of the senses for finding truth are narrow. Democritus testifies that truth lies sunk in some deep well; and because they find it nowhere, for this reason they affirm that no wise

man has yet existed. Therefore, since there is no human wisdom, as Socrates says in Plato, let us then follow divine wisdom, and let us give thanks to God, who both revealed and handed it down to us, and let us congratulate ourselves that we hold truth and wisdom by a heavenly benefit, which philosophy, sought by so many talents and so many ages, could not find." Nor would it have been easy for anyone to gather into a sum the truth scattered among individuals. "It is easy to teach," says the same Lactantius (*Divine Institutes*, book 7), "that almost the whole truth was divided among the philosophers and sects... and that there was no sect so wandering, nor any philosopher so empty, that he did not see something from the truth. But while they rage with eagerness to contradict, while they defend even their own false things and overthrow even the true things of others, not only has the truth slipped away from them, which they pretended to seek, but they especially lost it by their own fault. But if someone had existed who gathered into one and reduced into a body the truth scattered among individuals and diffused through the sects, he certainly would not dissent from us. But no one can do this unless he is skilled and knowledgeable in the truth."

145. II. But let us grant that the philosophers could have acquired for themselves the whole religious truth; nevertheless they could not themselves have expelled the ignorance of the human race. For by what way would they have taught the people? 1) By scientific instruction and philosophical investigation? But then all those difficulties would return which, as we have heard from St. Thomas (n. 126), make revelation necessary: for few are fit for philosophical investigation, few are zealous for it, and those themselves would attain truth only after a long time. Yet, as Lactantius has it (*Divine Institutes*, book 3, c. 16): "All philosophy must be cast aside, because wisdom is not to be studied, which lacks end and measure; but one must be wise, and indeed early. For a second life is not granted to us, so that when in this life we seek wisdom, in that one we may be wise; in this life each must be done. It must be found quickly, so that it can be undertaken quickly, lest anything perish from life, whose end is uncertain." Hence Tully himself wrote: "Philosophy is content with few judges, deliberately fleeing the multitude, and is itself suspected and hated by that multitude; so that if someone wishes to reproach the whole of it, he can do so with the people favoring him." 2) Would the philosophers have taught the people religious truths by the way of authority? But what is their authority? "Those precepts," says Lactantius (*Divine Institutes*, book 3, c. 27), "have no weight, namely those proposed by the philosophers, because they are human and lack a greater authority, that is, divine authority. Therefore no one believes, because he who hears thinks himself to be as much a man as he who commands." But did they not themselves take away every force from the very human authority of the philosophers, whatever it is, by their manner of living? For, as the same Lactantius observes (loc. cit., c. 16): "Those who only teach and do not do, themselves subtract weight from their own precepts. For who would obey, when the teachers themselves teach not to obey?" Behold what Tully writes concerning philosophers: "How often is any one of the philosophers found who is so formed in morals, so constituted in soul and life, as reason demands? who thinks his discipline not a display of knowledge, but a law of life? who obeys himself and submits to his own decrees? One may see others with such levity and boasting, that it would have been better for them not to have learned; others greedy for money, some for glory, many slaves of lusts, so that their speech wonderfully fights with their life; and this seems to me most disgraceful."

146. III. Let us grant even that the philosophers did not lack a means of teaching the human race; still it is not thereby established that, without revelation, it could have learned religious truth. For for this purpose very many philosophers would be required, since a few would not suffice. They would have to be lovers of the human race and zealous for propagating religious truth; especially, men who had seriously applied their mind to investigating the laws of religion and morals; who would be prepared in soul to endure the troubles and labors necessary for rightly instructing the human race; who would furnish this even against the commands and threats of rulers, and would not adopt a system of accommodation. Who would expect these things from philosophers destitute of revelation? It is pleasing, therefore, to complete this argumentation with the confession of Rousseau himself, who writes (*Emile*, book 1): "I consulted the philosophers, I turned through their books, and weighed their various opinions. I recognized them all as full

of spirits, affirming boldly, even in doubtful matters judging from the tripod, professing that they know everything, disentangling nothing, ridiculing one another. This indeed seemed to me common to all of them, in which they are least deceived. Elated and as if triumphant when they attack others; when they themselves are attacked, broken and cast down. If you examine their arguments, you find plainly none except those prepared for overthrowing something. If you count their votes, each bears the one which each attributes to himself. They cohere with one another in nothing except in contending; while they wish themselves alone to seem illuminated by the light of truth, candid, worthy of trust, then they command us in some way to acquiesce in their word and thrust upon us rotten and absurd fictions as true and certain principles." See Hooke (*On True Religion*, on natural law, diss. 1, art. 1, prop. 2; it is also extant in Migne, complete course, vol. 2).

147. The second part is proved. I. As regards the arts and sciences, history places beyond every hazard of doubt a fact known to all, namely that in certain periods of times the human race not only did not increase the treasure of cognitions received from past generations, but rather diminished it; and therefore, instead of having advanced or made progress, it rather followed the way of regress. It escapes no one, for example, that Greece attained the perfection of the arts under Pericles, of eloquence under Demosthenes, of moral philosophy under Socrates, of metaphysics, physics, and other natural sciences under Plato and Aristotle, and of military glory under Alexander. But who is ignorant that this glory, in subsequent times, turned toward setting? Almost the same thing happens in Latium. In the space of one century there flourished Tully, Sallust, Titus Livy, Tacitus, Virgil, Horace, etc., who carried eloquence, history, and poetry to the summit of perfection; but afterward, together with the Empire, Latin letters, continually declining, almost perished. The records of all nations which exist teach their rise, increase, summit, and then the decrease and destruction which followed, as regards arts and sciences. That is, societies of men seem in this matter to imitate what we see with our eyes in the organic nature of individuals: they are born, grow, and are dissolved.

148. II. But as regards religion: 1) history likewise is witness that in the beginnings of the human race religion and morality existed perfect; that men worshipped one God; that only in later times were peoples led into polytheism and substituted for the legitimate worship of the true God the foul adoration of idols. Worthy to be consulted on this matter is Thebaud, S.J. (*Gentilism: Religion Previous to Christianity*, New York, 1876). Indeed, all know that precisely at the time when polytheism was dominant among the nations, the Jewish nation professed monotheism; just as monotheism is now found not only in the Christian people, but also among Persians, Indians, Chinese, etc. And so is the passage from monotheism to polytheism called progress? Then the nations which now are monotheist have regressed. Is it called regress? Then those which formerly passed from monotheism to polytheism regressed. On either hypothesis the theory concerning religion continually progressing is shown false. 2) But our very experience manifests to us the departure of nations from the true religion, just as of men, when, legitimate authority being rejected, from Catholics they have become heretics, from heretics theists, from theists pure rationalists, and finally atheists. Who is ignorant that this was the process, for example, of the philosophism which prevailed in the last century? Certainly those who now, having followed the new philosophy, under the name of progress profess naturalism and rationalism have progressed so far that they embrace materialism or pantheism. Therefore let those hold the law of continual progress, or of reason and religion continually progressing, who do not fear to call a return to materialism and pantheism progress; for these are most ancient errors. 3) History so openly contradicts the asserted law of continual progress that finally even its defenders acknowledge this contradiction. But they try to explain it by calling the regressions manifest in history anomalies, and indeed such as contribute by some hidden reason to the progress of humanity. They speak almost in the way in which rivers not rarely hide their waters under the earth, so that, after new waters have been gathered there, they may be increased and appear more abundant. But everyone sees that an evasion of this sort is the work of imagination; for, to pass over the other points, no one will say that ignorance contributes to increasing

knowledge, or that errors of themselves contribute to increasing truth.

149. III. If we wish to penetrate the inner reason which impedes the continual progress of the human race, we must cast our eyes upon those things which happen to the individual man. Indeed, various causes, whether voluntary or involuntary, impede the continuous progress of any man in such a way that, instead of acquiring new cognitions, he rather forgets those which he once knew. Therefore what can happen to individuals can also happen to nations, and, with proportion, from the same causes. But in the business of religion it is still easier to regress, or at least not to progress; for religious truths are opposed to the passions of our corrupt nature. Material progress itself can sometimes hinder religious progress; for the more we are turned toward earthly things, the more we can be turned away from eternal things, so that the material man does not perceive those things which are of the spirit.

150. St. Thomas had already wonderfully solved this question (*Ethics*, book 1, lect. 11), where he says: "It belongs to the nature of man to use reason for the investigation of truth. But it is proper to reason not to apprehend truth immediately. And therefore it belongs to man to advance gradually in the knowledge of truth. But separated substances, which are called intellectual, have knowledge of truth immediately, without inquiry... In the case of things which are well disposed toward something being circumscribed, time seems to be, as it were, a discoverer or good cooperator, not indeed because time of itself does anything for this, but according to those things which are done in time." "Time seems to be, as it were, a discoverer or a good cooperator, not indeed because time of itself operates anything for this, but according to those things which are done in time. For if someone, as time proceeds, gives effort to investigating truth, he is aided by time toward finding truth, both as regards one and the same man, who later will see what he had not seen before, and also as regards different men, as when someone looks upon those things which were discovered by predecessors and adds something. And in this way additions have been made in the arts; from the beginning some small thing was discovered, and afterward through different persons it gradually advanced into a great quantity, because it belongs to each person to add what is lacking in the consideration of predecessors. But if, on the contrary, the exercise of study is omitted, time is rather a cause of forgetfulness, as is said in the fourth book of the *Physics*, both as regards one man, who, if he gives himself to negligence, will forget what he knew, and as regards different men. Hence we see that many sciences which flourished among the ancients, studies gradually ceasing, have passed into oblivion."

151. The third part is proved. I. If all religions which exist or have existed in the world, according to the law of continual progress, were nothing but diverse forms, successively more perfect, of one and the same religion, it would follow that all, for their various ages, were equally true. But this is absurd, since they are opposed to one another contradictorily or even contrarily; but contradictories and contraries cannot be true at the same time. Cicero himself recognized this truth; for after he had set forth various opinions about the gods (*On the Nature of the Gods*, book 1, n. 2), he adds: "There is no matter about which not only the unlearned but even the learned disagree so greatly. Since their opinions are so varied and so disagreeing among themselves, one of two things certainly can happen, that none of them is true; the other certainly cannot happen, that more than one is true." Wherefore all the arguments by which we proved Proposition III must here be recalled.

152. II. The system which we are attacking assumes as certain that religion is the work of reason alone, and that there is no revelation. But this is repugnant both to history and to reason. 1) It is repugnant to history. For authentic and historically most certain monuments, such as the books of Moses, prescinding for the time being from their divinity, testify that at the beginning of things God communicated true and perfect religion, monotheism, to men through revelation. But, as we said, with the lapse of time the greatest part of men deserted the true religion and substituted for the worship of the true God the vain and impious worship of many gods. With these monuments, which make us certain that true religion existed in the beginning by the help of revelation, even the traditions themselves of the gentiles agree, which, although

in a confused and obscure way, testify to some special communication of God for teaching men. 2) It is repugnant to reason. For reason, as we proved above, evidently manifests that revelation is possible, indeed necessary as regards religion, even if we remain within the limits of nature; and that the chief men even among the philosophers, destitute of revelation, erred disgracefully concerning matters of worship and morals. Therefore it is repugnant to reason to exclude any revelation as if a priori, and to attribute progress solely to the powers of reason.

153. III. Whoever seeks the intrinsic principle of the error which we attack will find it in the absurd system of pantheism, which could also be proved historically. According to the pantheists, only one substance exists, which unceasingly and continuously evolves and unfolds itself, like a spider which, as it were, unfolds and draws out its web from its own entrails. Thus humanity, like the rest of things, is nothing but a certain manifestation and evolution of that substance. But since religion itself is nothing but, as it were, a consequence of human nature, just as humanity evolves perpetually, so religion itself evolves perpetually. It is enough to have indicated these things, so that anyone considering them can gather for himself that the system which we are here attacking ultimately teems with those absurdities with which pantheism itself teems.

154. The fourth part is proved. I. "The truth of knowledge," says St. Thomas (*Contra Gentiles*, book 1, c. 59), "is the adequation of intellect and thing, according as the intellect says that what is, is, or that what is not, is not." Hence, in order that truth of knowledge be present, "that which the intellect says and knows in understanding must be made equal to the thing, namely, so that it is in the thing as the intellect says." Therefore, if there are objects which immutably and necessarily are what they are, there is immutable and necessary truth; and therefore it cannot be said that every truth is relative and mutable. For the concept which the intellect forms about objects either corresponds to them and presents them as they really are, or it does not correspond, referring them otherwise than they are. If the first, certainly the truth of knowledge is immutable, just as the essences themselves of things are immutable. But in the other hypothesis no truth is present, neither perfect nor imperfect or vitiated. Likewise, enunciable propositions either contain immutable truth or falsity, according as the thing has itself as it is enunciated, or otherwise. For when I say, for example, "man is endowed with liberty," the judgment which I put forward is immutably true; but the contrary judgment, "man is subject to necessity," is false. Nor can we find degrees in indivisible truth, is or is not, so that a false judgment has some degree of truth. In order that we may in some way clarify this argument, let us observe that there certainly are objects which immutably are what they are. For 1) the essences of things are immutable in this sense, that some thing, so long as it is, necessarily has all those things through which it is such a thing and not another; just as human nature necessarily and immutably has all the constituents of human nature, and if you take away soul or body, by that very fact you no longer conceive man. 2) The same must be said about the relations which necessarily flow from the essences of things; for they too are in themselves immutable and necessary. Certainly it will always be true, for example, that human nature necessarily excels the nature of brute animals, and that it is dependent on God. 3) Singular things are subject to continual changes, and therefore true cognitions about them are in some way mutable. Namely, it can happen that at one time something must be affirmed of them which, since they change, must be denied at another time. Nevertheless, as St. Thomas noted (I, q. 84, a. 1): "Of mutable things there are immobile relations; thus Socrates, even if he does not always sit, nevertheless it is immovably true that when he sits he remains in one place. And for this reason nothing prevents there being knowledge about movable things... There can also be some knowledge of generable and corruptible things, for example natural knowledge, not according to the particulars which are subject to generation and corruption, but according to universal reasons, which are of necessity and always."

155. II. If someone asks the reason why the essences of things are necessary and immutable, and therefore why true knowledge of them must be absolute and immutable, what is handed

down in metaphysics must be recalled. Namely, the essences of things must correspond to the ideas of the divine intellect; these ideas God has by contemplating His own essence as imitable ad extra. Compare what we set forth in the treatise *On God the Creator* (n. 128 ff.). Therefore mutability cannot be admitted in the essences of things unless mutability is admitted in the divine intellect and in the divine essence itself; and these things are openly repugnant.

156. Hence one understands: 1) the argumentation by which St. Thomas (I, q. 16, a. 1) proves that the divine intellect, and not our intellect, is the measure of truth. "Since the true," he says, "is in the intellect according as it is conformed to the thing understood, it is necessary that the notion of the true be derived from the intellect to the thing understood, so that the thing understood also is called true according as it has some order to the intellect. But the thing understood can have order to some intellect either per se or accidentally. Per se indeed it has order to the intellect on which it depends... Natural things are said to be true according as they attain the likeness of the species which are in the divine mind." And St. Anselm (*Dialogue on Truth*, c. 7): "Teacher: Do you think that there is ever anything, or anywhere, which is not in the highest truth, and which has not received from there what it is insofar as it is; or which can be other than what it is there? Student: It is not to be thought. Teacher: Whatever therefore truly is, insofar as it is this, is what it is there. Student: You can conclude absolutely that everything which is, truly is, since it is not other than it is there. Teacher: Therefore there is truth in the essence of all things which are, because they are this which they are in the highest truth." One understands: 2) that only those teach the mutability of truth who constitute our intellect as its measure. Thus Protagoras, who (Laertius, book 9, segment 311) held that "man is the measure of every truth," consequently denied the absolute true, as Cicero reports (*Academics*, book 2, c. 46): "Another judgment is that of Protagoras, who thinks that what seems true to each person is true for each person." But since the notion of God is absolute and immutable, he consequently held that it is hidden from us whether God exists (compare *On the Nature of the Gods*, book 1, n. 23). Hence St. Thomas (I, q. 16, a. 1, ad 2) writes: "It must be said that the ancient philosophers did not say that the species of natural things proceed from some intellect, but that they come from chance. And because they considered that the true imports a comparison to intellect, they were compelled to establish the truth of things in order to our intellect." And the more recent assertors of relative truth are chiefly those who, according to pantheistic principles, affirm that our mind, by knowing things, creates those same things!

157. III. The absurd theory concerning mutable truth can be refuted from false consequences. For 1) it leads to absolute skepticism. For if we attain no object as it is in itself, if we do not know the relations of things as they really have themselves, all our notions are mutable, so that the things which we now think true may rightly be found false in the course of time. Therefore we act prudently if we now hold nothing as certain, but doubt about all things. And certainly sad experience confirms the inference at which we arrive by reasoning from the adversaries' principles. For general skepticism occupies the mind of all those who have too greatly extolled the rights of reason; and they doubt about the chief religious truths, about the existence of a personal God, about the immortality of the human soul, indeed about the very first principles, such as the principle of contradiction. 2) Indeed it leads to nihilism. St. Augustine had already noted this, writing (*Soliloquies*, book 2, c. 5, n. 8): "A. The true is that which has itself as it seems to the knower, if he wills and is able to know. R. Therefore that will not be true which no one can know. Then if the false is what seems otherwise than it is, what if this stone seems to one person a stone and to another wood? Will the same thing be both false and true?" And (n. 7): "But if you say that nothing is true, do you not fear lest it follow that nothing exists through itself? For from the same source from which this is wood, from there also it is true wood. Nor can it happen that through itself, that is, without a knower, it is wood and is not true wood."

Article 8. The character of the notes of revelation and their necessity are sketched

158. Having demonstrated the possibility, indeed the moral necessity, of divine revelation, we must now inquire whether and how it can be known that divine origin belongs to some doctrine, or that some religion is truly divinely revealed. But when we inquire into the mode by which the existence of divine revelation can be established for us, by that very fact we investigate the means through which we can arrive at knowledge of this sort. These means are usually called the notes of revelation, since they manifest divine revelation itself; they are also called criteria of revelation, insofar as from them true revelation is judged and discerned; or they are also called motives of credibility, because by their help the fact of revelation is rendered evidently credible, and therefore it becomes known with certainty that the revealed truths themselves must be admitted altogether.

159. The necessity of knowing, and indeed with certainty, the fact of revelation is easily understood by all. For if God reveals anything, firm faith must be given to Him, as we showed in the treatise *On the Virtues* (n. 1029 ff.). But something would be believed irrationally with firm and irreformable assent as divinely revealed if there were some doubt about revelation itself. Therefore it is necessary that revelation itself be established with certainty. Hence among the propositions condemned by Innocent XI is the twenty-fifth, which sounds thus: "The assent of supernatural faith, useful for salvation, is compatible with only probable knowledge of revelation; indeed with fear, by which one fears that perhaps God has not spoken." And the Supreme Pontiff Pius IX (*Qui pluribus*, encyclical, November 3, 1846) teaches: "Human reason indeed, lest it be deceived and err in a matter of such importance, ought diligently to inquire into the fact of divine revelation, so that it may be certain for itself that God has spoken, and may exhibit to Him, as the Apostle most wisely teaches, a reasonable service." St. Thomas had already taught these things (*Contra Gentiles*, book 3, c. 154), saying: "Because the proposed speech needs confirmation in order that it be received, unless it is manifest through itself, and those things which are of faith are not manifest to human reason, it was necessary that something be applied by which the speech of those preaching the faith would be confirmed. But it could not be confirmed by any principles of reason by way of demonstration, since those things which are of faith exceed reason. Therefore it was necessary that the speech of the preachers be confirmed by certain signs, by which it would be manifestly shown that speech of this sort proceeded from God." But it suffices to have hinted at these things, since we expressly demonstrated them in the treatise *On the Infused Virtues* (disp. 3, art. 8).

160. From these things it is easily inferred that there can be some means for knowing revelation with certainty; and that to deny this possibility is finally the same as to deny the possibility of revelation itself. For if there were no means by which revelation could be rendered certainly credible, man could never firmly believe God speaking. But it would be repugnant to divine wisdom to manifest some truths to us by His own speech if it were impossible for us to adhere to them with the mind; just as someone would act in vain, and therefore foolishly, who directed his speech to a deaf person who could in no way hear or perceive what the other puts forward.

161. In truth, on the hypothesis that revelation has been made, if no means could be available leading with certainty to knowledge of it, one of these two things would have to be conceded: either it would matter little whether man believed or did not believe God speaking; or it would matter little whether he believed rationally or otherwise. Now the first, as we were just recalling, is openly repugnant; the second appears evidently irrational, all the more because from it would follow that man could indifferently embrace one or another religion, although this has already been demonstrated to be erroneous and impious against the relative indifferentists.

162. Indeed it is proper to divine providence that it lead all things to their ends through means conformable to their nature. Therefore, on the hypothesis that revelation has been made, if man is bound to believe God speaking, God must lead man to believing by those means which are conformable to rational nature. But it belongs to rational nature to believe rationally; nor would one

rationally believe something to be divinely revealed without a sufficient motive confirming the fact of revelation. Therefore motives of this sort must be present, nor can they be lacking to divine providence. To this point, therefore, belongs that saying of Blessed Peter (1 Pet. 3:15): "always ready to give satisfaction to everyone asking you a reason for that hope which is in you." And by the same reason the Apostle says (Rom. 12:1): "your reasonable service." Hence also the Vatican Council (*Dei Filius*, ch. 3) testifies that God willed that "the service of our faith be consonant with reason," and that "the assent of faith is by no means a blind movement of the mind." Compare what we said in the treatise *On the Infused Virtues* (n. 677 ff.).

163. Therefore, with these things placed in safety, it remains to inquire what are the means, or criteria, by which divine revelation can certainly be discerned. The Deists of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, such as Herbert, Toland, Dodwell, Rousseau, etc., like most rationalists of our time who still retain the name of revelation, judge that the only means of judging the divine origin of a doctrine which is presented as revealed is its conformity with the principles of reason. This criterion is altogether worthy of rationalists. For 1) the conformity of some doctrine with the principles of reason indeed shows that it is true; but in no way does it demonstrate that it is revealed, if it is true that reason can know anything true by its own powers. Revelation is a fact, which needs witnesses in order to be proved true. 2) By this criterion of the rationalists, any doctrine containing mysteries would have to be excluded; for reason cannot positively demonstrate the conformity of mysteries with principles known by the natural light. 3) By the same criterion, any revealed doctrine exhibiting truly supernatural religion would have to be excluded as if a priori; for this exceeds the keenness of the mind. Hence, as a little earlier we heard from St. Thomas (*Contra Gentiles*, book 3, c. 154): "The speech of those preaching the faith could not be confirmed by any principles of reason by way of demonstration, since those things which are of faith exceed reason"; and he adds that Christian revelation was confirmed "when those preaching such things performed works, healing the sick and performing other mighty deeds, which no one but God could do. Hence the Lord, sending the disciples to preach, said: Heal the sick, raise the dead, cleanse lepers, cast out demons (Matt. 10:8); and it is said: But they, going forth, preached everywhere, the Lord working with them and confirming the word by the signs that followed, Mark 16:20." 4) It could seem strange that rationalists seek a criterion of revelation, since they reject every revelation. But just as they misuse the word revelation (n. 102), so they assign such a criterion of revelation that, once it has been admitted, nothing else can be believed except what is demonstrated from intrinsic causes to be true. We refuted this error in the treatise *On the Infused Virtues* (n. 1045 ff.).

164. For many Protestants there is no other criterion for knowing with certainty the divine origin of revealed doctrine besides revelation itself. Namely, they think that revelation takes place interiorly and immediately to each individual, and therefore that each person has what they call the testimony of the spirit. Others, however, acknowledge nothing except a certain instinct by which someone is impelled to believe, without any objective reason manifesting the credibility of revelation. We also refuted these errors in the treatise *On the Infused Virtues* (n. 706 ff.).

165. Therefore, these things being set aside, in order that the true doctrine in this matter may be understood, it must first be noted that some criteria of revelation are negative, others positive. Those are called negative which, if they are lacking to some doctrine, allow it to be concluded at once that it is not divinely revealed; but if they are present, it can indeed be argued that it can be revealed, yet it is not yet established that it is revealed. Positive criteria, however, are those which, if they are found in some doctrine, exhibit an irrefragable testimony of the divine origin of that doctrine. Again, of the criteria of revelation, some are intrinsic, others extrinsic. Intrinsic are those which, as it were, adhere intrinsically to the doctrine itself, so that to one rightly considering it, it immediately appears as divine. But extrinsic criteria are those which, distinct from the doctrine itself, come upon it from without, as an external testimony confirming its divine origin.

166. Now among negative criteria the principal one is the conformity of the doctrine which is presented as revealed with the principles of reason. That is: 1) if some doctrine which is called revealed contains anything evidently repugnant to certain and evident principles of reason, it is at once rightly established that it is not revealed; for God, who reveals, is Himself the author of the natural light, nor can the author of Truth, or substantial Truth, contradict Himself. Compare what we said in the treatise *On the Infused Virtues* (n. 1073 ff.). 2) By the same reason, if a doctrine which is called divinely revealed contains anything evidently repugnant either to certain and evident principles of morality, or to the true happiness of man, insofar as this is known certainly and evidently from the light of reason, it must at once be concluded that it is not revealed. For God, who is holiness, cannot propose anything repugnant to holiness; nor, when directing man to true happiness, can He teach anything which stands in the way of it. 3) By the same reason, if the diverse heads of the revealed doctrine itself evidently fight among themselves, it is immediately judged that that doctrine is not from God; for this contradiction, like the preceding ones, would be poured back upon God as author. 4) With proportion, the mode by which some doctrine is said to be propagated from revelation can exhibit a negative criterion. If, for example, it had to be propagated by force or fraud, it would rightly be said that it is not revealed.

167. As regards this criterion it is useful to note these things. 1) The criterion of conformity of revealed doctrine with the principles of reason is not of itself necessarily to be applied. For it is not necessary that we adhere to revealed doctrines because they are evident intrinsically, since they must be adhered to not on account of their intrinsic evidence, but on account of the authority of God revealing, once it is established that He has revealed. Nor is it necessary in order that we assent reasonably; for our assent is reasonable if, without the intrinsic truth of the doctrine being seen through, there is sufficient testimony that it is from God. Compare what we handed down in the treatise *On the Infused Virtues* (n. 1045 ff.). 2) Indeed the same criterion can only rarely be applied with fruit and without danger, both because revelation can contain mysteries, and also because, as regards even the truths not inaccessible to reason, it labors under nearly the same disadvantages as human reason left to itself without revelation. Hence in the treatise *On the Infused Virtues* (n. 1027) we showed that, in the inquiry into revelation, the testimonies on which the fact of revelation rests should rather be investigated, without undertaking a philosophical examination of the truths which are called revealed. 3) Hence, as we sufficiently indicated from the beginning, this criterion can be of use when there immediately appears an evident contradiction between the doctrine which is called revealed and the evident principles of reason, morality, etc.; and then of itself it has only negative force. Hence deservedly, by the help of this criterion, the ancient Fathers and Apologists of the Church showed the gentiles that their religion was not of divine origin, since monstrous crimes were sanctioned through it. Likewise even now, by the help of the same criterion, it can easily be shown that Mohammedanism and Buddhism are false religions.

168. The sublimity, beauty, and harmony of the doctrine which is called revealed is usually referred to the positive and intrinsic criterion of revelation. For when that sublimity and harmony is so great that, once the powers of human reason have been inspected, it becomes certainly known that the herald of such a doctrine could not have discovered it from himself, nor learned it from other men, it is deservedly concluded that he received it from God communicating it in an extraordinary and supernatural mode. Hence a criterion of this sort is properly referred to one of the extrinsic criteria, concerning which we shall speak shortly. Meanwhile, observe that the excellence and sublimity of doctrine indeed serve for confirming the faith of those who already believe, or of doctrine already approved by other motives; but it is little apt and suitable for finding true revelation. For the talent of only a few is so cultivated that it can rightly weigh the diverse heads of doctrine and compare them with one another, so that it may admire the sublimity and harmony of the whole revelation. Then also this same criterion is in some way subjective and ambiguous, since it is difficult to determine the degree of sublimity which is required for establishing the matter, and many things which appear sublime to some are contemptible to others, especially when passions

urge. This is especially true when mysteries are found in the same doctrine; for then that saying of the Apostle can be verified (1 Cor. 1:18 ff.): "For the word of the cross is indeed foolishness to those who perish; but to those who are saved, that is, to us, it is the power of God. For it is written: I will destroy the wisdom of the wise, and the prudence of the prudent I will reject. Where is the wise man? Where is the scribe? Where is the searcher of this age? Has not God made foolish the wisdom of this world? For since in the wisdom of God the world did not know God through wisdom, it pleased God through the foolishness of preaching to save those who believe. For both Jews seek signs, and Greeks seek wisdom; but we preach Christ crucified: to Jews indeed a stumbling block, and to Gentiles foolishness; but to those called, both Jews and Greeks, Christ the power of God and the wisdom of God."

169. Wherefore the positive criteria of revelation are chiefly extrinsic, which are certain sensible facts accommodated to the grasp of all, and they are reduced to miracles and prophecies. Hence Christ the Lord Himself said (John 15:24): "If I had not done works which no other has done, they would not have sin." And the Vatican Council taught (*Dei Filius*, ch. 3): "In order that the service of our faith might be consonant with reason, God willed that, with the internal helps of the Holy Spirit, there be joined external arguments of His revelation, namely divine facts, and especially miracles and prophecies, which, since they clearly show forth the omnipotence and infinite knowledge of God, are most certain signs of divine revelation and accommodated to the intelligence of all. Wherefore both Moses and the prophets, and most especially Christ the Lord Himself, produced many and most manifest miracles and prophecies; and of the Apostles we read: But they, going forth, preached everywhere, the Lord working with them and confirming the word by the signs that followed. And again it is written: We have the firmer prophetic word, to which you do well to attend as to a lamp shining in a dark place."

170. We established chiefly by authority (*On the Infused Virtues*, n. 700 ff.) that Christian revelation, which we shall demonstrate to be the only true one, must be made credible by miracles and other external signs. But now we must scrutinize the inner nature of miracle and prophecy, so that the intrinsic force which they have for proving the divine origin of the doctrine in whose confirmation they are produced may become plain.

Article 9. Whether miracles are possible

171. No one is unaware that the work of the rationalists is now widely diffused through the world, and that it tends to this: to extol our nature and reason in such a way that it thoroughly rejects whatever savors of the supernatural. Therefore no one will wonder if they strive with all force to deny not only the existence and knowability of miracle, but even its very possibility. For they know very well that, once miracles have been admitted, revelation and the supernatural order are invincibly proved by them. Hence it is that the Vatican Council (*Dei Filius*, can. 4 on ch. 3) most opportunely taught: "If anyone shall say that no miracles can be done, and therefore that all narratives concerning them, even those contained in Sacred Scripture, must be relegated among fables or myths; or that miracles can never be known with certainty, nor by them can the divine origin of the Christian religion be rightly proved, let him be anathema." (1) The eminent Bishop of Poitiers writes excellently to the point (*Third Instruction*, etc., *Works*, vol. 5, p. 106 ff.): "The miracle, which belongs to the order of facts, is infinitely more probative for the multitudes than all other kinds of arguments; it is by it that a revealed religion imposes itself and becomes popular... Most revealed doctrines, presenting themselves as mysteries and being unable to have intrinsic evidence in their favor, the result is that, once the wonder-worker has disappeared, rational objections and pleas of non-receipt abound against the revealer. War, therefore, and war to the death, against miracle: such is the order-word, such is the watchword of the rationalist coalition. No reason to allege. Here is a first principle of which one has no right to ask the proof: miracle does not exist, miracle is not possible; whoever admits miracle becomes the deserter of reason, the accursed of philosophy, the excommunicated of criticism; there is an abyss

between him and positive science."

172. Other things which are contained in this definition we shall later set forth; in this article we institute the question concerning the possibility of miracle. Yet before we vindicate it, it is necessary to hand down the genuine notion of miracle itself. And so it should first be noted that those things which are called miracles are often also called powers, signs, portents, and prodigies. St. Thomas explains the difference of these names (II-II, q. 178, a. 1), saying: "In miracles two things can be attended to. One indeed is that which is done, which is something exceeding the faculty of nature; and according to this miracles are called powers. The other is that for the sake of which miracles are done, namely for manifesting something supernatural; and according to this they are commonly called signs. But on account of excellence they are called portents or prodigies, as if showing something from afar."

173. But let us retain the common name of miracle; for the very force of the word serves the thing to be declared. For, as St. Thomas notes (*Disputed Questions*, *On Miracles*, a. 2): "The name miracle is taken from wondering. But two things concur for wonder: one of them is that the cause of that which we wonder at is hidden; the second is that, in that which we wonder at, there appears something by which the contrary of what we wonder at seems that it ought to be. Thus someone could wonder if he saw iron rise toward a magnet, being ignorant of the power of the magnet, since it seems that iron by natural motion ought to tend downward. But this happens in two ways: in one way in itself, in another way as regards us. As regards us indeed, when the cause of the effect at which we wonder is not hidden simply, but hidden to this or that person, nor is there in the thing at which we wonder a disposition repugnant to the effect at which we wonder according to the truth of the thing, but only according to the opinion of the one wondering. And from this it happens that what is wondrous or admirable to one person is not admirable to another; just as one knowing the power of the magnet by teaching or by experiment does not wonder at the aforesaid effect, but one ignorant of it wonders. "But in itself something is wondrous or admirable whose cause is simply hidden, and when in the thing there is a contrary disposition according to nature to the effect which appears; and these things can not only be called wondrous in act or wondrous in potency, but also miracles, as having in themselves the cause of wonder. But the most hidden and most remote cause from our senses is the divine cause, which operates most secretly in all things. And therefore those things which are done by divine power alone in those things in which there is a natural order to the contrary effect or to a contrary mode of doing are properly called miracles. But those things which nature does, yet are hidden from us or from some one of us, or even those things which God does and which are not naturally apt to be done otherwise than by God, cannot be called miracles, but only wondrous or admirable things."

174. From these things it is easily plain that, according to the Angelic Doctor, two things are required for the notion of miracle: 1) that its cause be per se and simply hidden, and therefore be God, whose "essence," as he says (*Contra Gentiles*, book 3, c. 101), "no man in the state of this life can grasp by intellect"; 2) that "in the thing" (q. 6, *On Power*, a. 2, corpus) "there be a contrary disposition according to nature to the effect which appears." These two conditions must be accurately explained, so that the nature of miracle may be thoroughly known, and at the same time the chief difficulties against its possibility may be anticipated.

175. I. Beginning from the latter condition, according to which a miracle is "an effect outside the order of nature, or contrary to the disposition of the thing according to nature," we first note the necessity of this condition. For when it is lacking, an effect exceeding the faculty of nature, and consequently having a cause hidden per se, namely God, is not called and is not a miracle. "Creation," says St. Thomas (I, q. 105, a. 7, ad 1), "and the justification of the impious, although they are done by God alone, nevertheless, properly speaking, are not called miracles, because they are not naturally apt to be done through other causes; and so they do not happen outside the order of nature, since these things do not pertain to the order of nature."

176. But in order that the character of this same condition may be seen, observe that order always means multiplicity reduced to unity; hence where there are many effects which are reduced to one cause, there some order is given. But there are many causes, each of which can have many effects; hence many orders also exist and can be considered. Therefore, as far as the present matter is concerned, we distinguish a threefold order: the particular order, or the order of some nature, to which some effect can be opposed; the universal order, or the order of all created things among themselves; and finally the most universal order, which is the order of all created things to the first cause, God. But it is better to hear St. Thomas, who says (*Contra Gentiles*, book 3, c. 98): "Consideration can be taken of a twofold order, of which one indeed depends on the first cause of all things, whence it also embraces all things; the other is particular, which depends on some created cause and contains those things which are subject to that cause. And this indeed is manifold, according to the diversity of causes which are found among creatures. Yet one of them is contained under another, just as one cause exists under another. Hence all particular orders must be contained by the universal order and descend from that order, which are found in things according as they depend on the first cause. An example of this sort can be considered in political matters. For all the domestics of one father of a family have a certain order among themselves, according as they are subject to him. Again, both the father of the family himself and all others who are of his city have a certain order among themselves and to the ruler of the city, who again with all who are in the kingdom has some order to the king."

177. Therefore, when a miracle is called a work outside the order of nature, of which order must this be understood? Certainly it must not be understood of the particular order. "It does not suffice," says St. Thomas (I, q. 110, a. 4), "for the notion of miracle if something happens outside the order of some particular nature; because thus, when someone throws a stone upward, he would perform a miracle, since this is outside the order of the nature of the stone. From this, therefore, something is said to be a miracle, because it happens outside the order of the whole of created nature."

178. But the very order of the whole of created nature can, as we said, be considered either according as all created things are ordered among themselves, that is, the universal order, or according as they are ordered to God, that is, the most universal order. Which, then, is that order of the whole of nature outside of which a miracle is said to be? It will perhaps help to propose the question itself a little differently, so that the whole doctrine of St. Thomas on this matter may be understood more clearly.

179. In the universal order there can be considered: 1) the ordered things themselves; 2) the principle from which that order proceeds, which is nothing other than divine preordination embracing directing knowledge, commanding will, and goodness, to which all things are ultimately directed. "But the universal order," says St. Thomas (*Contra Gentiles*, book 3, c. 98), "according to which all things are ordered from divine providence, we can consider in two ways, namely as to the things which are subject to the order, and as to the reason of the order, which depends on the principle of the order... But if we consider the aforesaid order as to the reason depending on the principle... that order proceeds, as was said (c. 97), from the knowledge and will of God ordering all things to His goodness as to an end." Hence when a miracle is called a work "outside the order of the whole of nature," it can be compared either with divine preordination or with the natural things themselves which are ordered by it; and therefore a twofold question arises: 1) is a miracle a work outside divine preordination, or a work which God did not preordain, outside the most universal order? 2) is it a work outside natural things which are subject to divine preordination, or outside the order implanted in them, outside the universal order?

180. Now it is evident that a miracle is not said to be "outside the order of the whole of nature" in such a way that it is outside divine preordination. For "it is not possible," says St. Thomas (cited c. 98), "that God should do anything which is not willed by Him, since creatures do not proceed from Him naturally, but through will, as has been shown (book 2, c. 23). Nor is it possible that anything should be done by Him which is not comprehended by His knowledge, since will cannot be except of something

known. Nor again is it possible that He should do anything in creatures which is not ordered to His goodness as to an end, since His goodness is the proper object of His will. Likewise, since God is altogether immutable, it is impossible that He should will something which He had not willed before, or should begin anew to know something, or should order it to His goodness. Therefore God can do nothing which does not fall under the order of His providence, just as He cannot do anything which is not subject to His operation."

181. From this theory of St. Thomas, an old objection against the possibility of miracle, repeated by more recent unbelievers, is overthrown from the foundation. Namely, they say: if a miracle could happen, since it is "outside the order of the whole of nature," something would have escaped the divine knowledge directing that order, and the divine will, which willed the same order, would be changed, etc. "God," says St. Thomas (*On Power*, q. 6, a. 1, ad 6), "does not act against natural reasons by a changeable will; for God from eternity foresaw and willed that He would do what He does in time. Therefore He so instituted the course of nature that nevertheless it was preordained in His eternal will that He would sometimes do something outside that course." And (ibid., ad 12): "The divine art does not explain its whole self in the production of creatures, and therefore according to His art He can operate something in another way than the course of nature has. Hence it does not follow that if He can act against the course of nature, He can act against His own art. For even a human artisan can make another artifact by his art in a contrary mode from that in which he made it before."

182. Wherefore it remains that a miracle is called a work "outside the order of the whole of nature" insofar as it is outside nature and the order implanted in it, that is, outside the universal order. Since, therefore, the notion of miracle is situated in this, let it be noted: 1) by the name of nature here is signified "the substance of a created thing insofar as it is a suitable principle of its own operations"; 2) if the complex of all created substances is taken, there is had that which is called universal nature; 3) since in the operation of created substances there is a certain constancy, the powers of worldly things can be conceived as tempered by certain norms, so that they constantly operate in the same mode. These norms, and, in the concrete, the powers themselves insofar as they are conceived as affected by these norms, are called laws of nature. 4) But the constant mode of these actions, and one directed toward the proposed end, is called the order of nature. 5) Finally, the succession of effects constantly arising from the powers of creatures is called the course of nature. Since these three mutually imply one another, they are usually used indiscriminately (Liberatore, *Cosmology*, c. 4, a. 1). Hence a miracle is called "outside the order of the whole of nature" either because it surpasses the powers of created substances, that is, of universal nature, or because there is no power in nature for producing such an effect; or because, although it does not surpass them, that is, although there are powers capable of producing some effect, nevertheless it passes beyond their laws and mode of operating, that is, the order of nature.

183. And from these things one can already gather how it is conceived that God works a miracle, although it is not necessary to assign some determinate mode. For God, who is of infinite power, can either 1) produce an effect for producing which there is no power in nature; or 2) produce an effect which the powers of nature can produce, but without them; or 3) contain the powers of natural things lest they do what they are naturally apt to do. For example, He can prevent fire from burning; this third thing He can effect either a) by withdrawing concurrence, or b) by attributing to the agent a transient contrary activity which frustrates the effect of its proper activity, etc. But these things will become clearer from what will soon be said concerning the division of miracle.

184. To complete this doctrine, one thing can still be asked: whether a miracle can be called a work against nature? In order to answer this question, we observe that something can be said to be against nature either simply or in a certain respect, according as it is repugnant to every, even the most universal, inclination of nature, or only to some inclination of nature. To this latter belongs the connection and dependence of the operation of each creature both with respect to itself and with respect to other created

causes; just as to the most universal inclination belongs the subjection and all-sided dependence of creatures upon God.

185. Now it is sufficiently established from what has been said that a miracle is against nature in a certain respect; but in no way can it be called simply against nature. For 1) that is not simply against nature for which nature is in some way in potency. But with respect to God all creatures are in obediental potency, so that they may be moved without their proper causes, or outside the order of their proper causes. Therefore. 2) Hence St. Thomas teaches (*Contra Gentiles*, book 3, c. 100): "In corporeal agents also this is seen, that the movements which are in these lower bodies from the impression of higher bodies are not violent nor against nature, although they do not seem fitting to the natural motion which the lower body has according to the property of its form. For we do not say that the ebb and flow of the sea is a violent motion, since it is from the impression of a heavenly body, although the natural motion of water is only toward one part, namely toward the middle, or lowest place. Much more, therefore, whatever is done by God in any creature cannot be called violent or against nature."

186. And from this the solution is plain to the difficulty of those who say: God can do nothing against the moral order; therefore neither outside or against the physical order. St. Thomas had already answered (*On Power*, q. 6, a. 1, ad 3), saying: "Although God can act against the order which is of one creature to another, which is, as it were, of a particular nature with respect to Him, nevertheless He cannot act against the order of the creature to Himself. But the justice of man consists principally in the due order of man to God. Hence God cannot act against the order of justice. But the course of nature is according to the order of one creature to another, and therefore God can act against the course of nature."

187. II. By these things, then, one of the two conditions required for a miracle has been sufficiently explained; now we must deal with the other, according to which, as we said, the cause of a miracle must be hidden. Here it is asked whether such a hidden cause is God alone, or whether it can also be an angel; or whether a miracle exceeds the faculty of the whole of sensible nature, or of the whole of nature simply, so that spirits also are included. This question could seem superfluous, after we have heard from St. Thomas that the cause of a miracle is hidden per se, and therefore is none other than God. Yet it is useful to examine it, both because the nature of miracle will be better understood, and especially because it greatly serves for establishing the force of miracles for proving. For "we suppose," says Suarez (*On Religion*, t. 1, book 2, c. 16, n. 2), "that every power and ability of operating ad extra, or by transient and corporeal action, which is natural to angels, remained entire in demons after sin, because natural things were not diminished in the angels by sin, much less lost, as is the axiom of the theologians with St. Thomas (I, q. 64, art. 4), and it is taken from Dionysius (ch. 4, *On the Divine Names*)."

188. In order to embrace briefly the many things which are usually disputed on this matter, we observe: 1) Here it is properly asked whether angels are, or can be, the principal efficient cause of a miracle by their natural power. For if the question concerns ministerial or impetratory causality, "it must be said," says St. Thomas (I, q. 110, a. 4), "that some angels are said to do miracles either because God does miracles at their desire, just as holy men also are said to do miracles, or because they exhibit some ministry in the miracles which are done, by gathering dust in the common resurrection, or by doing something of this kind." We observe: 2) in a miracle there can be distinguished the truth of the work and the truth of the miracle. "It must be known," says St. Thomas (I, q. 114, a. 4), "that although works of demons of this sort, which seem to us miracles, do not attain to the true notion of miracle, nevertheless they are sometimes true things; just as the magicians of Pharaoh, by the power of demons, made true serpents and frogs." Hence it could be asked whether angels can do miracles a) true as regards the truth of the work, b) true as regards the truth of the miracle. (1) Explaining these same things more fully, the holy Doctor (*On Power*, q. 6, a. 4) teaches that angels can be ministers of God in performing miracles in several ways: "in one way by obtaining through prayers... Another way is according as angels dispose matter by their natural power

for this, that a miracle be done; just as it is said that in the resurrection they will gather the dust of the dead, which will be brought back to life by divine power... A third way is that they also operate something by co-operating... But how this can be must be considered. It is established that God works miracles by command alone. But we see that the divine command comes to lower rational spirits, namely human spirits, by means of higher ones, namely angels, as appears in the giving of the old law. And in this way, through angelic or human spirits, the divine command can come to corporeal creatures, so that through them the divine precept may in some way be presented to nature; and thus human or angelic spirits act in some way as an instrument of divine power for the perfection of a miracle... Nor is it marvelous if in this way God uses a spiritual creature instrumentally for producing wonderful effects in corporeal nature, since He also uses corporeal nature instrumentally for the justification of spirits, as is plain in the sacraments."

189. Now two things here are first certain among all. The first is this: there are some miracles which angels cannot effect even as regards the truth of the work. For, as St. Thomas teaches (*Contra Gentiles*, book 3, c. 102): "Every creature in its action requires some subject upon which it may act; for it belongs to God alone to make something from nothing, as was shown above (book 1, c. 16). But nothing which requires a subject in its action can act except upon those things for which that subject is in potency; for an agent operates upon some subject in order to bring it from potency into act. Therefore no creature, just as it cannot create, so also cannot act in some thing except that which is in the potency of that thing. But many miracles are done by divine power which are not in the potency of that thing, as that a dead man should revive." Wherefore, as the same holy Doctor notes (I, q. 114, a. 4, ad 2), "if sometimes something of this sort seems to be done by the operation of demons, this is not according to the truth of the thing, but only according to appearance. This can happen in two ways: in one way from within, according as a demon can change the fantasy of a man, and also the bodily senses, so that something appears otherwise than it is... In another way from without. For since he can form a body from air of whatever form and figure, so that, assuming it, he may appear visibly in it, by the same reason he can place around any thing whatever corporeal form, so that it may be seen in that species."

190. It is also conceded by all that angels can do some miracles which are true as regards the truth of the work. They explain this in two ways. 1) Through local motion, that is, either by transferring things very quickly from one place into another; or by raising a man or other objects on high, so that he seems to fly; or by withdrawing things from the sight of men, rendering them invisible; or by causing statues and pictures to move, walk, speak, etc. For they themselves move these things and speak through them, etc. 2) By applying active things to passive things. "They can," says St. Thomas (I, q. 114, a. 4), "employ certain seeds which are found in the elements of the world for completing effects of this sort, as Augustine says, *On the Trinity*, book 3, c. 8. And therefore it must be said that all transformations of corporeal things which can be done through some natural powers, to which the aforesaid seeds pertain, can be done through the operation of demons, these seeds having been applied." Compare what we said in the treatise *On God the Creator* (n. 466 ff.).

191. Therefore it only remains to inquire whether extraordinary effects of this sort, which angels can produce as regards the truth of the work, if they are produced by them, also have the truth of miracle. Benedict XIV (*On the Canonization of Saints*, book 4, part 1, c. 3, n. 13) answers thus: "But if anyone wished from the things brought forward thus far to infer that miracles exceeding the powers and faculty of visible and corporeal nature can be done by a demon through his natural power, he would openly be mistaken; since it is certainly one thing that God sometimes has used and can use the work of a demon in the performance of miracles, another thing that a demon does miracles. For according to our mode of speaking and common understanding, he is said to do a miracle who effects some extraordinary work for the confirmation of the truth which he preaches, or he at whose intercession something wondrous is done by God, so that his holiness may be established among men."

192. But here the ontological truth of miracle is properly considered; and concerning it St. Thomas teaches (I, q. 114, a. 4): "If miracle is taken properly, demons cannot do miracles, nor can any creature, but God alone; because miracle is properly called that which is done outside the order of the whole of nature, under which order every created power is contained. Yet sometimes that is called a miracle broadly which exceeds human faculty and consideration; and thus demons can do miracles, namely things which men wonder at, insofar as they exceed their faculty and knowledge." And (q. 110, a. 4, ad 2) he had taught: "Miracles, speaking simply, are said to occur, as was said in the body of the article, when some things are done outside the order of the whole of created nature. But because not every power of created nature is known to us, therefore when something is done outside the order of created nature known to us, by a created power unknown to us, it is a miracle as regards us. Thus, therefore, when demons do something by their natural power, they are called miracles not simply, but as regards us." Compare also *Contra Gentiles*, book 3, c. 102.

193. But to one asking why the same effects, which have truth of the work, whether done by God or by angels, nevertheless do not have truth of miracle if they are done by angels through their own power, although they have it if they are done by God, Suarez responds by explaining the doctrine of St. Thomas (*On Angels*, book 4, c. 39, n. 9): "Because angels can do nothing without the intervention and preparation of natural causes. First, because they always require pre-existing matter, since they can make nothing from nothing. Next, the matter itself does not obey them at a nod, as we also said with Augustine, *On the Trinity*, book 3, c. 8. Hence they can only transform matter according to some natural capacity, but not according to obediental potency. And finally, if this transformation is toward a form beyond local motion, they cannot make it by themselves, as by their own power, but only by applying an agent which has natural power for introducing such a form." And (n. 10): "In this also it must be considered that in the present discussion we are speaking of sensible works which appear miraculous to men; concerning these it can and must be conceded that, for them to be true miracles, it is necessary and sufficient that they surpass every natural power of natural and corporeal causes. For from this it is evidently concluded that they are also above every angelic power, since this power cannot effect sensible effects of this sort except by applying natural and corporeal active causes to passive ones." And (n. 11): "I concede that not all true miracles are equal simply, because some are nobler than others, either on the side of the effect or on the side of the mode. Nevertheless, in this all agree, and have a certain equality or univocity, that all are above the whole order of natural causes, and above the natural capacity of matter, or at least above the connatural mode in which such an effect of itself demands to be made. Hence sudden health, if it is done only by the swift application of natural causes, will not be truly miraculous; yet if it is done by the sole efficacy of a higher cause, or by command alone, or if the healing is so sudden that natural causes, even sufficiently applied, would not suffice by natural power to dispose the matter so suddenly, then the health will be truly miraculous. The same must be said of sudden rain and other similar works." I wished to copy out these testimonies of the distinguished Doctor because they prove that by some, after Benedict XIV (op. and loc. cit., c. 1, n. 17), his doctrine on this matter is not faithfully reported.

194. Therefore the true definition of miracle is: "an effect transcending the faculty and order of the whole of created nature"; or, as St. Thomas speaks (I, q. 105, a. 7; *Contra Gentiles*, book 3, c. 101): "a work which is done divinely outside the commonly observed order." But just as the things set forth thus far clearly explain this true notion of miracle, so they exclude false notions, especially those proposed by Locke, Clarke, etc. There is no leisure here to report and refute these one by one, since we are going to demonstrate not the possibility and force of proving of miracle taken in any way whatever, but of miracle as defined by us. See, if you wish, Hooke (*On True Religion*, diss. 2, c. 1).

195. III. Thus far concerning the nature of miracle. Now as regards the divisions of miracles, St. Thomas first notes (I, q. 105, a. 8) "that nothing can be called a miracle by comparison with

divine power; because whatever has been done, compared with divine power, is least, according to that saying of Isaiah 40:15: 'Behold the nations are reputed as a drop of a bucket, and as the moment of a balance.' But something is called a miracle by comparison with the faculty of nature, which it exceeds. And therefore, according as it more exceeds the faculty of nature, according to this it is called a greater miracle."

196. Then he proposes (loc. cit.) the division of miracles according as a miracle is done by a cause per se hidden and thus exceeds the faculty of nature. "But something exceeds the faculty of nature in three ways. In one way as to the substance of the fact, as that two bodies be together... or that a human body be glorified; which no nature can do; and these hold the highest degree among miracles. Secondly, something exceeds the faculty of nature not as to that which is done, but as to that in which it is done, as the raising of the dead and the illumination of the blind, and similar things. For nature can cause life, but not in a dead man; and it can furnish sight, but not in a blind man; and these hold the second place among miracles. In the third way something exceeds the faculty of nature as to the mode and order of doing; as when someone is suddenly cured from fever by divine power without treatment and the customary process of nature in such matters; and when immediately the air by divine power is condensed into rains without natural causes, as was done at the prayers of Samuel and Elijah (1 Kings 12 and 2 Kings 18); and things of this sort hold the lowest place among miracles."

197. The holy Doctor also hands down another division of miracle, according as a miracle is outside the order of the whole of nature, saying: (*Disputed Questions*, q. *On Miracles*, art. 2, ad 3): "Concerning those things which God does miraculously, such a distinction is usually applied, so that some are said to be done above nature, some against nature, some outside nature. Above nature indeed, insofar as nature can in no way attain to that effect which God does; and this happens in two ways, either because the form itself introduced by God can in no way be introduced by nature, as the form of glory, which God will introduce into the bodies of the blessed, and also as the Incarnation of the Word; or because, although it can introduce such a form into some matter, nevertheless not into this matter, as nature is able to cause life, but that nature cause life in this dead man, this it cannot do. It is said to be against nature when in nature there remains a contrary disposition to the effect which God does, as when He preserved the boys unharmed in the furnace, with the power of burning remaining in the fire, and when the water of the Jordan stood still, with gravity remaining in it; and it is similar that a virgin gave birth. But God is said to do something outside nature when He produces an effect which nature can produce, yet in that mode in which nature cannot produce it."

198. Therefore, with these things set forth beforehand: Section II. The proposed question is solved. PROP. VIII. Having regard both to the order existing in things and to the divine attributes, miracles, or "events exceeding the faculty and customary order of the whole of created nature," must be said to involve no repugnance; indeed, the perfection of divine power, even as it becomes known by the natural light, wholly claims for itself the power of performing them.

199. I. It is proved from the side of the order existing in things. Some repugnance would be detected in miracle from the side of the order outside of which it is, insofar as that order were necessary. But the universal order, outside of which a miracle is, is not necessary, but altogether contingent. Therefore, from the side of the order implanted in things, there is no repugnance that a miracle be done. The minor is proved. 1) That order certainly cannot be called necessary absolutely, that is, with no hypothesis made. For order cannot be understood without the substances or things in which it exists; nor can it surpass their nature and perfection, since it is called and is natural. But all things which are in the world exist not necessarily but contingently. Therefore the order implanted in them, considered absolutely, must be contingent. 2) Nor can the same order be called necessary on the hypothesis of the existence of those things in which it exists. For only that is altogether necessary, on the hypothesis of the existence of some thing, which pertains to its essence; just as, on the hypothesis that man exists, it is impossible that he be anything

other than a rational animal. But the order implanted in things, or the physical laws by which the world is governed, do not pertain to the essences of things existing in the world. Therefore, on the hypothesis of the existence of the things which are in the world, the necessity of the order which exists in them does not follow. Suppose, I ask, that a river changes its course and flows back toward its source; that the motion of the earth around its axis is directed not from east to west, but from west to east; that the motion of the planets is completed with greater or lesser speed than it is now completed, and other things of this sort. Would the essence of the river, of the earth, of the planets, of the world, be so changed that these could no longer be conceived? 3) Nor can the universal order be called necessary on the hypothesis of its own existence, or while it remains, so that if a rare change should happen, by that very fact the order would be destroyed. For a) it is indeed repugnant to an already constituted order that it be changed by one of those who are subject to the same order; but not that it be changed by him who constituted it and is above it. The reason is evident: a change of the order made by one who is subject to it is, as it were, a transgression of it, and therefore repugnant to it; but made by him who constituted the order and is above it, it is a legitimate derogation, which certainly is not repugnant, as can be seen in laws properly so called. But according to us, a miracle is not done except by God, who constituted the universal order and is above it. Therefore. "God," says St. Thomas (I, q. 105, a. 6), "can act outside the order of things, because He Himself is not subject to the order of second causes, but such an order is subject to Him as proceeding from Him, not through necessity of nature, but through the choice of will. For He could have instituted another order of things. Hence He can act outside this instituted order when He has willed." Certainly man can throw a stone upward because he is above the particular order of the stone; why will God, who is above universal nature, not be able to do something which is outside the order of the whole of nature? b) We come to the same conclusion if we consider the concept of a law of nature. For it is not of the essence of law that in no case be there a derogation from it, so that derogation is abrogation or destruction of the law itself, but that it have order to its proper effects and be observed in most cases. But once a miracle is posited, the physical laws are still observed in most cases, nor does a miracle remove the order of those laws to their effects. Therefore. "Although God," says St. Thomas (*On Power*, q. 6, a. 1, ad 20), "produces some effect outside the action of a natural cause, nevertheless He does not remove the order of the cause to its effect; hence also in the fire of the furnace there remained the order to burning, although it did not burn the three boys in the furnace." 4) In order that these things may be further clarified and confirmed, observe that a miracle: a) is sometimes properly above the laws of the whole of nature, insofar as some effect is produced for producing which there is no power in nature. This is certainly possible, unless we wish to say that the infinite power of God can do nothing more than the finite power of created things. b) Sometimes a miracle is properly outside the laws of nature, insofar as some effect is produced for producing which there is sufficient power in nature, but it is produced either without that power or without preserving its mode of acting, as if something were done in an instant which nature does over a long time. This also is evidently possible, unless we wish to say either that God cannot effect what His creature effects, or that an agent through the command of will cannot immediately effect what he wills. c) Sometimes a miracle is properly against the laws of nature, insofar as, for example, the effect is impeded which, according to the ordinary course, nature ought to produce. But this also is easily shown to be possible. For once some essence is posited, only this is absolutely necessary: namely, that it have the demand for such powers, but not that it actually have them, if the powers themselves are really distinguished from it; and a fortiori it is not absolutely necessary that those same powers exercise their power actually. For in order that they proceed into act certain conditions are required, which are contingent; and therefore, when these are removed, the effect can be lacking, while the substances and their powers remain intact. Therefore, in whatever way miracle is considered, from the side of the order and laws of nature, nothing prevents it from being able to be performed.

200. From the side of God, the possibility of miracle is demonstrated still more easily. For it is not repugnant: 1) to the perfection of divine knowledge, as though God had not foreseen the

suspension of order which is had through miracle; nor to the immutability of the divine will, as though God afterwards wills what He did not will before. For we said (n. 180) that a miracle does not happen outside divine preordination. 2) Nor is it repugnant to God's justice and holiness, as though by derogating from the order of nature God removes the order of created things to Himself; for we saw that this order, certainly essential, always remains (n. 185). Nor is it repugnant to God's wisdom, as though God, by performing a miracle, corrects a defect of the laws of nature, just as a human artisan is sometimes forced to correct the defects of a machine constructed by him. For the laws of nature are perfect in their own order, and plainly suffice for manifesting the divine perfections in that degree which God intends. Hence the end of miracles is not the preservation of the laws and order of nature, as we shall immediately say. But these are all the things which, from the side of God, the adversaries object against the possibility of miracle. It is no wonder, therefore, if Bayle himself (*Dictionary*, art. Spinoza, note B) pronounced the difficulties of Spinoza and others against the possibility of miracle to be nothing but a play on words.

201. III. Explaining these things, St. Thomas (*Contra Gentiles*, book 3, c. 99) writes excellently: "For the order implanted in things by God is according to that which usually happens in things, but not everywhere, or according to that which is always. For many natural causes produce their effects in the same way usually, but not always; for sometimes, although in fewer cases, it happens otherwise, either because of a defect in the power of the agent, or because of the indisposition of matter, or because of some stronger agent, as when nature generates a sixth finger in a man. But not on account of this does the order of providence fail or change; for this very thing, that the natural order instituted according to those things which happen usually sometimes fails, is subject to divine providence. Therefore, if through some created power it can happen that the natural order is changed from that which is usual to that which is rare, without change of divine providence, much more can divine power sometimes do something, without prejudice to its providence, outside the order implanted by God in natural things. For this very thing sometimes serves for the manifestation of His power; for in no way can it be better manifested that all nature is subject to the divine will than from this, that sometimes He Himself operates something outside the order of nature. From this it is plain that the order of things proceeded from Him, and not through necessity of nature, but through free will. "Nor should this reason be reputed frivolous, that God does something in nature for this purpose, that He may manifest Himself to human minds, since above (c. 17) it was shown that all corporeal creatures are ordered to intellectual nature in some way as to an end. But the end of intellectual nature itself is divine knowledge, as was shown above. Therefore it is not marvelous if, in order to furnish knowledge of God to intellectual nature, some change is made in corporeal substance." (1) St. Augustine had already written (*On John*, tract. 24, n. 1): "The miracles which the Lord Jesus Christ did are indeed divine works, and from visible things they admonish the human mind to understand God. For because He is not such a substance as can be seen by the eyes, and His miracles by which He rules the whole world and administers all nature have grown cheap by constant occurrence, so that almost no one deigns to attend to the marvelous and stupendous works of God in any grain of seed whatever, according to His mercy He reserved for Himself certain things which He would do at an opportune time outside the usual course and order of nature, so that those to whom daily things had grown cheap might be astonished by seeing things not greater, but unusual. For the governance of the whole world is a greater miracle than the feeding of thousands of men from five loaves; and yet no one wonders at the former; men wonder at the latter, not because it is greater, but because it is rare."

202. IV. So far is miracle from conflicting with the divine attributes, that the infinite perfection of God altogether claims for itself the power of performing it. We have sufficiently indicated this in the preceding arguments, but now it is useful to establish it directly. Indeed: 1) The divine intellect claims this power for itself. For since the divine intellect is infinite, it is not confined to this order which we perceive in things; otherwise, since this order is finite, that intellect also would be finite. Hence God knows many other orders. "The order of things," says St. Thomas (*Contra Gentiles*, book 3, c. 99),

"flows forth from God into things according as it has been thought beforehand in His intellect, just as we see in human affairs that the ruler of a city imposes upon all an order premeditated within himself. But the divine intellect is not determined to this order from necessity, as though it could understand no other order, since even we can apprehend another order by the intellect. For it can be understood by us that God formed man from the earth without seed. Therefore God can operate, outside inferior causes, the effect proper to those causes." 2) Again, divine wisdom claims this power for itself. For "the order," says St. Thomas (I, q. 25, a. 5), "implanted in things by divine wisdom, in which the notion of justice consists, as was said above (q. 21, a. 2), does not equal divine wisdom, so that divine wisdom would be limited to this order. But it is manifest that the whole reason of the order which a wise maker imposes on things made by him is taken from the end. Therefore, when the end is proportioned to the things made for the sake of the end, the wisdom of the maker is limited to some determinate order. But divine goodness is an end disproportionately exceeding created things. Hence divine wisdom is not determined to some order of things such that another course of things could not flow forth. Hence it must be said simply that God can do other things than those which He does." 3) Divine goodness claims the same power for itself. For, "although the order implanted in things by divine providence represents divine goodness in its own way," says St. Thomas (*Contra Gentiles*, book 3, c. 99), "nevertheless it does not represent it perfectly, since the goodness of the creature does not reach equality with divine goodness. But what is not perfectly represented by some copy can again, besides this, be represented in another way. But the representation of divine goodness in things is the end of the production of things by God, as was shown above (c. 20). Therefore the divine will is not determined to this order of causes and effects, so that it could not will to produce some effect in lower things immediately without other causes." 4) Divine power claims it for itself. For a) the power of God is greater than the power of nature, since the latter is finite and the former infinite. But unless God could produce some effect exceeding the powers of nature, there would not be greater power in Him than there is in nature. Therefore He can produce it. But, as we said and proved, by the name of miracle we understand an effect exceeding the powers and order of the whole of nature. Therefore God can produce it. as we said and proved, by the name of miracle we understand an effect exceeding the powers and order of the whole of nature. Therefore God can produce it. b) "The higher some active power is," says St. Thomas (*On Power*, q. 6, a. 1, ad 18), "the more it can produce the same thing into a higher effect... and from this it is that some thing is in potency to diverse things according to its relation to diverse agents. Hence nothing prevents created nature from being in potency to some things to be done by divine power which an inferior power cannot do. And this is called the potency of obedience, according to which any creature obeys the Creator." c) An agent not operating by necessity of nature can immediately produce the proper effect of an inferior subordinated agent, just as a skilled sculptor can produce the statues of one less skilled. But God, acting ad extra, does not operate by necessity of nature, and all created causes are subordinated to Him. Therefore God can immediately, that is, without those causes, produce their proper effects. But this is a miracle. "For in this," St. Thomas teaches (*Contra Gentiles*, book 3, n. 49), "an agent according to necessity of nature differs from an agent according to will: that from an agent according to necessity of nature an effect cannot follow except according to the mode of the active power. Hence an agent which is of the greatest power cannot immediately produce some small effect, but produces an effect proportioned to its own power; in which, however, sometimes a lesser power than in the cause is found, and thus through many intermediaries some small effect proceeds, tending from the supreme cause. But in an agent through will it is not so; for an agent through will can at once, without an intermediary, produce any effect whatever which does not exceed its power. For the most perfect artisan can make a work such as an imperfect artisan makes. But God operates through will, and not through necessity of nature, as was shown above (book 1, c. 23). Therefore He can immediately, without second causes, make the lesser effects which are made through inferior causes."

Article 10. Whether there is in miracles a force of proving that for whose confirmation they are done

203. Having set forth the nature of miracle and established its possibility, we make a step toward investigating its force of proving. For if this is once demonstrated, there is already at hand for us the principal means of discerning whether some religion, which ascribes divine origin to itself, truly proceeds from God through revelation. The Vatican Council defined this force of proving of miracles in the canon cited (n. 171), which must be kept before our eyes.

204. But in order that we may rightly understand this doctrine of the Church, and then invincibly assert it, the state of the question must be set forth. And first, the force of proving of miracles can be considered as regards itself and as regards us. It can scarcely be doubted whether miracles have this force in themselves; for since it is established from what has been said (the preceding article) that the principal cause of miracles is none other than God, and since from another side it is established that He cannot confirm anything false as true, for this is repugnant to His supreme veracity, by the very fact that a miracle is done in confirmation of some revealed doctrine, we are made certain that it is revealed and consequently is true. Hence the whole question chiefly turns on this: whether miracles have force of proving as regards us.

205. Now in order that a miracle have force of proving as regards us, it is necessary that we be certain of their objective truth. But for this three things are required: 1) that the truth of the narration of that physical fact which is proposed as a miracle be certainly established for us, the historical truth of the miracle; 2) that it be certainly established that that fact is truly so outside the order and faculty of the whole of nature that it has none but God as author, the philosophical truth of the miracle; 3) that it be established that it was truly done in confirmation of revelation, if we intend to prove the existence of revelation by it, the relative truth of the miracle. Wherefore, since the Vatican Council defined not only that miracles can be known with certainty, but also that they can be so known that by them the divine origin of the Christian religion is rightly proved, it must certainly be held that we can know with certainty that those things which are narrated as miracles done in confirmation of that religion truly happened; that they were true miracles; and that they were truly done in confirmation of Christian revelation.

206. In reality, some I. deny the force of proving of miracles as regards us because they think that we can by no means attain their historical truth with certainty. They assert this chiefly by a twofold reason. The first affects moral certainty generally. For they say that miracles performed in confirmation of some revealed doctrine, and which we by no means behold with our eyes, cannot be established otherwise than from human testimony. But from human testimony there can arise only that certainty which is called moral; and this is by no means true certainty, but at most great probability.

207. But the other reason by which they attack the knowability of the historical truth of miracles specifically affects miracles themselves. For after Hume they say (*Works*, vol. 3, p. 178, ed. 1770): "It is easier for a thousand witnesses to err or deceive than for a fact repugnant to the laws of nature to exist. The first is only morally impossible and consonant with experience; the second is physically impossible and contrary to experience. Moreover, in every miracle a thousand rise up against one witness; thus, for example, if one person testifies that a dead man was raised, thousands of witnesses affirm that the dead do not return to life." Compare the treatise *On the Infused Virtues* (n. 685-704). Hence this twofold difficulty must be met, so that it may be shown that we can know the historical truth of miracle with certainty.

208. Others II. deny the force of proving of miracles as regards us because they judge that we are not permitted to attain their philosophical truth with certainty. And they assert this also chiefly by a twofold reason. The first is: no one has all the powers of nature thoroughly known; therefore no

one can discern between a natural work and a prodigious one. We know that men have more than once wrongly judged that nature could not do something and that it was opposed to its laws; and this can happen especially to the uneducated, to whom the powers and laws of nature are not thoroughly known. Hence some doubt can always remain in forming such a judgment; and therefore it cannot be said that a miracle is a most certain note of divine revelation, for which it is assumed as testimony. Indeed, some impious man of our time went so far that he boldly demanded that a miracle be performed in an assembly of men pre-eminent in science, who could rightly judge concerning the truth of the miracle. Unless this were done, he said, the notion of miracle must be attributed to ignorance. (1) The eminent Cardinal Bishop of Poitiers wrote to the point against this blasphemy (*Third Instruction*, etc., *Works*, vol. 5, p. 105): "To establish as a principle that a wonder-worker deserves credit only insofar as he appears before the tribunal of the principal representatives of nineteenth-century science and submits to the conditions of their program: this is to mock past centuries and the whole human race, to whom one refuses the dose of good sense necessary for establishing the most palpable facts; and it is also to mock God, whom one supposes able to bend to the whims and accept the regulations of His creature at the very moment when He is about to manifest His highest power; it is to condemn Him not to act as God at the hour when He wishes to prove that He is God."

209. But the other reason is of this sort: even if, they say, the doctrine established by us above is admitted, namely that angels cannot effect true miracles, nevertheless it cannot be denied that they can imitate some miraculous works as regards appearance; and produce others as regards the truth of the work, which nevertheless are not true miracles because they are effected by them by applying their proper causes. At least, therefore, it will always be uncertain whether those things which we believe to be miracles, as exceeding the powers of nature known to us, ought to be ascribed to divine or diabolical operation.

210. Now we do not contend that concerning all and each of the facts which are called miracles we can always bear a certain judgment; nor in some cases should this be judged easy. Hence also the Church, as is established from Benedict XIV (*On the Canonization of Saints*, especially book 4), institutes a stricter examination, so that even Protestants have been forced to confess the prudence of the Church in this matter. For our matter, therefore, it suffices to show that concerning at least some events of this sort, especially when several concur for confirming revelation, it can be certainly established for us both that they exceed the powers of the whole of nature, and that they proceeded not from evil angels but from God, and therefore that they are true miracles. (2) It is known, for example, what Fr. Daubenton reports (*The Life of Blessed Jean-Francois Regis*, Paris, 1716, apud Perrone): "A distinguished English Protestant had come to Rome. A certain Roman prelate, who had entered into friendship with him, gave him documents to read which contained proofs of several miracles. When he had read these with the greatest pleasure of mind, he returned them to the prelate, saying: 'That is certainly the surest way to prove miracles. If all those which are received in the Roman Church were established on proofs as evident and authentic as these are, we would have no difficulty in subscribing to them, and by this you would save yourselves from all the mockery which we make of your alleged miracles.' 'Well then,' replied the prelate, 'know that of all these miracles, which seem to you so verified and so well supported, none has been admitted by the Congregation of Rites, because they did not appear sufficiently proved.' The Protestant, struck by this unexpected answer, confessed that nothing but blind prejudice could stand against the canonization of the saints, and that he had never thought that the caution of the Roman Church progressed so far in the examination which it institutes concerning miracles" (p. 31).

211. Finally, others III. deny the force of proving of miracles as regards us because they judge it impossible for us to know their relative truth with certainty. In order that this may be understood, the doctrine common among theologians must be recalled, which teaches that the grace of miracles is freely given grace, and not grace making one pleasing; and therefore that it can be conferred by God even upon impious men. Hence: 1) Christ the Lord says (Matt. 7:22): "Many will say to me on that day:

Lord, Lord, have we not prophesied in Your name, and in Your name cast out demons, and in Your name done many mighty works?" Many of the Fathers, such as Jerome, Chrysostom, Euthymius, and Theophylact, understood this of men who performed miracles even while they were impious. 2) Likewise, just as to the other Apostles, the Lord seems also to have granted to Judas the grace of miracles. 3) And St. Thomas (II-II, q. 172, a. 4) admits that the gift of prophecy is sometimes communicated by God to the wicked, and he explains how this can happen by that reason which can also be adapted to miracles. For he teaches that such a gift is sometimes conceded to the wicked in order to show the power of the name of Christ and for the usefulness of others. "The gift of prophecy," he says, "is sometimes given to a man both for the usefulness of others and for the illumination of his own mind... But some obtain the gift of prophecy only for the usefulness of others, who are, as it were, an instrument of divine operation. Hence Jerome says on Matthew 7: 'To prophesy, and to do mighty works, and to cast out demons is sometimes not of the merit of the one who works, but either he does this by invocation of the name of Christ, or it is conceded for the condemnation of those who invoke and for the usefulness of those who see and hear.'" 4) St. Augustine had already written similar things concerning miracles (*Eighty-Three Questions*, q. 73): "Good Christians," he says, "do miracles through public justice; wicked Christians through the signs of public justice, as by invoking the name of Christ or by exhibiting certain sacraments."

212. This having been posited, behold the difficulty which arises, and which Suarez clearly proposes (*On the Mysteries of the Life of Christ*, disp. 31, sect. 2, n. 6): "Someone could evade by saying that it is by no means repugnant that God by special aid and freely given grace concur with a man for doing miracles, although the man himself does them in confirmation of falsehood. For from this it does not follow that God lies, and there is no other principle of this repugnance or inconvenience which would follow from it. "The antecedent is declared. First, God gives to a priest the supernatural faculty of consecrating and commits it to his liberty, so that he may use it well or badly; and when he uses it badly, God nevertheless concurs with him by special and supernatural aid for making a work miraculous by its own power. And nevertheless the wickedness of the man does not redound upon God. Therefore the same will be the case in the present matter, proportion being preserved. "Secondly, God can confer on a man the grace of healings, so that he may likewise use it well or badly. Therefore, just as God can concur with such a man for conferring health miraculously even if he does this on account of greed or vain glory, He can also concur even if he does this in order to deceive other men, and therefore in confirmation of falsehood. "Thirdly, there is an a priori reason: because although the man who does miracles says that he does this in confirmation of the things which he speaks, it does not follow from this that God concurs for the same confirmation. But He will concur only by force of a prior gift, or law, or pact by which He established to give to that man such power and to concur with him for whatever end he himself operates. Therefore even if God concurs, it does not follow that He lies, nor that He confirms a lie, but only that He permits others to think that He confirms it." These difficulties must be satisfied, so that we may vindicate the knowability of the relative truth of miracles.

213. Therefore, with these things having been noted beforehand for understanding the matter: Section II. The proposed question is solved. PROP. IX. If miracles are employed in confirmation of divine revelation, there is in them an unconquered force for proving it, 1. not only as regards itself, but also as regards us. For even if it cannot be established for us concerning all and each, nevertheless concerning many it can be established with certainty both 2. that they truly existed just as they are narrated, 3. that they truly are miracles, and finally 4. that they were performed for confirming revealed doctrine.

214. The first part is proved. I. There can be no divine word or testimony concerning a false thing. But miracles are a certain divine word and testimony. Therefore if they are employed in confirmation of divine revelation, it cannot be false; or that revelation is truly divine, and consequently the doctrine which it contains is true. The major is proved. The pronouncement of the true as

false, and of the false as true, can indeed in man be material, and therefore not wound his veracity; but in God it would always be formal, and therefore a true lie. For in man an erroneous pronouncement can happen from ignorance, by which it comes about, and sometimes invincibly, that he thinks true what is false and false what is true. But in God this cannot happen without a lie, since He is powerful with infinite knowledge. Wherefore in God this pronouncement is always opposed to veracity; but since God is infinitely truthful, it is impossible that He affirm as true what is false, and as false what is true. Compare what we said in the treatise *On the Infused Virtues* (n. 619 ff.). The minor is proved. The author of a miracle is none but God, since, from what has been said, a miracle is an effect exceeding every faculty of created nature and contrary to the customary laws of that nature. Therefore, if it is employed in confirmation of revealed doctrine, God Himself says, not indeed by words but by other signs, that that doctrine is revealed, and consequently true. Hence St. Thomas (Quodlibet 2, a. 6, ad 4) says: "It cannot happen that someone announcing false doctrine should do true miracles, which cannot be done except by divine power; for thus God would be a witness of falsity, which is impossible."

215. But in order that this argument may be understood more deeply, it will help to weigh other words of the holy Doctor. "Because," he says (III, q. 43, a. 1), "those things which are of faith exceed human reason, they cannot be proved by human reasons, but must be proved by an argument of divine power; and when someone does works which God alone can do, those things which are said are believed to be from God, just as when someone bears letters sealed with the ring of the king, what is contained in them is believed to have proceeded from the will of the king." Hence Bellarmine (*On the Sacraments in General*, book 1, c. 14) says: "The force of a seal and of a miracle is the same. For a royal seal is always more known and firmer than the letters of the king; for all know how to discern the seal, but not all discern the letters; and the seal without letters has authority, while letters without a seal do not. But a miracle also is more known and more efficacious than preaching. For all who see a blind man enlightened, or a dead man raised, understand that this is a supernatural and divine work, and therefore they are moved to believing that which is confirmed by such testimony; but not all who hear someone preaching immediately understand that those are the words of God." And De Lugo (*On Faith*, disp. 2, sect. 2, n. 25) writes: "But if some seal were so essentially affixed to the king that it could not be applied except by the king himself, conscious of the writing, then the king would speak through the seal, because that seal would sufficiently signify the knowledge which the king had and intended to communicate when he applied the seal. But true miracles performed by God in circumstances of this sort are such. Since they cannot be done except by God, and indeed by God conscious of the doctrine which is sealed by such a miracle, by that very fact they show that God speaks through miracles and seals of this sort, and manifests His mind."

216. II. Here the common persuasion of men could be invoked. For not only Christians, but the very assertors of false religions appeal to miracles, indeed they also strive to prove the excellence and authority of men by miracles as by divine signs. This is so true that unbelievers themselves, by one of the many contradictions familiar to them, seek from this an objection against the force of proving of miracles. Namely they say: several religions, contradicting one another, equally appeal to miracles; therefore miracle cannot be a certain criterion of revelation. But in truth, unless a persuasion common to all concerning the force of proving of miracles dwelt within them, they certainly would not appeal to miracles. Yet it by no means follows that miracle is not a certain note of revelation, just as from the fact that various philosophical schools boast evidence for their own doctrine, no one would rightly infer that evidence is not a criterion of truth. Therefore diligence and examination are needed for discerning the aforesaid threefold truth of miracles. (1) Behold, for example, how Origen argues (*Against Celsus*, book 3, n. 37): "You who think that the things which the disciples committed to writing concerning the miracles of Jesus are altogether inventions, and accuse those who join faith to them, how do you not judge things of this kind, which are reported concerning Aristeas, to be prodigiously invented things and fables? How do you, who charge others with fault because they admit the miracles of Jesus without any reason, seem to admit such things with no

proof brought forward and no argument that those things happened? Do you think Herodotus and Pindar do not deceive by lies, but those who choose to die for the documents of Jesus, and who left writings concerning things which they had thoroughly known to be transmitted to posterity, fought so greatly for inventions, fables, and fabricated wonders that they wished to live miserably and be removed from the midst by force? Rather, making yourself judge between those things which are written about Aristeas and those which are narrated about Jesus, see from the outcome and from those things which each did for the amendment of morals and for inducing piety toward the supreme God whether this judgment ought not to be made: that what history handed down concerning Jesus must be believed to have been done not without God, but not those things concerning Aristeas of Proconnesus." Indeed the first Christian Apologists already knew the miracles which the gentiles boasted, and they judged many to be only tricks of demons (compare Tertullian, *Apology*, c. 22-23; St. Augustine, *On the Trinity*, book 4, c. 17; *On the Divination of Demons*, c. 5 ff.), although their historical faith itself totters. Thus, for example, Valerius Maximus (book 1, c. 8, n. 6) writes: "Nor does it escape me in what doubtful opinion judgment turns concerning the movement and voice of the immortal gods perceived by human eyes and ears." And Curtius (book 9, c. 1): "Indeed I transcribe more than I believe. For I do not sustain affirming things about which I doubt, nor subtracting things which I have received." Thus concerning the miracles of Hadrian it is read in Aelius Spartianus (*Hadrian*, c. 25), who reports them, "although Marius Maximus mentions that these things were done by simulation." Concerning the miracles of Vespasian it suffices to read what Suetonius himself reports; for they are said to have been done (*Vespasian*, c. 7) to conciliate authority for the new emperor. Concerning the miracles of Apollonius, the things which Huet learnedly discusses can be read (*Demonstration of the Gospel*, prop. 9, c. 147).

217. The second part is proved. I. If the possibility of acquiring historical certainty of miracles is denied because it rests on fallible human testimony, every historical and moral certainty will have to be rejected; yet the adversaries themselves do not admit this. And deservedly indeed; for what sane person would attribute any force to arguments which attack every historical certainty and render uncertain whatever is said to have been done in antiquity?

218. II. Indeed human testimony clothed with due conditions, especially if it is public and is borne by many witnesses diverse in character, age, education, nation, etc., as is shown in logic, can ultimately be resolved into the metaphysically certain principle "there is no effect without a cause"; or, there is no effect greater than its cause (compare the treatise *On the Infused Virtues*, nn. 686 ff.). Hence, if testimony of this sort reporting miracles can be given, historical certainty of a miracle can be had. But testimony of this sort reporting miracles can be given. For 1) although miracles are supernatural events, they are nevertheless sensible, insofar as they strike the exterior senses of sight, hearing, etc.; and if they are public, as was the raising of a man dead for four days, they are subject to the senses of several witnesses. Hence if many eyewitnesses narrate that they saw a mute man suddenly endowed with speech, hearing restored to a deaf man, and, what is still greater, life to a dead man, certainly those witnesses are no less worthy of faith than when they narrate that they saw the one whom they now see hearing, speaking, alive, etc., formerly deaf, mute, dead, etc. 2) Indeed, as Perrone rightly observes, since men of past times were endowed with the same faculties with which we too have been gifted, and were of the same nature, it must be presumed that they did those things which we also would have done, had we been placed in the same circumstances. If we, for example, heard that a man had been recalled to life from the dead, would we immediately give faith to it? On the contrary, we would first subject all things to the most accurate examination: whether he who is said to have been raised truly was dead; at what time; through whom he was raised; how; by what witnesses it is reported, etc. Let the same be said of sight restored to one born blind and other similar things, especially if these things were done in confirmation of some doctrine; for then those things would concur which by their own nature arouse and sharpen human investigation, and can easily be weighed and known. Therefore it must be presumed that our ancestors conducted themselves thus, unless we wish to suppose them dull and leaden, or of another nature and character than men now are; and this cannot

be thought except by the highest shamelessness and madness. to suppose that they were dull and leaden, or of another nature and character than men now are; and this cannot be thought except by the highest shamelessness and madness. 3) But men would apply this care and diligence a fortiori if the event were extraordinary and wondrous; for this usually makes witnesses or spectators more attentive to examining and weighing it rightly; and therefore, other things being equal, their testimony is of greater weight in facts of this sort. 4) The argument grows further when several of the witnesses strive with every effort to contradict the truth of the miraculous event, and yet cannot deny it, because it is too evident. We know that this indeed happened, for example, in the resurrection of Lazarus, when they wanted to kill him, lest the people, moved by that miracle, should believe in Christ. Indeed, it happened in many miracles performed by Christ; for when His enemies could not deny the truth of the fact, they attributed them to the demon.

219. III. Nor can Hume's exception (n. 207) in any way weaken the historical certainty of miracles. For 1) that argument proves too much. If it proved anything according to the principles of the adversaries, then even if we beheld with our own eyes a dead man rise, we ought by no means to believe it, since it is contrary to the customary testimony of the senses that men once dead do not rise. Therefore the argument supposes a false principle, namely, that in the nature of things or in society nothing ever happens which is not consonant with our customary observations. 2) Moreover, the physical impossibility of some event would conflict with its historical certainty if it could be overcome by no power; for if it could be overcome by some power, due human testimony would furnish a sufficient argument that, in the case, it has been overcome. But when the question concerns miracles, that which is lacking to natural powers is abundantly supplied by the omnipotence of God, to whom alone the fact is ascribed as to the principal cause. 3) Who does not see that it is ridiculous to assert that a thousand witnesses rise up against one witness of a miracle? For a thousand witnesses who were not present at the fact can indeed affirm the ordinary law of nature, but they cannot testify that an exception was not made against that law. Otherwise it would have to be said that the testimonies of those who are ignorant of the whole matter are valid for absolving a thief whom three persons caught in the act of theft, even though the rest of men did not see him. 4) In order that this whole response may have greater force, let it be noted that testimony concerning a miracle performed can be compared either 1) with present experience concerning events according to the laws of nature; and then between testimony concerning an extraordinary past fact and present experience there can be no contradiction, since, as is plain, they do not fall upon the same object; or 2) with the testimony of those who report that the same events happened according to the same laws; and then there can be no contradiction between either testimony, for one reports what has been done for the most part, the other what sometimes happened by exception; or 3) it is compared both with our present experience and with the testimony of those who preceded, with the principle concerning the constancy of the laws of nature added; and then neither can testimony concerning a miracle performed be rejected a priori, since, as we showed, the laws of nature are not so constant that they do not admit an exception through divine omnipotence. Compare what we said in the treatise *On the Infused Virtues* (n. 704).

220. The third part is proved. I. The philosophical truth of a miracle is first said not to be able to be known by us with certainty because not all the powers of nature are thoroughly known to us; and therefore, they say, what seems to exceed nature must perhaps be attributed to hidden powers. But this reason is of no moment. For: 1) If those hidden powers existed, to which a miracle would have to be attributed, they would act either always or sometimes. But not always, for the discussion is about a miracle, which is rare; not all the dead have been recalled to life, sight has not been restored to all the blind, etc. Nor sometimes; for the discussion is about hidden powers producing an effect against some constant law of nature, and this is a miracle. But the adversaries ascribe to this or similar laws such constancy and necessity that they cannot be suspended even by divine omnipotence. How, then, do these things cohere with one another? Besides, this derogation would be independent of man, as one which would flow from the very nature of the thing. But a miracle happens when man commands, and in the name or authority of God.

Therefore a miracle is not a derogation from a general law made by some hidden force of nature, which acts either always or only sometimes. 2) Indeed we do not know all laws positively, so that we could affirm concerning all how far their efficacy extends; but we know them negatively, so that we can know how far they cannot reach. But this suffices for discerning some miracles. For, to look at the matter concretely, even if we admit, for example, that we do not know how far the most noble art of medicine rises, nevertheless we know certainly that no physician can recall to life one dead, and indeed one already four days dead and stinking. Similarly, although we do not know with exactness what the voice of a man can do, nevertheless we know with all certainty that it cannot make one blind from birth receive sight, or a deaf man hear, or a mute man speak, or a dead man revive, etc. Therefore it is not necessary that it be known how far the natural power of some agent extends; but it suffices that one know that it cannot extend to the said works, in order that they be judged miracles. 3) Although we do not positively know all the laws of nature, nor how far their efficacy extends, nevertheless we can know the powers which in fact are applied as regards the subject in which the miracle is done. But this suffices for discerning some miracles. For when Jesus Christ, for example, gave sight to one blind from birth by smearing his eyes with mud, it is evident that mud cannot give sight to one blind from birth, but rather can blind a healthy eye. But if it is supposed, in this or similar events, that hidden powers can be applied to which the effect must be attributed, then we shall destroy all physical certainty. 4) From the very mode in which a miracle is done it is sometimes evident that it cannot be attributed to any power of nature. In reality, if a man wishes to do something external, it is necessary that the soul move its own body and operate externally through its own body; for the word of man is not productive of a thing, but significative. Does a physician heal a sick man by the command of will alone? Rather, by prescribing medicines and giving them to the sick man, or applying them to him, he can obtain his health. Wherefore, if someone healed a sick man by command alone, saying: rise; and immediately the one who was sick rose, that person would certainly have to be said to perform a miracle. This inference especially holds when miracles are performed at the nod of a man ignorant of the natural sciences, solely in the name and authority of God; when they are performed precisely at the time when some necessity, or at least evident usefulness, is urgent for confirming truth, defending innocence, etc. For who would say that hidden powers operate at the nod of a man ignorant of them?

221. You will say: "Miracles which must be derived from the faith and will of the agents are that which once was called imagination operating outside its own body, whose efficacy Avicenna and Pomponazzi made so great, but now is called animal magnetism or mesmerism; its effect will be greater if contact, whether mediate or immediate, is joined to faith; if with the faith of the agent there is united the faith of the patient, or with the force of magnetism the force of imagination." I answer: It is not ours now to treat of magnetism and mesmerism. But it suffices to observe: 1) Not all miracles consist in healings alone, as the adversaries seem to suppose. Have the patrons of magnetism ever been able, with five loaves and two fish, to feed a multitude of five thousand men, as Christ accomplished? Have they ever been able to convert water into wine, as happened at the wedding of Cana? If they had accomplished this, the force of their imagination would be greatly commended, and they would gladly be received by all. 2) But if we consider the healings themselves, we concede that persuasion of recovering health sometimes contributes greatly, and in some cases has force especially for correcting a damaged fantasy. This is known by all; and not only physicians admit it, but Benedict XIV (*On the Canonization of Saints*, book 4, last chapter) holds it as certain. Hence this case also is kept before the eyes in the Congregations of Rites. But it belongs to a stubborn man, not to say a mad one, to wish to extend such a force to all cases, for example, to the bruising and fracture of bones, wounds, incurable diseases, etc. If this were so, we could easily bid farewell not only to miracles, but also to therapeutics and surgery. 3) It is further false that faith is always required in those for whose sake miracles are performed. Certainly Christ demanded no such faith in the cited miracles of the multiplication of loaves and the conversion of water into wine; nor when He raised the dead, the son of the widow of Naim or the daughter of Jairus, could He have demanded faith from them.

222. II. Nor can the philosophical truth of miracles be called impossible to know on account of the natural faculty of angels by which they can work tricks. For angels are either good or evil, according as they are either subject to God and in agreement with His will, or adversaries of Him, that is, rebels against Him. If they are good, then neither because of their zeal for truth and men, nor because of the union of their wills with the divine will, can they aid an impostor by confirming false doctrine with wondrous facts. But if they are evil, they are prohibited by God from aiding an impostor, or herald of pretended revelation, unto the invincible seduction of men.

223. In order that this last part of the argument may be well understood, first let it be noted what Benedict XIV teaches (*On the Canonization of Saints*, book 4, part 1, c. 3), who, copying the words of Suarez (*On Religion*, book 2, c. 16, n. 2), says: "Although the power itself of demons was not diminished in itself, nevertheless because of the order of grace and the punishment of fault, its subjection was in some way changed. A superior angel naturally, in natural perfection, can compel an inferior one, or resist lest he use his externally operative power, because just as he is superior in nature, so also in force and faculty of acting. But this order has not been changed among the demons among themselves; yet with respect to the holy angels it has been changed, because although a good angel is often inferior in nature, nevertheless the least holy angel can compel the highest demon and command him efficaciously, since then he does not operate by natural power alone, but as a minister of God, without whose nod and will he attempts nothing. This is the common opinion of the theologians." Hence we say: it pertains to divine providence that if either wonders or tricks are done by malignant spirits, God does not permit this in those circumstances in which sufficient indications are not available for judging that those signs are not divine. For 1) if such power were conceded to demons that they could at will overturn the order of nature and deceive men, without their frauds and illusions being able to be detected, all physical certainty would cease; indeed, very many duties of man toward men would also be rendered doubtful, because illusions would have to be feared everywhere. But who of sound mind would say that God so rules the world and governs it by His providence that, with any physical certainty repudiated, we always cling uncertainly as to whether duties to be exhibited according to the general rules of morals should be exhibited in concrete and particular cases or not? Therefore no one of sound mind will deny that the natural power of demons for effecting wonders and tricks is impeded by divine providence if a sufficient means for discerning them is lacking. Compare *On the Infused Virtues* (n. 692). 2) Hence Suarez (*On the Mysteries of the Life of Christ*, disp. 31, sect., n. 8) says: "It does not pertain to the providence of God not to permit false signs, since they profit for the trial and advancement of the elect; but it does pertain to the providence of God that aid and a mode be given by which they can be judged and known, because it is not of divine goodness and wisdom to permit man to be tempted beyond that which he can. And for this reason, when, after moral diligence and investigation have been made, it is still evidently established that the miracles which are done in confirmation of doctrine are true, no reason for doubting about the truth of such doctrine is left, especially if the miracles are frequent and done with great authority and power, and confirmed by innocence and holiness of life, and if in the doctrine itself nothing appears against honesty, nothing against right reason, and finally nothing against other divine revelations." 3) Wherefore, "when there are false miracles," as the same Suarez teaches (loc. cit.), "there always remains some mode by which they can morally be judged, if men do what lies in them for knowing the truth. First, by considering well the works and signs themselves and their circumstances. Secondly, by considering the person, life, and morals of the one who thus speaks and works. Thirdly, by considering the doctrine itself, whether in any part it is opposed to reason, or to other divine revelations sufficiently proposed," etc. And (*On Faith*, disp. 4, sect. 3, n. 9): "In these works, therefore, first the duration of the effect and perseverance must be considered, which is a great indication of truth; for things which are done only fictitiously suddenly vanish. And thus the death of Lazarus was proved for four days to have been true, and afterward life restored to him for long times. Then there come the effects through which such truth is manifested; such as actions of life are especially accustomed to be, as seeing in one blind from birth. Thirdly, the multitude and frequency of such effects is

considered, with all the signs and indications of truth which are accustomed to exist in all things which we handle before our hands. For by what greater evidence can it be established that some wine is true wine than that wine into which the Lord converted water? Hence fourthly there is also considered the manifold wondrous mode of working such signs, by command, by prayer to God, by joining at the same time another work proper to God, such as the manifestation of the thoughts of the heart, which Christ often did. Besides, the end of such works must be considered, because nothing temporal and human, and nothing depraved, was intended through them, but rather rectitude and honesty of morals, and knowledge of the true God, and the assault upon the demon himself."

224. From these things the worn difficulty is easily dissolved: the truth of the miracle, they say, is proved from the truth of the doctrine, and the truth of the doctrine is proved from the truth of the miracle. Behold a vicious circle. Now the holiness of doctrine is applied for discerning a true miracle from a trick of demons when it is already established that the work surpasses the powers of sensible nature. But then: 1) the holiness of doctrine, as is clear from what has been said, is not the only criterion which we use; 2) when we use it, we take doctrine as promoting holiness of morals, piety, etc., in order to judge that the work performed in its confirmation, concerning which it is already established that it is above the powers of sensible nature, is not from a demon. Hence we conclude that it is from God, and therefore, in the case, that the doctrine is revealed. Therefore the same is not proved by the same. 3) If at any time doctrine is taken as revealed for discerning a miracle from a trick of demons, then this is when revelation has been proved by other signs. Hence from doctrine already approved by many other signs, we deduce that this new sign performed in its confirmation is not from a demon; and since it is a work above the powers of sensible nature, it is therefore from God. But by hypothesis it was produced in confirmation of revelation; therefore revelation is confirmed by this new sign. Let us suppose, for example, what will be demonstrated below, that Christian revelation was confirmed by so many and wondrous signs that no reasonable doubt can be had about its divine origin. If afterward some wondrous work were performed, surpassing the powers of visible nature, for confirming a doctrine opposed to Christian revelation, would it not deservedly be attributed to the evil arts of a demon?

225. The fourth part is proved. The knowability of the relative truth of miracles would be denied insofar as God could perform a miracle if a man falsely proposed as revealed a doctrine which he intended to confirm by a miracle. But God cannot do this. Therefore. The minor is proved. 1) Just as God would testify to what is false if He performed a miracle in confirmation of false doctrine, so He would attest to what is false, and, as it were, apply His own seal to the lie of a man, if, when that man proposed a miracle in confirmation of false doctrine, God worked it. But God can neither testify nor attest what is false. Therefore. The arguments given for the first part of the thesis return here. 2) Although God can permit error, nevertheless He cannot Himself lead us into error. But if, when a man promised a miracle in confirmation of false doctrine, God worked a miracle, He Himself would lead us into error. Therefore. Here also apply the arguments by which we recently proved that, in those circumstances in which no means is available for detecting error, God cannot permit evil angels to work tricks.

226. You will say I: A seal can be impressed on a false and royal writing from the wickedness of the minister guarding the seal; therefore, by parity, from the wickedness of a creature having the power of miracles, a miracle could be performed in confirmation of error, signing it with the divine seal. I answer by denying the consequence. "Because," says De Lugo (*On Faith*, disp. 2, n. 24), "just as a prince, if in the very act of sealing or subscribing he noticed the falsity contained, could not seal or subscribe, but would have to take back the seal, lest he cooperate in deception and a lie, so God would be bound to the same. Hence, since God not only antecedently, but in the very act of sealing and working the miracle, always sees the falsity of the doctrine to be confirmed by the seal of the miracle, He does not then seem able to cooperate in the wickedness of the minister without being a participant in deception and falsity. For He did

not only subscribe before or give the seal, but then subscribes and seals."

227. You will say II: But, once the power of consecrating has been conferred, can God not concur for consecration even when man abuses it? (n. 212). De Lugo answers (loc. cit., n. 25) that "God can give that general power in two ways. First, in such a way that it is established, or can be established, for what end or when God gave it; in which case, if afterward a man abuses that power for another end, for approving something false, or for another depraved end, it can also easily be established that God does not here and now work a miracle for that depraved end, but for the other ends which He intended in that first general concession. Such is the case concerning the power of consecrating and converting bread into the body of Christ. This conversion, even if it were done sensibly, would still happen when a priest wished to consecrate for a depraved end or for approving an error, because it could be established from elsewhere that the miracle is not done by God on account of that depraved end or for approving an error, but for sustaining the truth of the institution of the sacrament. Therefore I have often said that a miracle cannot be done by God in those circumstances when, speaking per se, it cannot be gathered from elsewhere that it is done by God for another end, etc."

Article 11. Whether prophecy is possible, and what is its force of proving

228. We embrace two questions at once in this article, as the title itself manifests. But before we touch them, it is necessary to set forth briefly the nature of the prophecy with which we are concerned. And first, it should be noted that the word prophecy has multiple acceptions, not only among profane authors, but also in the Sacred Scriptures. For sometimes it is taken in a very broad and less proper sense; and then it signifies: 1) interpretation, in which sense it is read (Exod. 7:1-2): "Aaron your brother will be your prophet," that is, your interpreter before Pharaoh. "You shall speak to him all things which I command you, and he shall speak to Pharaoh." 2) A man endowed with cognitions above the common people is called a prophet. In this sense the Apostle wrote (Titus 1:12 ff.): "A certain one of them, their own prophet, said: The Cretans are always liars, evil beasts, sluggish bellies. This testimony is true." 3) Sometimes the composer of sacred hymns and songs is called a prophet, indeed also the singer of them in praise of God; in this sense it is taken (1 Kings 10:5-6): "When you have entered the city, you will meet a band of prophets coming down from the high place, and before them a psaltery and timbrel, and pipe, and harp, and they themselves prophesying. And the Spirit of the Lord will leap upon you, and you will prophesy with them." 4) By the name prophet also come teachers and interpreters of the law; whence some were called sons of the prophets, insofar, namely, as they were taught the doctrine of the law by those teachers, to some of whom, however, divine light was often communicated. 5) All inspired writers, although they did not write prophecies properly so called, are also called prophets, as we noted in the treatise *On the Infused Virtues* (n. 954). It is useful to keep these diverse acceptions of the words prophet and prophecy before one's eyes, so that response may be made to those who, abusing the ambiguity of the word, would wish to show that prophecy properly so called is not a supernatural gift.

229. Yet in the proper sense, prophets were anciently called those who knew and announced hidden things, namely those things which could not be known except in a supernatural mode. Hence the knowledge and prediction of things of this sort was properly called prophecy. "Prophecy," says St. Thomas (II-II, q. 171, a. 1), "first and principally consists in knowledge, because namely the prophets know those things which are far off and remote from the knowledge of men. Hence they can be called prophets from *pro*, which is far off, and *phanos*, which is apparition, because, namely, certain things which are far off appear to them. And because of this, as Isidore says in book 7 of the *Etymologies*, c. 8, in the Old Testament they were called Seers, because they saw those things which the rest did not see, and they foresaw those things which were hidden in mystery. Hence also paganism called them vates from the force of the mind, as he premised in the same place. But because, as is said in 1 Cor. 12:7, 'To each one is given the manifestation

of the Spirit unto usefulness,' and below, ch. 14:12, it is said: 'Seek that you may abound unto the edification of the Church,' hence it is that prophecy secondarily consists in speech, insofar as the prophets announce for the edification of others those things which, taught divinely, they know." Hence it is that prophecy secondarily consists in speech, insofar as the prophets announce for the edification of others those things which, taught divinely, they know, according to that saying of Isaiah 22:14: "The things which I have heard from the Lord of hosts, the God of Israel, I have announced to you." And according to this, as Isidore says in book 7 of the *Etymologies*, c. 8, they can be called prophets, as if *praephatores*, because they speak from afar, that is, they speak from remote things and truly predict future things."

230. Under this proper acceptation of prophecy is comprehended the knowledge of all things remote from natural knowledge. Hence St. Gregory says (*On Ezekiel*, hom. 1, near the beginning), that "one kind of prophecy is concerning the future, as that which is said in Isaiah 7: 'Behold, a virgin shall conceive and bear a son'; another concerning the past, as that which is said in Genesis 1: 'In the beginning God created heaven and earth'; another concerning the present, as that which is said in 1 Corinthians 14: 'If all prophesy, and an unbeliever enters, the secrets of his heart are made manifest.'"

231. But in the strictest acceptation prophecy imports knowledge of an event freely future; and in this sense Cassiodorus (*Prologue on the Psalms*, c. 1) said: "Prophecy is divine inspiration or revelation announcing the event of things with immovable truth." Here St. Thomas notes (*De Veritate*, q. 12, a. 2, ad 1): "the events of things are placed in the definition of prophecy as the matter most proper to prophecy"; and in the body he had already said that future contingents "seem chiefly to pertain to prophecy, to such a degree that, as the chief matter of prophecy, they are placed in the definition of prophecy, in this that it is said: prophecy is divine inspiration of the event of things, etc. From this also the name prophecy seems to have been received. Hence Gregory says on Ezekiel that, since prophecy is so called because it predicts future things, when it speaks of the past or present, it loses the reason of its name."

232. Since we must deal with prophecy according to its strictest signification, it is useful to unfold Cassiodorus's definition a little. And so prophecy is called 1) inspiration and revelation; for, as St. Thomas teaches (II-II, q. 171, a. 1, ad 4), "inspiration is required for prophecy as regards the elevation of the mind, according to that saying of Job 32: The inspiration of the Almighty gives understanding; but revelation as regards the very perception of divine things, in which prophecy is perfected, and by which the veil of obscurity and ignorance is removed, according to that saying of Job 12: He reveals deep things from darkness." 2) It is called divine inspiration and revelation; for in order that what is far from natural knowledge be known, supernatural light is required. "Just as," says St. Thomas (loc. cit., a. 2), "the manifestation of bodily vision takes place through bodily light, so also the manifestation of intellectual vision takes place through intellectual light. Therefore the manifestation must be proportioned to the light through which it takes place, as an effect is proportioned to its cause. Since, therefore, prophecy pertains to knowledge which exists above natural knowledge, the consequence is that for prophecy there is required a certain intellectual light exceeding the light of natural reason." In this matter observe "that what is formal in prophetic knowledge is the divine light, from whose unity prophecy has unity of species, although the things which are prophetically manifested through the divine light are diverse" (loc. cit., a. 3, ad 3). (1) In order that the character of prophetic light may be better understood, it is useful also to recall what St. Thomas teaches (II-II, q. 173, a. 4): "It must be said that in prophetic revelation the mind of the prophet is moved by the Holy Spirit as a deficient instrument with respect to the principal agent. But the mind of the prophet is moved not only to apprehend something, but also to speak something, or to do something; and sometimes indeed to all three at once, sometimes to two of these, but sometimes to one only. And any of these can occur with some defect of knowledge. For when the mind of the prophet is moved to judge or apprehend something, sometimes he is brought to this, that he apprehends that thing only; but sometimes further to this, that he knows these things have been divinely revealed to him. Likewise sometimes the mind of the prophet is

moved to speak something, so that he understands what the Holy Spirit intends through these words... sometimes he does not understand what the Holy Spirit intends through these words, as is plain concerning Caiaphas (John 11). Likewise also when the Holy Spirit moves the mind of someone to do something, sometimes he understands what this signifies... (Jer. 13); but sometimes he does not understand, as the soldiers dividing the garments of Christ did not understand what this signified. Therefore, when someone knows that he is moved by the Holy Spirit to judge something, or to signify by word or deed, this properly pertains to prophecy. But when he is moved and does not know it, it is not perfect prophecy, but a certain prophetic instinct." 3) Prophecy is called revelation and inspiration of the event of things, etc.; by these words the object of prophecy according to its strictest acceptation is determined, that is, the future contingent not knowable in its natural causes. Hence St. Thomas, weighing this definition (II-II, q. 171, a. 3, ad 1), says: "Prophecy is defined there according to that which is properly signified by the name prophecy. And in this way also prophecy is divided against the other freely given graces." 4) Prophecy is called revelation and inspiration announcing, etc.; this indicates not only the announcement made by God to the prophet, but also, indeed chiefly, the announcement made by the prophet himself to others, or prediction; by this reason also prophecy is distinguished from simple revelation. 5) Finally, prophecy is called revelation announcing with immovable truth, etc.; by these words is expressed the certainty required in prophecy. This imports: a) that prophecy cannot have what is false underlying it; for, as St. Thomas says (II-II, q. 171, a. 6), "prophecy is a certain knowledge impressed upon the intellect of the prophet from divine revelation by way of a certain teaching. But the truth of knowledge is the same in the disciple and in the teacher, because the knowledge of the learner is a likeness of the knowledge of the teacher... Therefore there must be the same truth of prophetic knowledge and enunciation as there is of divine knowledge, under which it is impossible for falsehood to lie." b) It imports certainty in the prophet concerning the truth of the things which he says, and concerning the revelation received about those same things. "Concerning those things, therefore," says St. Thomas (loc. cit., a. 5), "which the prophet knows expressly through the spirit of prophecy, he has the greatest certainty, and he holds as certain that these things have been divinely revealed to him. Hence it is said in Jeremiah 26: In truth the Lord sent me to you, that I should speak in your ears all these words. Otherwise, if he himself did not have certainty about this, the faith which rests upon the sayings of the prophets would not be certain. And we can take a sign of prophetic certainty from this, that Abraham, admonished in prophetic vision, prepared himself to sacrifice his only-begotten son; which he would in no way have done unless he had been most certain of divine revelation." c) It imports that the prediction itself, when the mode in which the matter is enunciated is inspected, be certain: both insofar as it is not vague and flexible in speech, and hence applicable to any event; and insofar as it is not conjectural, like that, for example, by which politicians announce and foresee human events, or physicians the health or death of a sick man. (1) To understand the mode of prophetic inspiration, it is pleasing here to copy out what St. Thomas has (II-II, q. 173, a. 2): "It must be said that, as Augustine says (book 12 *On Genesis according to the Letter*, q. at the beginning), prophetic knowledge pertains chiefly to the mind. But concerning the knowledge of the human mind two things must be considered, namely the reception or representation of things, and judgment concerning the things represented. Now when certain things are represented to the human mind according to certain species and according to the order of nature, first the species must be represented to sense, secondly to imagination, thirdly to the possible intellect, which is changed by the species of phantasms according to the illumination of the agent intellect. But in imagination there are not only the forms of sensible things according as they are received from sense, but they are transformed in diverse ways, either because of some bodily transformation, as happens in those sleeping and those mad, or also phantasms are disposed according to the command of reason in order to that which is to be understood. For just as from the diverse ordering of the same letters diverse understandings are received, so also, according to the diverse disposition of phantasms, diverse intelligible species result in the intellect. But the judgment of the human mind is made according to the power of intellectual light. "But through the gift of prophecy something is conferred upon the human mind above that which pertains to the natural faculty, as regards both: namely both as regards judgment, through

the influx of intellectual light, and as regards reception or representation of things, which takes place through certain species. And as regards this second point, human teaching can be assimilated to prophetic revelation, but not as regards the first. For a man represents certain things to his disciple through signs of speech; but he cannot illuminate inwardly as God does. But of these two, the first is more principal in prophecy, because judgment is the completion of knowledge. And therefore, if there is divinely made for someone a representation of certain things through imaginary likenesses, as for Pharaoh and Nebuchadnezzar, or even through corporeal likenesses, as for Belshazzar, such a person is not to be judged a prophet unless his mind is illuminated for judging; but such an apparition is something imperfect in the genus of prophecy... But one will be a prophet if only his intellect is illuminated for judging even those things which were seen imaginatively by others, as is plain concerning Joseph, who explained Pharaoh's dream. But, as Augustine says (loc. cit., in the middle), he is most of all a prophet who excels in both, namely that he sees in spirit the signifying likenesses of corporeal things and understands them with liveliness of mind."

233. Having touched upon these things concerning the nature of prophecy, we now approach the explanation of the first of the two questions to be treated here, which is concerning the possibility of prophecy. As regards the false and imaginary notions which the rationalists invent, there is no leisure to call them back to the scales, both because their falsity is too evident of itself, and also because we shall vindicate the possibility and force of proving of prophecy as defined by us. See, if you wish, Perrone in the objection.

234. Therefore the question concerning the possibility of prophecy finally returns to this: 1) whether God can foreknow the things which are future; 2) whether, supposing divine foreknowledge of them, God can manifest or reveal those same things to others, by one of the aforesaid modes. Now we have already shown that revelation generally is possible; and therefore there is no need here to demonstrate again that God can reveal even future contingents. But as regards divine foreknowledge of future things, it is attacked from a twofold side. For they say first that future things cannot be known because they do not exist, and therefore cannot be the object of knowledge. This difficulty was seriously proposed, among others, by Voltaire (*Essay on the Morals and Spirit of Nations*, preliminary discourse), as though its solution were not found everywhere among the Scholastics. Secondly, they say that divine foreknowledge of future contingents utterly destroys the choice of human liberty. This difficulty also is most ancient: "Nothing," wrote Cicero (*On Divination*, book 2, c. 7), "is so contrary to reason and constancy as fortune, so that it does not seem to me to fall even in God that He should know what is to be by chance and fortune. For if He knows, it will certainly happen; there is no fortune. But there is fortune. Therefore there is no presentiment of fortuitous things." Compare St. Augustine (*City of God*, book 5, cc. 7 ff.).

235. Yet more recent rationalists have by no means feared to renew this difficulty. Kant (*Anthropology*, section 103) says: "All prophecies which announce the inevitable fact of some people, which nevertheless is brought on by the fault and therefore by the free choice of that people, are useless, because it will nevertheless not be permitted to escape fate; and they have in themselves this absurdity, that in such an absolute decree a certain mechanism of human liberty is conceived, which involves an intrinsic contradiction." Rationalists everywhere repeat the same things, among whom Wegscheider (*Institutions of Dogmatics*, section 19) says: "Any prediction divinely disclosed, by which the inevitable fate of a man or of some people, which depends on some thing to be perpetrated by him, is expressly announced, is repugnant to the idea of the most holy and most benign God, fosters fatalism, and removes the moral liberty of men." Behold the progress of reason through rationalism!

236. As regards the other question, which concerns the force of proving of prophecy, it will help to note these things in order. 1) Every prophecy of the true name is a true miracle, or a species of it, since it imports knowledge and prediction which exceeds every natural faculty and order; and in this is properly situated the notion of miracle, as we declared above. Nevertheless, not every miracle is

prophecy, as is plain of itself. 2) Hence it is that the same force of proving belongs per se to prophecy as to the other miracles. For whoever knows with certainty that an event naturally hidden to the one predicting was predicted with certainty, and then contemplates in mind the outcome of that prediction, knows with certainty that something has been done by God, who cannot lead us into error as a false witness. 3) Nevertheless there is some difference here between miracle and prophecy. For the effect of a miracle immediately appears, and therefore immediately proves that for whose confirmation it is performed; thus if someone, in order to prove that he has been sent by God, heals a sick man by a word in an instant, raises a dead man, etc., he immediately proves his divine mission. But prophecy of itself does not prove except when it has been fulfilled by the event. The event, however, is often not fulfilled except after some period of time, sometimes a very long one. Thus it was with the prophecies of the Old Testament pertaining to the Messiah, and with the prophecy of Abraham regarding the return of the Jewish people from Egypt: "but in the fourth generation they shall return here." 4) Therefore we must consider prophecy before a twofold difference of time: before that time, namely, in which it has already been fulfilled by the event, and before that time which precedes the fulfillment of the prophecy already issued. For the first time, as we said, prophecy has force of proving per se. For the other, however, it cannot have the same force unless from elsewhere it is established that that prediction was truly from God. Thus, for example, when the prophets of the old law showed themselves to be legates of God by their manner of living, by miracles, by other prophecies soon fulfilled; when afterward they had already been authentically received as God's legates by the legitimate leaders of the Synagogue, they also conciliated faith for their prophecies before they were fulfilled by the event. This yielded to the greatest utility of the people of the Israelites. For the prophecies which they issued concerning Christ, the future Redeemer of the human race, stirred up the faith of the Jews, fostered their hope, and brought to them the greatest consolation in tribulations. And by this reason St. Thomas wrote (II-II, q. 171, a. 1): "But those things which are divinely revealed above human knowledge cannot be confirmed by human reason, which they exceed... Hence, thirdly, to prophecy belongs the operation of miracles, as a certain confirmation of prophetic enunciation. Hence it is said in the last chapter of Deuteronomy 34:10: 'There has not arisen a prophet further in Israel like Moses, whom the Lord knew face to face in all signs and portents.'" 5) From these things it is plain that miracles and prophecies add force to one another. For if someone announces something future and, in confirmation of his prediction, works a miracle, for example recalls a dead man to life, the miracle in the case exists as a valid argument of the prophecy to be fulfilled in its time by the event. And likewise, if in confirmation of the same thing, for example of revealed doctrine, both miracles and prophecies are issued, when the prophecies are afterward fulfilled, a new argument arises both for the truth of the doctrine and for the truth of the miracles which had been performed in its confirmation.

237. Nevertheless, for now we consider that force of proving which is per se in prophecy, and therefore for that time in which it has already been fulfilled by the event. But since this force of proving of prophecy is demonstrated by almost the same moments of reasons which we gave for the force of proving of miracles, recalling the same things, we shall indicate only what is proper to prophecy.

238. Therefore, with these things set forth: Section II. The proposed question is solved. PROP. X. 1. Right reason evidently shows that God knows future free things, and that He can communicate that knowledge to others. Therefore prophecy, which is the certain prediction of an event freely future, must be called possible. 2. But since certain knowledge of future free things belongs to God alone, prophecy uttered in confirmation of revealed doctrine supplies an inescapable argument of its divine origin.

239. The first part is proved. I. The infinite perfection of the divine nature certainly requires knowledge of infinite perfection. But if God did not know events freely future, His knowledge would not be infinitely perfect. Therefore. The minor is proved. Those events, when they are actually fulfilled in a difference of time, either are known by God, or they are not. If the first, then, since by supposition He was formerly ignorant of them, His knowledge will afterward be increased and perfected. But

if the second, then God will always be ignorant of that event. Yet each is repugnant to the perfection of divine knowledge, and therefore absurd. Wherefore St. Augustine cleverly observes that in God there is rather knowledge than foreknowledge of future things; for the knowledge which He has concerning them is not conjectural or obscure, as ours is, but He clearly beholds all things as present to Himself, since whatever things are to exist in any difference of time are present to eternity. "If," he says (*To Simplician*, book 2, q. 1, n. 2), "He has the things themselves in knowledge, they are not future to Him, but present; and by this it can now be called not foreknowledge, but only knowledge. But if with God those things which are future do not yet exist, but He anticipates them by knowing, then He perceives them twice, in one way according to foreknowledge of future things, and in another way according to knowledge of present things. Therefore something happens to the knowledge of God. This is most absurd and most false... But if even when those things which were foreknown as future have come, nothing new is added to the knowledge of God, but that foreknowledge will remain just as it was even before those things which were foreknown came, how is it now called foreknowledge when it is not of future things? For the things which He discerned as future are now present."

240. II. Whatever has objective truth is necessarily an object of divine knowledge. But an event freely future has objective truth. Therefore. The minor is proved. A proposition concerning the present, enunciating a fact already existing, is true; therefore also a proposition enunciating the fact for the future, or for that difference of time in which it will be, will be true from eternity. If it is true that I am now speaking, it was antecedently true that I was going to speak. Therefore God knew from eternity this objective truth of my present free speech. Hence, as Viva rightly notes, "from the determination which an object has in the present, it comes about that a proposition antecedently enunciating the same object as future, or a proposition consequently enunciating it as past, is determinately true. Indeed, let us posit two propositions: 'Antichrist will sin,' 'Antichrist will not sin.' These two propositions are contradictory. For to exist and not to exist are formally contradictory; but to be, namely the sin of Antichrist, is had through existence; not to be, namely the sin of Antichrist, is had through non-existence. Therefore those two propositions are contradictory. But of two contradictories one is necessarily true, the other false. Therefore, if in time the sin of Antichrist truly exists, from eternity it is determinately true that he is going to sin." (1) It can indeed be disputed among theologians from where future free things have determinate objective truth; but it is certain that they have it. Hence St. Thomas (II-II, q. 171, a. 8, ad 1) says: "the certainty of divine foreknowledge is borne upon them, future contingents, according as they are present and already determined to one"; and (ad 2): "divine foreknowledge regards future things according to two points: namely according as they are in themselves, insofar as it intuits them present, and according as they are in their causes... And although contingent future things, insofar as they are in themselves, are determined to one without the other being able to happen, nevertheless insofar as they are in their causes, they are not determined." Therefore when the holy Doctor says (loc. cit., a. 3): "in themselves they are not knowable as future contingents, whose truth is not determined," this must be understood, as Sylvius notes (in this place), insofar as "future contingents, as they are contingent future things, are not knowable in themselves, namely with certainty. For then they are considered as contingent future things when between the knowledge of the one knowing and the thing to happen there is found the order of past to future," as he, St. Thomas, speaks in the aforesaid q. 2 *De Veritate*, art. 12, "that is, when the event of the thing is considered only as future, and by no means present to the one knowing." Indeed, to deny the determinate objective truth of future contingents would be the same as to deny their infallible knowability before any intellect whatever; for knowledge is impossible without an object. Compare Sylvius (loc. cit.). It is pleasing to report other words of the same author (on I, q. 14, a. 13, ad 1): "Although," he says, "it is unknown to men which part of the contradictories concerning a future contingent is determinately true, nevertheless in reality one part is determinately true, the other false, as not only Blessed Thomas teaches, but also Durandus, Richard, Scotus, and others; because one of them is actually conformed to the thing which it enunciates, the other deformed from it; that is, one enunciates that which truly is future,

but the other the opposite. Therefore if it is true today that you write, from eternity it was true that you were going to write today." He then reports the objection from Aristotle, at the end of book 1 *Perihermenias*, and adds: "What the Philosopher thought is ambiguous. Not a few judge that he erred, and we would altogether subscribe to them if it were established that he had asserted that, of contradictories concerning a future contingent, neither is determinately true, neither false." He then shows that this is not established; and the things which seem contrary, "perhaps," says Sylvius, "can be explained so that he wished to teach that of contradictories concerning a future contingent it is not necessary that one, which is determined or designated by us, be determinately true, and the other similarly designated be determinately false; as in propositions about the present or past one can be determined which is determinately true and the other which is determinately false." We have set forth these things more fully in the treatise *On Grace* (n. 672), and they are treated professedly as in their proper place in the treatise *On the One God*, where divine knowledge is discussed. Yet I wished here to report the opinion and words of a grave theologian of another school.

241. Therefore it is plain that foreknowledge of a free future event does not require its physical existence from eternity, but only the logical, or objective, truth of that physical existence which it will have for its own difference of time. And it seems undeservedly attributed by some to St. Thomas that he taught that future things exist from eternity according to their real being. In reality (I Sent., dist. 28, q. 1, a. 5) he writes: "Before a thing is, it does not have being except in its causes"; and (*On Power*, q. 3, a. 5, ad 2): "From this very fact that being is attributed to a quiddity, not only being but the quiddity itself is said to be created, because before it has being, it is nothing, except perhaps in the intellect of the Creator, where it is not a creature, but the creating essence"; and (I, q. 10, a. 3, ad 3): "According to this, true and necessary things are eternal, because they are in the eternal intellect, which is the divine intellect alone. Hence it does not follow that anything outside God is eternal." Compare Sylvius (on I, q. 14, a. 13, question 1). Therefore, when it is objected: a free future thing does not exist, therefore it cannot be known, the response is easy. I distinguish the antecedent: it does not exist according to intentional being, I deny; according to real and physical being, either I concede, or I subdistinguish: it does not exist according to physical being from eternity, I concede; it does not exist according to that same being for its own difference of time, I deny.

242. III. The certain knowledge of free future things is chiefly denied to God because it would destroy human liberty. But this is altogether false. Therefore. The minor is proved. 1) Just as true liberty consists in immunity from a principle intrinsically and antecedently determining the will to one thing, so that which does not posit a principle of this sort by no means removes liberty. But divine knowledge of a free future thing posits no principle in the will intrinsically and antecedently determining it to one thing. Therefore it does not remove liberty. Wherefore it is more truly said that what God foresaw will certainly be, than that it will necessarily be. "If therefore," says Origen (*Against Celsus*, book 2, c. 20), "that 'altogether' is understood as necessary, so that it signifies that a thing will come forth from necessity on the side of the cause, we do not grant it; but if only the fact is enunciated as certainly future, not the mode, which would be necessity on the side of the cause, we concede it." we do not grant that the fact was thus future, if it is only enunciated that the fact is certainly future, but not the mode, which would be necessity on the side of the cause; this we concede." 2) God intuits from eternity the future free determinations of man as if they were present; and therefore, as we heard from St. Augustine, this knowledge of God must be called knowledge rather than foreknowledge. But the present knowledge of an object now freely existing does not remove its liberty, just as it does not change its nature. Therefore. Hence Boethius (*Consolation of Philosophy*, book 5, prose 6) writes: "Why do you demand that those things which are surveyed by divine light become necessary, when not even men make necessary those things which they see? For does your intuition add any necessity to those things which you discern as present? By no means. But if there is a worthy comparison of divine and human present, as you see certain things in this temporal present of yours, so He discerns all things in His eternal present. Wherefore this divine foreknowledge does not change the nature and property of things, and He beholds as present with Himself such things as will one day come forth in time as future.

Nor does He confuse the judgments of things; rather, by the intuition of His mind, He discerns things about to come both necessarily and not necessarily. Just as you, when you at the same time see a man walking on the earth and the sun rising in the sky, although you behold each at the same time, nevertheless distinguish them, and judge this one voluntary, that one necessary; so the divine intuition, looking upon all things, by no means disturbs the quality of things, present indeed with Himself, but future as regards the condition of time." 3) If some priority is to be considered between a free future event and the knowledge which God has concerning it, it must be said that divine foreknowledge supposes it as the object to which it is terminated. "For," says the Author of the *Orthodox Questions* (q. 53 among the works of St. Justin), "the future thing does not follow foreknowledge, but foreknowledge follows the future thing." But that which presupposes a free act, or the free determination of the will, cannot determine the will antecedently to one thing, or cannot destroy liberty. Therefore divine foreknowledge of a free future event is not hostile to liberty.

243. Wherefore to more recent rationalists we can give the same answer which Origen in the third century gave to the gentile philosopher Celsus, who argued thus: "It was God who predicted Judas's betrayal and the crimes of the Jews, and what had been predicted had altogether to happen." Origen answers these things (loc. cit.): "Celsus thinks that what is predicted from some foreknowledge therefore happens because it was predicted; but we, conceding this by no means, say that the cause of the future thing is not in the one predicting because he predicted that it would be future; rather, the future thing, which was certainly going to be future even if it had not been predicted, furnishes the cause to the foreknowledge for foreannouncing it." Compare the treatise *On Grace* (n. 671-701). Hence when they object: if God foresaw future free events, it is necessary that they happen, otherwise God could be deceived in His knowledge; one can answer: I distinguish. It is necessary that they happen by a necessity consequent upon the free determination of man, and hypothetical, taken from the hypothesis of the truth of the free determination, I concede; by a necessity antecedent to the free determination, and absolute, I deny. "There is," says St. Anselm (*Why God Became Man*, book 2, c. 18), "a preceding necessity, which is the cause that a thing is, and there is a following necessity, which the thing makes... Thus it is when I say that you speak of necessity when you are speaking." Compare the treatise *On Grace* (n. 84).

244. And so, in order that prophecy be possible, two things are required and suffice: 1) that God can know future free things; and 2) that He can communicate knowledge of them to others. But the first is plain from the arguments just given, the second from the things disputed above (nn. 106 ff.). Therefore.

245. The second part is proved. I. Prophecy has no author except God; therefore if prophecy is issued in confirmation of revealed doctrine, it is God who confirms that doctrine. But God cannot confirm error or falsehood by His authority (n. 214 ff.). Therefore prophecy uttered in confirmation of revealed doctrine supplies an inescapable argument of its divine origin. By this indeed is shown the force of proving of prophecy as regards itself. The antecedent is proved. The author of prophecy cannot be anyone except one who can know future free things with certainty. But this knowledge belongs to God alone. Therefore. That it belongs to God has already been proved; that it truly belongs to no one besides Him is proved. 1) Divine revelation being set aside, future free events cannot be known except either in their causes or in themselves. But they cannot be known in their causes, since by the very fact that those causes are free, they can be borne to either alternative, and therefore the events to follow do not have determinate truth in them. Nor can they be known in themselves by any creature. For for knowledge of this sort there is required the power of immutable and eternal intellection, by reason of which future free events, according to objective truth, are as present. But power of intellection of this sort belongs to God alone. Therefore. Compare what we said in the treatise *On God the Creator* (n. 378 ff.; 387 ff.), where natural and certain knowledge of future things is denied even to the angels. 2) It has always been the persuasion of all peoples that prophecy cannot be except from God. Hence those who foretold future things were called divine, as if, as Isidore says (book 3,

Etymologies), full of God. Likewise prophets were consulted as gods; and among them Apollo Pythius stood out, who was held as author of divination. Hence Valerius Maximus says: "The observance of all is bound up with some contact of religion, since it is believed to stand not by fortuitous motion, but by divine providence." And Cicero (*On Divination*, book 1, c. 5) reports the saying received among the ancient wise men: "if indeed these things reciprocate in this way, that if there is divination, there are gods, and if there are gods, there is divination." And (book 1, c. 1) he writes: "There is an old opinion, already drawn down from heroic times, and confirmed by the consensus both of the Roman people and of all nations, that a certain divination turns among men, which the Greeks call *mantiken*, that is, the presentiment and knowledge of future things. It is a certain magnificent and salutary thing, if there is any such thing; and by it mortal nature can come nearest to the power of the gods. And so, as in many other things we have done better than the Greeks, so our people drew the name of this most excellent thing from the gods, the Greeks, as Plato interprets, from frenzy, etc."

246. You will say: Prophecies are ascribed to God in vain; for they can be explained through a more vivid imagination. For it is not difficult for a more vehement affection of the soul so to inflame the imagination that the soul imagines as present the things which it hopes or fears. Rationalists dream that this is especially open from the phenomena of animal magnetism. I answer: 1) "The soul," says St. Thomas (II-II, q. 172, a. 1, ad 1), "when it is abstracted from corporeal things, is rendered more apt for perceiving the influx of spiritual substances, and also for perceiving subtle movements which are left in the human imagination from the impressions of natural causes. The soul is impeded from perceiving these when it has been occupied with sensible things. And therefore Gregory says, in the place cited in the argument, that 'the soul, when it approaches death, foreknows certain future things by the subtlety of its nature,' according as it perceives even slight impressions, and therefore in causes; or also it knows future things by angelic revelation, but not by its own power, because, as Augustine says, book 12 *On Genesis according to the Letter*, c. 13, at the beginning, 'if this were so, then whenever it wished, it would have in its power to foreknow future things,' which is plainly false." 2) Hence the holy Doctor, comparing certain natural previsions with true prophecies, says (loc. cit.): "This foreknowledge of future things differs from the first, which is had from divine revelation, in two ways. First indeed, because the first can be of any events whatever and infallibly; but this foreknowledge, which can be had naturally, is about certain effects to which human experience can extend. Secondly, because the first prophecy is according to immovable truth; but not the second, for falsehood can underlie it. But the first foreknowledge properly pertains to prophecy, not the second, because, as was said above, in the preceding question, art. 1, prophetic knowledge is of those things which naturally exceed human knowledge. And therefore it must be said that prophecy simply so called cannot be from nature, but only from divine revelation."

247. II. In order that prophecy have force of proving as regards us, it is required and sufficient that it can become known to us with certainty: 1) that it is true prophecy; 2) that the event was truly predicted and afterward fulfilled in deed; 3) that the prophecy was made in confirmation of revelation. But these three things can become known to us with certainty. The minor is proved as to the first part. For 1) prophecy taken most strictly, with which we are now dealing, has as object a future free thing which exceeds the knowledge of all created intellects. 2) Indeed, often a future free thing of this sort has relation to the supernatural order, and so depends on the free will of God that it cannot be known except by Him who intuits that will, or by one to whom God reveals it; for in natural causes there is rather a contrary disposition, as we said concerning miracles. 3) It can indeed happen that something is rashly or conjecturally predicted, and that the same thing sometimes happens. But if the events which are predicted are clear and determinate, if they are multiple, if some of them are even supernatural, if minute circumstances are designated, etc., and nevertheless all are fulfilled in deed, it is impossible that their prediction be attributed to conjectures or rashness. Recall, for example, the Messianic prophecies of the Old Testament, which clearly announce that the Messiah is to be born from the progeny of the Patriarchs and from the Davidic stock; they designate the

place of His birth, Bethlehem of Judah; the virginity of His mother; the time in which He will be born; the circumstances of His passion and death, etc. Who will say that all these things were rashly predicted and fulfilled by chance? (1) Hence it is plain how foolishly Rousseau wrote (*Emile*, vol. 3): "I say that no prophecies can have authority for me, because in order that they have it, it would be necessary... that it be demonstrated to me that this event could not have coincided fortuitously with the prophecy. For even if it were more precise, clearer, more luminous than an axiom of geometry, since the clarity of a prediction made at random does not make its fulfillment impossible, this fulfillment, when it takes place, proves nothing strictly for the one who predicted it." The minor is proved as to the second part. It is plain of itself that it can be established for us, either through our own experience or through human testimony, that an event had first been determinately predicted and afterward fulfilled in deed. Wherefore Rousseau (loc. cit.) attacks the force of proving of prophecy altogether foolishly, because for this it would be required "that I had been a witness of the prophecy, that I were a witness of the event." For prophecy is a certain fact; and therefore it is subject to the same laws as other facts. But certainty concerning other facts can be had even through the testimony of others. Therefore the first condition which Rousseau demands either is not necessary, or it removes the certainty of any fact which we do not see with our own eyes; and this would overthrow the certainty of all history. Moreover, the Apostles themselves immediately heard the prophecies of the resurrection and ascension of Jesus Christ; likewise of the mission of the Holy Spirit, and also other prophecies, such as the denial of Peter, the overthrow of Jerusalem and the temple, etc.; and they themselves were also eyewitnesses of their fulfillment. The minor is proved as to the third part by the same arguments by which we showed the knowability of the relative truth of miracles.

248. You will say: There is no religion which does not have its prophecies; therefore an argument taken from prophecies in confirmation of supernatural revelation always turns out doubtful. I answer by distinguishing the antecedent: which does not have its prophecies, true or fictitious, I concede; true, I deny. And so, as regards the oracles of the pagans, Perrone rightly notes: "For although we grant, with Fr. Baltus, S.J., against Van Dale and Fontenelle, which we judge truer on account of the open testimonies of the Fathers, that not all the oracles of paganism are to be ascribed to the frauds of priests, nevertheless we rightly affirm that characteristic notes are given which essentially distinguish the oracles of the pagans from the biblical ones." For, to omit the rest, oracles and divinations were: 1) only singular utterances, connected among themselves by no reason; 2) concerning events immediately impending, and therefore subject to some conjecture, so that counsel might be given to certain persons or cities; 3) so ambiguous that whatever happened would seem to have been predicted. Thus Cicero writes concerning the most celebrated oracles of Apollo: "But now I come to you, holy Apollo... for Chrysippus filled a whole volume with your oracles, partly false, as I think, partly true by chance, as happens very often in every discourse, partly flexible in speech and obscure, so that the interpreter needs an interpreter, and the lot itself must be referred to lots, partly ambiguous and such as must be referred to dialectic." Hence the opinion of those who ascribe all the oracles of paganism to the frauds of priests seems by no means to be approved. For this contradicts not only the authority of the ancient pagans, Plutarch excepted, but also that of the Fathers. Certainly St. Justin, Tertullian, St. Cyprian, St. Athanasius, Lactantius, and St. Augustine attributed several to demons, so that St. Augustine wrote: "The most talkative statues, once the demons were driven out by Christians, were silent like instruments without breath." And Bertier, S.J., having weighed all things, concludes: "The veneration by which we ought to follow the Fathers of the Church does not allow us to doubt that certain prophecies were issued by the art of demons." If there were any true prophecies among the pagans, namely predictions of events which could be known with certainty only by God revealing, as the Sibylline oracles seem to some, whatever may be the case concerning their historical truth, about which see Perrone in the notes if you wish, certainly they were not issued to confirm pagan superstition. Indeed, they rather serve for confirming the truth of Christian revelation. But predictions of this sort in confirmation of truth, as we have already heard from St. Thomas, can be made even by sinners and unbelievers, just as

Balaam, an impious man, prophesied.

249. The investigation of the preceding disputation has brought the matter to this point, that the possibility, fittingness, indeed moral necessity, of revealed religion must be acknowledged by all. Moreover, we established criteria from which the truth of divine revelation can be judged. It would indeed be opportune immediately to add to these things those which place in clear light the offices of reason both as regards the obligation and method of investigating revelation, as regards the necessity of embracing it once found, and finally as regards the relation which ought to exist between reason and revelation. But since we dealt sufficiently with these things in the treatise *On the Infused Virtues* (disp. 4, arts. 7-9), it remains that, employing the established criteria, we turn our mind to inquiring into the fact itself of revelation, so that from this it may become known whether revealed religion exists, and what that religion is.

250. Nevertheless, it is useful from the beginning to open the way which we shall follow. For first, no one is unaware that there does not exist in the world only one religion which ascribes to itself divine origin through revelation. But it is by no means necessary to subject all and each to examination; for since one of them, namely the Christian, has been propagated through the whole world, shines with a more splendid light, and draws the eyes of all to itself, we undertake immediately to examine it. This is all the more so because if it is once established that it proceeds from God revealing, then it will be easy to reject, by the best right, all the remaining religions plainly opposed to it.

251. Nor, secondly, are we unaware that God manifested Himself to men from the beginning, and afterward through Moses and the Prophets instructed the Israelite people in the true religion; that revelation, whether primitive or of the Mosaic law, was a preparation for Christian revelation; and that Christ the Lord exists as the center and end of both those revelations. Hence from the very writings of the old Covenant the strongest arguments could be taken for proving the divinity of the Christian religion; for the prophecies, especially the Messianic ones, while they directly show the divine nature or mission of Christ, consequently also proclaim as divinely revealed the doctrine which He Himself announced. But what prevents us from entering upon this way, above all, is the special inquiry instituted on this matter in the treatise on the Incarnation, which is handed down in this same year in this University.

252. But thirdly, even when we restrict our investigation to those things which immediately and directly touch Christian revelation, a very broad field of speaking opens to us; for the works of the Apologists are innumerable, from which it would be permitted to derive arguments. But we must be mindful of the space and time which are granted to us, lest, unfolding one matter with too much breadth, we be forced to omit the rest, which are also necessary. Therefore we shall set forth the principal arguments by which the divine origin of the Christian religion is sufficiently demonstrated for our matter; and then we shall indicate the sources from which the doctrine of this religion must be drawn.

Disputation II — On Christian Revelation

Article 1. Whether the four Gospels and the Acts of the Apostles are authentic books

253. Miracles and prophecies by which, according to the established principles, the truth of Christian revelation must be proved are chiefly gathered from the books which among us have the authority of Sacred Scripture. Chiefly, I say, because just as other monuments are not lacking which narrate several of those wondrous facts, so other sources are present from which, as we shall see, arguments can be drawn. Therefore, unless we first show the authenticity, or the force for making faith, which is in those books, we cannot use the narratives contained in them for instituting our demonstration. But it will help to remember that a twofold authority of the Scriptures can be considered: one divine, insofar as they were written under the inspiration of the Holy Spirit; the other human, insofar as we consider them like other historical monuments which are worthy of faith. Since here we are engaged in inquiring into revelation and defending its existence against unbelievers, we undertake to show not the divine authority, which we showed in the treatise *On the Infused Virtues* (disp. 4, art. 4), but the human authority of the Scriptures. Wherefore the method of demonstration will be this: The four Gospels of Jesus Christ are truthful; in them are narrated miracles performed and prophecies fulfilled by the event in confirmation of the divine origin of Christian revelation; miracles and prophecies demonstrate that in whose confirmation they are produced; therefore Christian revelation is truly from God (compare the treatise *On the Infused Virtues*, n. 912 ff.).

254. Now the historical authority of some book, as all know, consists in this, that the things narrated in it are true. But truth of this sort depends especially on the knowledge and truthfulness of the author; and therefore the truth of a historical book would be shown with greater difficulty unless its author, or the epoch in which it was written, were known in some way. Yet it would profit us nothing to know that the author wrote true things unless it were established at the same time that his book has come down to us in the same way as it was first written by him. Therefore to the question concerning the historical authenticity of the Gospels there is joined the question concerning their genuineness and integrity. These things must be unfolded a little, so that the sense of the question may become clearly known.

255. For some, an authentic book is the same as a genuine one; but these two concepts are truly diverse. For a book is called genuine when it has that author whose name it bears, or to whom it is commonly attributed; or at least when it was written around that age to which it is referred. Hence it is plain that genuineness contributes greatly to establishing the authority of a book; for from it can be gathered not only the sincerity of the author, but also his knowledge, if indeed he is an eyewitness; or, if an earwitness, whether he at least received the facts which he narrates from those who themselves saw; and if the facts are public, the public narration of them before those who could easily have discerned a lie, if there had been any, will be a new argument of truth.

256. But the integrity of a book properly means immunity from corruption. Now corruption can occur in a book in three ways: namely, by adding something to the author's text, and this will properly be interpolation; by taking something away from it, and this will be mutilation; by changing something, so that the sense of the author is depraved, and this will be corruption properly so called. But integrity admits of degrees: it will be enough for us to distinguish a twofold integrity, one substantial, the other absolute. For the first it is required that no interpolation, mutilation, or corruption have intervened which changes the substance of the matters; hence, for example, the Gospels are said to be substantially integral if the things which pertain to faith and morals, to the substance of some fact, and so forth, have not been changed. For the other, however, immunity is required even from accidental corruptions, which, namely, concern words, certain circumstances of lesser moment, and so forth, while the substance of the

matter remains safe. Compare what we said in the treatise *On the Infused Virtues* (nn. 1000-1002). Everyone sees that integrity in some way pertains to the genuineness of a book; for perfect genuineness requires that a book which is attributed to some author or age be such as it first came forth from him; so that, if the corruption is great, the book of that author is no longer possessed.

257. These things having been posited: 1) according to the limits which we have set for ourselves (n. 251), it by no means pertains to us in the present question to vindicate the historical authority of the books of the Old Testament; indeed, neither is it required for the present aim that we demonstrate the truthfulness of all the books of the New Testament. For in the Gospels and the Acts of the Apostles we find an abundant harvest of facts for undertaking our demonstration. 2) As regards the Gospels themselves, it will be enough for us to defend their substantial integrity; for that suffices to establish their historical authority, which we intend here. Certainly no historical book of approved reliability loses its authority in matters of greater moment, which could easily have been known by the author, from the fact that some error is detected in it concerning certain very slight circumstances. 3) Hence it is clear that we can safely leave to the Introduction to Sacred Scripture the task of treating the remaining books; the harmonizing of certain apparent contradictions among different writers; in a word, a fuller treatment of the matter.

258. Therefore, for understanding our matter, it helps to place before the eyes what St. Jerome has in his *Catalogue of Ecclesiastical Writers*: "Matthew, who is also Levi, from being a publican became an Apostle; he first, in Judaea, on account of those who from the circumcision had believed, composed the Gospel of Christ in Hebrew letters and words. Who later translated it into Greek is not sufficiently certain. Moreover the Hebrew itself was held even to this day in the library of Caesarea (but now it no longer exists)... It must be observed that wherever the Evangelist, whether in his own person or in the person of the Lord Savior, uses testimonies of the Old Scripture, he does not follow the authority of the Seventy translators, but the Hebrew; among these are those two: 'Out of Egypt I have called my son,' and 'because he shall be called a Nazarene.'" "Mark, disciple and interpreter of Peter, according as he had heard Peter recounting, having been asked at Rome by the brethren, wrote a brief Gospel. When Peter had heard it, he approved it, and by his own authority published it to be read in the churches, as Clement writes in the sixth book of the *Hypotyposeis*. Papias, bishop of Hierapolis, also mentions this Mark; and Peter, in his first epistle, figuratively signifying Rome under the name of Babylon: 'She who is co-elect in Babylon greets you, and Mark my son.' Therefore, taking up the Gospel which he himself had composed, he went to Egypt, and, first announcing Christ at Alexandria, established the Church there, with such teaching and continence of life that he compelled all followers of Christ to the example of himself. Finally Philo, the most eloquent of the Jews, seeing at Alexandria the first Church still Judaizing, wrote a book on their manner of life, as though in praise of his own nation. And as Luke narrates that those believing at Jerusalem had all things in common, so he handed this down to memory. But he died in the eighth year of Nero, and was buried at Alexandria, Anianus succeeding him." "Luke, a physician of Antioch, as his writings indicate, was not ignorant of the Greek language; a follower of the Apostle Paul and companion of all his travel, he wrote the Gospel concerning which the same Paul says: 'We sent with him the brother whose praise is in the Gospel throughout all the churches.' And to the Colossians: 'Luke, the most dear physician, greets you.' And to Timothy: 'Luke alone is with me.' He also published another excellent volume, which is prefaced with the title *The Acts of the Apostles*, whose history reaches to the two-year stay of Paul at Rome, that is, to the fourth year of Nero. From this we understand that the book was composed in the same City... Some suspect that whenever Paul says in his epistles, 'According to my Gospel,' he signifies the volume of Luke; and that Luke learned the Gospel not only from the Apostle Paul, who had not been with the Lord in the flesh, but also from the other Apostles. This he also declares at the beginning of his volume, saying: 'as they handed down to us who from the beginning themselves saw and were ministers of the word.' But the Acts of the Apostles he composed just as he had seen. He was buried at Constantinople, to which city, in the twentieth year of Constantius, his bones were translated together with the relics of Andrew the Apostle." "John the

Apostle, whom Jesus loved exceedingly, son of Zebedee, brother of the apostle James, whom Herod had beheaded after the passion of the Lord, wrote the Gospel last of all, having been asked by the bishops of Asia, against Cerinthus and other heretics, and especially against the dogma of the Ebionites then rising up, who assert that Christ did not exist before Mary. Hence he was also compelled to proclaim His divine nativity. But they also report another cause of this Scripture: that when he had read the volumes of Matthew, Mark, and Luke, he indeed approved the text of the history, and affirmed that they had said true things, but that they had woven the history of only one year, in which He also suffered, after the imprisonment of John. Therefore, passing over the year whose deeds had been set forth by the three, he narrated the deeds of the earlier time, before John was shut in prison, as will be able to be clear to those who diligently read the volumes of the four Gospels. This matter also removes the discordance which seems to belong to John with the others... Worn out by old age, he died in the sixty-eighth year after the passion of the Lord, and was buried near the same city (Ephesus)." But St. Jerome himself says (*Prologue in the Commentary on Matthew*): "These four Gospels, therefore, foretold long before, the volume of Ezekiel also proves, in which the first vision is woven thus: 'And in the midst, as it were, the likeness of four living creatures; and their faces were the face of a man, and the face of a lion, and the face of an ox, and the face of an eagle.' The first face, of a man, signifies Matthew, who began to write as if concerning a man: 'The book of the generation of Jesus Christ, son of David, son of Abraham.' The second signifies Mark, in whom the voice of a lion roaring in the desert is heard: 'The voice of one crying in the wilderness: Prepare the way of the Lord, make straight His paths.' The third, of an ox, prefigures that the evangelist Luke took his beginning from Zachariah the priest. The fourth signifies John the evangelist, who, having taken up the wings of an eagle and hastening toward higher things, disputes concerning the Word of God."

259. These things having been laid down: Section II. The Proposed Question Is Solved. PROPOSITION XI. That the four Gospels of Jesus Christ are 1. genuine, 2. substantially integral, and 3. truthful, is demonstrated by such force of arguments that no one can deny their historical authenticity, or call it alone into doubt, without rejecting all historical faith and stubbornly contradicting the evident principles of reason.

260. The first part is proved, I, by the argument which they call that of prescription or possession. The constant and universal testimony of Christian society, diffused through the whole world, concerning a matter of great moment done among itself and properly pertaining to itself, must be admitted unless it is clearly proved false from another source. But Christian society, already from the beginning, constantly acknowledged that the books of the New Testament, and especially the four Gospels, had those authors whose names they still bear even now, and that they were written at that time at which it is still commonly handed down. Therefore. The major, which otherwise is evident, is explained by the observation of St. Augustine, who writes (*Against Faustus*, book 28, chapter 2): "When I shall have begun to recite the Gospel of Matthew... you will immediately say that that narrative is not Matthew's, which the whole Church says is Matthew's, conducted from the apostolic sees down to the present bishops by a certain succession. What will you read to me in opposition? Perhaps that there is some book of Manichaeus, where Jesus is denied to have been born of a Virgin. Therefore, just as I believe that book to be Manichaeus's, because from that very time in which Manichaeus lived in the flesh, through his disciples by a certain succession of your superiors it has been guarded and brought down to your times; so also believe this book to be Matthew's, since from that time in which Matthew himself lived in the flesh, the Church has brought it down by an uninterrupted sequence of times and a certain succession of connection even to these times." And in book 33, chapter 6: "Who at last is blinded by such madness, unless he has been overthrown by consenting to the malice and deceit of lying demons, who would say that the Church of the Apostles, so faithful, so numerous a concord of brethren, could not have merited this: that their writings should be faithfully transmitted to posterity, when they have preserved their chairs down to the present bishops by a most certain succession, and when this happens with so great facility in the writings of any sort of men, whether outside the Church or

within the Church?" The minor is proved. 1) It is a thoroughly investigated matter, and admitted by all, that in the age of St. Augustine, Jerome, and Eusebius, the books of the New Testament, and especially the four Gospels, were already held as genuine among Christians. Indeed Eusebius, a most accurate historian who had searched through the ancient writers, reporting the traditions of the churches (in book 3 of the *Ecclesiastical History*, chapter 25), described the list of the books of the New Testament: "First, therefore," he says, "the sacred fourfold chariot of the Gospels is to be placed" (which in chapter 24 he had said had been written, the first by Matthew, the second by Mark, the third by Luke, the fourth by John); "after which follow the epistles of Paul" (which in chapter 3 he had asserted to be fourteen). "Then that first epistle of John, and similarly the epistle of Peter, is to be received. Last is to be joined, if it shall so seem, the Revelation of John; concerning which we shall set forth in its own place what the ancients thought. And these indeed have been received by the common consent of all." Compare the treatise *On the Infused Virtues* (n. 919). 2) Now St. Augustine, St. Jerome, and all the rest would certainly not have retained the Gospels as genuine unless they had been acknowledged as such in the preceding century. For just as they rejected several books which were falsely ascribed to the Apostles and disciples of Christ, so also they would have rejected the Gospels if they had detected anything apocryphal or supposititious in them. Far from doing this, by their own investigations and examination they rather confirmed the judgment of their predecessors; therefore they found nothing which could weaken the genuineness of the Gospels. 3) In reality, in the third century St. Cyprian (*Testimonies*, book 3), bringing forth testimonies from Matthew, Mark, Luke, and John, not only names them, but now says, for example, "Concerning this very thing in the Gospel according to Matthew"; now, "Likewise in the Gospel of Matthew"; now, "Concerning this very thing in Matthew"; and in the same way he names the other Evangelists. Tertullian (*Against Marcion*, book 4, chapter 4) writes: "The same authority of the apostolic Churches also supported the other Gospels, which likewise through them and according to them we have - I mean John's and Matthew's - although also that which Mark published is affirmed to be Peter's, whose interpreter Mark was. For they are also accustomed to ascribe Luke's digest to Paul; the things which disciples have promulgated can be seen as belonging to their masters," that is, as Jacob Pamelius observes, those things which disciples have promulgated can be seen as belonging to their masters. The same Tertullian (*On Fasting*, chapter 10, and elsewhere) cites texts from the Acts of the Apostles. Origen (apud Eusebius, book 6, chapter 25) says: "As I have received by tradition concerning the four Gospels, which alone in the universal Church of God, which is under heaven, are admitted without controversy: namely, that the first Gospel was written by Matthew, formerly indeed a publican, but afterward an Apostle of Jesus Christ, who published it, composed in the Hebrew language, for the Jews converted to the faith. We have received that the second was the Gospel of Mark, who, according as Peter in the catholic Epistle acknowledges him as his son in these words: The elect Church of God, which is in Babylon, greets you, and Mark my son. The third was the Gospel of Luke, which is commended by Paul, written for the sake of the Gentiles. But the last was the Gospel of John." And in homily 7 on Joshua he mentions the other books of the New Testament, and "Luke describing the deeds of the apostles" is commemorated. 4) In the second century Clement of Alexandria (apud Eusebius, book 3, chapter 24), after having reviewed the catalogue, adds: "When the three aforesaid Gospels" (of Matthew, Mark, and Luke) "had already been brought to the knowledge of all, and even of John himself" the Evangelist, it is said that John approved them and confirmed the truth of the writings by his testimony; and likewise (*Stromata* V, 12, and Eusebius book 6, chapters 13-14) he ascribes the Acts of the Apostles to Luke. St. Irenaeus (*Against Heresies*, book 3, chapter 1) says: "Thus Matthew among the Hebrews, in their own language, published a writing of the Gospel, while Peter and Paul were evangelizing at Rome and founding the Church. But after their departure, Mark, the disciple and interpreter of Peter, also himself handed down to us in writing the things which had been announced by Peter. And Luke, the follower of Paul, put into a book the Gospel which was preached by him. Afterwards John also, the disciple of the Lord, who also reclined upon His breast, himself published the Gospel while dwelling at Ephesus." And in chapters 12-15 he copies out many entire chapters from the Acts of the Apostles. St. Justin (*Dialogue with Trypho*, section 103) says: "For in His memoirs, which I say were written by His Apostles"

(Matthew and John), "and by their disciples" (Mark and Luke), "it has been handed down that sweat, like drops of blood, flowed down from Him" (Jesus Christ), "when He prayed and said: If it is possible, let this cup pass." To these can be added Hegesippus, close to the times of the Apostles, who, coming from Palestine to Rome, lived there until the death of Pope Soter; Dionysius, who was bishop of the Corinthians; Pantaenus, who was the predecessor of Clement of Alexandria in governing the catechetical school, and who, as St. Jerome testifies, published many commentaries on Sacred Scripture (Eusebius, book 5, chapter 10); Theophilus, bishop of Antioch, who not only most clearly commemorates or cites the books of the New Testament, but also, as St. Jerome testifies (*Catalogue*), "joining together into one work the sayings of the four Evangelists, sent forth monuments of his own talent for us." 5) It is not surprising if we do not have express and explicit testimonies from the Apostolic writers; for all know that only a few of their writings survive. Nevertheless implicit testimonies are not lacking. For they cite the books of the New Testament more often and more expressly than could be expected, either explicitly or equivalently under diverse formulas. Thus Clement of Rome, disciple of Peter and Paul, produces texts from Matthew and from Luke distinctly, and from Mark conjointly with Matthew. Papias, himself also a disciple of the Apostles, names Matthew and Mark as authors of the Gospels which circulate under their names. Sts. Ignatius and Polycarp frequently bring forward texts of those books in their epistles; indeed St. Ignatius writing to the Ephesians and St. Polycarp to the Philippians expressly recall the epistles received from Paul.

261. II. Whether some book was written at a certain time by a certain author is a historical fact, and therefore is to be proved by witnesses. But innumerable witnesses, both among Christians and among the enemies of the Christian name, refer the books of the New Testament, and especially the four Gospels, to the same time and the same authors. Therefore. The major is explained: In passing judgment concerning the genuineness of Christian books, the same rule must be employed which all use in passing judgment concerning the genuineness of the books of any author whatsoever. Now all judge those books genuine which in all centuries have been commonly attributed to the same authors, as is clear concerning Herodotus and Xenophon, Thucydides, Plato, Aristotle, Virgil, Cicero, and so forth. And St. Augustine vindicates this principle (*Against Faustus*, book 33, chapter 6), writing: "The books of Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, Varro, and other authors of this sort - whence do men know that they are theirs, unless from the continuous attestation of successive times? Many have written many things concerning ecclesiastical letters. Whence is it established what belongs to each one, unless because in those times in which each one wrote those things, he made them known and published them to those to whom he could, and thence the continued knowledge, passing into others and still others and being more widely confirmed, came down to posterity even to our times, so that, when asked whose each book is, we do not hesitate what we ought to answer?" The minor is proved as regards domestic testimonies. It can be noted: 1) innumerable others could be added to those already exhibited, beginning from the fourth century; but the matter is very well known to all. 2) The writers cited, even of the first three centuries, not only enumerate the four Gospels with the name of their authors, but transcribe very many testimonies from them word for word. Thus, for example, St. Irenaeus cites the four Gospels about 350 times; Tertullian, 1550; Clement, 577; the Acts of the Apostles: St. Irenaeus, 38; Tertullian, 97; Clement, 19. Indeed Clement not only frequently cited the sacred books, but also illustrated the individual books with commentaries in a work famous among the ancients, which he entitled *Hypotyposeis*. 3) All the copies of very many churches throughout the whole world, both manuscript and printed, whether in the original language or in translation, report the same names of authors for the Gospels. Hence, when several writers, especially at different times and places, and therefore without any possible agreement among themselves, bring forth entire texts in the same words, the same structure, the same order and arrangement, without doubt some common source must be admitted from which they drew them. But a common source of this sort cannot be tradition, as certain mythical rationalists contend in order to construct their own system. For although human tradition can transmit truth, nevertheless, when the real condition of human capacity is considered, it is naturally impossible that it transmit that truth from one person to another,

and successively into innumerable others through diverse centuries, in the same words, the same structure, the same order. Therefore it is necessary to admit what is denied by the adversaries: namely, that the truth itself was fixed from the beginning in its own form by someone, just as it was fixed, for example, in the poems of Homer, in the orations of Cicero, and so forth. Since, therefore, in the cited writings of St. Irenaeus, St. Clement I, St. Justin, St. Polycarp, Hermas, and so forth, almost innumerable texts are cited from the Gospels, and indeed under the same form, who will not laugh at the absurd hypothesis of Strauss, who seriously says that the Gospels were written after the middle of the second century? In that case not only would the Gospels be supposititious, but so also would be all the works of those writers. 2) The minor is proved as regards the testimonies of external witnesses. There can be cited: a) most of the ancient heretics, Ebion, Cerinthus, Marcion, and others, who used our Gospels just as they used the other writings of the New Testament; for although they attempted to explain or corrupt them in their own way, nevertheless they never dared to remove them from the Apostles. Hence St. Irenaeus (*Against Heresies*, book 3, chapter 11) says: "So great is the firmness concerning these Gospels that even the heretics themselves bear testimony to them, and each one of them, going forth from them, tries to confirm his own doctrine. For the Ebionites, using that Gospel alone which is according to Matthew, from that very Gospel are convicted of not rightly presuming concerning the Lord. But Marcion, cutting down that which is according to Luke, from those things which are still preserved among him is shown to be blasphemous against the only existing God. But those who separate Jesus from Christ, and say that Christ continued impassible, but that Jesus suffered, preferring that Gospel which is according to Mark, can be corrected if they read it with love of truth. But those who are from Valentinus, using that which is according to John most fully for the display of their conjunctions, from that very Gospel will be uncovered as saying nothing rightly, as we showed in the first book (chapter 9). Since, therefore, those who contradict us bear testimony to us and use these, our demonstration concerning them is firm and true." 3) The pagans themselves are witnesses for us. For as many of them as wrote against the Christian Religion did not raise even the slightest doubt about the authenticity of the sacred books. Thus Celsus, as Origen testifies (*Against Celsus*, book 3), never denied that the sacred books of the Christians were genuine; indeed he praises many things from the Gospels, and affirms that he describes those things from the books of the disciples of Christ. The same must be said of Porphyry, although, as St. Jerome testifies, he attempted to refute the Gospels, the Acts of the Apostles, and other books. Likewise the Author of the *Dialogue on the Death of Peregrinus* mocks the sacred writers; but he does not deny that the Apostles and disciples of Christ are the authors of the books of the New Testament. Julian the Apostate (apud St. Cyril of Alexandria, book 10) clearly expresses the names of the four Evangelists, saying: "For neither did that Jesus, neither Paul, nor Matthew, nor Luke, nor Mark, dare to call Him God, but that good John ... first dared to disclose this." Wherefore we rightly conclude with St. John Chrysostom (homily 6 on First Corinthians): "Even those who oppose us are sufficient for attesting the ancient origin of our books, namely the books written by Celsus and the Batanean" (Porphyry, born in Batanea), "who acted with him. For they could not have contradicted books which had been written after themselves."

262. After these things everyone sees how shamelessly a recent author, frivolous as much as impious, wrote that the formula "according to Matthew, Mark, etc." does not indicate the authors of the Gospels, but only those according to whose traditions the Gospels were written (1). (1) "It is known that each of the four Gospels bears at its head the name of a person known either in apostolic history or in evangelical history itself. These four persons are not given to us strictly as authors. The formulas, according to Matthew, according to Mark, according to Luke, according to John, do not imply that in the oldest opinion these narratives had been written from end to end by Matthew, by Mark, by Luke, by John (it is thus that one said: 'the Gospel according to the Egyptians'); they signify only that these were the traditions proceeding from each of these Apostles and covering themselves with their authority." Renan (*Life of Jesus*, Introduction). Rosenmueller the Protestant had already answered him (*Scholia on Matthew*): "Faustus the Manichaean, as Augustine testifies against Faustus, book 17, chapter 2; book 27, chapter 2; book 33, chapter

3, thought that from the titles of the Gospels it could be concluded that they had not been written by those Evangelists whose names they bear, but by others who professed that they had written according to them. But Faustus slipped through ignorance of the Greek language, because he did not know that *kata Matthaion*, *kata Markon*, etc., is the same as 'of Matthew,' 'of Mark,' etc." He then confirms this by examples drawn from Polybius, from the Acts of the Apostles, and from Aelian.

263. The second part is proved, I, by nearly the same arguments as the preceding part. For 1) all critics regard a book as substantially integral and incorrupt if the most ancient codices of the same book agree entirely, as to substance, with the more recent ones. But if the most ancient codices of the Gospels which have been discovered and are preserved in various libraries are inspected, all, both in the Latin Church and also in the Greek Church, agree entirely as to substance. Those themselves whose interest it was to assert that corruption had been made have never been able to prove it from a comparison of older and more recent codices. 2) The argument increases if translations made in various ages, or from ancient times, in various places, also agree with the original text. But it is established that almost innumerable translations exist, and that some are most ancient; the Syriac and Latin are eminent, which were made already in the first century. Now all these translations, as to substance, agree both among themselves and with the original text. Compare Brian Walton (*Prolegomena* 5, n. 3). 3) A book is held by critics to be integral and incorrupt if texts are frequently cited from it by ancient writers which are also read in our codices in the same way. But texts from the Gospels are cited most frequently and by the most ancient writers, such as St. Ignatius Martyr, St. Clement of Rome, St. Justin Martyr, St. Irenaeus, Athenagoras, Tertullian, St. Theophilus of Antioch, Clement of Alexandria, Origen, and so forth, which are read in the same way in our codices. Indeed similar citations also frequently occur in the genuine Acts of the Martyrs, who, while they publicly professed their faith before pagan judges, very often alleged the deeds and words of Sacred Scripture. But the testimonies of subsequent centuries are innumerable. Wherefore we conclude this argument with the words of Tertullian, who, speaking of the Gospel of Luke corrupted by the Marcionites (*Against Marcion*, book 4, chapters 4-5), writes: "I say that mine" (the Gospel of Luke) "is true, Marcion says that his is. Who will determine between us, unless the account of time, prescribing authority to that which will be found more ancient, and proclaiming corruption against that which will be proved later? For insofar as falsehood is the corruption of truth, to that extent it is necessary that truth precede falsehood... Therefore I say that among those" (Apostolic Churches), "and not only now among the Apostolic Churches, but among all which are confederated with them by the fellowship of the Sacrament, that Gospel of Luke has stood from the beginning of its publication which we most of all defend; but Marcion's is not known to most, and is known to none without being thereby condemned... The same authority of the Churches will also support the other Gospels."

264. II. No time can be assigned at which substantial corruption was possible. For, for the sake of clarity, let us consider three times: 1) the time when the Apostles were still living; 2) the time which immediately followed the death of the Apostles, namely from the end of the first century up to the middle of the second century; 3) the time which from then has proceeded down to us. But: Not while the Apostles were still living. For when there is question of the substantial corruption of the Gospels, the matter is of the gravest moment. Who, moreover, would have dared to attempt this under the very eyes of the Apostles, thinking, namely, that the Apostles would peacefully permit that corruption? Indeed if even by chance and without malice a corruption of this sort had occurred, would not the Apostles have opposed it with all their strength, lest writings which circulated under their name should report the false doctrine of their Master? Who would attribute such indolence to the Apostles, who, for disseminating the true doctrine of Christ, subjected themselves to innumerable dangers and persecutions? Those who poured out their blood for Christ certainly could not permit certain men, abusing their name, to corrupt the doctrine of Christ with impunity. Not immediately after the death of the Apostles. For then the doctrine of the Apostles was still recent; the autographs of the sacred codices, or at least copies approved by the Apostles, were preserved in

the Churches. Therefore the disciples and immediate successors of the Apostles would have protested against introduced corruptions. But those disciples whose writings survive, Polycarp, Ignatius, Papias, Clement, not only do not oppose them, but themselves use the same writings as undoubted works of the Apostles; and they report those things which we now read in the Gospels. Their adversaries, the Gnostics and Judaizers, acknowledge the same writings and try to evade the same, not by inventing corruptions, but rather by perverse interpretations. Not in the following centuries. For 1) at that time copies and translations of the Gospels had already been multiplied in the whole world; there already existed many writings of the Fathers, in which almost all the passages of the Gospel were contained. Therefore one who wished, not indeed alone but with the help of others, to corrupt the Gospels substantially, secretly or openly, would have had to bring under his power all the codices, existing not in one place but dispersed through the whole world, all the translations, and all the commentaries of the Fathers; to accomplish an equal change in all; and to force them again, changed, upon the Christian world without any sign of fraud. If it is possible to attempt so great a crime, who will not judge it impossible to accomplish it? For if only some copies had been corrupted, the corruption would immediately have been detected by the other Churches; and, far from being received by these, those copies would rather have been corrected according to the more ancient and integral copies. 2) Moreover it is established that already in the first three centuries, in the East and West, there were many Churches, and in great part founded by the Apostles; and that the books of the New Testament, and especially the Gospels, were preserved among them and publicly read. Therefore, if corruption had been attempted in the East, would not the Western Churches have detected and rebuked it? And if the Western Churches were corrupting the sacred books, would not the Eastern Churches have resisted? 261. III. No author of the corruption can be assigned. For either 1) pagans, or 2) Jews, or 3) heretics, or 4) Christians would have corrupted the Gospels. But: Not pagans. For 1) these men despised Christians and their sacred books; therefore they strove rather to eliminate them than to corrupt them. But Christians prevented, as much as they could, the sacred books from falling into the hands of pagans; how much less, then, would they have allowed themselves to receive them corrupted by them? But if pagans had attempted a substantial corruption, who will persuade himself that it could have happened that they brought all the codices under their own power, depraved all of them, and returned all of them corrupted to Christians, so that these, without murmuring and contradiction, would receive them as sacred books and documents of their own faith? 2) If pagans had corrupted the sacred books, they would especially have changed or deleted those things which are read in them concerning the vanity of idols, concerning the miracles and divinity of Christ, and concerning the necessity of faith in Him, namely, those things which destroy pagan superstition. Not Jews; and this is proved by similar arguments. For Christians above all would have resisted with all their strength; and if indeed the Jews had attempted this, without doubt they would especially have corrupted those things which were contrary and disgraceful to them. They would have omitted or mutilated what is narrated concerning the miracles of Christ, His resurrection and ascension into heaven, the predicted destruction of the temple and the city, the dispersion of the Jewish people, the vain traditions of the Jews, the hypocrisy of the Pharisees, the envy of the Priests, the arrogance of the Doctors, and so forth. But all these things are found in all copies of the Gospels. Not heretics. For 1) some heretics in fact attempted corruption, but in vain; for it is established that the attempts of Tatian correcting Paul (Eusebius, book 4, chapter 29), of Marcion mutilating Luke and Paul (Tertullian, *On Prescription*, chapter 36), and of Artemon and others introducing various innovations in the sacred books (Eusebius, book 5, chapter 26), were immediately repressed. And indeed, from the very beginnings of the Church, copies and translations of the Gospels were diffused everywhere, through Asia, Africa, and Europe. The writings of the Fathers, copied out, report very many passages of the Gospels, as is established from what has been said. Therefore, if anyone had attempted corruption, the rest would immediately have protested, so that the corruption could never have been accomplished. 2) Hence St. Augustine accuses the Manichaeans, who asserted that the sacred letters were held corrupted among Catholics, of falsehood and calumny, and says (*Against Faustus*, book 11, chapter 2): "O voice fugitive from truth, obstinate in madness! So unconquered are the things which are brought forth against you from the

divine codices that there is nothing else for you to say except that they have been falsified." Indeed, such corruption St. Augustine regards as impossible: "For whoever," he says (*ibid.*, book 32, chapter 16), "first dared this" (that is, to falsify the sacred codices), "would be refuted by comparison with many older codices, especially because the same Scripture would be contained not in one language, but in many." Finally, not Christians. For either it is supposed 1) that some Christians depraved the sacred books, or 2) that all conspired in this crime. The second is evidently absurd; for we know from history that Christians, considered universally, were affected with the greatest reverence toward the sacred books, and especially the Gospels; so far were they from wishing to corrupt them. But besides this, how could men innumerable in multitude, unlimited in places, diverse in nation, character, and opinions, agree together at the same time into one fraud? Nor is the first less absurd. For if a few had corrupted the Gospels, would not the Bishops, to whose vigilance and custody they had been entrusted, have resisted them? Indeed the Christian people themselves, to whom the sacred books were publicly read, would never have admitted a corruption of this sort. We have already seen how all resisted Tatian, Marcion, and other heretics attempting the corruption of the sacred books. Did not the Bishops rise up strenuously against the Apocrypha of the New Testament? But, what must not be passed over in silence, when a certain Triphyllus, as Sozomen narrates (*Ecclesiastical History*, book 1, chapter 11), speaking before several Bishops, wished to change some word, substituting for "bed" another word (*skimpodion*) more elegant, as it seemed to him, immediately all were moved, and St. Spyridion the Bishop publicly rebuked him and drove him from the church. And St. Augustine, writing to St. Jerome (epistle 71), warns him that he should interpret the Greek Scriptures of the Seventy rather than the Hebrew Scriptures; and he gives this reason, namely, lest, when some dissonance arose, the people should be disturbed. Among other things he writes: "A certain brother of ours, a Bishop, when he had established that your translation should be read in the church over which he presides, was moved by something placed by you in Jonah the prophet far otherwise than it had grown old in the understanding and memory of all, and been sung through the succession of so many ages. So great a tumult arose among the people, especially with the Greeks accusing and crying out the charge of falsity, that the Bishop was compelled" (for that city was involved) "to demand the testimony of the Jews... The man was compelled, as if correcting an error, wishing after great danger not to remain without his people." But in what did that change consist? In this alone: that in the book of Jonah the prophet, where the Seventy interpreters had rendered "gourd," St. Jerome with Aquila had rendered "ivy." Therefore let us conclude with the same Augustine (*On the Usefulness of Believing*, chapter 3): "Nothing seems to me to be said by them more shamelessly, or, to speak more gently, more carelessly and weakly, than that the divine Scriptures are corrupted, since they could prove this by no copies existing in so recent a memory."

266. The third part is proved. I. In order that the things which are narrated in the Gospels or in the other books of the New Testament be admitted by all as true, once their genuineness and integrity are supposed, this alone is required: that it be certainly established that their Authors were both endowed with due knowledge and wrote with candid sincerity. But both are established concerning the writers of those books, and especially of the Gospels and the Acts of the Apostles. Therefore. The minor is proved as regards the first part, namely, that due knowledge was not lacking. For 1) several of their authors were eyewitnesses of the facts which they narrate. Hence St. John (1 John 1.33) says: "That which we have heard, which we have seen with our eyes, which we have looked upon and our hands have handled, concerning the word of life, ... which we have seen and heard, we announce to you." And St. Peter inculcates the same when he writes (1 Peter 1.16): "For we have not followed learned fables when we made known to you the power and presence of our Lord Jesus Christ, but were made beholders of His majesty." But those who are earwitnesses, insofar as they themselves did not see and hear Christ the Lord, wrote those things which were communicated to them by immediate witnesses most worthy of faith. Thus St. Luke at the beginning of his Gospel gives notice: "Since indeed many have attempted to arrange a narrative of the things which have been accomplished among us, just as they handed them down to us who from the beginning

themselves saw and were ministers of the word, it seemed good also to me, having followed all things diligently from the beginning, to write to you in order, most excellent Theophilus." 2) Nor is it an obstacle that the Apostles and Evangelists, except Paul and Luke, were uneducated men. For in those things whose knowledge is obtained by sensible experience, and for the knowing of which nothing is required except healthy senses and their right use, a rude and simple witness is of greater authority than a learned one, who very often mingles his own opinions with the facts observed. Now the miracles, for example, of Christ consisted in external facts of this sort, which could be known by any man, even the most uneducated, through the right use of healthy senses. But that the Apostles and Evangelists, so that they would not be deceived but would acquire certain knowledge for themselves, duly used their senses and observed all things with due attention and diligence, is rightly argued from the gravity of the matter to which, having left the religion of their ancestors, they adhered with their whole soul; from the nature of the extraordinary facts, concerning which all were astonished; and from their narrative, by which they often describe even minute circumstances. 3) Nor can it be said that the Apostles and Evangelists were too credulous. For without any trace of excessive credulity appearing in their history, they frequently showed themselves too incredulous, especially when there was question of Christ's resurrection; although they expected it from the promises of their Master, nevertheless they were rather slow to believe it. Certainly Thomas did not at all believe the testimony of the other Apostles, who had already seen Christ risen; but he raised doubts against the resurrection of his Master and remained unbelieving until he himself saw and touched the sacred wounds of the risen Christ. But there is no place for excessive credulity when the witnesses are eyewitnesses; and such were most of the Apostles. 4) Are the Apostles and Evangelists said to have been deceived? But there stands against this: a) the sublime character of Christ, who lived so holily that His most hostile adversaries said to Him (Matthew 22.16): "Master, we know that You are truthful, and teach the way of God in truth, and that You have no care about anyone; for You do not regard the person of men." The adversaries were struck dumb when Christ challenged them, saying (John 8.46): "Which of you will convict Me of sin?" Indeed also, as St. Matthew reports (26.59-60), in a public judgment "the chief priests and the whole council sought false testimony against Jesus, that they might deliver Him to death, and they did not find it, although many false witnesses had come forward." There stands against it: b) the very nature of the facts concerning which the Apostles bear testimony. For since the miracles of Christ, concerning whose historical truth the question is chiefly here, are sensible works, performed without preparation, in full light, with many looking on, deception must be called plainly impossible. There stands against it: c) the character of the enemies of Christ, who, burning with resentment and envy, not only observed all His works most diligently, but sometimes also instituted judicial investigations concerning them. Therefore, if any fraud had lain hidden there, by their own shrewdness they would most certainly have detected it and would have manifested it with the most willing mind. The minor is proved as regards the second part, namely, that sincerity was not lacking. For 1) the life of the Apostles and Evangelists was so entirely upright that none of them could ever be accused of any crime by their most hostile adversaries. Their manner of living exhibited a living example of the most holy doctrine which they preached. This is confessed not only by Christians and all heretics, but by unbelievers themselves, such as Celsus, Porphyry, Julian, and among the more recent, Larroque, Salvador, and so forth. 2) Nothing could have induced the authors of the Gospels to deceive. For what advantage could they procure for themselves in this life from false testimony? Indeed the illustrious heralds and writers of the Christian religion, for the truth of their testimonies, endured with unconquered soul not only very many hardships, but even death itself. Nor could they promise themselves a reward for the other life, since they themselves knew and professed that deception in the gravest business of religion must be punished with eternal torments.

267. II. The preceding argument is confirmed from the fact that even if the Apostles and disciples of Christ had wished to deceive, they never could have done so. For: 1) How could men who are called uneducated have fashioned, as if from their own storehouse, so sublime a doctrine as the Christian doctrine? All the more because several writers, dispersed through various regions, narrate the

history of Christ in such a way that, without contradicting themselves as to substance, they agree excellently concerning the sayings and deeds of their Master. Is it said that one copied another? But the diversity of style stands against this, and the occurring apparent contradictions, which nevertheless right exegesis shows not to be real (1). (1) Hence Rousseau himself (*Emile*, book 4) was compelled to write: "Shall we say that the history of the Gospel was invented for pleasure? My friend, it is not thus that one invents; and the facts concerning Socrates, of which no one doubts, are less attested than those concerning Jesus Christ. At bottom, this is to push back the difficulty without destroying it. It would be more inconceivable that several men in agreement had fabricated this book, than that a single one had supplied the subject; and the Gospel has marks of truth so great, so striking, that the inventor would be greater than the Hero." 2) The facts which the Evangelists narrate were public, performed in the sight of very many contemporaries; they accurately designate place and time; they do not neglect various adjuncts and minute circumstances. If the things had not happened just as they were described, the deception could immediately have been detected, and would have had to turn into the greatest disgrace of the Apostles. All the more because they spoke publicly of the deeds of Christ as of a matter known to all. Thus St. Peter (Acts 2.22) on the day of Pentecost preaches to the Jews "Jesus of Nazareth, a man approved by God among you by powers and prodigies and signs, which God did through Him in the midst of you, as you also know." And when St. Paul was preaching Christ before Festus and King Agrippa, and Festus exclaimed, "You are mad, Paul; much learning turns you to madness," the Apostle himself responds (Acts 25.24-26): "I am not mad, most excellent Festus; but I speak words of truth and sobriety. For the king knows of these things, to whom I also speak confidently; for I think none of these things is hidden from him. For none of these things was done in a corner." Now suppose that the facts which the disciples narrated concerning their Master were false: certainly it would have been easy to accuse them of falsity or falsehood, nor is it to be presumed that the innumerable enemies of Christ, the Jews who perceived that their economy was to be abolished by Christ's doctrine, abstained from that accusation. Indeed, as is read (Acts 4.18), "they charged them not to speak at all, nor to teach in the name of Jesus"; they afflicted them with insults, calumnies, tortures, and finally death itself; but they were never able to deny or refute the things which the Apostles preached. Everyone sees how firm an argument this is for the truthfulness of the Evangelists. For the most hostile enemies of the Christian religion could easily have freed themselves from that superstition, as they called it, if they could have convicted the disciples of Christ of falsity or falsehood, and thus weakened all their authority. But what if several from among the enemies themselves were converted to the faith and religion of Christ, and persevered in it even to a most cruel death? 3) But even external writers, following closely after, confirm the truth of the miracles of Christ. Thus Flavius Josephus narrates the preaching, baptism, and death of John the Baptist; commemorates the murder of St. James, whom he calls the brother of Jesus Christ; indeed, concerning Christ Himself he has a most clear testimony. Namely, he writes (*Jewish Antiquities*, book 18, n. 3): "Now at this time there was Jesus, a wise man, if indeed it is right to call Him a man. For He was a doer of wonderful works, a teacher of men who willingly embrace true things. And He drew to Himself very many from the Jews, and also very many from the Gentiles. This was the Christ; and when Pilate had condemned Him to the cross, accused by the leading men of His nation, those who had first begun to love Him did not cease from loving Him. For after the third day He appeared to them living again, since the divine prophets had foretold these things and very many other admirable things concerning Him. Nor has the race of Christians, named from Him, failed down to this day." See the genuineness of this text vindicated apud Huet (*Demonstration of the Gospel*, proposition 3, n. 11 ff.). Thus also, as St. Justin testifies (*Apology* 1, n. 48) and Tertullian (*Apology*, chapter 21), Pilate narrated the miracles of Christ in the acts sent to the Emperor. Likewise Celsus, an Epicurean philosopher, as Origen testifies (*Against Celsus*, books 1 and 2), admitted the historical truth of several miracles of Christ. St. Cyril of Alexandria testifies the same concerning Porphyry, a Platonic philosopher (book 10, *Against Julian*). Plotinus declared all, Hierocles many, of Christ's miracles as historically true (apud Eusebius, *Against Hierocles*). Arnobius the African (*Against the Gentiles*, book 1, n. 43) and Lactantius (*Divine Institutes*, book 4, chapter 13) allege other pagan philosophers who in no way denied the miracles of Christ, but ascribed

them to magic.

268. SCHOLION. The things which we have disputed thus far for vindicating the historical authority of the Gospels not only demonstrate it sufficiently, but also anticipate difficulties, insofar as our matter demands. Nevertheless it will help, for the sake of example, to indicate certain heads of objections, so that each one may judge for himself how much the observations of rationalists are to be valued.

269. I. Against the genuineness of the Gospels, the hypothesis of Eichhorn is well known. For when he noticed the great agreement of the first three Gospels, not only as regards the things narrated, but often also as regards the words, he judged that from the beginning there existed one Gospel, which he called primitive, and that it was publicly read in the assemblies of the faithful. But in the course of time several changes were introduced into it, so that finally in different Churches there obtained three different editions of the Gospel. These began to be ascribed to Matthew, Mark, and Luke, not because they themselves had composed them, but because there were diverse opinions concerning the author of the primitive Gospel. Several then adopted this hypothesis fashioned by imagination; and Marsh, an Anglican Bishop, in order, as it were, to perfect it, supposed that the primitive Gospel had perished, and afterward had been restored by different men according as they retained it in memory. But memory is not always faithful; from this diverse Gospels arose.

270. But everyone perceives: 1) that the historical monuments which we have brought forward wholly contradict the hypothesis invented by these authors; but facts must be proved by monuments and witnesses. 2) We then ask on what foundation their hypothesis rests. They assign none, except the agreement of words. But it should be noted that an agreement of this sort is found only in a few places, and that it is present almost solely in reporting the words of Christ and the Apostles. What prevents us, however, from saying that the Apostles retained those words in memory and communicated them to Mark and Luke? This is all the more so because they lived together for a long time, held the words of Our Lord in highest esteem, and more often together treated of the preaching of the Gospel. These things indeed are likely, and they so explain the aforesaid verbal agreement in the first three Evangelists that at the same time the historical truth fully demonstrated concerning the genuineness of the Gospels remains intact.

271. II. Against the integrity of the Gospels they are accustomed to object: 1) that Christians were accused by the Manichaeans, as St. Augustine reports, and by Celsus, as Origen reports (*Against Celsus*, book 2, chapter 27), of corruption of the codices; 2) indeed that St. Jerome himself (*Preface to Damasus on the Gospels*) complains that "in our codices error has grown in, while what one Evangelist said more fully in the same matter, they added in another because they thought he had said less"; 3) but especially that, from the testimony of Victor of Tunnuna and St. Isidore of Seville, they say it is established that the text of the Gospels was corrupted by the work of the Emperor Anastasius at the beginning of the sixth century.

272. But it is answered to the first: Origen in the very place objected writes: "Indeed, I know no others who have changed the context of the Gospel except the followers of Marcion, of Valentinus, and perhaps of Lucanus"; namely, only heretics attempted corruption. They attempted it, I say; for St. Augustine proves against Faustus, refuting the calumny of the Manichaeans, by nearly the same arguments which we have used, that it was impossible for them to accomplish it. We say to the second: St. Jerome does not complain about corruption of the Greek text, but of the Latin version; hence he writes against Helvidius (chapter 16): "Most foolishly have you persuaded yourself that the Greek codices have been falsified." The corruptions themselves in the Latin version, as is clear from the words of Jerome, were for the most part nothing except explanatory annotations taken from the other Gospels; hence St. Jerome found only a few and very slight things that necessarily had to be corrected (compare *On the Virtues*, nn. 995-1002). We respond to the third: serious reasons for doubting the asserted corruption by the Emperor

Anastasius are not lacking; but even if the transmitted historical report is granted as true, we say that from it it follows that Anastasius attempted corruption, not that he accomplished it. This, besides the arguments brought forward in the thesis, is proved both by the many Greek copies and the many versions older than Anastasius, and also by the impossibility of corrupting in the sixth century all codices, all versions, and all citations existing among others, which were innumerable and were not contained within the boundaries of the Greek Empire. Therefore, if there had been corruptions in some codices, they could have been corrected from the others.

273. III. Against the truthfulness of the Gospels they seek arguments especially from the differences among the Evangelists as regards various narratives. Certainly it belongs to the Interpreters to pursue objections of this sort one by one; and St. Augustine himself has already weighed and solved them all in his work *On the Harmony of the Evangelists*. For us it will suffice to observe: 1) that here there is question not of the divine authority of the Gospels, but of their historical and human authenticity. But this, as is clear in other historical books, is not taken away by certain very slight differences in accidental matters, when all agree as to substance. This observation has the greatest force here, both because here we are defending only the substantial integrity of the Gospels, and because the objected differences do not consist in the Evangelists reporting contrary things, as the Interpreters show. 2) Indeed, from differences of this sort, when account is taken at the same time of the evident agreement as regards very many and principal things, a new argument arises for the truthfulness of the Evangelists. For if each had wished to weave frauds and fables, there would not be so great an agreement; and if all had agreed in one common fraud, there would not be so many differences. 3) Certainly unbelievers in this matter wonderfully contradict themselves; for sometimes they find such agreement, even verbal agreement, in the Gospels, that they say these were written by one author in the second century; but now they find such discrepancy in them that they deny their truthfulness. Truly they have become vain in their thoughts!

Article 2. Whether the truth of Christian revelation is confirmed by miracles

274. Proof. In the books of the New Testament, and especially in the Gospels and Acts of the Apostles, many and splendid miracles are narrated, performed either by Christ the Lord or by His Apostles. But concerning their historical-philosophical-relative truth in relation to Christian revelation, there can be no doubt. Therefore they are true and certain in every way. But miracles certainly prove that in whose confirmation they are performed (n. 214 ff.). Therefore Christian revelation is truly divine.

275. I. To illustrate the major of the argument, we note first with St. Thomas (III, q. 34, a. 4), "that the miracles of Christ were ordered to this, that the power of divinity might be known in Him for the salvation of men. But it pertains to the power of Divinity that every creature be subject to it. And therefore it was fitting that He perform miracles in every kind of creature." Hence: Christ performed miracles in inanimate nature. For 1) in Cana of Galilee (John 2.1-11), invited to a wedding, when the wine was lacking, He commanded that six stone water-jars be filled with water. When the ministers had done this, He immediately changed the water into wine, with the chief steward, the bridegroom, the ministers, the guests, and especially the disciples as witnesses; and they believed in Him. 2) A great movement arose on the sea (Matthew 8, Mark 4, Luke 8), so that the little boat in which Christ was with the disciples was already being covered by the waves. The disciples, greatly fearing imminent shipwreck, cried out: "Lord, save us, we are perishing!" Christ, awakened from sleep, "commanded the winds and the sea, and there was made a great calm." All those present there, seized with admiration at the sudden change of the air and the calm of the sea, said: "Who is this, that the winds and the sea obey Him?" 3) On another occasion (Matthew 14.24 ff.), when the disciples were in the middle of the sea and their little boat was being tossed by the waves, Jesus "came to them walking upon the sea." Peter also, called by Christ, "descending from the little boat, walked upon the water." 4) Christ twice (Matthew 14-15, John 6) multiplied loaves and fish in a wonderful way. For the first

time, with five loaves and two fish He satisfied five thousand men, besides women and little children; but when so great a multitude of men had been satisfied, "they took up the remnants, twelve baskets full of fragments." The other time He satisfied, with seven loaves and a few little fish, "four thousand men, besides little children and women; and what remained of the fragments, they took up, seven full baskets." But the hypothesis of Horus, who imagined that the crowds had brought the necessary food with themselves, is shown to be not only gratuitous but false; for it is expressly read concerning them: "They have nothing to eat"; and concerning Christ: "He gave to His disciples that they might set it before them, and they set it before the crowd." Christ performed miracles in men, especially by healing their diseases. For 1) (Matthew 4.23) "Jesus went about all Galilee... healing every sickness and every infirmity among the people"; and therefore, as is read (Luke 6.14), "the whole crowd sought to touch Him" (Jesus), "because power went out from Him and healed all." 2) When Jesus was beside the Sea of Galilee (Matthew 15.30 ff.), "great crowds came to Him, having with them the mute, the blind, the lame, the weak, and many others, and they cast them at His feet, and He cured them; so that the crowds marveled, seeing the mute speaking, the lame walking, the blind seeing, and they magnified the God of Israel." 3) Christ (John 5) healed one lying sick for a long time, whom physicians could in no way cure. He accomplished this by command alone: "Jesus says to him: Arise, take up your bed and walk. And immediately that man was made healthy, and he took up his bed and walked." 4) Likewise it is read (Luke 8.43): "There was a certain woman in a flow of blood for twelve years, who had spent all her substance on physicians and could be cured by no one; she came behind and touched the hem of His garment; and immediately the flow of her blood stopped." 5) Christ, as is read (Matthew 8 and 15; John 4), also healed absent persons, and those placed far away, who could neither hear nor see Him. This was done with the servant of the Centurion, the son of the ruler, and the daughter of the Canaanite woman. 6) To these can be added what St. Thomas has (same place, a. 3): "But nevertheless concerning the souls of men, especially as regards changing the lower powers, Christ performed certain miracles. Hence Jerome, on that passage of Matthew 9, 'Rising, he followed Him'" (or on that passage, "As He passed by, He saw a man," etc.), "says: 'The very brightness and majesty of the hidden Divinity, which shone forth even in His human face, was able from the first sight to draw those seeing Him to Himself.' And on that passage of Matthew 21, 'He cast out all those selling and buying,' etc." (or on that passage, "The chief priests," etc.), "the same Jerome says: 'To me, among all the signs which the Lord performed, this seems more wonderful: that one man, and at that time contemptible, could cast out so great a multitude by the blows of one whip. For something fiery and star-like radiated from His eyes, and the majesty of Divinity shone in His face.' And Origen says on John (tome 2, according to his order, before the middle) that this is a greater miracle than that by which water was changed into wine, because 'there inanimate matter subsists; but here the dispositions of so many thousands of men are subdued.' And on that passage of John 18, 'They went backward and fell to the ground,' Augustine says, tractate 112 on John, before the middle: 'One voice struck, drove back, and laid low so great a crowd, fierce with hatreds and terrible with arms, without any weapon; for God was hidden in flesh.' And to the same pertains what is said in Luke 4.30, that 'Jesus, passing through the midst of them, went away,' where Chrysostom says, homily 47 on John, a little from the beginning, that 'to stand in the midst of those laying snares and not be apprehended showed the eminence of divinity'; and what is said in John 8.59: 'Jesus hid Himself and went out of the temple,' where Theophylact says: 'He did not hide Himself in a corner of the temple as if fearing, or turning aside behind a wall or column; but, by divine power making Himself invisible to those lying in wait, He went out through their midst.' From all these things it is clear that Christ, when He wished, changed the souls of men by divine power, not only by justifying and infusing wisdom" (which pertains to the end of miracles), "but also by outwardly alluring, or terrifying, or astonishing, which pertains to the miracles themselves." Christ raised the dead. For 1) (Matthew 9, Mark 5, Luke 8) the daughter of the ruler of the synagogue was certainly dead; the father asserted this, the servants announced it, and those standing by the deceased girl so believed it that they laughed at Christ, who indeed did not deny the death, but compared it to sleep, saying: "The girl is not dead, but sleeps." Yet Christ, holding her hand, cried out, saying: "Girl, arise. And her spirit returned, and she arose immediately. And her parents

were astonished." 2) The young man in Naim (Luke 7) was so certainly dead that he was already being carried to the tomb. And indeed no prudent person will doubt that the widowed mother had used every solicitude for her only son, lest he be buried while only apparently dead. But Christ, meeting the funeral procession and moved with mercy toward the weeping mother, approached and touched the bier and said: Young man, I say to you, arise. And he who was dead sat up and began to speak. But fear seized all, and they magnified God. 3) Concerning the death of Lazarus (John 11), which Christ, located far from Bethany, had announced to the Apostles, his weeping sisters and all who had come to console them are irrefragable witnesses. Indeed when Jesus commanded that the stone of the tomb be taken away, Martha, the sister of the deceased, answered: "Lord, by now he stinks; he is four days dead." Nevertheless Jesus, lifting His eyes upward and giving thanks to the Father, cried with a loud voice: Lazarus, come forth. And immediately he who had been dead came forth. But many of the Jews who had come to Mary and Martha, and had seen what Jesus did, believed in Him. The Apostles also performed miracles. Christ the Lord (Mark 16) had promised them the power of performing miracles; and it is read (Acts 2): "Many prodigies and signs were being done through the Apostles in Jerusalem"; and (Acts 5): "Many signs and prodigies were being done among the people by the hands of the Apostles, so that they brought the sick out into the streets and placed them on little beds and couches, so that, when Peter came, at least his shadow might overshadow any one of them, and they might be freed from their infirmities." And (Acts 9) Peter healed a paralytic; and (Acts 20) Paul raised a dead man; indeed (Acts 19) his handkerchiefs drove away diseases. But Paul's conversion itself is eminent, and the miracle of Peter which is narrated in Acts 3. There are added the signs by which the Father confirmed Christ's divinity and His divine mission. For 1) when Jesus (Luke 3) had been baptized by John, "heaven was opened, and the Holy Spirit descended in bodily form like a dove upon Him, and a voice came from heaven: You are My beloved Son; in You I am well pleased." 2) On another occasion (Matthew 17), Christ, having taken Peter, James, and John, "was transfigured before them. And His face shone like the sun, and His garments became white as snow. And behold, Moses and Elijah appeared to them speaking with Him... behold, a bright cloud overshadowed them. And behold, a voice from the cloud saying: This is My beloved Son, in whom I am well pleased; hear Him!" By these words Christ was not indeed compared with Moses and Elijah, but preferred before them, as Son; and besides this, as Legate of God and herald of divine revelation, He obtained the most magnificent sanction: "hear Him." But these are not all, but only certain ones from the miracles which are narrated in the Gospels. Nor have all things which Christ did been written; since it is said (John 21.25): "But there are also many other things which Jesus did, which if they were written one by one, I think that not even the world itself could contain the books that would have to be written." Let it be permitted to use the words of Cyril of Jerusalem (*Catechesis* 10, n. 19): "Among the rivers Jordan is witness; among the seas, the Sea of Tiberias. The blind testify, the lame testify, the dead recalled to life testify. The demons bear testimony, saying: What have we to do with You, Jesus? We know who You are, the Holy One of God (Mark 1.24). The winds, restrained and checked by His command, testify; the five loaves... multiplied, etc., testify." And Arnobius (*Against the Gentiles*, book 1, chapter 50): "What of the fact that these powers, which have been brought forth by us summarily and not as the greatness of the matter demanded, He not only accomplished Himself by His own power, but, what was more sublime, permitted many others to experience and perform with affection for His name? For since He saw that you would be future deniers of the things done by Him and of the divine work, lest there should lie beneath any suspicion that He had bestowed those gifts and benefits by magical arts, from that immense multitude of people which followed His grace with admiration, He chose fishermen, craftsmen, countrymen, and that sort of unskilled persons, who, sent through various nations, would perform all those miracles without any disguises and aids."

276. II. To confirm the minor of the proposed argument, we first say: Concerning the historical truth of the miracles of Christ and the Apostles there can be no doubt. Although this is sufficiently clear from the demonstrated historical authenticity of the Gospels, nevertheless in a matter of

such importance it is useful still to recall a few things. 1) To this purpose serves the observation of St. John Chrysostom (*That Christ Is God*, n. 17): "The very same men who narrated that He was crucified and struck with blows also told of the miracles. Why, then, do you think them worthy of faith in those things, but in these rebuke them as though they had not happened? But if they wrote these things for favor toward their Master and boasted rashly and vainly, they would have kept silent about those things which were held by many as sorrowful and ignominious. Now they, declaring the truth of these things, dwelt especially on those, and treated all things diligently and abundantly, omitting neither a small nor a great matter; but in signs and miracles they kept silence about very many." And likewise to this purpose serve the things which Eusebius writes (*Demonstration of the Gospel*, book 3, chapter 5): "But if these were lies which they had contrived by agreement, it will be worth the trouble to wonder by what means so great a number preserved that agreement among themselves in fictitious matters even unto death, and no one ever, from fear of those things which had happened to those who had previously been taken away, withdrew from the society, nor publicly contradicted the rest, betraying those things which they had contrived among themselves." Hence he concludes: "Indeed it seems to me rightly said: either one must believe the disciples of Jesus entirely, if also the other writers; or if not these, then not the others either... Or if you say that it is fair to believe others indeed, but not these alone, why is this not plainly referred to envy?" 2) The facts about which we are treating, when their nature and the end toward which they were directed are inspected, were of the greatest moment, and therefore apt especially to excite the attention of all. Certainly the report of them immediately moved all Judaea and existed as the cause of innumerable conversions. They were, besides, sensible facts, several produced in the city of Jerusalem itself, often on feast days, not rarely before a very ample multitude of people, indeed before enemies, who left nothing unattempted so that they might deny their force. Hence Arnobius says (*Against the Gentiles*, book 1, n. 54) that the witnesses of Christ's miracles are present: "races, peoples, nations, and that unbelieving human race, which, unless the matter were open and, as they say, clearer than the light itself, would never offer the assent of its credulity to matters of this sort. But shall we say that the men of that time were so vain, lying, foolish, brutish, that they pretended they had seen things which they had never seen? And that they handed down by false testimonies, or confirmed by childish assertion, things which had not been done at all? And when they could live with you with one mind and conduct their connections without offense, did they take up gratuitous hatreds and become execrable in name?" 3) The miracles performed by Christ were such that sometimes a juridical inquiry was instituted concerning their truth, and indeed by His most hostile enemies; nevertheless this very inquiry placed the truth of the event beyond all doubt. This happened as regards the cure of the sick man at the pool (John 5); as regards the man who, from Christ's command, stretched out his withered hand in the sight of the adversaries (Matthew 12); especially as regards the man blind from birth, whom Christ, about to cure, "spat on the ground, and made clay from the spittle, and anointed the clay upon his eyes, and said to him: Go, wash in the pool of Siloam; therefore he went away, and washed, and came seeing." But concerning the raising of Lazarus it is said (John 11): "Many, therefore, of the Jews who had come to Mary and Martha, and had seen the things which Jesus did, believed in Him. But some of them went away to the Pharisees and told them what Jesus had done. Therefore both the chief priests and the Pharisees gathered a council and said: What are we doing, because this man performs many signs? If we let Him go thus, all will believe in Him, and the Romans will come and take away our place and nation... Therefore from that day they thought to kill Him." 4) As regards the Apostles, let us recall that their preaching was public; and that at the solemnity of Pentecost, that is, fifty days from the death of Christ, they announced Christ to the Jews. Behold how St. Peter addresses the multitude of the Jews (Acts 2): "Men of Israel, hear these words: Jesus of Nazareth, a man approved by God among you by powers and prodigies and signs, which God did through Him in the midst of you, as you also know: this man, delivered up by the determined counsel and foreknowledge of God, you have slain, afflicting Him by the hands of enemies, whom God raised up, having loosed the pains of hell... This Jesus God raised again, of which we all are witnesses." The most hostile adversaries could oppose nothing to the testimony of the Apostles; on the contrary, a huge multitude believed, certainly not with eyes closed, but on account of the evidence of the

facts. Nor did common people alone believe; for Jairus, Nicodemus, Zacchaeus, Lazarus, Joseph of Arimathea, many from the principal men and from the priestly order (John 12.42; Acts 6.7), Crispus the ruler of the synagogue, Sosthenes the ruler of the synagogue, Apollo an eloquent man (Acts 18.8, 17, 24), and Paul himself were not men of the common people. 5) Let us conclude with the words of St. Augustine, who writes (*City of God*, book 22, chapter 8): "Why, they say, do those miracles which you preach to have been done not happen now? I could indeed say that they were necessary before the world believed, in order that the world might believe. Whoever still seeks wonders so that he may believe is himself a great wonder, who does not believe when the world believes. But they say this so that those miracles may not be believed to have happened then either. Whence, therefore, with so great faith, is Christ everywhere sung as having been taken up into heaven with the flesh? Whence, in educated times, and in times rejecting everything which cannot happen, did the world believe incredible things, too wonderfully, without any miracles?... We cannot deny that many miracles were done which testified to that one great and saving miracle, by which Christ ascended into heaven with the flesh in which He rose again. For in the same most truthful books all things have been written, both the things which were done and the reason for which they were done as things to be believed."

277. III. There can be no doubt concerning the philosophical truth of the miracles of Christ. This part of the argument also becomes sufficiently known from the things disputed above (n. 220 ff.); but, because of the gravity of the matter, it is useful to renew the argument. And: 1) Several miracles of Christ and of the Apostles are of such a kind that they certainly surpass the powers of nature, art, and demons. The raising of the dead, for example, belongs to Him alone as author, whose role it is to create the soul and, at the time of conception, to unite it to the body (compare *On God the Creator*, n. 771). Hence it is that, although they have tried by tricks and marvelous works to imitate the works of Christ, it has never been seen or heard that, by means of magnetism, spiritism, or demons, the dead have been called back to life. Nor ought this to seem wonderful; for if there were some natural cause for calling a dead person back to life, a fortiori there would be some natural cause for preventing death, whatever the nature of the infirmity might be. But experience itself establishes this: "The Most High has appointed his" [man's] "bounds, which cannot be passed beyond." 2) As regards the other miracles, the manner in which Christ performed them, and the other accompanying circumstances, clearly show divine power. For He often used only the command of His voice. To restore life, for example, to Lazarus already stinking, He cried with a loud voice: "Lazarus, come forth"; and immediately Lazarus, who was bound hands and feet, obeying the voice of Christ, came forth from the tomb alive. Certainly art and nature need means and time in order to restore health; but Christ, with no means employed, often cured the sick in an instant, those laboring under long disease, and in such a way that the effect remained. Indeed, as we saw, Christ also healed absent persons; in which cases it is possible to attribute the effect to no natural cause. For what cause can produce anything in that upon which it can exercise neither any physical nor any moral influence? Or what possible influence is there upon the absent? Again, if there were some hidden natural cause of the wonderful works of Christ, how would it still remain hidden from us (for the explanations which rationalists force upon us are utterly foolish), when nevertheless Christ knew it long ago? Christ, I say, who in the hypothesis of the adversaries would be nothing except the son of a carpenter, who never learned letters? Finally, let there be considered the ease with which Christ performed miracles; the multitude and variety of wonderful works which He accomplished; the certainty with which the event answered His promise and command; the stability with which the effect of health, life, and so forth persevered; the fruit which followed from Christ's miracles. Clearer than the noonday light will be the demand of Arnobius (*Against the Gentiles*, book 1, chapter 43): "Can you designate for us, can you show from all those magicians who ever existed through the ages, anyone who performed anything similar to Christ even by a thousandth part?" Therefore let us conclude with Zachaeus Christianus (*Consultation with Apollonius the Philosopher*, book 1, chapter 13; ed. Migne, vol. 20, col. 1081): "If an echo is to be equated with one speaking, or foam with fountains, or shadow with true light, then the works of men are joined by no unworthy comparison with the powers of God, since here there is only this delay of remedies, that they are

commanded to help" [nothing was required except a nod], "there those things furnished through labor vanish almost before they are perceived." 3) To confirm these things, it is pleasing to report the eloquent words of Arnobius himself (book 1, chapter 45): "What do you say, O peoples, again? Therefore was He mortal or one of us, at whose command, at whose voice, uttered in common and everyday words, weaknesses, diseases, fevers, and other torments of the body fled? Was He one of us, whose presence, whose sight, that race of demons sunk in the entrails could not bear, and, terrified by a new power, believed it must yield possession of the members?... Was He one of us, who commanded the lame to run?... Was He one, I say, of us, who healed, by one intercession at once, a hundred or more afflicted by various weaknesses and diseases? At whose simple voice did raging and mad seas unfold themselves? Did whirlwinds of storms and tempests subside? Who carried an unsullied foot through the deepest whirlpools? Who trod the back of the sea, the waves themselves being amazed, nature passing into service? Who satisfied five thousand following Him with five loaves, and, lest to those unbelieving and hard men these things should seem tricks, heaped up the folds of twice six baskets with fragments of remnants? Was He one of us, who commanded souls long since breathed out to return into bodies, those buried under mounds to come forth, and after the third day of burial to be released from the wrappings of the undertakers?" etc., etc. 4) But that the miracles of Christ cannot be ascribed to the power of demons, besides the nature of certain of them and the other things which we have said, is opposed by the fact that the demons themselves were cast out of bodies; that Christ worked against their will; that He performed miracles for this end, that He might promote virtue and glorify God. For Christ, who was striving to overthrow the kingdom of the demon, was at the same time laboring to spread and establish the kingdom of God. If therefore the demon had worked the works which Christ displayed, the demon would have conferred his power against himself. The Lord Christ Himself used this argument when (Luke 11, Matthew 9), replying to the Pharisees, who could by no means deny the truth of the works and were ascribing them to diabolical power, He answered: "If Satan is divided against himself, how will his kingdom stand?... But if I cast out demons by the finger of God, surely the kingdom of God has come upon you." By these words He most openly asserted His divine power, which He manifested by casting out demons. Therefore it is permitted to use the words of Origen (*Against Celsus*, book 1, n. 51): "Therefore if, with every prejudged opinion concerning miracles set aside, it is asked whether He performed them with good or evil counsel, so that we neither condemn all things nor admire and admit all things as divine: is it not clear from the miracles of Moses and Jesus, by which entire peoples were established, that those things which the Scriptures narrate as done by them were done by divine power? For a whole people would not have been established by evil arts and magical tricks, a people which, despising not only images and false divinities which all others worshiped, but also all created things, rises up to God, the beginning of all things, Himself lacking a beginning."

278. IV. There can be no doubt concerning the relative truth of the miracles of Christ. For understanding this part, it is useful here to observe that the miracles of Christ, whether they were performed directly in confirmation of His divinity, or of His mission, or of His doctrine, equally prove the divine origin of that same doctrine, as is easily clear. Hence: 1) It is read (Matthew 11): "John... when he had heard in prison of the works of Christ, sending two of his disciples, said to Him: Are You He who is to come, or do we look for another? And Jesus answering said to them: Go and report to John the things which you have heard and seen. The blind see, the lame walk, lepers are cleansed, the deaf hear, the dead rise again, the poor are evangelized." Now both from John's request and from the response of Jesus Christ it is manifest that Jesus Christ directed miracles toward proving His divine mission. 2) When Christ had replied to the Jews, falsely accusing Him of violating the sabbath, that He worked all things together with the Father (John 5.17), and that He was intimately united with Him, He adds (v. 36): "The very works which I do bear testimony concerning Me." He asserted the same thing to His disciples at the Last Supper (John 14.10 ff.): "But the Father, remaining in Me, Himself does the works. Do you not believe that I am in the Father and the Father in Me? Otherwise, believe because of the works themselves." 3) When He was about to raise Lazarus (John

11), "Jesus, lifting His eyes upward, said: Father, I give thanks to You because You have heard Me. But I knew that You always hear Me; yet because of the people who stand around I said this, so that they may believe that You sent Me." And in reality "many... of the Jews who had come to Mary and Martha, and had seen the things which Jesus did, believed in Him." 4) Christ very often appealed to miracles in order to show His divine mission. When the Jews, for example, said (John 10): "How long do You take away our soul? If You are the Christ, tell us openly," Jesus answered them: "I speak to you, and you do not believe. The works which I do in the name of My Father, these bear testimony concerning Me. If you are not willing to believe Me, believe the works, so that you may know and believe that the Father is in Me, and I in the Father." Rebuking also the unbelief of the Jews (John 15), He says: "If I had not done among them works which no other has done, they would not have sin; but now they have both seen and hated both Me and My Father." Wherefore St. Augustine rightly writes (*On the Usefulness of Believing*, n. 32): "For what else do so many and such great miracles do, when He Himself also says that they happen for no other reason except that He may be believed?... Therefore... by miracles Christ won authority, by authority He merited faith, by faith He gathered a multitude, by multitude He obtained antiquity, by antiquity He strengthened religion." 5) Nor did the disciples and Apostles of Christ understand the matter otherwise. For Nicodemus said to Jesus (John 3.2): "We know that You have come from God as teacher; for no one can do these signs which You do unless God has been with him." Peter (2 Peter 1.16-18), in order to prove the divine mission of Christ, appeals to His transfiguration and the voice brought down from heaven, "which," he says, "we heard brought from heaven when we were with Him on the holy mountain." Likewise Paul (1 Corinthians 15) presents the resurrection of Christ as a public and irrefragable testimony of truth. Finally, to omit the rest, St. John (20.30 ff.) writes: "Indeed Jesus did many other signs in the sight of His disciples which are not written in this book. But these have been written so that you may believe that Jesus is the Christ, the Son of God, and that believing you may have life in His name." 6) All these things will shine with fuller light if we attend to the remarkable character of Christ. For He was so alien from every stain that He could publicly exclaim in the sight of His adversaries (John 8.46): "Which of you will convict Me of sin?" and no one was present who would rebuke Him. The Judges themselves, even unwillingly, confessed His innocence before the people. Pilate publicly protested, "I find no cause in Him"; and "I am innocent of the blood of this just man." The betraying disciple, driven to despair, said: "I have sinned, betraying just blood." But after the death of Christ, the religion preached by Him acquired very many adversaries; yet none of them ever rendered His innocence and exceptional virtue suspect, so that the Apostle, writing to the Hebrews, confidently proclaimed Him "holy, innocent, undefiled, separated from sinners" (1). Now it is Christ Himself who claims for Himself equality with God and universal power; who calls Himself the way, the truth, and the life; who therefore requires full faith in the doctrine which He preaches; and He confirms all these things, as we have seen, by miracles. Could these affirmations of Christ be reconciled with His remarkable character, if they were false? Would He not rather have to be called the worst of men, who, lifted up by remarkable pride, made Himself equal to God, and, confirming this by false miracles, strove to drive the whole human race to ruin? Indeed this testimony of Christ, confirmed by miracles from Him, either is said to be true, and we have what we want; or it is said to be false, and it openly conflicts with the character of Christ admitted by His adversaries themselves. But if it were judged that Christ uttered that testimony unknowingly, how could the sublimity and (1) Rousseau himself (*Emile*, book 4) confessed this remarkable character of Christ, saying: "What sweetness, what purity in His morals, what touching grace in His instructions! What loftiness in His maxims! What profound wisdom in His discourses! What presence of mind, what subtlety and what exactness in His answers! What command over His passions! Where is the man, where is the sage, who knows how to act, suffer, and die without weakness and without ostentation? Had Jesus Christ taken from His own people this elevated and pure morality, of which He alone gave the lessons and example? From the bosom of the most furious fanaticism the highest wisdom made itself heard, and the simplicity of the most heroic virtues honored the vilest of all peoples... Yes, if the life and death of Socrates are those of a sage, the life and death of Jesus are those of a God." harmony of the doctrine which He preached be reconciled with so great an

ignorance? How would He have spoken as no man ever spoke? (John 7.46). How would He have confounded the Pharisees, so that they did not dare to answer Him a word? (Matthew 12.46). This argument drawn from the character of Christ is remarkable; so much so that even from it alone Apologists everywhere demonstrate the divine origin of the Christian religion. Compare, if you wish, Duvoisin (*Demonstration Evangelique*, chapter 3).

279. Yet you will say: if Christ produced miracles in confirmation of His doctrine, He ought not to have prohibited but rather to have promoted the promulgation of the miracles. But Christ prohibited the spreading of the miracles produced by Him; thus, for example, to the healed leper He commanded: "See that you tell no one"; to the deaf and mute man, restoring the use of ears and tongue, "He commanded them that they should tell no one" (compare Matthew 9 and Mark 8). Therefore. It is answered. From the cited testimonies it is abundantly clear that Christ gave miracles as signs of His mission, publicly and everywhere appealed to them, and sometimes even expressly commanded the divulgation of a miracle, just as He said to the man freed from demons (Mark 5): "Go to your house, to your own, and announce to them how great things the Lord has done for you." Therefore there can be no doubt concerning the relative force of miracles for proving the divinity of the Christian religion. Why then did Christ sometimes command that the fame of a miracle not be spread? Namely, the confirmation of Christian truth is not the only possible end of miracles. Hence Christ the Lord, who was not only the Teacher of truth but also the Exemplar of virtue, after His mission had already been proved by innumerable and various signs, wished also to teach us humility, sometimes forbidding that certain miracles be openly manifested; just as He sometimes refused to perform miracles lest He feed the curiosity of those who only wished to see (Matthew 12.38), or rebuked those who refused to believe unless they touched with their own hands (John 20.29). Moreover, this difficulty, which Larroque repeats together with other more recent unbelievers (*Critical Examination of Doctrines*, etc.), St. Thomas had already proposed to himself and satisfied by the words of St. John Chrysostom, saying (III, q. 44, a. 3, ad 4): "On that passage of Matthew 9, 'See that no one knows,' Chrysostom says (homily 13 on Matthew, a little from the beginning): 'This which is said here is not contrary to what He says to another: Go and announce the glory of God; for He teaches us to prohibit those who wish to praise us on account of ourselves. But if the glory is referred to God, we ought not to prohibit it, but rather to enjoin that this be done.'"

280. SCHOLION. We have labored according to our powers to demonstrate the divine origin of Christian revelation from the miracles of Christ and the Apostles; and after the things which we have disputed, we would seem to waste time in vain if we lingered in refuting the things which more recent rationalists object. Indeed, in order to weaken the force of the transmitted demonstration, they enter upon a twofold way: 1) they drag down all miracles as myths and legends, and therefore attack the truthfulness of the Evangelists; 2) once historical truth has been admitted, they strive to explain miracles in such a way that they reduce them to merely natural events; and therefore they deny the philosophical truth of miracles.

281. In the mythical explanation Strauss and Renan stand out. But against them: 1) all those things must be repeated by which we above vindicated the historical authenticity of the Gospels. 2) Strauss concedes (*Introduction*, section XIII) that if the Gospel history had been written by contemporary authors and immediate witnesses, "an argument of this sort would truly be decisive"; therefore let the arguments be repeated to him by which we established the genuineness of the Gospels. 3) Strauss confesses that he adheres to the mythical explanation because, a priori, miracles are impossible; but Renan (*Life of Jesus*, Introduction LI) writes: "It is not in the name of this or that philosophy; it is in the name of constant experience that we banish miracle from history. We do not say: miracle is impossible; we say: until now there has been no verified miracle." But in the same place, contradicting himself, he establishes as a principle of sound criticism in history that, since a narrative of a supernatural work cannot be admitted as such, it is

necessary that it always involve credulity or imposture; therefore the office of the historian is to interpret it in such a way that he sees what falsehood and what truth it contains: namely, to drag it down as a myth. Therefore the things which we disputed concerning the possibility of miracle must be repeated to them. 4) Moreover the Apostles themselves oppose the facts which they narrate to fables (*mythoi*), which they themselves reject. Thus (1 Timothy 1.4) Paul exhorted Timothy that he should instruct the Ephesians "not to attend to fables"; and (4.4) he says: "But avoid foolish and old-womanish fables"; and Peter (1 Peter 1.16) writes: "For we have not followed learned fables when we made known to you the power and presence of our Lord Jesus Christ, but were made beholders of His majesty"; and he brings forward the fact of the transfiguration, of which he himself had been a witness.

282. But among those who try to reduce all miracles to merely natural events, Paulus stands out, to whom even the most trifling Renan also approaches. Therefore, since these deny the philosophical truth of miracles: 1) all those things must be repeated which we brought forward to establish it in this and in the ninth thesis. 2) They often force upon us a difficulty which is sought from our ignorance of natural laws and powers; we also sufficiently met this difficulty. 3) These things could be confirmed from the very manner, truly ridiculous, which they employ in order to explain Christ's miracles. When it is said, for example (Matthew 14), that Christ appeared to the disciples tossed by a storm, "walking upon the waters," Paulus (*Exegetical Manual on the First Three Gospels*) judges that without doubt one must read "beside the waters"; namely, Christ was walking on the shore of the sea. The miracle of the conversion of water into wine, which Christ performed in Cana of Galilee, and which John (2) calls "the beginning of the signs of Jesus," according to Paulus was nothing other than a sign of courtesy. And Renan, when he tries to imitate Paulus, explains the miracle of the multiplication of loaves and fish (Matthew 14) easily (!), saying that that holy crowd which followed Christ lived with the greatest frugality in the desert; and consequently it was ready for it to recognize a miracle. If there is question of the raising of Lazarus, Renan is in no difficulty at all; for this is reduced to fraud or collusion between Christ and Lazarus! The latter pretended to be dead, in order to provide Christ the opportunity of confirming His mission. Unless the matter were full of sorrow, his explanation of the conversion of Saul could be reported here for exciting and nourishing laughter. But enough concerning these things: simple common sense dictates that these and other similar things are worthy not of refutation, but of derision.

Article 3. Whether by the resurrection of Christ the truth of the Christian religion is demonstrated

283. The first part is proved. 1) Christ (John 2.19, 21, 22) said to the Jews: "Destroy this temple and in three days I will raise it up... But He was speaking of the temple of His body. Therefore when He had risen from the dead, His disciples remembered that He had said this, and they believed the Scripture and the word which Jesus had spoken." The unbelieving Pharisees, resisting the truth, were asking miracles from Christ according to their own pleasure. But Christ, refusing miracles to them, appeals to His resurrection, as to the supreme sign; whoever resisted it would by that very fact show his own obstinacy. For it is read (Matthew 22.38-40): "Then certain of the scribes and Pharisees answered Him, saying: Master, we wish to see a sign from You. He answering said to them: An evil and adulterous generation seeks a sign, and a sign will not be given to it except the sign of Jonah the prophet. For as Jonah was in the belly of the whale three days and three nights, so will the Son of Man be in the heart of the earth three days and three nights." 2) More clearly and without figures Christ often predicted His resurrection. For it is said (Matthew 16.21): "Jesus began to show His disciples that He must go to Jerusalem, and suffer many things from the Elders and Scribes and Chief Priests, and be killed, and on the third day rise again." And (ibid. 17.21-22): "While they were living in Galilee, Jesus said to them: The Son of Man is to be delivered into the hands of men, and they will kill Him, and on the third day He will rise again." Christ repeated the same things (book 20.19): "And they will hand Him over to the Gentiles to be mocked and scourged and

crucified, and on the third day He will rise again." 3) These same things are read among the other two Synoptic Evangelists in parallel places (Mark 9.30, 10.34; Luke 18.33, etc.); among whom this also is found, that Jesus, after His transfiguration, commanded His disciples, witnesses of the same, (Mark 9.8) "that they should tell no one the things which they had seen, except when the Son of Man shall have risen from the dead." Indeed, to the Jews themselves this often-repeated prediction of Christ was thoroughly known; for it is read (Matthew 27.63 ff.): "Lord, we have remembered that that seducer said while still living: After three days I will rise again. Therefore command the sepulcher to be guarded until the third day, lest perhaps His disciples come and steal Him, and say to the people: He has risen from the dead; and the last error will be worse than the first." 4) Nor is it an obstacle that the disciples of Christ did not seem to understand well this prediction, so clear and so often repeated, and did not seem to remember it after the death of their Master before He had returned to life. For Christ often discussed clearly and plainly the calamities threatening Him, His death and resurrection; but all these things were obscure to the Apostles, as is clear from Mark 10.32 ff.; Luke 18.34; Matthew 16.22, 17.22; and again Luke 19.45, especially because they did not see how they could reconcile those predictions with the commonly received opinions concerning the Messiah and His dignity. Hence they were also rebuked by Christ (Mark 16); and for this reason their subsequent testimony is to be held firmer. 5) But it is objected in vain that, in the last discourse with His disciples (John 13-17), Christ said nothing about His resurrection. For: a) those who object thus seem to say that they would believe the prediction of the resurrection if it were found in the discourse which Christ had at the Last Supper. But if on other occasions Christ clearly issued that prediction, is there not equal reason for believing? b) Even if Christ in that discourse had been silent concerning His resurrection, at most there would be a negative argument; but an argument of this sort has no force against the positive things which are present. c) But the resurrection is indicated not obscurely in the aforesaid discourse, when Christ says to the Apostles (John 16.16): "A little while, and now you shall not see Me, and again a little while, and you shall see Me"; and (v. 22): "Now indeed you have sorrow; but I will see you again, and your heart will rejoice."

284. The second part is proved, I, from express testimonies. For: 1) The Apostles and Evangelists testify to the resurrection of Christ, who cite the words of the Angel to the women, saying concerning Christ: "He is not here, for He has risen, as He said" (Matthew 28, Mark 16, Luke 24). St. John also testifies to the resurrection of Christ, narrating it with various accompanying circumstances (John 20). Peter intrepidly announced it in the first sermon held at Jerusalem, exclaiming (Acts 2): "This Jesus God raised up, of which we all are witnesses." The same man writes in his first epistle (1 Peter 1): "Blessed be God, who has regenerated us unto a living hope through the resurrection of Jesus Christ from the dead." Paul (1 Corinthians 15) says: "But now Christ has risen from the dead, the first-fruits of those who sleep." The same man (Acts 17), at Athens in the Areopagus, announces the resurrection of Christ to prove the truth of his doctrine, saying that God is "offering faith to all, raising Him from the dead." 2) This testimony of the Apostles is the more efficacious in proportion as they showed themselves more difficult in believing the resurrection. The women, by command of the Angel, reported the resurrection to them (Luke 24.11); "and these words seemed before them like madness, and they did not believe them." Peter and John, not finding the body of Christ in the sepulcher, report the matter to the others; nevertheless the two disciples going to the village of Emmaus toward evening of the same day do not yet believe, so that they merit that rebuke (Luke 24.25): "O foolish and slow of heart to believe!" These, convinced of the resurrection from Christ's conversation and presence, testify to it to the eleven disciples; who nevertheless (Mark 16.13) "did not believe them either." Jesus appeared to the Apostles gathered together; but they (Luke 24.37), "troubled and terrified, thought that they saw a spirit." The unbelief of St. Thomas is known. Finally, so far were the Apostles from being too prone to believing that (Mark 16.14) "lastly, as the eleven were reclining, He" (Jesus) "appeared, and reproached their unbelief and hardness of heart, because they did not believe those who had seen Him risen." Therefore, only when convicted by the evidence of the fact could they afterward announce the truth of the resurrection so constantly.

285. II. From the various apparitions. For after His glorious resurrection Christ often made Himself visible. For He appeared to Mary Magdalene in the form of a gardener (John 20); to the women returning from the monument (Matthew 33); to the two disciples going to Emmaus (Luke 24); particularly to Simon Peter (ibid.); to all the Apostles except Thomas, to whom, being terrified, He offered Himself to be touched (John 20), and again, with Thomas also present, whom He ordered to put his finger into the print of the nails and his hand into His side (ibid.); to several disciples at the Sea of Tiberias (John 21); to the eleven Apostles in Galilee, on the mountain where Jesus had appointed them (Matthew 28). As Paul testifies, Christ living again "was seen by more than five hundred brethren at once" (1 Corinthians 15). But it should be noted that Christ did not appear to the Apostles in passing and momentarily, but conversed with them as a friend, ate with them, and taught them. For it is read (Acts 1): "He showed Himself alive after His passion by many proofs, appearing to them for forty days, and speaking of the kingdom of God." Finally (Mark 16), while the Apostles were seeing, Christ was lifted up and ascended most gloriously into heaven.

286. You will say: Why did Christ appear only to His Apostles and friends? Why did He not show Himself alive again to the people, to the chief priests, to the Pharisees, and to His other enemies? Then truly the resurrection would have been placed beyond all doubt, and the Jews would have been converted. It is answered: 1) this very objection was proposed by Celsus, to whom Origen already replied (*On the Harmony of the Gospels*, chapter 24), that it does not pertain to men to prescribe the manner of performing miracles. Therefore the first response is: Christ did not appear to His enemies because He did not wish to. 2) But it is gratuitously asserted that the unbelieving Jews, having seen Christ alive again, would have received faith in Him. For just as, blinded by prejudices and passions, they could ascribe the other astonishing miracles to demonic power, so also they could have ascribed the resurrection itself to demonic power. 3) It is in fact established that Christ, living again, showed Himself to a member of the Synagogue, an assailant of the Christian religion, a persecutor of His name, and indeed while he was raging and mad against Him; namely, Christ appeared to Saul seeking Damascus and made him a distinguished Apostle. Nevertheless ancient and more recent adversaries have tried by a thousand sophisms to evade an apparition of this sort. 4) Certainly the most luminous arguments for believing in Christ were not lacking to the Jews, since by prophecies and miracles He had abundantly shown His divine mission; indeed, unless their stubbornness had stood in the way, they could have believed the resurrection itself, since the body of Christ, notwithstanding the guards selected by themselves, vanished from the sepulcher, and several witnesses affirmed the resurrection. 5) Nor are fitting reasons lacking which we ourselves can assign, and on account of which Christ did not show Himself to the hostile Jews after His resurrection. For great detriment could have arisen if the Jews, adhering to their prejudices concerning the Messiah as a most powerful temporal king, had seen Christ in the state of glory and exaltation. For it could easily have happened that, once He had been seen and held as Messiah, they would immediately have waged rebellion against the Romans, and, having been pressed and conquered by them, would have been shut up in Jerusalem. The Apostles also would have experienced that sad lot, and thus would have been especially hindered from the preaching of the Gospel. But the principal reason exists in Acts 10.14, concerning which elsewhere.

287. III. From the manner of acting of Christ's enemies. For: 1) It is read (Matthew 27): "But on the next day the chief priests and Pharisees came together to Pilate, saying: Lord, we have remembered that that seducer said while still living: After three days I will rise again. Therefore command the sepulcher to be guarded until the third day, lest perhaps His disciples come and steal Him, and say to the people: He has risen from the dead, and the last error will be worse than the first. Pilate said to them: You have a guard; go, guard it as you know. But they, going away, secured the sepulcher, sealing the stone with the guards." Now (ibid. 28) the guards, terrified by the earthquake, came into the city and "reported to the chief priests all the things which had happened." But these men, "having gathered together with the elders and taken counsel, gave abundant money to the soldiers, saying: Say that His disciples came by night and stole Him while we were sleeping." Weighing all these things, St. Augustine (on Psalm 62) exclaims: "What

is it that you have said, O unhappy cunning? Do you so much abandon the light of pious counsel and sink into the depth of craftiness that you say this: Say that while you were sleeping His disciples came and took Him away? Do you employ sleeping witnesses? Truly you yourself have fallen asleep, who have failed by searching out such things. If they slept, what could they have seen? If they saw nothing, how are they witnesses?" 2) The futile evasions of the adversaries confirm the matter. For certain men asserted that the body of Christ was absorbed by the rock split by the earthquake. But: a) if this were true, how could Christ afterward show Himself alive and appear to several persons? b) If the body of Christ had been absorbed, would not the linens and the cloth also have been absorbed with it, which nevertheless were found in the sepulcher? The earthquake was sensible to all, and if there had been any cleft of the rock, it would have been visible to all. Why therefore was this absurd hypothesis introduced late, when the chief Priests and Pharisees, for whom it was especially dear to deny the resurrection, did not observe that cleft? 3) Others dreamed that the body of Christ was taken away by the disciples. But: a) this certainly was not done. For either the Apostles believed the resurrection of Christ, and they would have acted in vain; or they did not believe, and, thinking themselves deceived, they would never have exposed themselves to the danger of life for a seducer. b) Nor, if they had wished, could the Apostles have carried away the body of Christ. For how could they have accomplished this? By corrupting the guards? But, once the falsity of the resurrection is supposed, both every motive for undertaking this was lacking and several motives for abstaining from that crime were present. For they could easily fear that the guards would resist the corruption, that they would spread their wicked plan, that they would accuse them before the Judges. By bringing violence upon the guards? But the guards would have protested before Pilate and the Sanhedrin; the Apostles would have been seized, judged, and condemned. Far from these things having happened, the guards reported what had happened, and the Jews, enemies of Christ, tried to persuade them to say that they had not suffered violence, but that Christ had been taken away while they were sleeping. c) Wherefore the chief Priests and magistrates were most grieved that the Apostles were announcing the resurrection of Christ; they tried in every way to prohibit preaching of this sort; yet they never dragged the Apostles forward as violators of the sepulcher and deceivers. d) But the Apostles testified that they had seen, heard, and touched Christ living again; in this preaching they remained constant, even to chains, to prisons, to death; and innumerable persons from the Jews themselves were converted to the faith of Christ. 4) Still more foolishly, Paulus, Strauss, and others, in order to attack the resurrection of Christ, deny the death of Christ and assert that He was only oppressed by syncope. To this absurd supposition there stand opposed: a) innumerable and most valid testimonies. For all four Evangelists testify that Christ was truly dead. Matthew (27) says: "Jesus... crying with a loud voice, yielded up the spirit"; Mark (15): "Having uttered a loud voice, He expired"; Luke (23): "Saying these things, He expired"; John (19): "Having bowed His head, He handed over the spirit." Indeed John himself, an eyewitness, narrates (John 19) that the soldiers broke the legs of the robbers who were still living, "but when they had come to Jesus, as they saw that He was already dead, they did not break His legs; but one of the soldiers opened His side with a spear, and immediately there came out blood and water." Pilate also, only after having been made certain of the death of Christ from the testimony of the Centurion, granted His body to Joseph of Arimathea. Joseph himself of Arimathea, when he had received the lifeless body of Christ from Pilate, "wrapped it in a clean linen cloth and placed it in his own new monument, which he had hewn out in a rock," and "in which no one had yet been placed." Then "he rolled a great stone to the entrance of the monument, and went away." Finally, not only for Christians, but for all Jews and pagans, the death of Christ was always a fact placed beyond all controversy. Indeed, the Jews and pagans had such certainty concerning this fact that, although they attacked the real resurrection of Christ, they never made exception that He had not been dead. b) The follies of unbelievers are refuted, among others, by Gruner father and son, Protestants (*On the True, Not Simulated, Death of Christ*, Halle, 1805): "Syncope," they say, "if any other affection of the body is, is by far the most dangerous of all, according to Aretaeus. The greatest weakness goes before, fainting begins, syncope follows, and finally death itself makes the sudden close of the evils... Placed" [Christ] "in a rocky, very cold place, after a grave wound and syncope caused by weakness and most abundant hemorrhage" (for,

having been scourged and on the cross, He had poured forth a large quantity of blood), "the blood ought suddenly to have stopped and congealed. The temperature of the air is almost absent from deep cells and sepulchers cut into rock. Nor does a man exhausted in strength and deprived of breathable air have a long space for reviving under the earth... What prudent physician would dare to draw blood from a man pressed by fainting, with a vein cut? For if violent syncope held Christ, He could not emit blood in a visible manner, for then the circulation of the blood is almost at rest... Christ expired, but He lived again; for Christians it is enough to know these things, the rest pertain to the triflings of the learned, in which, if anyone wishes to exercise himself in the future, he may do so by me."

288. IV. Therefore, to complete the demonstration of this part, we gather from what has been said that the fact of the resurrection rests upon those arguments which, according to all, render human testimony irrefragable. For the resurrection is testified by witnesses very many in number, most apt for acquiring knowledge of that fact, by no means credulous but on the contrary almost obstinate, wonderfully agreeing among themselves, constant in asserting that fact even unto death, placed in those circumstances in which it was impossible for them to wish or even to be able to deceive others (1). I shall report the most eloquent words of St. John Chrysostom (homily 89, otherwise 90, on Matthew), who comprehends all things in a few words: "Therefore consider: it was necessary to believe that He had died, and had been buried, and had risen again; all of which things are made credible by the works of the enemies. Therefore see those words which altogether confirm these things: 'We have remembered that that impostor said while still living'" (therefore He is dead), "'After three days I will rise again. Command the sepulcher to be sealed'" (therefore He was buried), "'lest perhaps His disciples come and steal Him.' If therefore the sepulcher has been secured and sealed, there will be no fraud? Certainly none. Therefore the demonstration of the resurrection is certain, as is clear from those things (1) After these things each one will easily detect how tastelessly the most trifling Renan (*Life of Jesus*, near the end of chapter 26), in order to extricate himself from this very troublesome argument taken from the resurrection, wrote: "Had His body" (of Jesus Christ) "been taken away, or did enthusiasm, always credulous, later hatch the whole collection of narratives by which one sought to establish faith in the resurrection? This is what, for lack of contradictory documents, we shall be ignorant of forever. Let us say, however, that the strong imagination of Mary of Magdala played a capital role in this circumstance"; and he concludes truly poetically: "Divine power of Love! sacred moments when the passion of a hallucinated woman gives to the world a risen God!" as though Mary Magdalene had been the only testimony of the resurrection! which you object. For when the sepulcher had been sealed, there was no fraud. If there was no fraud, and nevertheless the sepulcher was found empty, it is open and without controversy that He Himself rose again... Consider how the disciples are lovers of truth; how they hide none of the things which the enemies said, however disgraceful those things may be. For behold, they call Him an impostor, and they themselves do not keep that silent... What therefore of Pilate?... He does not permit the soldiers alone to seal it; for, as though having been informed concerning their affairs, he is no longer willing to act with them; but in order to free himself from them, he permits this also and says: you seal it as you wish, lest you be able to accuse others... They themselves came, they themselves asked, they themselves sealed it with a guard, so that they mutually accuse and refute themselves." Then he weighs the testimony of the Apostles itself more accurately, saying: "When would they have stolen it on the sabbath, and how?... How could they have persuaded the crowd? What recompense were they expecting? What reward? When they saw Him living and seized, they fled; and after death were they going to speak boldly for Him, if He had not risen? How can these things be thought? For that they would neither have wished nor been able to invent a resurrection which had not existed is here plainly clear. For He had frequently spoken many things to them concerning the resurrection... Therefore if He had not risen, it is manifest that they, as deceived men and attacked by the whole nation on account of Him, would have departed from His worship. For they would not have wished to spread such an opinion concerning Him, since they had been deceived by Him and brought into extreme dangers for Him. But that they could not have simulated it, unless the

resurrection had been true, is certainly very probable. For in what matter would they have had confidence? In gravity of speech? But they were the most unskilled of all. In abundance of money? They had neither staff nor shoes. In splendor of family? They were lowly, born from lowly persons. In the splendor of their native place? They were born from ignoble places. In multitude? They were not more than eleven, dispersed in various places. In the promises of the Master? If He had not risen, they would have had no faith in them. But how would they have endured the raging people? For if their chief did not bear the word of a doorkeeper woman, and if the rest, seeing Him bound, were dispersed, how would they have brought themselves to run to the ends of the world in order to plant a fictitious word of resurrection? How could they stand against kings and princes and peoples, where there were swords, frying-pans, furnaces, and a thousand deaths every day, unless they had been aided by the power and grace of Him who had risen?"

289. The third part is proved. When it is now established that Christ predicted His resurrection from the dead, and that that prediction was fulfilled by the event, after the things which we have said concerning the force of proving of miracle and prophecy, the argument which is drawn from the resurrection of Christ for proving the truth of Christian revelation is easily understood by all. For: 1) the resurrection is not a work which can be foreseen in natural causes, since it is rather beyond the order of natural causes; therefore it can be foreknown only by God, and by him to whom God has revealed it. Therefore a certain prediction of the resurrection, fulfilled by the event, is true prophecy; and, employed in confirmation of Christian revelation, it certainly proves that revelation. 2) From what has been said it is also established that the resurrection is a true miracle which has no author except God. Therefore either Christ rose by His own power, and now He is shown to be God; or God is said to have raised Him from death, and now God has confirmed by this miracle the divine mission of Christ.

290. But it is useful to show briefly how the resurrection of Christ is the principal foundation of our faith, which the Apostle openly asserts (1 Corinthians 15.14): "But if Christ has not risen, then our preaching is empty, and your faith also is empty." Certainly: 1) If Christ had not risen, He would not have conquered death, but rather would have been conquered by it. But it is more difficult, as St. John Chrysostom reasons, to conquer sin than death; therefore Christ would not have conquered sin either unless He had risen. And the Apostle himself seems to indicate this when (same place, v. 17) he says: "But if Christ has not risen, your faith is vain, for you are still in your sins." 2) If Christ rose again, therefore He was dead; if He was dead, therefore He was a true man. But once the human nature of Christ has been believed, there is no longer any difficulty in believing the other truths which pertain to His humanity. Again, if Christ truly rose again, He Himself, just as He had said, is true God; for either by rising by His own power He showed Himself to be God, or God, by calling Him back to life, manifested that He Himself is God. But if once we believe the truth of the divine nature in Christ, no difficulty remains in believing His miracles, the mysteries which He revealed, and His whole doctrine. 3) It is true that Christ had already performed several miracles in confirmation of His divine mission; nevertheless the seal, as it were, and final confirmation of all, as He Himself had said more than once, was the resurrection. Indeed He appealed to His future resurrection as to a sign sufficient of itself for His mission; for He says (Luke 11.29 ff.): "This generation is a wicked generation; it seeks a sign, and a sign will not be given to it except the sign of Jonah the prophet. For just as Jonah was a sign to the Ninevites, so also will the Son of Man be to this generation." Compare Matthew 12.39; 16.4. Therefore suppose that Christ did not rise again: the seal which He Himself had proposed would be lacking to His works. Would not the rest of His works be weakened from this? 4) The Apostles themselves exhibit themselves chiefly as witnesses of the resurrection of Christ, just as if the force of all the things which they were testifying depended upon this testimony alone. Hence the Apostle, in the cited epistle to the Corinthians (v. 14 ff.), says: "If Christ has not risen... we are found also false witnesses of God, because we have given testimony against God that He raised Christ, whom He did not raise." Certainly St. Peter, Prince of the Apostles, when there was question of substituting someone in the place of Judas (Acts 1.15-22): "Rising in the midst of the brethren, he said" (and the crowd of men together was about one hundred twenty), "...

Therefore from these men who have gathered with us during all the time in which the Lord Jesus entered and went out among us, beginning from the baptism of John until the day on which He was taken up from us, one of these must become with us a witness of His resurrection." And (2.24-32) the same Peter, in the first sermon to the people, speaking concerning Jesus Christ, says: "Whom God raised up"; and he produces the prophecy of David, who from the mouth of Christ Himself said (Psalm 15.8): "Because You will not abandon my soul in hell, nor will You give Your holy one to see corruption... Foreseeing," Peter adds, "he" (David) "spoke concerning the resurrection of Christ, because neither was He abandoned in hell, nor did His flesh see corruption. This Jesus God raised up, of which we all are witnesses." And (4.3) it is said concerning all the Apostles: "And with great power the Apostles were giving testimony to the resurrection of Jesus Christ our Lord." 5) Indeed the Apostles themselves worked miracles directly for confirming the truth of the resurrection, and consequently the truth of the religion which they announced. Thus (Acts 3) it is narrated that Peter and John cured a man "who was lame from his mother's womb... whom they placed daily at the gate of the temple which is called Beautiful, that he might ask alms from those entering the temple." To him Peter said: "Silver and gold are not mine; but what I have, this I give you: In the name of Jesus Christ of Nazareth, arise and walk. And taking him by his right hand, he lifted him up, and immediately his feet and soles were strengthened. And leaping up he stood and walked." But to the admiring people Peter immediately declared that God in that miracle glorified "His Son Jesus... whom God raised from the dead, of which we are witnesses." Indeed (chapter 4) it is confirmed that the Apostles "were teaching the people and announcing in Jesus the resurrection from the dead"; and then (chapter 5) it is added: "By the hands of the Apostles many signs and prodigies were being done among the people. And all were with one accord in Solomon's porch. But of the rest no one dared to join himself to them; yet the people magnified them. But the multitude of men and women believing in the Lord was increased more and more, so that they brought the sick out into the streets and placed them on little beds and couches, so that, when Peter came, at least his shadow might overshadow any one of them, and they might be freed from their infirmities. But also the multitude of the neighboring cities came together to Jerusalem, bringing the sick and those troubled by unclean spirits, all of whom were cured." But these miracles, which the Apostles used to confirm their preaching, would have no force if the resurrection, which they were directly testifying, were false. And for that reason that saying of the Apostle again becomes known (1 Corinthians 15): "But if Christ has not risen, then our preaching is empty... We are found... false witnesses of God, etc." Therefore you see how much Wegscheider conflicts with the Apostle, writing (part 3, chapter 2, section 131): "Nevertheless we do not contend that the whole truth of the Christian religion depends on this fact alone" [of the resurrection].

291. Wherefore it is useful to complete this distinguished argument with the most beautiful words of St. Augustine (*City of God*, book 22, chapter 5). "It is incredible," says the holy Doctor, "that Christ rose again in the flesh and ascended into heaven with the flesh; it is incredible that the world believed a thing so incredible; it is incredible that men ignoble, lowest, very few, unskilled, were able to persuade the world, and in it even the learned, of a thing so incredible so efficaciously." "Of these three incredible things, the first they with whom we are dealing are unwilling to believe; the second they are compelled both to see and to perceive; but they do not find whence it was done, if they do not believe the third. Certainly the resurrection of Christ and His ascension into heaven with the flesh in which He rose again are now preached and believed throughout the whole world. If it is not credible, whence has it already been believed throughout the whole world? If many noble, lofty, learned men had said that they had seen it, and had taken care to spread abroad what they had seen, it would not be wonderful that the world believed them; but that these men are still unwilling to believe would be very hard. But if, as is true, the world believed a few obscure, lowest, unlearned men saying and writing that they had seen it, why do the few most obstinate men who have remained still not believe the world itself now believing? The world believed a small number of ignoble, weak, unskilled men precisely because, in witnesses so contemptible, divinity much more wonderfully persuaded it by itself. For the utterances of those persuading, which they spoke,

were wonderful deeds, not words. For those who had not seen Christ rise again in the flesh and ascend with that flesh into heaven believed those narrating that they had seen it, not merely speaking, but also performing wonderful signs." Then, after reviewing the signs, he concludes thus: "But if they do not believe that, through the Apostles of Christ, so that they might be believed when preaching the resurrection and ascension of Christ, even those miracles were performed, this one great miracle suffices for us: that the world believed it without miracles."

292. SCHOLION. We have demonstrated the established proposition by such a method that at the same time we have satisfied objections which could seem of some moment. Nevertheless it is useful to indicate certain other difficulties which are commonly proposed against the truth of the resurrection, so that from this it may be apparent to all on account of what futile quibbles they attempt to deny a fact most fully demonstrated.

293. And I. They say that there are many things in the Gospel itself which suggest that the resurrection of Christ was not real but apparent. For: the Apostles themselves (Luke 24.37) thought "that they saw a spirit"; the two disciples going to Emmaus (ibid. 31) did not recognize Jesus except in the breaking of bread, and then "He" [Jesus] "vanished from their eyes"; Jesus entered into the supper-room with the doors closed, as is said in John (20.19); Mary Magdalene (ibid. 17) could not touch Him; and those intermittent apparitions under the form of a gardener, a stranger, and so forth, seem to indicate only an apparent resurrection.

294. Having before our eyes the demonstration exhibited, we can dispatch difficulties of this sort in a few words. Certainly the Apostles, because of fear conceived from the sudden apparition of Christ with the doors closed, thought for a brief moment that they saw a spirit; but immediately they were made certain of the truth of the matter, since Christ offered Himself to them to be seen and touched. Hence we have seen with how great constancy of soul the Apostles testified to Christ's resurrection. Likewise the disciples going to Emmaus did not recognize Jesus at first because of His changed form, whether of the glorified body or of a stranger; but since afterward they recognized Him, and since that is reported by the same Evangelist, and since they announced Him and gave their life for Him, how shall we refuse their testimony? A glorious body, such as the body of Christ was after the resurrection, could easily enter into the supper-room with the doors closed, without its being possible to infer from this that it was not a true and real body. Mary Magdalene could not touch the body of Christ because He Himself did not wish it, not because a true body was lacking; certainly Christ showed the scars and offered Himself to Thomas to be touched. Finally, the diverse apparitions under those diverse forms certainly do not weaken the truth of the resurrection; for the Evangelists themselves, who report them, testify that under the form of a gardener, a stranger, and so forth, it is always the same Christ living again. We must only confess that the reasons for this particular economy in Christ's apparitions are not sufficiently clear to us.

295. II. They are accustomed to object certain apparent contradictions which occur in the evangelical narrative of the resurrection of Christ. For, they say: 1) the Evangelists do not agree as to the time at which the women came to the sepulcher; for (Matthew 28) it is said that this happened in the evening of the sabbath; Mark (16.2) says, "very early... when the sun had already risen"; John (20), "while it was still dark." 2) As to the object which the women had seen: Matthew and Mark mention only one Angel; Luke and John, two. Luke (24.4) says that the Angels stood; Mark (same place) and John (20.12) testify that they sat. 3) As to the manner in which the disciples received the first announcement of Christ's resurrection. For according to Mark, the women coming out of the monument, terrified by fear, said nothing to anyone (v. 8). But if we hear John (20.2 ff.), Mary Magdalene "ran and came to Simon Peter and to the other disciple whom Jesus loved," and could announce nothing else to them except that "they have taken the Lord from the monument, and we do not know where they have put Him."

296. But in order to meet these difficulties, we first recall two observations made above. First, indeed, the substance of the fact, that is, the truth of the resurrection, is unanimously reported by all the Evangelists; but the contradictions which are objected touch only certain accidental circumstances of that same fact. Contradictions of this sort, even if they were real and not merely apparent, by no means prevent faith from being given to the substance of the fact, which all the witnesses unanimously testify in the same way. Namely, since here there is question only of the human authority of the Gospels, we employ that rule of criticism which is usually of use to all in judging the truthfulness of any history. Secondly, the objected contradictions in their own way confirm the truth of the testimony of the Evangelists. For if they had wished to deceive by agreement in reporting Christ's resurrection, they could easily, also by acting in agreement, have avoided those contradictions; and, according to what commonly happens, they surely would have done this.

297. These things indeed suffice for the present purpose. But whoever would desire a correct exposition of those apparent contradictions could consult the Interpreters, and especially the distinguished Patrizi, who (*On the Gospels*, book 3, dissertation 53), solidly and learnedly after the Fathers, handles this matter. Let it be permitted to us to copy out a few things from the principles which he establishes for solving the difficulties and arranging the whole narrative. He first notes that among the Jews the day begins from sunset; that at Jerusalem on the day of the equinox twilight extends to an hour and a half; and that Christ's sepulcher was removed less than three hundred paces from the Judicial Gate, by which the way lay to that place. Then he adds: "The things which one must observe in the explanation of this history are these. After Christ had risen from the sepulcher, no fewer than five women went there... Between Mary Magdalene's departure from home and the arrival at the sepulcher of those women about whom Mark speaks, at least an hour and a half intervened... Therefore all those women did not come at the same time, nor did all return at the same time; and therefore neither are all to be thought to have come at the same time to all the Apostles together, nor indeed each one to all with all and individual things to be announced, but, as some women came to the sepulcher after others and saw different things, so some announced to some Apostles, some earlier, some afterward, the things which each of them had seen... Mary Magdalene came in the morning while it was still dark and saw the stone taken away from the monument. But that she by no means remained there we ascertain from the Gospel of John, who continues writing thus: 'Therefore she ran and came to Simon Peter.' But the matter itself does not allow us to believe that Peter and John delayed after hearing the matter, and John himself altogether forbids it, inasmuch as he narrates that both ran, which Luke also says concerning Peter. Yet they did not go out except after the return of those women about whom Luke speaks in v. 9; therefore these brought the announcement to Peter within the space of an hour from when Mary Magdalene had come to him. And if you consider the short way which had to be measured out, you will not doubt that they arrived at the sepulcher when not yet one hour had passed from when Mary Magdalene departed from home, and therefore long before sunrise, yet when it was already growing light enough that John, looking into the sepulcher, although he had not entered, could see the linens laid there. What Matthew narrates, that Jesus living again appeared to the women, is different from and later than that which we read in John happened to Mary Magdalene. For Mark wrote these things: 'But Jesus rising in the morning on the first day of the sabbath appeared FIRST to Mary Magdalene.' The women who went to the sepulcher one after another, when they arrived there, did not yet know what had happened; therefore the women going were not meeting the women returning. But each of these goings and returns must be thought to have been completed quickly, both because the distance of the way was short and because they hurried. But if you have all these things in view, you will easily understand also what distinctions are needed in narrating and illustrating this history... It also happens that someone less attains those things which Mark wrote about those women: 'But they, going out, fled from the monument... and THEY SAID NOTHING TO ANYONE.' But this was on the road itself. For Mark, just as Matthew, narrates that they had been commanded by the Angel to announce to the Apostles the things which they had seen and heard, and from

Matthew and Luke it appears that they carried out the command. Then Mark opens for us the cause of this silence: 'for they were afraid,' he says; which fear must be believed to have possessed them while they were fleeing from the sepulcher, but without doubt they were released from it when they had gone farther away from there." But compare the whole dissertation.

298. III. Finally they say: Christ foretold that He would rise after three days and that He would remain in the heart of the earth for three days and three nights, as Matthew reports (12.40). Yet the Evangelists report that Christ remained in the heart of the earth only for one whole day. Behold therefore a new contradiction. But, once those things which we noted a little before are supposed, we say that those three days can and must be taken for three incomplete days, not for completed ones. Indeed they can be taken in this way because this manner of computing was common among the Jews, and it is established that the old synagogue, by a certain fiction of law, always regarded a part of time as a whole time; indeed among all people part of a day, month, or year is commonly called a day, month, or year. This is still more easily understood in another expression everywhere employed (Matthew 16.21; 17.22; 20.19; Mark 9.30; 10.34; Luke 9.22; 24.7, 46), according to which Christ is said to be going to rise, or to have risen, on the third day. But that this phrase "three days and three nights" must be so taken is understood even from the manner of acting of the chief priests and Pharisees. For unless they themselves had understood the matter as we explain it, they would not have gone to Pilate and sealed the sepulcher with a seal at that time when the twofold solemnity of the sabbath and passover coincided. For unless they had thought that the foretold resurrection could happen near the beginning of the third day, time would have been abundantly available to them to carry out all those things on the following day. Compare, concerning this whole argument taken from the resurrection, Sherlock (*Trial of the Witnesses of the Resurrection of Jesus*, which also exists apud Migne, *Demonstration Evangelique*, vol. 7); and Ditton (*The Truth of the Christian Religion Demonstrated by the Resurrection of Jesus Christ*, which exists apud Migne, cited work, vol. 8; nor do I now have at hand the original work written in English), who undertook the demonstration by the geometrical method.

Article 4. Whether the divine origin of the Christian religion is rightly proved from its propagation and conservation

299. The argument which is drawn from the propagation and conservation of the Christian religion for proving its divinity is illustrious and clear to all. Yet so that we may thoroughly grasp its whole force and efficacy, we must note a few things beforehand. And first, it is by no means hidden from us that most people here construct a twofold argument by examining separately the propagation and the conservation of the Christian religion. Nevertheless we prefer to join them together and to consider them as if with one view. For, following this method, we shall both take counsel for brevity and the argument itself will come forth more efficaciously; besides, the principles by which one argues are the same, whether from the universality or from the perpetuity of the Christian religion.

300. Now both the aforesaid propagation and conservation have a twofold force of proving, namely as miracle and as prophecy. But here there is question of a miracle which is such in the moral order; for just as a work above all physical laws of nature is called and is a miracle in the physical order, so a work which surpasses all moral laws by which human nature is ruled is commonly called a miracle in the moral order. Namely, that which can in no way be obtained by human industry, wisdom, or power, and yet happens in such a way that, contrary to all the laws of human prudence, it has a prosperous outcome, must certainly be said to have happened with God positively and directly willing, and with Him immediately acting. But if we diligently weigh all the circumstances of the matters, we easily discover that no human industry, wisdom, or power could ever have obtained the universality and perpetuity which the Christian religion obtained. Rightly therefore we attribute it to God positively and directly acting and promoting it. But since God cannot directly intend and positively effect what is false and evil, the Christian

religion must be called true.

301. Nevertheless it is useful here to observe that the special protection of God, by which the Christian religion has been propagated and preserved, by no means excludes human industry and natural means which can concur toward the same effect. Indeed, the use of means of this sort, according to ordinary providence, is altogether to be admitted, just as the aid of grace for producing a salutary work by no means excludes the cooperation of nature itself elevated by grace. Yet while human industry is put forth and the human means which are at hand are applied, God so works and cooperates toward producing the effect that it is evident that the effect is above every human industry and power, and therefore must be attributed to the special intervention of God.

302. But that the propagation and conservation of the Christian religion, if it has been predicted, has a most efficacious force for proving its truth as prophecy, is easily drawn from what has been said. For if it can be ascribed to no natural cause, but is a true miracle, it must be attributed to God freely acting apart from and above the order of natural causes; but the things which God does in this way can be foreknown and predicted only by divine power. Therefore, if a prediction of this sort exists and has been fulfilled by the event, it is an evident sign of special divine intervention. Certainly unless someone is lord of space and time, he cannot truly promise that which embraces all space and all time, since it is necessary that he have in his power the ability to effect that which he promises. But this is what Christ accomplished through the very ample and indefinite promises of the universality and perpetuity which His religion was going to obtain, and in fact has obtained. Therefore, by that very fact, Christ showed Himself the Lord of all space and time, who would have the power of effecting that which He promised, and therefore true God. Therefore His religion is divine.

303. One thing remains to be noted; and it is this: we can indeed distinguish by mental consideration the religion of Christ from the Church of Christ; but it is impossible to separate them, since Christ instituted His religion in such a way that it would be the Church. Hence it ought not to seem strange if, while we contend to prove the truth of the Christian religion from its propagation and conservation, we seem to demonstrate the truth of the Catholic Church, which is the true Church of Christ. This does not weaken the present demonstration; but only in some way anticipates that which must be asserted more expressly below. Moreover we shall use the very words of the Fathers, who most fully and eloquently set forth this whole argument.

304. Therefore, these things having been laid down for understanding the matter: Section II. The proposed question is solved. PROPOSITION XIV. The most rapid and universal propagation of the Christian religion, and its wonderful perpetual conservation, 1. not once only clearly predicted by Christ, 2. is a fact placed before the eyes of all, 3. which can be explained by no human industry or created power, but demands the special protection of God. Therefore, both as prophecy and as miracle, it renders constant and infallible testimony to the divine origin of that same religion.

305. The first part is proved. 1) Christ promised that His Church would be universal. For He signified this when (Matthew 8.11) He said: "But I say to you that many shall come from east and west, and shall recline with Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob in the kingdom of heaven," or in His Church. And again (Matthew 26.13), concerning the pious woman who poured an alabaster vessel of ointment upon His head, He foretold: "Wherever this Gospel shall be preached in the whole world, that also which she has done shall be spoken in memory of her." And (Luke 24.26 ff.) after His resurrection, Jesus says: "Thus it was necessary for Christ to suffer and to rise from the dead on the third day, and that repentance and remission of sins be preached in His name to all nations, beginning from Jerusalem." And in reality He sent His Apostles to preach His Gospel into the whole world with those words (Matthew 28.19): "Going therefore, teach all nations, baptizing them," or enrolling them into the Church; and as it is read in Mark (16.15): "Going into the whole world, preach the Gospel to every creature." Finally, in the Acts of the Apostles (1.8), Luke thus

presents Christ addressing the Apostles: "And you shall be witnesses to Me in Jerusalem, and in all Judaea and Samaria, and even to the end of the earth." And to this pertains the oracle (Psalm 2) in which the Father is introduced addressing His Son thus: "Ask of Me, and I will give You the nations for Your inheritance, and the ends of the earth for Your possession"; just as Christ Himself (Matthew 28) declared, saying: "All power has been given to Me in heaven and on earth." 2) In more than one place Christ promised that the Church would endure perpetually. Famous concerning this matter is His oracle in Matthew (16.18): "Upon this rock I will build My Church, and the gates of hell shall not prevail against it." Likewise there is that other promise of the same divine Savior, when, living again, He said to His Apostles: "Behold, I am with you even to the consummation of the age." The Angel also foretold that this same kingdom of Christ in these lands would never have any end; for (Luke 1.32) he addressed the Blessed Virgin thus in His annunciation: "The Lord God will give Him the throne of David His father, and He shall reign in the house of Jacob forever, and of His kingdom there shall be no end," alluding to the words of Daniel (2), who, speaking of the kingdom of the Messiah, says: "His power is an eternal power, which shall not be taken away; and His kingdom one which shall not be corrupted." Likewise: "But in the days of those kingdoms the God of heaven will raise up a kingdom which shall not be dissipated forever, and His kingdom shall not be given to another people; but it shall break in pieces and consume all these kingdoms, and it itself shall stand forever." 3) Indeed Christ both predicted the difficulties, and promised special protection for conquering them, and for that reason foretold a happy outcome notwithstanding the difficulties. The difficulties indeed: thus (Matthew 10) Christ said to His disciples: "They will deliver you up in councils, and in their synagogues they will scourge you; and you will be led before governors and kings on account of Me, for a testimony to them and to the nations... and you will be hated by all on account of My name." Christ predicted that Peter would be crucified, addressing him thus (John 21): "Amen I say to you: when you were younger, you girded yourself and walked where you wished; but when you have grown old, you will stretch out your hands, and another will gird you and lead you where you do not wish"; and the Evangelist adds: "But He said this signifying by what death he would glorify God. And when He had said this He said to him: follow Me"; that is, sustain the same death as I do. And (Luke 21.12 ff.): "They will lay their hands on you and persecute you, delivering you into synagogues and prisons, dragging you before kings and governors on account of My name. But it will happen to you for a testimony... And you will be betrayed by parents and brothers and relatives and friends, and they will put some of you to death, and you will be hated by all on account of My name." In turn He promised special protection; for (Luke 21.14 ff.) it is said: "Set it therefore in your hearts not to premeditate how you will answer. For I will give you a mouth and wisdom, which all your adversaries will not be able to resist and contradict." And (Mark 16): "These signs will follow those who have believed: in My name they will cast out demons, they will speak with new tongues, they will take up serpents, and if they drink anything deadly, it will not harm them; they will place hands upon the sick and they will be well." And (John 14): "I," He says, "will ask the Father, and He will give you another Paraclete, that He may remain with you forever, the Spirit of truth, whom the world cannot receive... But you will know Him, because He will remain with you"; and again: "But the Paraclete, the Holy Spirit, whom the Father will send in My name, He will teach you all things, and will suggest to you all things whatsoever I shall have said to you"; and finally: "When that Spirit of truth shall come, He will teach you all truth." Finally (Matthew 28.18 ff.): "Jesus spoke to them, saying: All power has been given to Me in heaven and on earth; going therefore, teach all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit, teaching them to observe all things whatsoever I have commanded you; and behold, I am with you all days, even to the consummation of the age." Finally He promises a happy outcome, notwithstanding the difficulties, as is clear from that saying: "And I say to you that you are Peter, and upon this Rock I will build My Church, and the gates of hell shall not prevail against it." Testimonies of this sort could easily be multiplied.

306. The second part is proved. I. It is certain that the Christian religion was propagated among all nations with a speed plainly admirable, and that the same is still preserved; therefore

the prediction of Christ has been fulfilled. In order first to place before the eyes, in a few words, the fact of the most rapid propagation, we shall touch upon these things in order: 1) On the very day of Pentecost, after the descent of the Holy Spirit (Acts 2), Peter, Prince of the Apostles, preached in Jerusalem, and, as St. Luke, author of Acts, writes (2.41): "There were added on that day about three thousand souls." He also adds a little after (2.47): "But the Lord increased daily those who were being saved into Him." But in another discourse, "many," says the same St. Luke (4.4), "of those who had heard the word believed; and the number of the men was made five thousand." "To these," Cornelius a Lapide observes, "if you add women and children, who without doubt were very many mingled with so many men, the number was far greater." But this number, as the praised St. Luke narrates a little below (5.14), was increased daily: "But the multitude of men and women believing in the Lord was increased more and more." Therefore in a few days the number of the faithful was brought, as can rightly be judged, to not less than fifteen or twenty thousand. 2) But that number of the faithful, on account of the great persecution, immediately grew very greatly. For the faithful, dispersed through the regions of Judaea and Samaria, were preaching (ibid. 8.4): "Those who had been dispersed went through, evangelizing the word of God." Hence persecution was the cause of dispersion; but dispersion, by God's disposition, served for propagating the Christian religion. Thus Philip (8.5-14) converted a city of the Samaritans, then the Ethiopian, the powerful eunuch of Candace, queen of the Ethiopians. Afterward, as is said (ibid. 8.40), "he was found in Azotus, and passing through he evangelized all the cities until he came to Caesarea." Peter and John, who had been sent to give the Holy Spirit (8.14) to those who had been baptized in Samaria, "were returning" (ibid. 25) "to Jerusalem, and were evangelizing many regions of the Samaritans." Therefore, before a year had elapsed from the descent of the Holy Spirit upon the Apostles, there were already innumerable believers in Christ in Judaea and Samaria. 3) Then with the same speed the religion of Christ continued to be propagated. For before ten years had elapsed from the death of Christ, Peter was sending an epistle from Rome (1 Peter 1) "to the elect strangers of the dispersion of Pontus, Galatia, Cappadocia, Asia, and Bithynia." John the Evangelist (Apocalypse 1.11) was writing under Domitian from the island Patmos "to the seven Churches which are in Asia: Ephesus, Smyrna, Pergamum, Thyatira, Sardis, Philadelphia, and Laodicea." Paul, traveling through very many cities of Asia and Europe, preached the word of God everywhere, and acquired innumerable disciples for Jesus Christ, so that after about twenty years from His ascension into heaven he could set forth these words in the Epistle to the Romans (1.8): "Your faith is announced in the whole world." 4) Certainly from these things it is established that, while the Apostles were still living, the number of Christians was enormous; and a little afterward it grew immeasurably. For St. Clement of Rome (in the first epistle to the Corinthians) writes: "To these men" (Peter and Paul) "there was joined a great multitude of the elect, who sustained many martyrdoms and torments, and became splendid examples for us." St. Ignatius Martyr writes to the Philadelphians: "The Church of Christ has been spread from the end of the earth to the end." St. Justin Martyr, who flourished around the middle of the second century, testifies that "there is no race of men, whether of barbarians or of Greeks, or even of all others by whatever name they are called, whether those living in wagons or those lacking a house, among whom prayers and thanksgivings are not made to the Father and Creator of all through the name of Jesus Christ crucified." St. Irenaeus, who followed a little later, confirms his testimony; in the catalogue of Churches he enumerates Germany, Gaul, Spain, Egypt, and Libya as illumined by the same light of faith, and with equal agreement of all: just as the whole globe of the earth is illumined by one light of the sun. 5) But before all others Tertullian (died in the year 245) expressed more eloquently this most rapid and universal propagation of Christianity. "We are of yesterday," he says (*Apology*, chapter 37), "and we have filled all your places, cities, islands, forts, municipalities, councils, the camps themselves, tribes, decuries, the palace, the senate, the forum; we have left you only the temples." And (*Against the Jews*, chapter 7): "For in whom else," he says, "have all nations believed, except in Christ, who has already come? For in whom have also the other nations believed: Parthians, Medes, Elamites; and those who inhabit Mesopotamia, Armenia, Phrygia, Cappadocia; and those dwelling in Pontus, Asia, and Pamphylia; those residing in Egypt and those inhabiting the region of Africa which is beyond Cyrene? Romans and inhabitants; then also in Jerusalem Jews, and the

other nations; so that now the varieties of the Gaetulians, and many boundaries of the Moors; all the limits of the Spains, and diverse nations of the Gauls, and places of the Britons inaccessible to Romans, but truly subjected to Christ; and of the Sarmatians, and of the Dacians, and of the Germans, and of the Scythians; and of many hidden nations; and of provinces, and of many islands unknown to us, and which we are less able to enumerate. In all these places the name of Christ, who has already come, reigns; as before Him the gates of all cities have been opened, and for Him none are closed; before Him iron bars have been broken in pieces, and bronze gates have been opened." 6) To these can be added the testimony of pagan writers. Tacitus (*Annals*, book 15, chapter 44), speaking of the times of Nero, says: "An enormous multitude of Christians was found." Seneca, confusing Christians with Jews, says apud St. Augustine (*City of God*, book 6, chapter 11, n. 36): "Meanwhile the custom of that most criminal people has prevailed to such a degree that it has now been received through all lands: the conquered gave laws to the conquerors." Pliny the Younger, proconsul of Asia, wrote to Trajan (book 10, Epistle 97): "The matter seemed to me worthy of consultation, especially on account of the number of those in danger. For many of every age, every rank, and even of both sexes are called into danger, and will be called. Nor only cities, but even villages and fields have been traversed by the contagion of Christian superstition... the temples of the gods are now almost desolated, and the solemn rites have long been interrupted."

307. II. Nor is the matter less evident if we inspect the conservation of the Christian religion: since in the following centuries, even down to our own age, that the Christian religion is universal is a fact so powerful that it needs no demonstration. And indeed this is true not only if, with the Catholic Church, we include all the sects which call themselves Christian, but also if we speak of the Church alone, in which alone there is the true religion of Christ. For even if we stand by the calculation which Hurst exhibits (*Outline History of the Church*), those who profess the Christian religion in the world rise to the enormous number 407,000,000. Of these, according to the calculation which is read in the periodical *Weekly Register* (London, August 14, 1875), 200,339,390 belong to the Catholic Church. In the same place can be seen a comparative table of Catholics and non-Catholics; but this also exists in the periodical collection *La Civilta Cattolica* (June 1865, p. 729 ff.). From it, moreover, is detected the enormous difference which lies between the Catholic Church and all the sects even taken together. But to behold the constant increase of the Catholic Church, it is useful to consult Petri (*L'Orbe Cattolico*, vol. 3, Rome, 1850), who exhibits the Patriarchates, Archbishoprics, Bishoprics, Apostolic Vicariates, and Apostolic Prefectures of the whole Catholic Church dispersed throughout the world, down to the year 1850. But from that time the Church has received new and not small increases, as is known to all (1). (1) It is pleasing here to report the testimony of a celebrated Protestant. Macaulay (*Ranke's History of the Popes*, *Edinburgh Review*, October 1840) writes: "The history of that Church" (the Roman Church) "joins together the two great ages of human civilization. No other institution is left standing which carries the mind back to the times when the smoke of sacrifice rose from the Pantheon, and when camelopards and tigers bounded in the Flavian amphitheatre. The proudest royal houses are but of yesterday when compared with the line of the Supreme Pontiffs... The Papacy remains, not in decay, not a mere antique, but full of life and youthful vigour. The Catholic Church is still sending forth to the furthest ends of the world missionaries as zealous as those who landed in Kent with Augustin; and still confronting hostile kings with the same spirit with which she confronted Attila. The number of her children is greater than in any former age. Her acquisition in the New World has more than compensated for what she has lost in the Old. Her spiritual ascendancy extends over the vast countries which lie between the plains of the Missouri and Cape Horn... The members of her communion are certainly not fewer than a hundred and fifty millions; and it will be difficult to show that all the other Christian sects united amount to a hundred and twenty millions. Nor do we see any sign which indicates that the term of her long dominion is approaching. She saw the commencement of all the governments, and of all the ecclesiastical establishments, that now exist in the world; and we feel no assurance that she is not destined to see the end of them all. She was great and respected before the Saxon had set foot on Britain, before the

Frank had passed the Rhine, when Grecian eloquence still flourished at Antioch, when idols were still worshipped in the temple of Mecca. And she may still exist in undiminished vigour when some traveller from New Zealand shall in the midst of a vast solitude take his stand on a broken arch of London Bridge to sketch the ruins of St. Paul's. "We often hear it said that the world is constantly becoming more and more enlightened, and that this enlightenment must be favourable to Protestantism and unfavourable to Catholicism. We wish that we could think so. But we see great reason to doubt whether this be a well-founded expectation... Nay, we believe that, as far as there has been a change, that change has been in favour of the Church of Rome. We cannot, therefore, feel confident that the progress of knowledge will necessarily be fatal to a system which has, to say the least, stood its ground in spite of the immense progress which knowledge has made since the days of Queen Elizabeth."

308. Before we pursue the remaining things, it is pleasing here to conclude the argument with the most beautiful words of St. Augustine (*On Faith in Things Which Are Not Seen*, chapter 4): "Attend to me," the Church says to you, "attend to me, whom you see even if you are unwilling to see. For those who were faithful in those times in the land of Judaea learned, as present things from His presence, the marvelous birth from a virgin, and the passion, resurrection, and ascension of Christ, and all His divine sayings and deeds. You have not seen these things; for that reason you refuse to believe. Therefore look upon these things, attend to these things, consider these things which you discern, which are not narrated to you as past nor foretold as future, but are demonstrated as present. Does it seem to you empty or light, and do you think it to be no divine miracle or only a small one, that in the name of one crucified man the whole human race runs? You have not seen what was predicted and fulfilled concerning the human birth of Christ: 'Behold, a virgin shall receive in the womb and shall bear a son'; but you see what was predicted and fulfilled in the word of God to Abraham: 'In your seed all nations shall be blessed.' You have not seen what was predicted concerning the wonderful works of Christ: 'Come and see the works of the Lord, what wonders He has placed upon the earth' (Psalm 45); but you see what was predicted: 'The Lord said to me: You are My Son, today I have begotten You. Ask of Me, and I will give You the nations for Your inheritance, and the ends of the earth for Your possession' (Psalm 2). You have not seen what was predicted and fulfilled concerning the passion of Christ: 'They dug my hands and my feet, they numbered all my bones; but they considered and looked upon me; they divided my garments among themselves, and over my garment they cast lots'; but you see what was predicted in the same psalm, and now appears fulfilled: 'All the ends of the earth shall remember and be converted to the Lord, and all the fatherlands of the nations shall adore in His sight, because the kingdom is the Lord's, and He Himself shall rule over the nations' (Psalm 21). You have not seen what was predicted and fulfilled concerning the resurrection of Christ, when the psalm spoke from His person first concerning His betrayer and His persecutors: 'They went forth outside and were speaking together as one: all My enemies whispered against Me; against Me they were thinking evils for Me; they arranged an unjust word against Me.' There, to show that they accomplished nothing by killing Him who was going to rise again, He added and said: 'Surely he who sleeps will add that he may rise?' And a little after, when through the same prophecy He had foretold concerning His own betrayer what is also written in the Gospel: 'He who ate My breads has enlarged his heel over Me,' that is, has trampled Me, He immediately added: 'But You, Lord, have mercy on Me, and raise Me up, and I will repay them' (Psalm 40). This has been fulfilled: Christ slept and awoke, that is, rose again; He who through the same prophecy says in another psalm: 'I slept and took sleep, and I rose again, because the Lord will receive Me.' But you have not seen this; yet you see His Church, concerning which it was likewise said and fulfilled: 'Lord my God, to You the nations will come from the end of the earth and say: truly our fathers worshiped lying images, and there is no usefulness in them.' This certainly, whether you wish or do not wish, you behold; so that if you still think there is, or has been, some usefulness in images, you certainly have heard innumerable peoples of the nations saying, after such vanities have been left behind, cast away, or broken: 'Truly our fathers worshiped lying images, and there is no usefulness in them; if a man shall make gods,' and they themselves are not gods

(Jeremiah 16). You have not seen what was predicted and fulfilled concerning the ascension of Christ: 'Be exalted above the heavens, O God'; but you see what immediately follows: 'And Your glory above all the earth' (Psalm 107). All those things already done and past concerning Christ you have not seen; but you do not deny that you see these present things in His Church. We show both to you as predicted; but we cannot demonstrate both to you as fulfilled things to be seen, because we cannot recall past things into sight." Compare also chapter 8.

309. The third part is proved, 1, from the magnitude of the work. For there is question of a Religion to be propagated throughout the whole world, and of the conversion of all nations. "For when," says Eusebius of Caesarea (*Demonstration of the Gospel*, book 3), "He" (Christ) "had thought of that which no one had ever thought of, to disseminate His own laws and new doctrine into all nations, and to teach the whole human race that piety which would venerate one supreme God, and to show Himself as the teacher of this matter, He thought that, above all, the most rustic and most ignoble men should be used by Him as ministers of this plan... But who would not be astonished, who would not rightly judge incredible that miracle which surpasses all belief? Certainly none of those who ever had any brightness among men, not king, not inventor of laws, not philosopher, not Greek, not barbarian, is narrated to have thought anything of this sort, nor even to have dreamed anything which comes near to this. For each such man always had enough and more than enough, provided only that he fulfilled his institution and proposal in his own region, and could sanction and protect, at least in his own nation, those laws which seemed good and useful. But this our Man, having undertaken nothing mortal or human, consider, I ask, whether again He did not utter His voice as truly God, when He said word for word to those His disciples, so ignoble: Going, teach all nations." And Tertullian, concerning this enormous work already completed (*Against the Jews*, chapter 7), writes: "For who could have reigned over all except Christ, the Son of God? He was announced as going to reign forever over all nations. For if Solomon reigned, his boundaries of kingdom are marked only within the limits of Judaea, from Beersheba to Dan. But if Darius reigned over the Babylonians and Parthians, he did not have power among all nations. If Pharaoh reigned over the Egyptians, or whoever succeeded him in inheritance, there only did he possess dominion of his kingdom. Thus Nebuchadnezzar with his petty kings had the boundaries of his kingdom from India to Ethiopia. Thus Alexander the Macedonian, after he had conquered Asia and the remaining regions, never held all Asia. Thus Germans still are not allowed to cross their own boundaries. The Britons are enclosed within the circuit of their own Ocean. The nation of the Moors and the barbarism of the Gaetulians are besieged by the Romans, lest they exceed the limits of their regions. What shall I say of the Romans, who fortify their empire by the garrisons of their legions and cannot extend the forces of their kingdom beyond those nations? But the kingdom and name of Christ is extended everywhere, is believed everywhere, is worshiped by all the nations enumerated above, reigns everywhere, is adored everywhere, is distributed equally to all everywhere. There is not greater favor of a king with Him, not lesser joy of some barbarian; not merits distinguished by dignities or births. He is equal to all, King to all, Judge to all, God and Lord to all."

310. II. From the intrinsic difficulties of the work. For 1) the principal object of the preaching of the Apostles was "Jesus crucified, to the Jews indeed a scandal, but to the Gentiles foolishness." Everyone knows that the nation of the Jews was despised, and, as is clear from the writings of the ancients, was everywhere exposed and subjected to most frequent mockeries. But no punishment was regarded as more ignominious than the punishment of the cross. For how much horror those who had been subjected to the punishment of the cross caused the Romans can be seen from the fact that Cicero desires this kind of punishment "to be absent from not only the body of Roman citizens, but even from their thought, eyes, and ears," since not only its occurrence and endurance, but even the condition, expectation, and finally the very mention of it, is unworthy of a Roman citizen and a free man (*For Rabirius*, chapter 5). Hence Chrysostom (on the First Epistle to the Corinthians) says: "Let us see whether this doctrine at last was easily persuasive. And yet in this matter unbelievers could have been sufficiently drawn. For what did they profess

in their preachings? That the Crucified One was to be adored, that He was to be held as God, who had been born of a Jewish woman. And who would have believed them, unless divine power had gone before? For all certainly knew that He had been crucified and buried. But that He rose again and ascended to heaven, no one had seen except the Apostles, etc." 2) In its theoretical part the Christian Religion proposes most difficult things to be believed. God must be believed one in essence and three in persons; the Son of God incarnate; original sin must be believed, which infected all men; the resurrection of the flesh must be believed, with several other mysteries which far surpass human grasp and do not seem conformable to proud reason. But who does not know how much the mind of man flees from assenting to those things which it thinks are not only incomprehensible but even opposed to itself? 3) Nor is the difficulty less which the Christian religion contains as to its practical part, which declares war on all desires. Hence St. Augustine (*On True Religion*, chapters 3 ff.) writes: "Not to speak of past things, which anyone can refuse to believe: if today among nations and peoples it is preached: 'In the beginning was the Word... and without Him nothing was made, etc.'; if, in order to perceive and enjoy this, so that the soul may be healed and the edge of the mind may grow strong for drinking in so great a light, it is said to the greedy: 'Do not lay up treasures for yourselves on earth, etc.'; it is said to the luxurious: 'He who sows in the flesh, from the flesh shall reap corruption; he who sows in the spirit, from the spirit shall reap eternal life'; it is said to the proud: 'He who exalts himself shall be humbled, and he who humbles himself shall be exalted'; it is said to the angry: 'You have received a slap; prepare the other cheek'; it is said to the discordant: 'Love your enemies'; it is said to the superstitious: 'The kingdom of God is within you'; it is said to the curious: 'Do not seek the things which are seen, but the things which are not seen. For the things which are seen are temporal, but the things which are not seen are eternal.' Finally it is said to all: 'Do not love the world, nor the things which are in the world; because everything which is in the world is the concupiscence of the flesh, and the concupiscence of the eyes, and the ambition of the age.' "If these things are now read throughout the whole world to peoples and are most willingly heard with veneration; ... if these things are so received that, just as before it was monstrous to dispute such things, so now it is monstrous to dispute against them; ... if so many innumerable persons enter upon this way that, with the riches and honors of this world and every kind of men deserted, the islands once deserted and the solitude of many lands are filled with men able to dedicate their whole life to the one supreme God; if finally through cities and towns, villages and even fields, and private villas, aversion from earthly things and conversion to the one true God is persuaded and sought to such an extent that daily throughout the whole world the human race answers almost with one voice that it has hearts lifted up to the Lord: why do we still yawn?... Let them know God and believe God, through whom these things to be believed have already been persuaded to all peoples."

311. III. From the extrinsic difficulties. For 1) "The inveterate errors of superstition," says Minucius Felix (*Octavius*, n. 22), "we learn both from ignorant parents, and, what is more serious, we elaborate them by studies and disciplines themselves, especially by the songs of poets, who harmed truth itself as much as possible by their authority." But the more an error has grown in, the more tenaciously also do men adhere to it, especially if they have it as an inheritance received from their fathers. Let there be considered the difficulty which we daily experience even in the correction of one corrupt man; and from this let it be gathered how much greater the difficulty had to be in the conversion of so many nations. 2) But to whom was the Christian religion to be preached? First to the Jews, who, knowing the religion of their fathers to have been divinely revealed, and clinging most tenaciously to the external ceremonies prescribed through Moses, could not be driven by human means to give these up. There is added that, from their carnal heart, they had preconceived opinions concerning the Messiah as a most powerful King who would free them from the yoke of the Romans. Therefore they desired and expected this one, and for that reason necessarily recoiled from Christ humble and poor. 3) Then the Christian religion had to be preached to the Gentiles, who especially in Latium and in Greece flourished excellently in arts and sciences; but as regards morals, as the pagan writers themselves narrate, at that time they were very corrupt, given over

to delights and pleasures, and therefore wholly unfit to receive the sublime and holy religion of Christ. We exhibited a specimen of both their intellectual and moral corruption when asserting the necessity of revelation. 4) Moreover, the obstacle which the priests of the Gentiles opposed to the propagation of the Christian religion was very great; for since their authority and sustenance depended on the worship of idols, they tried by whatever means they could to turn the people away from receiving the faith of Christ. A very great obstacle also arose from pagan philosophers; for since their mind was offended by the mysteries and other truths of the Christian religion, and their empty systems were rejected, they attacked the religion of Christ with words and writings. Finally, the greatest opposition came from the Roman Emperors, who, judging the ancient idolatry to be joined with the prosperity of the Empire, and desiring to preserve for themselves the right and honor of the Priesthood, left nothing unattempted in order to overturn the religion of Christ. Hence, with cruelty scarcely credible among men, they stirred up the most atrocious persecutions and devised inhuman torments, which, employed in their very wide dominion, would frighten peoples away from receiving the faith of Christ and impel them to fall away from the faith once received. Behold, by way of example, what Tacitus writes (*Annals*, book 15, section 44): "Therefore, to abolish the rumor, Nero substituted the accused and afflicted with the most sought-out punishments those whom the crowd, hated for crimes, called Christians. The author of that name was Christ, who, while Tiberius was ruling, had been subjected to punishment by the procurator Pontius Pilate. And the deadly superstition, checked for the present, was again breaking out, not only through ## Boundary Completion From PDF Page 255 Judaea, the origin of that evil, but also through the City, to which all atrocious or shameful things flow together from every side and are celebrated. Therefore first those who confessed were seized; then by their information an enormous multitude was convicted, not so much on the charge of arson as from hatred of the human race." (1) Everyone knows that from Christian martyrdom alone a new argument is constructed by the Apologists for proving the divine origin of the Christian religion. And indeed that martyrdom has a twofold force of proving: as a fact which can be explained by no natural cause, and therefore constitutes a miracle in the moral order; and as testimony which cannot exist otherwise than with the truth of the religion which it testifies being supposed. But in order that martyrdom may obtain this twofold force of proving, it must be considered in all its accompanying circumstances. And: 1) The number of martyrs is enormous. Suetonius, Pliny, and Tacitus (in the place cited above) assert that in the persecution of Nero alone "an enormous multitude" perished. Concerning the persecution of Decius, Dionysius of Alexandria writes (apud Eusebius, book 7, chapter 11): "But it is superfluous to recount our" (martyrs) "by name, since they are also very many, etc." Concerning the persecution of Diocletian, Lactantius writes (*On the Death of the Persecutors*, chapter 16): "Therefore the whole earth was harassed, and except for Gaul, from East to West three most bitter beasts were raging." Compare Ruinart (*Acts of the Martyrs*). 2) The torments were atrocious. Hence the churches of Vienne and Lyons (apud Eusebius, book 5, chapter 1) wrote: "And indeed the very gravity of the hardships, and the fury and rage of the Gentiles against the saints, and what and how great things the blessed martyrs suffered, neither can we express by speaking, nor can anyone accurately comprehend by writing. For with the whole force of his powers the adversary rushed upon us." But that the same must be said concerning others is established from history (compare, for example, Lactantius, *Divine Institutes*, book 5, chapter 11). 3) Sometimes the struggle against flesh and blood was more atrocious. "The eyes of their own people weeping," says St. Augustine (*Enarration on Psalm 47*, n. 12), "had greater violence than the persecutions of those attacking. For how many did children hold back, lest they suffer? At the knees of how many did wives roll themselves, lest they be left widows?" etc. 4) The martyrs were of every condition. Hence St. Dionysius of Alexandria (apud Eusebius, book 7, chapter 11) says: "It is fitting that you know this one thing in general: that men and women, young men and old men, girls and aged women, soldiers and private persons, finally from every kind and age of men, some by blows of scourges, some by the edge of the sword, others by fires, having overcome in the contest, carried off crowns." 5) They sustained torments constantly and cheerfully. Hence Lactantius (book 5, chapter 13) says that they endured lacerations "with patience inspired"; and he adds: "Behold, the weak sex and fragile age suffers itself to be torn through the whole body and burned, not

by necessity, because they could avoid it if they wished, but by will, because they trust in God." And Tertullian (*Apology*, chapter 1, n. 6): "If he is denounced, he glories; if he is dragged, he does not resist; if he is accused, he does not defend himself; when interrogated, he confesses; when condemned, he gives thanks." Indeed, with many examples of virtues, with great wisdom in their answers, they showed perfect tranquility of soul. 6) Let the fruit of martyrdom be considered. Tertullian, addressing the magistrates of the Roman empire (*Apology*, chapter 50, n. 176), says: "Crucify us, torture us, condemn us, grind us down; for your injustice is the proof of our innocence... Yet no cruelty of yours, however more refined, profits anything... We become more numerous as often as we are mown down by you: the blood of Christians is seed." "For," Lactantius observes (book 5, chapter 13), "when the crowd sees men torn apart, and sees them maintain unconquered patience among the wearied executioners, they judge, as the matter is, that neither the agreement of so many nor the perseverance of the dying is vain, nor that patience itself can overcome such torments without God." When these things have therefore been weighed, it appears evidently: 1) that no human cause is equal to explaining Christian martyrdom. Hence already in the second century the Church of Smyrna, in the Epistle concerning the martyrdom of its holy Bishop Polycarp, wrote: "Who would not admire their" (the martyrs') "strength and endurance and charity toward the Lord? They were so lacerated by scourges that the structure of the body could be seen even to the innermost veins and arteries; nevertheless they endured, so that even those who were present pitied and wept. But they themselves had come to such fortitude that none of them either groaned or sighed, showing to all that the martyrs of Christ, at the time when they were being tortured, had been pilgrims from the flesh, or rather that the Lord stood by them and was conversing with them." 2) That unless because of the truth of religion, the martyrs could not have exhibited such testimony to it. Hence St. Jerome (Epistle 120 to Hedibia, chapter 10) concludes: "When someone has seen martyrs standing and being tortured with such perseverance, and glorying in those who torture them, the silent thought arises that unless the Gospel were true, it would never be defended by blood. For confession is not delicate, eager for riches, and secure; but in prisons, in blows, in persecutions, in hunger, in nakedness and thirst. This is the triumph of God." Compare, concerning this argument, the splendid dissertation of Fr. Hurter, S.J. (*Selected Opuscula of the Holy Fathers*, vol. 4). 5) Add to all these things the heretics of all ages, who fought bitterly against the Church of Christ from which they had defected; the schismatics, who, having undertaken to tear apart Christian unity, tried to render it weak and infirm against external enemies; the Mohammedans, for whom it is holy and meritorious to kill Christians; unbelievers and secret societies, which have tried to shake the very foundations of the Christian religion; the very sons, proud, unruly, rebellious, who turned arms against their mother; and see whether by human industry and power the Church could have overcome and conquered all these things.

312. IV. From means naturally weak. For 1) only a few disciples of Christ undertook so great a work; and they were so disposed that they could more easily turn peoples away from themselves than gain them for Christ. For they were rough, unlettered, hateful to all Jews. "Truly the things which are foolish," the Apostle already wrote (1 Corinthians 1.27-28), "God chose, that He might confound the wise; and God chose the weak things, that He might confound the strong; and the ignoble and contemptible things of the world God chose, and the things which are not, that He might destroy the things which are." Hence St. Ambrose says (on Luke, book 5, n. 44): "Observe the heavenly counsel: Christ chose not some wise men, not rich men, not noble men, but fishermen and publicans whom He would direct, lest He should seem to have drawn some to His grace by prudence, or to have bought them by riches, or to have drawn them by the authority of power and nobility, so that the reason of truth, not the charm of disputation, might prevail." And Eusebius of Caesarea (*Demonstration of the Gospel*, book 3), after reporting the words of Christ to the disciples, "Going, teach all nations," adds: "What if the disciples, as happens, had answered their teacher and had said: In what way at last will this be able to be done by us? How, for example, shall we publicly teach the Romans? But how shall we address the Egyptians? In what language, we who are accustomed to hear one Syriac tongue, shall we speak among the Greeks? In what among the Persians?

Armenians? Chaldaeans? Scythians? Indians? And finally all the barbarous nations whatsoever which we shall encounter? How shall we preach to them that they should abandon their paternal gods, but worship the one God, maker of all things whatsoever? Moreover, relying on what force of speaking shall we undertake so great a deed? But what hope of accomplishing it will be present to men who dare to set up laws contrary to whatever laws all nations have observed concerning their paternal gods from the beginning of the world? By what resources at last, or by what power, will it be permitted to us to survive that boldness? Lest the disciples of Jesus should say these things, as it is credible they would have said, or even think them, the teacher Himself freed them from every difficulty by adding one word, when He said that they would attain their desire in His name. For He did not command them simply or indefinitely to teach all nations, but with a necessary addition: in My name, He says." 2) And with what arms were the Apostles to fight? "The arms of our warfare," says Paul, "are spiritual, not carnal." Hence St. John Chrysostom (homily 23, otherwise 24) writes: "In order that they" (the disciples) "may learn that this is a new law of warring and an unheard-of manner of battle, since He sends them naked, clothed with one tunic, without shoes, without staff, without belt or purse, and commands them to be fed by those receiving them, He does not make an end here of speaking; but showing His ineffable power, He says: Going thus, show the meekness of sheep, even if you are going against wolves, and not only against wolves, but even in the midst of wolves. Nor does He command them only to have the meekness of sheep, but also the simplicity of a dove. Thus especially will I show My strength, when sheep conquer wolves, even if they are in the midst of wolves and are torn by innumerable bites; and not only are not destroyed, but even convert the wolves, which is much more wonderful and greater than if they killed them, namely if they change their will and transform their soul; and these things when they were only twelve, and the whole world was full of wolves." See also the things which, on this matter, we indicated from St. Augustine in the treatise *On the Virtues* (n. 771). 3) And while the Apostles required all arduous things, and the very sacrifice of life, they promised only future rewards, which indeed are accustomed to attract little. "This very thing therefore," says St. John Chrysostom (on the Epistle to the Corinthians), "besides those things which have been said, shows especially that there is no deceit in our dignity. For all difficult things are promised in this life, but useful things after the resurrection. This very thing therefore, for I shall say it again, plainly shows our dogma to be divine. And why did none of the believers say: I will not come near, nor will I suffer; you threaten difficult things in this life, but promise useful things after the resurrection? Whence is it established that the resurrection is going to be? Who after finishing life ever returned? Who after being buried rose again? Which of them said that any reward would be future after the passage from this life? But although they knew nothing of this sort, nevertheless they laid down life for the Crucified One. Therefore this was even of the greatest power: that concerning matters so great, which they had never before heard, all competitively gave faith, and could be persuaded actually to undergo the greatest calamities, while awaiting rewards for the future. For if they had wished to use deceptions, they would rather have done the opposite. Rewards would indeed have been promised here, but those terrible things would have been kept silent. For deceivers and flatterers act in this way, proposing nothing rough, nothing troublesome, nothing grave, but the contrary; but this is deceit."

313. V. From the outcome itself, which is already clear from the testimonies adduced for proving the second part of this proposition. Yet so that the force of the argument may become more clearly known, let it be noted: 1) that the effect of apostolic preaching, far from being on the surface, rather intimately pervaded the human race, and renewed not only the individual man, but the whole human society; so that the cultivators of this doctrine held as delights those things from which they formerly recoiled, and truly utterly detested those things in which they formerly delighted. Hence St. Augustine (*On the Morals of the Church*, chapter 33), addressing religion, says: "You exercise and teach boys boyishly, young men strongly, old men quietly, according as each one's age is, not only of the body but also of the soul. You subject women to their husbands with chaste and faithful obedience, not for fulfilling lust, but for propagating offspring and for the fellowship of family affairs. You place husbands over wives, not for

mocking the weaker sex, but by the laws of sincere love. You join children to parents by a certain free servitude; you place parents over children by a pious dominion. You bind brothers to brothers by the bond of religion, stronger than that of blood. You bind every nearness of family and necessity of affinity, with the bonds of nature and will preserved, by mutual charity. You teach slaves to adhere to masters, not so much by necessity of condition as by delight in duty. You make masters placable toward slaves by consideration of the supreme God, the common master, and more inclined to consult for them than to coerce them. You join citizens to citizens, nations to nations, and altogether men to men, by remembrance of the first parents, not only by society, but also by a certain fraternity. You teach kings to look out for peoples; you warn peoples to subject themselves to kings... showing how, both not all things are owed to all, and charity is owed to all, and injury to no one." And St. Justin (*Apology* I, n. 14): "We who once rejoiced in debaucheries now embrace chastity alone; we who also used magical arts have consecrated ourselves to the good and unbegotten God; we who had the ways of money and possessions before all things now even bring into common what we have, and communicate with all who are in need; we who fought with mutual hatreds and slaughters, and did not have a common forum with those who were not of our tribe on account of different institutions, now, after Christ appeared, live together and pray for enemies." Hence also Tertullian (*Apology*, chapter 44, n. 148) confidently appeals to the judicial records of the Roman empire, saying: "We now call as witnesses your records, you who preside daily over prisons to be judged... your prison always boils with your people; your mines always sigh with your people; your beasts are always fattened with your people; your providers of games always feed their flocks of criminals with your people. No Christian is there, except for this alone," that is, not on account of any other crime than the Christian profession. And the same Tertullian (*To the Nations*, book 1, chapter 1) reports the admiration of the Gentiles if at any time they heard that some Christian was fraudulent, harsh, and so forth. But there is no need to multiply the testimonies of the Apologists. Pliny Secundus himself, proconsul of Bithynia, wrote to Trajan (book 10, epistle 97): "But they" [the Christians] "affirmed that this had been the sum of their fault or error: that they had been accustomed on a fixed day before light to assemble, and to say a hymn among themselves by turns to Christ as to God, and to bind themselves by oath not to any crime, but that they would not commit thefts, robberies, or adulteries; that they would not break faith; that, when called upon, they would not deny a deposit." And Julian the Apostate speaks thus concerning Christians (apud Sozomen, book 5, chapter 26): "What is the cause why we do not rather turn our eyes to those things by which the religion of Christians grew, that is, to kindness toward strangers, to the care placed by them in burying the dead, and to the sanctity which they simulate? It is certainly not shameful, since no one among the Jews begs, and the impious Galileans feed not only their own, but ours also." 2) But the Apostles persuaded Christian doctrine not only to the uneducated, but to men flourishing in learning, nobility, and wealth. We listed several above; to them we can add Polycarp, Ignatius, Irenaeus, Justin, Clement, Ammonius, Origen, Aristides, Apollinaris, Athenagoras, Quadratus, Apollonius, and so forth, to omit later persons. We add Glabrio, who had held office under Trajan; Flavius Clement, a man of consular rank, cousin of Domitian; and his wife Flavia Domitilla, born from the blood of Augustus; finally those whom Tertullian recounts from the palace, forum, and senate, and those of every order whom Pliny enumerates. Fittingly Jerome (*Preface in the Catalogue of Ecclesiastical Writers*) says: "Let Celsus, Porphyry, and Julian, raging dogs against Christ, learn; let their followers learn" (who think that the Church had no philosophers and no eloquent teachers) "how many and what sort of men founded and built her; and let them cease to accuse our faith of only rustic simplicity. Did not there already exist a public school in the city of Alexandria, established from the first centuries of the Church, in which most learned men, Ammonius, Pantaenus, Clement of Alexandria, Origen, etc., flourished, and to which even the pagans themselves flowed in crowds?" And he adds the testimony of Eusebius. And St. John Chrysostom objected to himself: "But those believing were slaves, women, nurses, midwives, eunuchs." But he responds: "Indeed, the Church was not confirmed for us by these alone, and this is plainly established for all. But if you contend that it was confirmed by these, this makes their preaching especially wonderful: that the dogmas which neither Plato nor the Platonists were able openly to understand, fishermen, suddenly, the most unlearned kind

of all men, were able to persuade others to receive. For if they had persuaded only the wiser, it would not have been so greatly wonderful. But from the fact that they drew slaves, nurses, eunuchs to so great a philosophy that they made them rivals of angels, it furnished the greatest argument of divine inspiration. For if they had commanded vile and abject things, perhaps not without reason that persuasion could have been referred as an argument for abject preaching. But if they philosophized about great and profound things, things almost exceeding human nature, and things which needed a penetrating mind, then the more foolish you show those who were persuaded, the wiser and fuller of divine grace you show those who persuaded them." 3) But the fruit of apostolic preaching of this sort is not momentary, but perennial. In order that this observation may unfold its whole force, a comparison must be made between this work of God and any excellent human works. For what did the most outstanding philosophers in all antiquity accomplish, who directed all their powers to the reform of the human race? What did the almost innumerable sects which arose from Christian profession accomplish, many of which were furnished with so great an abundance of human means that they seemed destined to endure perpetually? Weigh the dissolution of the Protestant sects and the sterility of their missions, although they abound in human means, riches, learning, and power. They themselves, such as Bucer (*On the Kingdom of Christ*, Basel, 1551), both assign human causes of their first propagation and complain concerning the sad fruits of the Reformation. Hence Erasmus (*Letter to Vulturius Neocomus*) wrote confidently: "Look around at that evangelical people and observe whether less indulgence is given there to luxury, lust, and money than is done by those whom you detest. Show me whom that Gospel has rendered from a reveler sober, from a fierce man gentle, from a grasping man liberal, from a reviler one who blesses, from an unchaste man modest. I will show you many who have been made worse than themselves, etc." Hence the things which Tertullian writes (*On Prescription*, chapter 17) fit very well also the present-day missions of the Innovators: "Since this is their business, not to convert pagans, but to overthrow ours, they seek this glory more, if they work ruin for those standing, not if they work elevation for those lying down; because even their work itself does not come from their own proper building, but from the destruction of truth. They undermine ours, in order to build their own." Compare Perrone (part 2, proposition 10). Therefore St. John Chrysostom rightly exclaims (oration delivered after the capture of Eutropius, n. 1): "Nothing is equal to the Church. Do not mention to me walls and arms; for walls are worn away, but the Church never grows old. Barbarians demolish walls; but not even demons conquer the Church. That these are not boasting words, the facts themselves testify. How many have attacked the Church and themselves perished? But the Church has transcended the heavens. Such is the greatness of the Church: it conquers when attacked; when sought by snares, it overcomes; when affected with insults, it becomes more splendid; it receives wounds, and does not fall by ulcers; it is shaken by waves and is not sunk; attacked by storms, it does not suffer shipwreck; it wrestles and is not thrown down; it contends in boxing and is not conquered."

314. Wherefore let it be permitted to conclude this argument with the most eloquent words of St. John Chrysostom himself. "If a Gentile says," he writes (*That Christ Is God*, chapters 1 and 17), "Whence is it manifest that Christ is God?... We shall not seek the demonstration from heaven, nor from other things of this kind. For if I say to him: He created heaven, and likewise earth or sea, he will not bear this; if I say: He raised the dead, cured the blind, drove away demons, he will not admit this either; if I say: He promised a Kingdom and hidden goods, if I speak of the resurrection, he will not only not receive this, but will even laugh. Whence therefore, especially if he is uneducated, shall we instruct him? Whence, I say, unless from those things which are admitted by me and him, and cannot be called into doubt? What therefore are those things which the Gentile himself confesses that He did and cannot deny? That He Himself founded the race of Christians; for he will not deny this, that He established churches throughout the whole world. From this we shall draw an argument of His power, and we shall show that He is truly God. We shall say that it is not the work of a mere man to pervade the whole world, land and sea, in so brief a time and to call men to things so great, especially when men were accustomed to such absurd morals and entangled in so many evils. And nevertheless He was able to free the human race from all these things, not only Romans, but

Persians and every race of barbarians. Moreover He did these things not by using arms, not by expenses, with no armies, with no battles joined, but at the beginning through eleven men, ignoble, lowly, ignorant, uneducated, poor, naked, unarmed, lacking shoes, covered with one tunic. What do I say, He did? He was able to persuade so many nations of men that they should philosophize not only about present things, but also about future things, and that they should tear up their ancestral laws, utterly remove old customs rooted for so long a time, and substitute others which would lead them from accustomed and easy things to the more difficult precepts of Him... Why do you not reckon this with yourself: Unless He were God, and a strong God, how did His worshipers, vexed and agitated, grow so, while those who crucified Him were so cast down that they fell from their whole commonwealth and wander around as vagabonds, strays, fugitives; and although so long a time has passed, neither of these things has been changed?"

315. SCHOLION. I. Wegscheider shows that he does not grasp the force of the aforesaid argument (part 1, chapter 2, section 51, n. 1), where he wrote: "Nor can the favorable propagation and conservation of the Church be referred among the documents of truth and divine origin, because the same happened also to the Islamic religion." St. Thomas had already discussed the difference between the propagation of Mohammedanism and of Christianity (*Against the Gentiles*, book 1, chapter 6), saying: "Not by the violence of arms, not by the promise of pleasures, and, what is most wonderful, amid the tyranny of persecutors, an innumerable crowd not only of simple persons but also of the wisest men flew together to the Christian faith; in which things exceeding every human intellect are preached, the pleasures of the flesh are restrained, and all things which are in the world are taught to be held in contempt. For mortal souls to assent to these things is both the greatest miracle and a manifest work of divine inspiration, so that, visible things having been despised, invisible things alone are desired. But that this was not done suddenly or by chance is manifest from the fact that God foretold through many oracles of the prophets long before that He would do this... But this so wonderful conversion of the world to the Christian faith is a most certain indication of the signs that went before, so that it is not necessary for them to be repeated further, since they appear evidently in their effect. But it would be more wonderful than all signs if the world had been led by simple and ignoble men, without wonderful signs, to believe things so arduous, to perform things so difficult, and to hope for things so high; although God does not cease even in our times to work miracles through the saints for the confirmation of faith. But those who introduced erroneous sects proceeded by the contrary way, as is clear in Mohammed, who enticed peoples by promises of carnal pleasures, to the desire for which carnal concupiscence incites. He also handed down precepts conformable to the promises, relaxing the reins to carnal pleasure, in which things it is easy for carnal men to obey. He also did not bring documents of truth except those things which can easily be known by natural ability by anyone moderately wise; indeed rather, the true things which he taught he mixed with many fables and most false doctrines. He also did not employ signs supernaturally done, by which alone testimony suited to divine inspiration is given, when a visible operation which cannot be except divine shows that the teacher of truth is invisibly inspired; but he said that he had been sent in the power of arms, signs which are also not lacking to robbers and tyrants. Nor did any wise men, exercised in divine matters and in divine and human matters, believe him from the beginning, but beastly men dwelling in deserts, utterly ignorant of every divine doctrine, through whose multitude he compelled others by the violence of arms into his law." These indeed are all the things which it is necessary to observe here; but if anyone wishes to unfold the same things at greater length, compare Hoocke (in the Appendix, chapter 3), and Bergier (article *Mahometisme*).

316. II. Gibbon (*History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*) opposed several things to the same argument, which, to one rightly weighing the things which we have said, are altogether nothing. Thus, for example, he attributes the most rapid universal propagation of the Christian religion: 1) to the conjunction of so many peoples under the one authority of the Roman empire. But this broad dominion of the Roman empire, which happened by favor of divine providence, did indeed effect that the way lay more easily open for the Apostles to various provinces of one and the same empire; but the

difficulty was not therefore less of preaching and persuading a doctrine filled with mysteries and grave precepts, especially since for three centuries the emperors themselves not only adhered tenaciously to the ancient error, but also terribly persecuted the new religion. 2) He attributes the same thing to the community of goods and mutual charity conspicuous among the first Christians, by which provision was made for the necessary support of the poor. But the community of goods and mutual charity was conspicuous after the propagation had been made, or in Christian churches already founded, but could by no means serve the first propagation. And from another side, if that could attract the poor, it naturally ought to have frightened away the rich; but with these absent, how could the poor flatter themselves concerning the necessary support? 3) Likewise, others attribute the conservation of the Catholic Church to the principle of authority. But we say that we by no means deny that the social constitution which the Church had from the Lord Himself, its author, is splendid; but that the conservation of the Catholic Church can in no way be explained from the prevailing principle of authority by itself alone as a natural cause. For: a) in order that the principle of authority, for its part, may be able to concur in conserving the Christian religion, or the Church of Christ, it must already be supposed to have been received and deeply placed in the souls of the faithful. But can it happen that, without a power altogether divine, men in great number, from all conditions, diverse in country, character, and education, adhere with humble faith and constant obedience to that same principle, proposing and commanding the most difficult things? Especially when the attacks of the adversaries are directed against that very authority, without the gates of hell ever being able to prevail? b) The danger of the Church's ruin, as is clear from history, especially that of the first three centuries, did not consist only in the dissolution of the social bond; but often persecutions were directed toward the complete destruction of the Church. Thus, unless God had come to the aid of His Church in a singular manner, the blood of martyrs would not have become the seed of Christians, but would have utterly extinguished the Church itself. In these and other similar matters the means which divine providence used for helping the propagation and conservation of the Church are confused with the cause which is equal to producing this wonderful effect. Compare, if you wish, Spedalieri (*Against Gibbon*, section 6, part 1, and especially chapter 3).

317. But after the things which we have heard disputed so splendidly by the Fathers, it is wearisome to report these things. It is more pleasing to recall the judgment of Gamaliel, when the Apostles were being commanded not to preach Jesus and His doctrine. "But one arose" (Acts 5.34-35, 38-39) "in the council, a Pharisee named Gamaliel, a doctor of the law honorable to all the people, and ordered the men to be put outside for a short time; and he said to them: Men of Israel, take heed to yourselves concerning these men, what you are about to do... And now therefore I say to you: withdraw from these men, and let them alone, because if this counsel or work is from men, it will be dissolved; but if it is from God, you will not be able to dissolve it, lest perhaps you be found even to fight against God. And they consented to him."

Article 5. Whether Christian revelation is contained only in written books, or also in unwritten traditions

318. Once the existence and divine origin of Christian revelation have been demonstrated, the question spontaneously arises: "where is it found?" This question would be satisfied more fully if we inquired into the medium instituted by Christ for propagating, conserving, and proposing His doctrine as truly credible. But we carried out this investigation according to our powers when treating of the rule of faith (*On the Infused Virtues*, disputation 4, article 1 ff.); and therefore here we inquire only generally into the sources from which Christian doctrine can be drawn. Indeed, not all sources of this sort must be treated here; since we completed the dogmatic questions pertaining to the written word of God in the same treatise *On the Infused Virtues* (same place). Therefore here only this is asked: "whether, besides the written word of God, oral traditions must be admitted."

319. But it is useful first to present the genuine concept of tradition and to define the true state of the question. And: 1) The name of tradition, according to a certain very broad acceptation, signifies any doctrine or institution received from the elders and transmitted to posterity, whether by writing, or by voice, or by practice. In this sense it is said (Exodus 17.14): "Write this for a memorial in a book, and hand it down to the ears of Joshua"; and the Apostle says (2 Thessalonians 2.14): "Hold the traditions which you have learned, whether by word or by our epistle." But tradition of this sort can be considered objectively, and it is the very doctrine which is transmitted or communicated to posterity; actively, and it is the complex of acts and means by which it is communicated; comprehensively, and it is the transmitted object together with the means by which it was transmitted. Comprehensively, as is clear, tradition must be taken in order that its full concept may be had. 2) In a less broad sense, tradition means any doctrine or institution transmitted from the elders to us as if from ear to ear, or without writing. In this sense Tertullian wrote (*On the Crown*, chapter 4): "If you demand the law of the Scriptures for these disciplines, you will find none: tradition is set before you as author, custom as confirmer, and faith as observer." Yet thus far tradition abstracts from sacred and profane, true and false, pious and impious, and so forth. 3) Taken in the strict and theological sense, tradition is a doctrine or institution pertaining to religion, or to faith and morals, transmitted not by writing but by living voice, as if from ear to ear, and coming down even to us. The object of tradition accepted in this way is sacred, true, pious; and concerning it we are treating here.

320. But the division of this tradition is manifold. For: 1) By reason of object, tradition is divided into dogmatic and moral. The first presents unwritten doctrine either to be believed properly by divine faith, as is, for example, the divinity of the whole of Sacred Scripture which the Catholic Church uses, the fourfold number of the Gospels, etc.; or necessarily connected with the doctrine of faith, or even revealed, but not yet sufficiently proposed to be explicitly believed by divine faith. The other presents unwritten doctrine pertaining to forming the morals of the Church; and this either is properly of morals, insofar as it precisely contains good to be done or evil to be avoided; or is of discipline, insofar as it contains those things which regard the external governance of the Church and of the faithful, as is, for example, public penance; or is of rites, insofar as it contains those things which pertain to the external worship of God, as are, for example, the rubrics to be observed in the sacrifice of the altar. 2) By reason of subject, one tradition is universal, another particular. The first regards the universal Church, or all the faithful everywhere, as is, for example, the authenticity of the four Gospels, the celebration of Easter, the Lenten fast, etc.; the other regards only one or a few particular Churches. Such was, for example, the fast which was observed at Rome on the day of Saturday, and concerning which St. Ambrose, as St. Augustine reports (to Januarius, epistle 118), used to say: "When I come to Rome, I fast on Saturday; when I am here" [at Milan], "I do not fast." 3) By reason of duration, tradition is divided into perpetual and temporary. The first is said to be that which was instituted from the beginning so that it would always endure in the Church, without being able to be changed by any authority; such are, for example, the things which pertain to the matter and form of the Sacraments, the precept concerning water to be mixed with the chalice, concerning which St. Cyprian wrote (book 2, epistle 3): "But know that we have been admonished that, in offering the chalice of the Lord, the Lord's tradition be observed, and that nothing else be done by us than what the Lord first did for us, so that the chalice which is offered in commemoration of Him be offered mixed with wine." The other is said to be that which either was instituted so that it would endure for a certain time, or is of such a nature that it can be changed by the Church; such, for example, was the tradition concerning abstinence from things strangled, concerning baptism by triple immersion, concerning the communion of the faithful under both species, etc. 4) By reason of obligation, necessary and free tradition are distinguished. Necessary is said to be that which, instituted by way of precept, must be observed; such are, for example, first of all dogmatic traditions, the observance of some greater feasts, the time of celebrating Easter, etc. Free is that which indeed is commended or proposed to the faithful by way of counsel, but is left to their judgment, insofar as it has not been instituted by way of precept; such is, for example, the use of the sign of the cross, of holy water, etc.

321. But the principal division of tradition, which ought especially to be of use in the present controversy, is into divine, apostolic, and ecclesiastical. This division is taken on the part of the author; hence that tradition is called divine which has God as author, and therefore is doctrine or an institution divinely revealed and transmitted from elders to posterity from mouth to mouth. That tradition is called apostolic which has the Apostles as authors and comes down even to us by a similar means. Finally, ecclesiastical tradition has the Church as author after the times of the Apostles. But divine tradition is subdivided into dominical and apostolic; or apostolic is subdivided into simply apostolic and apostolic-divine. The Council of Trent furnishes the foundation for this division (session 4), saying that "all saving truth and discipline is contained in written books and unwritten traditions, which, received by the Apostles from the mouth of Christ Himself, or from the Apostles with the Holy Spirit dictating, as if handed down by hands, have come down even to us." Dominical is the tradition which was proposed by the mouth of Christ Himself; apostolic is that which the Apostles received from the Holy Spirit and of which they themselves were the first heralds (compare *On the Infused Virtues*, n. 486 ff.). Likewise, simply apostolic tradition is that which first emanated from the Apostles, who proposed it not in the name of God, but in their own name; namely, as rulers and pastors of the Church, but not as heralds of divine utterance. Of this sort is the institution of Lent, the observance of the Lord's day in place of the Sabbath, the Symbol which is called that of the Apostles, etc. But divine-apostolic tradition is that which the Apostles first proposed, but in the name of God Himself, and therefore as His heralds; this tradition therefore is truly divine. Yet it must be noted that apostolic and ecclesiastical traditions are sometimes called divine by the Fathers, either because they were received by authority divinely accepted, or because they were instituted with the Holy Spirit assisting; and conversely, divine traditions are sometimes called apostolic or ecclesiastical because the Apostles and the Church promulgated them and transmitted them to us. Compare Bellarmine (*On the Word of God*, book 4, chapter 2).

322. Moreover, equal force is in dominical and divine-apostolic traditions, since they are equally divine and are distinguished only by reason of the first visible herald; and therefore it is not necessary always to be able to discern them. But so far are Catholics from attributing the same force to divine traditions and to simply apostolic or ecclesiastical traditions, as the Innovators calumniously charge, that they assign rules accurately for discerning them. Certainly: 1) That some tradition is merely ecclesiastical can be established from the later epoch in which it was instituted; from the document from which it has its origin, and which can be assigned; etc. But if it is doubtful whether it is ecclesiastical or apostolic, the rule handed down by St. Augustine must especially be employed (*Against the Donatists*, book 1, chapter 24): "What the universal Church holds, and which was not instituted by councils but always retained, is most rightly believed to have been handed down by no authority except apostolic." 2) But in order that it be discerned whether it is simply apostolic or divine: a) the very matter of the tradition must be inspected. For if it is a doctrine which the universal Church holds as a dogma of faith, and yet it is not contained in the Scriptures, it is to be referred to divine tradition; for neither can the universal Church err in these things, nor is divine faith possible in an object not divinely revealed. Such is, for example, the perpetual virginity of the Blessed Virgin Mary. If the institution is such that it altogether requires divine power, and yet is not found in the Scriptures, it must be referred to divine tradition; examples are had in the matters and forms of the Sacraments, in sacramental confession to be put before eucharistic reception, etc. b) It must be inspected by whom and how some doctrine or institution is proposed. For if most of the Fathers and Doctors of the Church so propose something that they condemn the contrary as heretical, with the rest not contradicting; if an ecumenical Council, etc., teaches something in the same way, that certainly pertains to divine tradition. Of this sort, for example, is the tradition concerning the veneration of holy images. If a doctrine or institution is guarded as divine in a Church certainly apostolic, it is most rightly judged divine; you have an example in the deuterocanonical books, in the baptism of heretics, etc. If the Church by her practice shows that she cannot change some institution, or dispense in it, it is rightly judged divine. c) But the supreme and safest rule is the

judgment of the Church; this is sufficiently established from the things disputed elsewhere concerning the office of the Church in the matter of faith, and it will be confirmed from the things to be said concerning the infallible magisterium of the Church. Compare Bellarmine (same place, chapter 9).

323. These things having been laid down concerning the nature and divisions of tradition, it must be known that the question between us and the Innovators here properly turns around divine traditions, whether dominical or divine-apostolic; around dogmatic traditions, or traditions of faith, and moral traditions, or traditions of morals; around unwritten traditions. But traditions of this sort are called unwritten so that this source of Christian revelation may here be distinguished from Sacred Scripture. Wherefore all writing is not excluded (for traditions can be found, for example, in the writings of the Fathers); but divinely inspired writing is excluded. "But unwritten doctrine," says Bellarmine (*On the Word of God*, book 4, chapter 2), "is called not that which is written nowhere, but that which is not written by the first author" [herald]. "Let the baptism of infants be an example. That little children are to be baptized is called an unwritten apostolic tradition, because this is not found written in any apostolic book, although it is written in the books of almost all the ancient Fathers."

324. Now the Innovators do not deny that divine traditions, if they exist, have the same authority as the Scriptures; but from the principle established by them, that Scripture contains the whole Word of God and therefore is the sole rule of faith, they first denied the existence and necessity of any divine tradition. It is read in the *Formula of Concord* (p. 570): "We believe that the only rule and norm according to which all dogmas and all teachers ought to be estimated and judged is absolutely no other than the prophetic and apostolic Scripture of both the Old and New Testament." And in the *Second Helvetic Confession*, chapter 2: "We sustain no other judge in the cause of faith than God Himself pronouncing through Sacred Scripture what is true, what is false, what is to be followed or what is to be avoided." And in article 6 of the Anglican Church: "Sacred Scripture contains all things necessary for salvation, so that whatever is not read there, nor can be proved by it, ought not to be required of anyone to be believed as an article of faith, or to be judged necessary for salvation." Compare Bellarmine (the cited book, chapter 3).

325. But later certain men softened this doctrine. For they introduced the distinction of tradition into inhesive and declarative. They called inhesive tradition that which exhibits altogether the same dogmas which are found in the Scriptures; of this sort, for example, they said is the doctrine concerning Christ's Resurrection, which the Scriptures and the common sense of the faithful equally report. But they called declarative that tradition which has more expressly the doctrine which the Scriptures teach more briefly or less clearly. They thought of this sort the doctrine concerning the Eucharist not being necessary for little children, which restricts the words of Christ, "Unless you shall eat, etc." (John 6), to adults alone. They acknowledged each of these traditions; but they always denied traditions exhibiting doctrine by no means contained in the Scriptures. Hence they attributed no force to tradition as distinct from Scripture, which they retained as the sole rule of faith. Compare Shuttleworth (*Not Tradition, but Scripture*).

326. The Council of Trent declared the Catholic antithesis (session 4), teaching that "saving truth and discipline of morals" are contained "in written books and unwritten traditions, which, received by the Apostles from the mouth of Christ Himself, or from the Apostles themselves, with the Holy Spirit dictating, as if handed down by hands, have come down even to us." It adds that the Holy Synod "receives and venerates, with equal affection of piety and reverence," the Scriptures, "and also those traditions themselves pertaining both to faith and to morals, as having been dictated either orally by Christ or by the Holy Spirit, and conserved in the Catholic Church by continuous succession." It concludes: "But if anyone knowingly and deliberately contemns the aforesaid traditions, let him be anathema." Indeed the Holy Synod declares that it will use both Scriptures and traditions "in confirming dogmas and restoring morals in the Church"; and it decrees "that no one dare interpret Sacred Scripture itself against that sense which Holy Mother Church has held and holds, whose office it is to judge concerning the true sense and interpretation of

the Holy Scriptures, or even against the unanimous consent of the Fathers." Compare the Vatican Council (*Dei Filius*, chapter 2).

327. From these documents it is clear: 1) that two sources of divine revelation are admitted, plainly distinct as to the mode by which it is communicated and transmitted, namely Sacred Scripture and oral tradition; and that equal force is asserted for this latter, even apart from Scripture. 2) That not only inhesive or declarative traditions are admitted, but also traditions by no means contained in the written word of God. The Innovators especially denied these, and therefore the Council asserted the same. Nor did the Fathers of the Council, asserting the twofold foundation of faith, Scripture and tradition, not know that several things are held in the Church which rest upon tradition alone. But if Theologians sometimes undertake to show truths of this sort also in the Scriptures, this is because they are intimated from the Scriptures, not because they are demonstrated apodictically. Indeed, as we shall see, there are some which the Scriptures do not even intimate. 3) Wherefore tradition is necessary not only for establishing truths contained in Scripture, but also for having the whole deposit of revelation. But if sometimes all truths of faith and morals are said to be exhibited in the Scriptures, this must be understood insofar as some are immediately exhibited in the Scriptures, but others only mediately, or through tradition, which the Scriptures themselves proclaim must be admitted.

328. Therefore, these things having been noted beforehand: Section II. The Proposed Question Is Solved. PROPOSITION XV. Christian revelation is contained not only in written books, 1. but also in unwritten traditions, which, received by the Apostles from the mouth of Christ Himself, or from the Apostles themselves with the Holy Spirit dictating, as if handed down by hands, have come down even to us. 2. Indeed, so great is the breadth of Christian tradition that it both exhibits dogmas contained in the Scriptures, and exists as the sole source of several others. Therefore tradition, when the order of comprehension is considered, extends more widely than Scripture.

329. The first part is proved. I. From the economy instituted by Christ. 1) Certainly Christ the Lord announced His doctrine by living voice, nor did He leave anything written. He imposed upon the Apostles the duty that they should teach, preach, and be witnesses; but nowhere is it read that the duty of writing was imposed as an apostolic duty. Hence not all the Apostles wrote, although all rightly discharged their duty. But He wished the imposed apostolic duty to be exercised everywhere on earth, among all nations, even to the consummation of the age; therefore the duty of teaching, preaching, and testifying, from Christ's institution, must be perpetual. But just as Christ, once His divine mission had been proved, required faith, so also He wished that faith be given to the preaching of the Apostles, so that those who did not believe would be condemned. All these things are established historically from the Gospels. 2) Nor can it be said that this economy would endure only until the Scripture of the New Testament, and therefore ceased with the Apostles. For there stands against this: a) the very perpetuity of the instituted apostolic ministry. b) "If Christ and the Apostles," says Bellarmine (same place, chapter 4), "had proposed to limit and restrict the word of God to Scripture, first Christ would openly have commanded a matter of such great moment" [the sole means of propagating His doctrine], "and the Apostles somewhere would testify that they wrote from the mandate of the Lord, just as from the mandate of the Lord they taught in the whole world; but we read this nowhere. Then, the Apostles did not wait for an offered occasion or necessity to preach by living voice, but went forth voluntarily and from their own institution; but they applied their mind to writing only when compelled by a certain necessity." 3) But the argument increases if we recall in mind that Christ willed universality and unity of faith, which certainly cannot be obtained by the help of Scriptures alone, with tradition excluded. Especially since the Scriptures themselves are so constituted that they are often obscure and excite questions, they necessarily require another medium by which the doctrine contained in them may be rightly understood, communicated to all, and be one and the same among all. But that medium is tradition. "When the Church," writes St. Irenaeus (*Against Heresies*, book 1, chapter 10, n. 2),

"has received this preaching and this faith, as we have said before, although scattered throughout the whole world, she diligently guards it as if inhabiting one house; and she believes these things similarly, namely as if having one soul and one heart, and constantly preaches and teaches and hands down these things as if possessing one mouth. For although languages in the world are dissimilar, nevertheless the power of tradition is one and the same." 4) Therefore, just as in the time of the preaching of Christ and the Apostles Christian doctrine was drawn from oral tradition, so also after the Scriptures of the New Testament have been completed, full force remains at the same time in oral tradition as a source of Christian revelation. We have scarcely sketched here this argument, plainly distinguished in the present controversy, because we unfolded it according to all its parts in the treatise *On the Infused Virtues* (disputation 4, articles 2, 3, 5).

330. II. From the ancient, perennial, unanimous persuasion and profession of the prevailing Christian society. This argument has manifold force. For, first, what the doctrine and constitution of some society is cannot be known better than from the society itself; just as we learn from the very societies themselves the constitution and laws by which any empire, kingdom, or commonwealth is ruled. Secondly, if in the first centuries themselves of Christian society tradition was admitted unanimously and publicly, we cannot deny it unless by asserting that that society immediately fell away from its own institution, and consequently that Christ was not a prudent architect, since He would have built His house not upon rock but upon sand (Matthew 7.24). Thirdly, who could persuade himself that the medium for propagating Christian doctrine was better known in the sixteenth century by the Innovators than it was known by the Fathers in the first times of the Church? To this point belong the words of Tertullian (*On Prescription*, chapter 28): "Come now, let all have erred; let the Apostle also have been deceived in bearing witness; let the Holy Spirit have had regard to no Church, so as to lead it into truth, though sent for this by Christ and asked for this from the Father, that He might be the teacher of truth; let the steward of God, the vicar of Christ, have neglected His office, allowing the churches meanwhile to understand otherwise and believe otherwise than what He Himself was preaching through the Apostles. Is it at all likely that so many and such great churches should have erred into one faith?... In whatever manner the error occurred, certainly error reigned for so long as heresies did not exist. Was the truth waiting to be freed by some Marcionites and Valentinians? Meanwhile the Gospel was being wrongly preached, it was being wrongly believed, etc." Fourthly, finally, the force of the argument is greatest, once the infallibility of the Church has been supposed, which we shall demonstrate in its own place. Now: 1) The Fathers establish certain general principles which suppose or construct tradition. For a) institutions which cannot be proved from the Scriptures they call Tradition, Apostolic Tradition, Dominical Tradition: thus Tertullian (*On the Crown*, chapter 4), St. Cyprian (Letter 63, to Caecilius), St. Augustine (*On Baptism*, book 2, chapter 7, and book 5, chapter 23). b) They distinguish the Scriptures from traditions by reason of the mode in which doctrine is to be propagated: thus St. Irenaeus (book 3, chapter 4), Tertullian (*On the Crown*, chapter 3), Vincent of Lerins (*Commonitorium*, n. 32). c) They join tradition and Scriptures together, as two sources of Christian revelation: thus St. Irenaeus (book 3, chapter 5, n. 1), Tertullian (*On Prescription*, chapter 19), St. Basil (*On the Holy Spirit*, chapter 27), St. John Chrysostom (on 2 Thessalonians, homily 4, n. 2). d) They teach that the doctrine of Christ is to be drawn from the apostolic churches: thus Tertullian (*On Prescription*, chapter 21). e) They exhort us to learn the faith from the successors of the Apostles: thus St. Irenaeus (book 4, chapter 26, nn. 2, 5). f) They establish that ecclesiastical preaching is the norm according to which revealed doctrine is to be judged: thus Origen (*On Principles*, preface, n. 2), Athanasius (Letter to Epictetus, n. 3), Vincent of Lerins (*Commonitorium*, chapters 29, 31). 2) I. The Fathers expressly affirm, as it were theoretically, that traditions are to be admitted. Thus in the first century St. Ignatius (in Eusebius, *Ecclesiastical History*, book 3, chapter 36) exhorted the faithful "to beware for themselves of the depraved opinions of heretics... and he exhorted them to cling tenaciously to the traditions of the Apostles." Hegesippus (ibid., book 4, chapter 22) comprised the apostolic traditions in five books. St. Polycarp (ibid., book 4, chapter 14) reported words which Christ had uttered and which he himself had heard from the Apostles concerning His virtues and doctrine. Papias (ibid., book 4) and

Dionysius (*Ecclesiastical Hierarchy*, chapter 1) may be added. II. St. Irenaeus (*Against Heresies*, book 3) reproves the craftiness of the Valentinians and Gnostics, who, while they were pressed by the Scriptures, had recourse to traditions, and conversely returned to the Scriptures while they were constrained by traditions. On this occasion (chapter 3) he writes: "Therefore the tradition of the Apostles, manifested in the whole world, is present in every Church for all who wish to see rightly to behold." Then (chapter 4) he adds: "To this ordering many nations of barbarians assent, who believe Christ, having salvation written without paper and ink by the Holy Spirit in their hearts, and diligently guarding the ancient tradition." Whence (chapter 5) he concludes: "Therefore, since the tradition which is from the Apostles so stands in the Church and remains among us, let us return to the demonstration which is from the Scriptures." Tertullian, as all know, discusses many things concerning this matter. We shall report what he has (*On Prescription*, chapter 37): "If these things so stand, that truth is adjudged to us, whoever we are who walk in that rule which the Church handed down from the Apostles, the Apostles from Christ, Christ from God, the reason of our proposition is established, defining that heretics must not be admitted to entering upon an appeal concerning the Scriptures, whom without the Scriptures we prove not to belong to the Scriptures." III. Besides Tertullian, who could also be referred to this century, we have Clement of Alexandria, who could be referred to the preceding one. He writes (*Stromata*, book 7, chapter 16): "They are held by the desire for glory who voluntarily elude, by other arguments, those things which agree with the divinely inspired words, handed down from the blessed Apostles and teachers, resisting by human doctrines the divine tradition, so that they may establish heresy." Origen (*On Principles*, book 2, n. 2): "Since there are many who think that they understand the things that are Christ's, and some of them think things diverse from those before them, while the ecclesiastical preaching handed down from the Apostles through the order of succession and remaining in the churches down to the present is preserved, that truth alone is to be believed which in nothing disagrees from ecclesiastical and apostolic tradition." St. Cyprian (Letter 63) and Serapion (in Eusebius, *Ecclesiastical History*, book 6, chapter 12) proclaim the same. IV. We have Eusebius of Caesarea, St. Epiphanius, St. Basil, St. John Chrysostom, Cyril of Jerusalem, St. Gregory Nazianzen, whose testimonies, and very many others, Bellarmine reports (*On the Word of God*, book 4, chapter 7). V. St. Jerome (*Dialogue against the Luciferians*, chapter 4): "Even if the authority of Scripture did not lie beneath it, the consent of the whole world on this side would obtain the force of a precept. For also many other things which are observed through tradition in the Churches have usurped for themselves the authority of written law." St. Augustine (Letter 118, to Januarius): "But those things which we guard not as written but as handed down, which indeed are observed throughout the whole world, are given to be understood as retained either as commended and established by the Apostles themselves, or by plenary Councils, whose authority is most salutary in the Church." Compare the Walenburgs (*On Testimonies or Traditions*, chapter 6). 3) The Fathers practically assert the same doctrine, constantly opposing to rising heresies not only the Scriptures, but also tradition. First of all it should be noted that, just as the prevailing Christian society constantly adhered to traditions, so heretics, separating themselves from that society, rejected traditions; this is surely a very grave presumption against the Innovators of the sixteenth century. Certainly St. Clement of Rome opposed tradition to the rebellious Corinthians (First Letter to the Corinthians); St. Irenaeus opposed the same to the Valentinians (book 3, chapter 3, n. 2); by the same means Tertullian refuted Marcion, who mutilated the Scriptures (*On the Flesh of Christ*, chapter 2); with the aid of tradition Serapion rejected the Gospel of Peter (in Eusebius, *Ecclesiastical History*, book 6, chapter 12); St. Cyprian objected tradition to schismatics (*On the Unity of the Church*), Pacian to the Novatians (*Against the Novatians*, letter 3); St. Athanasius, disputing with the Arians, Nazianzen with the Apollinarians (to Cledonius, letter 2), Nyssen with the Eunomians, St. Basil with the Pneumatomachi (*On the Holy Spirit*, chapters 9, 25, 27), Cyril with the Nestorians (*Defense against the Orientals*, anathema 8), Optatus with the Donatists (*Against Parmenian*), St. Augustine with the Pelagians (*Against Julian*), Nicephorus with the Iconoclasts (*Shorter Apology for the Holy Images*, n. 2), had recourse to tradition. Wherefore Canus rightly writes (*On Theological Places*, book 3, chapter 6): "Since all the saints confidently objected unwritten traditions to the adversaries of the Catholic faith, and by their force, just as if

they had been written, each overthrew the heresies of his own time, certainly with no lesser efficacy shall we be able through traditions of this sort to refute and overthrow whatever dogmas of heretics, whether they now exist or even shall exist in the future." 4) The Fathers draw the same doctrine from the Scriptures themselves. For a) the Apostle writes (1 Corinthians 11.2): "I praise you, brothers, because in all things you are mindful of me, and as I delivered to you, you hold my precepts." On this place St. Basil (*On the Holy Spirit*, chapter 29) says: "I judge it to be apostolic to persevere also in unwritten traditions. 'I praise you,' says [the Apostle], 'because you remember all my things, and as I delivered to you, you hold the traditions.'" St. John Chrysostom, Theophylact, St. Epiphanius (heresy 61), and St. John Damascene (book 4, chapter 17) teach the same concerning this place. b) The Apostle himself writes (2 Thessalonians 2.15): "Therefore, brothers, stand, and hold the traditions which you have learned, whether by word or by our epistle." On this place St. John Chrysostom says: "Hence it is plain that they did not hand down all things by epistles, but many things also without letters. But the former and the latter alike are worthy of the same faith." And Oecumenius and Theophylact use the same words; Damascene (book 4, chapter 17) agrees with them, saying: "That the Apostles handed down very many things without writing, Paul writes: Therefore, brothers, stand, and hold the traditions which you have been taught, whether by word or by epistle." c) The same Apostle writes (1 Timothy 6.20): "O Timothy, guard the deposit, avoiding the profane novelties of words and the oppositions of knowledge falsely so called"; and (2 Timothy 1.13-14): "Have the form of sound words which you have heard from me in faith and in love in Christ Jesus. Guard the good deposit through the Holy Spirit who dwells in us"; and (2 Timothy 2.1-2): "You therefore, my son, be strengthened in the grace which is in Christ Jesus. And the things which you have heard from me through many witnesses, entrust these to faithful men, who will be fit to teach others." These words, sufficiently clear in themselves, St. John Chrysostom and Theophylact explain in such a way that they comprehend not Scripture alone, but the understanding of dogmas, the sense of the Scriptures, other dogmas also, or the whole treasury of doctrine which the Apostle wished to be propagated through tradition. And St. Irenaeus alludes to these things (book 3, chapter 4), writing: "The Apostles most fully deposited in the Church, as into a rich depository, all things which belong to truth"; and (book 4, chapter 43): "It is necessary to obey the Presbyters of the Church, who have succession from the Apostles, who with the succession of the Episcopate have received the certain charism of truth, according to the good pleasure of the Father." Compare Bellarmine (same place, chapter 5). 5) Finally, Christian society professed the same doctrine in Synods. St. Athanasius (*On the Decrees of Nicaea*) says: "Therefore with this understanding the Fathers who assembled at Nicaea wished to use those words [homoousion]. But that they did not fashion these terms from themselves, as the adversaries object, but received them long ago from others, let us now declare in the present matter." When he has supplied this, he adds: "Behold, we demonstrate that a sentence of this sort was handed down from Fathers to Fathers as if by hands. But you are new Jews and disciples of Caiaphas, etc." The Council of Chalcedon (Act 2): "This is the faith of the Fathers; all the Apostles so taught; so we believe; anathema to him who does not so believe." The Fifth General Council concludes its definitions thus: "Since therefore we have rightly confessed these things, which have been handed down to us both from the divine Scriptures and from the doctrine of the holy Fathers, and from those things which were defined concerning one and the same faith by the aforesaid four Councils, etc." The Seventh General Council, in the definition of faith, says: "Walking the royal road and standing upon the doctrine of our holy and divine Fathers, and observing the tradition of the Catholic Church, in which the Holy Spirit dwells, we define, etc." To these may be added the Synod of Ariminum and Seleucia (Letter of St. Anastasius on the Synods of Ariminum and Seleucia, nn. 3-5), the Synod of Sardica (Letter to Julius the Roman Pontiff, letter to the Church of Alexandria, and to all the churches), the First Council of Constantinople (in Theodoret, *Ecclesiastical History*, book 5, chapter 9), the Synod of Ephesus (in Vincent of Lerins, *Commonitorium*, penultimate chapter). From these things it is manifest that the Councils of Trent and the Vatican innovated nothing by declaring oral tradition to be a source of revelation, but confirmed the ancient doctrine of the Church.

331. III. From analogy and induction. Certainly, 1) men were led to salvation before the written law by traditions alone. Hence it is said (Genesis 18.19): "For I know that Abraham will command his sons and his household after him, that they may keep the way of the Lord and do judgment and justice"; and (Job 8.8-10): "Ask the former generation, and diligently search the memory of the fathers; and they themselves will teach you, they will speak to you, and from their heart they will bring forth sayings." 2) After the written law also, traditions had force. Thus it is read (Psalm 77.5 ff.): "What great things He commanded our fathers to make known to their sons, that another generation might know them, the sons who will be born, and they will arise and tell them to their sons"; and (Sirach 8.11 ff.): "Let not the narration of the elders pass you by; for they themselves learned from their fathers; because from them you will learn understanding, and in the time of necessity to give an answer." 3) The same economy was in force in the first promulgation of the Gospel, as we have seen and as all acknowledge. 4) All human commonwealths have unwritten laws, or customs. Pericles, for example, in Thucydides, divides the law of Athens into written and unwritten; Aristotle (book 3 of the *Politics*, chapter 11) establishes that the city is to be ruled not by written laws alone, and (chapter 4) calls judgment living law, to indicate that besides it there exists written law, which is as it were dead. To these may be added what Plutarch reports concerning the Lacedaemonians; what Tullius has (*On Laws*, book 1); what Caesar writes concerning the wise men of the Gauls (*Gallic War*, book 6); and finally what is read in the Civil Law (*l. diuturna*, Digest, *On Laws*) and in Canon Law (distinction 1, canon *Consuetudo*), where the same force is attributed to written law and to unwritten custom. 5) Must this not be admitted for a stronger reason in the Church of Christ, in which the charism of infallibility is the guardian of immovable tradition? Compare the treatise *On the Infused Virtues* (n. 706 ff. and 979). Hence it is not wonderful if several of the more distinguished Protestants have at last proclaimed the existence and necessity of tradition; Benedictus Bachinius reports their testimonies at length (in *Polemical Letters*, tome 1, letter 2, section 12).

332. The second part is proved. I. Since it has already been established that divine traditions exist, if they are to be restricted to those things alone which are contained in the Scriptures, so that they exhibit nothing to be believed besides that which is in the Scriptures, this certainly must be demonstrated. But this can in no way be demonstrated; indeed, the contrary is easily demonstrated. Therefore. The minor is proved. And: 1) From the nature of the thing it cannot be demonstrated that all things to be believed by divine faith are contained in the Scriptures. For from the nature of the thing, in the present matter, only that is necessary which is required for believing by faith the revealed word of God. But for this it is not necessary that the revealed word be written. For a) for this it is only necessary that the revealed word be sufficiently proposed as prudently credible and to be believed by divine faith. But this, as is plain of itself and as we demonstrated in the treatise *On the Infused Virtues* (n. 700 ff., 934 ff.), can be obtained without the Scripture of revelation. b) Before the Scriptures existed, there was divine faith in the world; before the Scriptures of the New Testament existed, there was faith concerning those things which were proper to Christian revelation; therefore divine faith is possible without the Scriptures. 2) Nor is it shown from the ordinary providence of God that tradition does not extend more widely than the Scriptures. For a) all with whom the matter is here being conducted admit that from the origin of the human race there existed a revelation concerning God the Creator and Sanctifier; concerning the future life; concerning good and evil angels; and especially concerning the future restorer (compare *On the Infused Virtues*, n. 493 ff.). But these things were known through tradition, not through Scripture. Revelation was renewed and increased in the Patriarchs; yet we saw in the preceding part of the thesis that it had to be transmitted to sons by fathers without Scripture, for indeed there was no written word of God at all until Moses. b) In the written law, many things were possessed through tradition alone. For first, Suarez says (*On Laws*, book 9, chapter 6, n. 21): "The law taken properly did not promise eternal rewards... and nevertheless it is also most true that men placed under the law had the promise of eternal life and of spiritual goods, and faith in them... The Jews did not have this promise from the law, but from the Fathers, so to speak, certainly through their tradition; for

from the beginning of the Church it was made to faithful men, and in them faith in it remained through tradition, and in Abraham it was renewed and made more express ... Thus therefore it came to the Israelite people." Bellarmine adds (same place, chapter 4): "In the time of the Old Testament, without doubt women no less than men had some remedy by which they would be cleansed from original sin, and yet circumcision was instituted for males according to the opinion of many; but what there was for women, Scripture nowhere has. Then, in the same time, it is in no way credible that there was no remedy for males dying before the eighth day, on which alone they could be circumcised; and yet nothing stands forth concerning this matter in Scripture. Thirdly, many Gentiles could be saved, and were saved, in the time of the Old Testament, and truly belonged to the Church... and yet there is absolutely nothing in Scripture concerning their justification from original sin and other sins." c) The Christian Church in its beginning believed all things which Christ and the Apostles preached; therefore it believed several things which were not yet written until the death of the Apostles. Concerning this time not even Protestants raise any question. 3) Therefore, if, once the Scriptures of the New Testament had been completed, nothing outside them was any longer to be believed from tradition alone, this certainly would have happened outside ordinary providence. But an event of this sort cannot be admitted unless it is demonstrated. But again, whence is this proved? Is it from the very fact that the word of God was written? But a) could God not institute a twofold medium of transmitting revelation, Scripture and oral Tradition? b) Certainly in preceding times Scriptures existed, and yet several things by no means written were an object of faith. c) If the Scriptures without tradition were sufficient, this would have to be understood either of individual books, or of some books, or of the whole canon of the Scriptures. "It cannot be said," says Bellarmine (same place), "that individual books are sufficient; for then what Chemnitz says would be false, that the use of tradition was in the Church until the completion of the whole canon of the Scriptures. Besides, we see that the Evangelists do not each contain all things [which, exactly, would anyone designate?]... They themselves openly say that the whole canon is necessary for this, that sufficient doctrine may be had. But neither can this truly be affirmed. For many books truly sacred and canonical have perished; therefore we do not have... sufficient doctrine, if it is wholly situated in the Scriptures." Finally, Scripture does not suffice for determining the whole canon with certainty. 4) Therefore it remains that the Innovators prove their assumption from the Scriptures. For the positive will of God, establishing something beyond the course of ordinary providence, cannot really be established except from revelation. But revelation, according to the Innovators, is not had from tradition; if they consulted tradition, it would be against them, as we shall immediately see. Therefore they could prove their assumption only from the Scriptures. But: a) the Scriptures already cited, especially according to the interpretation of the Fathers, teach the contrary. b) The testimonies which the adversaries bring forward by no means establish the matter, as will be clear in the solution of the objections. Therefore.

333. II. Christian society, or the Church, has theoretically and practically always proclaimed the principle that there are some revealed truths, to be believed and believed in fact, which are not written. In reality, 1) explicit testimonies on this matter are present. Eusebius, after saying that Christ inscribed His doctrine in the minds of men, adds (*Demonstration of the Gospel*, book 1, chapter 8): "His disciples... committed things to be observed partly by letters, partly without letters, as by a certain unwritten law." St. Epiphanius (Heresy 71): "There is also need of tradition. For not all things can be sought from the Scriptures. Therefore the most holy Apostles left some things written, others by tradition, which very thing Paul affirms thus: as I delivered to you." St. Basil (*On the Holy Spirit*, chapter 27, n. 66): "Of the dogmas preserved in the Church, some indeed we have from doctrine handed down in writing; but others, handed down to us in mystery, we received from apostolic tradition. Both of these have the same force for piety." St. Augustine (Letter 54, to Januarius): "But those things which we guard not as written but as handed down, which indeed are observed throughout the whole world, are given to be understood as retained, commended and established either by the Apostles themselves..." To this point belong several things which we gave above, and other testimonies may be seen in Bellarmine (cited chapter 7). Whence the Seventh Council (Act

7) has: "East and west and north and south, by the inspiration of the Holy Spirit, we consent into one... receiving all things whatsoever the Holy Catholic Church received of old, written and unwritten." The Eighth Council (Act 10, canon 1): "If anyone makes ecclesiastical tradition, whether written or unwritten, void, let him be anathema." 2) In establishing several dogmas, the Fathers confess that they are had only from tradition. And a) regarding the canon of the Holy Scriptures, the matter is plain from its very demonstration, which all hand down to a man (compare *On the Infused Virtues*, n. 915 ff.). Hence Serapion (in Eusebius, *Ecclesiastical History*, book 6, chapter 12), considering the Gospel of Marcion thrust upon him, says: "We receive both Peter and the rest of the Apostles just as Christ Himself; but the writings which falsely bear their name inscribed upon them, these we reject as knowledgeable and experienced men, since we have ascertained that we by no means received them from our elders." And Origen (ibid., chapter 25): "As I received by tradition concerning the four Gospels, which alone are admitted without controversy in the whole Church of God." b) In the same way they establish the baptism of little children. "The Church," says Origen (on chapter 6 of the Letter to the Romans), "received by tradition from the Apostles the practice of giving baptism even to little children." And St. Augustine (*On the Literal Meaning of Genesis*, book 10, chapter 25): "The custom of Mother Church in baptizing little children is in no way to be spurned, nor in any way to be reckoned superfluous, nor to be believed at all unless it were an apostolic tradition." c) So also they establish the value of baptism conferred by heretics. "If they do not have baptism," says St. Augustine (*On Baptism*, book 5, chapter 23), "who think depraved things concerning God, that this can happen also within has already been sufficiently discussed. But the Apostles indeed prescribed nothing concerning this [in the Scriptures]; yet that custom which was objected to Cyprian must be believed to have taken its beginning from their tradition, just as there are many things which the universal Church holds, and on this account are rightly believed to have been prescribed by the Apostles, although they are not found written." And (*On the Unity of the Church*, chapter 19): "Here perhaps you say: read to me how Christ ordered those to be received who wish to pass from heretics to the Church. This, openly and evidently, neither do I read nor do you... Since this is nowhere read, the testimony of the Church must be believed, which Christ testified to be truthful." d) Tertullian (*On the Crown*, chapters 3-4) enumerates several things, pertaining either to faith and morals or to discipline; and then concludes: "If you demand the law of the Scriptures for these and other disciplines of this sort, you will find none. Tradition is set before you as author." St. Basil also enumerates several things (*On the Holy Spirit*, chapters 27-29). Compare Becanus (*Manual of Controversies*, book 1, chapter 2).

334. III. We can use the testimony of the adversaries themselves. For... 1. They admit several dogmas together with us which cannot be proved from the Scriptures. Certainly: a) those who have not yet slipped down into rationalism acknowledge the divinity of Scripture; but this, like the canon, is had only from tradition. Hence Brentius (in the Prolegomena) admits this one tradition; and Chemnitz (*Examination of the Council of Trent*, session 4) says: "This tradition, by which the books of Sacred Scripture are put into our hand, we have reverently received." b) They admit the baptism of little children; but Chemnitz himself says (in 5. gen.): "Origen and Augustine affirm that the baptism of little children is an Apostolic Tradition. This we receive." The Anabaptists were asking the other Protestants to demonstrate from the Scriptures that baptism was to be conferred on infants. Since they could not accomplish this, Luther replied that infants by a miracle elicit an act of faith, and therefore no one is an infant with respect to receiving baptism. But where is this miracle read in the Scriptures? Hence Krummacher, preacher of the King of Prussia (in the year 1855), confessed: "It is wholly admitted that infant baptism cannot be demonstrated from Scripture." c) Likewise they acknowledge the value of baptism conferred by heretics; that the day following the sabbath is to be celebrated; that sometimes an oath is lawful; that abstinence from blood and from what has been strangled is not necessary; and so forth, all of which are not had from the Scriptures. 2) They believe many things against the faith of the Catholic Church; these certainly are not contained in the Scriptures. Thus, for example, they admit a distinction between fundamental and

non-fundamental articles. Let them prove this from the Scriptures, and from them define which articles are fundamental (compare *On the Infused Virtues*, n. 358 ff.). They admit that faith alone, or trust that God does not regard sins, justifies. Let them prove this from the Scriptures. Certainly Luther, in order to accomplish this, corrupted the Scriptures, and especially inserted the particle "alone" ("by faith alone") into the text of the Apostle (Romans 3.28); he rejected the epistle of St. James, which expressly hands down the contrary dogma, as by no means evangelical, not apostolic, and truly straw-like (compare Bayle, Dictionary, article Luther, note O. P.). Compare Becanus (work and place cited). Section III. The Principal Objections Are Answered.

335. It is useful to reply to at least the principal objections, so that especially from the solution of those which the adversaries bring forward from the Scriptures, it may be evident that they in no way prove their doctrine from the Scriptures. The testimonies, however, which they object are reduced to three classes: 1) the Scriptures teach that nothing is to be added to the word of God; 2) they expressly teach that the Scriptures are sufficient; 3) they openly condemn traditions. And with regard to the first class:

336. They object 1) the words of Deuteronomy (4.2): "You shall not add to the word which I speak to you, nor shall you take away from it." 2) Likewise the words (12.32): "What I command you, this only shall you do; neither shall you add anything nor diminish." 3) Finally the words of the Apocalypse (22.18-19): "If anyone shall add to these things, God shall add upon him the plagues; and if anyone shall take away, God shall take away his part from the book of life." The reply is: The first and second testimonies are not to the point. For first, the matter concerns a word which is handed down by living voice ("which I speak," "which I command"); but even passing over this, the sense cannot be that it is not permitted to add new precepts. Otherwise it would not have been permitted to add evangelical precepts either. Therefore the sense of the first testimony is that the Mosaic precepts had to be kept integrally and perfectly, just as they had been commanded, without corruption or false interpretation. Becanus rightly concludes (work and place cited, n. 47) that "the testimony of Deuteronomy has nothing to do with the matter, unless [the adversaries] wish to argue thus: The Jews had to keep the Mosaic precepts perfectly and integrally. Therefore Christians must not admit Apostolic Traditions, but must be content with Scripture alone. This consequence surely is absurd and ridiculous, as all see. Yet that the matter may become clearer, I ask the adversaries whether they think this testimony pertains to Jews alone, or also to Christians? If it pertains to Jews alone, why is it brought forward against Christians? Or why do Lutherans and Calvinists wish that we be obliged to observe it? If it also pertains to Christians, why do the adversaries not keep the Mosaic precepts? Why do they not circumcise themselves? etc." But the true sense of the second testimony, as is clear from the context, is: "When you come into the land of Palestine, toward which you are tending, and offer sacrifice to the Lord your God, for this is the precept under discussion here, you will not imitate the Gentiles, but will offer only this which I command you." With regard to the objected testimony from the Apocalypse, first it can be noted that it condemns Lutherans, who not only diminish from the words of this prophecy, but reject the whole book. Certainly it does not prohibit anything else besides the Apocalypse from being admitted; otherwise the Gospel of St. John himself, together with his epistles, would have to be rejected. Therefore the sense is that that prophecy is not to be depraved, neither by addition, namely by appending something as a part of it, nor by diminution, namely by taking away something which belongs to it.

337. They especially object the words of the Apostle (Galatians 1.8): "Even if we, or an angel from heaven, should preach to you besides what we have preached to you, let him be anathema." Therefore, they say, besides the Gospel, traditions must not be admitted. The reply is: 1) The Apostle teaches that nothing is to be preached besides what the Apostles had preached; but from what has been demonstrated, the Apostles did not preach all things in writing, but partly in writing, partly by living voice. Therefore. Certainly after the Epistle to the Galatians, St. John wrote the Apocalypse and his Gospel. Are these also

excluded by the Apostle? 2) The word "besides" in the objected passage signifies "against"; and therefore the Apostle forbids dogmas and precepts contrary to those which the Apostles were announcing to be proposed. Moreover the particle "besides" often among Latin writers has the force of "against"; hence something is said to be beside, that is, against hope, custom, law, dignity. The particle *para* among the Greeks often has the same force; you have examples in Acts 18.13, Romans 1.26, 4.18, 11.24. Hence also the Arabic and Ethiopic version reads: "If we or an Angel from heaven should announce to you anything different." This very thing is manifest from the context; for it is read (verse 6): "I marvel that you are so quickly being transferred from Him who called you into the grace of Christ, into another Gospel." Hence St. Augustine (Tractate 98 on John) says: "Therefore let the admonition of the Apostle not recede from your hearts: if anyone has preached besides what you have received, etc. He did not say, more than you have received; for if he had said that, he would have prejudiced himself, because he desired to come to the Thessalonians, that he might supply what was lacking to their faith... But he who supplies what was lacking adds; he does not remove what was present. But he who goes beyond the rule of faith does not advance on the way, but withdraws from the way." St. Ambrose and St. Jerome agree (on this place), as also St. John Chrysostom and Oecumenius. But if Theophylact observes that the Apostle did not say "if they preach contrary things," this is in order to teach that not only those are anathematized who openly teach things contrary to the whole doctrine, but also those who even obliquely undermine anything from the handed-down doctrine. In reality St. John Chrysostom (homily 1 on Galatians), whose words Theophylact is accustomed either to recite or to report in summary, says: "Nor did he say, if they should announce contrary things, or should overturn the whole Gospel; but if they should preach even a little besides what you have received, even if they should undermine anything whatever, let him be anathema." "Contrary," therefore, is used for what totally destroys.

338. With regard to the second class, they object 1) the words of John (20.30-31): "Jesus indeed did many other signs which are not written in this book; but these are written, that you may believe that Jesus is the Son of God, and that believing you may have life in His name." Therefore, they say, the things which are not written, or traditions, are not required for eternal life. 2) The words of the Apostle (2 Timothy 3.16-17): "All Scripture divinely inspired is useful for teaching, for arguing, for correcting, for instructing in justice, that the man of God may be perfect, furnished for every good work." Therefore, they say, traditions are superfluous. The reply to the first is: 1) St. John is speaking not about the whole of Scripture, but about his Gospel, as is evident from the objected words. Therefore, if the interpretation of the adversaries were true, not only traditions, but all the remaining sacred books, besides the Gospel of St. John, would have to be rejected. 2) St. John speaks not about doctrine, but about the miracles of Christ; and he says that those miracles which he wrote in his Gospel suffice for persuading the world that Christ is the Son of God. This indeed is one of those things which are required in order that we may obtain eternal life, but not the whole. For, believing that Christ is the Son of God, we must believe all things which He taught, and fulfill all things which He commanded. But all these things, as is clear from the demonstration given, are contained in the word of God, both written and orally handed down. To the second: 1) It is at least very probable that the Apostle is speaking of the Scriptures of the Old Testament alone, since he is speaking of the sacred letters which Timothy knew from infancy, as is said in the same place. Therefore not only traditions would be superfluous, but also the Scriptures of the New Testament. 2) The praise which Paul attributes to all Scripture, in the judgment of all who know Latin, must be attributed to the individual books of Sacred Scripture. Therefore, according to the interpretation of the adversaries, once one book is assumed, the others would be superfluous. 3) When the Apostle wrote the Second Letter to Timothy, the writings of St. John did not yet exist, and perhaps neither the Second Letter of Peter, nor the letters of James and Jude. Therefore, in the opinion of the adversaries, all these writings together with traditions would have to be rejected. 4) The Apostle teaches that Scripture is useful, so that the man of God may be perfect; and the adversaries infer: "therefore traditions are superfluous." But the Apostle says (2 Timothy 4.11): "Take Mark, and bring him with you; for he is useful to me for the ministry." Therefore it would have to be concluded that Timothy,

Titus, Onesimus, etc., are superfluous. 5) And so the Apostle does not say that Scripture alone suffices for teaching, arguing, etc.; but that it is profitable for all these things and is a great aid, which we readily concede, without the exclusion of traditions following from it.

339. With regard to the third class, they object that passage of Isaiah (29.13): "In vain do they worship Me, teaching the commandments and doctrines of men"; and Matthew 15.6: "You have made void the commandment of God because of your tradition"; and Galatians 1.14: "Being a zealot for the traditions of my fathers"; and Colossians 2.8: "See lest anyone deceive you through philosophy and empty deceit, according to the tradition of men"; and 1 Peter 1.18: "You were redeemed from your vain manner of life of paternal tradition," etc. Hence, they say, just as the traditions which the Jews boasted they had received from Moses and the Prophets are reproved, so the traditions which we say we have received from Christ through the Apostles must be reproved. The reply is: as is clear from the objected testimonies themselves, traditions which the Jews received from Moses and the Prophets are not reproved; but either traditions received from certain more recent men, some of which were empty, others pernicious and contrary to Scripture (St. Jerome, Letter to Algasia, question 10, reports the authors of these traditions); or Jewish traditions now useless in the Christian law; or the institutions and corruptions of Gentile philosophers. But what does this have in common with true traditions, which have God as their author? Compare Bellarmine (*On the Word of God*, book 4, chapter 10).

340. They object several things from the Fathers. Thus, they say, according to Origen (homily 1 on Jeremiah), "our meanings and explanations without these witnesses [the Scriptures] do not have faith"; according to St. Athanasius (Letter 39, on the canonical books), "in these [Scriptures] alone the school of piety is blessedly announced"; according to St. John Chrysostom (homily on Psalm 95), "if anything is said without Scripture, the thought of the hearers limps"; according to Cyril of Jerusalem (Catechesis 4), "not even the least thing ought to be handed down without Scripture"; according to St. Irenaeus (*Against Heresies*, book 2, chapter 47), "the Scriptures are perfect"; according to Tertullian (*Against Hermogenes*, chapter 22), we must adore the fullness of Scripture; according to St. Athanasius (*Oration against the Gentiles*), "the Sacred Scriptures suffice by themselves for the indication of truth"; according to Tertullian again (*On the Flesh of Christ*), "I do not receive what you [he is addressing Marcion] bring in from your own, outside Scripture"; according to St. Jerome (on Matthew 23), "what does not have authority from Scripture is contemned with the same facility with which it is proved." Finally, the Fathers seem to censure the use of tradition. Thus St. Irenaeus (book 3, chapter 2) says concerning heretics: "When they are refuted from the Scriptures, they turn to an accusation of the Scriptures, as if truth could not be found from them by those who do not know tradition"; and Cyril of Jerusalem (Catechesis 16): "We shall say concerning the Holy Spirit only those things which have been written; but if anything is not written, we shall not search into it curiously." The reply is: From the testimonies adduced in the proof of the thesis, it is clear that the Fathers admitted divine traditions, both theoretically and practically, so unanimously and plainly that they cannot reject them without manifest contradiction. Therefore, unless we wish to portray the Fathers as shamefully contradicting themselves, it is impossible to admit the adversaries' interpretation in the objected testimonies. In reality, that this may be positively established, Origen (homily 1 on Jeremiah) does not treat all dogmas, but a singular figure of the Old Testament to be applied to Christ. Hence he adds: "That I may strengthen the word of my understanding, I shall take two witnesses from the Old Testament; I shall take three from the Gospel, from the Prophet, from the Apostle: for thus every word shall stand." St. Athanasius (Letter 39) does not exclude divine traditions, but apocryphal books thrust forward by heretics. Hence he begins that letter thus: "Since some have undertaken to describe apocrypha for themselves and to confuse them with divinely inspired Scripture, etc." St. John Chrysostom (homily on Psalm 95) does not oppose Scripture to traditions, but to the thought of the mind alone, as the entire text reads. Cyril of Jerusalem (Catechesis 4) does not speak of every dogma, but of dogma comprised in the Apostles' Creed, and excludes only apocryphal books. Hence in the same place he says: "Learn also zealously from the Church which are the books of the Old Testament,

and which are those of the New; and do not read anything apocryphal to me." St. Irenaeus (book 2, chapter 47) says that Scripture is perfect with regard to establishing the unity of God, and excludes the fictions of the Valentinians repugnant to Scripture. Tertullian (*Against Hermogenes*, chapter 22) adores the fullness of Scripture in order to the origin of the world without pre-existing matter. St. Athanasius (*Against the Gentiles*) teaches that Scripture suffices for showing the vanity of idols and the divinity of Christ; and in the same place he acknowledges traditions: "Indeed," he says, "both the Sacred Scriptures suffice by themselves for the indication of truth, and very many books concerning that matter have been written by the most holy teachers; if anyone reads these, he will understand in some way the mind of the Scriptures, and perhaps will obtain the knowledge which he desires." Tertullian (*On the Flesh of Christ*) rejects traditions contrary to Scripture and apocryphal traditions, not true traditions. Hence he reproves Marcion as one who "dared to destroy the original instruments of Christ and to bring in something from his own." The testimony of St. Jerome (on Matthew 23) has a similar sense; hence he premises: "Others wish Zechariah the father of John to be understood, approving this from certain dreams of the apocrypha... because this does not have authority from the Scriptures, etc." The Fathers censure spurious traditions, or the illegitimate use of authentic tradition. Thus St. Irenaeus (book 3, chapter 2) attacks the Valentinians, who, after excluding apostolic traditions, thrust forward their own; hence he continues: "But when again we provoke them to that tradition which is from the Apostles, which is guarded in the churches through the successions of Presbyters, they oppose tradition, saying that, since they are wiser not only than the Presbyters but even than the Apostles, they have found the sincere truth." Cyril (in the objected place) rejects only useless questions concerning the mode of divine generation and concerning the names of the Holy Spirit, without nevertheless rejecting the useful and right use of traditions; for in the same place he brings forward many things by no means written concerning both mysteries. Compare, for Cyril's opinion, Touttee, editor of his works, disputing against Rivet.

341. From these things certain general rules can be established for rightly understanding and explaining sayings of the Fathers which, according to appearance, are repugnant to the doctrine asserted by us. And: 1) The Fathers frequently oppose the Scriptures not to divine traditions, but either to the inventions of philosophers which were being substituted for divine authority (Tertullian, *On Prescription*, chapter 7; St. Gregory Nazianzen, Oration 27, etc.), or to traditions, indeed to apocryphal writings (St. Irenaeus, book 3, chapter 2; St. Jerome on Haggai, chapter 1, etc.). 2) They leave aside traditions, with attention to the nature of the adversaries, who would acknowledge nothing except the Scriptures, from which alone they could be convicted in their errors. Such, for example, were the Arians denying the divinity of Christ; and thus are understood the words of Constantine (in Theodoret, *Ecclesiastical History*, as printed), on which nevertheless Bellarmine makes several observations. Or they also contend that certain dogmas, but not all, can be established from the Scriptures. 3) Phrases denying "what is not written" they often use concerning that which is opposed to Scripture; just as phrases affirming that "Scripture is the rule of faith" by no means exclude traditions. 4) The Fathers, affirming the sufficiency of the Scriptures, do not separate them from traditions and from the interpretation of the living and authentic magisterium; rather, they suppose these things. In the same way they also teach that the Scriptures contain all things, immediately or mediately; for they require and teach that those things which the Scriptures themselves do not immediately exhibit are to be received from tradition through the authentic magisterium. "Although," says St. Augustine (*Against Cresconius*, book 1, n. 39), "certainly no example of this matter [the value of baptism conferred by heretics] is brought forward from the canonical Scriptures, nevertheless the truth of those same Scriptures is held by us even in this matter, when we do what has now pleased the universal Church, which the authority of those Scriptures commends; so that, since Sacred Scripture cannot deceive, whoever fears being deceived by the obscurity of this question may consult concerning it that same Church, which Sacred Scripture demonstrates without any ambiguity." Compare Bellarmine for the individual objections (same place, chapter 11).

Article 6. Whether the writings of the Holy Fathers are means of conserving and knowing divine traditions

342. Since it has now been established that Christian revelation is comprised also in traditions, we now inquire into the monuments in which those traditions are found, and by whose help they have both been conserved and can be known by us. First of all, no one fails to see the congruity and moral necessity of such monuments. For although, as we hinted (n. 329) and showed more fully elsewhere, Christ the Lord instituted an authentic, living, and perennial magisterium as the intrinsic and proper medium of conserving and propagating His doctrine, nevertheless the Apostles and disciples of Christ, when occasion was given and with the Holy Spirit inspiring, committed part of it to writings. In a similar way, while the doctrine and institutions of Christ were being propagated from apostolic succession through the continual magisterium, as the occasion arose they were also committed to monuments. Nor, considered in view of the wisdom of God and ordinary providence, could the matter have happened otherwise. For on the one hand, the promised assistance of the Holy Spirit to the apostolic magisterium by no means excludes the help of human means; but on the other hand, in Christian society, which is a society of men, circumstances could not be lacking in which there would be issued public professions of faith, solemn judgments of the teaching Church, defenses of doctrine under attack, catecheses for the instruction of peoples, declarations for a fuller understanding of doctrine, etc. All these and similar things are monuments left to us, from which it is permitted to know what Christian faith and discipline were in past times; just as they are a connatural aid of conserving tradition and instruments of doctrine for the magisterium itself, which is always living.

343. Now monuments of this sort, as is plain of itself, can be of manifold kind; but chiefly they are divided into written and unwritten. Certainly Christian art, even from the first centuries, exhibits many sculpted, painted, and architectural monuments in crypts, shrines, chairs, and so forth, which place before the eyes the life, faith, and ecclesiastical discipline of those times. You have testimony of this matter in the distinguished and most learned work of Father Raphael Garrucci, S.J. (*History of Christian Art in the First Eight Centuries*). Yet the principal monuments are written ones, since institutions and doctrines can be reported more distinctly and fully. Compare Cardinal Franzelin (*On Tradition*, etc., chapter 13).

344. But among written monuments the chief place is held by the definitions and judgments which emanate directly from the living and authentic magisterium itself, under the assistance of the Holy Spirit. But nothing must be said here concerning these, since below we shall establish the infallibility of the teaching Church. Therefore here we inquire into the authority of the Holy Fathers, insofar as they are doctors and witnesses of tradition, by adhering to whom, as the Seventh Council speaks (in the definition concerning Sacred Images), we follow the royal road. Concerning them, in the name of the Greeks, St. Basil writes (Homily 29): "I follow the faith of the Fathers. In this certitude also the martyrs themselves who are situated here obtained crowns. Therefore accuse me under this name"; and in the name of the Latins, St. Jerome says (in the epitaph of Paula): "I teach what I have learned, not from myself, that is, from presumption, the worst teacher, but from illustrious men of the Church."

345. But first of all, what comes under the name Father of the Church? This appellation has its origin from an analogy drawn from natural paternity. For just as in the order of nature that man is called father who generated another, and upon whom consequently there falls the care of the right instruction of the one whom he generated, so he is called a Father of the Church who has generated sons of the Church and has rightly instructed them. But since sons of this sort are generated through faith, and right instruction chiefly demands salutary doctrine, it is easily understood why eminent doctrine enters in a certain principal way into the concept of Father of the Church. This idea the Apostle exhibits, who calls the Corinthians, first instructed by him in the Gospel, "my dearest sons" (1 Corinthians 4.14); for he adds (verse 15): "In Christ Jesus, through the Gospel, I have begotten you." He inculcates this same idea when writing to the Galatians (4.19): "My little children, whom I bring forth again, until Christ be formed in you." St.

Irenaeus beautifully unfolded these same things (*Against Heresies*, book 4, chapter 41, n. 2), saying: "Since therefore all things were made by God, and the devil made himself the cause of apostasy for himself, Scripture justly has always called those who persevere in apostasy sons of the devil and evil angels. For son, as someone before us also said, is understood in two ways: one is reckoned a son according to nature, another according to that which he has been made, although there is a difference between one born and one made. For the former was born from him; the latter was made by him, whether according to creation, or according to the magisterium of doctrine. For he who has been taught by another in word is called a son of the one teaching, and that one is his father." Clement of Alexandria (*Stromata*, book 1, n. 1), St. Augustine (*Against Julian*, book 1, chapter 7, n. 31), and St. Jerome (to Principia, letter 140, otherwise 65) have similar things.

346. Thus far, however, the concept of Father of the Church has not yet been plainly defined; since, according to the things thus far set forth, all Christian writers conspicuous for doctrine could be called Fathers, although in reality they are by no means held as such. Therefore, that we may define the matter more strictly, we can use the description of Mabillon, who says (Preface to the works of St. Bernard, section 2, n. 23): "The Church calls those Fathers whom sanctity, doctrine, and antiquity commend; doctrine, I say, adhering to Scripture and tradition rather than to philosophical reasons." Or it can also be said more fully that the Fathers of the Church are "men who are eminent in doctrine, flourish in sanctity, are vigorous in antiquity, and enjoy the express or tacit designation of the Church." By explaining this description through its parts, we shall present a clear and full concept of the Fathers of the Church. Hence: 1) Those men are called Fathers who are eminent in doctrine; for the name of father is a name of excellence and authority, and therefore it does not belong to all who teach in whatever way, but only to those who, being excellent in that office, acquire authority for themselves. But it is understood that here the matter properly concerns Christian doctrine, which they received from the Apostles or their successors, and of which they were solicitous guardians, unconquered defenders, faithful expositors, and illustrious preachers. This is not always to be made clear from the amplitude and erudition of their works, but sometimes from simple and orthodox doctrine joined with antiquity, as happens, for example, in the writings of some of the Apostolic Fathers and Apologists. 2) Those men are called Fathers who flourish in sanctity; and this certainly supposes and comprehends also communion with the Catholic Church even to the end. In reality, just as it belongs to a carnal father to instruct his children rightly not only by word but also by example, so it belongs to the Fathers of the Church to generate and instruct sons for Jesus Christ by doctrine and example. It is indeed true that eminence of doctrine can be separated from sanctity; but the sublime doctrine of faith can scarcely be obtained without sanctity. For sanctity joins more intimately with God, the source of all wisdom; it renders men more attentive in the consideration of faith and discipline; it instills an ardent love of the Church and of sincere doctrine. Hence it conciliates to the doctrine itself an authority so great that it certainly does not belong to a name destitute of sanctity. 3) Those men are called Fathers who are vigorous in antiquity. The idea of father indeed contains a certain priority; but that priority, according to the variety of orders, will be different. Hence either a distinguished or a relative antiquity is necessary in order that someone be held as a Father. St. Thomas also suggests this (on chapter 4 of First Corinthians, lecture 3), weighing that saying of the Apostle: "For if you have ten thousand pedagogues in Christ, yet not many Fathers." There the Holy Doctor says: "A father is he who first generates; but a pedagogue is he who nourishes and educates one already born"; and he teaches that the Apostle "calls himself their father because he first preached the Gospel to them." In our time they almost commonly judge the extreme limit of the period of the Fathers to be the twelfth century, and by nearly unanimous consent they call St. Bernard the last among the Fathers. Yet the ancients called by the name Father all their predecessors distinguished by integrity of faith, doctrine, and sanctity (compare Council of Ephesus, Act 1); indeed there were not lacking some who were adorned with this name a few years after death (compare Council of Chalcedon, Acts 2 and 4). Thus certainly St. Cyril of Alexandria, who died in the year 444, was numbered among the Fathers in the year 451. 4) Those men are called Fathers who enjoy the express or tacit designation of the Church. For the whole deposit of revelation,

to be guarded holily, has been committed to the Church; therefore, just as it belongs to her to declare the certain and fixed canon of sacred books, so it is her right and office to designate fitting witnesses and safe teachers of divine tradition. Hence the Church has always used this right: both in solemn acts and definitions by consulting some as Holy Fathers, or by bringing forward their authority as such, or even by expressly calling them probable or approved Fathers (compare the letter of St. Hormisdas, letter 70, to Possessor the Bishop; Council of Ephesus, Act 1; Chalcedon, Act 1; Third Constantinople, Act 10; Second Nicaea, Acts 4 and 6); and by never referring among the number of Fathers certain Christian writers distinguished by antiquity and doctrine, who therefore were never held as Fathers; and by expressly rejecting one or another of these as a Father, as Tertullian and Lactantius (Decree of Pope Gelasius in the Roman Synod, year 494), and also Eusebius of Caesarea (Second Council of Nicaea, Act 5). But we said "express or tacit," because in reality the designation of the Church can be had in diverse ways. Hence those are to be held as Fathers who are alleged as such in ecumenical Councils; who have been recognized or proposed as such by the Supreme Pontiffs in public monuments; whose writings once publicly used to be read after Sacred Scripture, which, for example, is established concerning St. Clement of Rome (compare Eusebius, *Ecclesiastical History*, book 3, chapter 16), St. Polycarp (compare St. Jerome, *On Illustrious Men*, chapter 17), and St. Ephraem the Syrian (St. Jerome, same place, chapter 115); who are counted by some distinguished Father, in dogmatic inquiry, among the Holy Fathers for manifesting the doctrine of faith, etc. Compare Fessler (*Institutions of Patrology*, tome 1, chapter 1, section 12).

347. Therefore it is established for us that someone is a Holy Father of the Church from the express or tacit designation of the Church; but the Church, as Footnote 1. The same distinguished author (section 11) observes: "Moreover it is plain of itself that it is not required in a Holy Father that he be a Bishop or Presbyter, although most are found in this order, since the office of teaching in the Church was properly committed by Christ to these. But since laymen too are not wholly excluded from the office of teaching, and the Holy Spirit sometimes descends abundantly also upon laymen, even laymen who teach excellently according to the judgment of the whole Church, and are furnished with the other gifts of a Holy Father, can be referred among the Holy Fathers, for example, St. Prosper of Aquitaine." is manifest from usage, requires for this designation the first three qualities which we have described. But from these the specific notion of an Ecclesiastical Writer and of a Doctor of the Church is easily taken; for insofar as they fall short of one or another of the aforesaid conditions required to constitute a Father, while retaining the others, they are Doctors or Ecclesiastical Writers. Thus those who are distinguished by doctrine and antiquity, but either did not persevere in the communion of the Church or did not attain a more perfect form of sanctity, are properly called not Fathers but Ecclesiastical Writers. By one or another reason Tatian, Tertullian, Origen, Arnobius, Lactantius, Eusebius, Rufinus, and others are counted in this number. "It is truly a great matter," says Vincent of Lerins (*Commonitorium*, chapter 17), "useful for learning and necessary for recollection, which again and again we must illustrate and inculcate by heaps of examples, so that all truly Catholics may know that they must receive doctors with the Church, not abandon the faith of the Church with the doctors." But those are called Doctors of the Church who are indeed distinguished by doctrine and sanctity, but lack antiquity. It must be noted here that the title of Doctor requires a more excellent and more ample doctrine than the name Father. Hence the Church has not adorned all Fathers with the prerogative of Doctor. By the public suffrage of the Church, the following are held as Doctors of the Church: St. Ambrose, St. Augustine, St. Jerome, St. Gregory the Great (these are also called the great doctors of the western church, according to the number of the four Evangelists), St. Athanasius, St. Basil, St. Gregory Nazianzen, St. John Chrysostom (these are the four great doctors of the eastern church), St. Leo the Great, St. Peter Chrysologus, St. Isidore of Seville, St. Peter Damian, St. Ildephonsus of Toledo, St. Anselm of Canterbury, St. Bernard, St. Thomas Aquinas, St. Bonaventure, St. Hilary of Poitiers, St. Alphonsus Liguori, and St. Francis de Sales.

348. With these things set forth beforehand for understanding the matter concerning the notion of Father of the Church, before we propose the question concerning their authority, it is necessary to distinguish a twofold kind of doctrine in their writings, namely profane doctrine, which is referred to human sciences or arts, and sacred doctrine, pertaining to faith and morals. But the doctrine of faith and morals comprehends not only those things which are properly revealed and consequently to be believed by divine faith, but also those things which, on account of their necessary connection with revealed things, constitute theological truths. Moreover, all admit the rule which Canus hands down (*On Places*, book 7, chapter 2, n. 2) regarding the first kind of doctrine: "The authority of the saints, whether of few or of many, when it is brought to bear upon those faculties which are contained by the natural light, does not supply certain arguments; but it has as much force as reason consonant with nature will have persuaded." Wherefore the question concerning the authority of the Fathers regards only sacred doctrine, whether they handed it down by interpreting the Scriptures, or by defending the faith under attack, or by instructing the people in things to be believed and done.

349. What, therefore, is this authority? There are two excesses here. For 1) Luther and his followers, by denying tradition, make little of the authority of the Fathers. "Thus it happens," says Luther (in the book against the King of England), "that I cry out: Gospel, Gospel, Christ, Christ; they answer: Fathers, Fathers; usage, usage; statutes, statutes. But when I say that the Fathers, usage, and statutes have often erred, and that a matter of this sort ought to be fortified by a firmer and more certain authority, but that Christ cannot err. Here they are more mute than fish... as Scripture says: like deaf asps they stop their ears, lest they hear the voice of the charmer. Or again they give me this, which always floats on the surface like spittle: Ambrose says so; are you more learned than Ambrose?" etc. Among some Protestants, however, the Fathers began to be held in honor, especially those of the first four centuries; several of their writers indeed expressly affirm this, and others show it sufficiently by using the testimonies of the Fathers. 2) The Jansenists, on the contrary, seemed to make so much of the authority even of one Father, especially Augustine, that they preferred it to the authority of the Church herself. Hence proposition 30, condemned by Alexander VIII (December 7, 1690): "Where anyone has found a doctrine clearly founded in Augustine, he can absolutely hold and teach it, without looking to any Bull of the Pontiff." St. Thomas had already established the contradictory doctrine (2-2, question 10, article 12), saying: "The very doctrine of the Catholic Doctors has authority from the Church; hence one must stand more by the authority of the Church than by the authority either of Augustine, or Jerome, or any Doctor whatsoever."

350. With these excesses rejected, in order that the true doctrine concerning the authority of the Fathers with regard to sacred doctrine may be established, it is useful to propose diverse hypotheses here. Footnote 1. "Whether something is of this sort [pertaining to sacred doctrine] or not," Schrader rightly observes (*On the Theological Source of Witnesses*, page 290), "must be judged not against the mind of the Fathers, but, as far as can be done, also according to their doctrine or opinion. And this is the caution by which the rules or conclusions must be corrected which Melchior Canus (*On Theological Places*, book 7, chapter 3) established for defining the authority of the Fathers. But by those things by which, in his fifth conclusion, Cajetan is refuted by him as detracting from the Fathers when they agree concerning the sense of Scripture, he himself must similarly be amended, when in his first conclusion he detracts from the Fathers when they agree concerning dogmas of philosophy, as he says, since without doubt there are such dogmas of philosophy without which the very dogmas of theology, concerning which he himself protects the authority of the Fathers, cannot be conserved and defended as they ought. Hence the same man must be amended when detracting from the Fathers when they judge concerning the character and quality of things which they refer to the end and he to reason or philosophy; and he must also be amended when he too lightly denies that the immaculate conception of the Virgin is taught by the Scriptures and apostolic tradition, and therefore that it cannot be declared as a dogma of faith; and when he too readily affirms the lapses and dissensions of several ancient Authors of the Church from the common doctrine of others." Compare also

Cardinal Franzelin (*On Tradition*, etc., page 182 ff., Rome, 1875). And first we can consider the opinion of one or another Father, separated from consensus; and then "they indeed deserve as much veneration as the antiquity, doctrine, and sanctity of each of them demands; nevertheless their authority is not such that, especially if grave reasons demand it, it would be a sin to depart from their opinions, always with due reverence." Certainly infallibility has not been promised to individual Fathers; nor, when individuals are considered separately from consensus, do they appear to be clothed, as it were, with the infallibility of the Church. Hence from the fact itself it is established that someone sometimes erred; compare St. Augustine concerning St. Cyprian (*On Baptism*, book 1, chapter 18). Nor did the Fathers themselves think otherwise. Thus St. Augustine (Letter 148 to Fortunatianus, n. 15) writes: "For neither ought we to hold the disputations of any men whatsoever, although Catholic and praiseworthy, as canonical Scriptures, so that it would not be permitted to us, while preserving the honor which is owed to those men, to disapprove and reject something in their writings, if perhaps we have known that they thought otherwise than the truth has it, whether understood with divine help by others or by ourselves. Such am I in the writings of others; such do I wish the understanders of my writings to be." And (*On the Trinity*, book 3, Proem): "Indeed, since in all my writings I desire not only a pious reader, but also a free corrector, much especially in these, where would that the very greatness of the question could have as many discoverers as it has contradictors. Nevertheless, just as I do not wish my reader to be devoted to me, so I do not wish my corrector to be devoted to himself. Let the former not love me more than Catholic truth. As I say to him, do not serve my writings as if they were canonical Scriptures, but in those, when you have found what you did not believe, believe without hesitation; but in these, do not firmly retain what you did not hold as certain unless you have understood it as certain; so I say to the latter, do not correct my writings from your own opinion or contention, but from divine reading or unshaken reason." And, omitting the rest (Letter 82 to Jerome, n. 3): "Other books besides the Scriptures I read in such a way that, however much they may excel in sanctity and doctrine, I do not think something true for this reason, that they themselves thought so; but because, either through those canonical authors or by probable reason, they were able to persuade me that they do not abhor the truth." St. Jerome often has similar things; and St. Thomas (1 p., question 1, article 8, ad 2) writes for this same reason: "Theology uses the authorities of canonical Scripture properly, arguing from necessity. But the authorities of other Doctors of the Church it uses as if arguing from its own, but probably. For our faith rests upon revelation made to the Apostles and Prophets, who wrote the canonical books, but not upon revelation, if there was any, made to other doctors."

351. Secondly, we can consider the hypothesis in which several Fathers affirm or deny something, while the others protest against it. Then there can be a greater or lesser probability for one side or the other, but from neither can an irrefutable argument be taken, so far as concerns the authority of the Fathers. We say, so far as concerns the authority of the Fathers, because after the disagreement, once the question has been clarified, a definition of the Church and a subsequent consensus could be added; in which case the truth would already be established with certainty (compare *On the Infused Virtues*, n. 521 ff.; 542 ff.). The matter understood in this way is evident of itself. Only this must be noted here: disagreement among the Fathers is not easily to be admitted; but, on account of the authority which is in them and the reverence which is owed to them, we must endeavor, as much as possible, to reconcile them. The Fathers themselves taught this by word and example. Thus St. Ambrose (letter 48, n. 4) says: "If a word gives offense, ask about the power of the profession... even a mind that is not doubtful shades and defends doubtful speech from a fall." And St. Augustine, that he might defend St. Hilary, wrote (*On the Trinity*, book 6, chapter 10, n. 11): "Someone, wishing to indicate very briefly the proper things of each person in the Trinity, said: eternity in the Father, Form in the Image, Use in the Gift. And because he was a man of no mediocre authority in the treatment of the Scriptures and the assertion of the faith, for Hilary placed this in his books, having searched as far as I am able the hidden understanding of these words... I think that in the term eternity he followed nothing except that the Father does not have a Father [principle] from whom He is." St. Athanasius did the

same with regard to Dionysius of Alexandria, St. Basil with regard to Gregory Thaumaturgus, etc.; examples of these occur in several special questions in theology.

352. Thirdly, we can consider the Fathers agreeing in some matter pertaining to sacred doctrine; and then their authority is irrefutable. Since this is the chief point in the matter of which we are treating, and therefore must be expressly asserted, it will be useful to define the same thing accurately. The consensus of all the Fathers, or unanimous consensus, must be taken not mathematically but morally. "Then," says Cardinal Perrone (Reply to the King of England), "the unanimous consensus of the Fathers, cumulatively proved, must be sustained when the most eminent men of the individual nations agree in the assertion of some matter, so that among them no one who always was orthodox and always adhered to the orthodox dissents." Yet the matter itself can be proposed a little more fully in this way: the consensus of the Fathers can be known and demonstrated directly and immediately, or indirectly and by inference. In the first way it is shown if from the writings of morally all of them express testimonies are brought forward, so that from this it is established that one opinion concerning some matter adhered in them. But this method renders the use of the Fathers more difficult; hence there is another way, by which from the testimonies of some that have been brought forward the consensus of the others is legitimately inferred. This happens in three ways: 1) if several eminent Fathers agree in the same point, with the rest not protesting, especially if they wrote in diverse places and diverse ages; 2) indeed, sometimes even the testimony of a few Fathers is irrefutable, namely if from all the circumstances it is certainly established that they report the common faith of the Church; 3) finally, the explored consensus even of the western Fathers alone suffices, although when this is had, as is also historically established, there is never present such a dissent of the eastern Fathers as could weaken it. Therefore we undertake to demonstrate these things, in order to vindicate the authority of the Fathers. Section II. The Proposed Question Is Solved. PROPOSITION XVI. 1. The morally unanimous consensus of the Fathers in matters of faith and morals exhibits an irrefutable testimony of divine tradition. Nor is it necessary that that consensus always be demonstrated directly and immediately; but it is excellently inferred: 2. from the explored suffrage of all the western Fathers; 3. from the testimony of several who are distinguished by doctrine and reputation, who flourished in diverse ages, with the rest not protesting; 4. indeed, even from the testimony of a few, if it is given in those circumstances such that it is evident that it reports the common faith of the Church.

353. The first part is proved. I. We suppose here what we shall expressly demonstrate in its own place, that according to the promises of Christ, from the perennial assistance of the Holy Spirit there is present in the Church the charism of infallibility, both active in the teaching Church and passive in the whole Church. But if the unanimous suffrage of the Fathers in matters of faith and morals could be false, that twofold infallibility would fail. Therefore. The minor is proved. 1) The Church extends her magisterium to the faithful especially through the works of the Fathers; therefore if all the Fathers taught something false, the teaching Church herself would seem to lead us into errors. At least the Church could not fail to know that all the Fathers were teaching error; if she did not correct it, she would certainly fail in the office of guarding the deposit. It can indeed be understood that one or another of the Fathers errs, and yet the Church does not yet reprove their error; for the faithful would be taught by others, and there would never be universal error in the Church. But if all err, and the Church does not contradict, all are easily led into error, especially if the Fathers present themselves as witnesses of the doctrine of the Church herself. Wherefore Cardinal Franzelin skillfully observes (*On Tradition*, etc., thesis 14): "This [the consensus of which we are treating] surely is the same as if the universal Church, with all her pastors and doctors, martyrs and faithful people, in her connection with the Apostles, and through the Apostles with the preaching of Christ Himself, were placed before us through the course of the centuries, always in homogeneous progress, testifying to her faith and to the understanding of the faith." 2) From these things it is understood that passive infallibility also perishes in the Church, or that the Church falls away from the faith, if the Fathers can unanimously teach error. For the principle from which passive infallibility proceeds, according to the institution of Christ, is the

teaching Church endowed with active infallibility. Therefore if this latter fails, it is necessary that the former fail also. In reality, the faithful people receives instruction from the principal doctors, such as the Fathers are; therefore if they unanimously taught something erroneous, with the Church not contradicting, it would be led into error. 3) These things are confirmed from the disposition of divine providence, which according to the necessities of the times gave principal luminaries who would spread light in the Church. St. Augustine speaks of this disposition of God (*Against Julian*, book 2, chapter 10, n. 37), saying: "God Himself, through diverse ages and distances of times and places, as it pleases Him and as He judges expedient, dispenses His few dispensers, faithful and more excellent than many." And he had said (n. 35): "To such an extent are darkness said to be light, and light darkness, that Pelagius, Coelestius, and Julian see, and Hilary, Gregory, and Ambrose are blind? But whatever kind of man you are, yet because you are a man, I seem to myself to see your shame (if indeed all hope of health is not dead in you), and in a certain way I hear your voice. You answer: Far be it that I should dare to think or say that those men are blind. Therefore weigh their judgments." And Leontius of Byzantium (*Against Nestorius*, book 1, n. 35): "After the Apostles and Prophets, God placed doctors in the Church according to the incomprehensible providence of the Holy Spirit, for the work of ministry unto the edification of the body of Christ. Wherefore he who does not receive those Fathers, who are clear and celebrated in the Church, plainly resists the ordering and constitution of God." St. Jerome has similar things (on the Letter to the Ephesians, book 2, chapter 4).

354. II. Christian society, whether theoretically or practically, has always asserted for the unanimous consensus of the Fathers that authority which we vindicate here. For it used that consensus to settle questions of faith; it expressly affirmed its peremptory force; and, with an anathema proclaimed, it sanctioned that no one should turn aside from the common judgment of the Fathers. St. Athanasius testifies (Letter to the Africans, n. 6) that the First Council of Nicaea used the word *homoousion* "relying on the testimony of the Fathers." The Council of Ephesus (Act 1) says: "It pleased God that nothing else be decreed for posterity to be believed except what sacred antiquity, agreeing with itself, of the Holy Fathers has held." The Council of Chalcedon (Act 5) issued the definition of faith "following the Holy Fathers"; and in the Address of the Council to Marcian the Emperor, the Bishops are said to have been persuaded "that, when ambiguity of the question had arisen, it was permitted to adapt the confession to the interpretations of the Fathers... and to teach that we have brought forward a mind in no way discordant from their understanding, but that we use these as witnesses for the confirmation of our faith"; and it is added that he "who depraves the understanding of the Fathers is guilty of prevarication." The Second Council of Constantinople (Collation 3) declares that it holds the faith "which the Holy Fathers confessed and explained." The Third Council of Constantinople (Act 18), "having followed without offense the right path of the holy and probable [approved] Fathers, and defining consonantly with them, confesses" the right faith. The Second Council of Nicaea (Act 1) prescribes that this anathema be pronounced by Basil the penitent: "Those who contemn the doctrines of the Holy Fathers and the tradition of the Catholic Church, and who make excuses and boast the words of Arius, Nestorius, Eutyches, and Dioscorus, saying that unless we were sufficiently instructed from the Old and New Testament we would not follow the traditions of the Holy Fathers and of the Catholic Church, let them be anathema." The Fourth Council of Constantinople (canon 1) says: "In order that we may hold the right and royal way of divine justice without the offense of error, the decrees of the Holy Fathers, as certain unextinguished torches always shining, must be followed." The Lateran Council under Martin I (Consultation 5) defines that "whoever has not received in word and mind the Venerable Fathers, and all things which were set forth by them for the orthodox faith, is condemned and alien to the holy Church of God." The Second Council of Lyons (canon 1) and the Council of Florence (Definition of Faith), "with testimonies brought forward from the divine Scriptures and very many authorities of the Holy Doctors of East and West, finally agreed and consented unanimously into the same judgment." The Council of Trent (Proem of session 7) states that "the true and sound doctrine, which Jesus Christ, the author and consummator of our faith, taught, the Apostles handed down, and the Catholic Church, with the Holy Spirit

suggesting, has perpetually retained, adhering to the consensus of the Fathers"; and (session 4), as we saw, it forbids "anyone to dare to interpret Sacred Scripture against the unanimous sense of the Holy Fathers." This very thing the Vatican Council renewed. Hence Pius IX rightly noted in the books of Gunther (Brief to the Cardinal Archbishop of Cologne, 1857) that he "did not have for the Holy Fathers that reverence which the canons of the Councils prescribe, and which the most splendid lights of the Church altogether deserve"; and (Brief to the Bishop of Breslau, March 30, 1857) he noted that Gunther "neither sufficiently understood how greatly one must defer to the venerable authority of the most holy Fathers, and with what zeal one must beware lest, from love of profane novelty, their safe footsteps be deserted and very grave errors be spread."

355. III. Above we already indicated that the Fathers themselves made very much of the consensus of the preceding Fathers, and invoked it for routing heresies. Therefore here, to confirm the matter, we shall add one or another testimony. St. Augustine (*Against Julian*, book 2, chapter 10, n. 37) writes: "These are bishops, learned, grave, holy, most keen defenders of truth against talkative vanities; in their reason, erudition, and liberty, the three things which you assigned to a good judge, you cannot find what you may despise. If an episcopal Synod were gathered from the whole world, it would be wonderful if so many such men could easily sit there. For these men were not of one time, but God Himself dispenses His few dispensers, faithful and more excellent than many, through diverse ages and distances of times and places, as it pleases Him and as He judges expedient. You see these, therefore, gathered from different times and regions, from East and West, not in a place to which men are compelled to sail, but in a book which can sail to men. By as much as these would have been more desirable judges for you if you held the Catholic faith, by so much are they more terrible to you because you attack the Catholic faith, which they sucked in with milk, which they took in as food, whose milk and food they ministered to little and great, which against enemies, even you not yet born then, from whom you are now revealed, they defended most openly and most strongly. With such planters, waterers, builders, shepherds, and nourishers after the Apostles the holy Church grew. Therefore it shuddered at the profane voices of your novelty... it abhorred the snares of your dogma creeping in, and, as the head of a serpent, trampled, crushed, and cast it away." Vincent of Lerins (*Commonitorium*, chapter 2): "We shall follow antiquity in such a way if we in no way depart from those meanings which it is manifest that our holy elders and Fathers celebrated"; and (chapter 3): "What if in antiquity itself the error of two or three men, or certainly of one city or even of some province, is detected? Then he will altogether take care that, if there are any decrees of the universal Church from antiquity, he place them before the temerity or ignorance of a few. What if something of such a kind should emerge that nothing of this sort is found? Then he will give his attention to consulting and interrogating the opinions of the elders compared with one another, of those only who, although in diverse times and places, nevertheless remained in the communion and faith of the one Catholic Church, and stood forth as approved teachers; and whatever he has known not only one or two, but all equally, with one and the same consensus... to have written and taught, let him understand that this also is to be believed by himself without any doubt." St. Basil (letter 52, n. 1): "Not to stand upon the footsteps of the Fathers, nor to consider their voice preferable to one's own opinion, is a matter worthy of reproof, as full of arrogance." In order that the force and method of this and the preceding argument may be perceived, let the observations which we premised to the second argument of the preceding thesis (n. 330) be recalled.

356. The second part is proved. I. There is a solid foundation for inferring from the consensus of the western Fathers also the consensus of the eastern Fathers. But, from what has been proved, the unanimous consensus of the Fathers supplies an irrefutable argument for the existence of divine tradition. Therefore. The major is proved. 1) It is historically established that in matters of faith and morals the eastern Fathers agree with the western; therefore, if in some question the consensus of the western Fathers is demonstrated, the consensus also of the eastern Fathers is rightly inferred. To clarify the antecedent, first of all there belong the words of St. Gregory the Great (Letters, book 10, letter 35, to Eulogius of Alexandria): "To him, therefore, long before I received your writings, I responded against that same heresy [of the

Agnoetae], the things which afterward I found in the letter of your holiness; and I rendered great thanks to Almighty God, because concerning all the inquiries, the Roman [whom he calls western] and Greek Fathers, whose followers we are, spoke with one spirit. For in many things I found that same letter of yours so, as if I were reading the writings of the Latin Fathers against the aforesaid heresy." To this could be added what Pope Celestine has (letter 13 to Bishop Maximian), Felix III (synodical letter to all the presbyters of Constantinople and Bithynia), Agatho (letter to the Emperor against the Monothelites, which stands forth in the Sixth Council, Act 4), Gregory II to Leo the Isaurian, etc. Compare Habert (*Theology of the Greeks concerning Grace*, book 1, chapter 1, n. 4). 2) The eastern and western Church constituted one Church; but the Church is one, especially by unity of faith; therefore they had one faith. But if, when all the western Fathers asserted something in a matter of faith and morals, the eastern Fathers had commonly resisted, this unity of faith would have been lacking. Therefore. 3) In the West is the principle and center of unity, namely the successor of Peter, under whose care and vigilance the western Fathers were more immediately placed. But it is altogether incredible that, if the Fathers asserted something against faith or morals, when there was danger that the error would first pervade all the westerners, the principle and center of unity would not resist.

357. II. These same things can be confirmed by authority. St. Augustine (*Against Julian*, book 1, chapter 4, n. 12) first says: "Again I admonish you, again I ask you, look upon so many and such great defenders and doctors of the Catholic Church; see upon whom you heap so grave and so nefarious an injury." Then (n. 13) he adds: "Or do you therefore think them to be contemned, because they are all of the western Church, and no bishop of the East has been commemorated by us among them? What then shall we do, since they are Greeks, not Latins? I think that that part of the world ought to suffice you, in which the Lord willed to crown with a most glorious martyrdom the first of His Apostles. If you had wished to hear Blessed Innocent presiding over that Church, you would already then have stripped your dangerous youth from Pelagian snares. For what could that holy man answer to the African councils, except what the apostolic See and the Roman Church with the rest [eastern and western] has held perseveringly from antiquity?" And (n. 14) he adds: "Therefore there is no reason why you should appeal to the bishops of the East, because they too certainly are Christians, and that faith is one in both parts of the earth, because that faith too is Christian." Bessarion in the Council of Florence (Dogmatic Oration, chapter 4) asserted the same: "And according to my judgment, both the eastern and the western Fathers spoke clearly and manifestly, and handed down to us the truth of the faith. And one could easily, using the authorities of either part, by these alone conclude the proposed question. And this a little later, if God grants it, we shall prove. Yet let it be conceded that the eastern Fathers did not speak so clearly, nor so expressly, concerning the procession of the Holy Spirit from the Son, as did the western Fathers. What therefore must be done? Plainly nothing else than that, since the western Fathers have most openly preached this faith, the eastern Fathers also must be thought to say this same thing... For the same Spirit who spoke in those spoke also in these." George Scholarius proved the matter in the orations held in the same Council, and Joseph, Bishop of Methone, in the refutation of Mark of Ephesus. Compare Cardinal du Perron (Reply to the King of Great Britain, tome 3, page 648) and de Rubeis (*On Original Sin*, chapter 20, n. 4).

358. The third part is proved. I. From, as it were, the nature of the thing. For 1) it seems incredible that several doctors, distinguished by doctrine and sanctity, through diverse ages and diverse places should think one and the same thing, unless it truly pertains to sacred doctrine. To this point belong those words of St. Augustine (*Against Julian*, book 1, chapter 6, n. 22): "There are other things in which sometimes even the most learned and best defenders of the Catholic rule do not agree among themselves, while the structure of faith is preserved, and one says something better and truer concerning one matter than another. But this matter, about which we now treat, pertains to the very foundations of faith." 2) Indeed, it is impossible that Fathers, several in number, especially if they are distinguished, should assert something pertaining to faith or morals, with the rest not protesting, without all the faithful being led into error, and the Pastors themselves altogether failing in the office of guarding the deposit. But this is

impossible. Therefore. History itself is witness that the others protested whenever some distinguished Doctor taught error, as is established, for example, in the case of St. Cyprian; just as it is established that they protested whenever novelty arose. Wherefore Vincent of Lerins says (*Commonitorium*, book 1, n. 9): "To announce something to Catholic Christians besides that which they received has never been lawful, nowhere is lawful, and never will be lawful."

359. II. The same thing can be confirmed by authority. Vincent of Lerins (*Commonitorium*, n. 29) exhibits the rule which the Fathers of Ephesus followed: "We used the example of the holy Council which was celebrated almost three years ago in Asia at Ephesus... where, when there was discussion about making rules of faith, lest perhaps some profane novelty should creep in there in the manner of the perfidy of Ariminum, it seemed to all the priests, who had assembled there to the number of almost two hundred, most Catholic, most faithful, and best to do this: that the opinions of the Holy Fathers should be brought into the midst." He reports (n. 30) the names of those Fathers whose testimonies were recited, and concludes: "These then are all those who at Ephesus, in the sacred number of the decalogue, were produced as teachers, counselors, witnesses, and judges; holding whose doctrine, following whose counsel, believing whose testimony, obeying whose judgment, that blessed Synod pronounced concerning the rules of faith without weariness, presumption, and favor. Although a much larger number of elders could have been employed, it was not necessary, because neither by the multitude of witnesses, etc." St. Augustine (*Against Julian*, book 1, chapter 1, n. 3): "I do not indeed promise that I shall gather the opinions of all concerning this matter, nor all the opinions of those whom I shall commemorate, because it is too long and I do not judge it to be necessary; but I shall set down a few things of a few men, by which nevertheless our contradictors may be compelled to blush and yield, if any fear of God or shame before men in them has overcome so great an evil of obstinacy." Then, after bringing forward the testimonies of certain Fathers, he says (chapter 5, n. 20): "Can Pelagius and Coelestius have so much power with you that from the rising of the sun even to its setting, so many (they are not all) and such great doctors and defenders of the Catholic faith, ancient and close to our age, sleeping and remaining, you dare not only to desert, but even to call Manicheans? I wonder if this could ever proceed from your mouth, although the perversity of your error compels you to cry it out. But it is wonderful if in the face of a man there is so great an interval between forehead and tongue that in this cause the forehead does not restrain the tongue." Compare also what the Holy Doctor has (book 3, chapter 17, n. 32). Footnote 1. From these things it is evident that some Protestants contend altogether undeservedly that controversial dogmas must be proved from testimonies of the Fathers of the first centuries. Petavius expressly pursues this error; appealing to the Council of Ephesus, and referring to Cyprian as first in time among the rest for establishing the dogma concerning God born from the Virgin, he adds (*On the Incarnation*, book 14, chapter 15): "Now I would like this, that the adversaries answer me whether they think that that Synod, because it could bring forward no supporters of its decree from the earlier centuries, summoned more recent men and those who had died a few years before it, or that, although it could name others more ancient, it was content with these more recent men as being suitable. Whichever of these they say, they will both help our cause and make their own worse. For if there was no Doctor of the Church in those first centuries who would make faith for the Catholic dogma concerning the divinity of Christ, so that it had to be affirmed from recent men, they strive in vain to prepare ill-will against us from the silence of those most ancient times. But if some existed in those first centuries, but those who had immediately preceded were deliberately set before them, they ought no more to accuse us if in appealing to the more recent we followed their examples... Thus also the Council of Chalcedon enrolls as authorities men scarcely a whole century before itself, and one even very near, that is, Cyril of Alexandria, who had died six years before." Then he confirms the same thing by the authority of other Councils and Fathers. Certainly, since the Church cannot at any time fail in faith, if consensus is proved for one time, even a more recent one, concerning some dogma, that dogma is solidly established. Hence Bossuet rightly (*Defense of Tradition and of the Holy Fathers*, book 8, chapter 1), among the principles which he establishes from St. Augustine, places this in

fourth place: "Fourth and last principle: the unanimous sentiment of the present Church suffices in order not to doubt concerning the ancient Church."

360. The fourth part is proved. I. From what has been said it is sufficiently established that if a few Fathers truly report the faith of the whole Church, the consensus of the Fathers is rightly inferred. Hence rather this must be demonstrated: that there can exist, and do exist, those circumstances from which it ought rightly to be judged that those few report the faith of the Church. But this certainly happens. 1) If in some controversy of faith against a rising heresy, some distinguished one of the Fathers, as a leader, leads the battle line, and in the sight of the whole Church vindicates some head of doctrine as pertaining to the faith, with no one protesting, indeed sometimes with all applauding. Such, for example, was the condition in which St. Athanasius, St. Hilary, St. Augustine, and St. Basil fought for the mystery of the Most Holy Trinity; Cyril of Alexandria, Sophronius, and St. Leo the Great for the mystery of the Incarnation of Our Lord Jesus Christ; St. Augustine, St. Prosper, and St. Fulgentius for the divine grace of Christ (compare *On Grace*, n. 41 ff.). 2) If Fathers, even fewer in number, but whose authority in the Church has always been great, confidently teach something as pertaining to the faith, or testify that it is held by common faith, and do this publicly, so that their doctrine or testimony could easily have become known, and yet no one in the Church ever protested, those Fathers are rightly judged to report the common faith of the Church. 3) If certain writings indeed proceeded from one Father, but were approved by others as orthodox, or even were adopted as their own, from the opinion of that Father the consensus of the others is rightly inferred. Of this sort are, for example, several letters of St. Basil, St. Augustine, and St. Leo the Great; the book *On the Holy Spirit* written by St. Basil; the work of St. Proclus *On Faith to the Armenians*; the book of St. Fulgentius *On the Incarnation and Grace to Peter the Deacon*, etc. A fortiori this holds if the writing has been approved or received as a rule of faith in some Council, as the letter of St. Cyril of Alexandria to Nestorius (letter 4), and to John of Antioch (letter 34), etc.

361. II. The same thing can be confirmed by authority and usage. St. Cyril of Alexandria (letter 1 to the monks) affirms concerning St. Athanasius: "Certainly this man is suitable and especially worthy, to whom one may safely attach faith, as one who would have brought forward nothing alien from the divine letters. For in what way would that illustrious and celebrated Father, who in that sacred and great Synod of Nicaea was held in such great admiration by all, wander from the path of truth?" St. Augustine more than once disputes against Julian while relying upon the authority of St. Gregory Nazianzen alone; and (book 1, n. 16) says: "He is so great a person that neither would he say this except from the Christian faith most known to all, nor would they [the bishops of his region and age] hold him so clear and venerable unless they knew that these things said by him were from the rule of most well-known truth." And the same Holy Doctor, to prove that St. John Chrysostom thinks with the others in the dogma concerning original sin, says (ibid., n. 22): "Far be it that you [John] should think otherwise and stand forth so preeminent in her [the Church]." St. Leo (to Julian, letter 117, otherwise 88, chapter 3): "If [rebellious ignorance] thinks that our doctrine must be doubted, let it at least not reject the writings of Athanasius, Theophilus, and Cyril, priests of Alexandria of blessed memory; with whom the form of our faith so agrees that whoever professes himself to consent to them disagrees with us in nothing." Compare also Scholarius in the oration before the Fathers of Florence (in Hardouin, tome 9, page 448), and Bessarion in the dogmatic oration (chapter 7, in Hardouin, same place, page 356).

Article 7. Whether the consensus of Theologians and the sense of the faithful exhibit certain testimony of divine tradition

362. We embrace two questions together in this article; for since their solution rests upon almost the same principles as the authority of the Fathers, after the things which we have disputed concerning this authority, it is easy to dispatch them more briefly. But first it is necessary to note a few things

beforehand for the understanding of each.

363. I. And regarding the first, we said (n. 346) that the period of the Fathers is closed in the twelfth century; after that time there followed the institution of the School, whose office is to propose and teach by a new and more precise method the doctrine received from the Fathers. Hence the Scholastic Doctors were substituted in the place of the Fathers; and to this belong the things which St. Gregory writes (*Morals*, book 36, chapter 17): "When aged trees are cut down, tender shoots grow up in their strength." It is true, as Canus says (book 8, chapter 1), "that there were in the school certain ascriptitious Theologians, who resolved all theological questions with frivolous arguments, and by empty and invalid little reasons, detracting great weight from very grave matters, published commentaries on theology scarcely worthy of the night-work of old women. And since in these the testimonies of the Sacred Books are very rare, mention of Councils is none, they smell of nothing from the ancient Saints, indeed of nothing even from grave philosophy, but almost wholly from childish disciplines, nevertheless, if it please those above, they are called scholastic Theologians. Nor are they scholastics, much less Theologians, who, bringing the dregs of sophisms into the school, provoke learned men to laughter and the more refined to contempt."

364. But the defects of certain men must not be transferred to the School itself. Wherefore here we consider those Theologians who rightly fulfill the offices of scholastic theology itself. The same Canus (same place, chapter 2) recalls these to three: "The first is that those things which are contained hidden in the sacred letters and apostolic traditions be drawn, as if from darkness, into the light. For the Theologian gathers his conclusions from the principles of faith revealed by God, and explains by argumentation consonant with nature those things implicit in the principles themselves... Again, this faculty of disputing in the school has another proposed aim: that of defending our faith against heretics... But if the doctor of the school cannot teach sound doctrine to the faithful, and refute those who do not have sound doctrine, he will perhaps be able to be a Theologian among the crowd; in reality he never will be... Finally, it belongs to the function of scholastics to illustrate, or even confirm, as far as possible, the doctrine of Christ and of the Church from human disciplines." All these things the scholastic Theologian performs by a fitting method, by defining matters accurately, dividing them distinctly, and proving them solidly.

365. This indeed is the genuine idea of scholastic Theologians. Now, for establishing their authority, the distinctions used for defining the authority of the Fathers must be recalled. And first, the matter here does not concern merely human doctrine, but sacred doctrine. Yet to this belong not only those things which Theologians teach as of faith, but also those things which they teach as theologically true, insofar as, even if they are not properly revealed, nevertheless they are inferred from revealed things and are intimately connected with them. But it is plain that a proposition opposed to doctrine which Theologians commonly hand down as of faith, and another opposed to doctrine which is commonly handed down as theologically true, do not deserve the same note. Concerning this matter compare what we said in the treatise *On the Infused Virtues* (n. 458 ff.).

366. Nor does the matter concern the opinion of one or another, or even of several Theologians, with the rest contradicting. For these things are judged not by number, but by weight... At this point certain scholastics must be censured, who, from the prejudices of opinions which they received in the school, brand other Catholic men with more serious notes... The doctrines of the school, about which we shall speak soon [which are handed down by common consensus], are one thing; the precepts of a sect, about which we now speak, are another. Things which disagree from the former have a note; things which disagree from the latter do not have one. For neither, if something is contrary to Scotistic or Thomistic pronouncements, is it immediately an error." Footnote 1. Yet Cardinal Franzelin rightly observes (*On Tradition*, etc., thesis 17, page 212) that in those things which remain ambiguous, so far as concerns the authority of Theologians, the question is not immediately to be neglected, nor is the authority of the princes of theology to be contemned; but an inquiry into the reasons must be instituted. "But when this examination

has been duly instituted, it will become clear that the doctrine of the princes of the school, Lombard, Hales, St. Bonaventure, and especially St. Thomas, in constant and common opinions, is nothing other than a compendium and sum of the doctrine of the Fathers and of ecclesiastical preaching. But even in those chapters which are more ambiguous and placed in opinion, there is not lacking a more or less close congruity and connection with that same ecclesiastical preaching... On account of this intimate connection with the doctrine of the Fathers and with the Catholic understanding universally, the authority of the princes of the school, and before the rest St. Thomas, by itself alone indeed is not irrefutable, yet it is venerable and chief among private doctors."

367. Therefore the question concerns the authority of Theologians when by unanimous consensus they teach something, not as an opinion, but as a certain judgment either of faith or theologically certain. Certainly authority of this sort is not to be contemned under the pretext that those doctors are more recent. For as Canus very well observes (same place, chapter 4): "Just as he who contemned the Theologians succeeding Christ also contemned Christ the Lord, so he who despises the younger Theologians succeeding the ancients must necessarily despise Christ Himself also. Hence Chrysostom, or whoever it was, in the *Imperfect Commentary on Matthew*, homily 42: 'When you hear someone blessing the ancient doctors,' he says, 'test what kind of man he is toward his own doctors. For if he sustains and honors those with whom he lives, without doubt he would have honored those others if he had lived with them. But if he contemns his own, if he had lived with those others, he would have contemned them...' Clearly heretics reason after the likeness of the Pharisees. If the scholastic doctors were such as Hilary, Jerome, and Basil were, we would follow them; if we had been in the days of Augustine, Ambrose, and Jerome, we would not have been companions of Mani, Novatus, Vigilantius, Pelagius, or Jovinian. And so they bear witness that they are sons of those who contemned the holy ancients, when they count the younger Theologians of the school as nothing... Therefore, as long as the body of Christ, that is, the Church, shall be, it will pertain to divine governance that those who are held in the Church as doctors of sacred doctrine, as men given by God, hold truth in faith, lest the people be carried about after the manner of little children."

368. With regard to the second question, two things must be noted. The first is that the common sense of the faithful in matters of faith and morals is manifested not only by explicit theoretical judgments, but also implicitly by usages, rites, prayers, and any external actions whatsoever which, as resting upon revealed truths, suppose them and manifest the same. The other we shall set forth in the words of Canus (book 4, chapter 6, to the fourteenth objection): "There are two kinds of things, as has been said elsewhere, which are believed by the Church. One is of those things which pertain equally to all... and in this kind it is not very difficult to know the faith and sense of all... The other is the kind of those things which it is of interest not for the rude and unskilled in the Church to know, but for the greater and wise... In this kind, if you ask the vulgar opinion of the people, it will be just as if you were asking from a blind man the sense of colors. Therefore cautiously and prudently, when matters of this sort perhaps fall into popular speech, those in the crowd who are a little more modest pronounce nothing at all affirmatively and assertively; but they profess that they believe and think in these matters what the Church believes and thinks... Now we say this: in a common controversy of all, a certain argument is drawn from the common sense of the faithful... But in the faith of those things which are proper to doctors and the wise, the opinion of these alone is to be sought, and that of the crowd is not even to be awaited."

369. Therefore, these things having been noted: Section II. The Proposed Question Is Solved. PROPOSITION XVII. 1. The concordant doctrine of Theologians concerning a matter pertaining to faith or morals is a legitimate and certain criterion of divine tradition. 2. And the same thing must be attributed to the Catholic sense and consensus of the whole Christian people, whether it is declared by explicit profession, or is contained implicitly in deeds and practice.

370. The first part is proved. I. The concordant judgment of Theologians in a matter pertaining to faith or morals is equivalent, in individual ages, to the doctrine of the Church herself. But the Church can never err either in teaching or in believing in matters pertaining to faith and morals. Therefore that concordant and certain judgment of Theologians also cannot be found false. The major is proved. 1) Catholic schools, but especially theological schools, are always by right under the guardianship of the Church, by which they must be instituted, directed, and governed. Although this right in more recent times has been violated in some places, nevertheless from the twelfth century down to the eighteenth, theological schools and academies "were and were considered legitimate only by the authority of the Apostolic See, erected and fortified by diploma of the Pontiff, constituted under the continual vigilance of that Apostolic See itself; they derived all their right, their privileges, and their authority in teaching from the Church." Even in the more recent age, whenever some of the doctors seemed to incline toward dangerous doctrines, they were restrained either by Academies, or by Bishops, or finally by the Supreme Pontiff himself. Therefore if some doctrine pertaining to faith or morals is handed down not by one or another doctor, but by the common consensus of the schools, without the guardians of the deposit ever protesting, is it not rightly judged to be the doctrine of the Church herself? 2) "Whether those who hear confessions," says Canus (same place), "or those who preach to the people, each instructs the people as they have received from Theologians." It can be added that Supreme Pontiffs and Councils use Academies and doctors for counsel. "Thus it happens," Canus continues, "that the Church, by dissimulating their error into the common faith, would deceive Christ's faithful by her silence. 'For error which is not resisted is approved; truth, when it is not defended, is oppressed,' as Innocent says, distinction 83, canon *Error*. And God Himself, if He did not disclose the error of all Theologians, would fail the Christian people in necessary matters. For what is the unskilled people going to do except follow those whom it has received for that time as masters of ecclesiastical doctrine?" 3) Indeed, the Church defined very many things by the authority of Theologians. "For three hundred years from now [in the time of Canus], if the Church condemned any heresies, if it issued any decrees concerning faith and morals, in both it was strongly aided by the help and diligence of the Scholastics. Since this is established among all to whom either the acts of Councils or the business of the knowledge of faith are known, it is necessary that we confess that scholastic doctors all together cannot err in faith and morals." 4) Finally, it is established by experience both that Theologians have never unanimously taught anything as pertaining to faith and morals which afterward was found false, and that those who at first contemned the common consensus of Theologians eventually also despised the authority of the Fathers and of the Church herself. "No dogma," says Canus (chapter 4), "will be found which all scholastics with the same mind and mouth have asserted certainly and firmly, unless the Church universally holds the same... If heretics can find something, let them bring it forward, and we shall be silent." And (chapter 1): "All Lutherans to a man both wonderfully contemn and hostilely attack the authority of our school. And perhaps from this, as from the first source, the rest of their heresies have been derived. For at the beginning, which was easy, once the authors of the school had been contemned, they also contemned the judgments of the school. Once these had been neglected, it soon was necessary that Jerome, Augustine, Gregory, Ambrose, and Basil be neglected, whom recent Theologians had as the authors of their dogmas. But after the ancient Saints had been set aside, their Councils also were held in contempt. Whence it followed that the Lutherans cut down both certain canonical books and ecclesiastical authority... For after the school had arisen, contempt of the school and the plagues of heresies have always been connected."

371. II. These same things can be confirmed by authority. For Martin V (*Inter cunctas*) proscribed this proposition of Wyclif: "Universities, studies, colleges, graduations, and magisteria in them were introduced by vain heathenism; they profit the Church as much as the devil." Pius VI (*Auctorem fidei*) noted these propositions of the Pistorians: "The attack by which the synod assails scholasticism as that which opened the way for finding new and mutually discordant systems regarding truths of greater price... insofar as it rejects against scholasticism the faults of private men who were able to abuse

it, or did abuse it: false, rash, injurious to the most holy men and doctors who cultivated scholasticism for the great good of the Catholic religion, favoring the hostile insults of heretics against it." And: "The assertion which with insults and reproaches assails opinions debated in Catholic schools, and concerning which the Apostolic See has not yet judged that anything must be defined or pronounced: false, rash, injurious to Catholic schools, derogating from the obedience due to apostolic constitutions." Gregory XVI prohibited the works of Hermes also because they contain propositions "injurious to Catholic schools." This proposition was proposed to D. Bonnetty for subscription: "The method which St. Thomas, St. Bonaventure, and other scholastics after them used does not lead to rationalism, nor was it the cause why philosophy among present-day schools should strike into naturalism and pantheism. Therefore it is not permitted to turn it into a charge against those doctors and masters that they used this method, especially with the Church approving, or at least being silent." And Pius IX noted concerning the books of Gunther that "he did not abstain from those sarcasms against Catholic schools which our predecessor Pius VI of recollected memory solemnly condemned." The same Supreme Pontiff writes concerning the assemblies of Theologians of Germany: "Nor were we ignorant that in Germany also there has become strong a false opinion against the old school, and against the doctrine of those supreme doctors whom, on account of their admirable wisdom and sanctity of life, the universal Church venerates... By this false opinion, the authority of the Church herself is called into danger, since the Church herself not only permitted through so many continuous centuries that theological science be cultivated according to the method of those same doctors and from principles sanctioned by the common consensus of all Catholic schools, but also very often extolled with the highest praises their theological doctrine, and strongly commended it as the strongest bulwark of the faith and formidable arms against her enemies." Compare Denzinger (*Enchiridion*, nn. 505, 1439, 1442, 1487, 1508, 1511, 1532). These things indeed vindicate the honor of the school and, generally, its authority. But the things which Pius IX wrote to the Archbishop of Munich (December 12, 1863) pertain directly to the present matter: "Even if the matter concerned that subjection which must be rendered by an act of divine faith, it nevertheless would not have to be limited to those things which have been defined by express decrees of ecumenical Councils or of Roman Pontiffs and of this Apostolic See; but it must also be extended to those things which, by the ordinary magisterium of the whole Church dispersed throughout the world, are handed down as divinely revealed, and therefore by universal and constant consensus are retained by Catholic Theologians as pertaining to faith."

372. III. The same thing can also be persuaded from this, that in any art one must believe the skilled; nor would someone suffering from a grave illness reject the counsel of all physicians without rashness. The Fathers of the Council of Vienne confirm this prudent way of acting by example (Clementine, single constitution *On the Supreme Trinity*), saying: "That opinion which says that informing grace and virtues are conferred in baptism upon little children as well as adults, as being more probable and more consonant and concordant with the theology of modern doctors, is to be chosen by Catholics" (compare *On the Infused Virtues*, n. 37). On these words Canus rightly observes (same place, chapter 4): "If therefore in a matter which formerly had been controversial even among the scholastic Theologians themselves, the concordant opinion of the younger men was of so much weight with the Fathers in Council, how much more must we hold and revere matters prescribed by the school in every age? And if the common opinion itself of more recent Theologians makes faith for a Council, and inclines it to define that an opinion of this sort is to be held, what if all Theologians have predefined something not from opinion, but from a certain and by no means circuitous mind?"

373. The second part is proved. I. From, as it were, the nature of the thing. 1) Christ instituted an infallible magisterium in the Church in order that faith might be conserved whole in it. This is plain from the things which we indicated (n. 329), and it will be clearer from what must be said concerning the infallibility of the Church in teaching. Therefore, just as this infallibility can never fail in the Church, so neither can infallibility in believing fail in the whole Christian people; which would happen if by

common sense and consensus it erred in doctrine pertaining to faith and morals. 2) Christ so constituted the Church that she will always be indefectible. But the Church of Christ would fail if all in her erred concerning matters of faith and morals; for the principal bond, the foundation of the others, by which the faithful are contained in the Church, is the bond of faith. Therefore. Hence it is said (Ephesians 4.11-13): "He gave some indeed as Apostles... and others as pastors and doctors... until we all meet into the unity of faith"; and (Matthew 16.18) both that the gates of hell will not prevail against the Church, and that this is brought about by her being built upon the rock, are said.

374. From authority. St. Jerome uses this criterion against Vigilantius, writing (n. 5): "Who, O mad head, ever adored martyrs? Who thought a man to be God?... Therefore are we sacrilegious when we enter the basilicas of the Apostles? Was the Emperor Constantius sacrilegious, who transferred the holy relics of Andrew, Luke, and Timothy to Constantinople?... Is Arcadius now sacrilegious, who after a long time transferred the bones of blessed Samuel from Judea into Thrace?... Are all bishops to be judged foolish?... Are the peoples of all the churches foolish, who would go forth to meet the holy relics? etc." 3) Vincent of Lerins reasons in a similar way (*Commonitorium*, chapter 24): "If [novelties] are received, it is necessary that the faith of the blessed Fathers be violated either wholly or certainly in great part; it is necessary that all the faithful of all ages, all saints, all chaste, continent persons, virgins, all clerics, Levites and priests, so many thousands of confessors, so many armies of martyrs, so great a renown and multitude of cities and peoples, so many islands, provinces, kings, races, kingdoms, nations, finally already the whole world of lands, incorporated into Christ the Head through the Catholic faith, be pronounced, through so long a stretch of ages, to have been ignorant, to have erred, to have blasphemed, and not to have known what it believed." Cassian (*On the Incarnation*, book 1, chapter 6): "Therefore this confession of his [Leporius], that is, the faith of all Catholics, both all the African bishops from whom he wrote and all the Gallican bishops to whom he wrote approved... Therefore the consensus of all ought now by itself to suffice for refuting heresy, because the authority of all is the manifestation of undoubted truth, and a perfect reason is made where no one dissents." St. Basil (*Against Eunomius*, book 3, n. 1): "That he indeed does not think one ought to remain in the simple and bare faith of the many, but by certain artful and captious reasons to drag truth back again to that which seems good to himself, he shows sufficiently from the words which he has brought forward. For after contemning the opinion of the many, by which they glorify the Holy Spirit, he pretends that he holds the doctrine of the saints." St. Augustine often uses the same criterion. Thus, for example, he writes (*Against Julian*, book 1, chapter 7, n. 31): "We do not oppose to you, as you calumniously say, only the murmur of the people; although the people itself murmurs against you for this reason, because the question is not of such a kind that it can escape even the knowledge of peoples. Rich and poor, high and low, learned and unlearned, males and females know what is remitted to each age in baptism. Hence mothers also daily throughout the whole world run with little children not only to Christ, that is, to the Anointed, but to Christ Jesus, that is, to the Savior." And (page 55, otherwise 119, n. 35) he indicates the reason: "For the Church of God," he says, "placed among much chaff and many cockles, tolerates many things; and yet she neither approves, nor is silent about, nor does those things which are against faith or good life." You will find similar things in St. Athanasius (*On the Synods*, n. 4), Tertullian (*Prescription*, chapter 29), and St. Gregory Nazianzen (letter 2 to Cledonius). Hence the Church herself, before her definitions, sometimes investigates the sense of the faithful, just as Pius IX, before the definition of the Immaculate Conception, asked the Bishops to indicate "what was the piety and devotion of their faithful toward the Immaculate Conception of the Mother of God." But in the Bull *Ineffabilis*, among the criteria of divine tradition, he numbers "the singular agreement of Catholic Bishops and faithful."

375. SCHOLION. Against the established authority of the consensus of doctors, they are accustomed to object that several opinions were formerly commonly received in the school, which afterward were either found false or at least called into doubt. They illustrate this assertion by three principal examples. They say: 1) The Schools commonly taught that all minor orders are true sacraments. This

doctrine is now safely rejected by many. 2) They also commonly taught that the handing over of the instruments is the matter of the sacrament of orders. After the investigations of Morinus, Martene, and others, this is now placed in the imposition of hands alone. 3) Finally, they commonly taught that a penitent must approach the Sacrament of penance contrite, so that God alone absolves from fault, and the Priest or minister absolves from punishment or shows him to have been absolved. "For He Himself [God]," says the Master of the Sentences (book 4, distinction 18), "through Himself alone remits sin, because He both cleanses the soul from interior stain and frees it from the debt of eternal death. But He did not concede this to priests, to whom nevertheless He gave the power of loosing and binding, that is, of showing men bound or loosed." This opinion, especially after the Council of Trent, is held false. The reply is: Canus rightly wrote (book 8, chapter 4): "No dogma will be found which all Scholastics with the same mind and mouth have asserted certainly and firmly... If they can find any, let them bring it forward, and we shall be silent. But if none can be brought forward, without doubt, whether they wish it or not, that which is confirmed by the authority of the whole school is true, if it pertains, as I said, to faith and morals." With regard to the three alleged cases, that there was no universal consensus as concerning a matter certainly pertaining to faith or morals is clear even from this: that if it had once existed, it could never afterward have ceased, nor certainly would it have departed without the protest of the Church and of other doctors. But when, after the matter had been considered better, grave doctors began to go off into contrary opinions, they were never held guilty of violated faith or error. But that this may be directly plain concerning the individual objected heads of doctrine, we reply: To the first: Hugh of St. Victor, Peter Lombard, and Gratian, already before the age of St. Thomas, had taught that the Church had "constituted for herself" the minor orders, and that they were not instituted by Christ. By asserting this ecclesiastical institution, they sufficiently indicated that they are not true sacraments. But St. Thomas himself (on book 4, distinction 24, question 1, article 2, solution 2) speaks thus concerning this matter: "Concerning this there was a threefold opinion. For some said that a character is imprinted in the order of priesthood alone. But this does not seem true... Others said that a character is imprinted in sacred orders, but not in the minor ones... Since character is a sign distinguishing from others, it is necessary that it be imprinted in all... and this is the third opinion, which is more common." Where, therefore, is the unanimous consensus concerning a certain matter? The matter concerns an opinion then more common. But among several others who left this opinion, formerly more common, are Cajetan and Dominic Soto; the latter indeed thinks that St. Thomas would have changed his opinion if in the *Summa Theologiae* he had reached this place. To the second: It is conceded that the objected opinion concerning the matter of the sacrament of orders was formerly more common; even now it is defended by several; indeed in practice and usage it is to be held. But it is denied that it was handed down by unanimous consensus as altogether explored and certain. Let St. Bonaventure suffice as a witness, who defends that the essential matter of order is the imposition of hands alone. For (book 4, distinction 24, part 2, article 1, question 4) he says: "Just as every instrument or armor is in the power of the hand, so also through the imposition of hands, where such things [instruments] were lacking, they can be signified; whence... in the imposition of hands in the primitive Church the other orders were implied." Indeed, from the things which St. Thomas has (book 4, distinction 24, question 2, article 3), it is sufficiently clear that others explain the matter in other ways. To the third: The same is the reply. Certainly Richard of St. Victor, a contemporary of Lombard, writes thus (*Treatise on the Power of Binding and Loosing*, chapter 12): "There stands forth the opinion of certain men [therefore not of all] concerning the power of binding and loosing, so frivolous that it seems to be laughed at rather than refuted. For they think and preach that priests do not have the power of binding and loosing, but of showing men to be loosed or bound... They say that apostolic men do not have the power of remitting or retaining sins, although the Lord says this; they say that they have only the power of showing each, although the Lord does not say this." And St. Thomas (on book 4, distinction 18, question 1, article 3, solution 1, ad 1) tries to explain the opinion of the Master in a favorable sense; for he says: "As the Master says in the text, the power of remitting sins was committed to priests, not so that they remit by their own power, because this belongs to God; but so that they show the operation of God remitting, as ministers. But this happens in three

ways. In one way, that they show it as not present, but promise it as future... thus the sacraments of the old law signified the operation of God... In another way, that they signify it as present and operate nothing toward it; and thus some say that the sacraments of the new law signify the conferral of grace... In a third way, that they signify the divine operation present for the remission of fault, and operate something toward it dispositively and instrumentally; and thus, according to another opinion which is sustained as common, the Sacraments of the new law show cleansing divinely made; and in this way also the priest of the New Testament shows those absolved from fault." These things suffice for our matter; for the doctrine itself, which the proposed difficulties touch, is set forth in its own places.

Article 8. What the use of Scripture and Tradition is in Theology

376. Christian theology, which some call supernatural theology, others the theology of faith, is properly "a certain discursive science from revealed principles believed by divine faith." "It must be said," says St. Thomas (1 p., question 1, article 2), "that sacred doctrine is a science. But it must be known that there is a twofold kind of sciences. For some are those which proceed from principles known by the natural light of the intellect... But some are those which proceed from principles known by the light of a higher science: just as Perspective proceeds from principles made known through Geometry... And in this way sacred doctrine is a science, because it proceeds from principles known by the light of a higher science, which namely is the science of God."

377. Hence the proper office of theology is to inquire and demonstrate whether and how truths are contained in divine revelation; to compare them together, so that their mutual connection may be perceived; to infer one from another, or also from revealed truths to establish other truths by inference; finally, to polish, defend, and vindicate all of them if they are attacked. "It must be said," says the same Angelic Doctor (article 8), "that just as the other sciences do not argue to prove their own principles, but argue from their principles to show other things in those sciences, so this doctrine does not argue to prove its own principles, which are the articles of faith, but from them proceeds to show something else: as the Apostle in 1 Corinthians 15 argues from the resurrection of Christ to prove the common resurrection." Yet he observes that, just as the supreme human science in a certain way disputes against one denying its principles, so theology, "since it does not have a superior, disputes with one denying its principles, by arguing indeed if the adversary grants something of those things which are had through divine revelation; just as by the authorities of sacred doctrine we dispute against heretics, and by one article against those denying another. But if the adversary believes nothing of those things which are divinely revealed, there remains no further way to prove the articles of faith by reasons, but only to solve the reasons, if he brings any against the faith." Here apologetic theology is supposed, which from the motives of credibility shows the existence of Christian revelation, and which we have carried out thus far. Yet this, as Cardinal Franzelin notes (*On the One God*, page 15, ed. 1876), "does not deserve the name of Christian theology, except insofar as it rests, as upon its foundation, on the primitive supernatural persuasion from the light of faith. For if this connection with supernatural persuasion is lacking, it will be able to be philosophy propedeutic to Christian theology; it will not be Christian theology in the proper sense."

378. From these things it follows: 1) theology, like the other sciences, has sources from which it draws its arguments. Those sources are called theological places. For as Aristotle says (*Rhetoric*, book 1, chapter 2, n. 7): "Those are called places which commonly contain arguments concerning things which pertain to morals, to nature, to civil science, and to many other things differing from one another in species." Therefore for Aristotle a Place is that from which the philosopher or rhetorician draws the materials of reasons. Nor does Tullius teach otherwise, who says: "And so it is permitted to define a place as the seat of an argument." 2) It follows that the proper places of theology are contained in revealed principles, or divine revelation, although it does not reject the help of human sciences at times. "It must be

said," says St. Thomas (1 p., question 1, article 5, ad 2), "that this science [theology] can receive something from philosophical disciplines, not because it needs them from necessity, but for the greater manifestation of those things which are handed down in this science. For it does not receive its principles from other sciences, but immediately from God through revelation. And therefore it does not receive from other sciences as from superiors, but uses them as inferiors and handmaids... And this very fact that it uses them in this way is not on account of its defect or insufficiency, but on account of the defect of our intellect, which from those things which are known through natural reason (from which the others proceed) is more easily led by the hand into those things which are above reason, which are handed down in this science." And (article 8, ad 2): "To argue from authority is especially proper to this doctrine, because the principles of this doctrine are had through revelation... Yet sacred doctrine also uses human reason, not indeed to prove the faith... but to manifest certain other things which are handed down in this doctrine. Since therefore grace does not take away nature, but perfects it, it is necessary that natural reason serve faith, just as also the natural inclination of the will obeys charity... But sacred doctrine uses authorities of this sort as, so to speak, extraneous arguments."

379. Now the use of reason or of human sciences in a theological matter is sufficiently gathered from the things which we discussed concerning the office of reason in the matter of faith (*On the Infused Virtues*, disputation 4, article 7 ff.). We vindicated the authority of the divine Scriptures (ibid., article 4). We showed a little above the existence of divine traditions, and at the same time indicated the principal monuments by which they are conserved. Therefore from these things the theological Places have now been established. It remains only that we prescribe rules for their right use in theology; and after the things which have been disputed, it is permitted to dispatch this briefly.

380. I. The rules which are assigned for the right use of the Scriptures, some regard Scripture itself, others its sense. With regard to the former, it is certain: 1) an argument duly taken even from one place of Scripture is altogether irrefutable, for it is the word of God. 2) But the place must be taken from the canonical Scriptures, concerning whose authority alone it is established. We established the canon of the Scriptures (*On the Infused Virtues*, disputation 4, article 2). 3) Indeed, in order that the argument be efficacious, the text of Sacred Scripture must be drawn from its authentic edition; and therefore first of all from the Latin Vulgate edition, concerning whose authenticity there is an explicit and solemn judgment of the Church. 4) Yet since, as to the substance of the matter, there remained in the Hebrew text for the Old Testament and in the Greek text for the New Testament that authenticity which they already enjoyed before the decree of the Council of Trent, it is permitted to have recourse to those original texts. 5) Indeed, it is expedient to have recourse to them in the cases which we noted in the treatise *On the Infused Virtues* (n. 621). 6) But if some text is read both in the Latin Vulgate edition and in the original text, yet the sense is ambiguous in one or the other, the clear sense must prevail, if such a sense is found in one or the other. 7) It is understood, however, that the sense which either the Church or the unanimous interpretation of the Fathers has declared must always be retained. Compare *On the Infused Virtues* (disputation 4, articles 6 and 5).

381. But with regard to the rules concerning the sense of Sacred Scripture, it is necessary first to note that several senses are distinguished in it. For: 1) There is the literal or historical sense, which the words immediately present, and the spiritual or mystical sense, which is referred to something other than that which the words immediately signify. St. Thomas gives the reason for this twofold sense thus (1 p., question 1, article 10): "For the author of Sacred Scripture is God, in whose power it is not only to adapt words for signifying, which even man can do, but also the things themselves. And therefore, since in all sciences words signify, this science has this as proper to itself, that the very things signified by words also signify something. Therefore that first signification by which words signify things pertains to the first sense, which is the historical or literal sense. But that signification by which things signified by words again signify other things is called the spiritual sense, because it is founded upon the literal and supposes it." 2) The literal

sense is divided in two ways. One is proper, namely that which arises immediately from the words according to their proper acceptation, as, for example, in that text: "You shall love the Lord your God." The other is figurative, namely that which arises immediately from words transferred from their proper signification into an alien one, as in that text: "I have other sheep, which are not of this fold." Compare St. Augustine (*On Christian Doctrine*, book 3). Here it must be noted with St. Thomas (same place) that "the figure itself is not the literal sense, but that which is figured. For when Scripture names the arm of God, the literal sense is not that in God there is a bodily member of this sort, but that which is signified through this member, namely operative power." 3) Likewise the mystical sense is distinguished by more recent writers as threefold. It is allegorical, namely, if the words of Sacred Scripture, besides the literal sense, signify something in the New Testament pertaining to Christ or the Church. Thus it is literally true that Abraham had two wives, one free and the other a bondwoman, and two sons, Isaac and Ishmael; but these things, with the Apostle as witness (Galatians 4), signify God as author of the two Testaments and Father of two peoples. Furthermore there is the tropological spiritual sense, when words or deeds are referred to signify something pertaining to morals. Thus that text (Deuteronomy 25.4), "You shall not muzzle the mouth of the ox treading out the grain," with the Apostle as witness (1 Corinthians 9), mystically signifies that preachers are not to be forbidden to receive sustenance from the people. Finally there is the anagogical sense, which is had when words or deeds are referred to signifying eternal life. Thus that text (Psalm 94.11), "To whom I swore in My wrath, if they shall enter into My rest," is understood literally of the land of promise, but, with the Apostle as witness (Hebrews 4), spiritually signifies also eternal life. St. Thomas also gives the reason for this threefold sense, saying: "The old law is a figure of the new law; and the new law itself, as Dionysius says (*Ecclesiastical Hierarchy*, part 1, chapter 5), is a figure of future glory. In the new law also, the things done in the Head are signs of the things which we ought to do." Compare Bellarmine (*On the Word of God*, book 3, chapter 3). 4) Another sense can be added, which they call accommodative, or by accommodation, when the words of Sacred Scripture signifying some matter are used to signify another, from the fittingness which the one using them judges to exist between each matter. You have examples everywhere in the texts which Sacred Orators apply to the saints whose praises they celebrate.

382. These things having been set forth: 1) from the literal sense a certain argument can always be taken; from the mystical sense sometimes, namely when it is certainly established from Scripture or from the interpretation of the Church or the unanimous interpretation of the Holy Fathers; but from the accommodative sense never. The reason is evident: for the literal sense, and the mystical sense when it is established, is intended by the Holy Spirit and has infallible truth; but the accommodative sense is otherwise. 2) The words of Sacred Scripture must be taken in their proper sense, unless necessity compels them to be taken in an improper sense, according to the rule of St. Augustine (*On the Literal Meaning of Genesis*, book 8, chapter 7). Necessity would compel this if from words accepted in their proper sense some absurdity, something against faith, against morals, etc., would follow. Thus, for example, an absurdity would follow if the testimonies which seem to attribute human members to God were taken in the proper sense; something against moral uprightness would follow if those words (Matthew 18.8) were taken in the proper sense: "If your hand or your foot scandalizes you, cut it off and cast it from you"; and (verse 9): "If your eye scandalizes you, pluck it out and cast it from you," etc. 3) For attaining the true and genuine sense, the rules which hermeneutics supplies are useful, and we suppose them here. Hence it is often necessary to weigh the force of the words, the context, the aim, etc., so that that sense may be drawn out from these. 4) Yet the chief norm will always be the judgment of the Church and the unanimous sense of the Fathers, if it exists.

383. It must be noted here that in places of Sacred Scripture one must discern what the sacred Writers themselves say from what they report as said by others. The former always has infallible truth, since it is a divinely inspired judgment. Of the latter, by the same reason, it is always true that it was said by another just as it is reported. But whether the judgment uttered by another and reported by the sacred Writer contains truth, if it has not been approved by him, must be taken from the person and authority of the

one whose judgment it is. Thus if something is reported as said by God Himself, by the Prophets, or by another inspired Writer, it has infallible truth. But if something is reported as said by a man left to himself, it has human and fallible authority, as, for example, those words of the Jews (John 2.20): "This temple was built in forty-six years." Sometimes also a judgment truthfully reported can be false; as, for example, the words of the man born blind (John 9.31): "We know that God does not hear sinners"; or the words of the foolish man (Psalm 52.2): "There is no God"; or the words of Satan (Job 2.5): "Then you will see that he blesses You to Your face," etc.

384. These indeed concern the rules pertaining to the use of the Scriptures in theology. Now it is necessary to set forth the rules concerning the use of tradition. And first it should be noted that tradition, like Scripture, has a twofold authority (n. 252): historical or human, and divine. History can and must be employed according to the nature of the adversaries and according to the stage of the question, just as we employed the historical authority of the Gospels to prove the divine origin of Christian revelation, and the historical authority of tradition (n. 330) to prove its divine authority. Once historical authority is supposed, which is common to the other human testimonies, clothed, as they say, with the same conditions, we, as is clear to one weighing the arguments, have established divine authority, which is the criterion and effect of the charism of truth residing in the Church from the perennial assistance of the Holy Spirit. And this divine authority is of use in theology when theology establishes matters of faith and morals from its own proper sources. But in order that it may have full force of proving, the existence of the tradition and its true character must be certainly established. Wherefore the rules which we handed down (n. 322) for discerning traditions truly divine, whether they are Dominical or apostolic-divine, belong here. Nevertheless, just as questions could arise concerning the canon of the Scriptures, and others can arise concerning their genuine sense, so they can also arise concerning the existence, nature, and sense of tradition. In these doubts, just as for Scripture, so also for tradition, the chief norm which can authentically define the matter, in a way accommodated also to all, is the judgment of the living and authentic magisterium, existing always in the Church from the institution of Christ. Compare Valentia (*On Faith*, disputation 1, question 1, part 7, section 12).

385. But among the monuments which conserve and exhibit traditions, the principal ones, as we said (n. 344), are those which contain the judgments and definitions of the teaching Church. Even one of these judgments, in matters of faith and morals, entirely completes the matter, since, as we suppose here, it was issued from the infallible assistance of the Holy Spirit. Yet the following things must be noted. 1) If the matter concerns things to be believed by faith, it must be certainly established that those monuments contain a definition of faith. Certainly they are not of this sort if "the judges use words of opining, or if the responses are referred not to the whole universal Church, but to private Churches and Bishops. For they are to be understood to pronounce concerning faith only in that case where the judgment looks to all Christ's faithful and binds all. For the certitude of faith has been promised and conceded to judges constituted by God, not on account of private Churches, which individually can err, but on account of the universal Church, which cannot err. Therefore the doctrine of Supreme Pontiffs and Councils, if it is proposed to the whole Church, if it is proposed also with the obligation of believing, then truly it is a judgment concerning a cause of faith." 2) Even when it is established that some monument exhibits a definition of faith, it must be noted: "those things which in the decrees of Councils or Pontiffs are introduced either for the sake of explaining, or so that an objection may be answered, or even incidentally and in passing outside the principal subject concerning which chiefly there was controversy, do not pertain to faith; that is, they are not judgments of Catholic faith." 3) Yet beware lest you immediately judge these things and the preceding things, which we denied to pertain to a judgment of faith, to be destitute of all authority. Concerning this matter we discussed several things in the treatise *On the Infused Virtues* (n. 440 ff.), and we shall touch upon something below. 4) But in order that judgments of faith may be recognized, the following notes are assigned: the first, if those asserting the contrary are judged as heretics; the second, if this formula

is applied: "If anyone shall think this or that, let him be anathema"; the third, if upon those who contradict, a sentence of excommunication is passed by the law itself; the fourth, if anything is expressly said to be firmly believed by the faithful, or to be accepted as a dogma of Catholic faith, or if by other similar words something is said to be contrary to the Gospel or to the doctrine of the Apostles, certainly not by opining, but by a certain and firm judgment. Compare Canus (*On Places*, book 5, chapter 5). If, after these notes have been applied, doubt still remains, "in judging this matter," says Tanner (*On Faith*, question 4, doubt 6, n. 262), "both the judgment of wise men, and much more the sense and consensus of the Church, have great force."

386. But the monuments of tradition which next follow the definitions of the Church in dignity are the writings of the Holy Fathers. "In antiquity itself," says Vincent of Lerins (*Commonitorium*, chapter 38), "the sons of the Church will first of all place before the temerity of one or of very few the general decrees, if there are any, of a universal Council; then next, what is nearest, let them follow the mutually consenting judgments of many and great teachers." Now we said that the authority of the Fathers is irrefutable when by morally unanimous consensus they teach something (n. 352), and that it pertains to sacred doctrine (n. 348). But when it must be judged that unanimous consensus is present is plainly known from the things disputed (n. 353 ff.). Therefore it remains that rules be assigned for discerning whether what the Fathers teach pertains to sacred doctrine. And: 1) generally, if they hand down something by a truly unanimous consensus, it can generally be judged to pertain to sacred doctrine; for in other matters they are accustomed to disagree. 2) A certain note that a matter has been handed down by the Fathers as pertaining to sacred doctrine is present if they use words expressing a profession of faith: if, for example, they say, "We believe, we confess, we have been taught, Christ said or commanded, the Church believes or holds," etc. 3) If, as soon as a new opinion had arisen, the Fathers rose up against it as against something alien from the faith of the Catholic Church, opposed to the faith of the Church, or attacked its author as an innovator, heretic, etc. 4) If in catecheses or sermons to catechumens or to neophytes they proposed it as something to be believed, or commanded it to be done. 5) With regard to the interpretation of the Scriptures, "this also," says Fessler (*Institutions of Patrology*, chapter 1, section 20), "must not be passed over in silence: not so much the exegetical works of the Fathers, in which, indulging the genius of their age, they were sometimes too intent on catching allegories, but the dogmatic, moral, and polemical works, in which they treat lucidly and expound solidly the places of Scripture from which dogmas of faith and morals are proved, are to be used... Thus St. Cyril of Alexandria, if judgment is to be made from his Commentaries, will be judged an interpreter of a lower bench; but if we estimate him from his dogmatic and polemical works, he is most practiced in finding and expounding the true and literal sense of Scripture, and must be held in the first place."

387. These same things, with proportion observed, must be kept in the use of the authority of Theologians. But with regard to the sense of the faithful, besides the things said (n. 368), we shall note these things: 1) That sense and consensus is not the only criterion, but one of the criteria for judging concerning the existence of tradition; and therefore it can indeed be employed, but it is not always necessarily to be employed, for other criteria are available. 2) If that common sense is discovered either before the question has arisen or at the present time, it has equal force for certainly proving the existence of divine tradition, for at no time can the whole Church err in matters of faith and morals. Hence we must follow either antiquity or universality (compare *On the Infused Virtues*, n. 542). 3) It can indeed happen that at some time that common sense does not appear with regard to a matter concerning which it is had at a later time (compare ibid., n. 516); but if that common sense has once prevailed in the Church, dissent at a later time can never be universal; for otherwise the Church would err in either time. SERIES OF ROMAN PONTIFFS | Number | Names | Year | Migne, Patrologia Latina | |---:|---|---:|---:| | 1 | St. Peter | 42 | | | 2 | St. Linus | 67 | | | 3 | St. Cletus | 78 | | | 4 | St. Clement I | 91 | 130 | Century II. | Number | Names | Year | Migne, Patrologia Latina | |---:|---|---:|---:| | 5 | St. Anacletus | 101 | 130 | | 6 | St. Evaristus | 110 | 130 | | 7 | St.

Alexander I | 119 | 130 | | 8 | St. Sixtus I | 130 | 130 | | 9 | St. Telesphorus | 140 | 130 | | 10 | St. Hyginus | 152 | 130 | | 11 | St. Pius I | 156 | 130 | | 12 | St. Anicetus | 165 | 130 | | 13 | St. Soter | 173 | 130 | | 14 | St. Eleutherius | 177 | 130 | | 15 | St. Victor | 192 | 130 | Century III. | Number | Names | Year | Migne, Patrologia Latina | |---:|---|---:|---:| | 16 | St. Zephyrinus | 201 | 130 | | 17 | St. Callixtus I | 219 | 130 | | 18 | St. Urban I | 224 | 130 | | 19 | St. Pontian | 231 | 130 | | 20 | St. Anterus | 235 | 130 | | 21 | St. Fabian | 236 | 130 | | 22 | St. Cornelius | 251 | 3 | | 23 | St. Lucius I | 253 | 3 | | 24 | St. Stephen I | 255 | 3 | | 25 | St. Sixtus II | 257 | 5 | | 26 | St. Dionysius | 258 | 5 | | 27 | St. Felix I | 270 | 5 | | 28 | St. Eutychianus | 275 | 5 | | 29 | St. Caius | 283 | 5 | | 30 | St. Marcellinus | 296 | 6 | Century IV. | Number | Names | Year | Migne, Patrologia Latina | |---:|---|---:|---:| | 31 | St. Marcellus | 304 | 6 | | 32 | St. Eusebius | 309 | 6 | | 33 | St. Melchiades | 311 | 6 | | 34 | St. Sylvester I | 314 | 8 | SERIES OF ROMAN PONTIFFS | Number | Names | Year | Migne, Patrologia Latina | |---:|---|---:|---:| | 35 | St. Mark | 326 | 8 | | 36 | St. Julius I | 337 | 8 | | 37 | Liberius | 352 | 8 | | | Felix II (Pseudo) | 355 | 13 | | 38 | St. Damasus I | 367 | 13, 23 | | 39 | St. Siricius | 385 | 13 | | 40 | St. Anastasius I | 398 | 20 | Century V. | Number | Names | Year | Migne, Patrologia Latina | |---:|---|---:|---:| | 41 | St. Innocent I | 402 | 20, 33 | | 42 | St. Zosimus | 417 | 20 | | 43 | St. Boniface I | 418 | 20 | | 44 | St. Celestine I | 423 | 50 | | 45 | St. Sixtus III | 432 | 50 | | 46 | St. Leo I the Great | 440 | 54, 56 | | 47 | St. Hilary | 461 | 58 | | 48 | St. Simplicius | 467 | 58 | | 49 | St. Felix III | 483 | 58 | | 50 | St. Gelasius I | 492 | 59, 74 | | 51 | St. Anastasius II | 496 | | | 52 | St. Symmachus | 498 | 62 | Century VI. | Number | Names | Year | Migne, Patrologia Latina | |---:|---|---:|---:| | 53 | St. Hormisdas | 514 | 63 | | 54 | St. John I | 523 | | | 55 | St. Felix IV | 526 | 65 | | 56 | Boniface II | 530 | 65 | | 57 | St. John II | 532 | 66 | | 58 | St. Agapetus I | 535 | 66 | | 59 | St. Silverius | 536 | 66 | | 60 | Vigilius | 538 | 69 | | 61 | Pelagius I | 555 | 69 | | 62 | John III | 561 | 72 | | 63 | Benedict I | 575 | 72 | | 64 | Pelagius II | 579 | 72 | | 65 | St. Gregory I the Great | 590 | 75, 79 | Century VII. | Number | Names | Year | Migne, Patrologia Latina | |---:|---|---:|---:| | 66 | Sabinian | 604 | | | 67 | Boniface III | 607 | | | 68 | St. Boniface IV | 608 | 80 | | 69 | St. Deusdedit | 616 | 80 | | 70 | Boniface V | 620 | 80 | | 71 | Honorius I | 626 | 80 | | 72 | Severinus | 640 | | SERIES OF ROMAN PONTIFFS | Number | Names | Year | Migne, Patrologia Latina | |---:|---|---:|---:| | 73 | John IV | 640 | 80 | | 74 | Theodore I | 642 | 87 | | 75 | St. Martin I | 649 | 87 | | 76 | St. Eugene I | 654 | | | 77 | St. Vitalian | 657 | 87 | | 78 | Adeodatus | 672 | 87 | | 79 | Donus | 677 | 87 | | 80 | St. Agatho | 678 | 87 | | 81 | St. Leo II | 682 | 96 | | 82 | St. Benedict II | 685 | 96 | | 83 | John V | 686 | 96 | | 84 | Conon | 687 | | | 85 | St. Sergius I | 688 | 89 | Century VIII. | Number | Names | Year | Migne, Patrologia Latina | |---:|---|---:|---:| | 86 | John VI | 702 | 89 | | 87 | John VII | 705 | 89 | | 88 | Sisinnius | 707 | | | 89 | Constantine | 708 | 89 | | 90 | St. Gregory II | 715 | 89 | | 91 | St. Gregory III | 731 | 89, 98 | | 92 | St. Zachary | 741 | 89, 98 | | 93 | Stephen II | 752 | 89, 98 | | 94 | St. Paul I | 757 | 89, 98 | | 95 | Stephen III | 768 | 89, 98 | | 96 | Adrian I | 772 | 96, 98 | | 97 | Leo III | 795 | 98, 102 | Century IX. | Number | Names | Year | Migne, Patrologia Latina | |---:|---|---:|---:| | 98 | Stephen IV | 816 | 102, 129 | | 99 | St. Paschal I | 817 | 102, 6, 29 | | 100 | Eugene II | 824 | 105, 129 | | 101 | Valentine | 827 | 105 | | 102 | Gregory IV | 828 | 106, 129 | | 103 | Sergius II | 844 | 106, 129 | | 104 | St. Leo IV | 847 | 115 | | 105 | Benedict III | 855 | 115, 129 | | 106 | St. Nicholas I | 858 | 119 | | 107 | Adrian II | 867 | 122, 119 | | 108 | John VIII | 872 | 126 | | 109 | Martin I, or Martin II | 882 | 126 | | 110 | Adrian III | 884 | 126 | | 111 | Stephen V | 885 | 129 | SERIES OF ROMAN PONTIFFS | Number | Names | Year | Migne, Patrologia Latina | |---:|---|---:|---:| | 112 | Formosus | 891 | 129 | | 113 | Boniface VI | 896 | | | 114 | Stephen VI | 896 | 129 | | 115 | Romanus | 897 | 129 | | 116 | Theodore II | 898 | 87, 129 | | 117 | John IX | 899 | 131 | | 118 | Benedict IV | 900 | 131 | Century X. | Number | Names | Year | Migne, Patrologia Latina | |---:|---|---:|---:| | 119 | Leo V | 904 | | | | Christopher (Pseudo) | 904 | 131 | | 120 | Sergius III | 905 | 131 | | 121 | Anastasius III | 912 | 131 | | 122 | Lando | 914 | | | 123 | John X | 915 | 132 | | 124 | Leo VI | 928 | 132 | | 125 | Stephen VII | 929 | 132 | | 126 | John XI | 931 | 132 | | 127 | Leo VII | 936 | 132 | | 128 | Stephen VIII | 939 | 132 | | 129 | Martin II, or Martin III | 943 | 133 | | 130 | Agapetus II | 946 | 133 | | 131 | John XII | 955 | 133 | | | Leo VII (Pseudo) | 963 | 134 | | 132 | Benedict V | 964 | | | 133 | John XIII | 965 | 133 | | 134 | Benedict VI | 972 | 135 | | 135 | Benedict VII | 975 | 137 | | 136 | John XIV | 984 | 137 | | | Boniface IV (Pseudo) | 985 | | | 137 | John XV | 986 | 137 | | 138 | Gregory V | 997 | 137 | | | John XVI (Pseudo) | | | | 139 | Sylvester II | 999 | 139 | Century XI. | Number | Names | Year | Migne, Patrologia Latina | |---:|---|---:|---:| | 140 | John XVII | 1003 | | | 141 | John XVIII | 1004 | 139 | | 142 | Sergius IV | 1009 | 139 | | 143 | Benedict VIII

| 1012 | 139 | | 144 | John XIX | 1024 | 141 | | 145 | Benedict IX | 1033 | 141 | SERIES OF ROMAN PONTIFFS | Number | Names | Year | Migne, Patrologia Latina | |---:|---|---:|---:|---:| | 146 | Gregory VI | 1045 | 142 | | 147 | Clement II | 1046 | 142 | | 148 | Damasus II | 1048 | | | 149 | St. Leo IX | 1049 | 143 | | 150 | Victor II | 1055 | 143 | | 151 | St. Stephen IX | 1057 | 143 | | | Benedict X (Pseudo) | | | | 152 | Nicholas II | 1059 | 143 | | 153 | Alexander II | 1061 | 146 | | 154 | St. Gregory VII | 1073 | 148 | | 155 | Victor III | 1087 | 149 | | 156 | Urban II | 1088 | 151 | | 157 | Paschal II | 1099 | 163 | Century XII. | Number | Names | Year | Migne, Patrologia Latina | |---:|---|---:|---:|---:| | 158 | Gelasius II | 1118 | 163 | | 159 | Callixtus II | 1123 | 163 | | 160 | Honorius II | 1128 | 166 | | 161 | Innocent II | 1130 | 179 | | 162 | Celestine II | 1143 | 179 | | 163 | Lucius II | 1144 | 179 | | 164 | Eugene III | 1145 | 180 | | 165 | Anastasius IV | 1153 | 188 | | 166 | Adrian IV | 1154 | 188 | | 167 | Alexander III | 1159 | 188 | | 168 | Lucius III | 1181 | 201 | | 169 | Urban III | 1185 | 202 | | 170 | Gregory VIII | 1187 | 202 | | 171 | Clement III | 1187 | 204 | | 172 | Celestine III | 1191 | 206 | | 173 | Innocent III | 1198 | 214-217 | Century XIII. | Number | Names | Year | Migne, Patrologia Latina | |---:|---|---:|---:|---:| | 174 | Honorius III | 1216 | 148 | | 175 | Blessed Gregory IX | 1227 | 142 | | 176 | Celestine IV | 1241 | | | 177 | Innocent IV | 1243 | | | 178 | Alexander IV | 1254 | | | 179 | Urban IV | 1261 | | | 180 | Clement IV | 1265 | | | 181 | Blessed Gregory X | 1271 | | | 182 | Innocent V | 1276 | | | 183 | Adrian V | 1276 | | | 184 | John XX, or XXI | 1276 | | | 185 | Nicholas III | 1277 | | SERIES OF ROMAN PONTIFFS | Number | Names | Year | Migne, Patrologia Latina | |---:|---|---:|---:|---:| | 186 | Martin IV | 1281 | | | 187 | Honorius IV | 1285 | | | 188 | Nicholas IV | 1288 | | | 189 | St. Celestine V | 1294 | | | 190 | Boniface VIII | 1294 | | Century XIV. | Number | Names | Year | Migne, Patrologia Latina | |---:|---|---:|---:|---:| | 191 | Blessed Benedict XI | 1303 | | | 192 | *Clement V* | *1305* | | | *193* | John XXII | 1316 | | | 194 | *Benedict XII* | *1334* | | | *195* | Clement VI | 1342 | | | 196 | *Innocent VI* | *1352* | | | *197* | Urban V | 1362 | 99 | | 198 | *Gregory XI (Returned to Rome)* | *1370* | | | *199* | + *Urban VI* | *1378* | | | | Clement VII (Pseudo) | 1378 | | | 200 | + Boniface IX | 1389 | | | | Benedict XIII (Pseudo) | 1394 | | Century XV. | Number | Names | Year | Migne, Patrologia Latina | |---:|---|---:|---:|---:| | 201 | + Innocent VII | 1404 | | | 202 | + Gregory XII | 1406 | | | 203 | + Alexander V (Pseudo) | 1409 | | | 204 | + John XXIII (Pseudo) | 1410 | | | 205 | Martin V | 1417 | | | 206 | Eugene IV | 1431 | | | 207 | Nicholas V | 1447 | | | 208 | Callixtus III | 1455 | | | 209 | Pius II | 1457 | | | 210 | Paul II | 1464 | | | 211 | Sixtus IV | 1471 | | | 212 | Innocent VIII | 1484 | | | 213 | Alexander VI | 1492 | | Century XVI. | Number | Names | Year | Migne, Patrologia Latina | |---:|---|---:|---:|---:| | 214 | Pius III | 1503 | | | 215 | Julius II | 1503 | | | 216 | Leo X | 1513 | | NOTES *Pontiffs who lived at Avignon. + Pontiffs who during the Western Schism lived at Rome. SERIES OF ROMAN PONTIFFS* | *Number* | *Names* | *Year* | *Migne, Patrologia Latina* | *|---:|---|---:|---:|---:|* | *217* | *Adrian VI* | *1522* | | | *218* | *Clement VII* | *1523* | | | *219* | *Paul III* | *1534* | | | *220* | *Julius III* | *1550* | | | *221* | *Marcellus II* | *1555* | | | *222* | *Paul IV* | *1555* | | | *223* | *Pius IV* | *1560* | | | *224* | *St. Pius V* | *1566* | | | *225* | *Gregory XIII* | *1572* | | | *226* | *Sixtus V* | *1585* | | | *227* | *Urban VII* | *1590* | | | *228* | *Gregory XIV* | *1590* | | | *229* | *Innocent IX* | *1591* | | | *230* | *Clement VIII* | *1592* | | *Century XVII.* | *Number* | *Names* | *Year* | *Migne, Patrologia Latina* | *|---:|---|---:|---:|---:|* | *231* | *Leo XI* | *1605* | | | *232* | *Paul V* | *1605* | | | *233* | *Gregory XV* | *1621* | | | *234* | *Urban VIII* | *1623* | | | *235* | *Innocent X* | *1644* | | | *236* | *Alexander VII* | *1655* | | | *237* | *Clement IX* | *1667* | | | *238* | *Clement X* | *1670* | | | *239* | *Innocent XI* | *1675* | | | *240* | *Alexander VIII* | *1689* | | | *241* | *Innocent XII* | *1691* | | *Century XVIII.* | *Number* | *Names* | *Year* | *Migne, Patrologia Latina* | *|---:|---|---:|---:|---:|* | *242* | *Clement XI* | *1700* | | | *243* | *Innocent XIII* | *1721* | | | *244* | *Benedict XIII* | *1724* | | | *245* | *Clement XII* | *1732* | | | *246* | *Benedict XIV* | *1740* | | | *247* | *Clement XIII* | *1758* | | | *248* | *Clement XIV* | *1769* | | | *249* | *Pius VI* | *1775* | | *Century XIX.* | *Number* | *Names* | *Year* | *Migne, Patrologia Latina* | *|---:|---|---:|---:|---:|* | *250* | *Pius VII* | *1800* | | | *251* | *Leo XII* | *1823* | | | *252* | *Pius VIII* | *1829* | | | *253* | *Gregory XVI* | *1831* | | | *254* | *Pius IX* | *1846* | | | *255* | *Leo XIII* | *1878* | | *Century XX.* | *Number* | *Names* | *Year* | *Migne, Patrologia Latina* | *|---:|---|---:|---:|---:|* | *256* | *Pius X* | *1903* | | *ECUMENICAL COUNCILS* | *Year* | *Council* | *Fathers* | *Labbe* | *|---:|---|---|---:|* | *325* | *Nicaea I* | *318 bishops* | *2* | | *381* | *Constantinople I* | *150* | *2* | | *431* | *Ephesus* | *200* | *3* | | *451* | *Chalcedon* | *636* | *4* | | *553* | *Constantinople II* | *165* | *5* | | *680-681* | *Constantinople III* | *160* | *6* | | *787* | *Nicaea II* | *350* | *7* | | *869-870* | *Constantinople IV* | *102* | *8* | *Western Councils.* | *Year* | *Council* | *Fathers* | *Labbe* | *|---:|---|---|---:|* | *1123* | *Lateran I* | *300 bishops* | *10* | | *1139* | *Lateran II* | *997 in all; 1000* | *10* | | *1179* | *Lateran III* | *302* |

10 | | 1215 | Lateran IV | 439 bishops; 800 inferiors | 11 | | 1245 | Lyons I | 140 | 11 | | 1274 | Lyons II | 587 bishops; 1070 inferiors | 11 | | 1311 | Vienne | 300 | 11 | | 1417-1418 | Constance (from session 41) | | | | 1431 | Basel (from session 1 to 25) | | | | 1439-1445 | Florence | 150 | 13 | | 1512-1517 | Lateran V | 100 | 14 | | 1545-1563 | Trent | 276 bishops; 174 inferiors | 14 | | 1869 | Vatican | | | LIST OF ECCLESIASTICAL WRITERS | Names | Death | Migne, Patrologia | |---|---:|---| Century I. | Names | Death | Migne, Patrologia | |---|---:|---| | St. Barnabas | | G. 2 | | Presbyters of Achaia | | G. 2 | | Hermas | 95 | G. 2 | | St. Dionysius the Areopagite | 95 | G. 3, 4 | | St. Clement of Rome | 101 | G. 1 | Century II. | Names | Death | Migne, Patrologia | |---|---:|---| | St. Ignatius | 107 | G. 5 | | St. Polycarp | 166 | G. 5 | | St. Justin, Tatian | 167 | 6 | | Athenagoras | 177 | 6 | | St. Theophilus of Antioch | 181 | G. 6 | | Hegesippus | 181 | 6 | | Hermias | | G. 6 | | St. Irenaeus | 202 | 7 | Century III. | Names | Death | Migne, Patrologia | |---|---:|---| | Minucius Felix | 209 | L. 3 | | Clement of Alexandria | 217 | G. 9 | | Julius Africanus | 221 | G. 10 | | St. Hippolytus | 222 | G. 10 | | Tertullian | 245 | L. 1, 3 | | Origen | 254 | G. 11, 17 | | St. Cyprian | 258 | L. 4 | | St. Dionysius of Alexandria | 265 | G. 10 | | St. Gregory Thaumaturgus | 270 | G. 10 | | St. Pamphilus | 294 | G. 10 | Century IV. | Names | Death | Migne, Patrologia | |---|---:|---| | St. Methodius | 312 | G. 18 | | Arnobius | 320 | L. 5 | | Lactantius | 325 | L. 6, 7 | | Juvencus | 330 | L. 19 | | Constantine the Great | 336 | L. 8 | Footnote 1. According to another opinion, Hermas was the brother of Pius I, and therefore belongs to the second century. Footnote 2. But the works under the name of Dionysius the Areopagite are referred by others to the fifth or sixth century. LIST OF ECCLESIASTICAL WRITERS | Names | Death | Migne, Patrologia | |---|---:|---| | Firmicus Maternus | 337 | L. 12 | | St. Eusebius of Vercelli | 338 | L. 12 | | Eusebius of Caesarea | 340 | G. 19, 24 | | Marcellus of Ancyra | 341 | G. 18 | | St. Eustathius of Antioch | 345 | G. 18 | | St. Pachomius | 348 | G. 40 | | St. James of Nisibis | 352 | | | St. Anthony the Abbot | 356 | G. 40 | | St. Diadochus | 360 | G. 65 | | St. Hilary of Poitiers | 368 | L. 9, 10 | | Victorinus Marius | 370 | L. 8 | | Lucifer of Cagliari | 371 | L. 13 | | St. Athanasius | 373 | G. 25, 28 | | St. Ephrem | 378 | | | St. Basil | 379 | G. 29, 32 | | St. Zeno of Verona | 380 | | | St. Optatus of Milevis | 384 | L. 11 | | St. Cyril of Jerusalem | 386 | G. 33 | | St. Gregory Nazianzen | 392 | G. 35, 38 | | St. Phoebadius | 392 | L. 20 | | St. Pacian | 397 | L. 13 | | St. Ambrose | 397 | L. 14, 57 | | Didymus of Alexandria | 397 | G. 39 | | Evagrius Ponticus | 399 | G. 40 | | St. Epiphanius | 402 | G. 40, 43 | | St. Gregory of Nyssa | 403 | G. 44, 46 | | St. Amphilochius of Cappadocia | 404 | L. 73 | | St. Gaudentius of Brescia | 405 | L. 20 | | St. Chromatius | 407 | L. 20 | | St. John Chrysostom | 407 | G. 47, 64 | | SS. Macarii, Egyptian and Alexandrian | | G. 34 | Century V. | Names | Death | Migne, Patrologia | |---|---:|---| | Synesius | 410 | G. 66 | | Prudentius of Aurillac | 410 | L. 59, 60 | | St. Jerome | 420 | L. 22, 30 | | Palladius of Helenopolis | 420 | G. 34, 65 | | Theophilus of Constantinople | 420 | L. 22 | | Orosius | 420 | L. 31 | | Rufinus | 420 | L. 21 | | Sulpicius Severus | 420 | L. 20 | | St. Augustine | 430 | L. 32, 47 | | St. Paulinus of Nola | 430 | L. 61 | | Theodore of Mopsuestia | 430 | G. 66 | | Socrates | 430 | G. 67 | | Sozomen | 430 | G. 67 | | St. Isidore of Pelusium | 440 | G. 78 | | St. Cyril of Alexandria | 440 | G. 68, 77 | | St. Proclus | 446 | G. 65 | | Cassian | 448 | L. 49, 50 | | St. Hilary of Arles | 449 | L. 50 | LIST OF ECCLESIASTICAL WRITERS | Names | Death | Migne, Patrologia | |---|---:|---| | Marius Mercator | 450 | L. 19 | | St. Vincent of Lerins | 450 | L. 50 | | St. Peter Chrysologus | 451 | L. 52 | | St. Nilus | 452 | G. 79 | | St. Eucherius of Lyons | 454 | L. 50 | | Theodoret | 458 | G. 80, 84 | | Dracontius | 460 | L. 60 | | St. Basil of Seleucia | 460 | G. 85 | | Arnobius Junior | 460 | L. 53 | | Victorius of Le Mans | 460 | L. 54 | | St. Leo the Great | 461 | L. 54, 56 | | St. Prosper of Aquitaine | 463 | L. 51 | | St. Maximus of Turin | 466 | L. 57 | | Claudianus Mamertus | 470 | L. 53 | | Victor of Vita | 480 | L. 58 | | St. Sidonius Apollinaris | 482 | L. 58 | | St. Faustus of Riez | 485 | L. 58 | | Salvian | 490 | L. 53 | | Gennadius of Marseilles | 495 | L. 58 | | Julianus Pomerius | 498 | L. 58 | Century VI. | Names | Death | Migne, Patrologia | |---|---:|---| | Ennodius | 521 | L. 63 | | Boethius | 523 | L. 63, 64 | | Procopius of Gaza | 524 | G. 87 | | St. Avitus of Vienne | 525 | L. 59 | | St. Fulgentius | 533 | L. 65 | | St. Caesarius of Arles | 542 | L. 67 | | St. Benedict the Abbot | 543 | L. 66 | | Arator | 550 | L. 68 | | Eugyppius the Abbot | 555 | L. 62 | | Dionysius Exiguus | 555 | L. 67 | | Liberatus | 555 | L. 68 | | Cassiodorus | 562 | L. 69, 70 | | St. John Climacus | 570 | G. 88 | | St. Germanus of Paris | 576 | L. 72 | | St. Martin of Braga | 580 | L. 72 | | St. Gregory the Great | 584 | L. 75, 79 | | Evagrius Scholasticus | 594 | G. 86 | | St. Gregory of Tours | 595 | L. 71 | | St. Leander of Seville | 595 | L. 72 | | St.

Anastasius Sinaita | *599* | *G. 89* | | *Venantius Fortunatus* | *609* | *L. 88* | | *Hesychius of Jerusalem* | *609* | *G. 93* | *Century VII.* | *Names* | *Death* | *Migne, Patrologia* | |---|---:|---| | *St. Columbanus* | *615* | *L. 80* | | *St. Sophronius of Jerusalem* | *629* | *G. 87* | | *John Moschus* | *630* | *G. 87* | *LIST OF ECCLESIASTICAL WRITERS* | *Names* | *Death* | *Migne, Patrologia* | |---|---:|---| | *St. Braulio* | *633* | *L. 80* | | *St. Isidore of Seville* | 636 | L. 81, 84 | | St. Gallus the Abbot | 640 | L. 87 | | John of Dara | 650 | G. | | St. Taio | 656 | L. 81 | | St. Eligius of Noyon | 659 | L. 87 | | St. Maximus the Martyr | 662 | G. 90 | | St. Ildephonsus of Toledo | *667* | *L. 93* | | *St. Andrew of Crete* | *680* | *G. 97* | | *John of Thessalonica* | *680* | *G.* | | *St. Julian of Toledo* | *690* | *L. 96* | | *St. Theodore of Canterbury* | *690* | *L. 99* | | *Abbo of Metz* | *700* | *L. 87* | *Century VIII.* | *Names* | *Death* | *Migne, Patrologia* | |---|---:|---| | *St. Aldhelm* | *710* | *L. 89* | | *Venerable Bede* | *735* | *L. 90, 95* | | *St. Germanus of Constantinople* | *740* | *G. 98* | | *St. Boniface of Mainz* | *755* | *L. 89* | | *St. John Damascene* | *760* | *G. 94, 96* | | *St. Chrodegang* | *766* | *L. 89* | | *St. Cosmas of Jerusalem* | *743* | *G. 98* | | *Blessed Alcuin* | *804* | *L. 100* | | *St. Paulinus of Aquileia* | *804* | *D. 99* | *Century IX.* | *Names* | *Death* | *Migne, Patrologia* | |---|---:|---| | *Charles the Great* | *814* | *L. 97, 98* | | *Isidore Mercator* | *814* | *L. 130* | | *Amalarius of Trier* | *815* | *L. 99* | | *Theodulph of Orleans* | *821* | *L. 105* | | *St. Benedict of Aniane* | *821* | *L. 103* | | *Smaragdus* | *824* | *L. 102; G. 99* | | *St. Theodore the Studite* | *826* | *L. 129* | | *Amalarius of Metz* | *830* | *L. 105* | | *Ansegisus the Abbot* | *833* | *L. 105* | | *St. Agobard of Lyons* | *840* | *L. 105* | | *Jonas of Orleans* | *843* | *L. 104* | | *Walafrid Strabo* | *849* | *L. 116* | | *St. Paschasius Radbertus* | *851* | *L. 133* | | *Rabanus Maurus* | *856* | *L. 107, 112* | | *St. Eulogius of Toledo* | *859* | *L. 115* | | *Lupus of Ferrieres* | *861* | *L. 119* | | *Ratramnus* | *870* | *L. 121* | | *St. Remigius of Lyons* | *873* | *L. 131* | | *St. Ado of Vienne* | *875* | *L. 133* | | *Usuard* | *877* | *L. 133, 134* | | *Hincmar of Rheims* | *882* | *L. 135, 136* | *LIST OF ECCLESIASTICAL WRITERS* | *Names* | *Death* | *Migne, Patrologia* | |---|---:|---| | *Anastasius Bibliothecarius* | *887* | *L. 127, 129* | | *Photius* | *881* | *G. 101, 104* | | *Remigius of Auxerre* | *908* | *L. 131* | *Century X.* | *Names* | *Death* | *Migne, Patrologia* | |---|---:|---| | *Notker Balbulus* | *911* | *L. 131* | | *Regino* | *915* | *L. 132* | | *Symeon Metaphrastes* | *942* | *G. 114, 116* | | *St. Odo of Cluny* | *942* | *L. 133* | | *Flodoard* | *966* | *L. 135* | | *Ratherius* | *973* | *L. 136* | | *Gerbert* | *1003* | *L. 138* | | *Abbo of Fleury* | *1004* | *L. 139* | *Century XI.* | *Names* | *Death* | *Migne, Patrologia* | |---|---:|---| | *Burchard* | *1025* | *L. 141* | | *St. Fulbert* | *1028* | *L. 141* | | *Symeon of Thessalonica* | *1030* | *G.* | | *St. Bruno of Wurzburg* | *1045* | *L. 142* | | *Bruno of Reichenau* | *1048* | *L. 143* | | *St. Peter Damian* | 1072 | L. 144, 145 | | Theophylact | 1077 | G. 126, 126 | | St. Lanfranc | 1089 | L. 150, 158 | | St. Bruno the Carthusian | 1101 | L. 152, 153 | | St. Anselm | *1109* | *L. 158, 159* | *Century XII.* | *Names* | *Death* | *Migne, Patrologia* | |---|---:|---| | *St. Ivo of Chartres* | *1115* | *L. 158, 159* | | *St. Bruno of Asti* | *1125* | *L. 164, 165* | | *Honorius of Autun* | *1131* | *L. 172* | | *St. Alger of Liege* | *1132* | *L. 180* | | *Rupert of Deutz* | *1135* | *L. 167, 170* | | *Hugh of St. Victor* | *1140* | *L. 175, 176* | | *Gratian* | *1151* | *L. 187* | | *Suger the Abbot* | *1152* | *L. 186* | | *St. Bernard* | 1153 | L. 182, 185 | | Peter Lombard | 1164 | L. 190, 192 | | Richard of St. Victor | 1173 | L. 196 | | St. Thomas of Canterbury | 1174 | L. 190 | | Peter Comestor | 1199 | L. 198 | | Peter of Blois | 1200 | L. 107 |

388. In the preceding disputation we considered the Christian religion as it were in the abstract, and we saw that it alone is true; just as we established that its doctrines and institutions are contained not only in the Scriptures, but also in oral tradition. But it is time, by setting up the question concretely, to inquire what the Christian religion is, and where that authentic and living magisterium is to which, as we demonstrated elsewhere, both the Scriptures and traditions have been committed. This is all the more necessary because there are several groups of men, disagreeing among themselves, who claim the Christian name for themselves.

389. Hence no one fails to see of how great moment the present treatment is. For just as Christ is the end of every controversy with Jews and unbelievers, so the Church is the end of every controversy with non-Catholics. For Christ instituted her so that through her men might learn the true religion and profess the same within her. Therefore, just as the treatment concerning Religion aims at this, that men become Christians, so the treatment which we undertake concerning the Church pertains to this, that Christians become or be Catholics.

390. Yet in this disputation, that we may consult order and clarity, we treat of the institution of the Church of Christ and her intimate constitution; but in the following disputation we shall establish the properties, gifts, and notes of the Church herself, from which finally it will not be difficult to define which is the true Church of Christ.

391. But in the whole course of the demonstration we often draw arguments from Sacred Scripture. By what reasoning this is done must be sought from the things said in the treatise *On the Infused Virtues* (n. 912 ff.). Nor do we introduce here the authority of the Fathers by a dissimilar reasoning; for the divine authority of tradition is rightly employed only when it has already been established that the charism of infallibility is present in the Church; but its human authority must always be held efficacious, and against all.

392. Indeed this method is different from that which the older Theologians followed; but Perrone rightly observes (Proem) that we are compelled to follow it "first of all by the manner of acting of Protestants, biblicists, rationalists, and mythicists in attacking Catholic doctrines, on account of which it is no longer granted to us to tread the worn path... The norm of attacking the enemies of Religion had to be varied after they began to use new contrivances for attacking Catholics... Who has ever not seen that no one can suitably discuss the sacred Scriptures, insofar as they are regarded as divine, concerning their inspiration and canon, as they say, to pass over the rest, unless that authority is first constituted from which alone those notes can be safely established for us? Say the same concerning divine traditions and their authority, and concerning the rest which depend upon the authority and testimony of the Church."

Disputation III — On the Institution and Constitution of the Church

Article 1. Preliminary Notions are Handed Down

393. "The name Church," says Bellarmine (tome 2, book 3, chapter 1), "is Greek, and is derived from the verb *ekkaleo*, which is to call forth. Therefore Church is a calling forth, or the assembly of those called. But the people of God are called an assembly of those called because no one joins himself to this people by himself and by his own proper impulse, but all, as many as come, are preceded by the calling of God. For calling is the first benefit which the saints receive from God. 'Whom He called,' says the Apostle (Romans 8), 'these He justified; whom He justified, these He also glorified'; and (Acts 2): 'Whomsoever the Lord our God shall call.' Hence so often the Apostle calls Christians 'called,' in almost all his epistles."

394. Sometimes the name Church is transferred from the thing contained to the container, and therefore is taken for the place in which assemblies are held. Thus (Judith 6.21): "All the people were called together, and through the whole night they prayed within the church"; and (1 Corinthians 11.22): "Do you not have houses for eating and drinking? Or do you despise the Church of God?..." "Yet when it is used for an assembly of men," the same Bellarmine notes (same place), "the name Church, with some added term, can be taken both in a good and in an evil sense; for it is said, 'the church of the malignant,' Psalm 25, and 'the Church of the Saints,' Psalm 88. But when this name is put absolutely, it is not understood except of the Church of Christ, with the exception of one place, Acts 19, where it is said of a people of Gentiles: 'The assembly was confused.' Here by the name Church we signify the assembly of called men, or of the faithful."

395. But even according to this proper acceptation, the word Church is sometimes taken in a very broad sense; and it designates all the faithful, both wayfarers, those being purified, and comprehensors, even angels. Hence the Apostle says of Christ (Ephesians 1.22): "He gave Him as head over the whole Church"; where he deliberately said "over the whole Church," so that it may be understood that Christ is not head only of the Church which is on earth, or in purgatory, or in heaven, but of the whole Church, whether militant, purgative, or triumphant. But in the triumphant Church even angels are comprehended; hence St. Augustine (on Psalm 36) writes: "From all the faithful and angels there is made one city under one king." And St. Thomas (3 p., question 8, article 4) says: "The mystical body of the Church consists not only of men, but also of angels. But Christ is the head of this whole multitude, because He has Himself more closely to God, and participates more perfectly in His gifts, not only than men, but also than angels; and from His influence not only men receive, but also angels." Moreover, in this treatise we speak of the militant Church.

396. According to this acceptation, the word Church can still signify the collection of all the faithful on earth, from the beginning of the world until its end. In this way St. Gregory the Great (homily 19 on the Gospels) says: "The universal Church begins from righteous Abel even to the last elect one who is to be born at the end of the world." Hence a threefold state of the Church can be considered in this life: the state of the law of nature, the state of the written law, and the state of the law of grace. In the state of the law of nature she properly had no determined form, although some things were successively added by God through revelation. Thus of Enos it is read (Genesis 4.26): "He began to invoke the name of the Lord," namely by some external and public sign. In the state of the written law the form of the Church was determined for a time with regard to the Hebrew people; but the nations were not bound to it. Therefore with regard to them the Church was as in the law of nature. But in the state of the law of grace the Church received a new and perfect form from Christ; and all peoples are bound to adhere to her.

397. But St. Augustine observes, with the ancient author of the commentary on Proverbs (chapter 5, in St. Jerome), that the name Church is more excellent than Synagogue, which is a congregation; for only rational creatures are called, while even cattle are said to be congregated. Hence although in the Old Testament the people of God among the Israelites were sometimes called Church, nevertheless the Church of Christ, or the people of the New Testament, was never called Synagogue. Therefore here we take the name Church not in a strict sense insofar as it means convocation, or the assembly of the faithful wayfarers in the New Testament.

398. Yet even in this sense, the word Church does not have one signification. For: 1) it imports the assembly of Pastors, or the teaching Church. Thus (Matthew 18.17), Christ, speaking of fraternal correction, says: "But if he will not hear, tell the Church; but if he will not hear the Church, let him be to you as a heathen and a publican." Here St. Chrysostom (on Matthew) observes: "'Tell the Church,' that is, the prelates and superiors." St. Cyprian, Augustine, and others teach the same. In reality, "the circumstance of the place manifestly demonstrates," says Stapleton (*Controversies*, book 5, *On Ecclesiastical Power*, chapter 7), "that that saying of Christ must be referred to the superiors of the Church. For immediately there follows: 'Amen I say to you: whatsoever you shall bind upon earth shall be bound also in heaven, and whatsoever you shall loose upon earth shall be loosed also in heaven.' But who would deny that this pertains to superiors alone?" 2) The same name designates the people of the faithful, or the learning Church, insofar as it is distinguished from the superiors. Thus in Acts (20.28): "The Holy Spirit," says the Apostle, "has placed you as bishops to rule the Church of God"; and (15.4): "But when," says the sacred author, "they had come to Jerusalem (Paul and Barnabas), they were received by the Church and by the Apostles and elders"; and (ibid., 22): "It pleased the Apostles and elders with the whole Church to choose men from among them." Hence also the fathers of the Synod of Antioch (in Eusebius, *Ecclesiastical History*, book 7, chapter 30) inscribed their synodical letter against Paul of Samosata: "To the Bishops, presbyters, deacons, and Churches of God." 3) Most frequently, and in the Creed itself, the same name Church is applied to the whole assembly growing together from pastors and all the faithful, insofar as it is separated from the gatherings of unbelievers, heretics, and schismatics. This threefold acceptation pertains to the present treatment; but which one obtains in individual questions must be seen there.

399. Yet the name Church accepted in this way can still signify a particular Church, or the universal Church. Certainly it is used for the aggregation of the faithful residing in the same house or family (Romans 16.3-5), where Paul greets Prisca and Aquila, and "their domestic church." It is taken for the assembly of the faithful living in one city or province (Romans 16.16), where it is read: "The Churches of Christ greet you." Indeed, everywhere the Apostle mentions "the church of the Corinthians," "of the Thessalonians," etc. But often the universal Church is expressed: thus (1 Timothy 3.15) it is said, "That you may know how you ought to conduct yourself in the house of God, which is the Church of the living God." Here we treat of the universal Church.

400. These things, then, concern the word Church, or its nominal definition. But before we come to the real definition, it will be helpful first to observe that it is not our intention here to hand down such a definition as must be admitted equally by Catholics and non-Catholics. For since in the real definition of the Church lie hidden the seeds of all the disputations which exist between us and the Innovators, only after these have been completed do we propose our definition of the Church. Rather, we intend to place before the eyes the true Catholic definition, so that from the beginning the subject of the disputation may be known, and we shall prove its individual parts in their own place. It must likewise be observed that there is some difference between definitions of the Church handed down by Catholic doctors before and after the Council of Trent; yet Launoy wrongly rejects the more recent ones (Letter 13) as new and erroneous. For: 1) certain older writers defined the Church according to her generic essence, prescinding from the state and form which she has after Christ; while the definition usually handed down after the

Council of Trent regards the present state and form of the Church. Thus, for example, St. Thomas (3 p., question 8, article 4) says: "The Church, according to the state of the way, is the congregation of the faithful." And Melchior Canus (*On Theological Places*, book 4, chapter 2) says: "And although the society of angels and men is sometimes called Church, and sometimes the kingdom of heaven, which is composed of men who are comprehensors and wayfarers, nevertheless in the present matter we do not have the intention of discussing anything except the militant Church, that is, the assembly of faithful wayfarers." But he immediately observes (same place) that this definition comprehends all the faithful "both in the people of the Jews under the law of Moses, and in pious men formerly under the law of nature. In this sense catechumens are most truly members of the Church. For she is not separated by the sacrament of baptism, but by faith, which in every time has distinguished the people of God from the assemblies of unbelievers." Therefore, when Canus himself wished to define the Church in such a way that he would distinguish her both from the state of nature and from the Synagogue under the written law, he said that she is "the congregation of the baptized." For Baptism, he says (ibid.), "is the sacrament of faith which properly makes members and parts of the Church, and distinguishes the Church of Christ from the synagogue." 2) But if someone seeks a definition of the Church which distinguishes her also from the sects of heretics who are baptized, Pope Nicholas had already handed it down by saying that the Church is "the collection of Catholics." If this definition expresses less explicitly the things which are brought out in the common definition now, nevertheless it fully agrees with it. In reality, the universal or Catholic Church, as St. Cyprian says (Letter 69 to Pupianus), "has not been torn nor divided, but is certainly connected, and joined by the glue of priests mutually cohering with one another." Therefore when the Church is called "the collection of Catholics," it is sufficiently expressed that she is one also with exterior unity, insofar as she is ruled by one visible head. Hence it is that the less explicit definitions which formerly used to be handed down were easily understood by all in the same sense in which the later ones are now understood, and the character of new errors itself urged that these later ones be proposed more explicitly.

401. Behold, then, the real definition of the Church which Theologians, after Bellarmine (same place, chapter 2), now commonly hand down: "The Church is the assembly of wayfaring men, united by profession of one and the same Christian faith and by communion of the same sacraments, under the rule of legitimate pastors, and especially of the Roman Pontiff." The same Bellarmine immediately illustrates this definition thus: "From this definition," he says, "it can easily be gathered which men pertain to the Church and which do not pertain to her. For there are three parts of this definition: profession of the true faith, communion of the Sacraments, and subjection to the legitimate pastor, the Roman Pontiff. By reason of the first part all unbelievers are excluded, both those who never were in the Church, such as Jews, Turks, and pagans, and those who were and withdrew, such as heretics and apostates. By reason of the second, catechumens and the excommunicated are excluded, because the former have not been admitted to the communion of the Sacraments, and the latter have been dismissed. By reason of the third, schismatics are excluded, who have faith and Sacraments, but are not subject to the legitimate pastor, and therefore profess the faith and receive the Sacraments outside. But all others are included, even if they are reprobate, wicked, and impious."

402. The Innovators, and especially Melanchthon (*Apology of the Augsburg Confession*), fiercely attacked this definition; for he said that that definition of the Church is defective and imperfect in which no mention is made of the just, of interior faith, of hope, and of charity, in which nevertheless the principal part of the Church is situated.

403. But let it be noted: 1) Theologians in their definition of the Church especially consider her insofar as she is a visible and external society. For since the Church under that respect, or insofar as she is visible, is shown by us to be the mistress of truth, by the given definition we attack the errors of the Protestants more directly. For they distinguish a twofold Church, one internal and invisible, another

external and visible; of which the former alone, not the latter, enjoys the privileges granted to the Church which are narrated in the Scriptures. 2) By the name Church taken absolutely, the true Church must be understood, which is external and visible. The most illustrious Bossuet demonstrates this from the Scriptures, from confessions of faith, and from books of discipline of the Protestants themselves in the book entitled *Conference with the Minister Claude*. 3) Once the true visible Church has been discovered, immediately her soul is had, which is inseparable from her body; and therefore faith, hope, charity, etc., are necessarily found in that society which, with the profession of the true faith and the communion of the sacraments, is subject to the legitimate succession of pastors and acknowledges the Roman Pontiff as visible head. 4) Wherefore by these words, "under the rule of legitimate pastors," just as by the others, "united by profession of one and the same true faith and by communion of the same sacraments," it is certainly sufficiently expressed that the true doctrine of Christ is announced in the Church, and that the true sacraments instituted by Christ are rightly administered. But from this it is rightly inferred that internal faith, grace, and charity are found in her; since the preaching of the true doctrine of Christ, the right use of His sacraments, and the ministry instituted by Christ are born to bring forth abundant fruits.

404. As we have said, this is not the place to establish and defend the Catholic definition of the Church; so neither is it the place to attack the false definitions of heretics. Yet it is useful, so that the difference of doctrine may immediately appear, to recall here the principal ones. And first, among the heretics who preceded the Protestants: 1) The Donatists, with St. Augustine as witness (Heresy 70), "turned schism into heresy, as though the Church of Christ, on account of the crimes of Caecilian, whether true or, as appeared more to the judges, false, had perished from the whole world, where she was promised to be, and had remained in the African part of Donatus, as though extinguished in other parts of the earth by the contagion of communion." Hence they defined the Church as "the assembly of the faithful whose faith never fails," or "the congregation of the just." 2) The Pelagians "advance even to this," St. Augustine said (Heresy 88), "that they say that the life of the just in this age has absolutely no sin, and that from these the Church of Christ is perfected in this mortality, so that she is wholly without spot and wrinkle, as though that were not the Church of Christ which throughout the whole world cries to God: forgive us our debts." Hence they defined the Church as "the congregation of those who have no sin." 3) In the fifteenth century John Wyclif and John Hus disseminated their errors into several parts of Germany, especially into Bohemia. In their opinion the Church is the congregation of the predestined.

405. From these the Protestants derived their errors. For: 1) The Lutherans, following Martin Luther (in the Augsburg Confession, article 7), taught that the Church is the congregation of saints who truly believe and obey Christ. Yet they add: in this life many evil men and hypocrites are mixed with this congregation until the final judgment. By these words they seem to imply a twofold Church: one true Church, to which belong the privileges expressed in the Scriptures, and which is the congregation of saints visible not to the eyes of the body, but of faith; another external Church, which is Church in name only, and which exists as a congregation of men agreeing in the doctrine of faith and the use of the sacraments. And in this they concede that good and evil are found. Calvin himself, although he tried to speak equivocally concerning this matter, did not in reality depart from that opinion. For first (Institutes, book 3, chapter 2, nn. 8-11) he teaches that faith is incapable of being lost; then (Institutes, book 4, chapter 1, n. 2) he hands down that the true Church can be known by God alone, and that her foundation is divine election, inasmuch as she consists only of the faithful, who for this reason belong to the roll of the elect; finally (same book and chapter, in the following sections) he establishes an external Church, in which good and evil are numbered. Compare Bellarmine (same place). 3) But among the more recent writers, behold how Pfaff defines the universal Church: "that which consists of all particular Christian churches professing the doctrine of Christ." This definition, wholly arbitrary, recalls to mind what St. Augustine writes concerning the heresy of Rhetorius (Heresy 72): "It affirms that all heretics walk rightly and speak true things; which is so absurd that it seems incredible to me." And the apostate Marcus Antonius de Dominis (*On the Christian*

Commonwealth, book 7, chapter 10) writes: "We see the presumptive [Church]; we believe the truthful one. For we cannot indicate her except through conjectures. Reprobates, hidden heretics, and bad Catholics are in the presumptive Church; but only the predestined and upright are in the truthful Church."

406. From these things it is clear that heretics chiefly have this at heart, that they establish an invisible Church; or if they admit some visible Church, they say that it is diverse from the invisible one, and they ascribe to the latter, not the former, the prerogatives conferred or promised by Christ. This truly fundamental error will be expressly refuted in its own place in the whole course of this treatment. Footnote 1. Litton, who belongs to the sect commonly called "The Evangelical School," proposes the idea of the Church thus (in Murray): "The one true Church, that holy Catholic Church of which the [Apostles'] Creed speaks, is not a mixed body, embracing within itself both evil and good. It is the assembly of those who, wherever they may be, are joined by living union with Christ through faith and participate in the sanctifying influences of His Spirit. Properly speaking, besides those already on earth, it comprehends all who are to be saved. In a stricter signification, the name [Church] designates the body of those truly believing, existing in the world at any given time. "The true Church is invisible insofar as she is not yet manifested as a body; or, in other words, there is no society or visible body on earth of which it can be predicated that it is the mystical body of Christ. Hence it plainly follows that the Head of this body is not visible. "Particular Churches, otherwise separated, are one on account of their common relation to the one true Church, or mystical body of Christ, and their conjunction with her. The external notes of this conjunction, and therefore of a true visible Church, are the pure preaching of the word, in fundamentals at least, and the administration of the sacraments 'with regard to those things which are necessarily required according to Christ's institution.' These are the two necessary notes of a true Church; to which the use of discipline can be added, although less necessary. "Although, according to the concept of Church, visible 'congregations of saints,' that is, of those truly sanctified, are visible and are to be held as such if they are to be called Churches, nevertheless they are never truly such. In fact they are always mixed assemblies, embracing hypocrites and Christians who are such only in name, as well as those truly believing; among whom perfect separation, in the present life, is impossible and is reserved to the second coming of Christ. Hence the collection of visible Christian Churches throughout the world is not accurately the same as the true Church, which, as has been said, consists only of the living members of Christ. "'Succession of Bishops,' 'Antiquity,' 'Amplitude,' 'Name of Catholic,' and notes of this sort do not by themselves prove that some society is a true Church of Christ. "To the one true Church, the body of Christ, properly belong the promises of perpetuity, of the perpetual presence of Christ, and of preservation from fundamental error. The same can be said of the attributes of the Church, Unity, Sanctity, etc. These, in their full and proper signification, could not be predicated except of that [mystical] body of Christ which is not yet fully manifested."

Article 2. General Survey concerning the Constitution of the Church

407. The things which pertain to the constitution of the Church must be unfolded and demonstrated in the whole series of this disputation. Yet it will be helpful to propose its idea summarily in advance, so that the treatment may proceed more clearly. But if the character of any society whatsoever cannot be rightly defined unless one inspects the fact from which it was, as it were, born, this must be said a fortiori of the Church, which is a supernatural institution, and as a whole depends upon the free will of her Founder. Wherefore the assertion of Kant is evidently absurd (*Religion within the Limits of Reason*, trans. Trullard, Paris, 1841, page 174), who on the contrary contends that it is impossible to attain the genuine nature of universal religion unless we prescind from fact. Compare Taparelli (*Essay*, etc., volume 2, nn. 1410 ff.).

408. Therefore, first, it is established not only among Catholics but even among the Innovators that the Church contains something invisible of herself, and is a spiritual and supernatural

society. She is indeed a society: 1) spiritual, namely insofar as she has been made and prepared divinely for this purpose, that proximately she sanctify her members according to the appointed norm, and then, which is its fruit and crown, bring them to eternal beatitude; and in this way finally promote the external glory of God. 2) She is supernatural, namely she is a society whose origin, means, and end, having passed beyond every exigency of human nature, are owed to God, who, just as moved by His goodness He advanced the human race from the beginning to an undue or supernatural state, so moved by His mercy He wholly willed to restore it, fallen, to that same state. Compare Schrader (*On Roman Unity*, book 1, page 16).

409. But secondly, it is no less certain, as will be proved below, that some sensible element belongs to the Church, and that therefore she is a visible society. For it was established by Christ, to touch upon some things already: 1) the mode of aggregation, baptism; 2) the principal condition was prescribed, faith; 3) the object to be believed and done was proposed: whatever I have commanded you; 4) an authentic magisterium and tribunal was instituted, in whose possession would be the integrity of doctrine and the supreme power of making laws, judging, and punishing: teach, I am with you; the keys of loosing and binding were conferred; and unless he shall hear the Church, let him be to you as a heathen and a publican; 5) twelve were called and chosen, in whom there would be every power of teaching and ruling the Church, and from whom, with the hierarchical form determined, the ministry to be continually carried on would perpetually flow down into the following doctors and pastors. Compare Schrader (work cited, page 12).

410. From this it has come about that Theologians now commonly teach that the Church is constituted, as it were, by soul and body: they call the visible element the body, and the spiritual and supernatural element the soul. That this is most aptly said is established: 1) from analogy. For the assembly of the faithful, or society, exhibits to us the idea of a moral body, or of a moral person, which exists and acts after the likeness of a living human individual. Therefore just as in the physical human individual body and soul are distinguished, so in the moral individual body and soul can be considered. Now in man the body is the material, visible, determinable element; but the soul is the invisible, informing, determining element or principle. Therefore rightly the visible element of the Church is called the material part or body; but the spiritual and supernatural element is called the formal part or soul. 2) This same appellation of body and soul of the Church has a foundation in the Scriptures. For, to select a few passages, the Apostle says (Colossians 3.15): "Let the peace of Christ exult in your hearts, in which also you were called in one body." And (1 Corinthians 10.17) he writes: "Because there is one bread, we, being many, are one body, all who partake of one bread." Namely, just as there is one Eucharistic bread, of which we all the children of the Church partake, so we all associated with one another effect one body of the Church; just as from many grains one bread is made, so from many faithful there is made one sacred and living bread, namely one mystical body. And (12.13): "In one Spirit we all were baptized into one body, whether Jews or Gentiles, whether slaves or free; and we all were made to drink in one Spirit." Clearly by one Spirit or His gift, as by the same informing soul, from the beginning in baptism we have grown together into one body; and afterward, refreshed in the Eucharistic participation of one spirit, as by the continual influence of the vital soul, we are conserved and grow in one body.

411. To examine more deeply the intimate constitution of the Church, some, progressing further, have seemed to themselves to see in the Church a kind of continuation of the Incarnation. This idea, set forth and developed by Mohler (*Symbolism*), Perrone proposes briefly thus (chapter 2): "Christ, God-Man, willed to leave in [the Church] a perfect image and likeness of Himself, in which and through which He Himself would seem in some way to live and to converse with us even after His visible ascension into heaven. Therefore this society, displaying Christ before itself, as they say, is divine-human, subsisting in unity of person with communication of each nature. Whence it comes about that the element, as they call it, divine pervades and penetrates the human element, and rules and directs it, nourishes it and as it were informs it, and constitutes unity from both. What they say is divine in this moral

person or society constitutes its intimate part or soul; but what they call human constitutes its exterior and visible form or body, by which, as by an organ, the soul outwardly brings forth and manifests itself. From this it comes about ... that the Church is one, as Christ is one; holy, as Christ is holy; indefectible, as Christ is indefectible; infallible, as Christ is infallible, who willed her to be a living and perfect image of Himself, indeed through her in some way established that He would perpetuate Himself on these lands until the consummation of the age, so that what Christ had and has by His nature He communicates by grace and privilege to this daughter or spouse of His."

412. But these things, if they are rightly understood, namely insofar as Christ instituted the Church after the likeness of the Incarnation, and she therefore is His mystical body, are handed down in the Scriptures and by the Fathers. And 1) indeed in the Scriptures. For it is said (1 Corinthians 12.27): "But you are the body of Christ," which, as is plain of itself, must be understood of the whole Church of Christ; nor does the Apostle there speak of the Corinthians taken separately. And (Ephesians 1.22 ff.): "He gave Him [Christ] as head over the whole Church, which is His body." And (ibid., 4.11 ff.): "He gave some indeed as Apostles... unto the building up of the body of Christ." And (ibid., 5.30): "We are members of His [Christ's] body, of His flesh and of His bones." And (Colossians 1.24): "I fill up those things which are lacking of the sufferings of Christ, in my flesh, for His body, which is the Church." 2) The same things are handed down by the Fathers, among whom St. Athanasius (*On the Incarnation*, section 21) writes: "And when Peter says, 'Therefore let all the house of Israel know most certainly that God has made this Jesus whom you crucified both Lord and Christ,' he does not say concerning His divinity that He made Him Lord and Christ, but concerning His humanity, which is the universal Church, which in Him rules and reigns after He Himself was crucified, and which is anointed for the kingdom of heaven, that it may reign with Him who emptied Himself for her and who, having put on the form of a servant, assumed her." And St. Augustine (sermon 86 on Easter, n. 2) says: "Behold, the disciples both saw Christ after the resurrection, and heard from His own mouth that this would be in the holy Scriptures. We have not seen Christ present in the flesh, but the Scriptures, by which they too were confirmed, we hear daily as they are read. And what did He say concerning the Scriptures? That penance and remission of sins should be preached in His name through all nations, beginning from Jerusalem. The disciples were not seeing this; they were seeing Christ speaking of the future Church. Therefore, when Christ said what they were not seeing, they believed. They saw the Head; they did not yet see the body. We see the body; we believe concerning the Head. There are two: bridegroom and bride, head and body, Christ and the Church. To the disciples He showed Himself and promised the Church. To us He has shown the Church and commanded us to believe concerning Himself. The Apostles saw one thing; they did not see the other. And we see one thing; we do not see the other. As they believed concerning the body from the present Head, so let us believe concerning the Head from the present body. Or shall we deny? But Truth itself crying out will not allow us to deny. For we see the Church of Christ from the rising of the sun even to its setting praising the name of the Lord."

413. Once these things have been established, it will not be difficult to judge what constitutes the soul and what the body of the Church. For whatever is primarily spiritual, and determines the Church in her being, and in her is the principle of life and motion, must be said to pertain to her soul. Hence there pertains to the soul of the Church: 1) sanctifying grace, which is the formal principle of supernatural life; 2) Faith, Hope, and Charity, which cannot be absent where sanctifying grace is, and which are the principal proximate principles of the operations of supernatural life; 3) the other supernatural virtues, and also interior actual grace, without which supernatural operation is impossible; 4) all the remaining internal gifts of the Holy Spirit, by which supernatural sanctity and activity is amplified and rendered more efficacious.

414. To these gifts, which, unless actually possessed by all members of the Church, are nevertheless ordered to all, there must be added those which are conferred only upon some for

the utility of others. By this kind of gifts we comprehend not only the nine graces gratis given which the Apostle enumerates (1 Corinthians 12), and concerning which we treated in the treatise *On Grace* (n. 19 ff.), but also the power of order and jurisdiction, for baptizing, for remitting sins, for offering sacrifice, for preaching the word of God, for making laws, etc., etc. All these regard one common end, namely the conservation and increase of the Church, the sanctification and perfection of her members. For the life and sanctity of the Church consists not only in this, that she has holy members and is, as it were, passively holy; but, if taken adequately, it also imports supernatural activity and energy, by which she teaches, rules, and advances her own members in supernatural life for obtaining eternal life, and calls, instructs, and converts outsiders in order to the same end. But for accomplishing this, gifts gratis given, the grace proper to the sacrament of orders, the perennial assistance of the Holy Spirit, etc., contribute especially; and therefore, under this respect, they are rightly said to pertain to the soul of the Church.

415. But whatever is external, visible, and as it were determinable must be counted in the body of the Church. Hence: 1) the very men who are plainly visible and pertain to the Church, insofar as they form an assembly from which the material fellowship of the Church results, belong to the body of the Church, in almost the way in which the persons of soldiers, insofar as they are considered as aggregated together, constitute the body of an army. 2) Hence the government by which those persons are contained in unity, and from which they receive impulse for exercising social operation, likewise pertains to the body of the Church. 3) By the same reasoning, all external means are recalled to the body of the Church: preaching, the administration of the Sacraments, rites, etc., which are employed for pursuing the end of the Church herself. 4) To these must be added the external manifestation itself of interior gifts. Certainly the aforesaid theological virtues are manifested in innumerable ways, both through the acts of individuals and through the public worship of the Church; spiritual power also, whether of order or of jurisdiction, appears in the various ways in which it is both conferred and exercised; finally, that vigor of the apostolic ministry, which according to the words of Christ is to remain perpetually in the Church, daily brings itself forth in the confirmation of the just, in the conversion of sinners and non-Catholics.

416. From all these things it is already permitted to infer certain points which more clearly exhibit this summary idea of the constitution of the Church. And first, the controversy of gravest moment which is conducted between Catholics and Protestants concerning the nature and definition of the Church consists especially in this: namely, which is the Church to which many privileges were immediately conceded by Christ, and which the promises of Christ concerning her perpetuity, infallibility, etc., directly affect. All these things heretics, as we hinted, attribute to the invisible Church. But this error, to be refuted everywhere in the course of the treatise, can already be sufficiently uncovered and rejected. For if the Church consists of soul and body, or if she is the body of Christ, a Church which is only invisible cannot be admitted; nor can a twofold Church be admitted, one invisible and the other visible. For just as body and soul do not constitute a twofold man, but are two essential elements constituting one man, and if one of them, for example the body, is lacking, man is no longer had; so the visible and invisible element constitute not two Churches, but one Church. If one of them, for example the visible, is lacking, the Church of Christ is no longer had. Therefore the Church of the promises is the visible Church.

417. Secondly, it is gathered that the Church, although she consists of human individuals as matter, is nevertheless a society intrinsically, essentially, and in her own kind supernatural. For she is supernatural not only in origin, end, and means, but also in intrinsic form and vivifying principle, which itself, from what has been disputed, is essentially supernatural. But because a supernatural element of this sort does not merely exist in the body of the Church, but constitutes it in the being of such a social body, permeates it in every direction and informs it, and produces and administers every motion and action of it, hence the body of the Church itself, material in itself, puts on a certain true elevation and supernaturalness, and therefore the whole society, or Church, obtains a supernatural dignity and order.

418. Hence thirdly, since the gifts of grace by appropriation are attributed to the Holy Spirit, to whom we are intimately joined through sanctification (compare *On Grace*, n. 1032 ff.), the Church is rightly called: 1) the dwelling place of God, according to that text (Ephesians 2.20 ff.): "Built upon the foundation of the Apostles and Prophets, Jesus Christ Himself being the chief cornerstone, in whom all the building, constructed, grows into a holy temple in the Lord; in whom you also are built together into a dwelling place of God in the Spirit." 2) She is called the Spouse of the Holy Spirit, "since it appears that an intimate communication is given between Him and the Church; that the same Church is cherished and nourished by the continual breath of the Holy Spirit, and is the immediate and adequate subject of the outpouring of all charisms which the Holy Spirit perpetually confers upon her. But on her part the Church hands herself over wholly to be fixed and ruled by the Holy Spirit; she rightly and holily administers His gifts to the faithful committed to herself. Finally, fecundated by the Holy Spirit, she does not cease to beget sons for God, whom she also embraces with maternal solicitude beyond the very limits of mortal life." 3) Indeed the Holy Spirit is called the Heart of the Church. "The head," says St. Thomas (3 p., question 8, article 1, ad 3), "has manifest eminence with respect to the other exterior members; but the heart has a certain hidden influence. And therefore the Holy Spirit is compared to the heart, who invisibly vivifies and unites the Church; but Christ Himself is compared to the head according to His visible nature, according to which man is preferred to men."

419. Similarly fourthly, if the Church is the body of Christ, who is the Head of the Church, there must be a perpetual union between Christ and the Church. Hence Christ Himself (John 15.1 ff.) exhibits all the faithful as so many branches adhering to Himself as to the one vine, and drawing vital juices from the one vine. But St. Thomas (same place, corpus) splendidly explains this notion of Head, saying: "Just as the whole Church is called one mystical body by likeness to the natural body of man, which according to diverse members has diverse acts, as the Apostle teaches (Romans 12 and 1 Corinthians 12), so Christ is called the head of the Church according to the likeness of a human head, in which we can consider three things, namely order, perfection, and power. Order indeed, because the head is the first part of man, beginning from above; and from this it is that every principle is customarily called head, according to that text (Ezekiel 16.25): 'At every head of the way you built a sign of your prostitution.' Perfection, however, because in the head all the senses, both interior and exterior, are vigorous, while in the other members there is touch alone; and from this it is that it is said (Isaiah 9.15): 'The aged and honorable, he is the head.'" "Power, however, because the power and motion of the other members, and their governance in their acts, is from the head, on account of the sensitive and motive power dominant there. Hence also a ruler is called head of the people, according to that text (1 Kings 15.17): 'When you were little in your own eyes, were you not made head among the tribes of Israel?' But these three things belong to Christ spiritually. For first, according to nearness to God, His grace is higher and prior, although not in time, because all others received grace with respect to His grace, according to that text (Romans 8.29): 'Whom He foreknew, these He also predestined to be made conformable to the image of His Son, that He might be the firstborn among many brothers.' Secondly, He has perfection with regard to the fullness of all graces, according to that text (John 1.14): 'We saw Him full of grace and truth,' as was also shown above (preceding question, article 9). Thirdly, He has the power of influencing grace into all the members of the Church, according to that text (John 1.16): 'Of His fullness we all have received.' And thus it is plain that Christ is fittingly called the head of the Church."

420. From this, fifthly, it further follows that just as in the human body not all members are of the same perfection, nor have the same act, although all concur toward the common good of man, so, if we consider gifts gratis given, not all members of the Church, which is the body of Christ, possess the same gifts, although they are ordered to the building up of the whole body; therefore the Church is an unequal society. The Apostle taught all these things more than once, but especially writes (1 Corinthians 12, from verse 12): "For as the body is one and has many members, and all the members of the body, although they are many, are nevertheless one body, so also is Christ. For the body is not one member, but many. If the

foot should say: Because I am not a hand, I am not of the body, is it therefore not of the body? And if the ear should say: Because I am not an eye, I am not of the body, is it therefore not of the body? If the whole body were an eye, where would hearing be? If the whole were hearing, where would smell be? But now God has placed the members, each one of them in the body, as He willed. But if all were one member, where would the body be? Now indeed there are many members, but one body. But the eye cannot say to the hand: I do not need your work; or again the head to the feet: You are not necessary to me... And if one member suffers anything, all the members suffer with it; or if one member is glorified, all the members rejoice with it. But you are the body of Christ, and members of member. And God has placed some indeed in the Church, first Apostles, secondly Prophets, thirdly Doctors, then powers, next graces of healings, helps, governments, kinds of tongues, interpretations of speeches. Are all Apostles? Are all Prophets? Are all Doctors? Are all powers? Do all have the grace of healings? Do all speak with tongues? Do all interpret?"

421. Indeed, sixthly, even if we inspect the gifts which are ordered to all, since not all who are in the Church possess them in the same measure, nor do all always possess all, not all are joined to Christ the Head with the same perfection or reasoning, and therefore not in the same way are they members of the Church. "Christ," says St. Thomas (3 p., question 8, article 3), "is the head of all men, but according to diverse grades. For first and principally He is the head of those who are actually united to Him by glory; secondly, of those who are actually united to Him by charity; thirdly, of those who are actually united to Him by faith," etc. And Bellarmine (*On the Militant Church*, book 3, chapter 2) says: "But it must be noted from Augustine in the brief of the conference, conference 3, that the Church is a living body, in which there is soul and body, and indeed the soul is the internal gifts of the Holy Spirit, Faith, Hope, Charity, etc. The body is the external profession of faith and the communication of the Sacraments. From this it follows that some are of the soul and of the body of the Church, and therefore united to Christ the Head internally and externally; and such are most perfectly of the Church. For they are like living members in a body, although even among these some participate life more, some less, and some even have only the beginning of life and, as it were, sensation but not motion, as those who have faith alone without charity. Again, some are of the soul and not of the body, as catechumens or the excommunicated, if they have faith and charity, which can happen. Finally, some are of the body and not of the soul, as those who have no internal virtue, and yet, either from some temporal fear, profess the faith and communicate in the Sacraments under the rule of pastors; and such are like hairs, or nails, or bad humors in the human body." But all these things must be asserted and unfolded below through their parts.

Article 3. Whether Christ is the immediate author of the Church, and gave her the form of a true society

422. We seem to embrace two questions together, as is clear from the title of the article; yet they are joined together by so intimate a bond that not only is each satisfied by the same moments of reasons, but one is almost confused with the other. This will become evident from their very exposition.

423. Among those who deny that the Church was instituted by Christ, the mythical rationalists hold the first place. For them Christ is nothing but a mere man, although pious and wise, who therefore is rightly held as a type of the perfection toward which human nature ought to strive. This perfection is exhibited in the doctrine which Christ announced; nor is the Church referred to Christ as author except through the doctrine which she professes and which is from Christ. How therefore could the followers of Christ have grown together into one assembly and constituted the Church? Always pursuing the doctrine of Christ, accustomed to philosophical speculations, and increased in number, with an easy step they passed from the ideal Christ, or from His doctrine, to asserting a society instituted by Him. The things which had been foretold to Abraham and Jacob concerning the temporal glory of the Jewish nation they transferred to the Church, just as from the Synagogue they accepted ideas concerning rites, government, and priesthood.

But when the number and authority of this new Church had grown sufficiently, Christians rose up against the Synagogue itself and occupied its place. Therefore in this hypothesis, only as the second century was waning could the Church of Christ exist and flourish; just as the writing of the Gospels itself is referred to this time (Strauss, *The Life of Jesus*, translated by F. Littre, Paris, 1839, tome 1, part 1, page 85).

424. From principles a little different the Socinians came to the same conclusion (*Library of the Polish Brethren*, tome 1). Following the Waldenses of the twelfth century, and rejecting the authority of the Apostles and of their successors in the Church, they defined the Church as the assembly of men united to God through faith. From this it was easy to infer that the Church was not instituted by Christ except insofar as Christ proposed the doctrine to be held, and by His redemption merited faith and justification for all. Protestants gladly received this doctrine. For they, having established the principle that the Church is the assembly of the faithful immediately adhering to God through faith, and therefore invisible, deny that Christ instituted some separate assembly distinct from the synagogue. In reality, they say, Christ attended the synagogues and there, as elsewhere, announced His doctrine; those who followed Him also came together there. After Christ, the Apostles by no means separated themselves from the assemblies of the Jews, but frequented the synagogue and temple, and there preached the doctrine of Christ; until, once persecution was stirred up by the synagogue, and the number of converts from the Gentiles, who rejected the yoke of the Mosaic law, had increased, it was necessary that the assembly of the faithful be separated from the Jews. Only then, they say, did the Apostles, having received the norm not from Christ, but from the synagogue, institute those things which recalled the assembly of the faithful to a true and distinct society (Boehmer, *Ancient Ecclesiastical Law*, dissertation 8, chapter 2; Grotius, *On the Power of the Supreme Authorities*, chapter 11). Hence it is that Salvador asserted that Christ brought nothing new to the world and instituted nothing properly which He did not take from the Hebrew nation.

425. From this concise indication of errors everyone sees that three things must be asserted here in order to vindicate the true doctrine adequately: 1) Christ Himself immediately instituted the Church; 2) He instituted her in the form of a true society; 3) and indeed of a society distinct from the synagogue. A few things must be noted concerning each before we establish the thesis.

426. With regard to the first, in order that Christ be called the founder of the Church, it is necessary that He placed her foundations, prescribed laws, proposed the end and the means for attaining it, and joined the diverse members together by some bond, so that by His authority He gave strength and power to her. "He institutes something," says St. Thomas (3 p., question 64, article 2), "who gives strength and power to it, as is clear concerning institutions of laws." But Christ is called the immediate author of the Church if by Himself, and not by the mediation of other persons, He as it were applied His hand to the institution of the Church; just as by this reasoning He Himself is said immediately to have chosen the twelve Apostles, Himself immediately to have been baptized by John, etc. But it should be noted that for this it is required only that He Himself suitably constitute the essential principles, fittingly dispose them mutually, and imprint force and efficacy upon the Church so constituted, so that by the development of the essential principles she may acquire due amplitude and faculty. But it is not necessary that such development happen immediately from the beginning. For, according to the ordinary course of things, this cannot be instantaneous; nor, if it were required, could any human society now be said to be legitimately instituted, or could anyone be thought a founder in the true sense of the name. Therefore one must reason similarly concerning Christ and the Church. For Christ Himself formed from the beginning all things which pertained to the perfect and essential constitution of the Church, so that the Church from the beginning had this whole and absolute constitution; but these same things, with the original constitution neither increased nor changed, had to be developed in the course of time.

427. But if someone asks when Christ founded the Church, we can answer by distinguishing three times. The first is before the death of Christ, in which the Church was already, as it were,

conceived, since the principal sacraments, namely baptism and Eucharist, sacrifice likewise and priesthood, had already been instituted; likewise the Apostles had been chosen, and very many laws promulgated. Yet she had not yet been born, because the sacraments generally were not yet to be administered, nor the sacrifice celebrated, nor had the Apostles obtained the authority of ruling the people, and therefore the Synagogue still flourished. The second is in the death of Christ: then the Synagogue expired with Him, and as a sign of this matter, according to the Fathers, the veil of the temple was torn into two parts. Yet she was not deadly according to the opinion of St. Augustine against Jerome, but plainly dead; but the Church was then properly brought into the light, or was truly founded. The third is on the day of Pentecost, on which the Church, already indeed born, but not yet promulgated nor in some way made of public right, obtained this on that day, and became legal and obligatory. By this observation the cavils of M. A. de Dominis (*On the Christian Commonwealth*, book 1, chapter 1, n. 23) are refuted, by which he contends to establish that "the Church of Christ was in reality built by the Apostles after the ascension of Christ."

428. With regard to the second, it must be noted that several of the arguments by which it is shown that Christ the Lord immediately instituted the Church at the same time prove that He instituted her as a society. Therefore, lest we be forced to repeat the same things, we embrace these two things together. Moreover, as is clear from what was just said, what the adversaries chiefly deny is that Christ founded a society; and this plainly coheres with the principle of the Innovators concerning an invisible Church. For an invisible society among men cannot exist. Hence Boehmer (*Protestant Ecclesiastical Law*, preliminary dissertation) teaches that the external or visible Church is of ecclesiastical institution, insofar as it draws its origin not from Christ, but from the Apostles; but that the true Church, founded by Christ, grows together from all those who are joined to Christ by faith and spirit. From this invisible union of hearts, he says, visible union and congregation easily arises.

429. But for understanding the matter it is useful briefly to recall here the idea of society. Society is "the conjunction of several persons conspiring by their acts toward some common end," or "a multitude of men, for the matter concerns society among men, coming together in such a way that by joined forces they employ means to attain a certain and common end."

430. From this definition, for our matter, it is permitted to infer: 1) a society can grow together only from beings endowed with reason or intelligence. For these alone apprehend an end, especially insofar as it is common, and direct their actions toward obtaining it together with others with whom they are associated; these things indeed cannot have place in living beings destitute of reason. For although these sometimes come together into one, and therefore are held by some material joining, they by no means perceive a common good of which the members are made participants. 2) The elements of any society are four: a multitude of men; their moral conjunction; the end toward which they conspire; the means for attaining the end. Of these, the multitude of men exhibits as it were the matter of the society, but the others the form, yet in such a way that the End is the principal element, by reason of which both the means and the conjunction of the associates are desired. 3) Especially note the necessity of moral conjunction. For if men exist together somewhere, and individuals perhaps procure the same good, nevertheless they by no means constitute a society. For this it is required that they intend that good insofar as it is common, and that they work for it, insofar as it ought to redound to all, by mutual conspiring. Compare Taparelli (*Essay*, etc., nn. 301 ff., edition 1855, which we always use). 4) Hence it follows that authority is necessary for constituting a society. For the members of a society, who grow together toward the same end to be procured through many means, are endowed with intellect and will. Hence each for his own part could choose diverse means for attaining the end. But once this diversity of means and dispositions is posited, the social conspiring in which the essence of society resides could easily fail. Therefore some intelligent principle is necessary to society, prescribing the same mode of operation to the intelligences of those conspiring, and able to bind their wills to observing it. But that principle possessing the power of binding free wills is called authority.

Therefore authority is required by the very essence of society. Compare Taparelli (work cited, nn. 421 ff.).

431. With regard to the third, it is common doctrine among the Fathers and Doctors that the Church of Christ in some way existed from the very beginning of the world. St. Augustine (Sermon 4, otherwise 44, *On Jacob and Isaac*) writes: "Take the Church not in those saints alone who began to be after the coming and birth of the Lord; but as many as were saints pertain to that same Church." And St. Thomas (3 p., question 8, article 3) teaches: "This is the difference between the natural body of man and the mystical body of the Church, that the members of the natural body are all together; but the members of the mystical body are not all together, neither as to the being of nature, because the body of the Church is constituted from men who existed from the beginning of the world until its end," etc.

432. This indeed must be understood with regard to the generic essence of the Church, as they say. For just as the Church of God, or religious society, is the assembly of men rightly worshiping the true God, so a society existing because of the merits of Christ, and having faith in Christ, in some true sense is called the Christian Church. Hence the Church of Christ is said to be the same as that which existed before Christ, insofar as she has the same end, namely interior sanctity in this life and eternal life in the future life; she has the same internal principle, namely faith in Christ and grace through Christ; and therefore she has the same invisible head, namely Christ Himself. Hence St. Augustine (letter 190, otherwise 157, to Optatus, chapter 2, n. 8) says: "Certainly what is written, that there is no other name under heaven in which we must be saved, has power for saving the human race from that time from which the human race was corrupted in Adam. 'For just as in Adam all die, so also in Christ all will be made alive.' For just as in the kingdom of death no one is without Adam, so in the kingdom of life no one is without Christ." And (letter 102, otherwise 49, n. 12) he says: "Just as we believe in Him [Christ] both remaining with the Father and having now come in the flesh, so the ancients believed in Him both remaining with the Father and going to come in the flesh. Nor because, according to the variety of times, what was then foretold as future is now announced as done, for this reason is the faith itself varied, or salvation diverse." Compare Bergier (article "Revelation"), where you will find several testimonies of the Fathers.

433. Hence the opinion of certain Theologians, Tournely, Legrand, etc., does not commend itself to us, who think that the Church begins from Abel, and not from Adam, to whom (Genesis 3.15) the first promise was made concerning the reparation of man through Christ. But we subscribe to Suarez (*On Faith*, disputation 9, section 2, n. 3), who says: "The Church began to be produced with Adam; and, once Eve had been formed, it could properly be said that the Church existed. And to that extent it seems certain that the Church was in each of them, at least after the fall, before the generation of Cain and Abel. This is now the common opinion." Then he reports many Theologians who are in the same opinion.

434. Nor is it an obstacle: 1) that Abel is read as the first of all to have offered sacrifices, as they say. For from this it by no means follows that he was truly the first to exhibit that service to God. Scripture especially commends the sacrifices of Abel because they were the occasion of his bloody death; but truly Cain also is said in the Sacred Letters to have been accustomed to offer sacrifices to God; and therefore that custom was not uniquely proper to Abel, but was antecedently proposed to all in common. But who could and ought to have proposed it except Adam, the parent and teacher of all, who had received the first revelation of the repairer and of salvation? Nor are certain sayings of the Fathers obstacles, 2) by which they seem to assert that the Church has her beginning from Abel, just as the evil city from Cain. For in the places which are objected, the Fathers without doubt by those formulas of speaking by no means intend to exclude the first parents, since often, as we saw, they refer them to the Church; nor do they there turn upon that question, namely what the beginning of the Church is. Having pressed into silence those beginnings of the Church which were more obscure, they mention as if first of all him who is both more often praised in the Scriptures and more clearly expressed Christ by his innocence and bloody death.

435. Yet the more the fullness of time approached, the more explicit also the primitive Church was made. Hence (Genesis 17) circumcision, which had not existed before, was commanded to Abraham and to his posterity. But this, according to the Apostle (Romans 4), had among other things this end and effect: that it would designate the people of God adhering to Him by faith and charity; that it would join more closely with one another those who pertained to that people; finally that it would be an indelible memory impressed in the flesh, and a public and solemn protestation, of their faith and messianic expectation.

436. But through Moses the Church was preformed still more perfectly. For faith, through more frequent and more open prophecies concerning Christ, was continually confirmed and increased. Sacraments, sacrifices, expiations, anointings, initiations were instituted, by which both that faith itself would be more abundantly nourished and men would be more efficaciously contained in the profession of the same. Likewise the Aaronic priesthood was inaugurated (Exodus 28.1 ff.), consisting of the high priest, ordinary priests, and Levites. By this institution surely a hierarchy in the true sense of the name was raised up, to which was attributed the administration of worship, the interpretation of laws, and the custody of sacred dogmas.

437. But although these things are true, nevertheless if we consider the state and form of the Church after Christ, she must certainly be said to have been founded by Christ; and therefore He rightly said: "I will build My Church." For, to recall the principal points: 1) with regard to faith itself, not only was it previously in Christ who was to come, but now in Christ who has already come; but with the passage of time, until the completion of Christian revelation, it both became more explicit and received true increase, as we set forth in the treatise *On the Infused Virtues* (nn. 497 ff.). 2) With regard to the force and efficacy of sanctifying, the old law conferred only legal justice. But if among the Jews there were saints with interior and true sanctity, this was by no means conferred upon them by the force of the law, but by the force of the covenant entered into with Christ, mediator and head of men. Hence certain persons among the nations also obtained the same sanctity, although the Mosaic law did not pertain to them. Therefore the sacraments of the old law were "weak and needy elements," as the Apostle speaks (Galatians 4), which indeed were a sign and pledge of grace to be obtained through the merits of Christ, but did not confer it. But the Church of Christ has the power of sanctifying, or of bestowing true and internal sanctity; and for this she received from her divine author sacraments which truly are the cause of grace and produce it from the work worked. 3) With regard to government, considered in its origin, form, and power, that which flourishes in the Church of Christ is altogether different from that which obtained in the old Synagogue. For the immediate author of the Synagogue was Moses, the servant of God (Hebrews 3.5); but Christ the Lord Himself immediately instituted the apostolic government. Therefore the Apostles, founding Churches, by no means borrowed the norm of government from the Synagogue, but followed the norm which they had received from Christ. Hence they set a Bishop over each Church, with the power of jurisdiction conferred upon him, to whom all would be subject; and they recalled all particular Churches to the unity of rule, by subjecting them to one Supreme Head, according to the institution of Christ, so that from all the particular Churches one kingdom of Christ would be constituted on earth. 4) With regard to privileges and prerogatives, there is a great discrepancy between the old Church and the Church instituted by Christ. For the former was type and shadow, the latter the antitype, as the Apostle teaches (Hebrews 10); hence the former, according to the oracles of the Prophets, was to perish, but the latter is to endure even to the consummation of the age. The Synagogue was instituted for the Jewish people alone, who therefore alone were subject to its rulers; the Church was instituted for all nations, so that outside it there is no salvation. Hence, for the office of teaching all nations throughout the whole world until the consummation of the age, it has been furnished with the charism of infallibility, by which it can never fail; and thus the Christian Church will always be the pillar and ground of truth.

438. These points are indeed sufficient for the present matter, in order to indicate the distinction between the Church before and after Christ; for from them it is sufficiently understood what is properly meant by saying that Christ is the author of the Church, according to the form and state which it now has. **Section II The Proposed Question Is Resolved Proposition XVIII.** Although in some true sense the Christian Church has existed from the beginning of the world: 1. nevertheless, with regard to its present state and form, it must be said to have had Christ as its immediate Author. 2. But since Christ, who is God, founded and instituted it in the form of a true society, it plainly follows that the Church, considered with respect to its immediate origin, is a divine society.

439. The first part is proved. An ancient, perpetual, universal testimony, which Christian society, or the Church, gives concerning its origin and concerning its Author, and which is also strengthened by the agreement of outsiders, must certainly be admitted. But Christian society, or the Church, constantly and universally asserts, and has asserted, that it had Christ as its immediate Author; and its testimony is also strengthened by the agreement of outsiders. Therefore. The major is proved. 1. If, once such testimony is granted, the institution of the Church by Christ could not be inferred, then the foundation and origin of no society could be established by a similar method. But all agree that the institution and origin of other societies are legitimately supported by that method, and they perpetually make use of it. 2. In reality, no fuller and more constant testimony is given concerning any human fact. Wherefore, if nevertheless this testimony could be rejected, then no testimony, no history, could appear unavoidable; and thus historical faith would plainly collapse, and we would fall altogether into foul skepticism. The minor is proved. 1. With regard to the present time: a. there presents itself, of its own accord, a certain large existing society spread throughout the whole world, which calls itself Christian and founded by Christ as author, and which is honored with the name of the Catholic Church. In it, individual faithful obey their own bishops; these, however, together with their flocks, obey the supreme high priest, that is, the Roman Pontiff, by whom they are also appointed in their own office, and whom they revere as the center, so to speak, of their whole communion. b. There exist other sects, which disagree both mutually among themselves and from the Catholic society in very many matters; nevertheless, all agree with one another in this, namely, that Christ instituted some Church. This is sacred and unavoidable for all of them; indeed, by the very fact that they dispute among themselves as to where the true Church of Christ is found, they most openly testify that they hold as certain the institution of his Church originally accomplished by Christ. 2. If from the present time we rise to preceding centuries, yet nearer to us, the matter is most manifest. For all histories speak, as do churches, altars, icons, successions of bishops and of Roman Pontiffs; the very character and form of civil laws and of kingdoms, insofar as in these a manifest relation is perceived to some existing Christian society; the sacred expeditions; and six hundred things of this kind. 3. Thus we can rise further to a more ancient age, say to the first three centuries after Christ. And: a. the writings of the apologists of the Christian religion pertain to this, in which Christian society is continually attested; and it is designated as the true Church of Christ, and distinguished from the sects of heretics. Several writers of these works belong partly to the third century from Christ, partly to the second. But from the very age of the Apostles there were not lacking those who said that not the assembly of others dissenting from them, but their own assembly, as their own Church, had been founded by Christ. On the other hand, those who were reckoned by the name of Catholics did not deny that Christ founded the Church; rather, they reproved them because they represented their own body as the true Church of Christ. Therefore there was agreement on both sides concerning the origin and institution of the Church; for the heretics, by attacking the body of Catholics, show forth its existence down to that age; and likewise the Catholics, by repelling the efforts of their adversaries and affirming that the Church of Christ subsists among themselves, evidently demonstrate the existence of their own body. b. The testimony of the sects has greater force if we observe that they had been torn away from the predominant Church; and thus in some way they were compelled to justify their defection from it. They could indeed easily have turned away from themselves the mark of rebellion by saying that Christ announced his Gospel to men, but

did not undertake the foundation of any Church. Yet this, though it was the most ready expedient, they never attempted; rather, they preferred to maintain that the true Church existed among themselves. Plainly, the fact of the Church instituted by Christ was so evident that it could be called into doubt by no one. c. There could be added the writings, whether historical or of any other kind, of profane writers, even the most ancient, such as Celsus, Porphyry, Pliny, Ammianus Marcellinus, Suetonius, Josephus Flavius, and others. All these writers would be inexplicable in many respects unless the existence of the Christian Church were presupposed. Therefore, as is clear, there could be brought forward here the things which we handed down in the preceding disputation concerning the authenticity of the Gospels and the Acts of the Apostles. But what we have indicated thus far is sufficient; for this part of the thesis will be confirmed from what is soon to be said concerning the other part. Meanwhile, compare Cercia, *On the Church of Christ*, lectures 3-4.

440. The second part is proved. We proved above, in numbers 260 and following, the historical authority of the Gospels; from them, therefore, considered in this way, we rightly draw arguments. These arguments, moreover, obtain greater force against Protestants, who together with us acknowledge the divine authority of the Gospels. Hence it is proved that Christ instituted the Church in the form of a true society. I. From the names which are attributed to the Church in the Scriptures. For: 1. The Church founded by Christ is very often called a Kingdom in the Scriptures. But a kingdom presents the idea of a society. Therefore. The major is proved: a. from the Old Testament. For it is read in Isaiah 9.6 and following: "A little child... is born to us, and a son is given to us..." "His dominion shall be multiplied, and there shall be no end of peace; he shall sit upon the throne of David and upon his kingdom, that he may establish it and strengthen it in judgment and justice, from now and even forever." And in Jeremiah 23.5: "Behold the days come, says the Lord, and I will raise up to David a just branch, and a king shall reign, and he shall be wise, and shall execute judgment and justice in the land; in those days Judah shall be saved, and Israel shall dwell securely; and this is the name by which they shall call him: The Lord our just one." And in Daniel 2.44: "The God of heaven shall raise up a kingdom which shall not be destroyed forever, and its kingdom shall not be delivered to another people; but it shall break in pieces and consume all these kingdoms, and it itself shall stand forever." b. From the New Testament. For in Matthew 25.1 it is said: "Then shall the kingdom of heaven be like to ten virgins"; and in Matthew 21.43: "The kingdom of God shall be taken away from you, and shall be given to a nation bringing forth its fruits"; and in Colossians 1.13: "Who [God the Father] has delivered us from the power of darkness and has translated us into the kingdom of the Son of his love." Hence, from these and many other similar testimonies, it is evident that Christ is called king, and a true king, to whom it is attributed that he sits upon a throne, exercises justice, and possesses dominion. But the question is of Christ's kingdom on earth, or among mortal men: this Jeremiah both expressly affirms, and it is clear from the duties to be discharged by a king. The question is also of a spiritual and supernatural kingdom, whereby worship is offered to God, justice and peace reign, and men are saved through Christ. Finally, the question is not of that dominion which belongs to God over all creatures; but, with that presupposed, the discourse concerns the dominion of Christ, whose foundation is redemption. Now either there is no such kingdom of Christ on earth, contrary to the plain oracles of the Scriptures; or that kingdom is the Church, which Christ founded, whose Head he himself is, and in which all obey him. 2. The Church is called a City; but a city presents the idea of a united and ordered multitude. Therefore. In reality it is said in Psalm 86: "Its foundations are in the holy mountains; the Lord loves the gates of Zion above all the tabernacles of Jacob. Glorious things are said of you, city of God. I will be mindful of Rahab and Babylon, knowing me. Behold, foreigners, and Tyre, and the people of the Ethiopians, these were there. Shall Zion not say: This man and that man was born in her; and the Most High himself founded her?" And in Isaiah 60: "For the nation and the kingdom which will not serve you shall perish... and the sons of those who humbled you shall come to you bowed down, and all who slandered you shall adore the footsteps of your feet, and they shall call you the city of the Lord, the Zion of the Holy One of Israel." And in Matthew 5.14: "A city set upon a mountain cannot be hidden." 3. The Church is called the House of God. Thus in 1 Timothy 3.15: "That you

may know how you ought to behave in the house of God, which is the Church of the living God." And in Hebrews 3.6: "But Christ as a son in his own house, which house we are"; and in Hebrews 10.21: "A great priest [namely Christ] over the house of God." And in 1 Peter 4.17: "The time has come that judgment should begin from the house of God." But a house, if you consider the material building itself, presents the union of several things, since it is joined together from many stones; but if you consider the inhabitants, it is one family composed of many members under the rule of one. Therefore. 4. The Church is called a Sheepfold: thus in John 10.16: "Other sheep I have which are not of this fold." It is called a Flock, to which appointed shepherds must attend; thus in Acts 20.28: "Take heed to yourselves and to the whole flock, in which the Holy Spirit has placed you bishops, to rule the Church of God." But these expressions put forward a multitude reduced to unity, and indeed by authority; and thus they signify a society. 5. The Church is called a Body, or the Body of Christ, as above in numbers 412-419 and following. Now, as Cornelius a Lapide beautifully observes on Romans 12.4: "As in a body there are four things. First, the unity of the body. Second, the diversity of the members. Third, the diversity of offices in the several members. Fourth, the aptitude and endowment of each member for carrying out its office: so entirely and in every respect is the matter found in the Church and in its several members, namely the Christian faithful." (1)

441. II. Christ instituted the Church in the form of a true society if, in its institution, he placed those elements which constitute the essence of society. (1) Robinson, as cited by Murray, notes that the primary meaning of body gives rise to the idea of some whole organically composed of diverse parts and members, "as an organized whole made up of parts and members." Hence such expressions as "legislative body," "political body," "body of soldiers," and "the whole body of the republic." From this also is derived the English word "corporation"; Webster says: "Corporation, a body politic or corporate formed and authorized by law to act as a single individual." But in the institution of the Church made by Christ all such elements are found. Therefore. The minor is proved. 1. That a multitude and a certain union are found is most evident. For this, first of all, is what the very name Church says. Then Christ sent the Apostles to preach the Gospel to all nations and to confer baptism, by which they would be enrolled in the Church (Mark 16). Moreover, he willed that the faithful should be joined mutually among themselves and with the pastors of the Church also by participation in the other Sacraments; that they should obey them as they would obey himself; and he solemnly begged the Father that they should be one with them and with one another (John 15.12; 17.20 ff.). 2. He constituted the principle of this unity in the multitude, namely authority. For from the beginning of his preaching he chose the twelve Apostles (Matthew 10.1); he set Peter over the rest of the Apostles and over all who would believe in Christ (Matthew 16.18); to him and to the others, according to their degree, he subjected the remaining common body of the faithful (ibid. and Luke 10.16); he granted to them the power of binding and loosing; from them also he constituted the tribunal of the Church, to which all would have to be subject, as many as wished to persevere in the number of the faithful (Matthew 18.17); and he added other disciples also, who were to be helpers to the Apostles in the office of gathering the new Church (Luke 10.1). 3. He established the proper end of the Church. For in Ephesians 4 it is read: "He who descended is the same also who ascended above all the heavens, that he might fill all things. And he gave some indeed as apostles, and some as prophets, and others as evangelists, and others as pastors and teachers, for the consummation of the saints, unto the work of the ministry, unto the building up of the body of Christ." These matters will become clearer in the following article.

442. III. It is pleasing to confirm all these things from one special testimony. It is said in Matthew 16: "You are Peter, and upon this rock I will build my Church... and to you I will give the keys of the kingdom of heaven; whatever you shall bind upon earth shall be bound also in heaven, and whatever you shall loose," etc. By these words whatever pertains to the notion of a society is expressed. This testimony, which we shall use more often, we shall examine by an accurate analysis in the last disputation, as in its principal place; but now, presupposing the rest, we note that in it there is expressed: 1. a multitude or a definite people; for it is said, "I will build my Church." But Church means a congregation, or a gathered

people. 2. A moral union in that multitude is expressed; for it is said, "I will build my Church": that is, I will aptly join diverse men, as so many stones, so that they become one spiritual building. Hence also in 1 Peter 2.5 it is said to the faithful: "Be you also, as living stones, built up, a spiritual house"; and likewise the faithful in 1 Corinthians 3.9 are called "God's building." 3. Authority is expressed, that is, the supreme visible Head of the Church; for it is said: "You are Peter, and upon this rock I will build my Church": that is, you, who by the name received signify solidity, will confer that solidity upon the Church. The following words confirm this: "to you I will give the keys of the kingdom of heaven"; "whatever you shall bind," etc. Although express mention of the other rulers by no means occurs here, it is nevertheless found in other places; indeed, they are in some way indicated here. For just as every power is comprehended in the supreme power, so in the Supreme Monarch inferior magistrates are contained. 4. The proper end of this new society is expressed; for it is called "the kingdom of heaven." In reality this appellation signifies holiness and eternal salvation to be obtained through this society; and for this reason this society can be called heavenly, or the kingdom of heaven, namely by reason of its end and means. Otherwise, in other respects, it is earthly, that is, composed of men living on earth. 5. Further, it is also expressed that the society to be founded by Christ is different from the Synagogue; for it is said "I will build" (the question is not of a building already existing, but of a future one), "my Church" (namely one set in contrast to the Synagogue, which alone the Apostles knew, and of which they could have understood Christ to be speaking).

443. Scholion. The things which we have disputed thus far show sufficiently and more than sufficiently that Christ the Lord founded his Church, wholly different from the Synagogue. Yet lest we seem altogether to neglect the objections of the adversaries, and especially of Salvador, as found in the cited work, books 2 and 3, and especially volume 1, page 154, Paris, 1838, it is better to examine them briefly.

444. They say first that Christ the Lord kept the Mosaic rites sacredly; that he by no means separated himself from the Synagogue; that he professed in Matthew 15.24 that he had not been sent except to the sheep that were lost of the house of Israel. But it is answered: 1. Christ the Lord promised that he would build his Church; but he did not build it until he entrusted the sheep to Peter to be fed. 2. He observed the Mosaic rites according to a certain economy of prudence and charity, but not so as to exclude the institution of a Church distinct from the Synagogue. That economy consisted in this: that first of all he would prove his divine mission by irrefutable arguments; from persuasion concerning this mission, as by necessity, the departure from the Synagogue would follow. For if Christ had wished from the beginning first to abolish the rites to which the Jews clung fiercely, there was danger that their mind would immediately be turned away from Christ's preaching and faith. But that Christ the Lord did not exclude the foundation of his Church is sufficiently clear from the demonstration of the thesis. Yet he also disclosed more often what he himself thought concerning the Mosaic rites; for in Luke 21.5 ff. he foretold the overthrow of the city and temple that would soon happen; in Luke 22.20 he announced that a new testament was being brought in by himself; in Matthew 16 he declared that a new Church was to be founded by himself, which, of course, would succeed the Synagogue, its figure; and he also sufficiently hinted at the abolition of the Mosaic rites when he said in John 4.21: "the hour comes when neither on this mountain nor in Jerusalem shall you adore the Father," etc. 3. It is certain that from the beginning the faithful, even those from the Jews, held assemblies separate from the Jews themselves. Hence, omitting other things, it is read in Acts 5.12 ff.: "By the hands of the Apostles many signs and wonders were done among the people. And they were all with one accord in Solomon's porch. But of the rest no one dared to join himself to them." 4. Christ indeed professed that he was sent to save the sheep of the house of Israel, but not exclusively. For he himself declared in John 3.17 that he had been sent "that the world may be saved through him"; and he sent his Apostles into the whole world, to teach all nations, to preach the Gospel to every creature. It was only necessary to begin from the house of Israel.

445. They say second that the Apostles themselves observed the Mosaic rites, indeed that Peter favored circumcision; that he timidly approached the task of teaching the nations, as is read in Acts 10; whence he was reproved by the remaining disciples in Acts 11. Because of the persecutions, they say, stirred up by the Synagogue, Christ's faithful then began to be separated; and finally Paul's phase, as they say, prevailed, by which he introduced a new form, namely that of a universal Church accommodated to all nations. But it is answered: 1. Three stages, as it were, in the Mosaic ceremonies must be recalled. For until the preaching of the Messiah they existed as necessary for the Jews; then it was still permitted to use them, though their obligation did not press; finally, God himself signified in Acts 10 that the time had now come for abolishing them. Then the Mosaic rites became unlawful and harmful. 2. It is false that Peter favored circumcision, since in Acts 15.10 he says: "Now therefore why do you tempt God, to put a yoke upon the necks of the disciples, which neither our fathers nor we have been able to bear?" At most it could be said that Peter, if indeed he is the same one of whom Galatians 2 speaks, withdrew from table fellowship with the Gentiles when those who were of the circumcision arrived, out of fear; but this is by no means to be attributed to a patronage of circumcision. 3. Peter did indeed approach timidly the preaching of the Gospel to the Gentiles; but not because he doubted whether it was to be announced to them, but because he was uncertain about the time at which the preaching to the Gentiles was to begin. Surely Peter had heard from Christ that the Gospel was to be preached in the whole world, to all nations, to every creature; he had heard that saying in Matthew 10.18: "you shall be brought before governors and kings for my sake, for a testimony to them and to the Gentiles"; whence he himself said in Acts 2.39 that the promise belongs "to all who are far off, whomsoever the Lord our God shall call"; and in Acts 10.43 he "announced remission of sins to all who believe in Christ." 4. Peter is said to have been reproved not by the Apostles, but by those who were of the circumcision, and who, though converted to Christ, nevertheless clung stubbornly to the law of circumcision (Acts 11.2). Hence it is turned into a charge against him not that he had approached Gentiles, but that he had approached the uncircumcised (v. 3). But those Judaizing Christians themselves quickly laid aside their error; for, instructed by Peter, they answered in v. 18: "Therefore God has given also to the Gentiles repentance unto life." 5. It is so far from being the case that Christians separated themselves on the occasion of the persecution stirred up by the Synagogue, that rather their separation was the cause of the persecution. This is indeed clear from that whole primitive history. 6. The things added concerning the new phase of the universal Church introduced by Paul are wholly false; for it is sufficiently established from what has been said that Christ himself instituted the universal Church. But in the Council of Jerusalem, rather the opinion of Peter prevailed, if it is permitted to speak thus. For when the Jews wished the nations converted to Christ to be circumcised, and Paul and Barnabas had referred the matter to the Apostles, "Peter rising up," Acts 15.7 and following, "said to them: Men, brethren, you know that in former days God made choice among us, that by my mouth the Gentiles should hear the word of the Gospel and believe. And God, who knows hearts, bore witness, giving them the Holy Spirit as also to us. And he made no distinction between us and them, purifying their hearts by faith. Now therefore why do you tempt God, putting a yoke upon the necks of the disciples, which neither our fathers nor we have been able to bear? But by the grace of our Lord Jesus Christ we believe that we shall be saved, in like manner as they." Although this decree was directly issued for Gentiles, nevertheless it is clear that it holds for all, both because the discussion is generally about disciples, and because the Mosaic rites are treated as a matter already past ("we have been able to bear"), and finally because a general reason is given: "we believe that we are saved by the grace of Jesus Christ."

Article 4. Whether, from Christ's Institution, the Church is Essentially Visible

446. Zacharias wrongly judged, in his annotations to chapter 8 of Cano's *De Locis Theologicis* (also extant in Migne, volume 5, column 942), that the question concerning the visibility of the Church is a question of name and not of reality. Indeed, as will immediately be clear, this question can be regarded as the head of all the controversies between us and the Innovators; and this is commonly admitted

not only by Catholic theologians, but also by Protestants. (1) (1) Hence we read in *The British and Foreign Evangelical Review*, June 1855, no. 13, page 295: "Everything depends upon the answer to the question, What is the Church? If it is an external society of professors of the true religion, then it is visible as an earthly kingdom; if that society is destroyed, the Church is destroyed; and everything that is true of the Church is true of that society. Then, in short, Romanism must be admitted as a logical necessity."

447. Therefore it is certain, first of all, that several of the ancient heretics logically arrived at the error concerning an invisible Church; for once the principle had been established that the Church is "the assembly of the just," or "the assembly of the perfect," or "the assembly of the predestined," as in number 404, since all these are not seen, it was consequent to say that the Church is invisible.

448. The same error was certainly taught by several among the Protestants, and especially by their leaders. Luther, in his book *On the Abrogation of the Private Mass*, part 1, says: "Who will show us the Church, since it is hidden in the spirit and is only believed, as it is said: I believe the holy Church?" Calvin, moreover, in book 4 of the *Institutes*, chapter 1, number 7, says: "Sacred Scripture speaks of the Church in two ways; for sometimes, when it names the Church, it understands that which truly exists before God." And below: "It is necessary for us to believe the Church invisible to us, visible only to the eyes of God." And in number 3: "Moreover, in order to embrace the unity of the Church in that way, there is no need to see the Church itself with the eyes, or to touch it with the hands." Bossuet reports several similar confessions concerning the invisible Church in his *History of the Variations*, book 15, numbers 16 and following; and so do the Walemburch brothers, book 1, *On the Unity of the Church*, chapter 5, and tract 3, *On the Church*.

449. The true origin of this error among the Innovators is this: when Catholics asked them where the Church of the Reformed had been before Luther's and Calvin's separation from the Roman Church, and when they could not in any way extricate themselves from this question, which was very troublesome to them, they fell, by a certain necessity, into the profession of an invisible Church. Palmer himself acknowledges this origin of the error. (1)

450. But since the doctrine concerning an invisible Church, considered both according to the nature of the thing and according to Christ's positive institution, as it is read in the Gospels, (1) Thus he writes, part 1, chapter 3, volume 1, page 26: "In fact, the Reformed seem generally to have taught the doctrine of the visibility of the church, until some of them deemed it necessary, in consequence of their controversy with the Romanists [Catholics], who asked them where their Church existed before Luther, to maintain that the Church might sometimes be invisible." Jurieu frankly admits the same, as cited by Bossuet in *Variations*, book 15, number 17. seems much too plainly absurd, not a few among Protestants indignantly reject that error, and its assigned origin, as a calumny. Thus, among others, Field, book 1, chapter 10; Gerhard, chapter 7; and Chillingworth, chapter 5, number 13.

451. Hence others among the Protestants themselves, moderating the opinion concerning the absolute invisibility of the Church, taught that the Church is visible by divine ordinance; but they denied that it is essentially and indefectibly visible, in such a way that for no space of time, however slight, it could either in some degree, or even altogether, be obscured. Hence they contend that the very faith of the Church can be so corrupted, and that this corruption can be so diffused and propagated for a time, that the true Church does not appear. Calvin himself above all insinuated this error, who says in the preface to the *Institutes*: "They roar unless the Church is always pointed out with the finger... Rather let us permit God, since he alone knows who are his, sometimes even to remove the external knowledge of his Church from the sight of men." The Gallican Calvinist confession, article 31, singing in harmony with these words, says: "Sometimes, as also in our times, when the state of the Church had been interrupted, it was necessary that certain men be raised up outside the ordinary order, who would restore the ruins of the collapsed Church." The same must also be held by logical necessity by as many as have dared to say that the Roman Pontiff is

Antichrist, or that the Catholic Church for some centuries before the heresy of Luther indulged in idolatry and superstition, since at that time their Church did not yet exist. (1)

452. But to still others it seems hard to concede that the Church has wholly failed even for a time; and therefore they establish the theory of a twofold Church, invisible and visible, attributing indefectibility and the other promises of Christ only to the first, (1) Hence the author of the book titled *The Church in the Middle Ages*, page 3, writes: "In full agreement, then, with the authorized teaching of the Church of England, in her Articles and Homilies; and with the views of all her leading divines from the Reformation downward... Jewel, Hooker, Hall, Ussher, Downame, Mede, Chandler, Halifax, Newton, More, Hurd, Lowth, Van Mildert, Davison, etc.,... we regard the history of the Middle Ages as the history of the Papal Apostacy; and in seeking for the Church of Christ in those ages, we look to find it in conformity with the predictions of Daniel and St. John, 'warred with,' 'prevailed against,' 'worn out,' 'overcome;' but still always visibly existing; to suffer these things for an allotted period, and in the end to revive and triumph." which they therefore call the Church of the promises. Luther himself taught this error, as we said in number 405; and not a few more recent writers adhere to it, among whom is Litton, whose words we reported in number 406, note. Suarez also reports the same in *Defense*, book 1, chapter 7, number 1, saying: "With this distinction [of a twofold Church, visible and invisible] presupposed, they [many of the ancient Protestants] answer that the invisible Church is the true and Catholic Church of Christ, to which it was promised that it would never fail, and that the gates of hell would not prevail against it. But the other Church, apparent and visible, although it perseveres in this external appearance, they say can fail in the truth of faith, and thereafter in the subsistence of the true Church, and has already failed in the Roman Church, whose form and appearance they depict in this way." Therefore Gerhard, in *On the Church*, chapter 7, number 70, undeservedly accuses Bellarmine of perverse interpretation because he attributes to Protestants the doctrine of a twofold Church.

453. Finally, to others all these things seem too absurd, and therefore they admit that the Church is visible, "yet in such a way," Bellarmine notes in book 3, chapter 11, concerning ancient heretics, and the same fits the more recent ones, "that it would be visible in name, but invisible in reality." (1) We have brought these things forward so that it may become known how many divergent opinions concerning the visibility or invisibility of the Church prevail among Protestants; and this at last they themselves admit. (2) (1) Let Palmer be an example, who writes in part 1, chapter 3: "By the visibility of the Church is meant the manifest, public, known existence of congregations or Churches professing Christianity, and joining in external acts of Christian worship. The point which I am about to establish is, that there were always to exist such societies, according to the Divine appointment; and that Christianity was never to be reduced at any time to obscurity; or to be a secret profession, held by a few scattered individuals, living and uniting externally in the profession of a false religion." (2) Thus Browne, *Exposition of the Thirty-Nine Articles*, article 19, writes: "It is, however, certain that the Article confines itself to the consideration of the visible Church, and gives us no authoritative statement concerning the invisible Church. And indeed the Reformers themselves vary considerably in their statements on the subject, though the sad corruptions in the visible Church in their days led them naturally to apply some of the promises in Scripture to a secret body, and not to the universal Church." Compare Murray, *On the Church*, disputation 5, section 4.

454. As regards us, lest we be forced to pursue each aberration individually, we shall try first of all to establish the true concept of the Church's visibility, and then to strengthen it with firm arguments; from this all contrary errors will collapse, as if by their own weight. And, to begin from the first point, when the visibility of the Church is treated, the question is certainly not whether it is materially visible, as they say, that is, with respect to the members of which it is composed, the rites by which they are associated, the ministry by which they are governed, and so forth; for it is evident that all these things must be visible so long as the question concerns an assembly of men. What is brought into question, therefore, is

whether the Church is visible also formally, namely as the true Church, so that the Church instituted by Christ, the Church which they call the Church of the promises, is certainly discerned from other assemblies which are not that true Church of Christ. Compare Suarez, *On Faith*, disputation 9, section 8, number 1.

455. But since the true Church of Christ consists of soul and body, as in numbers 410 and following, if only the body is seen and the soul in no way, the true Church of Christ, which certainly is not a dead body, is not properly seen. Likewise, certain properties belong to the true Church of Christ, as to any being; unless these properties are visible in some way, the Church cannot be said to be visible as the true Church of Christ. But from this a difficulty arises: in what way, they say, can interior faith, sanctifying grace, and the other gifts which constitute the soul of the Church, be seen? How can certain properties, for example unity and sanctity, be seen with respect to all their parts? To explain this difficulty, it must be noted that something can be visible either through itself, or through another thing, which they call accidentally, in which and through which it is manifested. Thus in man the body is visible through itself; but the rational soul informing it, although it is not visible through itself, is nevertheless manifested through external signs, for example through speech. Unless someone is visible as a rational animal, he is not visible formally, or as a man. Therefore the Church, with respect to its body, is visible through itself; with respect to its soul, it is visible through signs by which it manifests itself; with respect to its properties, it is visible partly through itself and partly through another. And therefore it is formally visible, or visible as the true Church of Christ. To be sure, internal faith, internal justice or sanctity, and so forth, which are like the soul of the body of the Church, do not appear and are not manifest through themselves; but neither does the soul of a man appear through itself. Nevertheless, just as the soul itself shines forth, as it were, through the body which it informs and vivifies, and through which it acts, so that a true man is seen; so the soul of the Church, informing, moving, and vivifying the body, is manifested through it, so that the true Church of Christ is visible. Compare Suarez, in the cited place, number 6. Therefore the visibility of the Church is "a certain manifestation of the true Church of Christ," which determines this certain judgment: "this is the true Church of Christ."

456. These things sufficiently make clear the concept of visibility which we vindicate for the Church. We need only add that this same visibility, in Catholic doctrine, pertains to the very essence of the Church, and therefore can at no time be absent from it. For just as, if the soul, or the body, or the union between soul and body were lacking, man would no longer exist, since all these pertain to his essence; so, if visibility were lacking, the Church itself would fail. Yet for this reason we do not here assert the perpetual indefectibility of the Church, which is to be proved below in its own place; rather, we say that the Church is visible for as long as it endures.

457. From what has been said, anyone easily sees that the Church is visible, or certainly knowable, as a truly divine fact. For the Church is formally visible, or visible as the true Church of Christ; but the true Church of Christ is a divine institution, a divine work. Therefore the Church is visible, or certainly knowable, as a divine work. Hence the Vatican Council, in the constitution *Dei Filius*, chapter 3, says: "God, through his only-begotten Son, instituted the Church, and furnished it with manifest notes of his institution, so that it could be recognized by all as the guardian and teacher of the revealed word. For to the Catholic Church alone belong all those many and wonderful things which have been divinely arranged for the evident credibility of the Christian faith. Indeed, the Church by itself, because of its admirable propagation, outstanding sanctity, and inexhaustible fruitfulness in all good things, because of its catholic unity and unconquered stability, is a certain great and perpetual motive of credibility and an irrefragable testimony of its divine mission. Thus it happens that, like a sign lifted up among the nations, it both invites to itself those who have not yet believed, and makes its own children more certain that the faith which they profess rests upon the firmest foundation."

458. But you will object: that the Church exists is an article of faith, since in the Creed we say, "I believe the holy Church"; but what is an article of faith is not seen, but believed. Therefore the Church is not formally visible.

459. Since theologians have answered this difficulty in various ways, it will help to note these things briefly. 1. Some answered that in the Church one thing is seen and another is believed: that the assembly of men which is the Church is seen; but that that assembly of men is the true Church of Christ is not seen, but believed. Thus, they say, baptism, insofar as it is an exterior washing, is discerned; but insofar as it is a sacrament, is believed; and in this way we say in the Creed: I believe one baptism. 2. But this answer, which perhaps could be tolerated at some stage of the controversy, considering the nature of the adversaries, absolutely cannot be approved. For from it there would follow that the Church is not formally visible; and therefore that we could not, through the notes of the true Church, as we shall accomplish below, demonstrate that that visible assembly of men who profess the faith of Christ under the Roman Pontiff is the true Church of Christ, but that this is had only through faith; and certainly no Catholic can admit this. 3. From this, however, it is clear that those theologians, if they gave this sort of answer absolutely, at most do not cohere with themselves; yet they are by no means to be judged contrary to the doctrine concerning the visibility of the Church, as it has been explained by us. For all admit that the Church is visible through certain notes, as the true Church of Christ; and all, by applying those notes, show that the Roman Church is the true Church of Christ. 4. Many of those theologians seem to have used the aforesaid answer for this reason, that, in their opinion, what is evidently known or clearly seen cannot be the object of faith. But we by no means embraced this opinion in the treatise *On the Virtues*; and therefore, according to the things which we handed down there, the answer to the proposed difficulty is easy for us. For we distinguish the minor proposition: "what is an article of faith is not seen, but believed." Distinguish: it is not seen formally as it is believed, or on account of the very motive on account of which it is believed: granted; it is not seen materially, or on account of another motive: denied. Therefore, just as we can believe the unity of God, evidently known, insofar as we assent to it on account of the authority of God revealing alone, without attending to the intrinsic reasons by which it is evident; so we can believe the Church, formally visible from its notes, insofar as, prescinding from the arguments by which it is rendered visible and credible, we hold it on account of the authority of God revealing alone. But see what we said in the treatise *On the Virtues*, disputation 2, article 8, and disputation 3, article 4.

460. With these points, therefore, having been set forth: **Section II The Proposed Question Is Resolved Proposition XIX.** The Christian Church is formally visible, or visible as the true Church, as the Church which they call the Church of divine promises, in such a way that, from Christ's institution, visibility pertains to its very essence. Therefore the Church, considered according to its nature, must be called not merely a divine or human society, but indivisibly a divine-human society.

461. Proof I. It is established in the preceding thesis that Christ instituted the Church in such a way that, although it is spiritual and divine under many heads, it was nevertheless a society of men and among men. But visibility belongs to the essence of a true society of men and among men. Therefore. The minor is proved. "Men cannot be bound together with one another into some social union without mutual external conjunction; without sensible signs by which they communicate among themselves and advance themselves toward the common end established for the society; without visible means and a visible principle of authority, which preserves the unity of the society." Therefore.

462. II. That which is necessarily connected with the proper end for which Christ instituted the Church must be said to pertain to its essence. But formal visibility is necessarily connected with the end for which the Church was instituted by Christ. Therefore. The minor is proved. As will be demonstrated a little below: 1. "Christ intended in the Church and through the Church to make his mission on earth perpetual, and continually to render present his oral magisterium. But Christ's mission and his

magisterium were visible; nor likewise could the Church satisfy that office unless it were a visible society." Therefore. 2. "Christ intended in the Church and through the Church to open the ark of salvation to men, and in it and through it to supply all the exclusive means of salvation. But unless the Church were conspicuous, neither would such means of salvation exist, nor could the same Church administer them, nor could men recognize and approach it, so that they might be advanced to salvation by suitable means." Therefore. Compare Cercia, section 2, book 2, who develops these arguments at greater length.

463. III. The same thing can be confirmed directly from the Scriptures. We take this argument from Bellarmine, *On the Church Militant*, book 3, chapter 12 and following, who explains it excellently. And: 1. Wherever the name Church is found in the Scriptures, by it a visible congregation is always signified; and Calvin could not produce, nor did he produce, even one place where this name was attributed to an invisible congregation. Certainly when it is said in Numbers 20, "Why have you brought out the Church of the Lord into the wilderness?" that very well-known people Israel, which had gone out of Egypt, is called the Church. Likewise in 1 Kings 8 Scripture manifestly speaks of the Church, saying: "And the king turned his face and blessed the whole Church of Israel. For the whole Church of Israel was standing." Similarly, in Matthew 16 Christ said: "Upon this rock I will build my Church." Now whether by the name of rock you understand Christ or the confession of faith, as the heretics wish, or Peter, as we believe, the foundation of the Church is always something sensible, as is evident, and therefore the Church itself is sensible, or visible. And in Matthew 18: "Tell the Church; if he will not hear the Church," etc.; certainly neither could be observed if the Church were invisible. And in Acts 20.28: "Take heed to yourselves and to the whole flock, in which the Holy Spirit has placed you as bishops to rule the Church of God." How could they rule a Church which they did not know? Likewise in Acts 15: "They indeed, being brought on their way by the Church, passed through Phoenicia"; and in the same place: "When they had come to Jerusalem, they were received by the Church"; and in chapter 18: "Paul went up and greeted the Church." How do these things fit an invisible Church? Finally, in 1 Timothy 3 the Apostle says: "These things I write to you, son Timothy, that you may know how you ought to behave in the house of God, which is the Church of the living God," etc. But surely he could not behave in it unless he knew which one it was. Therefore either it must be said that no Church was founded by Christ, or that he founded a visible Church. 2. The same is clear from the very origin and progress of the Church. For, to omit the state of the Old Testament, in which the Church was so visible that it bore in its very flesh the visible sign of circumcision, in the New Testament without doubt the whole Christian Church was at the beginning in the Apostles and disciples of Christ, who were so visible that the Holy Spirit visibly descended upon them on the day of Pentecost. Then on one day men up to about three thousand, and again up to five thousand, were visibly added to them through confession of faith and baptism, as is reported in Acts 1 and following; and thereafter all those, and only those, were always held to be the Church of Christ who joined themselves to those first ones through baptism and confession of faith. Moehler develops this argument excellently in *Symbolism*, chapter 5, section 48. 3. There are added the parables by which, with everyone's agreement, the Church is signified. For the threshing floor on which there are grains and chaff; the net in which there are good and bad fish; the field in which there are wheat and tares; the banquet at which good and bad recline; the sheepfold in which there are sheep and goats, signify a visible Church, as even the heretics admit. For the invisible Church does not have bad and good, but only good, according to their opinion. But the same parables teach that this visible Church will never perish until the day of judgment; for in Matthew 3 it is said: "He shall thoroughly cleanse his floor, and gather his wheat into his barn; but the chaff he shall burn with unquenchable fire." This without doubt will not happen before the day of judgment. And in Matthew 13 it is said: "Let both grow until the harvest"; and below: "But the harvest is the consummation of the age"; and below: "So shall it be at the consummation of the age; the angels shall go out and separate the wicked from among the just." Therefore the Church of the promises is the visible Church. 4. This is confirmed from the names Kingdom, City, House, Sheepfold, and Body, which, as we saw in number 440, are attributed to the

Church. All these plainly show that the Church is by its nature visible, and indeed formally visible. For it is called the Kingdom of God, the holy City, the House or Tabernacle of the Holy Spirit, the Body of Christ, which certainly is not a dead body, and so forth. Hence especially Christ says of the Church in Matthew 5.14: "A city set upon a mountain cannot be hidden." Weighing these words, St. Augustine says in letter 52, number 1, to Severinus the Donatist: "It is easy for you to attend and see the city established upon a mountain, concerning which the Lord says in the Gospel that it cannot be hidden. For it is the Catholic Church itself; whence it is called katholike in Greek, because it is diffused throughout the whole earth. No one is permitted to be ignorant of it; therefore, according to the word of our Lord Jesus Christ, it cannot be hidden."

464. Therefore, to gather all these things briefly and complete this argument, we say: the people of the Church is conceived through the preaching and hearing of faith, which certainly are something sensible; it is born through baptism, which is a sign most visible; it is nourished through the sacraments, which likewise are sensible signs of interior grace; its pastors, just as they are assumed through certain and visible signs, so, once assumed, govern through external and manifest laws. Hence the Church by its nature is an assembly of visible men, entering it visibly, and living in it under pastors visibly assumed, by manifold visible sign. Therefore if Christ had wished to institute a visible Church, as in reality, according to Catholics, he instituted it, and Protestants deny, let them say what more he ought to have done. For if, as the matter really stands, it is not understood in what clearer way he could have constituted it visible, either it must be said that the visibility of the Church is impossible even to God, which is absurd; or it must be admitted that the Church is truly visible. Again: from what has been said, it cannot be denied that several elements of the Church are visible. These, moreover, certainly pertain to the essence of the Church, both because Christ instituted the Church only by instituting these things, and because they are altogether necessary for the proper end of the Church. Therefore it is impossible that there be a true Church of Christ which is invisible; for in that case some essential element would already be lacking, and with that element lacking, the same Church cannot subsist. Finally, the elements of the Church which are invisible through themselves are manifested through another, as we have said; nor can that manifestation be doubtful for the whole assembly. For it can happen that the profession of faith in one or another member is mendacious, just as likewise the external signs of sanctity in one or another are hypocrisy; but apart from the special providence by which the Church is governed, the moral law itself by which the human race is governed prevents hypocrisy and falsehood from existing in the whole multitude.

465. IV. The Church, instituted by Christ as visible, had already been foretold by the Prophets as going to exist visibly. For in Isaiah 2 it is read: "And in the last days the mountain of the house of the Lord shall be prepared on the top of the mountains, and it shall be exalted above the hills, and all nations shall flow to it. And many peoples shall go and say: Come, and let us go up to the mountain of the Lord, and to the house of the God of Jacob, and he will teach us his ways, and we will walk in his paths," etc. And in Micah 4, in almost the same words, the same prophecy is found: "In the last of the days the mountain of the house of the Lord shall be prepared on the top of the mountains, and high above the hills; and peoples shall flow to it. And many nations shall hasten and say: Come, let us go up to the mountain of the Lord, and to the house of the God of Jacob; and he will teach us concerning his ways, and we will go in his paths," etc. Hence, in these testimonies the discourse is certainly about the Church. This is clear from those "last days," which designate the final economy; from the appellation "house of God," which is very often attributed to the Church, as in number 440; from the words "he will teach his ways," which express the proper office of the Church, and so forth. But in those same testimonies the Church is represented as formally visible, since it is called a Mountain, the mountain of the Lord, to which all nations come, so that they may learn the ways of the Lord, so that they may walk in his paths, that is, so that they may believe rightly and live holily. Therefore. This interpretation can be confirmed from the consensus of the Fathers. For, setting aside certain mystical interpretations, which do not exclude the proper interpretation but rather presuppose it, the Fathers

unanimously understand the cited testimonies as concerning the Church; and if any say that Christ is the Mountain, they say this of Christ as Head of the Church and as manifesting himself through it. St. Optatus of Milevis, in *On the Schism of the Donatists*, book 3, number 2, says: "It is written in Isaiah the Prophet: 'From Zion shall go forth the law, and the word of the Lord from Jerusalem' (2.3). Therefore in that mountain Zion Isaiah does not see a valley, but the holy mountain, which is the Church, which throughout the whole Roman world has raised its head under the whole heaven... Therefore the Church is the spiritual Zion, in which Christ has been appointed king by God the Father; which is in the whole earth, in which there is one Catholic Church." St. Basil, on Isaiah, number 66: "For how then will the mountain of the Lord (Isaiah 2.3) become conspicuous? In what way likewise will the house of God be placed on the summits of the mountains? For carnal Israel is not expecting the rising of another mountain; nor is it waiting for the construction of a second house to be superimposed upon other summits. But Mount Zion and the temple were also seen in the time of Isaiah when he was prophesying... The house of God, situated on the summits of the mountains, is the Church," etc. St. John Chrysostom, on Isaiah chapter 2, number 2, on those words, "In the last days the mountain of the Lord shall be manifest," says: "Manifest. This needs no further interpretation. If the very nature of the things sends forth a voice clearer than a trumpet, showing the splendor of the Church. For neither is the sun so splendid, nor is its light so clear, as are the things pertaining to the Church. For 'the house of God is above the summit of the mountains.'" St. Augustine, tractate 1 on John, number 13: "When men wish to see the new moon, they say: behold the moon, behold where it is; and if there are some there who cannot direct their gaze and say, Where? a finger is pointed for them, so that they may see. Sometimes, while they blush lest they be thought blind, they say that they have seen what they have not seen. Do we show the Church in this way, my brothers? Is it not open? Is it not manifest? Has it not held all nations?... Behold the mountain filling the whole face of the earth; behold the city concerning which it was said: A city set upon a mountain cannot be hidden. But they stumble against the mountain (1 John 2.11). And when it is said to them: Ascend; they say: it is not a mountain; and more easily do they strike their face against it than seek a dwelling there. Isaiah was read yesterday: whoever of you was keeping watch, not only with the eyes, but with the ear, nor with the ear of the body, but with the ear of the heart, noticed: 'In the last days the mountain of the house of the Lord shall be manifest, prepared on the summit of the mountains' (Isaiah 2.2). What is so manifest as a mountain? But there are also unknown mountains, because they are placed in one part of the lands. Which of you knows Mount Olympus? Just as those who live there do not know our Gildaba. These mountains are in parts. But that mountain is not so, because it has filled the whole face of the earth, and concerning it it is said: Prepared on the summit of all mountains." St. Cyril of Alexandria, on Isaiah, book 1, oration 2: "Hence, therefore, it could rightly be called the intelligible mountain of the house of God. And it is illustrious, as being raised above the hills. But concerning it someone could deservedly say that which was spoken by the voice of the Savior in the place of an illustrious example: 'A city set upon a mountain cannot be hidden.' There are indeed many other things which could very easily be collected, from which it is possible to see in the divinely inspired Scriptures that the summit of intelligible Jerusalem, that is, the height of the Church, is compared to hills and mountains."

466. To these could be added testimonies of the more notable Protestant interpreters, whose names Murray reports. But compare what that distinguished author has in disputation 5, section 2, where he diligently unfolds and defends these and other proofs from the Old Testament.

467. Scholion. We shall briefly indicate the difficulties which directly attack the visibility of the Church, together with their solutions; directly, I say, for several tend toward establishing that only the just or only the predestined are members of the Church. We shall indicate these where the discussion will be about the members of the Church. Others are properly opposed to the indefectibility of the Church, which also must be treated below.

468. Therefore, I. From the Old Testament there is objected: 1. that passage of Jeremiah 31: "This shall be the covenant which I will make with the house of Israel after those days... I will put my law in their inward parts, and I will write it in their heart"; where the old Church seems to be opposed to the new, insofar as the former is visible and the latter invisible. 2. That which he adds in verse 34: "A man shall no more teach his neighbor, and a man his brother, saying: Know the Lord; for all shall know me, from the least of them even to the greatest, says the Lord"; by which words a visible magisterium seems to be excluded. 3. Similarly in Isaiah 54.13 it is said: "I will give all your children taught by the Lord." It is answered to the first: the opposition is not between the visibility of the old Church and the invisibility of the new, as is already abundantly clear from the demonstration of the thesis given above; but between the greater abundance of grace which is conferred in the new law by its power, and the lesser grace which obtained in the old law, and which, as we said, was not conferred by the power of that covenant. Surely the Prophet here announces something excellent concerning the new Church before the old; but invisibility would not be of this kind, all the more because, according to the adversaries, the Church would become invisible precisely when it was corrupted. To the second: those words are certainly not said for the exclusion of an external magisterium; otherwise Isaiah would not have said in Isaiah 52.7: "How beautiful upon the mountains are the feet of him who announces and preaches peace, of him who announces good, who preaches salvation," etc.; and what would become of those words, "teach all nations," "he who hears you hears me," and innumerable testimonies of this kind? Therefore the objected words must be understood of a greater facility for attaining truth in the new law before the old; or of the knowledge of the true God, with idolatry removed; or the opposition is in this, that the Israelites had to teach only a brother and neighbor, that is, Israelites, whom alone that law regarded, whereas in the new law, which regards all, the mission is to teach all nations. Compare the interpreters. To the third: from the reasons just indicated, it is clear that the objected words cannot be taken so as to exclude an external and visible magisterium. Hence some, with Cyril, understand those words precisely of the doctrine of the Gospel; and the sense is that it is no longer to be preached through the Prophets, but through the Son of God himself, according to Hebrews 1.1: "God, who at sundry times spoke to the fathers in the prophets," etc. Others, with St. Augustine, explain the same words of divine grace; and the sense is that God himself, certainly through grace now more abundant, will interiorly persuade what is proposed through the external magisterium, according to John 6.45: "It is written in the Prophets: And they shall all be teachable of God; everyone who has heard from the Father and has learned comes to me."

469. II. They object certain sayings of Christ the Lord himself. And: 1. that passage in Luke 17.20: "The kingdom of God does not come with observation. Neither shall they say: behold here, or behold there. For behold, the kingdom of God is within you"; by which words, they say, the Church is openly said to be unobservable. 2. That passage in John 4: "Woman, believe me, the hour comes when neither on this mountain nor in Jerusalem shall you adore the Father... But the hour comes, and now is, when the true adorers shall adore the Father in spirit and truth... God is spirit, and those who adore him must adore in spirit and truth." But adoration in spirit is not visible. It is answered to the first: that phrase "without observation" is certainly not the same as "invisible," just as the kingdom of God in the objected passage properly and directly signifies the Messiah, or his advent. For when the Jews were asking, "when does the kingdom of God come?" thinking that the Messiah would come with secular pomp and royal display, Christ answered that his advent is without observation, that is, without any display; and therefore it is not said, behold here or behold there, as would happen if admiration were excited by that pomp. In order to confirm this, Christ the Lord adds: the kingdom of God is within you, that is, the Messiah is in your company by his presence, in the midst of you. Others explain the matter thus: "the kingdom of God comes without observation," that is, there is no need of subtle investigation in order to know it; for "it is within you," that is, it is already present. To the second: evidently that phrase "in spirit and truth" is not the same as "invisible"; otherwise not only would a visible Church be excluded, but any external worship whatever, which even the

adversaries do not contend for here. Therefore to adore in the objected passage, as is clear from the context, is the same as to offer sacrifice. Therefore the sacrifice of the new covenant is opposed to the sacrifices of Jews and Samaritans. Hence adoration is said to be "in spirit" against carnal sacrifices, by which, namely, carnal victims were immolated by the Jews; nor will there any longer be a determinate place for offering the new sacrifice, but it will be offered in every place. It is said to be "in truth" either by opposition to the typical sacrifices of the Jews, or also by opposition to the false worship of the Samaritans, who adored what they did not know.

470. III. They object certain sayings of the Apostles. And: 1. that passage in 1 Peter 2: "Be you also as living stones built up, a spiritual house, a holy priesthood, to offer spiritual sacrifices." But what is spiritual, they say, is invisible. 2. That passage in Hebrews 12: "For you have not come to a mountain that may be touched, to a burning fire, and whirlwind, and darkness, and storm... But you have come to Mount Zion, and to the city of the living God, the heavenly Jerusalem," etc.; where, they say, the Church is called a mountain that may not be touched, that is, invisible. It is answered to the first: certainly by a spiritual house St. Peter does not understand an invisible Church; for both he writes as visible president to the visible Church, and he adds in chapter 5: "The elders who are among you I beseech, I who am a fellow elder and a witness of the sufferings of Christ... feed the flock of God which is among you," etc. Therefore he calls the Church a spiritual house not by opposition to visible, but either by opposition to a material house composed of wood and stone; or in order to express the prerogative of the new covenant, namely, that it is a covenant of grace, that the faithful by its power live the life of grace, and that they are a temple of the Holy Spirit. Hence they offer spiritual sacrifices, that is, not carnal and bloody ones. To the second: some, with Theophylact, Oecumenius, St. Thomas, and others, understand by Mount Zion the Church triumphant; and thus the text would be outside the matter. Others understand the Church in a certain more general acceptance, and then it is Mount Zion, the heavenly Jerusalem, and so forth insofar as it is triumphant, not insofar as it is militant. Certainly the Apostle's aim is to extol the new covenant above the old; but for this it was not necessary to set forth all the elements of the Church or to hand down its definition. It was enough to commend the nobler things. He selects two things. The old law was given in an earthly and accessible place, because the covenant was situated in temporal goods; but the new covenant is spiritual, given from heaven, which Zion and Jerusalem signify tropologically, and through it communion is had with the Angels, and so forth. The old law was given with signs of fear; but the new covenant is one of mercy and love. But that the faithful in the new law are said to have come to "the assembly of many thousands of Angels," etc., imports the communion which exists between the assembly of the faithful and the Angels, and the ordering of those faithful toward the beatitude to be possessed with them; but in no way does it import that the assembly of the faithful on earth, the Church militant, is invisible.

Article 5. What End Christ Set Before Himself in the Institution of the Church

471. From what has been disputed thus far we have only this established: that the Church, from Christ's institution, is a true society, and that it is visible. And in this the Church agrees generically with any other society existing among men. Now we proceed to investigate the specific nature of the Church, or we inquire into that through which it is distinguished from other societies; and this can be known only from its end.

472. For, as Cardinal Tarquini reasons well in *Public Ecclesiastical Law*, number 7: "To determine the essence of some thing is the same as to assign some note intrinsic and immutable to it, which is uniquely proper to it. But the intrinsic and immutable note which is uniquely proper to each society can be nothing except its end; because, from the four essential elements mentioned in number 392, the two prior elements, that is, the multitude of men and their conjunction, insofar as they are considered in themselves, with abstraction made from the end, are common to the genus. The third, however, that is, the

means, is not determined through itself, since means by their nature are ordered to an end, so that they are sought only insofar as they conduce to the end. On the other hand, the fourth, that is, the end, in the genus of societies is plainly indeterminate; but it is determined only in individual societies, so that it is uniquely proper to each. Therefore the essence of societies can be determined only from the end. But societies which are distinct from one another and nevertheless have the same end adequately are so many repetitions of the same society, which are distinguished not in species but in number."

473. Now then, as we shall immediately prove, the end which Christ intended in instituting the Church was that, in the Church and through the Church, he would make perpetual his visible mission on earth and his visible magisterium. Hence, just as Christ's magisterium, governance, and ministry of sanctification persevere in the Church teaching and governing, so the faithful, by adhering to the doctrine proposed by him, by obeying him, and by receiving from him the means of sanctification, find in the Church the safe way of salvation.

474. Therefore, in order that the end of the instituted Church may be known adequately, it must be asked what was the end of Christ's own mission. This was certainly the eternal salvation of men, and the glory of God to be obtained through the salvation of men. Christ himself declares this in John 10.10, saying: "I have come that they may have life [certainly the supernatural life of grace], and may have it more abundantly." And in 1 John 5.11 it is said: "And this is the testimony, that God has given us eternal life. And this life is in his Son." And in John 17.4: "Father... I have glorified you upon earth: I have finished the work which you gave me to do." Hence it is clear that, by the same reason by which the end for which Christ instituted the Church is said to have been the perpetual continuation of his visible mission on earth, that end is also said to be the glory of God to be obtained through the eternal salvation of men.

475. From this it is also clear that this end of obtaining eternal salvation, which belongs to the Church of Christ, is likewise altogether proper to it, since no other society has it as proper to itself. In this matter it must be recalled what we indicated above in numbers 38 and 85, namely, that the other societies which are in the world, if they are legitimate and honorable, must intend eternal salvation in some way; nevertheless that end is in them only general and remote, not, as in the Church, proper and immediate. Therefore they need the Church, as will later be seen better, in order to obtain that remote end, so that they may proceed rightly in the pursuit of their proper and immediate end.

476. With the end of the Church declared in this way, it can immediately be inferred: 1. that the Church is a spiritual and supernatural society. For, as we said in number 472, the nature and essence of a society is determined by the end for which it was instituted; but the glory of God to be obtained through the eternal salvation of men, the end of the Church, is a spiritual end and a supernatural one. Therefore. In reality, once a supernatural end has been established, it is rightly inferred that the Church itself has both supernatural elements and supernatural means; for means have a proportion to the end, just as the end is proportioned to the subject to which it is proposed.

477. But it is vainly objected: if the Church is a spiritual society, it has no right to use material means. For, as Taparelli rightly notes in the *Essay*, number 1432, if by the name spiritual society they understand a society composed of spirits, the antecedent is false; if a society is understood which tends to a spiritual end, the consequent is false. This will immediately be clear if the two things which are understood beneath the argument are brought into the open. Here is the whole argument: the Church is a society which tends to a spiritual end; therefore it has a right to those means which are necessary for attaining such an end; but a spiritual end requires merely spiritual means; therefore the Church has a right to merely spiritual means; therefore it can claim for itself no right over material things. Now there is no one who does not see that the third proposition is false, since the question is of a human society, namely a society whose members are composed of soul and body, and who therefore, even when they deal among themselves about spiritual things, must necessarily use material means.

478. It is inferred: 2. that the Church is a religious society, indeed the Christian religion itself considered, as it were, in the concrete. It is indeed a religious society; for it belongs to religion to offer due worship to God and to promote man toward the attainment of his end, and thus of his happiness, as in numbers 21-23. But the Church was instituted to procure the eternal salvation of man and the glory of God. Therefore. But it is the Christian religion itself; for if the Church is a religious society, since it was instituted by Christ, it cannot be another religion besides the Christian religion itself, whose truth and divine origin we demonstrated in the preceding disputation.

479. Wherefore, as we indicated in number 388, true Christianity does not differ from the Church except as the abstract from the concrete, but in reality they are one and the same. For just as there cannot be a true Church of Christ which does not have the doctrine and institutions of Christ, so neither can true Christianity flourish outside the genuine Church of Christ. Therefore the Christianity which rationalists in our age imagine for themselves, severed from the Church of Christ, and thus released from the duties to be rendered to it, must be judged a pure and mere chimera. For, as we were just saying, our Redeemer willed "his religion to adhere to the society instituted by himself in such a way that it would remain thoroughly joined and, as it were, concreted with that society, and that outside it there would be no true religion of Christ."

480. This inference is indeed of the greatest moment. For if, for the institution and propagation of his religion, Christ immediately set about the institution of the Church, and deposited in it the doctrine and institutions which he had revealed, to be guarded by it and perpetually disseminated, then certainly Christian revelation never, not even for one instant, remained as if left to itself; rather, what at first remained, as it were, in the hands of Christ, passed from them to the Apostles, and then passed from the hands of the Apostles to their successors. Therefore, just as from the beginning the doctrine and religion of Christ had to be sought from Christ himself, and just as after Christ's ascension into heaven it had to be sought from the Apostles, so after the times of the Apostles until the consummation of the age it must be sought from the Church, or from its authentic magisterium, in which the magisterium of Christ himself still perseveres and flourishes. Compare what we disputed in the treatise *On the Infused Virtues*, disputation 4, articles 2, 3, and 5.

481. These things, therefore, having been set forth: **Section II The Proposed Question Is Resolved Proposition XX.** The end which Christ set before himself in instituting the Church was that, in the Church and through the Church, he would make perpetual his visible mission on earth; and thus that through it, by procuring the eternal salvation of men, he would promote the glory of God. Therefore the Church, especially considered with respect to its end, is a religious, spiritual, and supernatural society; namely, it is the Christian religion itself in the concrete, plainly different from every other society.

482. I. Let us consider Christ's mission generally. Certainly: 1. Christ communicated to the Apostles his own same mission. For it is read in John 20.21: "As the Father has sent me, I also send you"; and in John 17.17 and following: "Sanctify them in truth; your word is truth: as you have sent me into the world, I also have sent them into the world"; and in John 15.16: "You have not chosen me, but I have chosen you, and have appointed you, that you should go and bring forth fruit, and that your fruit should remain." 2. To discharge this mission Christ communicated his own power to the Apostles. For it is said in Matthew 28.18 and following: "All power has been given to me in heaven and on earth. Going therefore, teach all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit, teaching them to observe all things whatsoever I have commanded you; and behold I am with you all days, even to the consummation of the age." Hence also in John 20, after those words "as he sent," etc., Christ adds: "Receive the Holy Spirit; whose sins you shall forgive," etc.; and in Mark 16.15, once the mission of preaching the Gospel has been conferred, he adds: "he who does not believe shall be condemned"; just as in Luke 10.16 it is said: "he who hears you hears me; he who despises you despises me." 3. But this mission and

power did not belong to the Apostles alone, but was to be continued in their successors. For: a. that mission and power, as is clear from the cited testimonies, was communicated to the Apostles for the good of the whole world, of all nations, for every time; and surely all must be saved through Christ and through the means instituted by him. But the Apostles could not by themselves extend the mission they had received to all nations for every time. b. Especially from the text of Matthew 28 it is clear that Christ promised the Apostles that he would be with them as they taught and baptized until the consummation of the age. But these words cannot be understood of the person of the Apostles alone. c. Hence, just as the Apostles after Christ's ascension into heaven constituted the Church teaching, governing, and administering, which is clear also from the Acts of the Apostles and from the Epistles of Peter and Paul, they then visibly bearing the place of Christ on earth, so bishops succeed the Apostles until the end of the world, so that they visibly bear the place of Christ, and in them the mission of Christ may persevere.

483. II. Let us consider the individual offices of Christ's mission. Furthermore: 1. the office of his mission was to teach men the true and safe way of salvation; for concerning him it is said: "Jesus began to do and to teach"; and he himself says concerning himself that he came "to preach the Gospel to the poor," that he is "the way and the truth," and so forth. But he committed the same office to the Apostles, to whom he said: "going, teach all nations." Through their successors that office must endure "even to the consummation of the age." The same office is an authentic magisterium, as is clear from Mark 16.16: "he who believes and is baptized... shall be saved; but he who does not believe shall be condemned." Therefore. 2. The office of Christ's mission was to loose men from the bonds of sins and to sanctify them; since of him St. John the Baptist said: "Behold the Lamb of God, behold him who takes away the sin of the world." Christ himself said to the paralytic and to Magdalene: "Your sins are forgiven you"; concerning himself he declared that he had come "to save that which had perished." But it is established that Christ imposed the same office upon the Apostles, in whom he founded the Church. For he addressed the Apostles thus in John 20.21-23: "As the Father has sent me, I also send you. When he had said this, he breathed on them and said to them: Receive the Holy Spirit; whose sins you shall forgive, they are forgiven them; and whose sins you shall retain, they are retained." And in Matthew 18.18: "Amen I say to you, whatever you shall bind upon earth shall be bound also in heaven; and whatever you shall loose upon earth shall be loosed also in heaven." 3. The office of Christ's mission certainly was that, so long as he was on earth, he himself would rule the Church constituted by him. And Christ committed the same office to the Apostles, in whom he founded the Church. For in John 21.15-17 he enjoins upon Peter: "Feed my sheep, feed my lambs." Yet since the other Apostles, and their successors the bishops, had to share the same office, it is said to them in 1 Peter 5.2: "Feed the flock of God which is among you"; just as Paul says in Acts 20.28: "Take heed to yourselves and to the whole flock, in which the Holy Spirit has placed you to rule the Church of God." Indeed, lest anyone think that he can with impunity withdraw himself from the authority of such pastors, Christ declared in John 13.20: "Amen, amen I say to you: he who receives anyone whom I send receives me; and he who receives me receives him who sent me." And he decreed that the one who resists the judgment of the Church is to be held as a heathen and a publican in Matthew 18.17: "If he will not hear the Church, let him be to you as a heathen and a publican."

484. III. From these things it is plainly established that the end of the Church instituted by Christ is the continuation of the mission of Christ himself; from which, as we noted, it is rightly inferred that this end is the sanctification of men on earth and eternal salvation in heaven. But it is better to establish this directly. Certainly: 1. The first means of holiness and salvation is faith, which is called "the beginning, root, and foundation of all justice," and without which, according to the testimony of the Apostle in Hebrews 11.6, "it is impossible to please God." But, as the Apostle himself reasons in Romans 10.17, with reference to Isaiah 52: "faith is from hearing, and hearing through the word of Christ." But from whom shall we hear the word of Christ? The Apostle himself had said a little above in verses 14 and following: "How shall they believe him whom they have not heard? And how shall they hear without a preacher? And how

shall they preach unless they are sent?" And who are sent to preach, except those to whom Christ said, "going, teach"? Hence concerning them the Apostle adds in verse 18: "And indeed their sound has gone out into all the earth, and their words unto the ends of the earth." 2. The principal means of communicating sanctity and promoting salvation are the sacraments. But Christ entrusted each and all of the sacraments only to his Church. And indeed, only to the Apostles and their successors did he say in Matthew 28.19: "Going, teach all nations, baptizing them," etc.; to the same he said: "Receive the Holy Spirit; whose sins you shall forgive, they are forgiven them," etc.; to the same are directed those words in Luke 22.19: "Do this in commemoration of me"; and the remaining things which are customarily weighed concerning the individual sacraments when these are treated. Wherefore the Apostle pronounced generally in 1 Corinthians 4.1: "Let a man so account us, as ministers of Christ and dispensers of the mysteries of God." 3. To Peter in John 21.15-17 it was commanded: "Feed my sheep; feed my lambs"; just as it was said to the others: "Feed the flock of God which is among you." Now the word feeding signifies nothing more than to supply all the spiritual means by which eternal salvation can be attained; for the governance of the Church was instituted for this. Certainly no one will be able to enter eternal life unless the entrance to the kingdom of heaven is opened to him; but to Peter it was said in Matthew 16.19: "And to you I will give the keys of the kingdom of heaven." Therefore only through Peter, the foundation of the Church, and thus also through the Church itself, can the entrance to eternal life lie open. From these things it follows that the work of redemption, with respect to sufficiency and the payment of the price, was consummated by Christ, according to that saying of the Apostle in Hebrews 10.14: "by one oblation [Christ] has perfected forever"; but with respect to application, it was begun by Christ, but is to be consummated by the Church through those whom Christ instituted in Ephesians 4.12 and following "for the consummation of the saints, unto the work of the ministry, unto the building up of the body of Christ, until we all meet in the unity of faith and of the knowledge of the Son of God... unto the measure of the age of the fullness of Christ."

Article 6. Whether the Church of Christ Is a Legal Society and Ethically Necessary

485. As the title of the article makes manifest, we touch here upon two questions: one concerns the legality of Christian society, or the Church; the other concerns its ethical necessity, or the moral obligation of entering it. Each needs to be illustrated in a few words before it is resolved.

486. I. In general that society is called legal which is according to law. But here we must consider three kinds of law: namely, natural law; positive-divine law; and positive-human law. We presuppose, however, that no positive law is just if it conflicts with the natural law. See what was said in numbers 26 and following.

487. Now, that the Church is a divine-positive society, or instituted by divine-positive right, no one denies among those who profess Christianity in some way, nor can it be denied after the things which we have demonstrated concerning the divine origin of the Christian religion and concerning the institution of the Church made immediately by Christ. For since Christ, the founder of the Church, is true God, the Church is a divine society; and by a like reason, since a supernatural end was proposed to the Church, and therefore it itself is a supernatural society, no natural law could have prescribed its institution. Therefore its institution and existence must be attributed to positive right. Once this is granted, it is scarcely worthwhile to propose the question concerning the legality of the Church with respect to the very right by which it exists; for it was instituted by Christ the Lord, who is God, and who therefore has the right both of instituting the Church and of instituting it in whatever way he pleases.

488. But with respect to the natural law, properly speaking, the most that could be asked is whether the institution of the Church is honorable and licit; but not whether it is legal. Yet: 1. it must be judged honorable and licit if it has nothing that conflicts with the natural law. But it is evident that an

institution of divine right can contain nothing that conflicts with the natural law, since the Author of each right or law is one, God. 2. If absolute natural right is considered, namely that which exists independently from a hypothesis arising from some free determination, it can prescribe nothing positively with respect to the Church, which is a society of positive institution, beyond every exigency of nature. 3. But if hypothetical natural right is considered, namely that which exists once the hypothesis of the free institution of the Church by God has been made, it is certain that by the very law of nature, which dictates that a legitimate superior must be obeyed, we are obliged to embrace the Church, and indeed in that form and with those rights which it received from its founder. Compare what we said in the treatise *On the Infused Virtues*, number 1030.

489. Therefore the question concerning the legal existence and propagation of the Church properly regards positive human right. That is, since the Church of Christ from the beginning began to be propagated among the Jews, then among the Gentiles, and now also is announced among societies of unbelievers, Protestants, and Mohammedans, the question is therefore whether, according to the laws and customs of these societies, the Church could and can be legitimately propagated among them. Now this question presents no difficulty if once we consider what truly is on the side of reality. For no human law can have force against divine right. But the Church was instituted by divine right so that it might be propagated among all nations; it alone is the true religion, which surely all are bound to embrace and profess. Therefore there can be no law, among any society, justly impeding the institution and propagation of the Church. Thus, in order to place the legal propagation and existence of the Church in fuller light, we shall consider it in relation to the principles, laws, and customs by which the aforesaid societies are governed, and among which the Church was and is propagated.

490. II. Thus far concerning the legitimacy, or legal existence, of the Church. Now certain things must be declared concerning its necessity. And first of all we note that necessary societies are called those from which it is not permitted to abstain without fault; voluntary societies are those to which there is no obligation of enrolling oneself. Hence it is clear that the Church of Christ is a necessary society; for although someone must freely receive faith and baptism, if the discussion is about adults, and enter the Church, nevertheless, since there exists an antecedent necessity or obligation of receiving faith and baptism and of entering the Church, the Church is truly called and is a necessary society. This truth the Church itself has constantly asserted. For according to the prescription of the Fourth Council of Carthage, in the year 398, before consecration a bishop had to be asked "whether outside the Church no one is saved"; the Fourth Lateran Council says: "There is one universal Church of the faithful, outside which absolutely no one is saved"; and in the profession of faith proposed to the Waldensians: "We believe with the heart and confess with the mouth one Church, not of heretics, but the holy Roman Catholic and Apostolic Church, outside which we believe no one is saved." There are many other things, but let these suffice.

491. But in order that the matter may be well understood: 1. a twofold necessity must be distinguished, one which is called of means, the other of precept. We explained the nature of each more fully in the treatise *On the Infused Virtues*, numbers 851 and following, which passage you should by all means consult; here it is enough to recall that something is said to be necessary by necessity of means when, even if it is inculpably omitted, salvation cannot be obtained; but something is necessary by necessity of precept when it is required for salvation because it has been commanded, yet if it is inculpably omitted, salvation can still be obtained. Therefore when it is said that the Church is a necessary society, it can be asked whether it is such by necessity of means or of precept. 2. Again, the Church, as we saw in numbers 410 and following, consists of soul and body; and just as its soul is constituted chiefly by sanctifying grace, faith, hope, and charity, so its body, for the preservation of unity, chiefly requires a visible government, from which one who is separated is by that very fact severed from the body of the Church. Therefore when it is said, "the Church is a necessary society," or "outside the Church there is no salvation," is this to be understood of the soul of the Church or of the body?

492. These things having been noted, it is certain: 1. that it is necessary by necessity of means to belong to the soul of the Church. This is clear from those arguments by which it is shown that supernatural faith, both by reason of its principle and by reason of its motive, and therefore faith founded on the authority of God revealing, and indeed not only in desire but in reality, is necessary by necessity of means for salvation. Therefore let what we said in the treatise *On the Virtues*, numbers 861 and following, be recalled. The same must be said of grace and charity. It is certain: 2. that in Catholic doctrine it is indeed necessary by necessity of means to belong at least in desire to the body of the Church, just as baptism is necessary, by which we are joined to the Church; but it is not always necessary by necessity of means to belong in reality to the body of the Church. Thus one who inculpably was outside the body of the Church would not, on that account, be assigned to eternal punishments. Hence St. Augustine, in letter 43, otherwise 162, with whom the other Fathers agree, says: "Those who defend their opinion, although false and perverse, with no stubborn animosity, especially an opinion which they did not bring forth by the audacity of their own presumption, but received from parents seduced and fallen into error, while they seek the truth with cautious solicitude and are ready to be corrected when they have found it, are by no means to be reckoned among heretics." To this also pertains proposition 68 condemned in Baius: "Purely negative unbelief in those to whom Christ has not been preached is a sin."

493. Therefore when we teach that it is necessary for someone to belong in reality to the body of the Church, this is to be understood of necessity of precept. From this it immediately follows that everything which excuses from the obligation of fulfilling a precept also excuses from this necessity of actual conjunction with the body of the Church. Hence: 1. inability excuses. Thus, for example, a catechumen who, before receiving baptism, through which alone one becomes a member of the body of the Church, when it has been delayed without his fault, is overtaken by sudden death, if he already has true faith and charity, will without doubt be saved. Hence Innocent III, in book 3 of the *Decretals*, title 42, chapter 2, says: "To your inquiry we respond in this way: the priest whom you indicated to have closed his last day without the water of baptism, because he persevered in the faith of holy Mother Church and in the confession of the name of Christ, we assert without hesitation to have been freed from original sin and to have obtained the joy of the heavenly fatherland." 2. Invincible ignorance excuses. "Nevertheless, those who labor under invincible ignorance concerning Christ and his Church are not, on account of this ignorance, to be damned with eternal punishments, since before the eyes of the Lord they are bound by no fault in this matter... but no one will obtain this [justification and eternal life] who departs this life culpably separated from the unity of faith or from the communion of the Church. If anyone has not been in this ark, he will perish when the flood reigns." Now what ignorance must be called invincible is established from moral theology. Here we note only that it can occur in the present matter in manifold ways. For: a. Christian revelation, and therefore also the Church, may be invincibly unknown; this can happen among negative unbelievers. b. Or someone has Christian faith with respect to the things necessary by necessity of means, but still invincibly does not know the existence of the Church. c. Or he knows in some way that the Church exists, but invincibly does not know the obligation of entering it. d. Or finally he knows the obligation of entering the true Church of Christ, but by an invincible error thinks that his own sect is the true Church of Christ.

494. In all these cases, everyone sees that the salvation of those who in reality are outside the body of the Church is possible; since on the one hand inability or invincible ignorance excuses them from the necessity of the precept of entering the Church, and on the other hand it is possible that they have the things which are necessary by necessity of means for salvation. How this can happen to one who exteriorly seems to be numbered among unbelievers is clear from the matters disputed in the treatise *On Grace*, disputation 4, article 5.

495. Hence it also follows that no one can assert with certainty concerning one who dies outside the body of the Church that he is damned; for he could have labored under invincible

ignorance, and God could otherwise supply to him the means necessary for salvation. Nevertheless Croix, speaking of purely material heretics, rightly notes in *On Faith*, number 94: "This is to be pitied in their case: if they have fallen into another mortal sin [namely, besides the sin of heresy, of which they are supposed not to be guilty], which is altogether easy for such men, they are deprived of the grace of the principal sacraments and are commonly to be damned, not from a defect of faith [for I suppose that they believe the things necessary by necessity of means], but because of other sins which they have committed and from which they are not cleansed, neither by the sacrament of penance, which does not exist among them, nor by contrition or perfect love. Besides the fact that it is very difficult for such men to attain this, they nevertheless do not attend to it, nor commonly care for it, nor strive to elicit it, thinking that they are justified by faith alone and confidence in Christ; by this damnable confidence they perish most miserably."

496. It is better to confirm all these things by the doctrine of the Holy Father Pius IX, in the allocution *Singulari Quadam*, December 9, 1854, all the more because some seem not to grasp its sense rightly. Therefore: 1. the Holy Father teaches: "for it must be held by faith that outside the Apostolic Roman Church no one can be saved, that this is the sole ark of salvation, and that whoever has not entered it will perish in the flood." Hence there are the propositions condemned in the *Syllabus*, number 16: "Men can find the way of eternal salvation in the worship of any religion whatsoever and can obtain eternal salvation"; and number 17: "At least good hope is to be had concerning the eternal salvation of all those who in no way dwell in the true Church of Christ." 2. But he immediately explains how this is to be understood, saying: "But nevertheless it must likewise be held as certain that those who labor under ignorance of the true religion, if it is invincible, are bound by no fault of this matter before the eyes of the Lord. But now who would arrogate so much to himself as to be able to designate the limits of this sort of ignorance according to the character and variety of peoples, regions, minds, and so many other things? For indeed when, released from these bodily chains, we shall see God as he is, we shall certainly understand by how close and beautiful a bond divine mercy and justice are joined; but so long as we live on earth, weighed down by this mortal mass which dulls the soul, let us hold most firmly from Catholic doctrine that there is one God, one faith, one baptism; to advance further by inquiry is unlawful." 3. Yet undeservedly would it be inferred from these things that someone outside the body of the Church can be saved by broad faith. For this plainly conflicts with those words, "one faith, one baptism"; and besides, it contradicts the things which precede: "Strive to call them back from so great a perversity of mind, explaining namely that nothing more excellent has been granted to men by the providence of God than the authority of divine faith; that this is for us, as it were, a torch in darkness; this the guide whom we follow unto life; this is altogether necessary for salvation, since 'without faith it is impossible to please God, and he who does not believe shall be condemned.'" But the Apostle speaks of faith strictly taken, as we explained and demonstrated in the treatise *On the Infused Virtues*, number 859 and following. But whoever desires more concerning the providence of God regarding the salvation of unbelievers should compare what was said in number 130 and following, and the places cited there from the treatise *On the Grace of Christ*.

497. These things, therefore, having been carefully set beforehand: **Section II The Proposed Question Is Resolved Proposition XXI.** 1. Just as the Church, even with regard either to the constitution of the Jewish people or to the state of Gentile societies, was legitimately instituted, so 2. now it has the right of propagating itself among all nations; 3. indeed, from Christ's institution, the necessity of adhering to it so lies upon all that for those culpably remaining outside it there is no hope of salvation. Therefore the Church is a society both legal and also ethically necessary.

498. The first part is proved. I. With regard to the constitution of the Jewish people. For that society is legitimately constituted in relation to the constitution of the Jewish people which, according to its own fundamental law, was to be constituted. But according to the fundamental law of the Jewish constitution, the Church was to be constituted by Christ. Therefore. The minor is proved. 1. The

fundamental law of the Jewish Church was that it should be in the state of way, not of end; of promise, not of fulfillment; of a figure awaiting the thing figured. Hence the Apostle says in Galatians 3.23 and following: "But before faith came, we were kept under the law, shut up unto that faith which was to be revealed. Therefore the law was our pedagogue unto Christ... But when faith came, we are no longer under a pedagogue." But a promise, if it is true, must be fulfilled; a figure must cease when the reality arrives; the imperfect of itself tends toward the perfect. Therefore the Jewish Church, from being promissory, had to become real; from being typical, substantial and true; from being imperfect, perfect. This indeed was done through Christ and his Church. Hence the Apostle says in Romans 10.4: "Christ is the end of the law unto justice for everyone who believes"; that is, the law was finally ordered to this, and had this office, that it should lead to Christ. 2. Hence the same Apostle, to omit other things, in Hebrews 7 shows the imperfection of the old covenant before the new; and in verses 18 and following he pronounces: "There is indeed a setting aside of the former commandment because of its weakness and uselessness; for the law brought nothing to perfection," etc. Then, in chapter 8, he shows the necessity that the ancient covenant be abolished when the new one supervenes. He confirms this again in chapter 10, by revealing the typical nature of all the rites and of the Jewish Church itself; and finally, in chapter 11, by a perfect induction he demonstrates that the principal saints of the Old Testament could follow the way of salvation, and come to it, only through faith in Christ. All these principles, gathered together and understood according to the mind of Paul, evidently make clear that the old law and Synagogue were nothing but a preparation for the Christian Church, and that, once this was instituted, the former had to cease. But on these matters see Becanus, *Analogy of the Old and New Testaments*.

499. II. Considering the state of Gentile societies, the Church was legitimately instituted. For: 1. any society has the right and duty of preserving itself and of promoting its own proper perfection. But it can in no way effect this without religion, as we demonstrated in numbers 36 and following. Therefore any society has the right and duty of embracing and professing religion. Now: a. the only true religion is the Christian religion, which in the concrete is the Church itself, as was demonstrated. b. Moreover, in the civil society of the Gentiles at the time of Christ's coming, either the principal dogmas of natural religion had been obscured or they had been entirely extinguished, as is clear from what was said in numbers 128 and following; and on the other side, the Church promulgated and confirmed those truths again. Therefore at least under this title the civil society of the pagans had to admit the Church. 2. A society which, either according to its laws or according to its customs, admits any worship and any religion whatever, if it then excludes some religion, acts against its own laws or customs. But the civil society of the Gentiles, among whom the Church was first propagated, admitted any worship whatever, even the most absurd. Therefore. The first Apologists often used this argument; and St. Leo, in sermon 1 on the Holy Apostles, makes open mention of that condition, writing: "Here the opinions of philosophy had to be trampled down; here the vanities of earthly wisdom had to be dissolved; here the worship of demons had to be confuted; here the impiety of all sacrileges had to be destroyed, where, with the most diligent superstition, whatever anywhere had been instituted by vain errors was held gathered together. To this City, therefore, you, most blessed Apostle Peter, do not fear to come; and while the Apostle Paul, the partner of your glory, was still occupied with the ordering of other Churches, you enter this forest of roaring beasts and ocean of most turbulent depth, more constant than when you walked upon the sea." And in the sermon on the birthday of the Apostles Peter and Paul: "But this city [Rome], ignorant of the author of its own advancement, although it ruled over almost all nations, served the errors of all nations; and it seemed to itself to have assumed a great religion because it rejected no falsehood. Hence, the more tenaciously it had been bound by the devil, the more wonderfully it was set free by Christ." But see Taparelli, *Essay*, numbers 1412 and following.

500. The second part is proved. Here we first presuppose the observation proposed in number 489; nor is there need to discuss Catholic governments or nations, for with regard to them the matter is most clear. Compare Taparelli, *Essay*, numbers 1449 and following. Therefore let us examine the

matter.

501. I. With regard to Protestant nations. Certainly: 1. Protestants, as such, acknowledge the Christian religion as uniquely true; they only understand it in their own way, and therefore pervert it. Nevertheless the fundamental principle common to all of them is the interpretation of Sacred Scripture, which alone, according to them, presents the Christian religion, by private judgment. Therefore they must grant the same right to the Catholic Church, namely, that it understand Christian revelation in its own way, and consequently profess the Christian religion in its own way. If they deny this to the Catholic Church alone, they contradict themselves and openly violate the fundamental dogma of their religious profession. 2. In several nations now devoted to Protestantism, the Catholic Church was already flourishing when Protestantism invaded them. Therefore it was already in legitimate possession, from which it could be disturbed only unjustly. This is all the more so because the rights of the Church of Christ are of such a nature that they can be subject to no prescription; because Protestantism could prove by no signs its new mission, whether ordinary or extraordinary; and because indeed it was finally forced to admit that in the Catholic Church, from which it was being separated, the means of salvation are not lacking. Therefore, since among those nations the Catholic Church was deprived of its rights only by injury, it vindicates its right if it strives to establish itself among the same nations.

502. II. With regard to schismatic nations. 1. They themselves, if they adhere to the doctrine common among their own authors, must acknowledge that the Roman Church is the true Church of Christ; indeed they admit that salvation can be obtained in it, and although they wrongly deny the primacy of jurisdiction in the successor of St. Peter, they nevertheless do not refuse to admit a primacy of honor. Now if the Roman Church is for them the true Church of Christ, they are forced to concede to it at least the same rights which they attribute to their own. Therefore, since they judge the existence of their own Church legal, they can impede the propagation and existence of the Catholic Church only by injury. 2. It is historically established that the schismatic Churches were separated from the Roman Church under Photius; and the very name of schism means separation or division. Therefore previously the Roman Church flourished with all its rights, and could not be deprived of them except by injury. Therefore it still retains those same rights. Accordingly, just as in those places where schism now dominates, Catholics formerly legitimately professed their religion, so also today the same right belongs to them of professing the same religion there.

503. III. With regard to Mohammedans and ethnic nations, among whom the true Gospel is now also announced, the preceding observations hold proportionately. Certainly in the places where Mohammedanism first began to be propagated, the Church was already in peaceful possession; it was not disturbed from it except by arms and tyranny. But violence, just as it confers no right, so it takes none away. The state of ethnic nations, with regard to those very things which belong to natural religion, is that which we mentioned above in number 499. Among some of them full liberty is granted to other religions or sects; no one can justly impede someone from undertaking the true religion, and so forth. One consideration could still be added, from the very great utility which the Church of Christ brings to any civil association whatever. The matter cannot here be developed according to its dignity; but it is better at least to report the most excellent words of the Holy Father Leo XIII, in the encyclical letter *Arcanum*, February 10, 1880: "Once the Christian order of things was established, it happily befell individual men that they learned and grew accustomed to rest in the fatherly providence of God, and to nourish a hope of heavenly helps, which does not confound. From these things follow fortitude, moderation, constancy, equability of peaceful mind, and finally many excellent virtues and outstanding deeds. But it is wonderful how much dignity, how much firmness and honor accrued to domestic and civil society. The authority of rulers was made more equitable and more holy; the obedience of peoples more inclined and easier; the conjunction of citizens closer; the rights of ownership safer. Altogether, Christian religion has cared and provided for all things which are held useful in the state, so indeed that, according to St. Augustine, it would seem that it could not have brought

more importance for living well and blessedly if it had been born solely for preparing or increasing the advantages and utilities of mortal life."

504. The third part is proved. I. By collecting certain things from what has been said. For: 1. faith is necessary, and indeed by necessity of means for salvation; but one who embraces faith already belongs, at least in desire, to the Church. For through that faith he is subject to God speaking, and consequently is implicitly subject to the magisterium of the Church, which Christ instituted. 2. Baptism is certainly necessary, and indeed by necessity of means for salvation; but one who receives baptism, or has the desire for it, is already implicitly subject to the Church, as in number 400. Therefore. From the preceding article it is established that Christ instituted the Church so that through it he might make his visible mission on earth perpetual; and therefore in it he placed all the means of salvation. Therefore one who knowingly was outside the Church would deprive himself of the means of salvation. But one who acts in this way cannot arrive at salvation. Therefore. This is confirmed. It is true that God can supply, by extraordinary providence, faith and the other things necessary by necessity of means for salvation; but at least the Church is the ordinary means of communicating them. Now extraordinary providence regards only those who cannot use the ordinary means; but those who are culpably outside the Church are, by that very fact, outside it because they do not wish to be within it, not because they cannot. Therefore they are excluded from extraordinary providence.

505. II. These same things can be confirmed from Scripture, by recalling a few points. For: 1. in Mark 16.15 Christ, addressing the Apostles, says: "Preach the Gospel to every creature; he who believes and is baptized shall be saved, but he who does not believe shall be condemned." In this testimony the question is of every creature; therefore no one is excepted. But the Gospel is said to be preached to every creature, to be believed by all; all are said to be baptized, and he who does not believe is said to be condemned. Therefore faith, like baptism, is necessary for all; and consequently the Church is necessary. 2. It is read in Matthew 10.14-15: "Whoever will not receive you, nor hear your words, going forth from that house or city, shake off the dust from your feet. Amen I say to you, it will be more tolerable for the land of Sodom and Gomorrah on the day of judgment than for that city." These words do not pertain only to the Apostles, to whom they are immediately directed, but also to their successors, or to the teaching Church, even to the end of the world; for they are directed to the Apostles insofar as they must satisfy the office of teaching and ruling, which must endure until the consummation of the age. Therefore, just as it was necessary to receive the Apostles and to hear their words, so it is necessary to receive their successors and their magisterium; but this is the same as to be subject to the Church. 3. To this also pertain those testimonies in which the grave obligation incumbent upon each person of subjecting himself to the Church is declared, and the sin of refusing obedience to it is declared to be grave. Thus in Matthew 10.40: "He who receives you receives me, and he who receives me receives him who sent me"; and in the same Gospel, Matthew 18.17: "But if he will not hear the Church, let him be to you as a heathen and a publican"; and in Luke 10.16: "He who hears you hears me, and he who despises you despises me; but he who despises me despises him who sent me." But it is enough to have touched upon these things, since each is to be explained in its own place.

506. III. From the Fathers, who: 1. expressly assert this. Thus St. Ignatius Martyr, to the Philadelphians, number 3, writes: "For as many as are of God and Jesus Christ, these are with the Bishop; and as many as, led by repentance, return to the unity of the Church, these also will be of God, so that they may live according to Jesus Christ. Do not err, my brothers. If anyone follows one who makes schism, he does not obtain the inheritance of the divine kingdom." St. Irenaeus, book 4, chapter 33, number 7: "But he will also judge those who work schisms, who are empty, not having the love of God, and considering their own utility rather than the unity of the Church; and because of slight and any causes whatsoever they cut apart and divide the great and glorious body of Christ, and, as much as lies in them, kill it: speaking peace and working war; truly straining out a gnat and swallowing a camel. For no correction so

great can be made by them as is the destruction of schism. But he will also judge all those who are outside the truth, that is, who are outside the Church; but he himself will be judged by no one." Origen, homily 4 on Joshua: "Therefore if anyone wishes to be saved, let him come into this house of her who was once a harlot... Therefore let no one persuade himself, let no one deceive himself: outside this house, that is, outside the Church, no one is saved. For if anyone shall go outside, he himself becomes guilty of his own death." 2. They confirm the same thing when they acknowledge that the Church was figured in the ark of Noah. Thus St. Cyprian, in *On the Unity of the Church*, says: "If anyone who was outside the ark of Noah could escape, then also one who has been outside the Church escapes. The Lord warns, saying: 'he who is not with me is against me,' and 'he who does not gather with me scatters.' He who breaks the peace and concord of Christ acts against Christ. He who gathers elsewhere besides the Church scatters the Church of Christ." St. Gaudentius of Brescia, tract 8: "But it is established that in that flood all men of that time perished, except those who deserved to be found within the Ark, which bore the type of the Church. For similarly even now they will altogether be unable to be saved who have been alien from the Apostolic faith and from the Catholic Church. Therefore let each one of us strive with every effort to remain in the house of the Lord, exercising works fitting to the grace received." St. Jerome, letter 14 to Damasus: "Whoever has eaten the lamb outside this house [the Church] is profane. If anyone has not been in the Ark of Noah, he will perish when the flood reigns." St. Augustine, tractate 6 on John: "If you have baptism, be in the dove [that is, the Church], lest what you have not profit you. Come, then, to the dove, we say: not so that you may begin to have what you did not have, but so that what you had may begin to profit you. For outside you had baptism unto destruction; inside, if you have it, it begins to profit unto salvation... 'I have it [baptism],' he says to me. I admit it, you have it. Observe what you have; by the very fact that you have it, you will be condemned. Why? Because you have the thing of the dove apart from the dove. If you have the thing of the dove in the dove, you have it securely. Suppose you are a soldier: if you have the mark of your emperor within, you serve securely; if you have it outside, not only does that mark not profit you for military service, but you will even be punished as a deserter." 3. They also draw this from the fact that one who denies the due honor to the Church as mother does not honor God, who is father. "Whoever," says St. Cyprian in the cited place, "being separated from the Church is joined to an adulteress, is separated from the promises of the Church. Nor will he who leaves the Church of Christ arrive at the rewards of Christ. He is alien, he is profane, he is an enemy. He can no longer have God as father who does not have the Church as mother." St. Augustine illustrates this most beautifully in sermon 2 on Psalm 88, number 14, saying: "Let us love the Lord our God, let us love his Church: him as father, her as mother... Let no one say: I do indeed go to idols, I consult those possessed by spirits and fortune-tellers, but nevertheless I do not leave the Church of God, I am Catholic. Holding the mother, you have offended the father. Another likewise says: far be it from me, I do not consult a fortune-teller, I do not seek one possessed by spirits, I do not seek sacrilegious divinations, I do not go to adore demons, I do not serve stones; but nevertheless I am in the party of Donatus. What does it profit you that the father is not offended, who avenges the offended mother? What does it profit if you confess the Lord, honor God, preach him, acknowledge his Son, confess him sitting at the Father's right hand, and blaspheme his Church? ... If you had some patron whom you attended daily... If you said one accusation concerning his wife, would you enter his house? Hold, therefore, dearly beloved, hold all unanimously to God as father and the Church as mother." 4. They declare this from the fact that the Church is the body of Christ; and therefore one separated from the body can no longer receive the saving influence of the head. Among others, St. Augustine often uses this argument. Thus in sermon 269, number 4, he says: "See what you should beware, see what you should observe, see what you should fear. It happens that in a human body, indeed from the body, some member is cut off, a hand, a finger, a foot. Does the soul follow what has been cut off? When it was in the body, it lived; cut off, it loses life. So also a Christian man is Catholic while he lives in the body; cut off, he has been made a heretic; the spirit does not follow an amputated member." And in tractate 10 on the Epistle of St. John, number 8: "I do not know who sets the boundaries of charity in Africa! Extend charity throughout the whole world if you wish to love Christ, because the members of Christ lie throughout the

world. If you love a part, you are divided; if you are divided, you are not in the body; if you are not in the body, you are not under the head. What does it profit that you believe and blaspheme? You adore him in the head; you blaspheme him in the body. He loves his body. If you have cut yourself off from his body, the head has not cut itself off from its body. In vain you honor me, the head cries to you from above, in vain you honor me. Do not trample me. As if someone wished to kiss your head and trample your feet... Would you not, amid the words of one honoring you, cry out and say: What are you doing, man? You are trampling me. You would not say, You are trampling my head, because he was honoring the head; but the head would cry out more for the trampled members than for itself, because it was being honored. Does not the head itself cry: I do not want your honor; do not trample me? ... Do you not see, foolish one, that what you wish to embrace reaches, through a certain joining of unity, to that which you trample?"

507. IV. From the confessions of the adversaries. For the Protestants themselves, so long as abstraction is made from the question which is the true Church of Christ, hand down the doctrine which we defend here. In reality Luther, in the Larger Catechism, part 2, on the Apostles' Creed, article 3, says: "Outside this Christianity, where there is no place for this Gospel, there is no forgiveness of sins, just as there can be no sanctification." Calvin, in the *Institutes*, book 4, chapter 2, writes: "But because the proposal is not to discuss the visible Church, let us learn, even from the one title of mother, how useful to us is knowledge of her, indeed how necessary; since there is no other entrance into life unless she herself conceives us in her womb, unless she gives birth, unless she nourishes us at her breasts, and finally protects us under her guardianship and governance, until, having put off mortal flesh, we shall be like the Angels." And a little later: "Outside her bosom no forgiveness of sins is to be hoped for, no salvation." Indeed Leibniz, writing to Pellisson in *Acta Eruditorum*, volume 11, 1692, not rightly understanding Catholic doctrine, complains of the laxity of their doctrine, especially that of the Jesuits, in this matter. (1)

508. Therefore let us conclude this question concerning the necessity of the Church with the words of the Holy Father, in the cited allocution: "Moreover, as the order of charity demands, let us pour forth constant prayers, that all nations everywhere may be converted to Christ, and let us serve, according to our powers, the common salvation of men. For the hand of the Lord has not been shortened, and the gifts of heavenly grace will by no means be lacking to those who wish and ask with a sincere mind to be refreshed by this light. Truths of this sort must be fixed most deeply in the minds of the faithful, lest they be corrupted by false doctrines tending to this, that they foster indifference of religion, which we see creeping more widely and being strengthened unto the destruction of souls." (1) The same things are read in the Helvetic confession, article 17; the Saxon, article 12; the Scottish, article 17; the Belgian, article 28; the Gallican, article 16; the Bohemian, article 8. But the Anglican Church not only still retains the Athanasian Creed, which excludes from salvation all those who deny the dogma of the Trinity and Incarnation, but in article 18 expressly has: "They also are to be accursed that presume to say, that every man shall be saved by the law or sect he professed, so that he be diligent to frame his life according to that law." But see, if you wish, Bossuet, *Variations*, book 15, and the Walemburch brothers, *On the Unity of the Church*, book 1, chapter 17.

Article 7. Whether, From Christ's Institution, the Church Is an Unequal Society

509. The distinction between an equal and an unequal society is this: in the former the same rights belong to all, although the exercise of all these rights is not the same among all; but, on the contrary, in an unequal society not only is the exercise of rights diverse among diverse persons, but the rights themselves among some are other and diverse. In the present question, therefore, as anyone sees, we begin an examination of the form of government introduced by Christ into the Church, and thus we approach more closely the deeper investigation of its intimate constitution. In order that the question may be proposed

clearly, we shall first briefly set forth Catholic doctrine; then we shall report the errors contrary to it. From this it will be easy to define the true state of the question.

510. I. From the innumerable ecclesiastical documents which pertain to the present matter, we select the following. The Council of Trent, session 23, chapter 4, teaches: "But if anyone affirms that all Christians indiscriminately are priests of the New Testament, or that all are endowed among themselves with equal spiritual power, he seems to do nothing other than confuse the ecclesiastical hierarchy, which is as an army set in array; just as if, contrary to the teaching of blessed Paul, all were Apostles, all Prophets, all Evangelists, all Pastors, all Teachers. Therefore the sacrosanct Synod declares that, besides the other ecclesiastical grades, bishops, who have succeeded into the place of the Apostles, belong principally to this hierarchical order; and that they have been placed, as the same Apostle says, by the Holy Spirit to rule the Church of God; and that they are superior to presbyters... The sacrosanct Synod further teaches that in the ordination of bishops, priests, and the other Orders, neither the consent, nor the vocation, nor the authority of the people, or of any secular power and magistrate, is so required that without it the ordination is invalid; indeed, rather, it decrees that those who, called and instituted only by the people or by secular power and magistrate, ascend to the exercise of these ministries, and those who take them to themselves by their own rashness, are all to be regarded not as ministers of the Church, but as thieves and robbers, not having entered by the door." Hence in canon 2: "If anyone says that besides the priesthood there are not in the Catholic Church other Orders, both major and minor, through which, as through certain grades, one tends toward the priesthood, let him be anathema." And in canon 6: "If anyone says that in the Catholic Church there is not a hierarchy instituted by divine ordination, which consists of bishops, presbyters, and ministers, let him be anathema." And in canon 7: "If anyone says... that Orders conferred by them [the Bishops], without the consent or vocation of the people or of the secular power, are invalid; or that those who have neither been duly ordained by ecclesiastical and canonical power nor sent, but come from elsewhere, are legitimate ministers of the word and of the sacraments, let him be anathema." To these we add propositions 2 and 3 condemned by Pius VI in *Auctorem Fidei*, August 28, 1794: "The proposition which establishes that the power given by God to the Church, so that it might be communicated to the Pastors who are its ministers for the salvation of souls, is so understood that the power of ecclesiastical ministry and government is derived from the community of the faithful into the Pastors: heretical. Likewise that which establishes that the Roman Pontiff is a ministerial head, so explained that the Roman Pontiff receives the power of ministry not from Christ in the person of blessed Peter, but from the Church, by which power, as Peter's Successor, the true Vicar of Christ and head of the whole Church, he has authority in the universal Church: heretical."

511. Moreover, according to these documents, it must first be held that the whole body of the Church is distinguished into two classes, namely into Clerics and Laics. But what these names clerics and laics mean, "I think is doubtful to no one," says Bellarmine in *On the Members of the Church*, book 1, chapter 1; "although they have a Greek origin, nevertheless they are common and widely known. For who does not know that laos among the Greeks is the same as populus among the Latins? And that kleros among them is the same as lot or inheritance among us? "From this, therefore, laics are so called as being, as it were, plebeians and of the people, to whom no part of the ecclesiastical function has been entrusted; clerics, however, as being, as it were, the Lord's lot and inheritance, who, consecrated to divine worship, have received, at God's own command, the providence and solicitude of procuring religion and sacred things. 'Let the cleric,' says St. Jerome in the letter to Nepotian, 'first interpret his own term, and, once the definition of the name has been set forth, let him strive to be what he is called. For if kleros in Greek is called lot in Latin, they are therefore called clerics either because they are of the lot of the Lord, or because the Lord himself is the lot, that is, the portion of clerics.'"

512. Secondly, it is clear from the same documents that a true Hierarchy was constituted in the clerical order. The name hierarchy, derived from two Greek words, namely hieros, sacred,

and arche, principate, according to its etymological force is the same as sacred principate. But where there is a principate, there are also ministers; and among ministers there is a certain inequality, which is constituted by diverse grades of power. Therefore under the name hierarchy comes "a certain order embracing diverse grades, lowest, middle, and highest, and including among them a certain relation of prelacy and subjection." In this sense St. Dionysius the Areopagite distinguishes in the angels three hierarchies distributed into nine choirs. Compare *On God Creating*, numbers 294 and following.

513. But lest questions distinct among themselves be confused, we note that there are various acceptations of order. Sometimes it is taken for the assembly of those who are dedicated to the service of the Church, or for the sacrament by which ministers are consecrated to the service of the Church by a sacred and solemn rite; but sometimes for diverse grades. Passing over the first meaning, since it properly pertains to the treatise *On the Sacrament of Order*, here we consider order insofar as it embraces "persons constituted in diverse offices by diverse received power." "It pleased the holy Fathers," says the Catechism of the Council of Trent, on the Sacrament of Order, section 9, "to use this word order, which has a very broad meaning, so that they might indicate the dignity and excellence of the ministers of God. For order, if we take its proper force and meaning, is a disposition of superior and inferior things, which are so fitted among themselves that one is referred to another. Therefore, since in this ministry there are many grades and various functions, and all things are distributed and arranged by a fixed reason, the name of order seems to have been imposed on it rightly and fittingly."

514. Thirdly, it follows from the same documents that both the distinction between Clerics and Laics and the hierarchy constituted in the clerical order are of divine right; and consequently that by divine right itself a democratic form is excluded from the governance of the Church. For this obtains when supreme authority resides in the whole multitude; not insofar as the whole multitude actually commands and governs, which would be impossible, "but insofar as," says Bellarmine in *On the Roman Pontiff*, book 1, chapter 6, "where there is popular government, magistrates are constituted by the plebs itself and receive authority from it. For since the plebs cannot sit by itself to render judgment, it must at least constitute others who do this in its name." But once a hierarchy divinely constituted in the clerical order is presupposed, authority has already been communicated by Christ to this order, and not to the whole plebs; and therefore from Christ's institution there does not belong to the people the right of constituting rulers, nor do these rule the Church in the name of the plebs.

515. In order that this may be understood more clearly, let us observe: 1. with Bellarmine, in *On the Members of the Church*, book 1, chapter 2, that in the creation of Bishops "three things are contained: election, ordination, and vocation or mission. Election is nothing other than the designation of a certain person to ecclesiastical prefecture. Ordination is the sacred ceremony by which the future Bishop is anointed and consecrated by a fixed rite. Mission or vocation grants jurisdiction, and in reality makes one a Pastor and prelate." 2. Therefore the things are far different: to elect, to ask, and to render testimony. For one who renders good testimony for someone, or asks that the same be elected, confers no right on him for obtaining the dignity, but only bears the person of one praising and beseeching. But one who elects canonically calls to the dignity and grants a true right for obtaining it. 3. But the right of electing magistrates, unless something else has been established in the very constitution of the society, of itself belongs to the supreme power; for no one can oblige a people to obey someone unless the people is subject to him. 4. Wherefore the election of Bishops belongs of itself to the Roman Pontiff, once it is established that he possesses supreme power in the Church. Nevertheless, by his law, or by his approval and consent, that right could rightly be transferred to others; for what is done by someone's law or consent rests upon that same person's authority.

516. Here, therefore, is how the ecclesiastical hierarchy can be defined: "the assembly or order of presidents and sacred ministers, divinely instituted for governing the Church and for

begetting sanctity in men." "Since the end of the Church of this kind," says Cardinal Tarquini, *Public Ecclesiastical Law*, book 2, chapter 1, number 3, "that is, the sanctification of souls, is had through sanctifying grace, which Christ willed to be had through the sacraments, with man's cooperation added, whether through suitable dispositions for acquiring that grace or through good works for preserving and increasing it, he directed the care of the end of the Church committed to Clerics to two heads: first, to effecting the sacraments; second, to directing the faithful rightly and, as far as can be done, effectively, so that they may cooperate as is fitting with divine grace, which is conferred through the sacraments. Hence he constituted in the Church two powers, which are called Hierarchies, the one of Order, the other of Jurisdiction. The former is defined as the Power which is ordered to effecting the sacraments; the latter is called the Power of feeding, or of ruling the flock of Christ, both with respect to the intellect through the doctrine of right faith, which is proposed to be believed by the rite of precept, and with respect to the will through true and properly so-called command, by which the faithful are directed in the whole economy of means."

517. II. Against the aforesaid heads of Catholic doctrine, Marsilius of Menandrino, whom they call of Padua, wrote first of all, and the rest more or less copied him. Desiring to flatter Louis of Bavaria, who was hostile to the Roman Pontiffs, he utterly perverted the divine constitution of the Church. For in the book which he entitled *Defensor of Peace*: 1. he taught that the subject in which the supreme authority of the Church first resides is the whole body of the faithful. He derives this, as if a priori, from natural right, according to which, by his own testimony, the constitution of any society whatever is of this kind; nor does he think that the constitution of the Church should rather be sought from the positive will and institution of Christ. 2. The power, first residing in the body of the faithful, he then says was transferred to secular Princes; but if these are unbelievers, he thinks it is transferred to Bishops, yet in such a way that these are subject both to the people and to princes. 3. Finally, in truth, he denies power itself; for he recognizes in it no coercive force, but judges that it is situated entirely in admonishing, preaching, and other things of this kind. John XXII condemned him, especially in the constitution *Licet*, October 23, 1327; Albert Pighius, moreover, refuted him in *On the Ecclesiastical Hierarchy*, book 5.

518. From the discipline of Marsilius came forth first the Innovators. These taught: 1. that there is by divine right, or from Christ's institution, no distinction between Clerics and Laics. Luther, in *On the Abrogation of the Private Mass*, part 1, writes: "We are content to have said this, that the Christian people is simple, in which there ought to be absolutely no sect, no difference of persons, no cleric, no laic, no anointed one, no shaven one, no monk." And Calvin, in book 4 of his *Institutes*, chapter 4, section 9: "This appellation was born either from error, or certainly from a depraved affection, since the whole Church is called by Peter the clergy, that is, the inheritance of the Lord." And in the commentary on chapter 5 of the first Epistle of blessed Peter: "Would that it had never come into the minds of the Fathers to use this word." Compare Bellarmine, *On the Members of the Church*, book 1, chapter 1. 2. They asserted that the fullness of power resides in the Christian people. But since the people cannot immediately perform sacred offices by itself, they said that some are deputed by it who perform them. For this reason they generally call them ministers; but those who are eminent among these, bishops, yet in such a way that these by no means transcend the order of ministers. By a like reason they indeed attribute ordination, customarily done through imposition of hands, to pastors alone; but only for this reason, that the whole people could not impose hands. Hence in this matter they act in the name of the whole people and bear its place; for the whole people by itself could institute new pastors. 3. From this, moreover, they especially infer the necessity of popular suffrage in the election of ministers. Calvin, *Institutes*, book 4, chapter 3, section 15, says: "We hold this to be the legitimate vocation of a minister from the word of God, where those who have seemed suitable are created by the consent and approval of the people. But other Pastors ought to preside over the election, lest anything be done wrongly by the multitude, either through levity, or through evil pursuits, or through tumult." And among the Magdeburg Centuriators, century 1, book 1, chapter 4, it is read: "The Church in any

place, that is, the whole assembly, both of those whom we now call laics and clerics jointly, has the power of electing, calling, and ordaining suitable ministers." Compare Bellarmine in the cited place, chapter 2.

519. These things indeed concern the Authors of the Reformation themselves. But concerning their followers, behold what Schenkl writes in *Institutes of Ecclesiastical Law*, prolegomena, section 46, in the note: "Protestants again and again forge new systems of the Church, of which Pfaff enumerates ten diverse among themselves, and Mosheim enumerates no fewer; but that many more have been devised, and that almost every day new ones are being hammered out, is clear from the writings of Protestants."

520. Another shoot of Marsilius of Padua is Edmund Richer, doctor and syndic of the Sorbonne College. In order to establish the Gallican doctrines concerning the superiority of an ecumenical Council above the Pontiff upon a solid foundation, as he himself thought, in the year 1611 he published anonymously in Paris a little book entitled *On Ecclesiastical and Political Power*. He maintains that Christ, in founding the Church, conferred the keys, or jurisdiction, upon the whole Church earlier, more immediately, and more essentially than upon Peter; and therefore that Peter and his successors exercise power only as ministers deputed by the Church, in its name. It is by no means relevant to the present question to mention the other errors of this Author, although discussion will return in the last disputation concerning this very one which we have indicated. The Author, often condemned by the Provincial synods of Paris in 1612 and of Aix in the same year, then by several decrees of the Sacred Congregation of the Index, and by a particular Brief from Innocent XI in 1681, twice, as it seems, insincerely, and then with sincere mind, reprobated his doctrine in the year before he departed this life, 1630.

521. Nevertheless his system was adopted by Van Espen, Febronius, under which name lies hidden Nicholas Hontheim, suffragan of Trier, more or less by the Jansenists, and others. Febronius tends directly toward depressing the Primacy of the Roman Pontiff; and, with regard to the present question, he teaches that the legitimate way of exercising the office of this Primacy, that is, of caring for unity, consists only in watching over and directing, through counsel and admonitions, but not in ruling through coercion. Hence he says that that Primacy is properly one of association, inspection, and direction; concerning this matter we shall deal more fully in its own place.

522. These things, therefore, having been set forth: **Section II The Proposed Question Is Resolved Proposition XXII.** 1. From Christ's institution an essential distinction flourishes between Clerics and Laics. 2. And in the clerical order a hierarchy of the true name, or sacred principate, was instituted, to which Christ attributed not only the faculty of directing, but the power of ruling. Therefore the Church by divine right is an unequal society, and is entirely alien from a democratic form of government.

523. The first part is proved. I. From the Old Testament. Certainly in the old law God chose for himself the Tribe of Levi from among the others, to which alone belonged the right of performing sacrifices and discharging sacred offices. Hence the priesthood, by God himself thus ordering it, was altogether separated from the rest of the Hebrew people; nor was it permitted to anyone else outside that Tribe to involve himself in sacred things. Hence Saul was rejected in 1 Samuel 13; Uzziah was struck with leprosy in 2 Chronicles 26; Korah, Dathan, and Abiron were swallowed up by the earth in Numbers 16, since, being from an alien Tribe, they had involved themselves in priestly offices. Wherefore by a special reason the Levites are said to be God's: "I have taken the Levites... and the Levites shall be mine" in Numbers 3; they had to be consecrated to God by a special rite in Exodus 29 and Numbers 8.13; and the Lord himself is called their lot and inheritance in Deuteronomy 18.2. But if the election of those who would minister in sacred things belonged to God in the Old Law, this must obtain a fortiori in the New Testament, even though the propagation of the priesthood is no longer made through carnal generation from some tribe or from some families, but through election or institution made by those who already possess that power. "With the privilege of the Fathers ceasing," says St. Leo in sermon 3 on his birthday, "and with the order of families

passed over, the Church receives as rulers those whom the Holy Spirit has prepared." Hence when the Apostle had said in 2 Corinthians 3: "Who has also made us fit ministers of the New Testament, not of the letter, but of the spirit," he thus prefers the evangelical ministry to the ministry of the old law: "if the ministration of death was in glory... how shall not the ministration of the spirit be more in glory?"

524. II. From the New Testament. Certainly Christ himself had not received his power from the people; but to whom he directly and immediately communicated that power must be taken not a priori, but from his positive institution. But Christ: 1. immediately communicated his power to certain distinct persons, whom he had already bound to himself in a special way, and not to the faithful people; 2. there is no indication that those persons, already distinguished from the rest of the people, represented the people in this matter; 3. indeed they could not receive power by a delegation, so to speak, from the people, since both the Church was being instituted in those persons and in the conferral of power made to them, and this was not promulgated until after the descent of the Holy Spirit. Therefore. To illustrate this argument, let us observe: 1. Only to the Apostles, whom he chose, did he say in Matthew 28: "All power has been given to me in heaven and on earth; going therefore, teach," etc. Only to the same, from the number of all the disciples whom he had joined to himself, did he confer the power of binding and loosing in Matthew 18. Only to the same did he say in John 20 and following: "Receive the Holy Spirit; whose sins you shall forgive, they are forgiven them," etc. Likewise, only to the Apostles did he confer in Luke 22.19 the power of confecting the Eucharist. From the Apostles alone he declared that the public tribunal of the Church was to be constituted in Matthew 18.17. Them alone he called the salt of the earth and the light of the world in Matthew 5.13. Finally, so that the Apostles might have hearers and associates in discharging apostolic offices, Christ designated another seventy-two disciples in Luke 10.1, who would participate proportionately in the administration of sacred things. 2. The Apostles understood the matter in this way and taught it in express words. For they teach that priests must be called by God in Hebrews 5.4: "Nor does anyone take the honor to himself, but he who is called by God, as Aaron was. So also Christ did not glorify himself to become Pontiff, but the one who spoke to him: You are my Son, this day I have begotten you." They say that Bishops have been placed by the Holy Spirit, that they might rule the Church of God, in Acts 20.28: "Take heed to yourselves and to the whole flock, in which the Holy Spirit has placed you as Bishops to rule the Church of God." The Church then recently gathered by the Apostles did not place them, nor did magistrates, nor the people, but the Holy Spirit, from whom they had received the power of order and of jurisdiction, though in different ways, not only that they should teach, but also that they should rule the Church of God. To these can be added the things which we reported in number 420. 3. The Apostles showed the same thing by their practice. For they did not signify that they recognized any power in the assembly of the faithful; nor did they arrange that the people should institute or delegate sacred ministers, as would have had to be done on the hypothesis of the adversaries. Rather, independently of the people, and generally without even seeking its testimony, they inaugurated into the priesthood those whom they themselves approved. Thus in Acts 14.23 Paul and Barnabas are said by their own authority to have constituted presbyters through the several churches. Paul placed Timothy over the Church of Ephesus in 1 Timothy 1.3, and Titus over the Cretan Church in Titus 1.5; St. Peter did the same through all the churches of the West, as Tertullian, in the book *On Prescription*, chapter 25, Innocent I, letter to Decentius, number 2, St. Augustine, in the abridgment of the conference and in the book *On One Baptism*, and others testify. Finally St. John, according to St. Irenaeus, Clement of Alexandria, as cited by Eusebius, book 3, chapter 22, and Jerome, *On Illustrious Men*, chapter 9, placed men chosen by himself over the churches of Asia which he had founded, etc. Therefore. Nor indeed did they merely use this faculty themselves, but they also transferred it to others to be exercised. Hence Paul says in Titus 1.5: "For this reason I left you in Crete, that you might correct the things that are lacking and constitute presbyters through the cities, as I also appointed you." Compare Bellarmine, *On the Roman Pontiff*, book 1, chapter 6. In the same author, *On the Members of the Church*, book 1, chapters 1-4, the testimonies of the holy Fathers can be seen.

525. The second part is proved. I. By recalling the testimonies already brought forward. For: 1. Christ evidently sent the Apostles to teach and baptize with power; for he said in Matthew 28.18: "All power has been given to me in heaven and on earth; going therefore, teach," etc. Hence in Matthew 16 and 18 he conferred upon Peter and the remaining Apostles, proportionately, the keys of the kingdom of heaven, and likewise the power of binding and loosing. Now that notion of keys, just like the faculty of binding and loosing, imports a most true and full power of jurisdiction, with which the notion of principate is necessarily joined. 2. What Christ said to Peter in John 21.16-17, "Feed my lambs, feed my sheep," certainly imports power and jurisdiction, as is clear from the very force of the Greek word poimaine, which properly signifies to feed with command, or to feed by presiding. But St. Peter declares in 1 Peter 5.1-2 that this very thing pertains to all those to whom the care of the Church has been entrusted; for he says: "The elders I beseech... feed [poimanate] the flock of God which is among you." Hence also Paul said in the place cited above, Ephesians 4.11, that pastors were given to the Church by God; and still more expressly in Acts 20.28 it is asserted that Bishops were placed by the Holy Spirit to rule the Church of God. We shall weigh these testimonies below by a more accurate analysis. 3. The Apostles confirmed the same thing by their practice; for in founding and ordering churches they behaved as true princes of them. In reality, as we showed just now, they set men appointed over the several churches as by their own right. They bore laws, as we read was done, for example, in the Council of Jerusalem, Acts 15.22 and following; they also either threatened or inflicted punishments. Thus, for example, the Apostle threatens that he will come to the Corinthians with a rod in 1 Corinthians 4.21, and that he will avenge every disobedience in 2 Corinthians 10.6. From these things it is clear that they performed those things which could be expected from the princes of any duly constituted society. Indeed, they demanded this very thing from those whom they placed over particular Churches. For in Titus 1.5 the Apostle declares that he left Titus in Crete so that he might correct the things that were lacking, or supply whatever things seemed to be expedient for the utility of the Church. He commands the same in verse 13: "Speak these things and exhort, and rebuke with all authority." Finally there is no more illustrious argument of jurisdiction than the power of expelling rebels from the Church and separating them from the society. But that power, as is established, has its foundation in that saying of Christ in Matthew 18.17: "If he will not hear the Church, let him be to you as a heathen and a publican."

526. II. Since it was demonstrated above that the Church was instituted by Christ as a true society, if Christ had not constituted in the clerical order a hierarchy of the true name, power would have been given to the whole Church, or to all the faithful, which indeed the adversaries contend; and consequently, as is clear, the election of ministers would necessarily and always be made by the people, so that otherwise, as the adversaries also contend, it would not be valid. But this conflicts with the whole of tradition and practice. Certainly the Second Council of Nicaea, canon 3, says: "Every election of a bishop, presbyter, or deacon which is made by magistrates remains invalid. For he who is to be promoted to the episcopate must be elected by bishops." The Fourth Council of Constantinople, canon 28, says: "The holy and universal Synod defines that no lay prince or powerful person is to insert himself into the election or promotion of a Patriarch or Metropolitan, or of any bishop whatsoever; especially since it is fitting that none of the powerful or of the other laics should have any power in such things, but rather should be silent and attend to himself." Compare also the Council of Laodicea, canon 13, the Council of Antioch, canon 19, the Second Council of Braga, chapter 1, and others. (1) (1) It is permissible to copy out from Cardinal Tarquini, in the cited work, the things which he briefly and lucidly hands down concerning this matter: "In reporting the practice of the Church concerning the elections of Bishops," he says, "we wish this first to be observed: although various ages can be distinguished, in which various methods of election were observed, nevertheless the same method was never plainly common to all places, so that no slight variety is easily detected not only in all ages collectively, but even in individual ages. Therefore we set forth what was more commonly done through the several ages. "1. In the very beginnings of the Church, that Bishops were constituted by the Apostles or by their mandate is clear from the Sacred Scriptures, Acts 14.23 and Titus 1.5,

and from tradition; compare St. Gregory the Great, book 5, letter 60; book 6, letter 37; book 8, letter 35; St. Jerome on chapters 1 and 3 of the Epistle to Titus, and so forth. "2. After the Apostles had died, or even while they were still living, compare St. Clement, first letter to the Corinthians, down to the First Council of Nicaea, it is established that the elections of Bishops were attributed to the other Bishops of the same province; and indeed in such a way that the people were sometimes even expressly repulsed. Compare the Council of Laodicea, canons 12 and 13; the First Council of Antioch, canon 16; and the First Council of Nicaea, canon 4, where the same doctrine is not only confirmed, but is also said to be conformable to ancient customs. Hence it follows: "a. The words kai ho laos hairoito, read as a second condition added by the Fathers of the First Council of Nicaea in the Synodical Epistle, in Theodoret, *Ecclesiastical History*, book 1, chapter 9, after the first condition, 'that they may seem worthy,' with regard to those who were to be substituted in place of deceased Bishops, are not to be translated: 'and the people elected [them]'; but: 'and the people desired [them].' For the Greek hairesomai has both senses, of electing and of desiring; but the sense of electing is excluded by the aforesaid canon 4 of the same Council. "b. Likewise, if any part in the monuments of this age seems to be attributed to the plebs in electing Bishops, it must be understood as Geoffrey, Abbot of Vendome, explains in little work 2: 'The people concurred in elections by petition and by testimonies of good life; but the clergy by right of suffrage. For the people could not give right to the elected one in an ecclesiastical matter.' This is expressly seen in St. Cyprian, letter 68, otherwise 67,

527. Scholion. It is better to weigh the principal difficulties in a few words. Against the first part, they object, I. those testimonies by which priesthood seems to be attributed to all the faithful. Thus St. Peter says in 1 Peter 2.9: "But you are a chosen race, a royal priesthood," etc.; and St. John says in Revelation 1.6: "[Christ] has made us a kingdom and priests to God"; and in verse 10: "You have made us to our God a kingdom and priests." Therefore. I answer by distinguishing the antecedent: all the faithful are called priests in the proper signification, denied; in a less proper or broad signification, granted. Certainly: 1. these texts cannot be explained in such a way that they contradict others cited by us in the proof of the thesis. But a contradiction would arise if the priesthood which is here attributed to all the faithful were the same as that which was previously attributed exclusively to certain persons chosen by God. 2. In reality, although simple faithful are distinguished by divine right from priests properly so called, and are subject to them, they can nevertheless be called priests in some less proper sense, insofar as they receive a certain consecration in baptism and ought to offer spiritual victims to God, as St. Peter teaches in the very objected place, chapter 5; [Continuation of footnote (1)] where it is asserted that "the plebs present ought to be present with those electing in order to bear testimony"; namely, a distinction is made between the elector and the plebs, and only the part of witness is assigned to it. "3. From the First Council of Nicaea to the Fourth Council of Constantinople, which is the eighth among the ecumenical councils, the same discipline is found, that is, that the election of Bishops had to be made by the other Bishops of the province. Compare St. Julius, Roman Pontiff, as cited by St. Athanasius in his *Apology against the Arians*; the canons to the Bishops of Gaul which Constantius attributes to Siricius, chapter 5; the canons of the Nestorians, who in the fifth century withdrew from the Churches, in the collection of Ebedjesu, tract 8, at the very beginning, as cited by Mai in his new series of ancient writers, volume 8; the Second Council of Nicaea, act 8, canon 3; the Fourth Council of Constantinople, after act 10, rule 22; Stephen V, otherwise VI, in Gratian's Decree, canon 12, distinction 63, etc. And indeed in such a way that, as regards the people, these points were held firm: "a. That account should be taken of popular opinion in this sense: that by the electing Bishops there should not be elected one who by the common opinion of the people was judged unworthy, or, on the contrary, that one should be elected who by common consent was held most worthy. In this sense also St. Leo warned that the testimony even of those who are outside must be attended to, letter 10, otherwise 89, to the Bishops of the province of Vienne. or also the victim of lips confessing his name, as the Apostle speaks in Hebrews 13.15. 3. Hence the Fathers unanimously, when expounding the same testimonies, teach that the priesthood attributed by Peter to all the faithful does not consist in the administration of sacred things; but either in this,

that one "mortifies his members from every concupiscence of the flesh and is crucified to the world," and so forth, as Origen speaks in homily 9 on chapter 14 of Leviticus; or in this, that someone has been anointed with sacred chrism through confirmation, as St. Ambrose speaks in book 4 of *On the Sacraments*, chapter 1; or that they "offer a pure conscience and spotless victims of piety from the altar of the heart," as St. Leo the Great explains in sermon 3 on the anniversary of his election; or that they are members of Christ the priest, as Augustine expressed in book 20 of *The City of God*, chapter 10, and so forth. But Jerome excellently and elegantly calls baptism the priesthood of the laic in the *Dialogue against the Luciferians*, number 12, and opposes it to the priesthood of clerics, which is both properly such and is conferred by the proper consecration of order. 4. Hence also is understood that passage in 1 Peter 5.3: "Neither as domineering in the clerics, but being made from the heart a pattern of the flock," where the people of the faithful seems to be called clergy. For: a. St. Jerome, in the letter to Nepotian, and Oecumenius, on this place, not improbably judge that in the cited text under the name of clergy come true clerics inferior to Bishops, who are subject to them more than simple faithful are, and with respect to whom there is consequently a greater danger of not-right domination in Bishops. b. But if by the name clergy all the faithful are understood, this is said according to a certain generic acceptance, insofar as, namely, they have been called to the Church, have received baptism, and so forth, and thus belong to the lot of the Lord; but the arguments already given forbid the word clergy from being taken properly when the question concerns all the faithful. [Continuation of footnote (1)] "b. Besides this testimony, only the faculty of petitioning could belong to the people; yet in such a way that the electors by no means had to follow imprudently the wish of the people, this sort of sentence having been proposed to them in this matter of election in place of an axiom: 'The people must be taught, not followed.' "c. Regularly the people ought 'to be silent in elections and attend to itself, until the election receives its end in a regular way from the College of the Church,' which are the words of the Fourth Council of Constantinople, after act 10, rule 22. "4. Around the middle of the ninth century, the practice of investitures began to prevail in the West. These investitures indeed at first were customarily given after canonical election by a rite not at all to be condemned; but afterward they began gradually to oppress the liberty of elections, so that the elections were in reality made by the secular princes themselves, while the Roman Pontiffs reproved this depraved custom and resisted it with the greatest force. Compare the acts of St. Gregory VII and of the following Pontiffs, but especially the First Lateran Ecumenical Council in the year 1125, which was chiefly convoked to abolish investitures. "5. In the twelfth century the right of electing had come to the Chapter alone of the cathedral Church, as is established from the whole title of the Decretals which is *On Election*. "6. From Clement V, in the Extravagant *Ad Regimen*, under the same title, that is, from the beginnings of the fourteenth century, and thereafter by the other Pontiffs through rule 2 of the Chancery, the right of electing Bishops was recalled to the Apostolic See, and at first indeed absolutely; but afterward, power being granted to lay princes of presenting one, or several, though usually three, priests worthy of the episcopal office, from whom the Apostolic See, if it finds them truly worthy, chooses the one whom it judges more suitable. And this indeed in such a sense that a faculty of this sort granted to lay Princes is understood to rest merely on an indult of the Apostolic See, and not on any right, whether proper to them or of the people whose person, that is, they bear; since this has been declared by the dogmatic doctrine of the Council of Trent."

528. They object, II: Tertullian, in *On Exhortation to Chastity*, chapter 7, writes: "Are not we laics also priests? It is written: he has made us also a kingdom and priests to God and his Father. The authority of the Church has constituted the difference between order and plebs, and honor sanctified through the sitting-together of the order; so that where there is no sitting-together of the ecclesiastical order, you both offer and baptize, and you are a priest to yourself alone. But where three are, there is the Church, even though they are laics." Therefore. I answer: 1. Tertullian, while still Catholic, wrote these things in *On Prescription*, chapter 14: "I shall not omit the description even of heretical conduct itself: how futile, how earthly, how human it is; without gravity, without authority, without discipline... Their ordinations are rash,

light, inconstant. Now they install neophytes; now men bound to the world; now apostates from us, so that they may bind them by glory, since they cannot do so by truth... Therefore one is bishop today, another tomorrow; today a deacon, tomorrow a reader; today a presbyter, tomorrow a laic. For they impose priestly offices even upon laics." 2. Tertullian himself, after becoming a Montanist, when he wished to show that successive bigamy was forbidden to laics, used this argument: it is forbidden to clerics; but all the faithful are clerics, since all are priests; therefore it is also forbidden to laics. Compare nevertheless Petavius, *On the Ecclesiastical Hierarchy*, book 3, chapter 3.

529. Against the second part they object, I: a true principate does not seem to have been constituted in the clerical order. For Christ himself repelled it from clerics by those words in Luke 22.25-26: "The kings of the Gentiles lord it over them, and those who have power over them are called beneficent. But you not so; rather, he who is greater among you, let him become as the lesser; and he who is leader, as one who ministers." I answer. Christ wards off sacred principate itself in itself, denied; its depraved use, granted. Certainly Christ the Lord did not say: "you will not preside in any way," but: "not so as the kings of the Gentiles," namely with pride and pomp. But one who says, "you will not preside as that man does," certainly signifies: "you will indeed preside, but otherwise than he." Hence in the same place, verse 26, there is added: "he who is greater among you, let him become as the lesser, and he who is leader," in Greek hegoumenos, that is, leader and prince, "as one who ministers." Therefore he is greater and leader, although he ought to conduct himself in his office with modesty and humility. Christ confirms the matter itself by his own example: "just as I," he says in verse 27, "came not to be ministered to, but to minister"; and: "I am in the midst of you as one who ministers." Yet no one denies the royal dignity of Christ, and he says of himself in John 13.13: "You call me master and lord, and you say well." And by the same reason St. Peter wrote in 1 Peter 5.2 and following: "Feed the flock of God which is among you... neither as domineering... but being made from the heart a pattern of the flock."

530. They object, II: Matthias in Acts 1.15-26 and the seven deacons in Acts 6.1-6 are said to have been elected by the whole people. I answer. 1. From the things which were done by the Apostles it is not lawful immediately to infer divine right; for the Apostles could do many things as Rulers of the Church, without nevertheless doing them by divine mandate, as in number 321. 2. Yet in reality, in each objected case, those who had gathered with the Apostles, or the people, did not elect or constitute the Apostle in place of Judas, or the Deacons. For first in Acts 1.23 "they set forth two," Barsabbas and Matthias; and then it is added in verse 24: "You, Lord, who know the hearts of all, show whom you have chosen." But concerning the Deacons it is read in Acts 6.3: "Therefore, brothers, consider from among you seven men of good testimony, full of the Holy Spirit and wisdom, whom we may appoint over this work"; where the faithful openly render testimony, but "the twelve," namely the Apostles, constituted the Deacons. 3. But whatever the faithful did in the twofold occasion in question, as is clear from the objected places themselves, they did not perform by their own right, but by the concession of the Apostles. Compare Acts 1.21 and 6.1-3.

531. They object, III: St. Cyprian, letter 68, otherwise 67, says: "The plebs itself especially has the power either of electing worthy priests or of refusing the unworthy; and we see that this very thing descends from divine authority, that the priest, with the plebs present, should be chosen under the eyes of all, and that one suitable should be approved by public judgment and testimony." It is answered: St. Cyprian does not attribute to the people the right of electing, but the right of bearing testimony concerning suitability. In reality: 1. in the objected words themselves he distinguishes the plebs from those electing, "with the plebs present... should be chosen"; hence when at the beginning he says that the plebs has the power of electing, he takes the word electing in the broader sense for bearing testimony, which is not new among Latin authors. 2. What follows confirms this interpretation; for the holy Doctor immediately adds: "as in Numbers the Lord commanded Moses, saying: Take Aaron your brother and Eleazar his son, and you shall place them on the mountain before the whole Synagogue." Was Eleazar elected by the people? Certainly not.

Moreover, he adds: "God commands that a priest be constituted before the whole Synagogue; that is, he instructs and shows that priestly ordinations ought to be made only under the consciousness of the assisting people, so that, with the plebs present, either the crimes of the wicked may be detected, or the merits of the good proclaimed." Behold what belongs to the people. 3. For this very end, the presence of the plebs is not absolutely necessary; for testimony concerning suitability can be received in another way, which depends on the discipline prevailing in the Church. Hence St. Cyprian himself admits that the presence of the people is not employed in all provinces, "which is also held among us, and almost throughout all provinces"; but this could not have obtained if the presence of the people had been necessary by divine right.

Article 8. What Form of Government Christ Instituted in the Church

532. "There are," says Bellarmine in *On the Roman Pontiff*, book 1, chapter 1, "three good forms of government: Monarchy, that is, the principate of one, whose contrary vice is Tyranny; Aristocracy, that is, the rule of the best, to which Oligarchy is opposed, that is, the faction of the few; and Democracy, that is, the rule of the whole people, which not rarely degenerates into seditions. The chief philosophers teach this... nor do they teach it without great reason. For if a multitude is to be governed, it cannot happen that it is governed except in some way from these three. For either one will be set over the republic, or some from among the many, or absolutely all. If one, there will be Monarchy; if some from among the many, Aristocracy; if absolutely all, Democracy."

533. "But although," he adds, "there are only three forms of simple government, nevertheless they can be, as it were, mixed among themselves; from which mixture four other forms of mixed government will be produced. One, tempered from all three; another from Monarchy and Aristocracy; a third from Monarchy and Democracy; the last from Democracy and Aristocracy."

534. Now: 1. from the things established in the preceding article, it is clear that the form of government introduced by Christ into the Church is not democratic. 2. If we establish the monarchic form of government, by that very fact we exclude the aristocratic. 3. But the monarchic form is established most fully if the fullness of power is demonstrated in the Roman Pontiff with regard to all and each of the faithful and Bishops, even when gathered together. 4. Therefore here we employ rather more general arguments, and shall complete the matter in the last disputation. Nevertheless it is necessary to declare certain things in advance.

535. Therefore it is established among Catholics that a true monarchy was instituted by Christ in the Church; but it is also agreed among them that ecclesiastical monarchy is altogether new and singular. For: 1. in human monarchies, the one who has supreme authority is truly King; whereas in ecclesiastical monarchy, the one who possesses supreme authority is not king, but the Vicar of the king. For Christ, who now dies no more, still governs the Church, nor can anyone succeed him. Compare Taparelli, *Essay*, numbers 1453 and following. Hence St. Thomas says in Contra Gentiles, book 4, chapter 76: "But if someone says that Christ is the one head and one shepherd, who is the one spouse of the one Church, he does not answer sufficiently. For it is manifest that Christ himself accomplishes the ecclesiastical sacraments. For he himself is the one who baptizes; he himself is the one who remits sins; he himself is the true priest, who offered himself on the altar of the cross, and by whose power his body is daily consecrated on the altar." "And nevertheless, because he was not going to be corporally present with all the faithful, he chose ministers through whom he would dispense the aforesaid things to the faithful, as was said above, chapter 74. Therefore by the same reason, because he was going to withdraw his bodily presence from the Church, it was necessary that he commit to someone the care of the universal Church in his place. Hence it is that before the ascension he said to Peter: 'Feed my sheep' (John 21.17)." 2. Bellarmine notes in *On the Roman Pontiff*, book 1, chapter 9: "The Supreme Pontiff, if he is compared with Christ, does not have fullness of power, but only a certain portion of his own, according to the measure of Christ's donation. For Christ rules the whole Church,

which is in heaven, in purgatory, and on earth; and which was from the beginning of the world and will be until the end. Moreover, at his will he can establish laws, institute Sacraments, and bestow grace even without Sacraments." "But the Pope rules only that part of the Church which is on earth while he himself lives; nor can he change the laws of Christ, or institute Sacraments, or remit sins without a Sacrament. Yet if the Supreme Pontiff is compared with the other Bishops, he is rightly said to have fullness of power. For the others have defined regions over which they preside, and also defined power; but he is set over the whole Christian world, and has the whole and full power which Christ left on earth for the utility of the Church." 3. In ecclesiastical monarchy, under the supreme Prince and Monarch there exist true and properly so-called princes, who rule in solidum, as chapter *Loquitur*, cause 24, question 1 has it, without detriment to the supreme principate, indeed with its increase. This form is new and singular, nor could the human mind easily imitate it. For if full dominion is placed in one, by that very fact the others are removed from a proper and native participation in it. They will indeed be ministers, vicars, prefects, and so forth, representing the Monarch; they will administer another's province, not their own; they will exercise delegated jurisdiction, not ordinary; and therefore they will never be co-princes and brothers. On the other hand, if the supreme dominion is placed not in one, but in several, namely in the optimates, by that very fact there will not be fullness of power in one, and therefore Monarchy will be destroyed. For if each of those has proper and native authority, the supreme power is already, as it were, divided, and this power is no longer full, absolute, and free in one. Compare Zallinger, *Institutes of Public Ecclesiastical Law*, chapter 362.

536. But if it is asked whether in the Church a simple monarchy is to be admitted, or one tempered by aristocracy, or even by democracy, there does not seem to be one opinion of Catholics. For Cardinal Orsi, in *On the Power of the Pontiff over Ecumenical Synods and Their Canons*, part 2, book 7, to whom innumerable theologians and canonists subscribe, maintains that the government of the Church is simply and absolutely monarchic. Others, however, establish that it is tempered by aristocracy or even by democracy. Indeed, what is certainly worthy of wonder, there are found some true defenders of simple and absolute monarchy as to substance who nevertheless, if the question is about the name, then call it not simple, but mixed both with aristocracy and also with democracy. Thus Bellarmine, in *Controversies*, book 1, *On the Roman Pontiff*, chapter 3. On the other hand, from the opposite side, others are found, among whom is Natalis Alexander, by no means moderately hostile in reality to the doctrine of simple ecclesiastical monarchy, who nevertheless in word do not hesitate to call the form of the Church monarchic without addition. They would certainly be more worthy of pardon if they stumbled over the word, but thought rightly about the matter.

537. In order that the crisis of this question may be had at once, we note first of all that Natalis Alexander, distinction 4 in the *Ecclesiastical History* of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, with other Gallicans, establishes a true aristocracy in the Church, although he calls it monarchy without addition. For he teaches: 1. that the supreme prince, the Roman Pontiff, can make no law unless it is approved by the aristocratic order, the body of Bishops, either dispersed in the various provinces or gathered in council; 2. that the same order, considered collectively and apart from the Supreme Pontiff himself, is superior to him, is the supreme tribunal, and is the supreme source of all power in the Church; 3. what is consequent, they recognize a right of appeal from Pontifical decisions to a future Council. These things indeed set forth not so much a monarchy tempered by aristocracy as a pure and simple aristocracy; for the whole supreme authority is said to be situated in the aristocratic order. Therefore this error does not need other things to refute it than those which we shall bring forward in their own place to vindicate the nature and force of the Primacy of the Roman Pontiff. Here, however, those things are sufficient which we shall indicate for establishing true monarchy.

538. Bellarmine, however, who, as we indicated, says that the government of the Church is not a simple monarchy, but a monarchy tempered by aristocracy and democracy, thus explains his

mind in *On the Roman Pontiff*, book 1, chapter 3: "This government indeed requires that in the republic there be some supreme Prince, who both commands all and is subject to none. Yet the presidents of provinces or cities are not vicars of the King, or annual judges, but true princes, who both obey the command of the supreme Prince and meanwhile govern their province or city not as another's, but as their own. In this way there would be place in the republic both for a certain royal Monarchy and also for an aristocracy of princely optimates. But if to these it were added that neither that supreme King nor the lesser princes acquired those dignities by hereditary succession, but that the best men from the whole people were raised to them, then some proper place would also be attributed to democracy in the republic."

539. But all theologians and canonists who acknowledge simple monarchy in the Church admit all those things which Bellarmine says, as is clear of itself; nor, given Christ's institution, can they in any way deny them. The difference, therefore, between these theologians and Bellarmine is not of the matter, but of the name; or if one wishes to say that it is of the matter, it does not regard the constitution itself of the Church, but rather the concept which they form for themselves concerning simply monarchic government. To compose this apparent disagreement, therefore, it will help to set forth in a few words the genuine concept of monarchy.

540. Monarchy is defined by Aristotle as "the supreme command in the hands of one, without the partnership of a superior or equal, of the people, or of another prince." Hence others, illustrating these things, say: "the simple and absolute monarchic form is situated in the free and ready fullness of power conferred on one for governing the whole society." Bellarmine himself does not depart from this definition, since, as we saw in number 532, he defines monarchy as "the principate of one," or as government in which "one is set over the republic." Hence the Wurzburg theologians could safely assert, in *On the Roman Pontiff*, number 160: "in the proper and common sense, monarchy is taken for a government in which one ruling person has supreme power, without regard to whether another subject power is exercised by inferiors in their own name or in a vicarious name: this is called simple Monarchy."

541. From this definition of monarchy it follows that three things are required to constitute it: namely, 1. unity of command in the head; 2. universality of subjection in the members; 3. what is consequent and principal, the indivision of the highest power residing in one head. Wherefore, in order that a monarchic government be properly said to be tempered by democracy or aristocracy, it is necessary that the supreme power not reside wholly in one head, but be, as it were, divided among many and diminished in that head. This would happen if the command of the head, with respect to force and efficacy, depended on the suffrage of others, so that if this were lacking, that command would be ineffective and invalid.

542. If such a concept of monarchy, which is true, is retained, it is easily clear that among Catholics it is established, with respect to the matter, that the Church is a simple monarchy. For among them it is established: 1. that the fullness of supreme power in the Church was conferred by Christ upon Peter, and remains entire in Peter's successors; 2. that there is no power among simple faithful in the government of the Church; 3. that Bishops, whether taken individually or collectively, depend on Peter's successor; but that he is so independent of them that the force and efficacy of the things which he decrees in no way depends on their suffrage. 4. What then remains? Only this: that Bishops must exist in the Church by divine right, and therefore are not as vicars of the Supreme Pontiff, but have ordinary jurisdiction. But this, properly speaking, does not make the government of the Church not truly monarchic. For the power of Bishops is subordinated to the Supreme Head and dependent on him; on the contrary, the power of the Head does not depend in any way on the power of the Bishops. Therefore there is no division of supreme power, and no diminution of it in the head. Wherefore those who, on account of the original power of Bishops, deny that the government of the Church is merely monarchic, or call it monarchic tempered by Aristocracy, are shown to speak less accurately and less properly, since either Monarchy or Aristocracy must be understood in an alien and improper sense; and they admit such a tempering as does not truly temper the supreme power

of one Head.

543. Hence Zallinger rightly writes in *Public Ecclesiastical Law*, section 362: "That aristocratic tempering ought not to be understood as of the sort which is usually found in profane states, whose mixed form arises from a division of the rights of supreme command in such a way that the right which is in one subject is not the same in another, nor depends on another. The distinction is made by the singular unity, and the obligation of preserving unity, which Christ made proper to his Church. For first, the very power of Bishops which effects that aristocratic tempering is perpetually and by its nature bound to the center of unity and to the supreme power of the Vicar of Christ, and is subordinated to the same; and therefore this aristocratic mixture is not absolute, but limited. Second, whatever right belongs to Bishops exists in a certain eminent way in the Primate of the Church of Christ. These things, unless I am mistaken, cannot be asserted of other profane forms mixed from monarchy and aristocracy." And Devoti, *Institutes of Canon Law*, prolegomena, chapter 2, section 19, says: "There are Catholics who, rejecting pure aristocracy, nevertheless wish ecclesiastical monarchy to be tempered by aristocracy. But since among all Catholics it is agreed that the Roman Pontiff by divine right presides over the universal Church, and truly presides not only by honor and place, but also by power and jurisdiction, it is easily understood that the government of the Church is contained by monarchic reason. For the name monarchy designates supreme command which is with one. But the power of Bishops detracts nothing from monarchy; even if it is not precarious, but proper and native, nevertheless, since it depends on the Supreme Pontiff, certainly his monarchic power is not diminished by their power."

544. Since these things are so, it is enough for us to assert that the government of the Church is monarchic, and to prove this by indicating rather than developing the arguments. A fuller exposition of the arguments will be handed down where there will be discussion of the visible Head of the Church. **Section II The Proposed Question Is Resolved Proposition XXIII.** Although the form of government in the Church is new and singular under more than one head, nevertheless, if monarchic government is recalled to that concept which philosophers commonly handed down, namely, that it is "the supreme command in the hands of one, without the partnership of a superior or equal, of the people, or of another prince," no one can doubt that in the Church of Christ, from the very institution of its Author, a true and simple monarchy flourishes.

545. Proof I, from Scripture. If we consider the figure of the Church of Christ, by which it was foreshadowed; the exemplar according to whose image it was founded; the similitudes by which it is illustrated; and finally usage and analogy, all these express that the supreme command in the Church is in the hands of one, or that its government is truly monarchic. Therefore it truly is such. The antecedent is proved. 1. With regard to the figure. For, as we showed above and as Scripture often testifies, the Church of the Old Testament was the figure of the Church to be founded by Christ. But in the Synagogue there flourished the authority of one who presided over all in matters pertaining to the law and religion, especially after the Hebrews, having gone out of Egypt, assumed the form of a people that would be ruled by its own laws and magistrates. Then, moreover, down to the times of Christ there was never lacking one prince of priests who governed all the synagogues. Therefore reason altogether requires that, just as that which was the figure had, besides God as invisible ruler, one visible ruler, so also the Church of the New Testament, which is the thing figured, should have one. The consequence is confirmed: a. because no perfection ought to exist in the figure which is not found, and indeed more fully, in the thing figured; b. because the reason why the Jewish people had one head was that it might be contained in unity of faith and religion. But this reason obtains a fortiori in the Church of Christians; for the unity of Christian faith must be preserved in a greater multitude diffused far and wide throughout the whole world, is attacked by more enemies, and is surely subject to greater dangers. 2. With regard to the exemplar. For it is certain that the heavenly hierarchy of Angels is the exemplar of the Church militant. The Apostle seems to indicate this in Hebrews, and St.

Bernard expressly affirms it in book 3 of *On Consideration*, to Eugenius, where he teaches that the Church militant is called in the Apocalypse "the new Jerusalem descending from heaven," because it was instituted and expressed according to the exemplar of that heavenly city. But first of all, that heavenly hierarchy of spirits has one supreme King, God. Indeed the Fathers seem to teach that among the angelic spirits themselves there is one who presides over all the rest. "And in the beginning indeed," says Bellarmine, "that one who is now called the Devil was adorned with this dignity, as Tertullian, book 2 against Marcion, Gregory, homily 34 on the Gospels and book 32 of the *Moralia*, chapter 24, Jerome, or rather Bede, on chapter 40 of Job, Isidore, book 1 *On the Highest Good*, chapter 12, and others testify. But after the fall of the devil, that St. Michael is prince of all the Angels is gathered from chapter 12 of the Apocalypse, where it is said: 'Michael and his Angels.' For what is 'Michael and his Angels' except Michael and his army? For just as when it is said in the same place, the Devil and his angels, we understand that all evil Angels are subject to the Devil as soldiers to an emperor, so when it is said, Michael and his Angels, we ought to understand that all good Angels acknowledge Michael as their prince. Wherefore, rightly in the ecclesiastical office St. Michael is named prefect of paradise and prince of the heavenly army." 3. With regard to similitudes. The Church in the Scriptures is compared to an ordered army in Song of Songs 6; to a human Body, and to a beautiful woman in Song of Songs 6; to a Kingdom, Sheepfold, and House, as we said in number 440; and to the Ship or ark of Noah in 1 Peter 3. But all these present the idea of supreme government existing in the hands of one, or of monarchy. In reality: a. No camps are ordered where there is not one supreme Leader; hence St. Jerome says in the letter to Rusticus: "in however great an army, the standard of one is awaited." b. In any body there is one head, which governs the other members as it were. (1) c. It is established that a kingdom has only one king; and one sheepfold also requires one shepherd. Hence it is said in John 10: "There shall be one fold and one shepherd." (2) d. A house also has one lord, according to that passage in Luke 12: "Who, do you think, is the faithful and prudent steward, whom the lord will set over his family?" These words are said to Peter and about Peter, as is clear from the context. Indeed, so that Christ may show that he is speaking of one who presides over all the fellow servants and who is subject to the Lord alone, he adds: "But if that wicked servant shall say in his heart, My lord delays to come, and shall begin to beat the menservants and maidservants, and to eat and drink with the drunken, the lord of that servant will come on a day on which he does not hope, and at an hour which he does not know, and he will divide him and place his portion with the unbelievers." (1) "And lest perhaps you say," says Bellarmine, "the Church has its own Head, Christ: for this reason we do not compare the Church with Christ in this place as members with a head, but as bride with bridegroom, a similitude which the Scriptures use, Revelation 21.2, 2 Corinthians 11, Ephesians 5, and very frequently in the Canticles. And certainly if the Church which is on earth, with Christ set aside, is not unfittingly compared to a bride, then with Christ also set aside it ought to have one head, especially since in Song of Songs 7, among its other members, the head also is expressly numbered: 'Your head,' says the bridegroom to the bride, 'is like Carmel.' And the bride says of the bridegroom: 'His head is the finest gold' in Song of Songs 5. And indeed the bridegroom compares the head of the bride to Mount Carmel, since although the Supreme Pontiff is a great mountain, nevertheless he is nothing other than earth, that is, a man. But the bride compares the bridegroom's head to the finest gold, because the head of Christ is God." (2) Hence Cyprian, book 1, letter 6 to Magnus, speaking of Novatian, who wished to become Bishop of Rome when Cornelius had already been created and was sitting, says: "And therefore the Lord, insinuating to us the unity coming from divine authority, posits and says: I and the Father are one. Reducing his Church to that unity, he again says: And there shall be one flock and one Shepherd. But if the flock is one, how can he be numbered with the flock who is not in the number of the flock? Or how can he be held as shepherd who, while the true shepherd remains and presides in the Church of God by succeeding ordination, succeeding no one and beginning from himself, becomes alien and profane?" e. Finally, "in a ship," says St. Jerome in the letter to Rusticus, "there is one helmsman"; and St. Cyprian, book 1, letter 6, after teaching that the ark of Noah was a type of the Church, proves that Novatian could not become the helmsman of this ark, because Cornelius had already been made such, and one ship requires one ruler, not several. 4. With regard to

analogy and usage. a. Christ, when he lived on earth, visibly administered the Church as its supreme pastor and ruler. Therefore also he who now bears the place of Christ on earth alone possesses supreme power integrally. Thus indeed the Church which now exists is the same city and the same kingdom as the Church which Christ governed at the beginning. b. In individual places individual Bishops are constituted, who preside over all the other ministers and pastors of that place; in individual provinces individual Metropolitans are constituted, who preside over the Bishops of their province; in greater cities Primates or Patriarchs are constituted. It is therefore fitting that there also be one who presides over the whole Church, and to whom the Primates and Patriarchs themselves are subject. For since a monarchic principate befits one city, one province, one nation, it must also be said to befit the universal Church; for no reason demands that the parts be governed monarchically, but the whole otherwise. Compare Bellarmine, *On the Roman Pontiff*, book 1, chapter 9, from whom we have taken this whole argument.

546. II. Again from Scripture. For in Matthew 16 Christ says to Simon Peter: "You are Peter, and upon this Rock I will build my Church... to you I will give the keys of the kingdom of heaven. And whatever you shall bind," etc. But these words contain the promise of power, which Christ then conferred upon Peter in John 21, saying: "Feed my lambs... feed my sheep." Now it is established: 1. that unity of command in the head is contained in these words; for the words "You are Peter, and upon this rock... To you I will give the keys" are referred to Peter alone, just as those words also regard Peter alone: "[Jesus] says: Feed my lambs... Feed my sheep." But what is promised and conferred on Peter by these words? Supreme power in the Church, which is the sheepfold of Christ. For the word Feed expresses power in the manner of royal power, and properly signifies to rule with command, and is not restricted by any added word; just as also the power of the keys is absolute and monarchic, compare Isaiah 22 and Revelation 1. Finally, by the metaphor itself of the foundational rock, it is signified that each and all things in the Church depend on one Peter. 2. It is established that the universality of subjection in the members is contained in the same words. For what is subjected to Peter alone? That of which he is the foundation, namely the whole Church to be built upon him; that which is committed to Peter's pastoral care, namely the lambs and sheep, or the simple faithful and those set over them, absolutely all who are of the Church. 3. Hence it is established that the indivision of supreme power in one Peter is contained in the same words. For if the power first promised and then conferred upon Peter alone is such that it extends to all things without any restriction, and all in the Church are subject to it, it is necessary that the fullness of the highest power reside undivided in one head, namely in Peter. But it is enough to indicate this argument here, since it must be developed where the discussion will concern the primacy of Peter.

547. III. From the Fathers, who teach: 1. unity of command in the head. Thus Optatus of Milevis, book 2 against Parmenian, says: "The chair is one, and you do not dare deny that you know that the chair was first placed for Peter in the city of Rome, where Peter sat, the head of all the Apostles, whence he was called Cephas." St. Cyprian, in the book *On the Unity of the Church*: "Although after his resurrection he gives equal power to all the Apostles,... nevertheless, in order to manifest unity, by his authority he disposed the origin of that same unity as beginning from one. The other Apostles certainly were what Peter was, endowed with an equal partnership of honor and power; but the beginning proceeds from unity, and the primacy is given to Peter, so that the Church may be shown to be one." St. John Chrysostom, homily 3 on the Acts of the Apostles, treating of Peter ordering the election of Matthias, says: "Deservedly he first of all assumes authority in the business, as one who has all in his hand." Maximus of Constantinople, in the letter to the Orientals: "The Creator of the world chose Peter from the other mortals of the whole world, to whom he granted by perpetual right of privilege principally to hold the chair of magisterium to be possessed." They teach: 2. universality of subjection in the members. Thus St. Bruno, Bishop of Segni, commentary on John, part 3, chapter 21, number 55, says: "He constituted him not only pastor, but pastor of pastors; therefore Peter feeds the lambs, he feeds also the sheep, he feeds the sons, he feeds also the mothers, he rules subjects, he rules also prelates. He is pastor of all; because besides lambs and

sheep there is nothing in the Church." St. Leo, sermon 3 on his assumption: "From the whole world one Peter is chosen, who is set over the vocation of all nations, and over all the Apostles and all Fathers of the Church; so that although in the people of God there are many Priests and many pastors, nevertheless Peter properly rules all whom Christ also rules principally." Cyril of Alexandria, book *Thesaurus*: "To Peter all bend the head by divine right, and the Primates of the world obey him as the Lord Jesus himself." Nazianzen, oration 26: "You see how, from the disciples of Christ, all great and lofty indeed, this one [Peter] is called the rock and receives the foundations of the Church in faith; that one [John] is loved more intensely and rests upon the breast of Jesus; and the remaining disciples bear with equal mind that they are preferred to themselves." St. Gregory, book 4, letter 32: "It is clear to all who know the Gospel that by the Lord's voice the care of the whole Church was committed to blessed Peter, prince of all the Apostles... Behold, he received the keys of the heavenly kingdom; the power of binding and loosing is granted to him; the care and principate of the whole Church is granted to him." They teach: 3. the indivision of the highest power in the head. Thus Cyril of Alexandria, in *Thesaurus*: "To Peter he committed the fullest thing; and to no one else did Christ give what is fully his, but to him alone." Optatus of Milevis, in the cited book: "In this one, the unity of the chair was to be preserved by all, nor was each of the other Apostles to defend individual chairs for himself; so that he would already be schismatic and a sinner who set up another chair against the singular chair. Therefore the chair is one." Jerome, book 1 against Jovinian: "Among the twelve one is chosen, so that, a head having been constituted, the occasion of schism might be removed." Likewise Cyprian, letter 55: "For heresies have arisen and schisms have been born from no other source than this, that obedience is not given to the Priest of God, nor is one Priest in the Church at a time and one judge at a time in the place of Christ considered."

548. Embracing all these things together, St. Bernard, the true glory of the Gallican Church, most beautifully expresses it thus to Pope Eugenius: "Come, let us investigate still more diligently who you are, namely what person you bear for the time in the Church of God. Who are you? The great Priest, the Supreme Pontiff. You are prince of Bishops, you are heir of the Apostles; you are Abel in primacy, Noah in governance, Abraham in patriarchate, Melchizedek in order, Aaron in dignity, Moses in authority, Samuel in judgment, Peter in power, Christ in anointing. You are the one to whom the keys were handed, to whom the sheep were entrusted. There are indeed also other gatekeepers of heaven and pastors of flocks, but you inherited each name more gloriously, and also differently, before the rest. They have flocks assigned to themselves, individuals individual flocks; to you all were entrusted, one flock to one man, and not only of sheep but also of pastors. Do you ask whence I prove this? From the word of the Lord. For to whom, I do not say of Bishops, but even of Apostles, were all the sheep so absolutely and indiscriminately committed? If you love me, Peter, feed my sheep. Which sheep? Of this or that people, city, region, or certain kingdom? My sheep, he says. To whom is it not plain that he did not designate some, but assigned all? Nothing is excepted where nothing is distinguished."

549. IV. From reason, which shows the greatest congruence of the matter. "It is manifest," says St. Thomas, *Contra Gentiles*, book 4, chapter 76, "that although peoples are distinguished by diverse dioceses and cities, nevertheless, just as there is one Church, so there must be one Christian people. Therefore, just as in the spiritual people of one Church one bishop is required who is head of the whole people, so in the whole Christian people it is required that there be one head of the whole Church. "Likewise. For the unity of the Church it is required that all the faithful agree in faith. But concerning those things which are of faith, questions can be raised; and through diversity of opinions the Church would be divided, unless it were preserved in unity through the judgment of one. Therefore, to preserve the unity of the Church, it is required that there be one who presides over the whole Church. But it is manifest that Christ does not fail the Church in necessary things, which he loved and for which he poured out his blood, since even concerning the Synagogue it is said by the Lord: 'What more ought I to have done for my vineyard, and have I not done it?' (Isaiah 5.4). Therefore it must not be doubted that by Christ's ordinance one presides over the whole Church. "Further. No one ought to doubt that the government of the Church is best ordered, as being disposed by him

through whom 'kings reign, and lawgivers decree just things' (Proverbs 8.15). But the best government of a multitude is that it be ruled by one: which is clear from the end of government, which is peace. For peace and the unity of subjects is the end of the one ruling. But the more fitting cause of unity is one than many. Therefore it is manifest that the government of the Church has been so disposed that one presides over the whole Church."

550. Note. The objections which could be brought forward here properly attack the Primacy of Peter and its nature. Therefore we deliberately abstain here from weighing them.

Article 9. Whether, From Christ's Institution, the Church Is a Perfect Society

551. After the things which we disputed in the preceding article, it would scarcely be necessary to propose this question. For if, especially with the proper end of the Church presupposed, which is supreme, it is once established that a monarchic form of government flourishes in the Church, and consequently that it is a Kingdom, unless we wish to deny to all kingdoms the character of a perfect society, we must attribute it to the Church. Yet since in the present time the error is fairly common that the Church is like a college depending on civil society, it will not be beside the matter to attack this error directly.

552. Therefore from the error of those who were establishing a democratic form of government in the Church, as in numbers 517 and following, the passage was easy to proclaiming the subjection of the Church to civil society. For if right over sacred things is the patrimony of the people, it ought especially to be attributed to the one who bears the person of the people in the civil republic. More recent politicians and regalists, however, have come by a somewhat different process to the same consequence. For to them the Church is nothing other than a certain college existing in civil society, having itself almost in the way that a society of merchants has itself; hence, just as the latter is a part of civil society and dependent on it, so also is the Church.

553. Hence: 1. The Holy Father Pius IX, in the allocution *Multis Gravibusque*, December 17, 1860, denouncing this error, at the same time manifests its first source, saying: "We understand this, moreover, to have been derived from the false doctrine of the Protestants, who think that the Church exists in the civil Empire as a kind of College, and consequently possesses no rights except those which have been conceded and attributed to it by the civil power. But who does not understand how greatly this departs from the truth? For the Church was instituted by its divine author as a true and perfect society, which, circumscribed by no boundaries of regions and subject to no civil empire, freely exercises its power and rights everywhere on earth for the salvation of men. Nor indeed do those solemn words of Christ the Lord to the Apostles indicate otherwise: 'All power has been given to me in heaven and on earth; go, teach all nations... teaching them to observe all things whatsoever I have commanded you.'" 2. He also assigns a nearer cause: "There are indeed many," he says in the allocution *Singulari Quadam*, December 9, 1854, "who, placed in charge of public affairs, say that they are favorers and defenders of religion, exalt it with praises, and proclaim it most suited and useful to human society; nevertheless they wish to regulate its discipline, to govern sacred ministers, to touch the administration of sacred things; in one word, they strive to confine the Church within the limits of the civil state and to dominate it, although it is of its own right and by divine plan must not be contained by the boundaries of any empire, but must be propagated to the ends of the earth and embrace all peoples and nations, so that it may mark out and open for them the path of everlasting blessedness." 3. In the allocution *Maxime Quidem*, June 9, 1862, he indicates the very bad consequences of that false principle, saying: "Indeed they are not ashamed to assert... that the Church is not a true and perfect society, plainly free, nor possesses its own proper and constant rights conferred upon it by its divine Founder, but that it belongs to the civil power to define what the rights of the Church are, and the limits within which it may exercise those same rights. Hence they perversely devise that the civil power can involve itself in matters which pertain to religion, morals, and spiritual government, and can even prevent the Sacred Prelates

and faithful peoples from freely and mutually communicating with the Roman Pontiff, divinely constituted supreme Pastor of the whole Church, so that that necessary and most close conjunction, which by the divine institution of Christ the Lord himself must altogether exist between the members of the mystical body of Christ and its visible Head, may be plainly dissolved. Nor do they fear to bring forward among the people, with every fallacy and deceit, that the sacred ministers of the Church and the Roman Pontiff must be altogether excluded from every right and dominion over temporal things." Compare the condemned propositions in the *Syllabus*, which are contained in sections 5 and 6.

554. But setting aside for now the refutation of the corollaries, the principle itself from which they flow must here be overturned by us; or rather, we must assert that the Church was instituted by Christ as a perfect society. While by this we understand the nature of the Church more deeply, we at the same time vindicate its independence from civil society. It will help first to disclose briefly what is meant by the name perfect society.

555. That society is called perfect which is so complete in itself that it has in itself the means sufficient for attaining its end. If we unfold this definition a little, it will be plain that these things are required for the notion of a perfect society: 1. that it not be a part of another society; for if it were a part, by that very fact it would not be complete, since a part has its completion only in the whole. 2. That it not have an end subordinated to the end of another society in the same genus; for since the end gives species to a society, as in number 472, if the end of one is subordinated to the end of another, then one society also is subordinated to another, of which therefore it is, as it were, a part. "Just as a man," says St. Thomas, *Summa Theologiae*, first-second part, question 90, article 3, reply to objection 3, "is part of a household, so a household is part of a city; but the city is a perfect community... And therefore just as the good of one man is not the ultimate end, but is ordered to the common good, so also the good of one household is ordered to the good of one city, which is a perfect community." 3. That consequently it have in itself the means necessary for its preservation and for the attainment of its end; otherwise it would have to receive them from another, and therefore would not be complete in itself. 4. Finally, what follows from these things, that it be independent in its own genus. For a society is independent which does not have an end ordered to the end of another society, and which has sufficient means in itself.

556. It must only be noted that a society can have sufficient means in itself either in fact or in power. It has them in itself in fact when it must in no way seek them from another society. It has them in power, however, when it must indeed seek them from another, but by its own right, so that the other society has neither the faculty of denying them, nor of judging ultimately whether they are to be granted. But if, on the contrary, some society is forced to seek from another the means necessary for itself in such a way that with this other lies the right of denying them, or at least of settling the dispute whether they ought to be furnished or not, then it has sufficient means in itself neither in fact nor in power, and therefore is not a perfect society. **Section II The Proposed Question Is Resolved Proposition XXIV.** The Church founded by Christ, with regard both to the end proposed to it and to the positive will of its divine institutor, must be judged to obtain the form of a perfect society. Therefore, possessing its own proper and constant rights, it vindicates for itself that liberty by which, in discharging its office, it is subject to no civil power.

557. Proof I. Since the nature and species of a society, as we have often said, is determined from its end, in order to know whether the Church is a perfect society or not, the end itself must be considered. But if the end is such that from it the Church must be judged a perfect society, then it will be such by its nature. Now: 1. An end supreme by its nature cannot be ordered to another end and be, as it were, a part of it. But the end proposed by Christ to the Church is supreme, namely sanctity in this life and eternal salvation in the future life. Therefore it cannot be ordered to any other end whatever and be a part of it. Therefore the Church itself is a society ordered to no other society and part of no other society; and this implies that the Church is a perfect society. 2. In reality, besides these things, nothing else is required for

constituting a perfect society except that it have sufficient means in itself, and therefore that it not depend on another society in the economy of means. But a society ordered to no other and part of no other cannot depend on any society in the economy of means. Therefore, if the Church is such a society, by that very fact it must have sufficient means in itself, and therefore be independent from any other society in the economy of means. The minor is proved. If it depended on another in the economy of means, it would already be subject to it; if it were subject to it, then it is no longer supreme, but ordered to that other. This is confirmed: all other societies, in relation to a society which is ordered to no other, either have no connection with it or are ordered to it. But it is impossible that in the economy of means some society should depend on others which are ordered to it, or which have no connection with it. Therefore.

558. II. From what was established above it is clear that Christ himself immediately constituted those set over the Church and conferred on them full and perfect power. It is better now to examine more deeply the character of that power. For if it is subject to no power on earth, the Church itself from Christ's institution is ordered to no other society, and for that reason is a perfect society. Now Christ said in Matthew 16.18 and following: "You are Peter, and upon this rock I will build my Church... And to you I will give the keys of the kingdom of heaven; and whatever you shall bind upon earth shall be bound also in heaven; and whatever you shall loose upon earth shall be loosed also in heaven." But these words present a power independent from any other power on earth. For: 1. suppose that the power of the Church depends on civil society; then civil society could by right impede what the Church establishes. But if it impeded this by right, God would not confirm what the Church establishes. Therefore that universal affirmation would be false, that whatever the Church binds or looses on earth is bound or loosed in heaven. 2. On the contrary, if it is true that whatever is bound or loosed by the Church on earth is bound or loosed in heaven, then there can be no power on earth which can impede the statutes of the Church, and therefore the Church will be independent from any other society. For no human power can bind or loose what has been loosed or bound in heaven; and there is no intermediate power between the power of Peter and that of God.

559. III. When the Church is called a perfect society, or a society not ordered to another, it is in reality called such in relation to civil society; for all societies are reduced to the religious or civil, insofar as they partially pursue the end of one or the other. Now the Church cannot be ordered to civil society and depend on it. For it cannot be said that Christ the Lord so constituted his Church that he did not sufficiently provide for it. But this would have to be said if the Church were not a perfect society independent from civil society. For: 1. the supreme civil power in any republic would also have the supreme ecclesiastical power; and therefore there would not be one supreme power of the Church for any nation whatever, and thus the unity of the Church would be done away with. 2. In the first three centuries of the Church, and now also in unbelieving and non-Catholic regions, the Church would be handed over to enemies to be governed.

560. IV. From the Fathers. For St. Ignatius Martyr, in the letter to the Trallians, says: "What else is the Bishop than he who obtains every principate and power in the Church?" If Bishops have every power, kings have none in the Church. St. Gregory Nazianzen, oration 17 to Theodosius: "The Christian law subjects you also, Emperor, to my rule and throne. For we Bishops also bear rule; I add, even a more excellent and more perfect one." If the rule of Bishops is more excellent, it cannot be subject to the civil power. Hence St. John Damascene, orations 1 and 2 on Images, writes: "Do not attempt, Emperor, to dissolve the ecclesiastical state. For the Apostle says: God placed in the Church some Apostles, some Prophets, others Evangelists, and others Pastors and Teachers; but he did not say Kings." And St. Athanasius, *History of the Arians*, number 53: "If that is a decree of Bishops, what does it have to do with the Emperor? But if they are imperial threats, what need is there of men who are called Bishops? When from the beginning of the world has a thing of this sort been heard? When has a decree of the Church received authority from the Emperor, or been held as a decree? Many Synods have been assembled before this, many decrees of the Church have gone forth; but never did the Fathers suggest things of this kind to the Emperor, never did the Emperor

curiously investigate ecclesiastical things." St. Ambrose, against Auxentius, number 35: "Tribute belongs to Caesar; it is not denied. The Church belongs to God; it certainly ought not be handed over to Caesar, because the temple of God cannot be Caesar's right... The Emperor is within the Church, not above the Church." Hosius of Cordoba, as cited by Athanasius in *History of the Arians*, number 44, St. Hilary, to Constantius, book 1, number 1, and others have the same. But Lucifer of Cagliari must not be passed over. In book 1 *For Athanasius to the Emperor Constantius* he writes: "But you say in this place, Deuteronomy 17.9, that Moses, most devoted to God, just as he made mention of Priests, so also of a Judge. Prove that you have been made judge over us; prove that you have been constituted Emperor for this, and that you might lead us by your arms to fulfilling every will of your friend the Devil. Since you cannot prove it, because it has been commanded to you not only not to dominate Bishops, but even so to obey their statutes that, if you have attempted to overturn their decrees, if you have been caught in pride, you have been ordered to die by death, how will you be able to say that you can judge concerning Bishops? Unless you obey them, already, as far as before God is concerned, you have been punished with the penalty of death." This doctrine of Lucifer of Cagliari is not his alone. For thus St. Athanasius writes to the same Lucifer: "We have received the letters and books of your most religious and most holy soul, in which we have seen an apostolic image... the magisterium of truth... the doctrine of true faith... the integral tradition of our Fathers, the right rule of ecclesiastical order... You seem to be the temple of the Savior, who, dwelling in you, speaks these very things through you... Believe me, Lucifer, you alone have not spoken these things, but the Holy Spirit with you," etc. And in the letter to the Monks, besides other doctors, the Supreme Pontiffs Liberius and Julius are cited for the same opinion.

561. V. From the confession of kings themselves. Certainly Louis VII, King of the Franks, as Baronius reports in the year 1162, number 10, writes thus concerning Frederick I, who was resisting the power of the Church: "Does the aforesaid Emperor not know that our Lord Jesus Christ, when he was on earth, committed his sheep to blessed Peter, and through him to all his successors, to be fed? Has he not heard in the Gospel that it was said by the same Son of God to the same Prince of the Apostles: Simon, do you love me? Feed my sheep? Are the Kings of the Franks, or any Prelates, excepted here?" But other Kings and Emperors had already before then issued the same profession of doctrine; and the testimonies are very well known of Constantine the Great, as cited by St. Optatus; Valentinian I, as cited by Sozomen; Honorius, in his letter to his brother Arcadius in the case of St. John Chrysostom; Valentinian III, in the Novel concerning the Ordinations of Bishops in the Theodosian Code; Theodosius the Younger to the Synod of Ephesus; Theodoric, although a heretic, in the Fourth Roman Synod under Pope Symmachus; Justinian, in Novel 83, chapter 1; Charlemagne, canon *In Memoriam*, distinction 19; Basil the Macedonian, last act of the Fourth Council of Constantinople, in the year 869; and others. Compare Suarez, *On Laws*, book 4, chapters 1 and 8, and *Defense of the Faith*, book 3, chapters 6 and following; and Zaccaria, the dissertation entitled *Render to Caesar*, etc. Wherefore, if certain facts are brought forward from which it seems established that Emperors decreed something in ecclesiastical matters, it must be replied: 1. that this sometimes happened through abuse, and that the Church tolerated it for a time in order to avoid graver evils; 2. but that very often the Church protested, as is clear from the documents brought forward; 3. that sometimes Emperors sanctioned by their laws what had already been decreed by the Church, namely in order to urge execution; 4. or that they did this by delegation of the Church, compare Justinian, Novel 6, section 1, and Novel 123 in the prologue; Bianchi, *On External Polity*, etc., book 2, chapter 3; 5. since the Church is a perfect society by divine institution, no human fact is able to abrogate its rights.

562. You will say, I: If the Church were a perfect society, it would have to have its own territory. But the Church does not have its own territory. Therefore. I answer by distinguishing the major: it would have to have its own territory, that is, dominion of property, denied; that is, a place in which it has the right of exercising its jurisdiction, granted. Now dominion of property is not necessary; otherwise neither could a King exercise civil power in his whole kingdom. But the Church has a place in which it

exercises its jurisdiction by the very fact that it is, as we have shown, a legitimate and necessary society. Hence the same territory belongs at once to civil magistrates, so that they may care for the temporal end of their society, and to the Church, so that it may pursue its end, which is the sanctification of men and eternal salvation to be obtained through it. Now the end of the Church extends to all men, and therefore the Church is a society Catholic by its nature and institution. Therefore the whole earth is the territory of the Church. Wherefore St. Bernard, writing to Eugenius III, the Supreme Pontiff, in *On Consideration*, book 3, chapter 1, says: "One must go out of the world, if perhaps he wishes to explore things which do not pertain to your care." And to this pertains, Cardinal Tarquini adds on page 38, the decree of the Congregation of the Holy Office, in the year 1644, published with the approval of Innocent X, by which the proposition was called schismatic and heretical which affirmed that the Supreme Pontiffs, when they send their constitutions into those places which are subject to the temporal dominion of other Princes, make law in another's territory. This proposition Clement XI again reproved and condemned in the constitution *Accepimus*, January 11, 1715.

563. You will say, II: If in the same territory a twofold perfect society, ecclesiastical and civil, exercised its jurisdiction, frequent conflicts would arise between the two. But an ordering of this kind cannot be admitted. Therefore. I answer: 1. indirectly. If the argument had any force, as Cardinal Tarquini wisely notes, it would have force for stripping civil society of its power, because it is absurd that more account should be taken of temporal happiness, which is the end of civil society, than of eternal life, which is the end of the Church. I answer: 2. directly. Distinguish the major: conflicts would arise from the very nature of the thing, denied; through the fault of men, subdistinguish: in such a way that there is a reason for composing these conflicts, granted; in such a way that there is no way to compose them, denied. Now that cannot be said to be ordered by nature which produces evil from its own nature. But if evil proceeds from the fault of men, that in no way proves that something is not ordered by nature, since there is no good which man cannot abuse. In this case, right ordering requires only that there be a suitable means for avoiding or repairing the evil. Now the objected conflicts do not arise from the very nature of that twofold power; for each has its own proper end, and one is subordinated to the other. Therefore they arise from the fault of men, especially, namely, of the civil magistrate, since it is known, says St. Ambrose in the letter to his Sister, that "Emperors are more desirous of the Priesthood than Priests of empire." But the very subordination of one society to the other provides the way of composing conflicts that have arisen.

564. You will say, III: It is an axiom: "a state within a state is repugnant." But there would be a state within a state if, in the same territory, the Church and civil society, each as a perfect society, were dominant. Therefore. I answer by distinguishing the major: "A state within a state is repugnant with respect to the same end, granted; with respect to a diverse end, subdistinguish: if the question is of ends absolutely opposed, granted; if of ends opposed accidentally, distinguish again; if they are in no way coordinated, let it pass; if they are coordinated, denied." This difficulty is almost the same as the preceding one. Therefore let it be retained that the end of the Church is diverse from the end of civil society, and therefore that, in the same territory and with respect to the same persons, a different jurisdiction is exercised by each; that those same ends are not opposed to each other, but mutually assist one another, as St. Augustine shows in letter 5, otherwise 138, to Marcellinus, and Leibniz himself in the censuring letter against Pufendorf, section 6; and finally that those same ends are coordinated with each other, and therefore that the exercise of each power can be rightly ordered. And the difficulty vanishes. The remaining difficulties will be solved more suitably where there will be discussion of the coercive power of the Church.

Article 10. What the Relation of the Church Is to the Remaining Societies

565. Since from the matters disputed above the character of ecclesiastical society ought to be well known to us, we can now easily define in what rank the Church of Christ stands with respect

to the other societies. In this matter there is a wonderful analogy between the errors concerning Christ the Redeemer, in whom two distinct natures come together in the unity of person, and the errors concerning the Church, in which we perceive a certain continuation of the Incarnation, as in numbers 411 and following, and which, coordinated with the remaining societies, constitutes one supreme economy. (1)

566. But in order that the limits of our question may be defined beforehand, and those things which are of easier solution or do not belong to this place may be dispatched in a few words, it is better to note certain things in advance. And: 1. all societies, as we indicated above, are easily reduced to the Church and civil society. For a society is specified by its end; but the end, or good, toward which men can strive with united powers, is either temporal happiness, and then civil society is had; or eternal happiness, and then the Church is had. Wherefore, since all the other ends are contained under that twofold happiness, temporal and eternal, all societies are comprehended under the two aforesaid. (1) For, "as regards Christ," says Schrader, in *On Roman Unity*, book 1, number 50, "some, erring, 1. denied the divine hypostasis assuming, namely the Gentiles with the impious Jews; 2. others denied the human nature assumed, namely the Docetae and Phantasiasts; 3. others overthrew the relation intervening between God assuming and the humanity assumed, a. either by separation, as the Nestorians; or b. by confusion, as the Eutychians, whereby they imagined in diverse ways that the humanity had been absorbed by the deity; or on the contrary c. by corruption, whereby they deprived the assumed humanity now of this, now of that natural perfection and property, or contended that the nature of the assuming Word of God was almost absorbed by the human condition while supplying those parts, as the Apollinarians, Arians, Monophysites, and Monothelites; just as finally 4. others reject the whole economy of Christ among fables and myths." Similarly, "as regards redeemed humanity gathered into the society of Christians, by some 1. the saving authority of the Church of Christ is denied, to which every society and power of men is subject and subordinated in the business of salvation, compare Suarez, *On Laws*, book 3, chapter 6, number 3, and book 4, chapters 8-9, as by the paganism of the ancient Gentiles and those unbelievers and impious persons who relapse into it; by others 2. the very society of men corresponding to that civil power is excluded, once civil power is overthrown, for, they say, one must obey God alone, as Judas the Galilean in Suarez, *On Laws*, book 3, chapter 5, and thus the reformers from the beginning; by others 3. the relation of conjunction intervening between the Church of Christ and civil society is overthrown, concerning which see Suarez, *On Laws*, book 4, chapter 9, number 3, whether by a. the introduction of separation, according to the Donatist saying: What has the emperor to do with the Church? To this belongs Machiavellianism, concerning which see Suarez, *On Laws*, book 3, chapter 12, establishing that society should care neither for religion nor even morals, but only for its own happiness and therefore justice; hence there comes forth what they call a society of mere right, in which the law is established as atheistic; or by b. the introduction of a confusion of powers, whereby either they think the temporal power absorbed by the spiritual, concerning whom see Suarez, in the cited place, book 3, chapters 6-11, or they mix the spiritual with the temporal, as in what they call territorialism with Caesarean papism, to which Suarez refers in the cited place, book 5, chapters 8-9, and *Defense of the Orthodox Faith against the Errors of the Anglican Sect*, book 3, and Becanus, volume 3, *On the Primacy of Kings*; or by c. corruption brought sometimes upon the civil power, which they declare to be nothing without supernatural piety, as the Waldensians, Wycliffites, Hussites, and the following phantasiasts and mystics, concerning whom see Suarez, *On Laws*, book 3, chapter 10; sometimes upon the ecclesiastical authority, which they despoil and deprive of its prerogatives and rights over subjects, to which tend the systems of Febronianism, Gallicanism, Josephinism, and manifold court-theory and libertinism; finally by others 4. the whole reason and explanation of Christian society is held as the greatest calamity, and almost plague, of human happiness." 2. Those societies which are comprehended under the Church, as parts of it, insofar as they have the very end of the Church partially or under some special aspect, are called homogeneous with respect to it; but those which are proper parts of civil society, insofar as they partially pursue its very end as their own, are called heterogeneous societies with respect to the Church. 3. No one can doubt that homogeneous societies are

subject to the Church, since parts are subject to the whole whose parts they are. Nor can it in any way be doubted that heterogeneous societies have the same order toward the Church as civil society itself has. Therefore the whole question here is reduced to the relation between the Church and civil society. 4. But civil society is either: a. a society of unbelievers, namely of those who were never subjected to the Church through baptism; or b. of heretics or schismatics, who were subjected to the Church through baptism, but have been separated from it; or c. of Catholics, who both received baptism and remain joined to the Church and obey it. Hence it could be asked what the relation of the Church is to this threefold civil society.

567. But the things which pertain to the societies of unbelievers or of heretics can be indicated at once. For: 1. with regard to unbelievers, it is established that they are in no way of the Church of Christ. "For what have I to do," says the Apostle in 1 Corinthians 5.12 and following, "with judging those who are outside? Do you not judge those who are inside? For those who are outside God will judge." Wherefore: a. the Church can indeed and must announce the faith even among unbelieving nations, as in numbers 489 and 499; but it cannot use those means which it uses or can use toward subjects. b. Any obstacle opposed by unbelieving nations to the preaching of the Gospel is illegitimate and unjust; and therefore, exercising its mission, the Church rightly repeats that saying in Acts 5.29: "It is necessary to obey God rather than men." c. Therefore only inculpable ignorance will be able to excuse unbelievers if they persecute the ministers of the Gospel; but in itself this persecution is unjust. 2. With regard to heretics, Bellarmine rightly teaches in *On the Church*, book 3, chapter 4, that they are not of the Church, but pertain to the Church; or, that they are not members of the Church, but are subjects of the Church. This will become clearer below. In reality, everyone is subjected to the Church through baptism, which certainly remains in heretics; nor because they fall into the crime of heresy are they withdrawn from subjection to the Church. Hence the Church could in itself take action against them as against subjects. Compare Suarez, *On Laws*, book 4, chapter 18; Bellarmine, *On the Members of the Church*, book 3, chapter 21. I said "in itself," because power must be distinguished from its exercise. From what has been said, power always belongs to the Church; but its exercise could sometimes be impeded, insofar as, the circumstances being considered, it would turn not to edification, but to destruction. The judgment concerning this matter is left to the Church itself; and experience itself establishes that sometimes the Church has not wished to oblige heretics by its laws. You have an example in Benedict XIV, constitution *Singulari*, February 9, 1749.

568. It remains only, therefore, that we investigate the relation of the civil society of Catholics to the Church. We consider, namely, a society whose members, while under the rule of the civil magistrate they direct their powers toward seeking temporal happiness, at the same time under the rule of the Church strive to acquire sanctity and eternal life. But since the Church teaches that eternal life is the supreme end, to which all temporal life must be subject, it is necessary for it to profess that temporal happiness is subordinated to eternal happiness. Wherefore the civil society of Catholics is called "an assembly of men who so devote themselves to seeking temporal happiness that they profess that it ought to be subject to the pursuit of eternal happiness, which they believe can be obtained only under the rule of the Catholic Church."

569. Now a threefold relation of this civil society to the Church can be conceived; for either: 1. it is said to be equal to the Church; or 2. superior to it; or 3. inferior to it. But if the Church and civil society were equal, there could be no subordination of one to the other, just as there is no subordination of one perfect civil society to another of the same order. Hence they would not so much be distinct societies as separated societies. Certain more recent political writers indeed affirm this; and to this pertains proposition 55 condemned in the *Syllabus*: "The Church is to be separated from the State, and the State from the Church." The things which we said in the preceding thesis sufficiently show that civil society is not superior to the Church; and the same will be confirmed from the things soon to be said. It remains, therefore, that the Church be said to be superior to civil society, and consequently that the latter be subordinated to it.

570. This doctrine needs to be clarified before it is established. And: 1. a twofold subordination must be distinguished here, direct and indirect. Direct subordination is had when the inferior society, in all its acts concerning its own proper end, is so subject to the superior society that the latter can make those acts void or valid. Indirect subordination, however, is had when the superior society can exercise jurisdiction over the inferior only insofar as the necessity of its own end and its own preservation requires this. The former subordination cannot belong except to inferior homogeneous societies, nor can it of itself fall upon a perfect society. We therefore assert the indirect subordination of the civil society of Catholics with respect to the Church. 2. This indirect subordination can be considered negatively and positively. Insofar as it is negative, it requires that civil society, even within the limits of its own proper object, can do nothing which redounds to the harm of the Church; in this matter it must acquiesce in the judgment of the Church itself. But insofar as that subordination is positive, it requires that civil society must furnish to the Church those helps which the Church itself judges necessary for, or conducive to, its own proper end.

571. In order that these things may become clearer, let us observe that the Church is indeed a spiritual society by reason of its end, yet it also requires material means, since it is a society of men, who are not pure spirits, as in number 477. But these temporal means, considered individually, sometimes serve the end of civil society without being necessary for the proper end of the Church; and in these the Church has no power. But sometimes those same temporal or material things have a connection both with the proper end of civil society and with the proper end of the Church; and therefore a collision can arise between the rights of each. (1) The error of these writers is thus described by His Eminence Cardinal Pie, Bishop of Poitiers, in the third instruction, works, volume 5: "The most moderate are certainly those who, accepting the presence and authority of Jesus Christ in the order of private and religious things, exclude him only from public and temporal things. The Word, of whom St. John tells us energetically that 'he was made flesh,' they wish to have taken hold of humanity only on the spiritual sides; and while the Creed teaches that 'he descended from heaven and was incarnate for men,' that is, for beings essentially composed of a body and a soul and called to social life, they insinuate that the consequences of the incarnation have relation only to individuals taken outside civil and public life. From this comes a formal separation between the duties of the Christian and the duties of the citizen," etc. Thus, for example, the Church could open to all access to the clerical state, while civil society might except some classes of men, as in the time of St. Gregory the Great, Maurice excepted soldiers, and Marcian excepted certain men detained by fixed public offices. Likewise, the Church can except clerics from certain civil duties, although the political power might wish to subject them to the same. The Church could prohibit mixed marriages, which nevertheless the civil power, judging that they conduce to the wealth or multiplication of associates, might permit. The Church could prescribe certain feast days which nevertheless the republic might not wish to acknowledge, and so forth. In these and all similar cases, if civil society is indirectly subject to the Church, it must finally yield to it. "Attending to these things," says John, Archbishop of Canterbury, to Edward, King of England, in the year 1281, as cited by Mansi, *Councils*, volume 24, page 426, "the Catholic Emperors subjected all their laws to the sacred canons, lest they be thought schismatics or heretics. Therefore, since the illustrious peace of the empire pertains to you, most excellent lord king, you also are bound to subject your laws to the canons and to abolish contrary laws."

572. The Church has often asserted this doctrine; and Bouix, *On the Pope*, part 4, section 3, reports six Roman Pontiffs before St. Gregory VII and twenty-two who followed him, vindicating for themselves the superiority of which we are speaking. Pius IX also condemned in the *Syllabus* this proposition, number 24 in order: "The Church does not have the power of using force, nor any temporal power, direct or indirect."

573. But it is better to weigh more accurately the celebrated constitution *Unam Sanctam*, issued by Boniface VIII in the year 1302, where the Holy Pontiff: 1. establishes the unity of the

Church; 2. infers that its head is one, saying: "Therefore of the one and only Church there is one body, one head, not two heads, as if it were a monster, namely Christ and Christ's vicar, Peter, and Peter's successor; for the Lord says to Peter himself: 'Feed my sheep,' 'my,' he says, and generally, not singularly these or those, by which he is understood to have committed all to him." 3. He distinguishes two powers, which he says are in the Church, but in a diverse way: "We are instructed by the Gospel sayings that in this power there are two swords, namely the spiritual and the temporal. For when the Apostles said, 'Behold, here are two swords,' that is, in the Church, since the Apostles were speaking, the Lord did not answer that it was too much, but enough. Certainly he who denies that the temporal sword is in the power of Peter attends badly to the word of the Lord saying: 'Put your sword back into the sheath.' Therefore each is in the power of the Church, namely the spiritual sword and the material. But this latter is to be exercised for the Church, the former by the Church. The former is of the priest, the latter by the hand of kings and soldiers, but at the nod and sufferance of the priest." 4. He teaches the subordination of temporal power to spiritual power: "But it is necessary that sword be under sword and that temporal authority be subjected to spiritual power. For when the Apostle says, 'There is no power except from God, and those which are from God are ordered,' they would not be ordered unless sword were under sword and, as inferior, were reduced through the other into the supreme... For, Truth bearing witness, the spiritual power has to establish the earthly power and to judge it, if it has not been good. Thus concerning the Church and ecclesiastical power is verified the prophecy of Jeremiah: 'Behold, today I have set you over nations and kingdoms,' and the other things which follow. Therefore if the earthly power deviates, it will be judged by the spiritual power; but if the lesser spiritual power deviates, it will be judged by its superior; if, however, the supreme deviates, it will be able to be judged by God alone, not by man." 5. Finally he concludes: "Whoever therefore resists this power so ordered by God resists the ordination of God, unless, like Manichaeus, he invents two principles: which we judge false and heretical; because, as Moses bears witness, God created heaven and earth not in the principles, but in the principle. Moreover, we declare, say, define, and pronounce that for every human creature to be subject to the Roman Pontiff is altogether of necessity for salvation."

574. It is now necessary to note a few things concerning this Constitution, against which all the weapons of the adversaries are directed. And first, it is by no means unknown to us that some recent writers in certain periodical collections have raised doubts concerning the authenticity of this Constitution. Yet their doubts ought not move us. For, to pass over the rest here in silence, it is certain that it was approved and renewed by the Fifth Lateran Council. But this Council could not approve and renew any constitution *Unam Sanctam* issued by Boniface VIII except that which was already known to all, since it had already been inserted in the body of law, whence we have taken it. Therefore, whatever may be the case concerning the autograph, the authority of that Constitution remains altogether entire.

575. Nor, secondly, can there be any doubt for anyone that the Holy Pontiff spoke from the chair, and that this constitution is dogmatic. For: 1. there the Holy Pontiff, as universal Doctor, addresses the universal Church, teaching it doctrinal heads of the greatest moment. 2. He expressly says: "For every human creature to be subject to the Roman Pontiff, we declare, say, define, and pronounce to be altogether of necessity for salvation." 3. The same Constitution was confirmed, as we said, by Leo X in the Fifth Lateran Council, with these words: "Since it exists of necessity for salvation that all Christ's faithful be subject to the Roman Pontiff, as we are taught by the testimony of divine Scripture and the holy Fathers, and as is declared by the constitution of happy memory Boniface VIII, Pope, likewise our predecessor, which begins *Unam Sanctam*; for the salvation of those same souls, and for the supreme authority of the Roman Pontiff and of this Holy See, and for the unity and power of the Church his spouse, we renew and approve the Constitution itself, with the sacred present Council approving." 4. The doctrine which is handed down in the same Constitution is also had from the Fourth Lateran Council in the year 1215 and the First Council of Lyons in the year 1245.

576. After these things, thirdly, it is strange that some now insinuate what Bossuet had already said, namely that Clement V corrected or restricted the constitution of Boniface VIII, since that Pontiff only vindicated it from the false interpretations of those who, to create ill will, seemed to read in the same Constitution what was not there. This is clear from the very words of Clement V: "Hence it is that we wish or intend no prejudice to be generated for the said king [Philip] and kingdom through the definition or declaration of our predecessor of good memory Boniface VIII, Pope, which begins *Unam Sanctam*. Nor that through it the aforesaid king, kingdom, and inhabitants of the kingdom are more subject to the Church than they existed before. But let all things be understood to be in the same state in which they were before the aforesaid definition, both as regards the Church and also as regards the king and kingdom named above." Now Clement V does not teach that the King is not subject to the Church, but that he is not more subject than he existed before the constitution *Unam Sanctam*. But before this Constitution, from the Fourth Lateran Council, the First Council of Lyons, and so forth, there already existed the same subjection which is declared in that Constitution. Therefore.

577. Now, fourthly, it is no less certain that in the same constitution, as is clear to one reading it, the subjection of the civil power to the spiritual power of the Church is expressly taught. Although that alone is truly and properly defined which is contained in those words, "we define... that every human creature... is altogether of necessity for salvation to be subject to the Roman Pontiff," nevertheless it cannot be denied that the examination of the context and of the end for which that definition was issued greatly conduces to attaining the force and breadth of these words. The end, as is historically established, was to restrain the unjust demands of the King of the French, Philippe le Bel; and the context openly treats the subjection of temporal power to spiritual power. Therefore that phrase "for every creature to be subject," etc., must be understood of the subjection of the King even as he is King, so that in those things which he disposes as head of the republic, he is indirectly subject to the Church. Hence the doctrine set forth concerning the superiority of the spiritual power of the Church before the civil power is not a mere opinion; but, unless it is properly and immediately of faith, which nevertheless could be asserted with very grave foundation, it at least certainly pertains to the deposit of Catholic doctrine. Suarez also openly teaches this in *On Laws*, book 4, chapter 9; Bellarmine, *On the Power of the Supreme Pontiff*, chapter 3, and others. (1) **Section II The Proposed Question Is Resolved Proposition XXV.** If the question is asked concerning the relation between the Church and the civil society of Catholics, that relation: 1. does not consist in separation, whereby civil society would hold itself indifferently in those things which pertain to religion; 2. nor in such subjection that in temporal matters and under the respect of the temporal end, civil society would be subject to the Church; 3. but in that subjection by which, in temporal matters also, when the reason or necessity of the spiritual end concurs, civil society must yield to the Church. Therefore the Church is rightly said to be superior to civil society.

578. The first part is proved. I. By recalling the principles established above. For: 1. man cannot be indifferent concerning the true religion; but for Catholics the one true religion is the Church. Therefore Catholics cannot be indifferent concerning the Church. Now it is one and the same man who is both social and religious. Therefore, even insofar as he is a member of civil society, if he is Catholic, he is subject to the Church. Certainly the true religion, or the Christian religion, pervades the whole life of man and determines his duties even as he is social; but it is absurd to imagine in him, as it were, a twofold conscience, one insofar as he is a private man, the other insofar as he is a citizen. For when the question is of one action concerning the same object and regarding the same subject, it is in the concrete either licit or illicit. Compare what was said in number 20 and following. (1) It is worth adding here the testimony of a man by no means suspect in this matter, even though he by no means reports the full doctrine. Dollinger, *History*, volume 4, page 91, writes in the English translation: "It is a truth of faith that all men, even kings, are subject to the Pope; if, therefore, they should be guilty of grievous sins, in peace or in war, or in the government of their kingdoms, and the treatment of their subjects, and should thus lose sight of the object to

which the power of a Christian Prince should be directed, and should give public scandal to the people, the Pope can admonish them, since in regard to sin they are subject to the spiritual power; he can correct them; and, if necessity should require it, compel them by censure to remove such scandals. For if they were not subject to the censures of the Church, whenever they might sin in the exercise of the power entrusted to them, it would follow that as kings they were out of the Church." 2. Society itself, considered formally, cannot be indifferent concerning the true religion; but for Catholic society the one true religion is the Church. Therefore it cannot be indifferent concerning the Church. Hence if society is bound to care for the peace, tranquility, preservation, and increase of the republic; if it cannot attain these goods, which pertain to its proper end, without the true religion, then the civil society of Catholics is bound to be subject to the Church. Compare what was said in numbers 36 and following, and 75 and following. 3. Wherefore, since civil societies are members or parts of the Church, they not only ought to contrive nothing against the Church itself, but are bound positively to concur toward its good. Suppose that they neglect it: since they acknowledge no true religion outside the Church, they will in reality neglect every religion. This is all the more so because, with revealed religion rejected, the very principles and duties of natural religion are obscured or perish, as in number 126 and following. Hence to the civil societies of Catholics, to whom the Church is known and who nevertheless contemn or neglect it, those words of the Apostle in Romans 1.18 and following are deservedly applied, alas, our experience establishes this: "For the wrath of God is revealed from heaven against all ungodliness and injustice of those men who detain the truth of God in injustice; because what is known of God is manifest in them. For God has manifested it to them... When they had known God, they did not glorify him as God or give thanks; but they became vain in their thoughts, and their foolish heart was darkened. For saying themselves to be wise, they became fools." 4. Therefore let us conclude with Becanus, who in *Duel concerning the Primacy of Kings*, book 3, chapter 8, writes: "It must be established against the politicians that Christian kings and princes ought not so to administer their kingdoms and provinces that they cast aside every care of religion and of the Church as though it pertained nothing to them, and usurp that saying of the Donatists, 'What has the emperor to do with the Church?' which Augustine so greatly reproves in book 2 against the letters of Petilian, chapter 92. For this is contrary both to the Sacred Scriptures and to the examples of good kings and to reason itself. In the Sacred Scriptures David, Hezekiah, Jehoshaphat, Asa, and Josiah are praised because they either promoted or restored the worship and religion of God. Their example in the New Testament was imitated by Constantine the Great, Theodosius, Honorius, Charlemagne, Louis, and others. On the contrary, those who contemned religion and faith, Jeroboam, Ahab, Ahaz, and Amon, were not only reproved but also punished. And the reason is that kings who are placed in lofty power, just as they themselves are rightly honored by inferiors, so they ought deservedly to honor God himself, from whom they have obtained power and to whom by natural right they are subject, and to propagate his glory and majesty everywhere."

579. II. The same could be confirmed from the Fathers. But recall the testimonies which we gave in numbers 37, 40, and 82. You will also find others in Bellarmine, *On the Members of the Church*, book 3, chapter 18. But since here the question is with Catholics, it is pleasing to add what the Council of Trent has in session 25, chapter 20, *On Reform*: "The holy Synod... judged that secular princes also should be reminded of their office, trusting that they, as Catholics whom God has willed to be protectors of the holy faith and of the Church, will not only permit its right to be restored to the Church, but will also recall all their subjects to due reverence toward the clergy, pastors, and higher Orders... Therefore it decrees and commands that the sacred Canons and all general councils, and also other Apostolic sanctions issued in favor of ecclesiastical persons and ecclesiastical liberty, and against its violators, all of which it also renews by the present decree, must be observed exactly by all. And for this reason it warns the emperor, kings, republics, princes, and all and each, of whatever state and dignity they may be, that the more abundantly they are adorned with temporal goods and with power over others, the more holily they should venerate those things which are of ecclesiastical right, as the principal things of God and protected by his patronage; nor

should they allow them to be harmed by any barons, nobles, rectors, or other temporal lords or magistrates, and especially by the ministers of those princes; but they should act severely against those who impede its liberty, immunity, and jurisdiction." To this also pertain the things which Gregory XVI taught in the encyclical of September 18, 1832: "Nor could we augur happier things either for religion or for principate from the wishes of those who desire the Church to be separated from the kingdom and the mutual concord of empire with priesthood to be broken. For it is established that that concord, which has always existed favorably and salutarily for both sacred and civil affairs, is feared by lovers of the most shameless liberty." And Leo XIII recently expressed the same in most excellent words in the encyclical letter *Arcanum*, February 10, 1880: "No one doubts that Jesus Christ, the founder of the Church, willed the sacred power to be distinct from the civil, and each to be free and ready for conducting its own affairs; with this added, however, which is expedient for both and which is in the interest of all men, that conjunction and concord should intervene between them; and in those matters which are, though for a different reason, of common right and judgment, the one to which human things have been entrusted should fittingly and suitably depend on the other, to which heavenly things have been entrusted... If the civil authority agrees amicably with the sacred power of the Church, it is necessary that a great accession of utility be made for each. For the dignity of the one is amplified, and with religion going before, rule will never be other than just; but to the other there are supplied the helps of protection and defense for the public good of the faithful."

580. The second part is proved. I. The Church has a right only to those things which pertain to its end, and insofar as they pertain to that end. Therefore, if there are any temporal matters concerning which the civil authority disposes, and these are such that they neither impede the end of the Church nor are required for it, the Church has no right over them; and accordingly civil society, as perfect in its own order, disposes of them without any dependence. The antecedent is clear from the very notion of right, which is power according to reason, as in number 41. But the whole reason of any society consists in its end. Therefore one would dispose without any sufficient reason concerning those things which are foreign to the end.

581. II. But we would delay in vain over the demonstration of this part, since the Church itself expressly asserts the doctrine which is enunciated in it. In reality: 1. Pope St. Gelasius, writing to the emperor Anastasius, says: "As far as the order of public [civil] discipline is concerned, recognizing that the empire has been conferred upon you by heavenly disposition, even the prelates of religion themselves obey your laws." 2. St. Gregory II, in letter 2 to Leo the Isaurian: "As the Pontiff does not have the power of looking into the palace and of conferring royal dignities, so neither does the Emperor," etc. 3. The Fourth Lateran Council, chapter 42: "Just as we will that laymen not usurp the rights of clerics, so we ought to will that clerics not claim for themselves the rights of laymen. Therefore we forbid all clerics that anyone, under pretext of ecclesiastical liberty, should hereafter extend his jurisdiction to the prejudice of secular justice; but let him remain content with the written constitutions and with customs approved hitherto, so that the things which are Caesar's may be rendered to Caesar, and the things which are God's may be rendered to God, by a right distribution."

582. The third part is proved. I. From the Scriptures. For: 1. It is read in Acts 5.28-29: "By commanding we commanded you not to teach in this name; and behold, you have filled Jerusalem with your doctrine, and you wish to bring upon us the blood of that man. But Peter and the Apostles answering said: It is necessary to obey God rather than men." Hence, from this testimony it is clear that the legitimate authority of the Jewish nation wished to impede the preaching of the name of Jesus and the institution of the Church among that nation, and this, as it thought, on account of temporal good and public tranquility, or the proper end of civil society: "you wish to bring upon us the blood of that man." Yet the Apostles judged that this good had to be put after the other, since it came into conflict with the good of a higher order, the proper end of the Church. Therefore. 2. Moreover, this doctrine is inculcated by all those

places of Scripture which teach that every temporal happiness is subject to eternal happiness. Thus, for example, Matthew 6.33 and following: "Seek therefore first the kingdom of God and his justice, and all these things shall be added to you. Therefore do not be solicitous," etc.; and Matthew 5.29 and following: "If your right eye scandalizes you, pluck it out and cast it from you... and if your right hand scandalizes you, cut it off and cast it from you; for it is expedient for you that one of your members perish rather than that your whole body go into hell"; and Matthew 16.26: "For what does it profit a man if he gain the whole world, but suffer the loss of his soul? Or what exchange shall a man give for his soul?" By all these things we are taught that all goods must be abandoned, and all evils tolerated, when this is necessary for preserving holiness and attaining eternal life, or when the proper end of the Church requires it.

583. II. From the Fathers. St. John Chrysostom, on 2 Corinthians, homily 15: "But here there is also another kind of rule, and indeed one more sublime than civil rule. What is it? That which flourishes in the Church, of which Paul also makes mention when he says: Obey your prelates and be subject to them. For this rule is as much more excellent than civil rule as heaven is than earth; and as great as the distinction is between body and soul, so great also is the distance of this rule from that." St. Gregory Nazianzen, oration 17: "Let us submit ourselves both to God and to one another and to those who rule on earth: to God indeed for all causes, to one another on account of the bond of charity, to rulers on account of order... But you also, princes and prefects, the law of Christ has subjected to my rule and throne. For we too wield rule; I add, one both more excellent and more perfect, if indeed it should seem fair for spirit to yield to flesh and heavenly things to earthly things." St. Isidore of Pelusium, book 3, letter 449: "The administration of affairs has been composed from priesthood and kingdom. For although there is a very great difference between the two, since the former is as the soul, the latter as the body, nevertheless they tend to one and the same end, that is, to the salvation of men." Ivo of Chartres, to Henry, King of England, letter 51: "Because all affairs are not otherwise well administered unless kingdom and priesthood have come together into one endeavor, we admonish your Highness with entreaty that in the kingdom committed to you you permit the word of God to run, and that you always consider that the earthly kingdom ought to be subject to the heavenly kingdom, which has been committed to the Church. For just as the animal sense ought to be subject to reason, so earthly power ought to be subject to ecclesiastical government. And as much as the body is worth, unless it is ruled by the soul, so much is earthly power worth, unless it is informed and ruled by ecclesiastical discipline." Hugh of St. Victor, book 2, *On the Sacraments*, part 2, chapter 4: "Earthly power has the king as its head; spiritual power has the Supreme Pontiff. To the power of the King pertain the things which are earthly, and all things made for earthly life. To the power of the Supreme Pontiff pertain the things which are spiritual, and all things assigned to spiritual life. But as much as spiritual life is more worthy than earthly life, and spirit than body, by so much spiritual power precedes earthly or secular power in honor and dignity." Compare also the things which we gave in number 560.

584. III. From the consensus of theologians. St. Thomas, *Summa Theologiae*, second-second part, question 60, article 6, reply to objection 3: "It must be said that secular power is subject to spiritual power, as the body to the soul; and therefore the judgment is not usurped," etc. But St. Bonaventure has the same in book 1, *On the Ecclesiastical Hierarchy*, part 2; and, to omit the rest, the theologians of the Council of Constance have the same in the appendix to the Council of Constance, number 23, to article 12: "Nor is it lawful for such a cleric to appeal from the ecclesiastical judge and forum to the temporal judge and forum, since this is to appeal from the greater to the lesser. For just as spirit is related to body, and the realm of spirit to the realm of body, so proportionally is the ecclesiastical judge related to the earthly judge, and the ecclesiastical forum to the temporal forum, as the venerable Hugh of St. Victor says, and Alexander of Hales, and other doctors and sacred canons." Compare, if you please, Bouix, *On the Pope*, volume 3, pages 90-94.

585. IV. From reasons, which we shall indicate from Suarez, who in *On Laws*, book 4, chapter 9, writes: "Just as man would not be rightly composed unless the body were subordinated to the soul, so neither would the Church be suitably instituted unless the temporal power were subjected to the spiritual... Where there is one body, there must be one head, to which all things may in some way be referred; since otherwise there could be neither peace nor perfect unity in the body. But the Church of Christ is one body, as we have said. Therefore, although in it there are several powers or magistracies, it is necessary that they have subordination among themselves, so that they may in some way be referred to one because of the reason just given. Therefore either the spiritual power is subordinated to the temporal, or the contrary. The first cannot be said; for, as the Pontiff there brings forward from Paul: 'The things which are from God are ordered'; but it would be a perverse order if spiritual things were subject to temporal things. Therefore the second must necessarily be said." And in *Defense of the Faith*, etc., book 2, chapter 22, he says: "Each power, temporal and spiritual, insofar as they exist in the Church, ought to have been so conferred and possessed that they may profit the common good and salvation of the Christian people. Therefore it is necessary that these powers observe some order among themselves; otherwise peace and unity could not be preserved in the Church. For temporal advantages are often opposed to spiritual advantages; and therefore either there will be just war between each power, or one must yield to the other, so that all things may be rightly ordered. Therefore either the spiritual power will be under the temporal, or the contrary. The first neither can be said nor thought according to right reason, because all temporal things must be ordered to a spiritual end. Therefore it must be said on the contrary that temporal power is subject to spiritual power, lest it deflect from its end. For powers are subordinated as ends also are." But it is preferable to consult these places of the outstanding Doctor, and also the excellent things which Taparelli writes on this matter in *Essay*, etc., numbers 1419-1429.

586. Scholion. It is useful to solve the principal difficulties. Hence, you will say first: The Church is in the commonwealth, and not the commonwealth in the Church. Therefore the Church depends on the State, and not the State on the Church. I respond by distinguishing the antecedent: The Church is in the commonwealth as a part in the whole, I deny; as the soul in the body, I concede. Certainly, since the Church is broader than any civil society, for it is catholic, the Church cannot be held as a part of civil society, or as materially existing in some civil society. For the same reason, since the end of the Church is supreme, it cannot be contained within the limits of the proper end of civil society; and therefore the Church is not formally a part of civil society. Therefore if it is in the commonwealth, according to the likeness already set forth from the doctrine of the Fathers and Doctors, it is as the soul is in the body. But the soul is not inferior to the body. Therefore. Compare Liberatore, *The State and the Church*, chapter 1, article 3.

587. You will say secondly: nevertheless that axiom belongs to St. Optatus, who, in book 3 *On the Schism of the Donatists*, says: "The Church is in the commonwealth, not the commonwealth in the Church." Therefore. I respond by distinguishing the antecedent: St. Optatus says that "the Church is in the commonwealth," that is, in the Roman Empire, and insofar as it has the free exercise of its rights in it, I concede; in civil society as such, and insofar as the Church would be a part of civil society and inferior to it, I deny. Moreover, it is impossible that St. Optatus assert that "the Church is in the commonwealth" in the sense that it is subject to it. For the Donatists accused the Catholics of subjecting the Church to the emperor; but St. Optatus, in the same book and in book 1, indignantly removes this calumny. Therefore the common opinion of Catholics and schismatics was that the Church could in no way be subject to civil society. In what sense, therefore, did St. Optatus write that "the Church is in the commonwealth"? The holy Doctor was speaking not of civil society generally, but of the Roman Empire; and he was asserting that the Church was in the Roman Empire insofar as, in that empire, it enjoyed the free exercise of its rights. This is plainly clear from the fact that, reproving Donatus, who had returned curses for thanks to the emperor Constans because of alms sent to be distributed among the poor, he writes: "Already then Donatus was meditating injury

against powers and kings, for whom, if he had listened to the Apostle, he ought daily to have prayed. For thus the blessed Apostle Paul teaches: Pray for kings and powers, that we may live a tranquil life with them. For the commonwealth is not in the Church, but the Church is in the commonwealth," that is, in the Roman Empire, "where there are holy priesthoods, and chastity, and virginity, which are not among barbarian nations; and if they were there, they could not be safe." Hence he distinguishes the Roman Empire from barbarian nations, among whom nevertheless civil society flourished, and in it religion, the Church, virginity, etc.; but since all these things were not freely exercised among them, for this reason St. Optatus denies that the Church is among them. From these things surely it follows: 1. Against what the Regalists contend, according to the mind of St. Optatus, the Church is not in a civil society in which the rights of the Church are not safe, or in which the Church is subjected to civil power. 2. St. Optatus said that "the commonwealth is not in the Church" because at that time the Roman Empire repelled the force of adversaries not by the patronage of the Church, but by its own armies. That is to say, just as the Church was in the commonwealth insofar as it enjoyed its patronage, so the commonwealth was not in the Church because it did not use the Church's patronage. Moreover, Catholic doctrine is not to be taken from the opinion of one Father; nor should one of the Fathers easily be presented as contradicting all the others. But we have seen that the common doctrine of the Fathers is that civil power is indirectly subordinated to the Church, although at the same time they teach that civil power does not have a superior insofar as it is independent in its own order, and therefore is not directly subordinated to the power of the Church: this is proper to any perfect society.

588. You will insist: According to St. Optatus, the Church is in the commonwealth precisely insofar as it needs its protection; but a society which needs the protection of another is inferior to it; therefore the Church is inferior to civil society. The response is made by distinguishing the major: The Church needs protection, which, as a means for its own preservation, it rightly demands from civil power in a society of Catholics, I concede; otherwise, I deny. Therefore: 1. Since the Church can rightfully demand the protection of civil society, so that the judgment concerning whether protection should be granted and what kind should be granted belongs to the Church itself, this rather implies the superiority of the Church, as in number 556. 2. Since the Church can demand protection from civil society for its own preservation, the good of the Church, or the Church itself, is the end. But the end is more excellent than the means. Otherwise civil society would have to be called inferior to its army, whose protection and work it sometimes needs.

589. You will say thirdly: Were not: 1. religious affairs and priests subjected to kings in pagan societies? 2. civil society in the legitimate possession of this right when the Church was founded? 3. Therefore, in order that some society might become Catholic, it would be necessary to diminish its rights; but this is odious. I respond openly that difficulties of this kind are futile, and therefore it is enough for them to be scattered in a few words. Hence, to the first I say that whether it can be absolutely affirmed that, among the Gentiles, sacerdotal power was subject to kings may be seen in Lessius, *Defense of the Power of the Supreme Pontiff*, part 2, section 1, article 12. For us it is enough to observe that it is impious and absurd to draw an argument from the superstition of the pagans against the Church. In reality the end of the Church is supernatural, and therefore exceeds the proper end of civil society; but on the other hand the whole religion of the pagans served the temporal good of the civil principate. Hence it is read in *On the Government of Princes*, part 1, chapter 16: "The priesthood of the Gentiles and the whole worship of divine things was for the sake of temporal goods, which are ordered to the common temporal good of the multitude, the care of which rests upon the king. Hence the priests of the Gentiles were suitably subjected to kings." Christ, the founder of the Church, certainly did not designate kings as pastors of the Church. To the second: leaving aside those things which show that the Church, under the generic concept, is older than any civil society; leaving aside also those things which show that after Christ all are bound to embrace the Church instituted by him, and therefore, objectively speaking, societies are constituted outside the Church only by injustice; we observe only that the Church was founded by Christ, who is God, and consequently that civil society could legitimately be despoiled of some right which perhaps it previously possessed. To the third: even if it is

granted that civil societies lose some rights if they are aggregated to the Church, still nothing odious follows from this, since at the same time they are increased by the greatest goods, as in number 603. Compare also the objections which we solved above, in number 85 and following.

Article 11. Which Persons Are Members of the Church

590. In order that we may complete this question concerning the constitution of the Church, it remains only that we discuss something concerning the members of the Church. But since this question is very complex, in order to consult both clarity and brevity, we divide it, as it were, into two parts. One of these includes questions either debated among Catholic doctors or to be treated directly below; the other includes those heads of doctrine which we all here defend against heretics. We briefly weigh the former in this first section; the rest we shall establish in the following section.

591. I. No one is unaware that there are several different opinions among Catholics when the members of the Church are being discussed. In order that the cause of this disagreement may become known, and at the same time that the way may be indicated for reconciling discordant opinions, although the discrepancy seems to be rather of name than of reality, certain things must be noted beforehand.

592. And first, it must be recalled that, in number 421, from St. Thomas and Bellarmine, we established this: among those who in some way are of the Church, some pertain to it more perfectly, others less perfectly, according as they participate more or less in those elements by which the Church itself is constituted. For understanding this better, that also helps which we then touched upon concerning the definitions of the Church, in number 400 and following, and which we established beforehand concerning the soul and body of the Church, in number 410 and following.

593. Now secondly, when in the present question it is asked who are, and ought to be reckoned, members of the Church, the discourse is not properly about living and perfect members. For such, according to all Catholics, are only those who have sanctifying grace and through Baptism have entered the Church and have not been cut off from it by legitimate authority. Rather, the discourse is principally about those who pertain to the body of the Church, which alone, properly and strictly speaking, can have members, and these either living through charity, or imperfect and in a certain way dead. Indeed, it has been noted in numbers 403 and 463 that the Church, named simply and without addition, is understood according to the body, or according to that which is per se visible; for things are denominated simply according as they are external and appear. Hence in this sense, namely according to the body, the Church is taken in Matthew 3.12; 13.47; 22.2; and elsewhere passim; and among the Fathers: Cyprian, book 3, letter 3; Augustine, in the *Breviculus Collationis*, book 3, chapter 9; Nazianzen, in oration 1; Chrysostom, on Psalm 39; Fulgentius, book *On Faith*, chapter 43; Gregory, homilies 11 and 38 on the Gospels; and in the sacred canons almost everywhere, since they were composed to govern the Church insofar as it is an external body, which is subject to external government.

594. But thirdly, even when the question is restricted to the members of the body of the Church, there can still be some disagreement. For the body of the Church, as we said in number 415, consists of several elements, as it were, of which some can possess all, others only some. Yet the principal ones which must be attended to here are reduced to three: namely, to the faith authentically announced and received in baptism; to the communion of the same sacraments; and to subjection to legitimate pastors, especially the Roman Pontiff.

595. Nevertheless, fourthly, in order that we may keep the correct manner of speaking when the members of the body of the Church are under discussion, we must remember that the Church is, from the institution of Christ, a true society. Hence that seems to be required and sufficient in order that someone be called a member of the Church which is required and sufficient in order that someone

be called a member of any society. Now in any society, in order that someone be reckoned to pertain to it in some way, this one thing suffices: that he not break the external bonds by which he is bound to that society. Imagine someone positively, but only internally, wholly falling away from the very end of the society; suppose also that in the hidden places of his soul he pursues the society with hatred and plots rebellions against it. Not for this reason does he seem to have become wholly foreign to the society, namely internally and externally, although he certainly is a member not only useless and dead, but even rebellious. But if he also externally withdraws his former association, by renunciation or by manifest rebellion, then he will be held as altogether separated from the society. And rightly indeed is the matter so judged. For if judgment concerning the persevering association of the members of a society depended upon some merely internal element, we would be ignorant of the true members of the society, or at least we would be in doubt concerning them. But who does not see that from this the mutual rights and duties of the members would totter, the exercise of power would be rendered difficult or impossible, and the whole order of society would be overturned from the foundations?

596. Therefore one must reason similarly concerning the Church of Christ. For although all things are naked and open to the eyes of God, and men cannot scrutinize the internal thoughts and affections of others, nevertheless, in the matter with which we are dealing, it is not enough that God cannot err or be confused. Rather, it is altogether necessary that neither should those be able to err in whom, and for whom, the Church has been instituted. That is to say, men must visibly govern the Church in the place of Christ, and men must embrace the Church and obey it. Therefore the true members of the Church must also become known to men.

597. II. Having these principles before our eyes, we approach the individual questions. Therefore it is asked first concerning catechumens. Suarez, *On Faith*, disputation 2, section 1, number 20, simply affirms that they are members of the Church; Bellarmine teaches that they are members of the Church only potentially; Valentia, according to merit; Billuart, in vow; Tanner, by vow and merit; etc.

598. But if the discourse is about the soul of the Church, it seems that it must be said that catechumens pertain to it perfectly or imperfectly, according as they are adorned with faith alone, or also with hope and charity. St. Augustine favors this opinion; in tractate 12 on John and book 1 *On the Creed*, he says that catechumens are in the Church. And in tractate 12 on John and book 2 *On the Creed*, he affirms that catechumens are considered by the Church as children conceived and not yet born, but afterwards to be brought forth into the light through baptism.

599. But if the discourse is about the body of the Church, catechumens are excluded from the Church, and accordingly, according to the principles established, they cannot properly be called members of the Church. For this: 1. is insinuated by the Council of Florence, in the decree for the Armenians, saying: "Baptism holds the first place of all the sacraments, which is the gate of spiritual life; for through it we are made members of Christ and of the body of the Church." And the Council of Trent, session 14, chapter 2: "It is certainly established that the minister of Baptism ought not to be a judge, since the Church exercises judgment upon no one who has not first entered into it through the gate of Baptism." 2. The Fathers teach the same; among whom St. Gregory Nazianzen, oration 40, says: "As long as you are in the number of catechumens, you are in the vestibule of piety. You must enter, pass through the court, behold the holy things, see through into the Holy of Holies, be joined with the Trinity." St. Chrysostom, homily 34 on John: "A catechumen is foreign to a believer: he does not have the same principle, not the same parent, not food, not clothing, not table, not camp, not house, nothing common." St. Cyril of Alexandria, book 12 on John, says that catechumens are among Christians what the uncircumcised were among the Jews, who could not eat the Paschal lamb. 3. Reason confirms the same. For none of the three principal bonds by which, as we said in number 594, we are joined to the body of the Church exists in catechumens. But especially Baptism is the gate through which access to the Church is opened to the faithful, according to that saying in 1

Corinthians 12.13: "In one Spirit we were all baptized into one body, whether Jews or Gentiles, whether slaves or free." Therefore catechumens, who certainly have not yet received Baptism, have not yet entered the Church, and therefore do not pertain to it.

600. III. Public heretics certainly are not members of the Church. This is established: 1. From the Scriptures. For concerning them it is said in 1 John 2.19: "They went out from us... if they had been of us, they would surely have remained with us"; that is, they have been placed outside the congregation of the faithful. And in Titus 3.10 Paul commands: "A heretical man, after one and a second correction, avoid, knowing that one who is such is subverted and sins, being condemned by his own judgment." But the Apostle would not command a heretic to be avoided by a bishop if that man still in any way pertained to his flock. 2. It is established from the Fathers; among whom St. Jerome, in the dialogue against the Luciferians, writes: "If anywhere you have heard that those who are said to be of Christ are named not from the Lord Jesus Christ, but from someone else, as for example Marcionites, Valentinians, Montanists, etc., know that it is not the Church of Christ, but the synagogue of Antichrist." St. Augustine, sermon 5: "There are certain of those who are called Christians, and are not, whom the Church has partly digested, as dung; such are all heresies and all schisms." And in sermon 1 *On the Creed to the Catechumens*, chapter 1: "All heresies have gone out from that Church, as useless branches cut off from the vine." 3. It is established from reason. For, with faith lost, hope and charity also are lost; and therefore, first of all, heretics certainly are not of the soul of the Church. But since the question concerns public heretics, they do not have the external bond of profession of the same faith, of subjection to legitimate pastors, etc.; and therefore they must not be said to be of the body of the Church either.

601. Yet you will say: The Church has a right over heretics, and has sometimes exercised it by punishing them, as in number 567; but no one can have jurisdiction over outsiders; therefore heretics are of the Church. I respond: The Church has jurisdiction over heretics not because they are actually members of the Church, but because through Baptism they have been made subjects of the Church, and their crime ought not to furnish them protection. Just as a sheep pertains to the sheepfold from which it has fled, insofar as it is to be led back to it; a military deserter pertains to the king under whose standard he fought; a fugitive slave ought to return to the master whom he deserted: so also the heretic. Hence St. Augustine, book 1 *On Baptism*, chapter 15, says: "Indeed the Church brings forth all through Baptism, whether with herself, that is, from her own womb, or outside herself from the seed of her husband; whether from herself, or from the handmaid." He declares this by examples of those born from the handmaids of Abraham and Jacob, and then adds: "Just as among them, whoever are born are born by the right of the Church, which is in Baptism; but if they agree with their brothers, through the unity of peace they come to the land of promise, not to be cast again from the maternal womb, but to be acknowledged in the paternal seed. But if they persevere in discord, they pertain to the lot of Ishmael."

602. You will also say: Even public heretics who have been initiated in the Church of God by Baptism and sacred Orders retain the proper character of these sacraments. Therefore they are of the Church. I respond by denying the consequence; for otherwise even the damned, who in life professed the Catholic religion and retain the character of Baptism and Confirmation, would pertain to the Church. But these certainly are members of Christ neither actually nor potentially; nor can one who is in no way a member of Christ be a member of the Church, which is the body of Christ. Therefore the sacramental character by itself does not have the force of uniting a man with Christ the Head, but is only a sign of a power and of a certain union which certainly preceded, although it no longer perseveres.

603. You will say further: Those who have true sacraments are in the Church of Christ, for Christ handed true sacraments to this alone. But heretics have true sacraments. Therefore they are in the Church of Christ. I respond: Those sacraments which heretics retain in their sect are like spoils which they carried away with them when departing from the Church, but which pertain to the Church. A fugitive

slave can carry off with him the money of his master; a soldier can carry away the standard of the emperor. But as these are not for that reason of the household or army, so neither are heretics of the Church. But now enough concerning public heretics, concerning whom the discourse will return below.

604. IV. With regard to hidden heretics there are three opinions. The first, which Suarez follows in *On Faith*, disputation 9, section 1, number 3, with others, denies that they are members of the Church. The second, which Dens holds, number 71, 5, affirms that they are members of the Church, provided they are not also external heretics. The third, by far the more common, which Bellarmine teaches, book 3, chapter 10, Cornelius a Lapide on Ephesians 6.16, etc., affirms it.

605. According to this third opinion hidden heretics are members of the Church, but dead and dry ones. In this, however, they differ from impious believers: that these are not only of the body of the Church, but also in some way of the soul, since, although lacking charity, they nevertheless retain faith; whereas hidden heretics can in no way at all be said to be of the soul of the Church, and are only as dead and dry parts of the body, utterly destitute of the sense of spiritual life. They are not members of the Church in the order of its life, which they do not participate in; but they are members of the Church in the order of an instrument, insofar as, if, for example, they have jurisdiction, they do not lose it until their heresy becomes manifest.

606. They prove this opinion: 1. From Scripture; for it is read in 1 John 2.19: "They went out from us, but they were not of us; for if they had been of us, they would surely have remained with us." The discourse here is about heretics, for the appellation "antichrists" is proper to them, and certainly in this epistle it is attributed to those who are opposed to the faith. But St. John says that they, before they went out, were not of us, that is, were not Catholics in mind and will; and yet he says that they went out from us. Therefore they were in some way in the Church, namely through the external profession of faith and subjection to legitimate pastors. Hence St. Augustine, tractate 61 on John, number 2, says: "Both are true, both from us and not from us; according to one thing from us, according to another thing not from us." 2. From the manner of speaking of the Fathers. St. Augustine, tractate 3 on the epistle of John, says: "Many are inside, they have not gone out, and yet they are antichrists... those who are inside certainly are in the body of our Lord Jesus Christ, while his body is still being healed, and perfect health will not be until the resurrection of the dead," etc. And in the book *On Catechizing the Uninstructed*, chapter 7: "There are those who for this reason wish to be Christians, so that either they may gain favor with men from whom they expect temporal advantages, or because they do not wish to offend those whom they fear," that is, those who become Christians feignedly and not sincerely, and therefore remain hidden unbelievers. "But these are reprobate; although for a time the Church bears them, just as the threshing floor supports the chaff until the time of winnowing. If they do not correct themselves and begin to be Christians on account of the future eternal rest, in the end they will be separated. Nor should they flatter themselves because they can be on the threshing floor with the wheat of God; because they will not be in the barn with it, but are destined for the fire due to them." Bellarmine collected more passages in the same place. 3. From reason, which follows from the principles established above, number 594. For hidden heretics retain the external profession of faith once authentically received, and external subjection to legitimate pastors; but each person is reckoned to adhere to the Church, a visible society, through these external bonds. Therefore, just as one who is a hidden schismatic does not cease absolutely to be a member of the Church, so neither does a hidden heretic. 4. Hence it is that if a bishop, for example, were a hidden heretic, he would still retain and validly exercise his ordinary jurisdiction. This seems conformable to the things which Celestine wrote to the clergy and people of Constantinople, letter 14 in Gallandi, volume 9: "The authority of our See has openly decreed that no bishop or cleric, or Christian of any profession, who from the time Nestorius or his like began to preach such things were cast down or expelled from their place or communion by Nestorius or by his like, should be seen as either cast down or excommunicated... because one who, preaching such things, did not stand firm, could

cast down no one." Nicholas I has the same, letter 8 to the emperor Michael. 5. Hence there is nothing surprising if this third opinion is common among the Fathers, as Bellarmine shows; more common among the theologians, as all confess; conformable to the principles established, as is clear; and sometimes used by the Church itself, as is inferred from the documents just cited. Nevertheless, a difficulty arises from the bull *Ineffabilis Deus*, in which, after the Immaculate Conception of the Virgin Mother of God has been defined, the Holy Father Pius IX proceeds in this way: "Wherefore, if any should presume, which God avert, to think in their heart otherwise than has been defined by us, let them know and furthermore understand that they are condemned by their own judgment, have suffered shipwreck concerning the faith, and have fallen away from the unity of the Church; and for this reason, by their very own deed, they subject themselves to the penalties established by law, if they should dare to signify by word or writing or any other external mode what they think in their heart." But only incidentally does the Holy Father indicate that those have fallen away from the unity of the Church who have presumed to think in their heart otherwise than has been defined; and therefore he does not seem to have wished to settle the question debated among theologians. Indeed, with the judgment of the wiser preserved, that phrase "to have fallen away from the unity of the Church" can be understood of a disposition of mind with respect to the body, and of actual falling away with respect to the soul of the Church.

607. V. With regard to schismatics, there is no doubt to anyone that they are not members of the Church. For this is: 1. The constant doctrine of the Fathers. St. Cyprian, *On the Unity of the Church*, writes: "God is one, and Christ one, and his Church one, faith one, and the people joined together into the solid unity of the body by the glue of concord." The same, letter 59 to Pupianus: "You ought to know that the bishop is in the Church, and the Church in the bishop; and if any are not with the bishop, they are not in the Church." St. Jerome, commentary on chapter 3 of the epistle to Titus: "We judge this to be the difference between heresy and schism: that heresy has a perverse dogma, while schism, on account of episcopal dissension, likewise separates itself from the Church." St. Augustine, book *On Faith and the Creed*, chapter 10: "We believe also the Holy Church, certainly the Catholic Church. For heretics and schismatics also call their congregations churches. But heretics, by thinking false things about God, violate the faith itself; schismatics, however, by unjust divisions, leap away from fraternal charity, although they believe the things which we believe. Wherefore neither do heretics pertain to the Catholic Church, which loves God, nor schismatics, since it loves the neighbor." St. Fulgentius, book *On Faith*, chapter 37: "Hold most firmly... that heretics and schismatics, who finish the present life outside the Catholic Church, are going to go into eternal fire." 2. Reason confirms the same. For the societies of schismatics certainly are not the universal Church, since they were never diffused everywhere; nor can they be held as a part of the universal Church, since at the beginning of the schism either they departed from it or were expelled, and they remain separated. 3. Nor does it stand in the way that mere schismatics retain the true faith. For, from the principles established beforehand, that does not suffice for someone properly and simply to be called a member of the Church. Certainly one who rises up against some human society and withdraws himself from its legitimate authority is in no way reckoned a member of such a society, even if otherwise he does not cast aside its proper end and all its means; indeed, even if he sometimes uses them. Nor is the reasoning concerning catechumens who would have faith alone equal to that concerning schismatics. For although catechumens are outside the body of the Church, they are nevertheless kept from it not contrarily, but negatively, so that by desire they already pertain to the body of the Church; for this reason, as candidates of the society and as already, so to speak, conceived by it, they can rightly be numbered among the soul of the Church. But those who are kept contrarily from the body of the Church can have no agreement or affinity with the Church. But we shall say more concerning schismatics when the discourse will be about the unity of the Church.

608. VI. Now excommunicates must be discussed. It should be noted: 1. the discourse is about major excommunication; 2. it is now almost commonly admitted that those excommunicated by major excommunication, but tolerated, are members of the Church; 3. the question

therefore concerns excommunicates to be avoided. Suarez, with others, simply affirms that excommunicates of this kind are members of the Church, in *On Faith*, disputation 9, section 1, number 14; but Bellarmine, chapter 6, Liberius, number 156, etc., deny it. To others this seems to be a question rather of name than of reality; and Valentia, volume 3, disputation 1, question 1, point 7, section 15, warns: "From that same foundation, namely that there are many and diverse parts of the Christian Church, it can be understood by what reasoning excommunicates, although they are believers, are nevertheless said to have been cut off from the Church, and not to be its members. This indeed is most true if they are understood to have been cut off from that part of the Church which is joined not only by faith, but also by the mutual communication of solemn prayers and suffrages." Nevertheless, since the proper manner of speaking itself must be retained, it seems that one must adhere to the second opinion.

609. In reality it is certain: 1. The Church has the power of cutting off and casting wholly outside itself not only heretics and schismatics, but also other sinners who are guilty of some very grave crime. Therefore it can only be asked whether in fact the Church intends to cut off a member through excommunication. This, however, seems to have to be affirmed. For in the sentence of excommunication issued by the Council of Orange, these words are read: "Violators of the Churches of God, by the authority of God and the judgment of the Holy Spirit, we eliminate from the bosom of Holy Mother Church and from the fellowship of all Christianity until they come to their senses and satisfy the Church." Now here violators of the Churches are expressly said to be eliminated from the bosom of Holy Mother Church; but here no new penalty is inflicted, but an excommunication is pronounced, the effect of which alone is declared more expressly. Therefore, according to the mind of the Church, excommunication eliminates, or separates, from the Church. 2. It is confirmed from Scripture. For it is read in Matthew 18.17: "If he will not hear the Church, let him be to you as a heathen and a publican." Now all confess that the penalty of excommunication is being treated here. But Christ signifies that those who incur this penalty are not of the Church in the way that heathens and publicans are not of the Church; these certainly do not pertain to the Church at all. 3. The Fathers assert this very thing. St. Cyprian, letter 62 concerning Pomponius, writes: "The proud and contumacious are slain by the spiritual sword, when they are cast out of the Church. For neither can they live outside, since the house of God is one, and there can be salvation for no one except in the Church." St. Jerome, on chapter 2 of the epistle to Titus: "A fornicator, adulterer, murderer, and the other vices are driven from the Church by priests. But heretics pronounce sentence upon themselves, departing from the Church by their own choice." St. Augustine, book *On Correction and Grace*, chapter 15, says: "Through excommunication a diseased sheep is separated from the healthy sheep, lest dire contagions creep through more of them."

610. VII. These things having been touched upon, the errors of heretics must now be refuted, as we proposed. These, as we said in number 404 and following, reckon that to the true Church of Christ there pertain either the predestined alone, or the perfect alone, or the just alone. From this principle indeed they easily adorn their rebellion with an honorable appearance; for one who is not of the Church cannot obtain power in the Church. But to no one is it established with certainty that someone, a superior, is predestined, perfect, or just. But if it is shown that sinful believers also are members of the true Church, by that very fact the error of those is overturned who invent a double Church: insofar as one would be composed of the just, the other of sinners. Compare Bellarmine, book 3, chapter 2; also, from the thirty articles of John Hus condemned by the Council of Constance and Martin V, articles 1, 3, and 5; from the propositions condemned in Quesnel, propositions 72-77; and censure 15 from the bull *Auctorem Fidei*. **Section II The Catholic Doctrine concerning the Members of the Church Is Established Proposition XXVI.** Once the genuine nature of the Church of Christ has been perceived, it ought to be established for all that it is composed as of members: 1. neither of all and only the predestined; 2. nor of the perfect alone; or 3. of the just alone. For with the idea of a visible society, which all are bound to enter lest they perish, all those things can in no way be made to agree.

611. The first part is proved. I. Not all the predestined are always members of the Church. For: 1. In no way can one be called a member of the Church who participates in nothing of those things which constitute the soul and body of the Church. But there are many predestined from Jews, Turks, and idolaters, who at some time, before, namely, they acknowledge supernatural revelation or are aggregated to the body of the Church through Baptism, have nothing of those things which constitute the soul or body of the Church. Therefore. 2. Hence it is abhorrent from the whole of Scripture to call all those persons members of the Church as long as they remain in unbelief, Judaism, or even hatred of Christianity. For St. Peter thus addresses the members of the Church, 1 Peter 2.9-10: "But you are a chosen race, a royal priesthood, a holy nation, a people of acquisition, that you may announce the virtues of him who has called you out of darkness into his marvelous light. You who once were not a people, but now are the people of God; who had not obtained mercy, but now have obtained mercy."

612. II. Not only the predestined are members of the Church. For from the things soon to be said in the third part of the thesis, all the faithful of the particular churches of Rome, Ephesus, Corinth, etc., to whom St. Paul gave his epistles, both good and bad, most certainly and most truly were members of the Church of Christ. But nevertheless it cannot be said that all of them were predestined; for this is opposed to the whole tenor of those epistles, in which the Apostle, sharply reproving sinners, not only gives no indication that they are predestined, but manifests his greatest anxiety concerning his own final perseverance and that of the good.

613. III. From the Fathers let us hear one here, St. Augustine, since below we shall present the testimonies of many. The holy Doctor, tractate 45 on John, writes: "According to the foreknowledge of God and predestination, how many sheep are outside, how many wolves inside." And in tractate 122 on John: "By another fishing the Lord signified the Church as it now is. But because he did that at the beginning of his preaching, and this after his resurrection, by this he showed that that catch of fish signified the good and the bad, whom the Church now has; but this one signified only the good, whom it will have eternally, once the resurrection of the dead has been completed at the end of this age." And in book 2 against the letters of Petilian, chapter 47: "Under the same pastures and under one shepherd, both sheep and goats are pastured, until they are separated in order to receive what is due."

614. IV. If the Church were constituted of the predestined alone, it would be invisible and could not be known by men. Hence, since no one is bound to impossibilities, no obligation would urge one to seek the true Church, much less to enter it. Therefore to all the most wicked persons an occasion would be given for withdrawing themselves from the obedience due to legitimate pastors; for they would say that these are not predestined, or at least that this is not established. But those who are not members of the Church cannot possess any authority of commanding and feeding in the Church. These things indeed are opposed to all those things which we established above concerning the true constitution of the Church.

615. The second part is proved. The true Church of Christ must be an assembly of the faithful diffused everywhere and truly catholic. But if imperfect believers, who sin venially, were excluded from it, the Church would not be an assembly of the faithful diffused everywhere or catholic. Therefore. The minor is proved. Christ excepted, who was not capable of sin, and his most blessed Mother, who by a special privilege certainly was immune from every, even the slightest, stain of sin, all the rest, on account of human frailty, sometimes fall into venial sins, according to that saying of James 3: "In many things we all offend"; and 1 John 1: "If we should say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves, and the truth is not in us." Hence St. Augustine rightly says in book 1 against two letters of the Pelagians, chapter 14: "No minister could rightly be ordained in the Church if the Apostle had said, 'if anyone is without sin,' where he said, 'if anyone is without crime'; or if he had said, 'having no sin,' where he said, 'having no crime.' For there are many baptized believers without crime; but without sin I would say no one in this life." We have

dealt with this matter in the treatise *On Grace*, disputation 2, article 5; and furthermore this part of the thesis will be confirmed from the following part.

616. The third part is proved. I. From Scripture. We select two special testimonies. And: 1. It is read in Matthew 18.15 and following: "If your brother shall sin against you, go, correct him... if he will not hear them, tell the Church. If he will not hear the Church, let him be to you as a heathen and a publican." Here certainly the discourse is about the Church which is both visible and the true Church of Christ. But nevertheless sinners are said to be in it, and such sinners that fraternal correction does not suffice for amending them. Indeed they are said to remain in the Church until they are cast out from it by the sentence of the prelate. Therefore. 2. The Corinthian fornicator, in 1 Corinthians 5, certainly sinned gravely; and in the same place the Apostle seems not obscurely to insinuate that there were also other fornicators among the Corinthians. Certainly those many who had unworthily received the Eucharist, eating and drinking judgment to themselves, were sinners, 1 Corinthians 11.29-30. But all these were members of the Church. Therefore. The minor is proved: 1. Certainly the Apostle and the rest of the just faithful were in the Church. But the Apostle himself speaks of those sinners and of the rest as united together among themselves and with himself in one and the same Church: "It is altogether heard among you," he says, "that there is fornication... When you come together into one... one indeed is hungry, but another is drunk... therefore among you many are weak and feeble, and many sleep... therefore, my brothers, when you come together," etc. The Apostle wished that the fornicator be taken away from the midst of the Corinthians, "that he may be taken away from your midst," and he himself ordered him to be excommunicated. Therefore up to that time the fornicator still pertained to the Church.

617. Against this argument they oppose the words of the Apostle, verses 3-5: "I... have already judged... him who has so acted... to hand such a one over to Satan"; from which, they say, it seems to be gathered that the Apostle held the incestuous Corinthian as already cut off from the Church. But the response is: 1. Even if it were said that the Corinthian fornicator was cut off from the Church through the sentence of Paul, nevertheless it would be true that before that sentence, although a known fornicator, he still remained in the Church. 2. But in reality that phrase "I have already judged" does not mean "I have passed sentence," but "I have determined to pass it." For that sentence was passed then when the Corinthian was handed over to Satan. But the Apostle judged that he should hand him over, but had not yet handed him over; afterwards, in the congregation of the Corinthians, he handed him over. Here is the whole context: "I indeed, absent in body but present in spirit, have already judged as though present, him who has so acted, in the name of our Lord Jesus Christ, when you and my spirit have been gathered together, with the power of our Lord Jesus Christ, to hand over to Satan unto destruction." Hence the Protestant interpreters themselves understand the matter in this way, such as Bloomfield, Parkhurst, Robinson, Whitby, etc. Let Rosenmuller stand for all, who writes on this place: "The Apostle did not immediately punish the guilty man, but says that it was his purpose, if the Corinthians continued to fail in their duty, to use his apostolic power, as if he were present, and by the authority of the Lord to drive out the wicked man whom the Church itself was refusing to cast out."

618. II. From Scripture again, by recalling the parables which we indicated in number 463. For the Church is compared: 1. to a threshing floor, Matthew 3.12: "He will thoroughly cleanse his floor, and will gather his wheat into the barn; but the chaff he will burn with unquenchable fire"; 2. to a dragnet, Matthew 13.47: "Again, the kingdom of heaven is like a dragnet cast into the sea, and gathering fish of every kind. When it was filled, drawing it out and sitting by the shore, they chose the good into vessels, but cast the bad outside. So shall it be at the consummation of the age"; 3. to a wedding banquet, into which good and bad entered, who afterwards, when they did not have a wedding garment, were sent into the outer darkness, Matthew 22; 4. to ten virgins, of whom five were prudent and five foolish, Matthew 25. Therefore in the Church there are also sinners and reprobates, who are signified by the chaff, by the bad fish, by the

man not clothed with the wedding garment, and by the foolish virgins. So great was the force of this argument against the Donatists that, according to the testimony of St. Augustine in the *Breviculus Collationis*, chapters 8-9, having been overcome by it, they at last confessed that the bad exist in the Church mixed with the good.

619. III. From the Fathers. And: 1. The Fathers commonly teach the doctrine which we defend here. St. Cyprian, letter 51, writes: "Our faith or charity ought not to be impeded, so that, because we perceive tares to be in the Church, we ourselves withdraw from the Church." St. Chrysostom, on Psalm 39: "Not even the whole Church consists of the perfect; but it also has those who give themselves to leisure and sloth, and embrace a soft and dissolute life, and willingly serve pleasure. And because it is one body, it pronounces these things and those things as from one person." St. Jerome, in the dialogue against the Luciferians: "The ark of Noah was a type of the Church. As in it there were the kinds of all animals, so also in this one there are men of all nations and ways of life. As there were the leopard and kids, wolf and lambs, so here also the just and sinners, that is, vessels of gold and silver dwell together with those of wood and clay." St. Fulgentius, *On Faith to Peter*, chapter 43: "Hold firmly and in no way doubt that the Catholic Church is the threshing floor of God, and that within it, until the end of the age, chaff mixed with wheat is contained; that is, the bad are mingled with the good by the communion of the sacraments." St. Gregory the Great, homily 12 on the Gospels: "In this Church, because the bad are mingled with the good and the reprobate with the elect, it is rightly said to be like the prudent and foolish virgins." 2. But since the adversaries especially abuse the authority of St. Augustine, it is useful to cite at least a few of the innumerable testimonies of the holy Doctor. Therefore in sermon 264, number 5, St. Augustine says: "For forty days the ark floated in the flood, which ark is the Church; made of incorruptible wood. The incorruptible woods are the souls of the saints and of the just. Yet it had clean and unclean animals, because as long as one lives in this age, and the Church is purified through Baptism as through a flood, it cannot but have good and bad; therefore that ark had both clean and unclean. But after Noah went out from there, he made sacrifice to God only from the clean animals. From this we ought to understand that in that ark there are clean and unclean animals, but after this flood God accepts only those who have cleansed themselves. Therefore, brothers, consider this whole time which is seen as standing for forty days. This whole time, as long as we are here, the ark is in the flood: as long as Christians are baptized and are cleansed through water, the ark seems to swim upon the waves." And on Psalm 8, number 13: "Let there come to mind... the threshing floor containing chaff and wheat; and the nets, in which good and bad fish are enclosed; and the ark of Noah, in which there were both unclean and clean animals; and you will see the Church in the meantime during this time until the final time of judgment, containing not only sheep and oxen, that is, holy laymen and holy ministers, but also 'the beasts of the field, the birds of heaven, and the fish of the sea, which walk through the paths of the sea.' For the beasts of the field are most fittingly understood as men rejoicing in the pleasure of the flesh, where they ascend to nothing high, nothing laborious. For the field is the broad way which leads to destruction." And on Psalm 48, number 8, he says: "'As a lily in the midst of thorns, so is my neighbor in the midst of daughters.' Did he say, in the midst of strangers? No, but in the midst of daughters. Therefore there are bad daughters, and among them is the lily in the midst of thorns. And so those who have the sacraments and do not have good morals are both called God's and not God's, and are called his and alien: his, on account of the sacrament; alien, on account of their own vice. So also alien daughters: daughters, on account of the form of piety; alien, on account of the loss of virtue." And in sermon 4 on Jacob and Esau, number 31: "There are bad persons in the Church pertaining to Esau; because they too are children of Rebecca, children of mother Church, born from her womb, and persevering as hairy in carnal sins, yet born from her womb. Therefore they have from the dew of heaven and from the fertility of the earth: from the dew of heaven, all the Scriptures, every divine discourse; from the fertility of the earth, all the visible sacraments. For the visible sacrament pertains to the earth. All these things the good and the bad have in common in the Church." And in sermon 137, number 1: "Jesus Christ... is the Head of the Church, and his body is the

Church, and in his body the unity of members and the joining together of charity exists as health. But whoever has grown cold in charity is sick in the body of Christ. Yet he who has already exalted our head is powerful also to heal sick members, provided that they are not cut off by excessive impiety, but cling to the body until they are healed. For whatever still clings to the body is not of desperate health; but what has been cut off can neither be cared for nor healed." And in book 4 *On Baptism against the Donatists*, chapter 7: "Let us distinguish between those who are evil outside and those who are evil inside."

620. IV. From theological reason. For: 1. Sinners pertain to the body of the Church; for they profess the faith authentically received in Baptism, retain the communion of the same sacraments, and are subjected to the legitimate power of the Church. But these are the bonds by which the body of the Church is joined together, as we said in number 594. 2. They pertain, although imperfectly, to the soul of the Church; for they retain faith, and also hope, unless they have sinned by despair. 3. There exists in the Church the power of remitting sins, which is exercised in the sacrament of penance, through a true judgment and true jurisdiction. But the sacraments are for those who pertain to the Church, and jurisdiction is exercised over subjects. Therefore it is supposed that sinners can be in the Church. But although the very sin of heresy can be remitted through the sacrament of penance, it is nevertheless required that heresy first be abjured, since faith is a necessary disposition for the sacrament. But the state of grace is not required in order that someone receive absolution of sins.

621. Scholion. I. In order that the adversaries may prove that only the predestined pertain to the Church, they bring forward many testimonies of Sacred Scripture and of the holy Fathers, especially of St. Augustine. If the things said in the exposition and proof of the thesis are well retained, almost all of them are easily solved. It will help only to note these things: 1. The Church is compared to the ark of Noah insofar as no one is saved except in the Church, but not insofar as in the Church there are none except those who are to be saved. This latter sense is excluded by the clean and unclean animals which were in the ark and represented the just and sinners. 2. Someone can pertain to some society without truly being informed by its spirit; and according to this he is said not to be of that society, although he adheres to it by external bonds and also by some internal bond, namely faith. 3. Someone can be of the Church, a son of God, a sheep of Christ, either according to predestination or according to present justice; or either by the truth of the end or by the truth of the essence. According to predestination, only those who are to be saved are such; by the truth of the essence all the just are such, and also sinners, although imperfectly. Hence if at some time Christ the Lord, speaking of his sheep in John 10.2, perhaps understands only the predestined, elsewhere all who are in the Church are called sheep, even sinners, according to that saying, for example, in John 21: "Feed my lambs, feed my sheep"; and in Psalm 73: "Your anger was kindled against the sheep of your pasture." Hence also in Matthew 25.32 sheep are separated from goats on the day of judgment. Thus St. Augustine, tractate 45 on John, says: "What is it that I said, how many sheep outside? How many live luxuriously," who will be chaste? "How many blaspheme Christ," who will believe in Christ? "And these are sheep. Nevertheless now they hear an alien voice; they follow strangers. Again, how many inside praise," who will blaspheme? "They are chaste," who will fornicate? "They stand," who will fall? "And they are not sheep: for we are speaking of the predestined." 4. Christ is truly called the Head of the Church, which he will save; but this must be understood: a. in many members, not in all; b. if the discourse is about all, he will save sufficiently, not efficaciously.

622. II. But in order that those things may be solved by which they strive to show that the Church consists either of the perfect alone or of the just alone, besides the things already said, these things must be kept before the eyes. 1. The Church is indeed called wholly beautiful, not having spot or wrinkle, etc.; but this must be understood: a. By reason of its essence, not of all individuals. For just as any commonwealth can be called perfect if it preserves an honorable end, suitable government, just laws, and duly promotes public happiness, although in it there are many members who do not conduct themselves

rightly, so the Church can be said to be wholly beautiful, etc., although some of its members deflect from the right path. b. It must be understood by reason of the term, not by reason of the way. Hence St. Thomas, third part, question 8, article 3, reply to objection 3, says: "It must be said that for the Church to be glorious, not having spot or wrinkle, is the ultimate end to which we are led through the passion of Christ. Hence this will be in the state of the homeland, but not in the state of the way... Such persons, however, sinners, receive from Christ a certain act of life, which is to believe, just as if a mortified member were moved in some way by a man." And St. Augustine, *Retractions*, book 4, chapter 18: "Wherever in these books I have mentioned the Church not having spot or wrinkle, it is not to be taken as if it already is such, but as being prepared to be such, when it will also appear glorious." 2. In a similar way, the Church is called holy; but it is not holy because all its members are holy, as the arguments already given prove. Therefore it is called holy by reason of its end, doctrine, means, invisible Head, some members, destination, etc. Below the proper account of holiness which must be attributed to the Church will be explained better. 3. If at any time St. Augustine, and the same should be said of the other Fathers, seems to restrict the body of the Church to the assembly of the just, this must not be understood of the body of the Church taken adequately, but insofar as it is living and informed by sanctifying grace; that is to say, the Church is denominated from the nobler part. Certainly when the Donatists calumniated the Catholics, saying that they invented two churches, one which contained only the good, another which contained the good mixed with the bad, the Catholics responded, and St. Augustine in the *Breviculus Collationis*, book 3, assented to them, that they in no way set up two churches, but distinguish either parts or times of one Church: parts indeed, because the good pertain to the Church in one way, the bad in another; times, however, because one thing is the state of the Church on earth, another in heaven.

623. III. They also say: 1. It is an axiom: "He who does not have God as father does not have the Church as mother." But sinners do not have God as father, since they are not sons of God. 2. As it is said in Romans 8.9: "If anyone does not have the spirit of Christ, he is not his"; but sinners do not have the spirit of Christ; nor can those who are not Christ's, the Head of the Church, be of the Church. To the first the response is made: Those who in no way have God as father certainly cannot have the Church as mother. But sinners, although they are not actually sons of God by adoption, are nevertheless sons through instruction and doctrine. Hence under one respect they are called sons of the devil, under another, sons of God. Therefore just as they are imperfectly sons of God, so they are imperfectly of the Church. To the second: One who does not have the spirit of Christ is not Christ's insofar as Christ gives life through charity. But if he retains the faith of Christ, he in some way has the spirit of Christ, or receives some influence from Christ the Head, and thus also in some way pertains to the Church. Indeed, insofar as he adheres by external bonds to the mystical body of Christ, which is the Church, he receives some external motion from Christ together with others, just as dry members of a body, because of continuity with the rest of the living and perfect body, have some external motion from the head, or at least do not wither.

624. Since from the preceding disputation the intimate constitution and essence of the Church has become known to us, we now make a step toward investigating its essential properties; for that which follows the investigation of the essence in the examination of any subject is the essential properties which flow from it.

625. But the properties of the Church, as we know from the Constantinopolitan Creed, are reduced to Unity, Sanctity, Catholicity, and Apostolicity. Yet these can be considered under a double respect: namely, insofar as they are merely intrinsic, proceeding from the very essence of the Church; and thus they are called properties, from which we are led to the knowledge of the Church of Christ in the abstract. They can be considered insofar as they are also extrinsic and manifest the true Church of Christ; and thus they are called notes, from which we are led to the knowledge of the Church in the concrete. That is to say, first of all it is asked what properties belong to the true Church of Christ; and the response is that it ought

to be one, holy, catholic, and apostolic. Then, however, it is asked to which one out of so many societies that boast themselves to be the true Church of Christ the said properties belong; and the response is that they can belong only to one, and that the one which is endowed with them is, in the concrete, the true Church of Christ.

626. But in order to acquire an adequate knowledge of the Church for ourselves, it greatly helps to investigate those things which they call endowments, and which are conceived as superinduced upon the Church and adorning it. Such are Indefectibility, Authority, and Infallibility. When these, together with the properties, have been duly established, at the end we shall deal with the notes.

627. Yet it is necessary that we warn one thing: these things which are called properties and endowments truly pertain to the very essence of the Church, if this is considered not a priori, as it could have been, but a posteriori, as it was instituted by Christ. But that manner of speaking, which has obtained almost commonly, and according to which properties and endowments are distinguished, as it were, from the essence of the Church, we willingly use for a certain equitable distribution of this treatment; for this itself helps not a little the distinct understanding of the whole subject and the memory of all the things which are handed down.

Disputation IV — On the Properties and Endowments of the Church

Article 1. Whether the Church of Christ Ought to Be One

628. There are so many and so clear oracles of the Sacred Scriptures by which the unity of the Church is asserted that the Innovators themselves, with very few exceptions, who are not consistent with themselves, by no means dare to deny it. Indeed Christ willed a most perfect unity in his Church; for thus in John 17.20-28 he addresses the Father: "But I do not pray for these only, namely the Apostles, but also for those who will believe in me through their word. That all may be one, as you, Father, in me and I in you, that they also may be one in us... And the glory which you have given me I have given to them, that they may be one, as we also are one. I in them, and you in me, that they may be consummated into one," etc.

629. It is likewise manifest that a multiple unity can be attended to in the Church: 1. by reason of the same principle, that is, of God calling, according to that saying in John 6.44: "No one can come to me unless my Father has drawn him"; 2. by reason of the same ultimate end, which was signified in Matthew 20.9 in that one denarius promised to all; 3. by reason of the same means, that is, faith, sacraments, laws, according to that saying in Ephesians 4.5: "One faith, one baptism," etc.; 4. by reason of the same Holy Spirit, by whom the whole Church is governed as by an internal ruler, according to that saying in 1 Corinthians 12.4: "There are divisions of graces, but the same Spirit"; 5. by reason of the same invisible head, for the whole Church is joined to the same Christ as to its Head, according to that saying in Ephesians 1.22: "He gave him as head over the whole Church"; 6. by reason of the connection of the members with one another, according to that saying in Romans 12.5: "We are one body, but individually members one of another."

630. But, these things having been supposed, the concept of the unity which we here assert of the Church must be explained. Generally, the unity with which we are dealing consists in this: that there are not several Churches, but one single Church, and that this same one is the one which Christ founded and instituted. Hence simultaneous and successive unity are usually distinguished. For the Church is said to be one: 1. insofar as at no time from its institution by Christ have there simultaneously been, or will there be, two or more Churches of Christ; and this unity is simultaneous; 2. insofar as throughout the whole succession of times the one true Church which exists always perseveres the same and consistent with itself, not changed into another; and this unity is successive. Compare Suarez, *On Faith*, disputation 9, section 4. Although this unity of the Church comprehends all these things, nevertheless, since successive unity is easily referred to apostolicity and indefectibility, here we properly and directly consider simultaneous unity.

631. In order that the genuine character of this unity, which is proper to the Church, may be well understood, we must recall to mind that the Church is "an assembly of the faithful," or "a society of men who are joined by the same profession of faith and by subjection to legitimate pastors," number 401. Therefore the property of unity ought to be such as is required in order that a society be called one, and one society of the faithful. Hence the unity of faith is usually distinguished, which presents a most close concord in faith, or the agreement of all Christ's faithful in professing the true faith; and the unity of government, without which no society can be one. Now to this double unity are referred the other species of unity which are usually assigned by some. Thus the unity which is called of communion or charity properly regards the union of the members among themselves, and denotes the mutual agreement of all the associates toward the same end through the same means under the direction of one and the same government; from this union it results that, feeling the same thing toward one another, they keep unity in the bond of peace. But everyone sees that the unity of faith and government in the Church necessarily includes this unity of

communion. Likewise a unity is usually assigned which they call ritual, by force of which all preserve in the Church those rites which are of divine institution. Hence one and the same rite of initiation exists among all, namely Baptism; there is a common fellowship of the same sacraments; one sacrifice exists among all, which, since it is the principal act of religion, in a certain principal way pertains to the Church of Christ, which is a Christian religious society. But everyone also sees that this ritual unity can by no means be lacking where the unity of faith and government is present. Therefore it is enough to treat this double unity.

632. But in what does the unity of faith consist? For the Innovators themselves, unless they have utterly declined to the views of the rationalists, do not deny that the Church is in some way one in faith. Certainly faith can be called one for many reasons: 1. by reason of the formal object or motive, which is one, namely the authority of God revealing; 2. by reason of the primary object, which is God himself; 3. by reason of the principle or habit, which, since it is one, is equally extended to all the objects which are believed, etc. But, these things having been presupposed or passed over, the unity of faith with which we are dealing is located in this: that "the faithful diffused throughout the world all believe, or profess to believe, all and the same articles which the Church proposes to them as to be believed." All and the same articles indeed, according to that saying in 1 Corinthians 1.10: "But I beseech you, brothers, by the name of our Lord Jesus Christ, that you all say the same thing, and that there be no schisms among you; but that you be perfect in the same sense and in the same judgment." Which the Church proposes as to be believed, according to that saying in Romans 1.5: "Through whom," Jesus Christ, "we have received grace and apostleship for obedience to the faith among all nations for his name"; that is, we have received the apostleship so that we may announce the faith and by the authority of our apostleship demand obedience to the faith among all nations for his name, namely that on account of his authority and name they may render the obedience of faith. Compare *On the Infused Virtues*, number 927.

633. From this it is clear: 1. The unity of faith imports not only the fact by which all and the same truths are believed by all everywhere, but also, as they say, the right, or the principle by which that fact is perpetually produced and preserved. This principle is the magisterium of the governing Church, certainly infallible under the assistance of the Holy Spirit in defining the truths of faith. We shall establish below the charism of infallibility in this magisterium. For the present matter it is enough to say that the unity of faith comprehends the consent of all in the same truths, through the adherence of all to the same principle determining consent, which is the apostolic magisterium. 2. It is clear that if a collection of Churches is supposed, each of which has its own proper profession of faith, complete and diverse from the others, so that what one embraces as doctrine pertaining to faith, another rejects or leaves only to free disputation, it must be concluded that all those Churches, taken collectively, do not make one true Church; nor do the individual Churches, taken separately, make so many true Churches; but either one alone of them is the true Church, or all are false.

634. But lest the Innovators accuse the Church as though it overwhelms the faithful with a multitude of things to be believed, let it be observed that it is not necessary that all the faithful believe with explicit faith all the truths proposed by the Church, but rather that, once such an article is known, they are prohibited from doubting about it or contradicting it. Indeed those things which are called necessary by necessity of means and of precept must be believed by all with explicit faith; but as regards the rest, it suffices that they believe them by a general and implicit faith, by which we universally believe as revealed by God those things which are proposed by the Church as such. Therefore the obligation which arises from the proposition of these dogmas is negative rather than positive; namely, one is prohibited from contradicting them, but is not commanded by a special act actually to believe them explicitly. Compare *On the Infused Virtues*, numbers 364-366.

635. Come then: in what does the unity of government consist? They are accustomed to distinguish a twofold unity of this kind. One they call the unity of similarity, and it is had

when different assemblies have the same form of government, without nevertheless being subject to the same supreme government numerically; of this kind is the unity of two independent nations which are governed by the same form of government, for example, monarchic. But this is only a likeness between two societies, and in no way true unity, nor can it rightly be called unity. The other, however, which they call the unity of identity, is had when all are subject to the same supreme government. By this unity the Church is said to be, and is essentially, one in government, namely by the unity of identity. From this certainly it follows that, if the existence is supposed of several assemblies which call themselves Churches of Christ, and each of which has its own independent government, it must be said that all of them, taken collectively, by no means make one true Church, nor do the individual ones, taken separately, make so many true Churches; but either one alone of them is the true Church of Christ, or all are false.

636. Therefore there are two things which split the unity of the Church: heresy and schism. Heresy is "a pertinacious error in faith"; but schism is "a voluntary withdrawal from the unity of the Church." Schismatics, says St. Thomas, second-second part, question 39, article 1, "are those who by their own will and intention separate themselves from the unity of the Church, which is the principal unity. But the unity of the Church is attended to in two things: namely, in the connection or communication of the members of the Church with one another, and again in the order of all the members of the Church toward one head... And therefore those are called schismatics who refuse to be subject to the Supreme Pontiff and who refuse to communicate with the members of the Church subject to him." Cajetan, explaining these things in the same place, notes that not just any disobedience constitutes schism, "unless it is rebellion against the office of the Pope or of the Church, so that they refuse to be subject to him, to recognize him as superior." And: "someone is a schismatic from this, that he refuses to operate as a part of the Church"; which indeed necessarily happens when someone refuses to operate as moved by a superior, number 37.

637. Therefore heresy and schism agree with each other in some respect, but differ from one another in some respect. "We judge this to be the difference between heresy and schism," says St. Jerome, "that heresy has a perverse dogma, while schism likewise separates from the Church on account of episcopal dissension," commentary on the epistle to Titus, chapter 3, verses 10-11; or, as St. Augustine says, "that heretics, by thinking false things about God, (1) In order that this definition of schism may be rightly understood, it is useful to observe with the brothers de Walenburch, *On the Unity of the Church*, book 3, chapter 8, number 2 and following, that the notion of schism is not completed by withdrawal from the unity of the Church. For a Christian who crossed over to the Turks would be called an apostate, not a schismatic. Similarly, withdrawal properly so called from the unity of the Church is not altogether necessary for constituting a schismatic; otherwise those who were born and educated in schism, adhering to the schismatic party, would not be true schismatics. Therefore, in order that someone be properly held as a schismatic, it is required and sufficient that he establish or follow private conventicles of Christians gathered from deserters from the Church. violate the faith itself, while schismatics by unjust divisions leap away from fraternal charity, although they believe the things which we believe." Yet it must be noted that heresy directly violates the unity of faith and indirectly always violates the unity of communion; but schism, although it properly violates the unity of communion, nevertheless must come to the point of splitting the unity of faith. For, as St. Jerome says, "there is no schism which does not fashion for itself some heresy, so that it may seem to have withdrawn rightly from the Church."

638. Thus far we have presented the sum of Catholic doctrine concerning the unity of the Church; now the errors contrary to it must be briefly set forth. Heterodox persons generally, as we have warned elsewhere, readily confess the unity of the Church, both because the most express testimonies of the Scriptures are had concerning it and because they have not dared to erase an article from the symbol of faith. But since they could not deny unity, they most shamefully corrupted its concept, as the interests of their own sect required. In what, therefore, do they constitute the unity of the Church? It would indeed be

impossible to report here the opinions of all, nor is that necessary; since once the true unity of the Church has been demonstrated, by that very fact any other unity which is opposed to it is rejected as insufficient or false. Still it is useful to indicate at least the principal errors.

639. And first, if the discourse is about the unity of faith, those who do not altogether deny it: a. reduce that same unity wholly to faith in Christ. Thus, for example, Wegscheider writes, section 186: "It is greatly to be wished that thought should now diligently be given not so much to uniting or confounding Churches, which defend formulas of doctrine plainly opposed to one another, as to bringing about and confirming a certain moral agreement among the individual members of these churches, so that whoever have given their name to Christ, however otherwise diverse they may be, may nevertheless be and remain most devoted to mutual concord." b. Others contend that the unity of faith is obtained if all things contained in the Scriptures are believed. But since all the sects retaining the Scriptures taught opposite things, indeed did not agree even on the canon itself of the Scriptures, compare *On the Infused Virtues*, number 916 and following, it was easy to see that there is no unity of this kind. c. Hence others introduced the distinction between fundamental and non-fundamental articles, asserting that for the unity of faith consent concerning fundamentals suffices. We said in the treatise *On the Infused Virtues*, number 366, in what sense that distinction has been handed down by Catholics; but the Innovators teach it in an entirely different sense. For for them those articles are fundamental "which must be explicitly believed by all if they wish to be saved"; but non-fundamental are those "which can be rejected without loss of salvation, even if they are proposed as to be believed through the apostolic ministry."

640. Jurieu methodically developed this doctrine in the book which he entitled *System of the Church*. There the disciple of Calvin taught that "the catholic Church is composed from all societies of Christians which do not err in fundamentals, even if no communion is preserved among those sects, indeed even if they mutually excommunicate and anathematize one another." This unheard-of notion concerning the unity of faith seemed so apt for defending the cause of the Reformation that the other Innovators embraced it with both arms, as the sole anchor of their salvation. But this opinion is so easily accommodated to the private views of each person that it is still today admitted by almost all heterodox persons. Compare *On the Infused Virtues*, number 358.

641. Secondly, with regard to the unity of government, Jurieu himself is so far from acknowledging that the catholic Church is one external society that, on the contrary, he teaches that the individual particular Churches are independent of one another and are connected by no other bond except the internal bond of charity alone. Indeed, with regard to faith itself, he distinguishes a double external unity. One of these he calls catholic unity, and it properly consists in the profession of fundamental articles. The other he calls the unity of a particular Church, and it is properly situated in this: that certain faithful persons professing the same faith make one society. Wherefore, according to him, only the particular Church is to be called a society, not the catholic or universal Church, although it is scarcely understood how even the particular Church itself can be called a true society, since it lacks authority, which is an essential part of society.

642. Yet it must be observed that our adversaries, when they say that all and each of the Churches are independent of one another, do not deny that a certain friendly league can exist among them. But they contend that this confederation itself is an arbitrary thing, so that the Church which withdraws from the confederation once entered into will not for that reason be less a true Church, although it acts illicitly if it breaks that confederation without a just cause.

643. The perverse opinion of the Oxford men concerning the unity of the Church deserves special mention here. They, at least in word, rejecting the distinction between fundamental and non-fundamental articles, confess that for the unity of faith it is required that all the faithful profess all the articles which the Church, at least gathered together, believes or by legitimate judgment has proposed as to

be believed. But: 1. They think that the universal Church is composed from the Roman Catholic Church, the Greek Church, the Russian Church, and the Established Church of England; therefore they attribute to this universal Church the authority of defining what must be held as of faith. 2. They hold no councils as ecumenical except the first six, and they say that all must necessarily agree in the articles defined by these. 3. But they do not seem stable even in this opinion, since Pusey himself, in his letter to the Protestant Bishop of Oxford, page 28, says that for communion with the Established Church only faith in the articles of the Apostles' Creed is required. (1)

644. But with regard to the unity of government, they say that the unity which is established by Catholics is indeed more perfect, and perhaps falls under precept, but is by no means essential; and therefore it can be lacking without the Church itself failing. Hence they teach that the obligation of preserving communion with the Church, just like certain other grave obligations from positive precept, can sometimes cease on account of a grave change of circumstances. Indeed, they say that it can be not only licit but even obligatory for this or that particular church, or collection of churches, to withdraw itself from the communion of the whole Church, or, as they say in English, "the rest of the Church." Then, they say, the separation is not total and perfect, nor is it from the Church insofar as it is true, but insofar as it is corrupted in faith or morals, or both. Essential communion remains, namely in those things which are true and right; nevertheless those things are rejected which in doctrine are erroneous, in worship superstitious, in government tyrannical. Compare on these things the distinguished Murray.

645. From this arose in London a society, founded in the year 1857, for procuring, as its founders and promoters say, by the help of prayers, (1) "For this [the essentials to Communion] she requires only belief in the Apostles Creed." And in the same letter, explaining his mind more fully, page 53, he says: To our own Church we owe submission; to the decisions of the Universal Church, Faith. the unity of Christendom; or for pouring forth prayers to God that he might bring to unity the three Christian communions, the Roman Catholic, the Greek schismatic, and the Anglican. The Sacred Roman Universal Inquisition, in a letter to the Bishops of England, says: "It has been reported to the Apostolic See that some Catholics and even ecclesiastical men have given their name to a society erected in London in the year 1857 for procuring, as they say, the unity of Christendom, etc..." And then it adds: "For it was formed and directed by Protestants and was stirred up by that spirit which it expressly professes: namely, that the three Christian communions, the Roman Catholic, the Greek schismatic, and the Anglican, although separated and divided from one another, nevertheless with equal right claim the Catholic name for themselves," etc. It prohibited the Christian faithful from giving their name to this society or in any way favoring it.

646. These things, therefore, having been established beforehand. **Section II The Unity of the Church in Faith Is Established Proposition XXVII.** 1. The true Church of Christ is one; 2. and it first claims for itself that unity of faith by which the faithful diffused throughout the world believe all and the same articles which the Church proposes to them as to be believed. Therefore every heresy separates from unity; and 3. the distinction introduced by the Innovators between fundamental and non-fundamental articles can in no way be admitted, since it overturns rather than establishes the unity of faith.

647. The first part is proved. I. The Church is called in the Scriptures the Kingdom of God and of Christ; but this is one, for all nations pertain to it. It is called the City placed upon a mountain, to which all nations come together, and therefore it also is one. It is called the House of God and of Christ, which, as the Apostle says in Hebrews 3.6, "we are"; therefore it is one House. It is called the Sheepfold to which all the sheep must be led back, and which has only one Shepherd; therefore it is one. It is called the Spouse of Christ, and this spouse is one. Finally, it is called the Body, and the Body of Christ, which likewise is one, numbers 400 and 463. Therefore the Church of Christ is one.

648. II. Christ constituted the Church as a society, numbers 439 and following, of which he himself is the one invisible Head; to which he gave one visible Head, as we hinted in numbers 545

and following and as will be shown more expressly below; which he willed to be extended to all nations, "going, teach all nations," or to be catholic; to which as a whole he established one end, etc. But all these things present the idea of one single Church. Therefore.

649. III. The true Church of Christ is the society which professes and teaches the true and divine religion of Christ which is in the world, number 478. But the true and divine religion can only be one, as we have shown several times. Therefore the true Church of Christ is only one; and on that account unity is an essential property of the true and divine Church of Christ. But we abstain from bringing forward other arguments, both because this part of the thesis, or the unity of the Church under the general acceptation, is easily conceded by all, and because it will be confirmed from the things soon to be said.

650. The second part is proved. I. From the general economy instituted by Christ. For: 1. As long as our Savior dwelt on earth, he alone was for his disciples the adequate rule of things to be believed, and indeed an external and living rule. For, clothed in visible flesh, as man teaching men, with a sensible voice and according to the manner of men, he taught his divine religion. But this contained all truths, not only those whose explicit faith would be necessary for all and each unto salvation, but also those whose explicit faith is not demanded from all. Now who would say that it was lawful for the disciples to distinguish among the truths proposed by Christ, so that they would admit some but reject others? 2. In order to perpetuate his doctrine, Christ equipped his disciples with the same authority by which he himself had been sent by the Father, and sent them through the whole world to preach the Gospel. "All power," he said to them, "has been given to me in heaven and on earth. Going, therefore, teach all nations." Therefore the Apostles were ambassadors of Christ, just as Christ was ambassador of the Father; and by the same obligation by which the disciples were bound to obey Christ teaching, the peoples also were bound to obey the Apostles preaching in the name of Christ. Hence the Savior had said: "He who hears you hears me; he who despises you despises me; and he who despises me despises him who sent me." Therefore, just as he could not have been called a true disciple of Christ who rejected some truths proposed by him, so he could not be reckoned a true disciple of the Apostles who rejected some doctrine preached by them as not necessary. 3. In reality Christ had made no distinction among truths; but, sending his Apostles, he had said: "Going... teach all nations... teaching them to observe all things whatsoever I have commanded you"; "Preach the Gospel to every creature," certainly the whole Gospel, and not a mutilated one. Hence it is that the Apostle exhorts the Romans "to observe those who cause dissensions and stumbling blocks contrary to the doctrine which they had learned"; and in the epistle to the Galatians he "pronounces anathema upon anyone who shall have evangelized otherwise than he himself had evangelized." Did the Apostles preach to the nations, or St. Paul to the Galatians, only fundamental articles? No sane person would say this. For Christ commanded the Apostles to teach them to observe "all things whatsoever he had commanded," and that the nations should receive these things by faith. To mention still one thing, St. Paul pronounces anathema upon those who, having contemned his doctrine, contended that "the observance of legal things" was necessary; but not even Protestants themselves will deny that "the observance of legal things" must be numbered among non-fundamental articles. 4. But the office of preaching the Gospel imposed upon the Apostles was not merely personal and therefore transitory, but public and permanent, as is clear from the things said in numbers 482 and following concerning the end for which Christ instituted the Church. Therefore, just as in the successors of the Apostles there perseveres the obligation of teaching the whole doctrine of Christ, so there remains the obligation of applying faith to their entire preaching.

651. II. It will help here to weigh briefly the testimony of the Apostle in Ephesians 4, where he says: "Careful to preserve the unity of the spirit in the bond of peace. One body and one Spirit, as you have been called in one hope of your vocation. One Lord, one faith, one baptism, one God and Father of all... And he gave some indeed as Apostles, and some as Prophets, others as Evangelists, and others as Pastors and Teachers, for the consummation of the saints, unto the work of the ministry, unto the building up

of the body of Christ; until we all meet in the unity of faith and of the knowledge of the Son of God, unto a perfect man, unto the measure of the age of the fullness of Christ; so that we may no longer be children tossed about and carried around by every wind of doctrine in the wickedness of men, in craftiness unto the circumvention of error. But doing the truth in charity, let us grow in him in all things, who is the head, Christ; from whom the whole body," etc. Hence: 1. Christ willed a unity of faith by which we would not be "carried around by every wind of doctrine... in craftiness unto the circumvention of error"; and to obtain that unity he gave Apostles, Pastors, Teachers, who must remain "until we all meet in the unity of faith." Therefore, from the institution of Christ, that is the unity of faith in the Church by which the faithful believe all the articles proposed by the Pastors, Apostles, and Teachers, so that they avoid every error concerning the doctrine of Christ. 2. The Apostle exhorts the Ephesians to fraternal charity, which, as is established in number 628, Christ willed to be most perfect in his disciples. But to inculcate it he uses, as an example and stimulus, the unity which flourishes excellently in the end of the religion which they profess, in its author, and in faith. Now if the faith of the Church were or could be divided and diverse, unity in faith would have to be proposed to those who are stirred up to preserving perfect unity of charity not as an example to imitate, but as a vice to avoid. Hence the Apostle ought not to say: as you have one faith, so have one heart; but rather: although you are disjoined in faith, nevertheless you must have one heart. Surely, as Murray rightly observes, if someone were to exhort Catholics and Protestants, or even diverse Protestant sects, to unity of charity, drawing an argument from the unity of faith flourishing among them, and were to say: "You ought to be united in charity, just as, or because, there is one faith among you," he would be held either as insane or as jesting. Compare the arguments from Scripture which we gave in the treatise *On the Infused Virtues*, numbers 369-371 and 934-938.

652. III. The Church itself, most conscious of its right and obligation, has perpetually watched over the integrity of faith with such solicitude that it has never tolerated even the smallest error in faith. Hence it condemned, without any distinction, all heretics who presumed to think otherwise than it did: it anathematized not only the Arians, who attacked the divinity of Christ, but also the Novatians, Montanists, Quartodecimans, etc., certainly infected by no fundamental error, and cut them off from its unity. The First Council of Nicaea, canon 8, says: "Concerning those who at some time call themselves Cathari, but come to the Catholic and Apostolic Church, it has seemed good to the holy great Synod that, hands having been imposed upon them, they should thus remain in the clergy." The First Council of Constantinople, canon 7: "Those who are joined to the right faith from the side of those who are saved from heretics... Arians indeed, and Macedonians, and Sabbatians, and Novatians, who also call themselves Cathari... Tesseradecadites, or Tetradites, and Apollinarists, we receive, giving indeed written statements and anathematizing every heresy which does not think as the Holy Church of God and Apostolic Church." All subsequent synods have similar things. Compare the things which we wrote concerning this argument in the treatise *On the Virtues*, numbers 440 and 983.

653. IV. The same is confirmed from the Fathers. For: 1. They all held as cut off from Catholic unity those who withdrew from the doctrine of the Church even in the smallest point. St. Epiphanius already in his time enumerated seventy heresies; after him St. Augustine, eighty-eight; Theodoret, fifty-two. But although among the heresies which they allege there are several which, according to the mind of the adversaries, touch no fundamental dogma of faith, nevertheless there was one judgment of those Fathers concerning all. "Not everyone," says St. Augustine at the end of *On Heresies*, "who does not believe these things," the heresies which he had enumerated, "ought consequently already to think or call himself a Catholic Christian. For there can either be or come to be other heresies also, which have not been mentioned in this work of ours, and whoever shall hold any one of them will not be a Catholic Christian." 2. They constantly preach our doctrine concerning the unity of faith. St. Irenaeus, *Against Heresies*, book 4, chapter 63, having established the principle that the preaching of the Church is the true rule by which the one and same way of salvation is manifested in the whole world, infers that light has been entrusted to the

Church, and that those who leave it are by that very fact constituted heretics. But just as the Church adds nothing to, or takes nothing away from, the true doctrine of Christ, so those who receive its light ought to add nothing or take nothing away. "True knowledge is," says the holy Martyr, "the doctrine of the Apostles and the ancient state of the Church in the whole world, and the character of the body of Christ according to the succession of bishops, to whom they handed down the Church which is in each place; which has come down even to us, guarded without fiction, with the fullest treatment of the Scriptures, receiving neither addition nor subtraction." Tertullian, *On the Prescription of Heretics*, chapter 21: "If the Lord Jesus Christ," he says, "sent the Apostles to preach, no other preachers ought to be received than those whom Christ appointed; but what they preached... ought not to be proved otherwise than through those same Churches which the Apostles themselves founded, by preaching to them themselves, both by living voice, as they say, and afterwards by epistles. If these things are so, it is consequently established that every doctrine which agrees with those Apostolic Churches, the mothers and originals of faith, must be counted as truth... but every doctrine must be prejudged as belonging to falsehood which tastes contrary to the truth of the Churches." Origen, as St. Pamphilus testifies in the *Apology for Origen*, distinguished two kinds of dogmas: some "which are manifestly handed down by ecclesiastical preaching," and others "which are not openly defined." But he taught that "that truth alone is to be received and believed which is opposed in nothing to the Apostolic dogmas; and that must be held which the apostolic and ecclesiastical reader has approved." This rule and no other, says the same Pamphilus, he followed "when he was examining the sects of heretics." But the heretical sects judged by this rule he himself so did not place in Catholic unity that, on the contrary, he held them as enemies of unity, who "unceasingly fight against the unity of the Church." St. Cyprian, letter 69 to Magnus: "Nor did our Lord Jesus Christ, when in his Gospel he testified that his adversaries are those who were not with him, at any time designate a species of heresy; but he showed that all heretics altogether, who were not with him and who, not gathering with him, scattered his flock, are his adversaries, saying: He who is not with me is against me, and he who does not gather with me scatters. Nor did the blessed Apostle John himself decree any heresy or schism, but called all who had gone out from the Church Antichrists, saying: You have heard that Antichrist is coming; but now many Antichrists have come into being... From this it appears that all are the adversaries of the Lord and Antichrists who are established to have withdrawn from charity and from the unity of the Catholic Church." St. Augustine teaches first of all that heretics and schismatics of any kind do not pertain to the Church: "The whole Christ," he says in *On the Unity of the Church*, chapter 4, "is head and body; the head is the Only-begotten Son of God, and his body is the Church, bridegroom and bride, two in one flesh. Whoever dissent from the Scriptures concerning Christ himself, even if they are found in all places in which the Church has been designated, are not in the Church. And again, whoever agree with the Holy Scriptures concerning the head itself and do not communicate with the unity of the Church, are not in the Church." In these words he by no means distinguishes between fundamental and non-fundamental errors; indeed, if he had acknowledged this distinction, he would without doubt have excepted several from the eighty-eight heresies which he enumerated. For Augustine the supreme rule of things to be believed was this: "To refuse to give first place to the Church," against the epistle of Fundanius, chapter 5, "is certainly either the height of impiety or of precipitous arrogance"; "But I," *On the Usefulness of Believing*, chapter 17, "would not believe the Gospel unless the authority of the Catholic Church moved me." St. Jerome openly teaches that the one doctrine and authority of the Church suffices for destroying all heresies: "I could," he says in the dialogue against the Luciferians, number 27, "draw out the day with speech of this kind, and dry up all the streams of propositions with one sun of the Church." And in the same place near the end: "I shall bring forth the open judgment of my mind: one must remain in that Church which, founded by the Apostles, endures unto this day. If anywhere you have heard that those who are said to be of Christ are named not from the Lord Jesus Christ, but from anyone else, for example Marcionites, Valentinians, Montanists or Campites, know that it is not the Church of Christ, but the synagogue of Antichrist." St. Vincent of Lerins, *Commonitorium*, chapter 13, beautifully expresses what would happen to the Christian religion if certain articles of faith could be rejected as less principal. "If once this impious license of fraud has been admitted, I

shudder to say," he writes, "how great a danger of cutting away and abolishing religion follows. For once any part of Catholic dogma has been rejected, another also, and likewise another, and thereafter another, will now be rejected as if by custom and lawfully. But when the parts have been repudiated one by one, what follows at the end except that the whole likewise be repudiated? But also, on the contrary, if new things begin to be mixed with old, foreign with domestic, and profane with sacred, this custom must creep through the whole, so that thereafter nothing in the Church is left untouched, nothing whole, nothing immaculate; but there will henceforth be there a brothel of impious and shameful errors, where before there was the sanctuary of chaste and incorrupt truth." 3. Hence all the testimonies of the Fathers, which are almost innumerable, by which they preach the unity of faith as necessary in the Church, must be understood of that unity which they explain in the cited testimonies. Therefore there is nothing surprising if Jurieu himself confesses that all the ancients taught such a unity of faith in the Church; but he insolently affirms that all of them erred.

654. The third part is proved. Although this is inferred from the things said, nevertheless it will help to confirm it with proper arguments. Therefore: I. That which constitutes true unity, which is an essential property of the Church, cannot be some new invention. But the distinction between fundamental and non-fundamental articles is new. Therefore. The minor is proved. 1. Surely the Fathers were ignorant of this distinction; for if they had known it, beyond doubt they would somewhere have used it, especially since in their polemical writings an occasion often occurred to make mention of this distinction. But far from indicating it, they unanimously exclude it, as is clear from the testimonies brought forward above, and from the confession of Jurieu himself, who is the true author of that distinction. 2. The same Protestant distinction was unknown to all the heretics who existed before the pseudo-Reformation; they never had recourse to it in order to accuse the Catholic Church of tyranny. If they had known it, the Novatians, Arians, Donatists, Pelagians, and Monothelites would willingly have embraced it, and would have reproved the Catholic Church because, rejecting only non-necessary articles, they were expelled by it. But so far were the heretics from objecting this to the Church that, on the contrary, they condemned the Church for error and called their own assemblies the true and Catholic Church.

655. II. That which constitutes the unity of faith proper to the Church ought to have a certain foundation. But the distinction with which we are dealing has none. Therefore. The minor is proved. Since the Innovators reject the word of God handed down by mouth, that foundation would be located either: 1. in the Scriptures; or 2. in the very nature of the thing. But it is found in neither. Therefore. The minor is proved as to the first part. For: 1. Jurieu, having searched the whole of Sacred Scripture, objected only one passage from which he thought his distinction could be proved: that saying of the Apostle in 1 Corinthians 3: "No one can lay another foundation besides that which has been laid, which is Christ Jesus; but if anyone builds upon this foundation gold, silver, precious stones, wood, hay, straw," etc. Jurieu interprets these words of the Apostle in this way: the foundation is the articles whose faith is necessary for salvation; gold and silver are articles whose faith is by no means necessary for salvation; finally, wood, hay, and straw are errors in non-necessary articles, which errors can be admitted without loss of salvation. But: a. This place, which Jurieu explains with such ease, seemed difficult to St. Augustine, who testifies in *On Faith and Works*, chapters 15-16, that the aforesaid words of the Apostle are obscure and plainly difficult to understand. And indeed, many and various interpretations of them are brought forward by the Fathers, among which nevertheless there is absolutely none which either indicates or supposes the explanation fabricated by the adversary. Therefore even its novelty itself stands against it. b. Moreover, that interpretation is altogether arbitrary; for, to observe one thing, hay, wood, and straw are indeed said not to stand in the way of salvation, but by what reason at last does the adversary assert that these things must be understood of errors in non-necessary articles? Compare Estius on this place. 2. Chillingworth, Hobbes, Locke, and others taught that there is one single article proposed in Sacred Scripture as necessary for salvation, namely faith in Christ Jesus, true God. But they relied chiefly on these sentences of Sacred Scripture: "He who believes in the Son has eternal life"; "Whoever shall have confessed that Jesus is the Son of God, God abides in him and

he in God"; "But these things have been written that you may believe that Jesus is the Son of God, and that believing you may have life in his name." But: a. in these places faith in Christ is indeed said to be necessary that someone may have life, but it is not said to suffice alone, the remaining articles of faith having been neglected. Indeed this latter sense is elsewhere expressly excluded; for Christ himself said: "If you wish to enter into life, keep the commandments"; and "unless one has been born again of water and the Holy Spirit, he cannot enter into the kingdom of heaven." Otherwise the Apostle would not have said concerning Hymenaeus and Alexander, who certainly boasted that they were subject to Christ, "that they had made shipwreck concerning the faith"; nor would he have written about those who said that the resurrection had already happened, "that they had fallen away from the truth"; nor finally would he have terrified the Galatians, saying: "Because if you are circumcised, Christ will profit you nothing." b. In reality, to believe in Christ as in the Son of God is to believe that he is such as he was announced by the prophets, declared by himself, and preached by the Apostles: namely, that faith must be applied to all his words, and obedience rendered to all his commands. Compare *On Grace*, number 1088 and following. The minor is proved as to the second part. It belongs to the nature of divine faith that revealed truths be believed on account of the authority of God revealing. But this motive is one and the same with respect to all revealed truths, whether they are called fundamental or non-fundamental. Therefore, once the nature of faith is considered, or from the nature of the thing, that distinction of articles into fundamental and non-fundamental, understood according to the mind of the adversaries, is rather to be rejected. Compare *On the Infused Virtues*, numbers 369-371 and 729 and following.

656. III. Since Christ the Lord absolutely willed unity in faith, the means of obtaining it must be certain and fixed. But that distinction between fundamental and non-fundamental articles is not a means of this kind. Certainly it would have to be established with certainty which articles are fundamental and which are not. But this can be defined certainly by no rule. To place this in full light, it is enough to weigh the principal rules which the Protestants themselves have assigned. Therefore they say first: "All those things pertain to fundamentals which are clearly contained in the Scriptures." But: 1. If that criterion were admitted, the smallest matters, such as the bend of Tobias's dog's tail and other things of this kind, clearly expressed in the Sacred Letters, would be fundamental articles; other things, on the contrary, most pertaining to piety, such as the real presence of Christ in the Eucharist, the sacrifice of the Mass, etc., would have to be sent away among indifferent matters. 2. Even if we grant that the articles which are clearly contained in Sacred Scripture are fundamental, nevertheless we have advanced nothing; for one would further have to determine which at last are those articles which are so clearly expressed in Scripture. 3. But if it is said that fundamental articles are clearly determined in Sacred Scripture, what is the cause why Protestants do not agree among themselves in assigning them? Compare the things which we said in the treatise *On the Infused Virtues*, number 976 and following. They say secondly: "Fundamentals are those things which have a necessary connection with the foundation of the Christian religion." Now one must be blind not to see that this rule is ridiculous, since it is reduced to this: Fundamentals are those things which are fundamental. In reality, what could the Innovators respond to a Catholic asking: what are those dogmas which have a necessary connection with the foundation of the Christian religion? Only this: that they are those which are fundamental. They say thirdly: "To fundamental articles pertain all those which all sects of Christians hold by common consent." But: 1. this rule fights against the principle of the Innovators concerning the interpretation of the Scriptures, which for them are the sole rule of faith, from the private spirit of each person. 2. When individual heresies first arose and new sects were born, they constantly repudiated faith in the truths which the Church believed by common consent; this is historically established also concerning the heresy of the Innovators. Therefore all those sects erred and err in fundamentals. Is the consensus concerning some article said to cease because a new heresy arises and a new sect is formed, and would that article therefore cease to be fundamental? But by this reasoning there will be no fundamental article. 3. If the article which all Christian societies have professed by common consent is fundamental,

certainly this article is fundamental: that the Catholic Church is one by such a unity of faith that it excludes all sects of heretics erring in any article whatever; since, as we have seen, the whole of antiquity looking backward believed in a Church one in this way. They say, fourthly, that there is "a certain internal sense, implanted by the Holy Spirit, by which someone discerns what is fundamental and what is not as easily as taste discerns bitter from sweet." But we refuted this rule, which is shown by the very fact to be vain and false, in the treatise *On the Virtues*, number 981 and following.

657. IV. Hence it is clear that the distinction with which we are dealing is subversive of unity. For if unity is lacking even in the rule by which the unity of faith must be procured, what unity in faith at last will be able to be obtained? This can furthermore be confirmed: 1. From the confessions of Protestants. Mosheim, *Elements of Dogmatic Theology*, volume 1, chapter 1, writes: "As long as it is asked in the abstract what is a fundamental article and what is not, they agree; but the face of things is far different if these concepts are applied to theological dogmas... then disputes arise which cannot easily be solved." Buddeus, *Institutes of Dogmatic Theology*, book 1, chapter 1: "It is usually disputed vehemently from what marks or indications the fundamental articles of faith are discerned." Limmerman, *Theological Opuscula*, volume 1: "He alone can discern who is Lord of salvation and destruction." 2. From the fact. For what do Protestants now believe? They protested from the beginning against some articles; day by day they protest against others; they will protest until some dogma of supernatural faith remains. And indeed the matter has now reached the point that many believe nothing further, many do not know whether they believe anything, or what at last must be believed. This fact is especially placed in clear view by those efforts, employed in vain in our days by the government of Prussia, to sustain its pseudo-evangelical Church. Who does not know that Protestantism has for the greatest part degenerated into rationalism? They contend, according to Malou, *Reading of the Holy Bible*, etc., volume 2, page 392, that "one must adhere to no symbol of faith, that nothing is more antiphilosophical than the word heresy; they wonder how fallible men still dare to call themselves orthodox"; and therefore to the old orthodoxy of the Protestants they oppose "a certain modern and progressive orthodoxy." Compare, for this last part of the thesis, the brothers de Walenburch, *On Necessary Articles*, treatise 3. **Section III The Unity of Government in the Church Is Established Proposition XXVIII.** 1. The Church is one also by the unity of government, by force of which however many faithful there are in the world are subject to one supreme authority. Therefore any schism whatever, as the very name indicates, separates from true unity; 2. nor is it ever lawful by any reason to introduce it or to remain in it.

658. The first part is proved. I. From Scripture. For it is read in Matthew 16.18-19: "And I say to you, that you are Peter, and upon this rock I will build my Church, and the gates of hell shall not prevail against it. And to you I will give the keys of the kingdom of heaven. And whatever you shall bind upon earth shall be bound also in heaven; and whatever you shall loose upon earth shall be loosed also in heaven." Hence, in this place supreme power is promised to Peter, as we showed in numbers 546-558, and as will be demonstrated more fully when the discourse is about the primacy of jurisdiction divinely instituted in blessed Peter. But that supreme power extends to however many faithful there are in the world. Therefore, however many faithful or particular Churches there are in the world, they must be subject to that supreme authority. The minor is proved: 1. The Church with which we are dealing here is the one which Christ built. But Christ built not some particular Church, but the universal Church. 2. Christ calls the Church to be built upon Peter his own, simply and without addition, "my Church." But the Church which is simply called the Church of Christ is not this or that particular Church, but the universal Church. 3. Christ speaks of the Church against which "the gates of hell shall not prevail." But this promise, that the gates of hell will not prevail against the Church, can be understood only of the universal Church. 4. It is established from the usage of the Scriptures of the New Testament that the name Church, used simply and without addition, signifies the whole Church. For when a particular Church is signified, either the name is restricted by express words, "the Church which prays at Jerusalem," "the Church of God which is at Corinth," etc.; or it is known

from the subject matter, as, for example, in Acts 20.17: "Sending to Ephesus, he called the elders of the Church," etc. But in the cited text of Matthew the name of Church is used simply and without addition, nor is it restricted by any of the reasons just stated. Therefore.

659. II. Again from Scripture. For there exists the prophecy which the Holy Spirit uttered through the mouth of Caiaphas, John 11.50-52: "It is expedient for you that one man should die for the people, and that the whole nation should not perish. But this he did not say of himself; but since he was the high priest of that year, he prophesied that Jesus was to die for the nation; and not only for the nation, but that he might gather together into one the children of God who were dispersed." Hence: here the discourse concerns all the faithful, wherever they may be, "not only for the nation... but that the children of God who were dispersed," etc., all of whom are said to be gathered into one society. But the one society which Christ founded by his death is the Church. Yet there is not one society where there is not one supreme government. Therefore. To confirm the major, let those things be recalled by which above we established that Christ founded the Church in the form of a true society; and at the same time let the word "he might gather together" be weighed, by which it is signified that men dispersed throughout the world are not only to be converted, but to be put and gathered together into one. (1)

660. III. Still from Scripture, by recalling things already often said. For: 1. The Church is called a kingdom, numbers 440 and 545, and indeed one kingdom in the singular, the kingdom of God, the kingdom of Christ. But a kingdom is not one unless there is one person with whom supreme power resides. Therefore. But this kingdom is visible, number 461 and following; therefore all must be subject to its one Head. 2. The Church is called a City. Now: a. it is one city; for it is constantly called city in the singular, and there is added "of you," (1) The Protestant interpreters themselves admit this. Kuinoel says: "that he might collect them into one assembly with the Jews, Ephesians 2.13-14; 3.6, so that there might come to be one flock of one pastor, John 10.16, a mixed flock from pagans and Jews." Rosenmuller: "that he might collect them into one society, so that all might become one by reason of a corrected and more divine soul, as Christ often afterwards speaks, so that there might thus exist one flock and one shepherd." Bloomfield: "As it were into one Catholic and universal Church, united in one holy communion, under one common head." A. Clarke: "That he should collect into one body; form one Church out of the Jewish and Gentile believers," according to Murray. "over you," "in you," "to you," "yours," "to you," etc., compare the things said in number 405 and Isaiah 60 and Psalm 86. b. It is a universal city; for all nations and all kingdoms flow together to it, "Rahab and Babylon, and Tyre and the people of the Ethiopians, the sons of foreigners, and all their kings who detracted from you." But it could not be one universal city unless one supreme power presided over it. Therefore. 3. The Church was instituted by Christ in the form of a visible society, as we demonstrated above. But, as is easily conceded, number 628, there is only one Church. Therefore there is only one Church as a society. But a society is not one unless there is one supreme authority. Therefore.

661. IV. From the Fathers, whose testimonies, for the sake of brevity, we shall refer to certain classes, as it were. And: 1. Here belong those testimonies by which the unity of government is placed by them in the very definition of the Church. Thus, for example, St. Cyprian, letter 69 to Florentius Pupianus, after saying that the Church is "a people united to the priest, and a flock adhering to its pastor," adds that the bishop is in the Church and the Church in the bishop; that he who is not with the bishop is not in the Church; that they flatter themselves in vain who, not having peace with the priests of God, creep in and believe that they communicate secretly with certain persons, "since," he adds, "the Church which is Catholic is one, not torn, nor divided, but certainly connected and joined by the glue of priests adhering to one another." 2. Unless the Church were one external universal society, or unless it had one supreme power for the whole world, it could not teach and judge as universal. Jurieu himself admits this, according to Nicole, *The Unity of the Church*, book 1, chapter 9; and it is clear from the very nature of the thing. For if the supreme magisterium and judgment pertained to Churches disagreeing among themselves, nothing could be

defined which would oblige all; the things which would be denied by one would be affirmed by another. But the Fathers always asserted universal magisterium and supreme judgment of the Church. Hence St. Irenaeus, *Against Heresies*, book 1, chapter 10, number 2, writes: "The Church, although scattered throughout the world... endowed by marvelous consent as if with one mouth, preaches, teaches, and hands down these things." "We receive heretics returning," says the First Synod of Constantinople, according to Labbe, volume 2, page 952, "giving indeed written statements and anathematizing every heresy which does not think as the holy Church of God and Apostolic Church." Leporius, in the abjuration of his errors, at the demand of the African bishops, was bound to profess that he accepted and held "what the order of the Church holds or accepts," in the same place, page 1683. Recall the things said in number 652. 3. There exists in the Church a power by which someone can be cut off from Catholic unity. Tertullian, *Apology*, chapter 39, calls excommunication "a prejudgment of the future judgment, if anyone has so sinned that he is banished from the communion of prayer, and assembly, and all sacred intercourse." St. Cyprian, letter 2 to Pomponius, calls it a spiritual sword, "by which the proud and contumacious are slain, while they are cast out of the Church." "The fornicator, adulterer, murderer, and the other vices," says St. Jerome, on chapter 3 of the epistle to Titus, "are driven from the Church by priests; but heretics pass sentence upon themselves, departing from the Church by their own choice." (1) But that power would be impossible unless one supreme authority presided over the whole Church; for he who was separated from one Church would be received by another, nor would all Churches be subject to one judgment. Therefore. 4. The Fathers taught the unity of government in the Church as often as they said that the Roman Pontiff is the center of Catholic unity divinely instituted. But testimonies of this kind are innumerable. St. Irenaeus, *Against Heresies*, book 3, chapter 3, teaches that "to the Church of Rome, because of its more powerful principality, it is necessary that every Church come together, that is, those who are the faithful from every side." St. Cyprian, letter 70 to Januarius, teaches: "Just as God is one, so the Church is one, and Catholic, founded as one upon Peter by the voice of the Lord." At the same time he says, in letter 55 to Cornelius, that the Roman Church is "this chair of Peter and the principal Church, (1) It may seem marvelous that this doctrine is sometimes acknowledged by the Protestants themselves. The second Synod of Paris, held in the year 1565, discipline chapter 5, article 17, defines excommunication in this way: "To excommunicate," they say, "is to cut someone off from the body of the Church as a rotten member, and to deprive him of communion and all its goods." In the same way the reformed ministers gathered in the twentieth Synod understood the matter; for, excommunicating Jeremiah Feriez, they have these words: "We have cast him off and we cast him off outside the congregation of the faithful, that he may be handed over to Satan. We have cut him off and cut him off from the communion of the saints, declaring that he ought no longer to be counted or reckoned as a member of Jesus Christ and of the Church, but to be held as a heathen and a publican, as profane and a contemner of God." Finally, several Synods of the Protestants agree, which may be seen in Malou, *Reading of the Holy Bible*, etc., volume 1, page 113. whence sacerdotal unity has arisen." Hence he calls it, in letter 45 to the same man, "the root and matrix of the Catholic Church." St. Ambrose, on Psalm 50, number 30, asserting that where Peter is, there is the Church, tells concerning his brother Satyrus, book *On the Death of His Brother*, number 47, that he was asked by the bishop of the place where he was staying "whether he agreed with the Catholic bishops, that is, with the Roman Church." St. Jerome, writing to Damasus in letters 16 and 14, brings forward these splendid words: "I... am joined in communion to your Blessedness, that is, to the chair of Peter. I know that the Church has been built upon that rock. Whoever shall have eaten the lamb outside this house is profane. If anyone is joined to the chair of Peter, he is mine." We shall see more in its own place.

662. V. For one weighing well the arguments brought forward, the response is easy to the exception which Palmer proposes. He thinks that the Church was indeed instituted by Christ as one, but not in such a way that it must always remain one without interruption, even with regard to government: that unity is of the necessity of precept, but not of essence. But: 1. It is clear from the things said that unity of government is attributed to the Church insofar as it is one society and a Catholic society; but this

pertains to the very essence of the Church. Hence the Fathers also place it in the very definition of the Church. For this reason, since the Church is indefectible, it will always be one, also by the unity of government. 2. In the Church, as Palmer also admits, there must always be unity of faith. But the unity of faith, as is clear from the preceding proposition, depends upon Apostolic government as upon its principle. Therefore if the unity of government can at some time be lacking, the unity of faith also will be able to be lacking. (1) 3. The Fathers not only affirm that the Church is one by the unity of government, but also say that it cannot be split into parts. Thus St. Cyprian, treating of the Church "which, suffused with the light of the Lord, spreads its rays through the whole world," and in which "there is only one flock (1) Worthy of consideration are the things which that author has, part 1, chapter 5, section 4: "We may infer then that Christ having enjoined unity in the belief of the truth on all Christians, there must necessarily be in His Church some means for preserving or restoring this unity, as well in particular churches as in the Church universal, and, therefore, all those societies which are prevented by their fundamental principles from sustaining unity in the truth, cannot he churches of Christ." and one Pastor," teaches in *On the Unity of the Church*, chapters 6-7, that the seamless garment of Christ, the type of the Church, cannot be split: "The people of Christ," he says, "cannot be split. Who therefore is so criminal and faithless, who so mad with the fury of discord, that he believes that the unity of God, the garment of the Lord, the Church of Christ, can be split? He himself warns and teaches in his Gospel, saying: 'And there will be one flock and one shepherd'; and does anyone think that in one place there can be either many pastors or several flocks?" St. Ambrose, book 1 *On Faith*, chapter 1, number 11, had said that the Church is one body; and afterwards he confirms this, because "unity is not divided nor split, and therefore is subjected neither to corruption nor to age." St. Epiphanius, *Exposition of the Faith*, chapter 6, locates the difference between the Catholic Church and the sects in this: that while the former is always virgin, undefiled, and one, the sects, on the contrary, are continually split: "It is worthy of observation," he says, "that very often any heresy whatever, split and divided within itself, is drawn into various parts and names." This will be confirmed from the things soon to be said.

663. The second part is proved. I. It is never lawful by any reason to introduce schism or to remain in it, if the necessity of preserving external unity is absolute and suffers no exception. But such is this necessity. Therefore. The minor is proved: 1. The Scriptures openly exclude any exception. This indeed is easily clear by recalling the arguments already given; for since the Church is the Body of Christ, the Temple or House of God, the Kingdom of Christ, the Sheepfold of Christ, if it were ever lawful to split the unity of the Church, it would be lawful to split the body of Christ, the house of God, the Kingdom of Christ, the sheepfold of Christ; or it would be lawful not to have Christ as Head, to live outside the house and Kingdom of Christ, not to have Christ as Pastor. But these things most plainly can never be lawful, just as it can never be lawful to be deprived of the life which Christ communicates to us. Therefore. 2. If the necessity of preserving the unity of the Church were not absolute, from the principles of the adversaries it would follow that there is no precept of this kind with regard to external government; which nevertheless they themselves deny. In reality, according to them, it would be lawful to split that unity by reason of corruption, heresy, etc. But in this case by whom would the cause of separation have to be defined? If by the authority constituted by Christ in the Church, the schism of the adversaries would certainly be illicit, since the Church always resisted it; but if without the consent of that authority, each person by his own judgment could define a just cause of separation. Then the government of the Church would be absolutely destroyed; for what is authority which subjects can licitly reject by their own judgment? 3. The Fathers teach that it is as illicit to be separated from the Church on account of schism as on account of heresy. But the adversaries against whom we are here dealing acknowledge the absolute necessity of avoiding heresies. Therefore. "I say and protest," says St. John Chrysostom, homily 11 on the epistle to the Ephesians, "that to split the Church is no less evil than to fall into heresy. Tell me, if someone subject to a king did not indeed defect to another, nor hand himself over to another king, but took off and tore into many fragments the purple garment received and held from that king's clasp, would he be punished less than those who defected to another? But what if, moreover,

he also took the king himself by the throat and killed him, tearing his body limb by limb? What punishments would he have paid according to his merits? But if he who did this to a king, his fellow-servant, has done things greater than anyone can adequately pay penalties for, what hell will he not deserve who slays Christ and tears him limb by limb?" 4. The Fathers teach that the external unity of the Church is as necessary as charity is necessary; but just as without charity nothing profits, so for those voluntarily existing outside the unity of the Church, nothing can profit. "Let no one," says St. Augustine, sermon 88, number 19, "leave the ark before the time; let him tolerate the chaff on the threshing floor; let him tolerate it in the ark... But he who has deserted unity violates charity; and whoever violates charity, whatever great thing he has, he himself is nothing. If he speaks with the tongues of men and angels, if he knows all mysteries, if he has all faith so as to transfer mountains, if he distributes all his goods to the poor, if he hands over his body to burn, but does not have charity, he is nothing; nothing profits him. He possesses all things uselessly who does not have that one thing by which he may use all things. Therefore let us embrace charity, striving to preserve the unity of the spirit in the bond of peace. Let those not seduce us who understand carnally and, making a bodily separation, are separated by spiritual sacrilege from the wheat of the Church diffused throughout the whole world," the Donatists. "For the good seed has been sown throughout the whole world. That good sower, the Son of Man, scattered the good seed not in Africa alone, but everywhere. But the enemy sowed tares over it. Yet what does the father of the household say? Let both grow until the harvest." And St. Cyprian, *On the Unity of the Church*, says: "Do they think that Christ is with them when they have been gathered together, who are gathered outside the Church of Christ? Such persons, even if they have been killed in confession of the name, this stain is not washed away even by blood. The inexpiable and grave fault of discord is not purged even by suffering. He cannot be a martyr who is not in the Church. He will not be able to arrive at the kingdom who abandons her who is going to reign... He cannot present himself as a martyr who has not held fraternal charity... Those who have not wished to be unanimous in the Church of God cannot remain with God. Although, handed over to flames and fires, they burn, or, thrown to beasts, lay down their lives, that will not be the crown of faith, but the penalty of perfidy; not the glorious departure of religious virtue, but the destruction of desperation. Such a one can be killed; he cannot be crowned." "Anyone at all who has been separated from the Church is to be turned away from and fled. One of this kind is perverse and sins, and is condemned by himself. Does he seem to himself to be with Christ who acts against the priests of Christ, who separates himself from the society of his clergy and people?" See the confessions of the heretics themselves in the brothers de Walenburch, *On the Unity of the Church*, book 2, treatise 9, chapter 7.

664. II. In order that we may press the argument more strongly, and at the same time exclude the principal causes of separation assigned by the adversaries, it is useful to renew the argument in this way: it is never lawful to introduce schism if there can be no just cause for splitting unity. But such is the case. Therefore. The minor is proved: 2. The Fathers generally deny any cause of this kind. St. Augustine, against the epistle of Parmenianus, book 2, number 25, says: "We bring forward these proofs from the Holy Scriptures, so that it may appear easily that nothing is graver than the sacrilege of schism: because there is no just necessity for cutting off unity, since the good tolerate the bad, who will in no way harm them spiritually, precisely so that they may not be spiritually separated from the good, when the consideration of preserving peace restrains or defers the severity of discipline," etc. And in book 3, number 2: "Therefore let us hold unshaken and firm that no good persons can divide themselves from it, that is, that no good persons, even if they suffer bad persons known to themselves, wherever they may live, are to be separated on account of them from good persons placed far away and unknown by the rash sacrilege of schism." And St. Irenaeus, book 4, chapter 33, writes: "For no correction so great can be made by them as is the destruction of schism. But he will judge all those who are outside the truth, that is, who are outside the Church; but he himself will be judged by no one." 2. Are the corrupt morals of Catholics said to be a just cause? But, leaving aside the rest, this supposes that the Church is composed only of the just, which we refuted above. Hence St. Augustine, against Gaudentius, book 2, chapter 3, says: "What do you say? Necessity compelled us, as just persons, to

leave the unjust? Scripture answers you: A bad son calls himself just." And in sermon 88, number 26: "Surely it is already manifest to your prudence how all such testimonies of the Scriptures are to be received: that when Scripture sounds forth that we ought to withdraw from the wicked, we are commanded to understand nothing other than that we withdraw in heart, lest we commit a greater evil in the separation of the good than we flee in the conjunction of the bad, as the Donatists themselves did... Certainly the Prophet said manifestly: Withdraw and go out from there, and touch not the unclean. In order that I may understand what he said, I attend to what he did. By his deed he explains his saying to me. He said: Withdraw. To whom did he say this? Certainly to the just. From whom did he say that they should withdraw? Certainly from sinners and the unjust. I ask whether he himself withdrew from such persons. I find that he did not withdraw. Therefore he understood it otherwise." Indeed the heretics themselves at last admit this. Calvin, against Pighius, book 1, writes "that his own are not so morose that they have judged that the Church must be split because of vices of morals, even the gravest." "We know none so shameless," says Crocius, "as to say that one must withdraw from the communion of the true Church on account of corrupt morals." "Therefore Christ warned us," according to the Apology of the Augsburg Confession in its conferences on the Church, "that, offended by the private vices either of priests or of the people, we should not stir up schisms." 3. Are new rites instituted by the Church said to be a just cause of schism? "In those matters," says St. Augustine, letter 85 to Casulanus, "concerning which divine Scripture has established nothing certain, the custom of the people of God, or the institutions of the elders, are to be held as law. If we should wish to dispute about these things, and from the custom of some to disapprove others, there will arise an endless struggle which, by the labor of speech, since it indicates no certain documents of truth, must certainly be avoided, lest by the storm of contention it cloud over the serenity of charity." There is also the confession of the Protestants among the brothers de Walenburch, in the same place, chapter 5. 4. Are heresies said to be a just cause of schism? But: a. the Church cannot fail in faith; b. the unity of faith, as we saw in the preceding proposition, depends upon the unity of government; c. if by an impossible hypothesis the Church were stained by heresy, by that very fact it would cease to be the true Church of Christ, and those who separated would constitute it; and therefore the one true Church of Christ would always remain. Compare the often-cited brothers de Walenburch, in the same place, chapters 5-8.

665. III. These things, as is clear, equally fit the introduction of schism and permanence in it. But the Fathers also expressly contemplate this latter case. Thus, for example, St. Optatus of Milevis, book 1, page 21: "You see, therefore, brother Parmenianus, that these two crimes, so evil, so grave, of betrayal and schism, pertain to your leaders. Recognize it even late... since it is established that your predecessors committed this other wickedness, schism, you also labor to follow in their criminal footprints, so that what those predecessors had done under the title of schism, you also may seem long ago to have done and now to be doing. They broke peace in their times; you exterminate unity. Concerning your fathers and concerning you it can rightly be said: 'If the blind lead the blind, both fall into the pit,' Matthew 15.14. Furious envy blinded the eyes of your fathers; rivalry has blinded yours." But separation from the Church is voluntary whether someone withdraws from it, or places or preserves a cause on account of which he is cut off or remains cut off. **Section IV Certain Difficulties Are Satisfied**

666. Many ecclesiastical documents are usually brought forward by the adversaries, especially by Jurieu and Palmer, from which they contend that they overturn the necessity of that unity in the Church which we have hitherto set forth and proved. There is not indeed leisure to refute all things one by one; but we shall report the principal ones, with certain observations premised, by which an answer is easily made to each. First of all, let us distinguish a threefold unity in the Church: 1. the unity of the members among themselves; 2. the unity of the members, or of particular Churches, with the one universal Church; 3. the unity of the Church itself, which, if removed, there would exist several true Churches of Christ. We do not deny that dissensions and divisions can exist among the various members of the Church. We also concede that the members themselves or certain particular Churches can fail from the

unity of the Church. Indeed, we concede that the unity of the Church itself asserted by us can sometimes be shaken and disturbed. But we altogether deny that the unity of the Church itself, about which alone the question is, can ever be so removed or interrupted that the Church itself is split into various communions, each of which would be the true Church of Christ.

667. Now the things which are heaped up here by the adversaries can be reduced, as it were, to two classes. The first includes various separations of heretics and schismatics from the Catholic Church; these do not bear on the matter, since, as is clear from what has been said, they can be separated and placed outside the Church, while the one true Church of Christ nevertheless remains. But the second class is drawn from divisions and schisms which are sometimes said to have existed within the true Church itself. Yet concerning many of these it is plainly established that they were contentions among various members of the Church, and that a true separation from the Church itself did not intervene. There is, however, one fact which seems to present a special difficulty, namely the great schism which is called Western; concerning this we must deal a little more fully. These things therefore having been noted, let us mention the principal cases.

668. They object first: St. Victor excommunicated the Asian Churches, which nevertheless, notwithstanding this excommunication, remained in the unity of the Catholic Church; therefore the Church at that time was, as it were, divided into two parts, and consequently by no means one. The response is: 1. With foundation it can be asserted that St. Victor did not proceed beyond threats. For: a. Eusebius, book 5, chapter 24, says that Victor "was attempting to cut off those Churches from communion"; but one who attempts to cut off has not yet cut off. b. The same author relates concerning St. Irenaeus, and St. Jerome hands down the same in the catalogue of ecclesiastical writers, chapter 25, as do Photius in the *Bibliotheca* and Nicephorus, ecclesiastical history, book 4, chapter 38, that he admonished St. Victor "not to cut off whole Churches of God from communion." But one who is admonished not to cut off seems not yet to have cut off. 2. If it be granted that a sentence of excommunication was issued by St. Victor, it is asserted with foundation that, at the insistence of bishops, it was revoked or suspended. For: a. Sozomen relates that the controversy was then quieted: "It was established," he says, "that each, celebrating the feast as they had been accustomed, should by no means depart from mutual communion." b. St. Firmilian testifies in the letter to Cyprian that on account of this question communion had not been interrupted. c. The silence of Eusebius confirms this; he would have criticized Victor's manner of acting if, at the prayers of St. Irenaeus and so many other bishops, "that he should rather be willing to think those things which suited peace," he had carried the sentence into execution, if it had been issued, so that communion was broken. 3. Finally, if it be granted both that excommunication was issued and that it was carried into execution, the Asian Churches would truly have been schismatic, just as they were held to be such after the Nicene Synod. This is clear from the very history of that controversy; for Victor asserted that he had the power of separating the Asians from the unity of the Church. St. Irenaeus and others, by the very fact that they asked Victor not to use that power, acknowledged it. Therefore, if the sentence had been issued, carried into execution, and the Asians had spurned it, they would have been placed outside the unity of the Church.

669. II. They take an argument from the very well-known controversy between St. Stephen and St. Cyprian. For the latter, with the bishops of Africa, and Firmilian with certain bishops of the East, contended that the baptism of heretics was invalid, and therefore that those who, having been baptized by heretics, sought the Church, had to be rebaptized. St. Stephen, on the contrary, with all the rest, taught that baptism conferred by heretics was valid, and therefore that nothing was to be innovated except what had been handed down. Although Cyprian did not acquiesce in the opinion of Stephen, nevertheless no one judged the unity of faith and communion dissolved between him and St. Stephen, or between the Roman Church and the African Church. The response is that there are various solutions of this difficulty. And: 1. St. Cyprian did not himself withdraw from the communion of Stephen. He himself testifies to this in the Third Council of Carthage, saying: "It remains that we bring forth what we think concerning this very matter, judging no one

or removing anyone from the right of communion, if he should think differently." Hence St. Augustine, book 1 *On Baptism*, chapter 18: Therefore "he did not separate himself by divided communion from the rest who thought differently"; but, as St. Jerome adds in the dialogue against the Luciferians, "he remained in the communion of those who had contradicted his opinion." But how can this be understood? St. Cyprian thought, although by error, that the question concerning the baptism of heretics was not one of faith, but of discipline. Compare Natalis Alexander, century 3, dissertation 12, article 4. Hence he sinned by not obeying the Holy Pontiff, but did not withdraw from the Church; all the more, they say, because St. Stephen, from a certain prudent economy, judged that this was to be tolerated for a time. Finally, they say, by the sickle of martyrdom he purged his disobedience. 2. Nor does St. Stephen ever seem to have separated St. Cyprian from the unity of the Church. For: a. St. Cyprian himself indicates this, who with a reproachful spirit thus addresses the Holy Pontiff: "Does he give honor to God who, a friend of heretics and an enemy of Christians, thinks that the priests of God, defending the truth of Christ and the unity of the Church, are to be cut off?" Therefore St. Stephen had thought that they were to be cut off, but he had not cut them off. b. Dionysius of Alexandria confirms this, according to Eusebius, book 7, chapter 2; in a letter to Xystus, Stephen's successor, he reports that Stephen had signified in his letters that "for this reason he would depart from their communion, because they were rebaptizing heretics." Therefore he had not departed. c. St. Augustine often openly declares that unity was not broken. Thus, for example, in the book *On the One Baptism against Petilian*, chapter 12, and book 5 against the Donatists, chapter 25, he says: "Behold, there were two, to be silent about the others, bishops of most eminent Churches, namely of the Roman and Carthaginian Churches, Stephen and Cyprian, both established in Catholic unity. Many agreed with the former, few with the latter, both groups standing with them in unity. Peace prevailed in their hearts, so that in such a dispute no evil of schism arose among them." How again can this be understood? As is clear, St. Stephen indeed proposed the doctrine of the Roman Church, but abstained from issuing a definitive sentence, permitting Cyprian to believe otherwise in the meantime, until the question, once clarified, should finally be defined. Nor does it stand in the way that Firmilian seems to judge that St. Stephen issued a sentence; for many doubt the genuineness of that letter in which Firmilian asserts this, while others hold that he was deceived. This is not marvelous if one considers the too-embittered spirit with which he was writing and the distance of the place. Compare Raymond Missorius, disputation on Firmilian's letter, chapter 11. Greater faith certainly must be given to St. Augustine, who testified in the book *On the One Baptism*, chapter 14, that Stephen, although he threatened excommunication, nevertheless did not break communion. "Therefore when Stephen," he says, "not only did not rebaptize heretics, but even judged that those doing this, or decreeing that it be done, were to be excommunicated, as the letters of other bishops and of Cyprian himself show, nevertheless Cyprian remained with him in the peace of unity." 3. There are not lacking those who judge that the history of this controversy, in whole or in part, must be sent away among fables. Surely: a. St. Augustine speaks doubtfully about the writings of St. Cyprian which come into controversy; for, against Cresconius, book 2, chapter 31, he says: "if it is established that they are his writings, which you think must be brought forward for you"; and chapter 25: "but if you think and boast that Cyprian also favors you in this opinion," namely concerning the invalidity of the baptism of heretics; and chapter 32: "or whoever wrote that letter," to Jubaianus. b. Especially worthy of consideration are the things which St. Augustine has in letter 93 to Vincent the Rogatist: "But that Cyprian thought otherwise concerning Baptism than the form and custom of the Church held is found not in canonical writings, but in his own letters and in the letters of the Council. But that he corrected that opinion is not found; nevertheless it must not incongruously be thought concerning such a man that he did correct it, and perhaps it was suppressed by those who were too delighted by this error and did not wish to lack so great a patronage, although there are not lacking those who contend that Cyprian did not think this at all, but that it was fabricated under his name by presumptuous and lying men," etc. But enough here concerning this difficulty, concerning which we shall speak again in the following disputation.

670. They say thirdly: The French with impunity: 1. resisted the Second Council of Nicaea; 2. and the same remove the Council of Florence from the list of legitimate and ecumenical councils. The response to the first: First of all, let it be noted that the Council of Frankfurt, held in the year 794 under Charlemagne, was indeed approved by Hadrian I with regard to those things which it established against Felix of Urgel and Elipandus of Toledo, but by no means with regard to those things which it imprudently said against the Nicene Synod. With regard to these things the men of Frankfurt erred by a twofold error of fact: 1. From a perverse version, they thought that the Nicene Fathers had decreed that holy images were to be adored just like the most holy Trinity; whereas, on the contrary, in act 3 it is said: "I receive and embrace the venerable images; but the adoration which is according to latria I preserve only for the supersubstantial and life-giving Trinity." 2. They thought that the Nicene Synod had not been approved by the Roman Pontiff, as is clear from the Caroline books asserting this and from Hincmar of Rheims. Others add: 3. that the men of Frankfurt also erred by an error of right, denying the due cult of the holy images; but that Hadrian and his legates, from a certain prudent economy, left the Franks in their ignorance for some time, lest graver evils should follow. Moreover, once the matters had been explained and rightly understood, the Germans and the French received the Nicene Synod and the cult of the holy images defined by it. Compare Cabassut, *Ecclesiastical Notice*, at the eighth century, and Christian Lupus, *Dissertation on the Seventh General Synod*, chapter 15 and following. To the second: The Council of Florence was never rejected by the Gallican Church, but only by certain Frenchmen who resisted it, not formally from a will of opposing the Church, but materially on account of an error of fact. All these things are clear: 1. from Natalis Alexander, an author otherwise most devoted to Gallican opinions, who says: "The Gallican Church nowhere opposed the Florentine Synod, nor was it opposed to the union of the Greeks and the definition of faith issued in it; indeed it perpetually venerated it"; 2. from Berthier, *History of the Gallican Church*, volume 16, book 48, who testifies that the Gallican clergy and the theological faculty of Paris thought no otherwise; 3. the principal French writers also agree, such as Bossuet, de Marca, etc.

671. They say fourthly: In the time of the Western schism, the unity of the Church was interrupted. In order that the force of this difficulty and its solution may be well understood, it will help to recall briefly the history of that schism. Hence: 1. The last of the Pontiffs legitimate by the opinion and consent of all in the fourteenth century of the Church had been Gregory XI, who, at the exhortation of St. Catherine of Siena, left Avignon and restored himself to Rome. When he died, the Roman people, with threats and arms, demanded a Pontiff Roman by country, or certainly Italian. Bartholomew Prignano, a Neapolitan, Archbishop of Bari, was created, and received the name Urban VI. He immediately sent letters concerning his election, and the whole Church acknowledged him as Supreme Pontiff. For at least two months no question was raised concerning the validity of the election. 2. But when Urban VI, scarcely made Pontiff, insisted not without severity on reforming the morals of the Cardinals, the French Cardinals with the Spaniard, for the rest were Italians, withdrew to Anagni. They declared Urban's election null, under the pretext that they had voted from fear; and they gave letters concerning that matter on August 9, namely in the fourth month after the election. Then they began to act concerning a new election, and, the three Italian Cardinals also having been won over, for the fourth had died meanwhile, at Fondi in Campania they elected the Cardinal of Geneva, called Clement VII. 3. At the beginning only a few adhered to him. But when the encyclical letter of the Cardinals became known, in which there was contained the unanimous testimony concerning the violence which they said had been brought upon them in the election, and at the same time the rather serious tumults which had arisen at the time of the election were enlarged, a great disturbance of minds was produced, and entire provinces withdrew from Urban. 4. To Urban VI succeeded Boniface IX in 1389, Innocent VII in 1404, and Gregory XII in 1406. But on the other side, to Clement VII succeeded Peter de Luna, called Benedict XIII, in 1394. Thus far we have two obediences, as they say. 5. Since these things were so, the Cardinals of each obedience determined to convene a general council at Pisa, which then seemed the only means of restoring peace to the Church. Each Pontiff was called to the council, and, according to the

oath issued, it was proposed that both should lay down the pontifical tiara; but if not, that they should be canonically deprived of authority. With each Pontiff deposed, Peter Philargus, commonly called of Candia, Cardinal priest of the Twelve Holy Apostles, was elected by the Cardinals of each obedience; he imposed upon himself the name Alexander V. Yet the schism did not quiet down, for Benedict XIII and Gregory XII by no means subjected themselves to the sentence of the synod. Hence three obediences came about. 6. Meanwhile, on May 3 of the year 1410, Alexander V died, in whose place on the seventeenth day of the same month Balthasar Cossa, a Neapolitan, created Cardinal by Boniface IX, was substituted, and he bore the appellation John XXIII. Certain cities of Italy still reverenced Gregory XII, and a great part of Spain Benedict XIII, because the authority of the Council of Pisa was not established. Hence John XXIII announced a general Council to be held at Constance, over whose first session he also presided. 7. In this Council: a. John XXIII was deposed, and he held the sentence as ratified; b. by law it was provided that neither he himself, nor Peter de Luna, nor Angelo Correr could be elected Pontiff; c. the resignation of Gregory XII was received in session 14, who before the resignation convoked the Council through the Cardinal of Ragusa of his obedience; d. by a decretory sentence Peter de Luna, or Benedict XIII, was deposed in session 37; e. the legates of the Spains joined themselves to the Synod; and from the Cardinals of the threefold obedience and other electors appointed by the synod, the Supreme Pontiff Odo Colonna, Cardinal deacon, was created, who chose the name Martin V.

672. With these things posited, behold the difficulty which arises: there is no unity of government where there are several independent societies. But for forty years in the Roman Church there were first two, then three obediences, namely independent Christian societies. Therefore. I respond by denying the minor. For there were indeed two, then three factions, as it were, of the same society; but there were not two or three separated and independent societies. To understand this solution, let us consider now not the Church, but any kingdom whatever, and let us see when it must be said to be divided so that it is no longer one kingdom. This certainly happens when it is split into several parts, each of which has its own king, and none of them judges that he is king of the whole kingdom, but of that part. Then certainly there would be several perfect societies of one and the same order, each of which would be independent, and consequently all together could not constitute one kingdom. But if the same multitude is split into several parts, each of which has its own king, who together with the multitude adhering to him judges and contends that he is king of the whole kingdom, and not only of the part adhering to him, then there will indeed be error with regard to the subject in whom supreme power legitimately resides; but the kingdom remains one. Unity has been disturbed and shaken, but not abolished and destroyed. Now during the division with which we are dealing: 1. All the obediences professed that the Catholic Church is essentially one, also by the unity of supreme government; that this supreme government pertains to him who, legitimately elected as Roman Pontiff, is the legitimate successor of St. Peter; that several legitimate successors of St. Peter cannot exist simultaneously. From where, therefore, did division arise? From an error of fact. For each obedience thought that its own Pontiff had been legitimately elected, and accordingly that he held the supreme principate not over the part which in fact was now subjected to him, but over all obediences, or over the universal Church. 2. Moved by this faith, all persons of whatever obedience seriously labored to remove the error of fact and to know with certainty the legitimately elected Pontiff who would preside over all the obediences, or over the universal Church. And since, while the doubt about the legitimate election of the Pontiff remains, there is no supreme tribunal able to expel the doubt except the assembly of bishops, all the obediences brought the matter to that assembly, all meanwhile prepared to render obedience to the one legitimate Pontiff once certainly known. 3. Therefore in the first period of the division, namely from the election of Clement VII up to the Council of Pisa, since the body of bishops had not yet brought forth a judgment, all the faithful invoked it. In the second period, namely from the Council of Pisa up to the Council of Constance, since judgment had been issued by a Council which seemed ecumenical, a great part of the faithful, having left Gregory XII and Benedict XIII, received Alexander V. Yet since the ecumenicity of that Council was not

established with certainty, not a few among the Catholics refused to acquiesce in it, until in the third period a certainly ecumenical Council defined the matter. Then all, acquiescing in its sentence, obeyed the one supreme Head legitimately elected and certainly acknowledged. Therefore that which is called the Western schism, far from standing in the way of the unity of the Roman Church, the true Church of Christ, exists as a new argument for the same.

Article 2. Whether the Church of Christ Ought to Be Holy

673. The second property of the Church is Sanctity; for we say in the Symbol: "I believe One, Holy... Church." Certainly the Church is distinguished in the Sacred Letters by those names which most clearly show its sanctity. For it is everywhere called "the kingdom of heaven," "the Body of Christ," "the spouse of Christ," "the holy temple, the dwelling place of God," "the house of God," "the city of God." Especially the Church, according to the testimony of the Apostle in Ephesians 1.23, is the Body of Christ; and therefore, adhering to the head and receiving from him the continual influx of sanctity, it cannot but be holy.

674. But if there is no difficulty in asserting the sanctity of the Church generally, defining the true concept of its sanctity is not without difficulty. For while the Innovators confess the Church to be holy and ascribe sanctity to it on account of several titles which we too acknowledge, nevertheless they deny that it is holy on account of other titles which are also true titles of sanctity.

675. It will help first of all to note certain general reasons according to which the Church is called and is Holy. Therefore the Church is Holy: 1. by reason of its Author and invisible Head, which is Jesus Christ; 2. by reason of its end, which is the same as that which Christ established for himself in his mission, as we demonstrated above; 3. by reason of its means. For if sanctity of end is owed to the Church, sanctity of means cannot be denied to it. Hence especially its doctrine must be holy, not only because it flows from Christ, who is holy, but also because it leads to sanctity; holy are the sacraments, which are ordered to sanctification and produce sanctity, etc.; 4. especially the Church is called holy because, as the Catechism of the Council of Trent says, on the ninth article of the Symbol, number 15, "it has been consecrated and dedicated to God. For thus other things of this sort... have been accustomed to be called holy, when they are assigned and dedicated to divine worship. Of this kind in the old law are vessels, vestments, altars; in it also the firstborn, who were dedicated to God Most High, were called holy."

676. But in order that we may come nearer to defining the concept of that sanctity which we here vindicate for the Church, it must be observed that, although the name of sanctity is taken in many ways in the Scriptures themselves, nevertheless properly, as Suarez says in *On the Incarnation*, disputation 17, section 6, "that is called holy which is pure and clean before God, as is established from the usage of Scripture." With this agree the things which Benedict XIV writes in *On the Canonization of Saints*, book 3, chapter 21, article 3: "Sanctity is nothing other than perfect purity, free from every uncleanness and altogether immaculate." But since, in the present state, we acquire immunity from uncleanness of spirit, or from sin, through the infusion of sanctifying grace and virtues, that society will rightly and deservedly be called holy which has as its end sanctifying grace and the exercise of virtues; suitable means of effectively procuring these things; and a people which in fact continually obtains interior grace and exercises virtues.

677. Hence the sanctity of the Church can be considered in two ways, actively and passively. The sanctity of the Church considered actively is its continual action and efficacy, and also its solicitude and industry in sanctifying its members, through the instruction of doctrine, through the sacraments, government, etc., all of which are means in themselves most efficacious for sanctity. This seems to be called sanctification rather than sanctity. But sanctity taken passively is the effect of active sanctity, namely the exercise of virtues and internal grace flourishing in the members of the Church. Moreover each belongs to the Church, but in a diverse mode and degree.

678. Now, with regard to the active sanctity of the Church, only the wondrous fecundity of the Church must be noted, by which it both constantly and perpetually brings forth children to God, and promotes some of them to an outstanding exercise of virtue and to eminent grace. To this also belongs the grace of miracles, which Christ both used for the conversion of men and wished the Apostles to use. But with regard to passive sanctity, it is necessary to observe certain things, lest, with its concept wrongly understood, difficulties should arise. And - 1) indeed, the subject of which passive holiness is asserted is the very Body of the Church, or the society which Christ instituted, not all and each of the members of that body or society. For passive holiness depends not only on the activity of the Church, but also on the free cooperation of men; and since this can fail, and sometimes does fail, in individual persons, the holiness of the Church on earth, under this respect, is not consummated but begun. These things are clear from what has already been established concerning the members of the Church. 2) But the dead or languid members which are in the Church by no means prevent the Church from being, and from truly being called, holy. For a) that some members are languid or dead, they certainly do not have from the Church; indeed, in order to be such, they must rather resist the continual action and influence of the Church, and prevent the life of the Church from flowing down to them and being communicated to them. b) As Suarez rightly observes (On Faith, disp. 9, sect. 7, no. 2): the Church receives this denomination, holy, first from the better part; for there are always in her very many just persons, and although they are fewer in number than sinners, nevertheless, because before God one just person is of greater esteem than many sinners, the Church can be denominated from them, especially since the holiness of the just is from the intention and institution of the Church, whereas wickedness is contrary to her. Compare also no. 3. 3) "Nor ought it seem wonderful to anyone," says the Catechism of the Council of Trent (loc. cit.), "that the Church is called holy, although she contains many sinners. For the faithful are called holy who have been made the people of God, and who, having received faith and baptism, have consecrated themselves to Christ; although they offend in many things and do not perform what they promised; just as also those who profess some art retain the name of artisans even if they do not observe the precepts of the art..." St. Augustine excellently, interpreting those words of the Prophet, "Preserve my soul, for I am holy," says: "Let the Body of Christ dare, let that one man, crying from the ends of the earth, with his head and under his head, dare to say: I am holy." For he has received the grace of baptism and the remission of sins. 4) Since "to each one grace is given according to the measure of the donation of Christ," and since the cooperation of men with the grace received is diverse, the passive holiness of the Church, in the members themselves which are actually holy, has diverse degrees (cf. On Grace, no. 1109 ff.). Hence there is a) some degree of holiness which can be called common; it consists in this, that men, aided by the grace of God, keep the precepts and are preserved in the state of grace. b) There is a more perfect degree of holiness in those who, by no means content with observing only the precepts, labor also to observe the evangelical counsels, and embrace that state of life which is called the state of perfection. c) In these very degrees there are other and still other degrees: for "star differs from star in brightness." But the degree of holiness especially to be considered is that which is called heroic, and is described by Cardinal Laura (in Benedict XIV, op. cit., book 3, chapter 21, no. 10) as "that degree, perfection, or splendor and excellence of virtue which makes a man, concerning the matter of that virtue [what is said of one particular virtue is to be said also of the complex of virtues], operate above the common mode of operation of other men [just men], and in this be like God." 5) Therefore holiness is asserted of the Church not only insofar as several of her members are actually holy, but also insofar as those diverse degrees of holiness are found in diverse members; whence deservedly the words are applied to her (Ps. 44.10): "the queen stood at thy right hand in gilded clothing, surrounded with variety." Indeed, if the discussion is about holiness which also includes the counsels, it is evident that it cannot be lacking to the Church; for Christ wills and promotes in the Church holiness according to the norm proposed in the Gospel, and those counsels are evangelical. Hence there are also always some in the Church who attain the heroic degree of virtue; nor can it be understood that Christ the Lord should find in no member of his the perfection to which he exhorted, and which he intends, namely that by which one is perfect as the heavenly Father is perfect.

679. In order that we may thoroughly understand this active and passive holiness of the Church, which is her genuine holiness, it is helpful to recall what we established above (nos. 410 ff.), namely that the Church consists of soul and body, and that she is the Body of Christ (no. 412); and therefore she is not like a corpse without life and without motion, but is living with the life of Christ and operating. Now 1) just as the soul, although it is the principle of life in the body, nevertheless does not vivify it unless it is intimately united to it, communicates to it a new being and new operations, and the body in turn serves the operations of the soul itself; so also, in the Church, in order that she can be called living and be living, or be a living body, it is necessary that, in its own manner, there intervene between her soul and body a union by which the soul and body of the same Church exert their power, and the body, by serving the soul, as it were manifests and exercises the life which it has received. 2) In the human individual, when the seed has been generated, the body is first developed; then the soul is infused into it, which informs and vivifies it. So likewise the Church begins from generation, which comes to her through baptism; and, if the discussion is about adults, she is prepared through the preaching of the word of God, which things are external, until through the infusion of faith, hope, charity, and sanctifying grace, which are internal gifts, there is had the soul by which one becomes a living member of the Church. 3) Just as the body is nourished by foods received from without, and the mind is informed and perfected by word or instruction, so the Church is nourished by the word of God and the other external aids, since these are so many vehicles of grace and holiness, and conduce to the perfecting of the soul itself: the body serves the soul. In turn, the soul, vivifying the body, operates in it, with it, and through it. Moehler writes excellently on this matter (Symbolism, part 1, chapter 4, section 48). In the English version cited here, he says in substance that Catholics teach that the visible Church comes first and gives birth to the invisible, whereas Lutherans reverse the order; he then explains that the kingdom of God came to men from without through Christ and through external media, and that the invisible Church continually springs from the visible Church. Thus the soul also perfects the body; and thus the Church externally manifests her interior life, or holiness. 4) But the Church, as we have seen (nos. 454 ff.), from her end and from Christ's institution is as it were eminently visible as the true Church of Christ; therefore her life must be manifested in such a way that no place for deception can exist. For this reason this manifestation of the Church's life is adorned not only by profession of faith, exterior worship of God, holy operations, and so forth, but also by wonderful fecundity, miracles, and the other supernatural charisms. 5) Since here the question is about supernatural life, whose Author is the Holy Spirit, who therefore (no. 418) is called the Heart of the Church, Albert the Great deservedly explains the article of the Symbol, "I believe the holy Church," in this way (On the Sacrament of the Mass, tract 2, chapter 9): "Looking," he says, "to this, that the Holy Spirit is given and sent for the sanctifying of the creature, which holiness never fails in the Church, although sometimes it may fail in a person, he said, the holy Church. And because every article is founded upon divine and eternal truth, not upon created truth, because every creature is vain and does not have solid truth, therefore this article is to be resolved thus to the proper work of the Holy Spirit: I believe in the Holy Spirit, not only according to himself, as the preceding article says, but I also believe in him according to his proper work, which is that he sanctifies the Church; which holiness he pours forth in the sacraments and virtues and gifts which he gives for the perfection of holiness, and finally in miracles and gifts gratuitously given, such as wisdom, knowledge, faith, discernment of spirits, operation of healings, prophecy, and things of this kind, which the Spirit gives for the demonstration of the holiness of the Church."

680. This is the genuine idea of the Holiness of the Church. Protestants, however, 1) do not deny some active holiness of the Church, although they exclude the chief means, such as the Sacraments, government, and so forth; but these are not matters for this place. 2) Some so exaggerate passive holiness that they suppose the Church consists only of holy members: this error we refuted above (nos. 616 ff.). Others, among whom, as it seems, are Litton and the Established Church of England in its homilies (in Murray, disp. 8, sect. 1, no. 16), so attenuate it that they think it can fail in all members. 3) But all seem more

or less to deny that splendid manifestation of holiness, which expels every doubt, through miracles and the other charisms. Middleton candidly states the cause of this denial (Introductory Discourse, p. 51), saying in substance: if you accept the ancient writers who narrate these miracles as upright witnesses, you must also admit the practices and doctrines which those miracles were done to confirm, or with which they are inseparably connected; and these are precisely the things which Protestants reject, such as monastic institutions, the cult of relics and images, prayers for the dead, and the invocation of the saints.

681. From these things it is plainly understood what holiness we must vindicate for the Church. Therefore: Section II. The Proposed Question Is Solved. Proposition XXIX. To the Church of Christ, which in the sacred letters is proclaimed holy in manifold ways, there is chiefly to be attributed holiness both 1. active, by which she continually labors for the sanctification of men through most efficacious means, and 2. passive, by which holy members are never lacking in her bosom. 3. Moreover, each is so excellent that not only by the profession of faith and the exercise of good works, but also by wonderful fecundity, miracles, and the other supernatural charisms, it renders the Church conspicuous to all as a body living with supernatural life.

682. The first part is proved. I. It is read (Ezek. 37.26 ff.): "And I will establish them and multiply them, and I will give my sanctification in the midst of them forever. And my tabernacle shall be in them; and I will be their God, and they shall be my people. And the nations shall know that I am the Lord, the Sanctifier of Israel, when my sanctification shall be in the midst of them forever." And (Eph. 4): "And he gave some apostles, and some prophets, and others evangelists, and others pastors and teachers, for the consummation of the saints unto the work of ministry, unto the edification of the body of Christ," etc. See no. 651. In the cited words of Ezekiel, the immediate subject is Judah and Israel, who under one king David were to constitute one kingdom; but just as Judah and Israel represent all peoples, so David represents Christ, with whom God entered into an everlasting covenant concerning that people, or concerning the Church. Therefore, from the cited testimonies it is established that God is the Sanctifier of his people, namely the Church, forever, and that he works sanctification through the ministry of Apostles, Pastors, and Doctors, namely of the teaching Church. Therefore this Church forever labors for the sanctification of men. But active holiness consists in this. Therefore.

683. II. Christ communicated to the Church his very mission; and therefore he willed that in his stead she should teach men the way of salvation through an external ministry, cleanse them from sin, sanctify them, and, for attaining this, he furnished her with suitable and efficacious means (nos. 482 ff.). But the Church can never fail from her end and from her institution; this will be clearer where we treat of the indefectibility of the Church. Therefore the Church continually labors, through the means which she has received from Christ and which are most efficacious, for the salvation of men. But the active holiness of the Church consists in this. Therefore.

684. III. The Church, as Spouse of Christ, is most closely joined to him in will; and, as subject to the interior influence of the Holy Spirit, being moved by him she continually operates (no. 419). But the will of Christ is the sanctification of men, and the operation of the Holy Spirit tends to our sanctification. Therefore the Church continually labors for this sanctification; and therefore active holiness can never be absent from her.

685. IV. In the Church, as we shall soon prove, holy persons can never be lacking. But Christ placed all the means of salvation in the Church. Therefore these means are always employed by the Church for sanctifying her members; and consequently active holiness always flourishes in the Church.

686. The second part is proved. I. From Scripture. For - 1) very often in the Scriptures there is expressed the ardent and efficacious desire of Christ to sanctify his people, that is, the Church; but it is altogether incredible that such a desire should lack every effect, even for a time. Therefore

holy persons are never lacking in the Church. The major is proved. It is said (Luke 12.49 ff.): "I have come to cast fire upon the earth, and what do I will except that it be kindled? But I have a baptism with which I am to be baptized, and how am I constrained until it be accomplished?" And (John 15.16): "I have chosen you and appointed you, that you should go and bring forth fruit, and that your fruit should remain." And (17.19): "And for them I sanctify myself, that they also may be sanctified in truth. And I ask not for them only," etc. And (Eph. 5.25): "Christ loved the Church and delivered himself up for her, that he might sanctify her," etc. And (Titus 2.14): "He gave himself for us, that he might redeem us from all iniquity, and cleanse for himself an acceptable people, a pursuer of good works." The argument is confirmed, because from Adam to Noah, from Noah to Moses, and through the whole time of the Old Law, some holy persons were never lacking, although at times they were few in number. Therefore, since after Christ there is a greater abundance of graces, so that we are said to live under the Law of grace, they can never be lacking in the Church. 2) It is read (Isa. 62.3 ff.): "And thou shalt be a crown of glory in the hand of the Lord, and a royal diadem in the hand of thy God. Thou shalt no longer be called Forsaken, and thy land shall no more be called Desolate; but thou shalt be called My Will in Her, and thy land Inhabited, because the Lord has been well pleased in thee, and thy land shall be inhabited. For the young man shall dwell with the virgin, and thy sons shall dwell in thee. And the bridegroom shall rejoice over the bride, and thy God shall rejoice over thee," etc. "...And they shall call them, The holy people, the redeemed of the Lord. But thou shalt be called, A city sought, and not Forsaken." And (Eph. 5): "Husbands, love your wives, as Christ also loved the Church and delivered himself up for her, that he might sanctify her, cleansing her by the laver of water in the word of life; that he might present to himself a glorious Church, not having spot or wrinkle or any such thing, but that she might be holy and immaculate. So also husbands ought to love their wives as their own bodies." Let the similar testimonies already given above be recalled. Hence: the Church is often called in the Scriptures - a) the object of divine complacency and of special love, and indeed forever, since she is the city not forsaken. But the object of such complacency and love is only the just (cf. On Grace, no. 1008 ff.). Therefore. b) The Church is called the land inhabited by God, the House of God, the Temple of God, the dwelling place of the Holy Spirit. But God is not said to inhabit except through sanctifying grace (cf. On Grace, no. 1027 ff.). Therefore. c) The Church is called the Spouse of Christ; therefore Christ loves her with the love of friendship, and with the same love he is loved by her. But only the just are loved by God with this love, and only the just so love him. Therefore. d) The Church is called the Body of Christ. But the body of Christ cannot be dead, but lives by the very life of Christ; and the life of Christ is the life of grace. Therefore. 3) The same can be concluded from parables cited several times. For - a) the good fruit grows together with the bad until the consummation of the age (Matt. 13.24); b) in the parable of the dragnet, good and bad fish remain together and are to be separated only at the end of the world (Matt. 13.47); c) in the parable of the great house, gold and silver vessels exist in it just as wooden and earthen vessels do (2 Tim. 2.20). But by the field, the dragnet, and the great house the Church is signified; and by the good fruits, good fish, and precious vessels the just are signified. Therefore.

687. II. From the Fathers. St. Irenaeus (book 23, chapter 24, no. 1): "For where the Church is, there also is the Spirit of God; and where the Spirit of God is, there is the Church and all grace: but the Spirit is truth." St. Cyril of Jerusalem (Catechesis 18, no. 23): "For the Church is truly called catholic... also because she subjects every kind of men to right worship, rulers and private persons, learned and unlearned. And finally, because in general she cures and heals every kind of sins which are perpetrated through soul and body; and she possesses every kind of virtue, by whatever name it may be signified, in deeds and words, and in spiritual gifts of every species." St. Ambrose (Hexaemeron, book 4, no. 22): "The Synagogue says in the Song of Songs: 'Tell me, thou whom my soul has loved, where thou feedest, where thou liest at midday, lest perhaps I become one wrapped about above the flocks of thy companions,' that is, tell me, O Christ, whom my soul has loved. Why not rather, whom it loves? But the Synagogue loved; the Church loves, nor does she ever change her affection toward her Christ." As regards St. Augustine, after so many passages already adduced (no. 619) in which it is affirmed that the Church consists of good and bad

members, it seems superfluous to bring forward here other testimonies from the same author. I shall add only what he has (sermon 214): "Honor, love, and proclaim also the holy Church, your mother, as the heavenly Jerusalem, the holy city of God. She is the one which in this faith that you have heard fructifies and grows throughout the whole world, the Church of the living God, the pillar and ground of truth; she bears the evil, who are to be separated at the end, while meanwhile she withdraws from them by disparity of morals, in the communion of the sacraments." St. Prosper (On Psalm 131), considering the words, "because the Lord has chosen Zion, he has chosen her beforehand for a habitation for himself," says: "Zion itself is the Church, and she herself is the heavenly Jerusalem, to whose peace those run who even now are on pilgrimage. She is the city of God, which, according to the better part of herself, has always remained with her author; and she awaits the part which daily by the grace of God is called back from exile, so that together she may be the whole building of her inhabitant." St. Cyril of Alexandria (On Micah 5-6): "'Glorious things are said of thee, O city of God.' For Christ inhabits the Church and made her a city proper to himself, although by the nature of divinity he fills all things. This city of God, therefore, is as it were a certain land and region of those sanctified and of those enriched by unity in God through the Spirit."

688. The third part is proved. I. From Scripture. For it is read (John 14.12): "Amen, amen, I say to you: he who believes in me, the works which I do, he also shall do, and greater than these he shall do, because I go to the Father." And (Mark 16.17-18): "But these signs shall follow those who believe: in my name they shall cast out demons, they shall speak with new tongues, they shall take up serpents, and if they drink any deadly thing, it shall not harm them; they shall lay hands upon the sick, and they shall be well." And (1 Cor. 12): "There are divisions of operations, but the same God who works all in all. But to each one is given the manifestation of the Spirit unto utility. To one indeed through the Spirit is given the word of wisdom; to another the word of knowledge according to the same Spirit; to another faith in the same Spirit; to another the grace of healings in one Spirit; to another the working of powers; to another prophecy; to another discernment of spirits; to another kinds of tongues; to another interpretation of speeches." Hence: 1) in the cited testimonies are contained Christ's promises concerning the charisms which ought to be in the Church. But promises of this kind are not restricted to any definite time. Therefore they ought always to be in the Church. 2) Christ addresses those to whom he promised that he would be present until the consummation of the age, and he promises those charisms for the good of the society instituted by him, or of the Church. Therefore the same charisms ought to last as long as the assistance of Christ lasts, and as long as the Church herself lasts, namely until the consummation of the age. 3) Indeed, since, according to the Apostle (1 Cor. 14.22), signs were given to unbelievers, not to believers, these extraordinary gifts of God will persevere as long as unbelievers are to be converted to Christ through the Church. But the fullness of the Gentiles, as the same Apostle says (Rom. 11.25), is not to enter into the Church except toward the end of the world; therefore those gifts ought to endure in the Church until the end of the world. 4) In fact, Christ instituted the succession of the Apostles so that through it he might continue to obtain those fruits which he was obtaining through the Apostles; therefore the activity of the Church cannot differ substantially from that of the Apostles in activity and fecundity. Therefore she must have those means by which the preaching of the Apostles obtained fecundity. But among these prodigies were eminent; therefore these also cannot be absent from the ministry of the Church. Therefore, just as the Apostles attested their mission by signs and thus converted the people, so the Church needs prodigies in order to bring unbelievers to the faith and to have a continual testimony to the divinity of her existence. For this reason, as long as there remain nations to be converted or recalled to Christ, so long there remains both the object of mission and the necessity of fecundity in the Church. But the clearest prophecies both of the ancient prophets and of Christ himself foretell that all nations will be converted to Christ. Thus Isaiah (54.1 ff.) addresses the Church: "Praise, O barren one, who dost not bear; sing praise and neigh, thou who didst not bear, because many are the children of the desolate woman, more than of her who has a husband, says the Lord. Enlarge the place of thy tent, and stretch out the skins of thy tabernacles; spare not. Make thy cords long, and strengthen thy stakes. For thou

shalt penetrate to the right and to the left, but thy seed shall inherit the nations." The Apostle expounds these things as concerning the Church of Christ to be gathered from the Gentiles (Gal. 4.27). Many prophecies of this kind exist in the Psalms; and Christ himself (Matt. 8.11) affirms that "many shall come from the east and the west, and shall recline with Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob in the kingdom of heaven"; indeed, he foretells that his Gospel is to be preached in the whole world.

689. II. From the Fathers. For - 1) they not only report many miracles wrought in their own time in the Church, but also from them prove that the Catholic Church is the true Church of Christ. Thus, for example, St. Irenaeus (Against Heresies, book 1, chapter 56) writes: "They [the heretics] cannot give sight to the blind, nor hearing to the deaf, nor drive away all demons, except those which are sent in by themselves, if indeed they even do this; nor restore the weak or paralytics or the lame; so far are they from raising a dead man, as the Lord raised, and as the Apostles did by prayer, and very often in the brotherhood, when for some necessary reason the whole Church in any place, asking through fasting and much supplication, the spirit returned to the dead man, and the man was granted to the prayers of the Saints, that they might believe that there is a resurrection from the dead." Tertullian has similar things (in the Apology against the Gentiles, chapter 23; To Scapula, chapter 2); St. Athanasius (book On the Incarnation of the Word); Origen (book 1 Against Celsus); Theodoret and Eusebius (passim in Ecclesiastical History); St. Jerome (letter 17, To Marcella); St. Chrysostom (homily 4 on Matthew); St. Augustine (The City of God, chapter 8), etc. 2) But if some, such as St. Augustine (On True Religion, chapter 25, no. 47) and St. Gregory (homily 29 on the Gospels), seem to restrict miracles and other signs to the beginnings of the Church, they understand this not absolutely but relatively, namely insofar as they are not now so frequent as they were formerly. This is clear - a) from their express doctrine. Indeed St. Augustine (loc. cit., On True Religion) had written: "Since the Catholic Church has been spread and founded throughout the whole world, those miracles were not permitted to endure into our times, lest the mind should always seek visible things, and the human race should grow cold by the customary occurrence of those things by whose novelty it once burned." But in book 1 of the Retractations, chapter 13, no. 7, he says: "But what I said must not be taken in such a way that no miracles are believed to be done now in the name of Christ. For I myself, when I wrote that very book, already knew that, at the bodies of the Milanese Martyrs in that same city, a blind man had been enlightened, and certain other things, such as happen even in these times, so that we cannot know all of them, nor enumerate those which we do know." Likewise St. Gregory the Great explains the things which he had written in homily 29 on the Gospels (book 27 on Job, chapter 18, no. 36, Maurist edition), saying: "Then indeed the holy Church needed the aids of miracles, when the affliction of persecution pressed. For after she subdued the pride of unbelief, she no longer requires signs of powers, but only the merits of works; although she also shows those signs to very many when opportunity requires." And no. 27: "What wonder is there, then," he says, "if, when the faith has been propagated, miracles are not done frequently?" Certainly each Father reports many miracles wrought in his own age. b) This is clear also from the very nature of the thing. For those charisms are means ordered to the conversion of the nations and to the attestation of the divinity of the Church; therefore they ought to have been more frequent in that age in which more things were required for each end. But now the Christian faith has already been made more manifest by the triumph almost everywhere won over idolatry, by the marvelous propagation and preservation of the Church of Christ, and by so many prodigies which have long since been accomplished in her bosom. Therefore it ought not seem wonderful if prodigies in our times are less frequent than in the age of the Apostles. It is easy from this to understand in what sense St. Augustine said (On the Unity of the Church, chapter 19) that he did not wish to settle the question concerning the truth of the Church from the fact that "throughout the whole world, in holy places which our communion frequents, such great wonders, whether of hearings or of healings, are done." He does not reject absolutely the proof from miracles; but, disputing against the Donatists, who boasted of their own miracles, he judged this way to be long, and therefore preferred to employ the easier demonstration from catholicity. Hence the holy Doctor writes: "Let no one, therefore, sell you fables: Pontius did a miracle,

and Donatus prayed and God answered him from heaven; either they are deceived or they deceive." But after adducing the sacred testimonies concerning the catholicity of the Church, he adds (chapter 5): "Let open truth cry out; let it shine; let it burst upon stopped ears; let it strike the eyes of those who dissemble." Once the demonstration from the catholicity of the Church has been most clearly completed, he rightly concludes against the Donatists: "Whatever things of this sort are done in the Catholic Church are therefore to be approved because they are done in the Catholic Church; the Church is not manifested because these things are done in her."

Article 3. Whether the True Church of Christ Ought to Be Catholic

690. The third property of the Church, according to the Symbol, is Catholicity: for we say, "I believe... the Catholic Church." The word Catholic, in Greek katholikos, means the same as universal. Although this appellation Catholic seems to be lacking in the older Latin formulas, nevertheless it is found in the most ancient Greek formulas already before the Council of Nicaea, and it is established that it was very well known. Thus St. Ignatius the Martyr (To the Smyrnaeans, no. 8) says: "Where the Bishop shall appear, there let the multitude be; just as where Christ Jesus shall be, there is the Catholic Church." And in the Encyclical Letter of the Smyrnaeans, concerning the martyrdom of St. Polycarp, it is read: "The Church of God which sojourns at Smyrna, to the Church of God which sojourns at Philomelium, and to all the parishes everywhere on earth of the holy and Catholic Church, mercy and peace," etc.

691. Moreover, the Church can be called Catholic in a manifold way, as is drawn from the words of Christ in Matthew 28. For it is said, "going into the whole world": behold catholicity of place; "Teach all nations": behold catholicity of persons; "Teaching them to observe all things whatsoever I have commanded you": behold catholicity of doctrine; "Behold, I am with you even to the consummation of the age": behold catholicity of time.

692. But - 1) catholicity of doctrine is clear from what has been said about unity of faith, and it will be confirmed more abundantly where the infallibility of the Church is treated. For, says Suarez (On Faith, disp. 3, sect. 7, no. 5), the doctrine of the Church is called catholic and universal, both because it does not rest upon the private judgment of each one, but is founded upon universal consent and upon the common and general rule of faith; and also because it has been received by perpetual and universal tradition; and finally because the doctrine of the Church is catholic because it fully and perfectly embraces all dogmas which ought to come to the knowledge of men concerning visible and invisible things, concerning heavenly and earthly things. Likewise, because in it every kind of virtue is contained, and a remedy is found against vices and against all sins. He pursues the same things more fully in Defense of the Faith, book 1, chapter 14. 2) Catholicity of time is easily reduced to indefectibility; for since universality of times is not simultaneous but successive, catholicity of time is the same as perpetuity. 3) Therefore here the question concerns only catholicity of place and of persons, which is properly called Catholicity of the Church. But this is nothing other than "a broad diffusion throughout the world with a great and conspicuous multitude of members." Hence two concepts of catholicity lie beneath it: a) a great number of members; b) their broad dissemination throughout the world. For a society either consisting of many members but confined to one region, or widely diffused but consisting in individual regions only of a few, would not be called, nor would it be, catholic; especially it would not be eminently catholic, such as we profess the Church to be.

693. In order that this concept of catholicity may be better defined, it is useful to distinguish material and formal catholicity. The first is the mere diffusion of men through all places and among all nations, without attention to whether they belong to one society or to several societies, which do not otherwise make one thing except because they are called, rightly or wrongly, by the common name of Christian Church. The other, however, means the identity, as to faith and government, of the Church diffused throughout the world. Now since the true Church is one, and catholicity is a property of the true Church,

there cannot be true catholicity unless it is also formal. It essentially prerequires and most clearly signifies unity; for it is a certain mode of unity, namely the amplitude of unity. Hence Suarez (Defense of the Faith, book 1, chapter 15, no. 7), speaking of the multitude which various sects form, says: "But that multitude is neither one political body, as is clear of itself, nor a mystical or ecclesiastical body, because they agree neither in the same faith, nor in one ecclesiastical government, nor in the same rule of believing; therefore neither can that whole multitude of peoples or sects be called the Catholic Church, since it is not one Church, nor can any particular sect of those be called catholic, since it is neither part of some Catholic Church nor sufficient by itself alone for constituting the Catholic Church."

694. Moreover, formal catholicity is either of right or of fact. The former consists in the right, and therefore in the aptitude, power, and efficacy which the Church has of propagating herself throughout the whole world; the latter is the actual broad diffusion itself throughout the world. Concerning catholicity of right there can be no controversy, as is clear from what has been said concerning the end of the Church, the necessity of entering her, and so forth. The Church enjoys catholicity of right, says Suarez (Defense of the Faith, book 1, chapter 16, no. 4), "both because she was instituted for the whole world, and not, like the synagogue, for a certain nation; and also because from that time she received the right of preaching the faith of Christ throughout the whole world; and finally because she has power on earth to govern the whole world in those things which regard the salvation of the soul or are referred to it." Therefore there remains the question concerning formal catholicity of fact.

695. This catholicity is either physical or moral. The Church would have physical catholicity if she occupied the whole world in such a way that there would be no region in which she did not have a great multitude of members; and a fortiori if there were no person who did not belong to the Church. But the Church would have moral catholicity if she were so diffused, says Suarez (op. cit., chapter 16, no. 10), that she had "in the world a certain universal splendor, by which her dignity and majesty could be known and could be distinguished from the crowds of heretics." He notes, however (ibid., no. 8), that "how great an extension or how great a number of members is required for this cannot be stated mathematically." Each catholicity, moreover, can be simultaneous and successive. Simultaneous is the diffusion of the Church embracing the whole earth, physically or morally, at the same time; successive would be had if the Church were propagated into all parts or regions of the world, physically and morally, that is, into one after another, in such a way that, withdrawing from one, she occupied another. These things being posited, it is asked whether the catholicity of the Church ought to be physical or moral, simultaneous or successive.

696. In this matter it seems that it must first be said that physical catholicity is not to be ascribed to the Church. For 1) it is read (Matt. 24.14): "And this gospel of the kingdom shall be preached in the whole world, for a testimony to all nations; and then the consummation shall come." Therefore the Gospel is to be preached to all nations, but not before the consummation arrives, or when the end of the world is at hand. 2) Likewise the Apostle writes (Rom. 11.25): "For I would not have you ignorant, brethren, of this mystery... that blindness in part has happened in Israel, until the fullness of the Gentiles should enter": that is, he says that the Jews are not to be converted unless first access to the Gospel has been opened to all the nations. But we know that the Jews are not to be brought to the faith except at the end of the world. 3) The same Apostle universally pronounces (1 Cor. 11.19): "There must also be heresies, that those who are approved may be made manifest among you"; and (2 Tim. 4.3) the Apostle prophesies, saying: "There will be a time when they will not endure sound doctrine, but according to their own desires they will heap up teachers for themselves, itching in their ears, and from the truth indeed they will turn away their hearing, but they will be turned to fables." But if heresies are to exist in the world, the catholicity of the Church cannot be physical. 4) Whence St. Augustine (letter 199, On the End of the Age, no. 48) writes: "If therefore, because the prophecy of truth cannot lie, it is necessary that all nations, as many as God has made, adore him, how will they adore him unless they invoke him? But how will they invoke him in whom they

have not believed? Or how will they believe him whom they have not heard? But how will they hear without one preaching? Or how will they preach unless they are sent? For he sends his angels and gathers his elect from the four winds, that is, from the whole world. In those nations, therefore, in which the Church is not yet, it is necessary that she be there, not that all who shall be there should believe; for all nations have been promised, not all men of all nations. For faith is not of all. Therefore every nation believes in all those who were elected before the foundation of the world; in the rest it does not believe, and it hates those who believe. For how also will that be fulfilled, 'You shall be hated by all nations for my name's sake' (Matt. 24.9), unless in all nations there are both those who hate and those whom they hate?" But concerning these things compare Bellarmine (book 4, chapter 7), and especially Suarez (On the Mysteries of the Life of Christ, disp. 56, sect. 1), where you will find many testimonies of the Fathers.

697. Since, therefore, physical catholicity does not belong to the Church, it remains that moral catholicity be attributed to her. But ought this moral catholicity to be successive or simultaneous? First of all, it is certain that, if the beginning of the Church is considered, her catholicity must be called successive; or actual catholicity did not have to exist together with the beginnings of the Church. For 1) from divine ordination the Gospel had to be preached first to the Jews before the Gentiles; for (Acts 13.46) it is said: "Then Paul and Barnabas said with constancy: To you [Jews] it was necessary first to speak the word of God; but since you reject it, and judge yourselves unworthy of eternal life, behold, we turn to the Gentiles." But it was necessary that the Apostles devote themselves for some years to the conversion of the Jews before they announced the Gospel to the Gentiles. Therefore the Church, which always had catholicity of right, could not at once have catholicity of fact. 2) Indeed a society which had to be propagated everywhere by the preaching and persuasion of a few could not from its beginning be actually catholic. Hence St. Augustine deservedly says (book 2 against Petilian, chapter 38), explaining Daniel's prophecy, which concerns the Church: "With closed eyes you stumble against the mountain which, according to the prophecy of Daniel, grew from a little stone and filled the whole earth."

698. Therefore only then could the Church attain moral catholicity of fact, when preaching sufficient to produce it had already preceded. Although, with the passing of the second century, this kind of catholicity can be attributed to the Church, as the testimonies which we gave seem to prove (no. 306), it is at least certain that the Church had already reached it at the beginning of the fifth century. "It is certain," says Suarez (Defense of the Faith, book 1, chapter 16, no. 9), "that the Church had so grown up to the times of Augustine and the other Fathers that she could simply be said to be diffused throughout the world, as they themselves speak; therefore at least at that time she already had the stated condition, as they themselves proclaim."

699. From this it is sufficiently clear that at least at one time the Church had simultaneous catholicity of fact; and therefore it is not sufficient to establish only successive catholicity. "It ought to be certain," says Suarez (loc. cit.), "from the common sense of all the Fathers who so understand the Scriptures, that the Catholic Church has attained not only in our times, but also through many centuries backward, a state, so to speak, of sufficient universality, so that she is said to be diffused throughout the whole world. For besides the prediction of the Prophets and the promises of Christ, Paul already in his own time said concerning the preaching of the Apostles: 'their sound has gone forth into all the earth, and their words unto the ends of the world.' Although Augustine interprets this as a prophecy of the future uttered by a verb of the past because of certainty, nevertheless Jerome understands that already then it was in some manner fulfilled; and this is consonant with the context of Paul in the same place and in others. For to the Colossians, chapter 1, he says concerning the Gospel: 'It has come to you, as also it is in the whole world, and bears fruit and grows, as also among you.'"

700. But Bellarmine (book 4, chapter 7) seems to judge that the simultaneous catholicity of the Church, once obtained, can sometimes, as it were, fail by accident, while catholicity of right

always remains; but the common opinion of theologians, which we shall establish, attributes perennial catholicity of fact to the Church. In fact, if the Catholic dominion of the Church in the fifth century is compared with that of our nineteenth century, it will be found almost equal; for what she lost in the south and east, she repaired in the north and west. This equal alternation of loss and recovery constantly recurs in the middle centuries between the fifth and the nineteenth. In the fifth, sixth, seventh, and eighth centuries, the losses brought by Nestorianism and Monophysitism are compensated by new acquisitions of Illyria, Ireland, England, Frisia, and southern and western Germany. In the ninth, tenth, and eleventh centuries, the damages received through Photius and Muhammad are repaired in Pannonia, Poland, northern and eastern Germany, and Scandinavia. In the sixteenth century, what the Catholic Church loses in Europe, she recovers in the Indies and in America.

701. Finally, moral catholicity of fact is either absolute or relative. The first consists in that broad diffusion of the Church throughout the whole world, no comparison being made with other sects; the other consists in such diffusion as, when compared with other sects, surpasses them. This comparison, however, can be made either with all sects, whether they are infidel or are called Christian, or with Christian sects only, taken collectively or distributively.

702. Now then - 1) absolute catholicity certainly belongs to the Church. 2) It is also certain that relative catholicity belongs to the Church when comparison is made with heretical sects distributively. 3) But if comparison is made also with unbelievers, "we concede," says Suarez (Defense of the Faith, book 1, chapter 16, no. 12), "that it does not belong to the universality of the Church, explained by the name Catholic, that in her there should be a greater multitude of men than in false sects; for this has nowhere been promised to her, and it depends upon the most high counsel of God in his predestination. And as far as we can gather from the Scriptures, by divine counsel it has rather been permitted that there be more bad than good in the world, more unbelievers than faithful..." St. Augustine explains this by the comparison of the threshing floor, in which the grains are few in comparison with the chaff, yet many in themselves and "to be gathered from the four winds, from the heights of the heavens even to their ends," etc. He teaches the same thing (book 13 against Faustus, chapter 16, and excellently in book 20), whose final words are these: "That fewness must be recognized, which the Lord especially commends in the immense and innumerable multitude diffused throughout the world; which fewness is called fewness as of grains in comparison with the multitude of chaff. Yet in itself it makes so great a mass of wheat that it surpasses, by an incomparable multitude, all your approved and reprobate persons, whom truth alike reproves."

703. But what must be said if the comparison is instituted with heretical sects only, but taken collectively? In itself it would not seem necessary to attribute this relative catholicity to the Church. For that relative catholicity is to be called necessary in itself by which the true Church of Christ is clearly distinguished from false acatholic sects; but whatever may be the diffusion of acatholic sects, taken together they would never produce true catholicity, for formal catholicity would be lacking. Yet if we consider the constant fact itself, it is evident that all heretical and schismatic sects taken collectively are surpassed in number by the Catholic Church. Therefore we rightly conclude that God, because of his exceedingly great love toward men, has decreed with most lavish liberality to increase and adorn his Church also with this glory.

704. Thus, therefore, the concept of the catholicity of the Church having been explained: Section II. The Proposed Question Is Solved. Proposition XXX. The Church, having received from her Divine Author the mission and power of propagating herself everywhere, 1. ought also actually to have been diffused, and has been broadly diffused throughout the whole world; not indeed with physical universality, but with moral universality; 2. yet this universality is not only successive, but also simultaneous. Therefore the Church is a society catholic by right and in fact.

705. The first part is proved. I. From the Old Testament. St. Augustine, disputing against the Donatists (On the Unity of the Church, chapters 6-17), considers in order first the passages from the Law, from the Prophets, and from the Psalms, and then those from the New Testament. We shall follow him. 1) From the Law. For (Gen. 22.18) it was promised to Abraham: "In thy seed all nations shall be blessed"; and these promises were renewed to Isaac (Gen. 26.4) and to Jacob (Gen. 28.14). That this seed is Christ, the Apostle teaches (Gal. 3.16). Now in all these testimonies the fact of the universal diffusion of the kingdom of Christ is stated; and therefore they cannot be understood of catholicity of right alone. Therefore, after all these have been brought forward, St. Augustine deservedly concludes at the end of chapter 6: "Give me this Church, if it is among you; show that you communicate with all nations, which we already see to be blessed in this seed. Give this, or, having laid aside fury, receive it, not from me, but from him himself in whom all nations are blessed." 2) From the Prophets. It is read in Isaiah (60.4 ff.): "Lift up thine eyes round about, and see: all these have been gathered together; they have come to thee. Thy sons shall come from afar, and thy daughters shall rise up at thy side. Then thou shalt see and abound, and thy heart shall wonder and be enlarged, when the multitude of the sea shall be converted to thee, and the strength of the nations shall come to thee. The inundation of camels shall cover thee," etc. Compare also the testimonies which we gave at no. 465. And in Daniel (2.27 ff.): "Daniel, answering before the king, said... There is a God in heaven revealing mysteries, who has shown to thee, King Nebuchadnezzar, the things which are to come in the last times... Thou, O king, sawest, and behold, as it were, one great statue... Thou sawest thus, until a stone was cut out of the mountain without hands; and it struck the statue on its feet of iron and clay, and broke them in pieces... But the stone which had struck the statue became a great mountain and filled the whole earth. This is the dream; we shall also tell its interpretation before thee, O king... But in the days of those kingdoms, the God of heaven shall raise up a kingdom which shall not be destroyed forever, and its kingdom shall not be delivered to another people; but it shall break in pieces and consume all these kingdoms, and it itself shall stand forever." And in Malachi (1.11): "For from the rising of the sun even to its setting, my name is great among the nations; and in every place sacrifice is made, and a clean oblation is offered to my name, because my name is great among the nations, says the Lord of hosts." But St. Augustine deservedly asserts in chapter 7: "What about the Prophets? How many and how manifest are the testimonies of the Church diffused through all nations in the whole world?" Certainly the words recited make manifest that the question concerns the catholicity of the Church; but neither can there be any doubt that it also concerns catholicity of fact. For the question concerns the nations which come and are gathered, and hence from this gathering of the nations the heart will be enlarged; it concerns the mountain which filled the whole earth; it concerns the sacrifice which is offered everywhere on earth. 3) From the Psalms. It is read (Ps. 2): "The Lord said to me: Thou art my Son; this day have I begotten thee. Ask of me, and I will give thee the nations for thy inheritance, and the ends of the earth for thy possession." And (Ps. 18): "There are no speeches nor languages, whose voices are not heard. Their sound has gone forth into all the earth, and their words unto the ends of the world." The Apostle cites these last words (Rom. 10.18). And (Ps. 21): "All the ends of the earth shall remember and be converted to the Lord. And all the families of the nations shall adore in his sight. For the kingdom is the Lord's, and he shall rule over the nations." And (Ps. 71): "He shall rule from sea to sea, and from the river even to the ends of the world. Before him the Ethiopians shall fall down, and his enemies shall lick the earth. The kings of Tarshish and the islands shall offer gifts; the kings of the Arabs and of Sheba shall bring presents; and all the kings of the earth shall adore him; all nations shall serve him... And in him all the tribes of the earth shall be blessed; all nations shall magnify him." Now all these testimonies are to be understood of Christ and the Church, as St. Augustine proves (chapter 9); and the question concerns catholicity also of fact, as the words themselves show. Hence, when the Donatists replied to these testimonies that the Church had indeed begun to grow throughout the world, but afterward, through the wickedness of men, the Christian Religion had failed everywhere except in the party of Donatus, St. Augustine answers thus (chapter 9): "As though the Spirit of God did not know the future wills of men. Who, unless utterly mad, would say this? Why then was it said by Luke (24.44) that all things had to be fulfilled which were written in

the Law, and the Prophets, and the Psalms?"

706. II. From the New Testament. It is read in Mark (16.15-20): "Going into the whole world, preach the gospel to every creature. He who believes and is baptized shall be saved... But they, going forth, preached everywhere, the Lord working with them and confirming the word by the signs that followed." And in Matthew (8.11) and Luke (13.29): "Many shall come from the east and west, and from the north and south, and shall sit down in the kingdom of God." And (Apoc. 7.9): "After these things I saw a great multitude, which no one could number, from all nations and tribes and peoples and tongues, standing before the throne," etc. And (Acts 1.8): "You shall receive the power of the Holy Spirit coming upon you, and you shall be witnesses to me in Jerusalem and in all Judea and Samaria and even to the end of the earth." Hence St. Augustine deservedly concludes (chapter 10): "Let us therefore hold the Church designated from the mouth of the Lord, whence she was to begin and how far she was to arrive; namely, that she was to begin from Jerusalem and to arrive among all nations." And in chapter 14 he observes that "the testimonies of the canonical Scriptures, which commend the Church as consisting in the communion of the whole world, need no interpreter." And afterward, again pressing the Donatists, he says: "Bring forward, therefore, something which is not more truly interpreted against you... Bring forward even one such thing by which Africa is most openly declared, either as left alone among the rest, or as preserved for the beginning of renewing and filling the world... But if you cannot show what we so justly demand from you, believe the truth, be silent, fall asleep."

707. III. From the Fathers. St. Augustine (On True Religion, chapter 7, no. 12) writes: "The Christian religion must be held by us, and the communion of that Church which is Catholic, and is called Catholic not only by her own, but also by all enemies. For whether they wish it or not, even heretics themselves and the offspring of schisms, when they speak not with their own but with outsiders, call nothing else Catholic except the Catholic. For they cannot be understood unless they distinguish her by that name by which she is called by the whole world." But when the Donatists were glorying in their own fewness, which Catholics reproached against them, saying, "For this reason we are more just, because we are few"; "In few," said Cresconius in Augustine, "truth frequently is; error belongs to the many." St. Augustine replied to them, as also to the Pelagians (book 2, Unfinished Work against Julian, chapter 3): "Do not glory in fewness. Parricides also are few, and very wicked. The Donatists do not understand in what way it was said by the Lord that few enter through the narrow gate, since he also said that many from the East and West would recline with Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob... They certainly are many in themselves, and the same are few in comparison with the far more numerous who are to be punished with the devil." St. Optatus (book 2 against Parmenian): "You, brother Parmenian, have said that she [the Church] is among you alone; unless perhaps because from pride you contend to vindicate special sanctity for yourselves, so that where you will, there the Church should be, and where you do not will, she should not be. Therefore, so that she can be among you in a little part of Africa, in the corner of a scanty region, will she not be among us in another part of Africa? Will she not be in Spain, in Gaul, in Italy, where you are not? If you wish her to be among you only, will she not be in the three Pannonias, in Dacia, Moesia, Thrace, Achaia, Macedonia, and in all Greece, where you are not? So that she can be among you, will she not be in Pontus, Galatia, Cappadocia, Pamphylia, Phrygia, Cilicia, and in the three Syrias, and in the two Armenias, and in all Egypt, and in Mesopotamia, where you are not? Where, then, will be the propriety of the Catholic name, since she is called Catholic because she is reasonable and diffused everywhere?" St. Cyril of Jerusalem (Catechesis 18): "But if by chance you come into cities, do not ask simply where the Lord's place is, or the house of the Lord; for the other heresies of the impious also try to honor their dens with the name of the Lord's places. Nor ask this only simply, where the Church is, but where the Catholic Church is. For this is the proper name of this holy one, and the mother of us all, who is the spouse of our Lord Jesus Christ, the only-begotten Son of God." St. Pacian (letter 1 to Sympronian the Novatian) observes that before heresies arose the Church was generally not called Catholic, for by the name Christian she was sufficiently distinguished from the Synagogue of the Jews, the Schools of

the Philosophers, and the various Religions of unbelievers. But afterward, when heresies arose, since many called themselves Christians, the Church was called Catholic so that the faithful might be separated from heretics. "This Catholic," he says, "does not sound of Marcion, nor Apelles, nor Montanus, nor does it take heretical authors"; and: "Christian is my name, but Catholic my surname. The former names me; the latter shows me; by this I am proved, by that I am signified." St. Cyprian (On the Unity of the Church): "The Church," he says, "flooded with the light of the Lord, stretches her rays through the whole world... she extends her branches into the whole earth with abundant fruitfulness; she spreads more broadly her streams flowing richly." But these and innumerable other things can be read in Tournely and in others everywhere.

708. The second part is proved. I. From Scripture, by recalling certain testimonies already cited. And 1) in the Psalms all nations, that is, the Church, are called the inheritance of Christ, whose possession is said to extend to the ends of the earth. But these things imply simultaneous catholicity. For a) properly speaking, and indeed with emphasis, it cannot be said that all nations are received as an inheritance if only a certain few nations are first received, and then, these being lost, certain other few nations, and so on. b) The ends of the earth cannot be said to be possessed, that is, the whole world from end to end, if at any given time only the smallest part of it is possessed. 2) With a tacit comparison instituted between the sound of Apostolic preaching and the human voice, the former is extolled above the latter because it went forth into all the earth. But there would be no reason for extolling it unless it were heard simultaneously unto the ends of the earth. For who would think my voice magnified if it were said to fill a very large hall, but by speaking or singing successively in diverse places of that hall, so that each time I was heard only in a part of that hall? 3) The Church is said to extend from sea to sea, or Christ is said to possess a universal kingdom over all nations. But this cannot be understood unless catholicity is simultaneous. For if someone occupied one or another province of some kingdom, and then, that being lost, occupied another, he could by no means be called the King of that whole kingdom. 4) According to the text of Daniel, the stone grew into a great mountain by filling the whole earth; but a mountain transferred successively from region to region certainly does not fill the whole earth. Similarly, that kingdom of the Messiah of which Daniel speaks would not rightly be said to break in pieces and consume all the other kingdoms if it conquered those kingdoms only successively and singly, while the others, both those formerly conquered and those afterward to be conquered, remained meanwhile safe and intact. It should also be noted that the kingdom which God will raise up is everlasting; but the kingdom itself is represented by the mountain which fills the whole earth. Therefore the universality of that same kingdom will be perennial. 5) From the text of Malachi such a diffusion of the Church is drawn that sacrifice is made and offered in every place, from the rising of the sun even to its setting. But these so ample and magnificent proclamations would lose force if the diffusion of the Church were not simultaneous, especially since they show no limitation of time.

709. II. From the Fathers, recalling also the testimonies already given. For 1) the Fathers often use the same testimonies of Sacred Scripture which we were just considering, in order to prove the catholicity of the Church. But the same testimonies speak, as we have seen, of simultaneous catholicity. Therefore. 2) The Fathers often speak of the catholicity which flourished in their own time, and which was to remain and to become more ample. Thus, for example, St. Gregory Nazianzen (oration 4 against Julian I, no. 67) writes: "O most foolish man, and most impious, and most unskilled in great matters! Do you oppose so great a lot, and the Church spread throughout the whole world, which through the lowliness of speech and the foolishness of preaching, as perhaps you yourselves might say, has embraced all the ends of the earth, which has conquered the wise, crushed demons, and overcome time; the same old and new together, as you portentously invent some one of the gods; the former reserved for a few, this latter for the promiscuous multitude, the former in shadow, this latter in the perfection of the mystery reserved for its own times? Do you, then, whoever and how great and whence you are, oppose the great inheritance of Christ? Great, I say, and one which, even if certain persons are carried headlong by a madness and insanity greater than yours, will not have an end, but rather will always and more and more advance, and rise higher?" 3) They employ,

as a note of the Church, a catholicity as it were then placed before the eyes of all; recall the testimonies already exhibited. Indeed, they say that it is essential to her in the same way as it is essential to her that Peter should rule the whole world. Thus St. Augustine (Enarration on Psalm 56): "But what kind of madness the heretics [the Donatists] suffer, I ask you to attend to. They, cut off from the joining of the Church of Christ, and holding a part, losing the whole, are unwilling to communicate with the whole world, through which the glory of Christ has been diffused. But we Catholics are in every land, because we communicate with every land wherever the glory of Christ has been diffused. For we see that what was then sung is now fulfilled. Our God has been exalted above the heavens, and his glory above all the earth. O heretical madness! What you do not see you believe with me; what you see, you deny. You believe with me that Christ has been exalted above the heavens, which we do not see; and you deny his glory above all the earth, which we do see. 'Be thou exalted above the heavens, O God, and thy glory above all the earth.'" And St. John Chrysostom (homily 54, otherwise 55, on Matthew, no. 2): "Those things which belong to God alone, namely to loose sins, to render the Church unmoved amid such a rushing together of waves, and to render a fisherman, while the whole world opposed him, firmer than a rock, these he promises that he will give to him [Peter]. As the Father, addressing Jeremiah, said that he had set him as a bronze column and as a wall (Jer. 1.18), but the one [Jeremiah] for one nation, the other [Peter] in the whole world... But the Son entrusted to him the spreading of the knowledge both of the Father and of himself throughout the whole world, and gave all power in heaven to a mortal man, when he handed over to him the keys, to him who extended the Church throughout the whole world and showed her firmer than the heavens."

710. Scholion. Several difficulties have been anticipated in the very exposition of the thesis; others we shall examine below when treating of the indefectibility of the Church. Therefore it suffices to indicate the following here.

711. You will say I: The Church (Luke 12.32) is called a little flock: "Fear not, little flock." Therefore she is not catholic. I respond. 1) Although several things contained in the context pertain to all, nevertheless only the disciples seem to be called "little flock," and indeed according to the letter. For at the beginning of the chapter, "when many crowds were standing around, so that they trampled upon one another, [Jesus] began to say to his disciples" (verse 1); then, in verse 15, he addresses the crowds; but in verse 22 he again turns his discourse to the disciples, until verse 40: "And he said to his disciples." Therefore the words objected from verse 32 are deservedly judged to be directed to the disciples. In fact, the Disciples were few in number. 2) But if they wish those words to be referred to all the faithful, we answer with Suarez (Defense of the Faith, book 1, chapter 16, no. 14): "The flock of Christ could also be called little by other titles and reasons: in comparison with unbelievers; or, if it is said of the predestined, in comparison with the reprobate; or on account of the devotion of humility, as Bede said (book 4 on Luke, chapter 54); or because of the lowliness of the condition of the disciples who were then hearing Christ, because they were poor and of the lowest condition; or because, on account of voluntary poverty or the renunciation of worldly glory, the servants of Christ are accounted in the world as lowly."

712. You will say II: If catholicity were an essential property of the Church, it could never be absent from her. But it can be absent. For in Luke 18.8 Christ says that at the end of the world there will scarcely be those who believe: "When the Son of Man comes, do you think he will find faith on the earth?" And in Matthew 24.24 and Mark 13.21 it is foretold that the tribulation of those days will be so great that those days are to be shortened for the sake of the elect, and that Antichrist will produce so many deceits that even the elect would be led into error, if it were possible. I respond. 1) These two things are certain: the persecution of Antichrist will be the most dreadful of all, and the victory of the Church will be the most glorious of all. But even if this happened, that the greatest part of Christians should fall away from the Church in that persecution, this momentary defection, according to moral estimation, would not take away catholicity; almost in the same way as, if at the beginning of a war, an enemy occupied the provinces of some

kingdom, that momentary invasion, according to moral estimation, would not diminish the amplitude of that kingdom, if a little later in the same war the enemy were cast out. 2) No catholicity belongs to the Church of Christ except that which Christ willed; but what Christ willed we are taught from the Scriptures. Therefore if from the Scriptures it is established that catholicity is greatly obscured in the time of Antichrist, this certainly does not obstruct the catholicity of the Church; indeed, the very fulfillment of the prophecy confirms her divinity. But since what is to happen in the time of Antichrist was often foretold by Christ and by the Apostles, so that men might guard themselves against error, if nothing of this sort has been foretold concerning other ages, that ought to be an indication that nothing of this sort will ever happen.

713. You will insist. But catholicity seems to have ceased also at other times, as, for example, at the time of the Arians; for St. Jerome writes (dialogue against the Luciferians, no. 19): "Then the name of ousia was abolished; then condemnation of the Nicene faith was shouted out. The whole world groaned and wondered that it was Arian." I respond. It must be denied that in the time of the Arian heresy the heretics surpassed the Catholics in number. "For," says Suarez (Defense of the Faith, book 1, chapter 16, no. 17), "although in the little council of Ariminum the greater part of the Bishops was deceived by the Arians, and therefore Jerome said that the groaning world wondered that it was Arian, nevertheless that error was not with a heretical mind; otherwise why would they wonder? As the same Jerome and Augustine indicate, and Ambrose (book 3 On Faith, last chapter). And therefore almost all, once the fraud was understood, immediately began clearly to profess and teach the true faith. Then, although perhaps in the East there was a greater multitude of heretics, nevertheless not in the West, nor simply in the whole world. For Basil openly testifies to this (letter 72, to the Evaisenians), writing: 'Stand in the faith, inspect the world itself, and see how small is that portion which labors under this disease; but the rest of the Church, which from the ends of the world even to the ends has received the Gospel, follows this sound and right doctrine.' Athanasius also, in the Synodical Letter to the emperor Jovinian, which Theodoret reports (book 4 of the History, chapter 3), speaking of the faith defined in the Council of Nicaea, says: 'All the Churches everywhere have assented to this, as those of Spain, Britain, Gaul, all Italy,' etc.; and after enumerating many others he adds: 'Finally the Churches of the East, excepting a few who favor the Arian sect; for we have the opinion of all these things known by the matter itself as explored, and we have received letters from them, and we know for certain, most holy Emperor, that nevertheless no prejudice can thence be made against the whole world.'"

Article 4. Whether the True Church of Christ Ought to Be Apostolic

714. The last property of the Church which we profess in the Symbol is Apostolicity; for we say, "I believe... the Apostolic Church." But as to why the ministerial cause of the Church, rather than the principal cause, is expressed in the Symbol, and thus she is called Apostolic rather than Christian, among other reasons this is usually given: namely, that the appellation Apostolic is fuller. For when the Church is called Christian, only the principal cause is designated; but when she is called Apostolic, the ministerial cause is designated together with the principal cause. For the name Apostle, that is, Sent One, is essentially relative, and therefore designates the ministerial cause with its dependence upon the principal cause.

715. Now, all who attribute to themselves the name Christian concede that the Church of Christ ought to be Apostolic in some sense. Indeed, Christ gave the mission to the Apostles of instituting or founding Churches throughout the whole world (John 20.21; Matthew, final chapter). The Apostle (Eph. 2.20) admonished the faithful that they had been built "upon the foundation of the Apostles and Prophets." St. John (Apoc. 21.14) says that he saw the city Jerusalem, namely the Church, whose wall had "twelve foundations, and in them the twelve names of the twelve Apostles of the Lamb." Hence those very persons who require faith alone for constituting the Church, and reduce that faith itself to the fundamental article concerning Christ (no. 639), call the Church Apostolic insofar as, as to this faith, she

agrees with the Church of the Apostles. But since there are diverse Christian sects, and only one can be the true Church of Christ, which therefore is also truly Apostolic, it is of the greatest importance to define the true concept of apostolicity.

716. Therefore, in a certain adequate but general acceptance, the apostolicity of the Church imports "the permanent and uninterrupted existence of the same Church which was in the Apostles and was founded by the Apostles." Hence that Church is now called apostolic which "has identity with the primitive Church of the Apostles." But in order that it may be well understood in what this identity consists, three kinds of institutions must be distinguished in the primitive Church: divine institutions, which were promulgated by Christ himself; divine-apostolic institutions, which, received by the Apostles from the Holy Spirit after Christ's Ascension, were first promulgated by them; and apostolic institutions, which the Apostles introduced by their pastoral authority without a new revelation (no. 321).

717. Now the institutions of the first and second class belong to that form of the Church in which she must persevere perpetually. The institutions of the third class are indeed for the most part perpetually preserved by the Church, but they are not those things which must be preserved by absolute necessity. For since the whole apostolic power was perpetually transmitted into the Church, there is also transmitted the power of abrogating apostolic institutions and of sanctioning new ecclesiastical statutes. When the Church does this, she is so far from receding from apostolic form that, on the contrary, she uses apostolic authority, to which it essentially belongs that it cannot be bound by any created will.

718. Therefore the Apostolic Church, under this general acceptance, is that which permanently has all things which pertain by divine institution to her essence, properties, and endowments; which is permanently a visible society, one in faith, in communion, in government; holy with a certain excellent and manifest holiness, both active and passive, etc. Hence, as Perrone rightly notes with others (On Theological Places, part 1, no. 172), apostolicity understood in this way is not something distinct from the constitutive elements and properties of the Church taken together, but is the conjoined, continuous, and indefectible existence of them all. Palmer, a Protestant, writes: "The Church of Christ is, by the admission of all parties, apostolical, or derived in some manner from the Apostles."

719. But here we inquire into the proper concept of apostolicity, which is distinguished from unity and the other constitutive elements or properties of the Church. In what is it to be placed? The Church is called apostolic for three principal reasons: 1) by origin, insofar as she was founded in the Apostles; 2) by doctrine, or faith, insofar as she retains that faith which the Apostles preached; 3) by succession or mission, insofar as she embraces in her bosom those who in the hierarchical order legitimately descend from the Apostles. "From the origin also," says the Catechism of the Council of Trent (on the ninth article of the Symbol, no. 17), "which revealed grace derives from the Apostles, we recognize the truth of the Church; since her doctrine is truth, not recent, nor now first arisen, but long ago handed down by the Apostles and disseminated into the whole world... The Holy Spirit, who presides over the Church, governs her through no other kind of ministers than through the Apostolic. This Spirit was first indeed bestowed upon the Apostles, and afterward, by the highest goodness of God, always remained in the Church."

720. But 1) apostolicity of origin is outside controversy (no. 715), and apostolicity of succession necessarily supposes and includes it; for no one can succeed the Apostles in the hierarchical order in the Church unless the Apostles had first held that same order. 2) Apostolicity of faith, which Tertullian (On Prescription, chapter 33) calls consanguinity of doctrine, namely with the doctrine of the Apostles, is manifestly established if apostolicity of succession is once demonstrated. This is both because, as we proved (nos. 650 ff.), the true faith of the Church consists in believing all the truths which the Church, that is, the Apostles and their successors, propose as divinely revealed and to be believed; and because Christ, as will be proved below, furnished the Apostles and their successors with the charism of infallibility in proposing the doctrine of faith. Hence the Fathers joined apostolic succession with the presumption of

apostolic doctrine, as though by its own right. "It is necessary," says St. Irenaeus (Against Heresies, book 4, chapter 33, no. 2), "to obey those presbyters who are in the Church, those who have succession from the Apostles, as we have shown: those who with the succession of the episcopate" "have received according to the good pleasure of the Father" the sure charism of truth; "but as for the rest, who depart from the principal succession and gather in any place whatever, one must hold them suspect, either as heretics and of evil opinion, or as cutters-apart and puffed up and pleasing themselves." 3) Therefore the whole of apostolicity is contained in apostolicity of succession.

721. The name itself in fact indicates this. For the name Apostle, whence Apostolicity, is derived from the Greek words `apo` and `stolon`, which is the same as one sent with commands. But the question concerns apostolicity, or divine mission in the matter of religion, indeed of the Christian Religion; for we do not call Apostles those who were divinely sent before Christ. Therefore apostolicity is that legitimate mission entrusted by God to certain men of propagating, teaching, and governing the Church in a ministerial capacity. But since the Apostles are mortal, and received a perpetual mission, it is necessary that others be substituted, who, made heirs and successors of those departing, receive and hold the mission, to be transmitted again in an uninterrupted series to those following, even to the consummation of the age. Therefore the Apostolic Church is that which the first envoys of Christ, or Apostles, founded and governed, and which even now they hold and govern through their legitimate successors. From these things it is evident that the true concept of apostolic mission and succession must be explained, so that we may attain the genuine idea of Apostolicity.

722. Come then, what is apostolic succession? It can be described as "the public, legitimate, perennial, or never interrupted, substitution of persons into the place of the Apostles for ruling and feeding the Church." It is called 1) substitution, in order to signify that the successors of the Apostles are not their vicars, but carry on that very office which the Apostles, insofar as they were rulers and administrators of churches, carried on. 2) It is called public, since, because the matter concerns the authority of ruling an external and public society, it must be established by determinate and publicly known marks that these and not others have truly succeeded to the apostolic office. 3) It is called legitimate, so that, namely, both on the part of the one giving the power, and on the part of the one receiving it, and on the part of the mode by which the power is conferred, the transmission has been carried out according to the norm of law. 4) It is called perennial or not interrupted, both materially, insofar as persons who are continually substituted for the Apostles are not wholly lacking, and formally, insofar as these very substituted persons possess authority derived from the Apostles, receiving it from him who actually has it and can communicate it.

723. In order that we may grasp these things more fully, it must be recalled that in the successors of the Apostles there can be distinguished ordination or consecration, and vocation or mission; and hence a twofold power, of order and of jurisdiction. But it is not necessary that we treat expressly here of ordination. For 1) the things which pertain to it are partly clear from what has been said about the distinction by divine right between clerics and laymen, and are partly and principally handed down in the treatise On Orders. 2) Although Apostolic succession necessarily includes ordination, nevertheless in ecclesiastical terminology it does not solely or principally signify a succession of men which through the continual transmission of the episcopal character ascends to the Apostles; rather, it principally signifies a succession of men which through the continual transmission of the authority of teaching and feeding the faithful ascends to the Apostles. 3) From the legitimacy of vocation or mission recognized through the other conditions, the validity of ordination is legitimately inferred, if the discussion is about the Church and her certain Head, not about some individual; for if apostolic succession can never be lacking in the Church, neither can any condition or element necessarily required for it. Compare On the Infused Virtues, no. 501.

724. But as regards mission, or the conferral of actual and ready jurisdiction in the mystical body of Christ, which is the Church, it must be noted 1) that this power, otherwise than the power of

order, can be lost; and therefore acts of this same power illegitimately exercised are not only illicit, but also invalid; whereas, on the contrary, acts of the power of order illegitimately exercised are illicit, but valid. Suppose, for example, that a heretical or schismatic Bishop, that is, one who truly received Episcopal consecration, consecrates another as Bishop; this man would be validly consecrated and would have the power of order, but not the power of jurisdiction. Otherwise he would receive this from one who does not have it, which is certainly repugnant. 2) In order that someone possess apostolic mission, it is necessary that he adhere to the center of unity which Christ instituted. For if he did not adhere to it, he would already be outside the Church; but one who is outside the Church cannot possess authority to rule her. Hence St. Gregory Nazianzen (Oration in praise of St. Athanasius, no. 8) writes: "For neither is he who has burst in by force to be regarded as successor... nor he who has violated the laws... nor he who holds contrary dogmas... unless perhaps someone would call him a successor in the way that we say disease succeeds health, darkness succeeds light, storm succeeds calm, and alienation of mind succeeds prudence." And St. Cyprian (letter 76): "The Church is one, which, being one, can be both inside and not outside. For if she is with Novatian, she was not with Cornelius. But if she was with Cornelius, who succeeded Fabian the Bishop by legitimate ordination, Novatian is not in the Church, nor can he be counted a Bishop, who, with evangelical and apostolic tradition despised, succeeding no one, arose from himself." 3) Since in the center of unity resides the fullness of apostolic authority, hence it happens that it is able to communicate apostolicity and to heal any defect which obstructs apostolicity. Suppose, for example, some assembly of baptized persons founded by Eutychians; that assembly certainly will not be apostolic. But if afterward, having abjured the heresy, it were subjected to the center of unity, by that very fact it would become part of the apostolic Church; for having renounced its prior adulterous birth, it would as it were obtain a second, legitimate one. Suppose also an assembly first gathered together by legitimate apostolic authority, but having lost apostolic succession through separation from the center of unity; if afterward it returns to that center, the loss incurred of apostolic origin is repaired. These things are easily understood either from those things which are required in order that someone become a member of some society, or in order that some province become part of some kingdom.

725. From these things there follows a corollary of the greatest importance, namely that communion with the center of unity suffices for recognizing apostolicity. For if this were otherwise lacking to some group which is called Christian, through the very adhesion to the center of unity, in which there is the fullness of apostolic authority, it would be supplied, as we have said, or obtained. Therefore, to summarize briefly what we have set forth thus far, we say that the aforesaid adhesion to the center of unity truly is the head in this whole controversy concerning the apostolicity of the Church. For the Church is called apostolic by origin, doctrine, and succession (no. 719); once apostolicity of succession has been established, apostolicity of origin and doctrine is rightly inferred (no. 720); but apostolicity of succession comprises ordination or consecration and mission (no. 723); legitimate ordination is deservedly supposed or inferred if legitimate mission is established (no. 723); and legitimate mission itself is obtained or supplied through adhesion to the center of unity. Therefore if this adhesion is proved, by that very fact adequate apostolicity is shown.

726. This is the genuine idea of Apostolicity, which is clear even by its exposition alone; but it will become clearer from the arguments soon to be brought forward. Meanwhile it is pleasing to confirm it at once by the authority of Tertullian (On Prescription, chapter 32). "But besides," he says, "if any [heresies] dare to insert themselves into the Apostolic age... we can say: Let them therefore produce the origins of their Churches; let them unfold the order of their Bishops, running down through successions from the beginning, so that that first Bishop had as author and predecessor some one of the Apostles or of apostolic men, 'who nevertheless persevered with the Apostles.' For in this way the apostolic Churches bring forward their rolls... According to this form, therefore, they will be tested by those Churches which, although they produce as their author no one from the Apostles or apostolic men, as being much later, and which finally are instituted daily, nevertheless, agreeing in the same faith, are accounted no less apostolic on

account of consanguinity of doctrine. Thus all heresies, challenged by our Churches to each form, may prove themselves apostolic in whatever way they think. But they are so far from being apostolic, and cannot prove what they are not, nor are they received into peace and communication by Churches in any manner apostolic, clearly because, by diversity of Sacrament, they are in no manner apostolic."

727. But the errors of the Innovators in this matter can be reduced to these: 1) In words they concede apostolicity of doctrine, but they pervert its true concept; the errors are the same as those which we reported against unity of faith. 2) As regards apostolicity of succession, first recur the errors which we refuted in establishing the distinction by divine right between laymen and clerics, and in excluding the democratic form of government from the Church. 3) Those who belong to what they call the High Church especially deny the necessity of communion with the center of unity. 4) Therefore the error proper to this place is extraordinary mission, which they devised in order to cover the defect of apostolicity of mission and origin in their sects. For when, they say, the state of the Church is such that either no persons can be appointed by ordinary vocation to perform ecclesiastical functions, or those who are appointed are infected with vices of faith and morals, so that not even their amendment can be hoped for; when otherwise the ordinary vocation of better persons is impossible, then, they say, nothing prevents those who have not been called ordinarily from performing apostolic duties through an extraordinary vocation. Indeed, they add, in that state of the Church anyone is bound in conscience, by force of the common vocation of all Christians, to discharge apostolic offices according to his powers. But the Innovators suppose that this happened in Luther and Calvin, who, moreover, were stirred up by a hidden divine motion, and therefore by an extraordinary vocation, to undertake the reformation of the Church. Palmer seems sometimes even to admit this necessity, since he writes (Episcopacy Vindicated, chapter 2): "We do not contend that unlawful consecrations transmit the apostolical jurisdiction"; and in On the Church, volume 1, page 142: "This succession from the Apostles is a certain note of a Church, unless it be clearly convicted of schism or heresy." But they err concerning the nature of schism, as we saw when treating of unity of government in the Church.

728. These things, therefore, having been set forth: Section II. The Proposed Question Is Solved. Proposition XXXI. 1. The Church of Christ, founded in the Apostles, must always persevere Apostolic, both by origin and doctrine, and by public and perennial succession, by which, through a series of pastors never interrupted, proceeding from the Apostles, she is always joined with them. 2. Nor can the hypothesis of extraordinary mission, introduced by the Innovators, be admitted in any way according to Christ's institution and promises. 3. And just as Apostolic succession alone sufficiently shows Apostolicity of origin and doctrine, 4. so the legitimate succession of the center of unity alone manifests the true Apostolic Church.

729. The first part is proved, I, as regards Apostolicity of origin. That Church must always be which Christ instituted; but Christ instituted the Church in the Apostles, and through the Apostles he willed her to be propagated. Therefore the Church must always be Apostolic by origin. In fact, if on the one hand Christ founded the Church, which was to endure perpetually, as apostolic by origin, and on the other hand the true Church could at some time not be one and the same with that which the Apostles founded, then not one Church, but a twofold Church, would be established. But from what has been said, Christ willed his Church to be one, indeed unique. Therefore.

730. II. As regards Apostolicity of doctrine. The faith of the Church at any time cannot be other than the faith and doctrine of Christ; but the doctrine of the Apostles is nothing other than the doctrine of Christ. Therefore the doctrine of the Church must always be Apostolic doctrine.

731. Hence the Fathers constantly used novelty of doctrine as a most certain sign of heresy; for it was settled among them that the doctrine or faith of the Church must be identical with the doctrine of the Apostles. Thus, for example, St. Irenaeus (Against Heresies, book 3, chapter 3): "Therefore the tradition of the Apostles, manifested in the whole world, is present in the Church to be looked upon by all

who wish to hear true things, and we are able to enumerate those who were appointed Bishops in the Churches by the Apostles, and their successors even to us, who taught nothing of this sort, nor knew anything such as is raved by these [heretics]. For if the Apostles had known hidden mysteries, which they taught separately and secretly to the perfect apart from the rest, they would have handed these things especially to those to whom they were also entrusting the Churches themselves. For they greatly wished those whom they left as successors, handing over to them their own place of teaching, to be perfect and irreprehensible in all things; for if these acted correctly there would be great utility, but if they fell, the greatest calamity." Tertullian (On Prescription, chapter 20): "The Apostles, first throughout Judea, after attesting faith in Jesus Christ and instituting Churches, then having gone out into the world, promulgated to the nations the same doctrine of the same faith, and accordingly founded Churches in each city; from these the other Churches borrowed, and daily borrow, the shoot of faith and the seeds of doctrine, so that they may become Churches. And by this they themselves also are accounted Apostolic, as offspring of Apostolic Churches." St. Jerome, in his letter to Pammachius and Oceanus: "Whoever you are, assertor of new dogmas, I beg you to spare Roman ears, spare the faith which was praised by the Apostolic mouth. Why, after four hundred years, do you strive to teach us what we did not know before? Why do you bring forward into the open what Peter and Paul were unwilling to publish? Until this day the Christian world has existed without that doctrine."

732. III. As regards succession. 1) The Church cannot be ruled and governed except by that authority which Christ instituted; this is clear both because Christ is the author of the Church, and because the power of ruling the Church is supernatural, and therefore can proceed only from God. But Christ willed that the Church be ruled through apostolic authority perpetually enduring in their successors. Therefore the Church must always be Apostolic by succession, or by government. The minor is proved. a) Christ conferred upon the Apostles the power of ruling the Church, and he willed that it be transmitted to their successors (nos. 482-484; 524). b) The Apostles preached this power of theirs received from Christ. For in order to commend themselves to the faithful, they often recalled to their memory that eminent power of ruling and teaching which they had received from Christ. Thus (2 Cor. 5.20): "We act as ambassadors for Christ, as though God exhorted through us"; (1 Cor. 4.1): "Let a man so account us as ministers of Christ and dispensers of the mysteries of God"; (1 Thess. 2.13): "We give thanks to God without ceasing, because when you had received from us the word of the hearing of God, you received it not as the word of men, but, as it truly is, the word of God." And, endowed with this persuasion, they exact from the faithful this recognition of their vicarious power, namely full obedience; thus (2 Cor. 2.9): "I wrote that I might know the proof of you, whether you are obedient in all things"; (2 Thess. 3.14): "If anyone does not obey our word, mark this man by letter and do not associate with him." c) The Apostles exercised this same power; they communicated it to others, to be communicated by those others to still others (no. 524 ff.). 2) Christ willed unity of faith, which consists in this, that the faithful dispersed throughout the world believe all those truths which the Apostles preached and which their successors propose to be believed (nos. 650 ff.). But such unity, as is clear, could not be had without apostolic succession, for this is the principle of unity of faith. Therefore this apostolic succession must always be in the Church.

733. The second part is proved. 1. From Scripture. For 1) the hypothesis of extraordinary mission must be rejected if, from Christ's institution, Apostolic succession can never fail. But so it is. For a) Christ the Lord sent the Apostles into the whole world, to teach all nations, and to them as teachers he promised that he would be present all days, even to the consummation of the age. But these things would be false if Apostolic succession could ever fail. b) Christ, according to the Apostle (Eph. 4), gave apostles, pastors, and doctors "for the consummation of the saints, unto the work of ministry, unto the edification of the body of Christ, until we all meet in unity of faith and of the knowledge of the Son of God, unto a perfect man, unto the measure of the age of the fullness of Christ." By these words an ordinary and mediate apostolic mission is foretold as enduring until the mystical body of Christ shall have been fully built up. Therefore pastors and doctors can never be given who, through an extraordinary mission, supply the

defect of the former ones. 2) The very mission of St. Paul, which some misuse, overturns the hypothesis of the Innovators. For it is true that the Apostle received a certain extraordinary mission immediately from Christ the Lord; but because this was done after Christ's ascension into heaven, or after the Church had been founded in the Apostles and announced through them, a) Paul is referred back to the Apostles themselves, or to others appointed by them; b) he confers with the Apostles concerning the Gospel to be preached by him; c) he brings to the Apostles in Jerusalem the question concerning legal observances which had arisen at Antioch. Therefore, far from overturning the Apostolic authority already existing and being substituted in its place, he rather acknowledges it.

734. II. If God wished to endow certain men with extraordinary mission, which all would have to acknowledge under penalty of eternal damnation, he certainly ought to confirm it by such signs that it would be plainly known to all. Now these signs are chiefly miracles: by these Christ himself showed his mission; by the same the mission of the Apostles was confirmed, as we demonstrated in the first and second disputations. Nor did Luther himself think otherwise in this matter, who, writing in the Jena volume 2 to the Senate of Muehlhausen in the case of Muenzer, says: "Let the illustrious Senate call Thomas Muenzer to itself, and, if it can be done, to the whole community, and let it ask him who sent him or called him to preach. If he says that he was sent by God and by his Spirit, as once the Apostles were, let him prove this by signs and miracles. For when God wishes the ordinary mode to be changed, he always works miracles at the same time." But what are the miracles of the Innovators? Luther indeed attempted to expel a demon from a girl possessed; but with so unhappy a result that he was forced to desist from what he had begun, as Staphylus, an eyewitness, reports. What shall I say about the miracles of Calvin? Jerome Bolsec, an eyewitness, narrates that Calvin wished to raise up a certain Brulaeus, whom he had persuaded, from hope of gain and money, to feign himself dead; but that he found him truly dead. Cardinal Gotti vindicates this story against the objections of heretics (On the Church, volume 1, chapter 2, section 6). Hence Erasmus (Diatribe on Free Will), speaking of the Lutherans, says: "No one of them has yet existed who could heal even a lame horse." To him Luther replied (in the book On the Bondage of the Will): "Miracles ought not to be demanded from us, who deny free will"; and Calvin (preface to the Institutes): "They act dishonestly," he says, "because they demand miracles from us." Compare Francis de Walenburch (tract 8, sect. 14 ff.).

735. The third part does not need to be demonstrated here; for 1) it is clear from the arguments which we indicated (no. 720); 2) from the authority of the Fathers, some testimonies of whom we have given in this very article; 3) it will be confirmed from the testimonies which we shall exhibit for the following part of the thesis.

736. The fourth part is proved. I. The Fathers, in order to prove apostolicity of doctrine, had recourse to apostolicity of succession; but in order to prove this, they constantly showed apostolic succession in the center of unity. Thus St. Irenaeus (Against Heresies, book 3, chapter 3) says: "But since it would be very long in a volume of this sort to enumerate the successions of all the Churches, by indicating the tradition which that greatest and most ancient Church, known to all, founded and constituted by the two most glorious Apostles Peter and Paul, has from the Apostles, and the faith announced to men, coming down through the successions of Bishops even to us, we confound all those who in whatever way gather otherwise than they ought, whether through self-pleasing, or vain glory, or blindness and evil opinion. For to this Church, on account of its more powerful principality, every Church must come together, that is, the faithful who are everywhere, in which Church the tradition which is from the Apostles has always been preserved by those who are everywhere." Compare what Schrader learnedly discusses concerning this testimony of St. Irenaeus (On Roman Unity, part 1, nos. 109 ff.). Tertullian, after confirming the same heads of doctrine which we have set forth, finally (On Prescription, chapters 32-36) extols "Rome, whence authority is also at hand for us," he says. "How happy is that Church, into which the Apostles poured out their whole doctrine together with their blood. Where Peter is made equal to the Lord's passion. Where Paul

is crowned with the departure of John [the Baptist]. Where the Apostle John, after he had been plunged into fiery oil and suffered nothing, is relegated to an island. Let us see what she learned, what she taught, what she has pledged together with the African Churches." St. Cyprian (On the Unity of the Church): "The proof for faith is easy by the compendium of truth. The Lord speaks to Peter: I say to thee, he says, that thou art, etc... And again after his resurrection he says: Feed my sheep. Upon that one he builds his Church, and to him he commands that his sheep be fed... so that he might manifest unity, he arranged by his authority the origin of that same unity beginning from one." St. Optatus of Milevis (On the Schism of the Donatists, book 1, chapter 2): "Therefore you cannot deny that you know that in the city of Rome the episcopal chair was first conferred upon Peter, in which Peter, the head of all the Apostles, sat; whence he was also called Cephas. In this one chair unity was to be preserved by all; nor were the other Apostles each to claim separate chairs for themselves, so that he would already be a schismatic and sinner who should set up another chair against the singular chair." St. Ambrose (On the Sacraments, book 3, chapter 7): "He himself is Peter, to whom Christ said: Thou art Peter, and upon this rock I will build my Church. Where Peter is, therefore, there is the Church." And: "In all things I desire to follow the Roman Church." St. Jerome (Against the Luciferians) concludes thus: "I could spend the day with discourse of this kind, and dry up all the little streams of propositions with the one sun of the Church. But because we have already spoken much, and the prolixity of the contest has wearied the attention of the hearers, I shall put forward to you the brief and open judgment of my mind: one must remain in that Church which, founded by the Apostles, endures to this day." Now it is established that for Jerome the Church antonomastically Apostolic is Rome. For, answering Theophilus, Patriarch of Alexandria, who had said that it was guarded by the rules of the Church that no one should make a divorce from his own bishop, he says (letter 63, no. 2) that he follows "the Roman faith, praised by the apostolic mouth, in which the Alexandrian Church glories that it shares." And disputing against Rufinus (book 1, no. 4), he sharply presses him thus: "What does he call his faith? That in which the Roman Church is strong, or that which is contained in the volumes of Origen? If he answers, the Roman, then we are Catholics." St. Augustine very often wrote in the same sense, but especially in the psalm against the party of Donatus and in the letter (letter 23, no. 2) which he himself, Fortunatus, and Alypius gave to Generosus. For in order to demonstrate that the Donatists were cut off from the Church, on both sides he weaves through the series of Roman Pontiffs even to Anastasius. And after he has proved that in that series no Donatist bishop is found, and that no prelate is present with whom the Donatists might communicate, he concludes that they are strangers to the building of the Church, which, with Christ as author, rests upon the Roman Pontiffs as upon a foundation. Hence also (Against the Letter of Manichaeus, chapter 4, no. 5) he writes: "For in the Catholic Church... the succession of priests holds, from the very see of Peter the Apostle, to whom the Lord after his resurrection commended his sheep to be fed, even to the present episcopate." We conclude with the very beautiful words of Peter, abbot of Celle, who (letter 23, letters book 6; and letter 10, book 9) says: "There is, nevertheless, a place for gold in which it is smelted, and silver has the beginnings of its veins: the see of Peter and the Roman court, which principally holds the keys of heaven." And again: "Turned and turned back, in whatever state of veneration and glorification, I go with you, I think with you. But if outside the form of common coinage you wish to fabricate another, which the see of Peter has not approved, to which it belongs either to approve or disapprove the order of the universal Church, I plant my foot and do not cross the established boundaries." See more in Schrader (op. cit., especially nos. 109-134).

737. II. Adequate apostolicity, and therefore the apostolic Church itself, is sufficiently shown if there is found 1) the fullness of apostolic power, which 2) is able to communicate apostolic mission to others, and 3) with which all must communicate in order to belong to the apostolic Church. But once succession in the center of unity has been established, all these things are found. Therefore. The minor is proved as regards the fullness of power. The center of unity in any society is the supreme government; in the Church it is monarchical government; monarchical government requires that supreme authority reside undivided in one. Therefore, once legitimate succession in this one has been found, by that

very fact the fullness of power is found, which indeed in the Church is apostolic. The minor is proved as regards the faculty of communicating apostolic mission. Certainly to him who by divine right possesses the fullness of apostolic power, also by divine right to be perpetuated in the Church, it belongs to communicate it to the rest (no. 515). Some difficulty could arise here from the fact that by divine right itself there must be bishops in the Church. But it should be noted 1) that the institution of bishops belongs by proper right to the Supreme Pontiff; 2) that here the question is not so much about the power of order, which is immediately from God, as about the power of jurisdiction, which apostolic mission principally signifies (no. 723); 3) even if it were granted, which we by no means concede, as will be clear in the following disputation, that jurisdiction in bishops is immediately from God, it would always be wholly dependent upon the Supreme Pontiff, as all concede. Hence by proper right it belongs to him to choose and institute bishops, to assign to them the part of the Church which they govern, to limit, suspend, revoke jurisdiction, and so forth. Hence the Fathers do not hesitate to assert that power flows down from the successor of Peter into the remaining bishops. Thus Optatus of Milevis (book 7 against Parmenian) says: "For the good of unity, Blessed Peter, for whom it would have been enough if after he denied he had obtained pardon alone, both merited to be preferred to all the Apostles, and alone received the keys of the kingdom of heaven to be communicated to the others." Before St. Optatus, Nyssenus (Against Those Who Take Correction Badly) says: "Nothing false or lying has been written in the Gospels, nor does Christ's predilection have a fallacious outcome. Through Peter he gave to the bishops the keys of the kingdom of heaven." St. Leo the Great, in his letter to the bishops of Gaul, or of the province of Vienne, argues thus: "The Lord willed the sacrament of this office [namely, of preaching the truth] to pertain to the office of all the Apostles in such a way that he placed it principally in the most blessed Peter, the chief of all the Apostles, so that from him, as from a certain head, he might diffuse his gifts as into the whole body." Innocent I, in his letter to the Council of Carthage, speaks thus: "Knowing what is owed to the Apostolic See, since all of us placed in this position desire to follow the Apostle, from which the episcopate itself and the whole authority of this name has emerged." Caesarius of Arles confesses the same, writing to Pope Symmachus: "Just as the episcopate takes its beginning from the person of Blessed Peter, so it is necessary that your holiness plainly show to individual Churches, by fitting disciplines, what they ought to observe." And, omitting the rest, St. Cyprian (On the Unity of the Church) says: "The Church of the Lord, flooded with light, stretches her rays throughout the whole world; nevertheless there is one light which is diffused everywhere, nor is the unity of the body separated. She extends her branches into the whole earth with abundant fruitfulness; she spreads more broadly her streams flowing richly; nevertheless there is one head and one origin." The minor is proved as regards the necessity of communion with the center of unity. This is clear 1) from what has been disputed concerning the unity of government which Christ willed in the Church; 2) from what has been indicated in this same article, especially no. 724; 3) let St. Cyprian stand for all, who immediately before the words just cited writes: "The Church is one, which is extended more broadly into a multitude by the increase of fecundity. Just as there are many rays of the sun, but one light, and many branches of a tree, but one strength founded in a tenacious root, and when very many streams flow down from one source, although number may seem diffused by the largeness of overflowing abundance, nevertheless unity is preserved in the origin. Tear a ray of the sun from the body: unity does not admit a division of light. Break a branch from the tree: what is broken will not be able to germinate fruit. Cut off a stream from the source: once cut off, it dries up. So also the Church," etc.

Article 5. Whether the True Church of Christ Is Indefectible

738. Having completed the question concerning the properties of the Church, we proceed to examine her endowments, beginning from indefectibility. The indefectibility of the Church imports not only that the Church never fails, but that she cannot fail; namely, when Christ's institution is considered, which also includes the end, it is necessary that the Church persevere in her being as long as there are men dwelling on earth in the state of wayfarers. Some distinguish the indefectibility of the Church

from her perpetuity. For perpetuity, they say, properly imports "the duration of the Church even to the end of the world"; while indefectibility properly means "identity of perpetual permanence in the same nature." Hence they also say that perpetuity affects the existence, but indefectibility the essence of the Church.

739. But identity in the same nature can be understood either in such a way that by the name nature is signified only that which constitutes the essence of the Church, or in such a way that, in a certain broader sense, there is signified both the essence and whatever follows upon the essence of the Church from Christ's institution. In the first way, the perpetuity of the Church necessarily includes indefectibility; for if the essence of the Church were changed, the Church herself would not endure to the end of the world, but some new institution would be put in her place. In the other way, however, indefectibility is not included absolutely and of itself in perpetuity; for absolutely it can happen that a thing remains without some one of its properties, and a fortiori without one or several of the prerogatives added to it, just as a man can endure in his existence to old age, remaining the same in his essence and even in his properties, although, weighed down by the burden of years and diseases, he loses the use of several senses or even of reason.

740. Therefore, in order that the concept of the indefectibility which must be asserted of the Church may be proposed adequately and explicitly, it must be said that it consists "in her perpetual duration even to the end of the world in that internal and external constitution, in the complex of those properties and endowments, in which she was first instituted by Christ." From this description it is clear 1) that the indefectibility of the Church regards both the essential constitutive elements, the soul and body, whatever belongs to the nature of such a visible society, magisterium, ministry, government; and the properties, unity, holiness, etc.; and finally the remaining endowments or prerogatives, infallibility, etc. 2) That indefectibility of this kind regards all times of the Church's existence, so that at no time can she be without any of her constitutive elements, nor without any of her properties or endowments. 3) That this very existence will endure even to the end of the world; hence the indefectibility of which we treat includes perpetuity. 4) Nevertheless this indefectibility is by no means confused with Apostolicity, taken under that general acceptance according to which the Church of any time whatsoever must be the same as the Church founded in the Apostles (nos. 716 ff.). For Apostolicity so taken means that the Church, for as long as she endures, must be the same as the Church founded in the Apostles; indefectibility means that she will endure in this identity even to the end of the world.

741. The indefectibility described by us is also customarily called indefectibility as to state, which is to be attributed to the Church in comparison with the Synagogue. That is, if the generic notion of Church is considered, just as it can be said that the Church has existed from the beginning of the world, so it can be said that the Synagogue in some way still perseveres. But if the state and form of the present Church is considered, just as she must be said to have been immediately instituted by Christ, so also it is established that the Synagogue failed (no. 432 ff.). Therefore the indefectibility of the Church is "her perpetual permanence in that form and state in which she was instituted by Christ."

742. But it must be noted that indefectibility is attributed to the universal Church and not to each of her parts, or particular Churches; for the promises of Christ were not made to the Church existing in this or that nation, but to the whole Church. Yet however particular Churches may fail, the Church herself will always remain unfailing and indefectible; indeed, catholicity itself will remain, either because the defections of particular Churches are not simultaneous, or because while one fails, new Churches are founded elsewhere (no. 700).

743. All the Innovators err against the true indefectibility of the Church, although not all in the same degree. For 1) some, such as the Anabaptists, Swedenborgians, and Irvingians, seem to deny it absolutely, while they expect a certain new economy, which they call that of the Holy Spirit, to succeed the present economy, which they call that of the Word, just as this succeeded the economy of the Old Testament, which they call the economy of the Father. According to the Swedenborgians this new economy

began in the year 1770; according to the Irvingians, in the year 1830. 2) Others, although they do not expect that third economy, nevertheless, making no distinction, hold that the Church can fail entirely for a time; indeed, that in fact she has failed. According to Palmer (part 1, chapter 1), this was taught especially by the Socinians, Arminians, Episcopius, and others. 3) Some seem to restrict indefectibility to visibility, or they constitute it in this, that there will always exist some who profess the true faith; or in this, that the essence of faith, as they call it, will never be wholly lacking from the Church; or finally all these things are mixed together by them. Compare Newman, Lectures on the Prophetical Office of the Church, etc., London, 1837. 4) Most, on the contrary, teach that the invisible Church cannot fail, but not so the visible Church. Hence Bellarmine (book 3, chapter 13) says: "Many of our own waste time while they prove absolutely that the Church cannot fail; for Calvin and the other heretics concede this, but say that it must be understood of the invisible Church." Compare also Moehler, Symbolism, book 1, chapter 5, section 34. Finally, we omit the opinions of those who, although they seem to assert the indefectibility of the visible and invisible Church, nevertheless judge that she can fail as to one or another thing, for example faith, unity of government, and so forth.

744. As we have suggested, all these not only assert more or less the defectibility of the Church, but also affirm the fact of defection, by the same reasoning by which they deny the visibility of the Church (no. 449): namely, they thus strive to make honorable their own defection from the Church. But if you ask them for the epoch of this defection, Stapleton (Relection, chapter 1, question 5, article 3) enumerates seven opinions. Of these opinions two are extremes: one affirms that the defection began from the Council of Constance; the other thinks that the defection began from the very time of the Apostles, for already at that time, they say, the Church was stained with the mud of errors. Luther held each opinion, in his own manner, according to the diversity of occasions.

745. Now if the true indefectibility of the Church is demonstrated, all contrary errors will collapse at once. Yet in order that the force of the arguments which we shall exhibit may be rightly perceived, it is useful to note in advance: 1) some of them at first sight seem to demonstrate only indefectibility as to the essence strictly taken, but not as to those things which follow upon the essence, since they seem to state the perpetual existence of the Church, which, as we said, can absolutely and of itself be understood with indefectibility of the essence alone. Nevertheless, if we examine them more deeply, they prove adequate indefectibility. For if a) we consider the nature of any thing whatever, the properties which follow upon the essence are not separable from it except by a miracle. Do the adversaries teach that God works a miracle so that the Church may fail in her properties? If they do not assert this, then when the Church is shown to endure perpetually, this is rightly understood both of the essence and of those things which naturally follow upon it. b) But if we consider the nature of the Church, those things which are called her properties or endowments truly pertain to her essence, as we suggested (no. 627), and as the concept of them shows. Therefore if the Church, as instituted by Christ, is demonstrated to be indefectible as to essence, by that very fact she is shown to be indefectible as to properties and endowments. 2) Nor are there lacking arguments which directly prove the full indefectibility described by us, especially when the perpetuity of the Church is stated in opposition to the synagogue; for the latter ceased not as to essentials, but as to state (no. 437). 3) Indeed, nor are there lacking arguments which still more directly demonstrate the perpetuity of those properties and prerogatives which, according to the adversaries, can most of all fail and have at times failed in the Church. Of this kind especially is Apostolic succession, and the external ministry of teachers, upon which unity and the other things depend. Now, if even this property alone is shown to be indefectible, every approach is closed off to the adversaries for making honorable their own defection from the asserted defectibility of the Church.

746. These things, therefore, having been noted in advance: Section II. The Proposed Question Is Solved. Proposition XXXII. Christ so instituted the Church that she would be the last

economy of salvation, destined to endure ceaselessly and perpetually, not only as to essentials, but also as to state, as they say. Therefore she enjoys true indefectibility, by force of which she perseveres until the end of the world in the same internal and external constitution, in the same properties and endowments, with which she began to exist.

747. It is proved, I. From the Old Testament. For 1) in the Old Testament it is often asserted simply that the Church will endure perpetually. For it is read (Isa. 9.6 ff.): "A child is born to us, and a son is given to us, and the principality has been made upon his shoulder, and his name shall be called wonderful, counselor, God, mighty, father of the future age, prince of peace. His empire shall be multiplied, and of peace there shall be no end. Upon the throne of David and upon his kingdom he shall sit, to confirm it and strengthen it in judgment and justice, from now and even forever." And (61.8-9): "I will strike an everlasting covenant with them, and their seed shall be known among the nations, and their offspring in the midst of the peoples. All who shall see them shall know them, because these are the seed which the Lord has blessed." Likewise (Dan. 2.44) it is said: "In the days of those kingdoms the God of heaven shall raise up a kingdom which shall not be destroyed forever... and it itself shall stand forever." Almost all of Psalm 88 treats of the perpetuity of the kingdom of Christ; especially verses 36-39, it is said: "Once have I sworn in my holy one, if I shall lie to David. His seed shall remain forever. And his throne as the sun in my sight, and as the moon perfect forever, and a faithful witness in heaven." Compare also the testimonies which we gave at no. 465. Hence, in the cited testimonies the discussion concerns a covenant and a kingdom, to which perpetual permanence is expressly attributed. But the covenant is that which God entered through Christ, and the kingdom of which the discussion treats is the Church. Indeed, a) the kingdom of David is typically the kingdom of Christ, with whom alone God made an everlasting covenant; hence (Luke 1.32) concerning Jesus it is said: "He shall be great, and shall be called the Son of the Most High, and the Lord God shall give to him the throne of David his father, and he shall reign in the house of Jacob forever." b) But from Christian understanding and from the Scriptures themselves we are taught that the kingdom of Christ on earth is the Church. For the kingdom itself is exhibited as a sheepfold under a shepherd, a body under a head, a building upon a foundation; all these things evidently signify the Church. Certainly she is the assembly of men who obey Christ; but this is equivalent to the kingdom of Christ. Therefore in the cited testimonies the perennial duration of the Christian Church is asserted. 2) In the Old Testament the kingdom of Christ, the new covenant, the Christian Church, are often opposed to the ancient covenant and to the Synagogue, insofar as the latter must at some time cease, while the former must endure perpetually (cf. Jer. 31.32; Hag. 2.7 ff., etc.). But the Synagogue had to cease and did cease as to state (no. 437). Therefore the Church founded by Christ must persevere perpetually as to state, and therefore she is truly indefectible. This argument the Apostle often proposes and develops while explaining the Scriptures of the Old Testament. But especially in Hebrews 7 ff. he teaches first that the priesthood is, as it were, identified with the law: once the priesthood has been transferred, it is necessary that a transfer of the law occur. Then he opposes the Levitical priesthood to the priesthood of the new law: the former he declares ineffective and to be abrogated; the latter, however, effective, eternal, and never to be abrogated. He also compares the Old Testament with the New Testament, as the movable with the immovable, the imperfect with the perfect; and in 1 Corinthians 13 and Hebrews 10 he proclaims that the intuitive vision in the fatherland will succeed to the New Testament, or to the present economy of faith. But compare what we said concerning this argument in the treatise On the Infused Virtues, no. 576 ff.

748. II. From the New Testament. From the many things which could be brought forward, we choose one or another. And 1) we argue from the classic passage (Matt. 16.18): "And I say to thee, that thou art Peter, and upon this rock I will build my Church, and the gates of hell shall not prevail against her." From this testimony it is clear that the Church in herself is a most firm building, as founded upon the rock; but relatively to her enemies, she is an impregnable citadel, against which the gates of hell will not prevail. Therefore there is no cause, whether intrinsic or extrinsic, by which the Church could be

corrupted or fail. 2) We argue from the perpetuity and indefectibility of the Apostolic office, upon which the other things in the Church depend, and which, even if it alone stands, settles the case with the Innovators. Now (Matt. 28) Christ sends the Apostles to teach and baptize, and at the same time promises that he will be with them, namely with them teaching and baptizing, even to the consummation of the age. And (John 14.16) Christ the Lord says: "And I will ask the Father, and he will give you another Paraclete, that he may remain with you forever." And (Eph. 4) Paul teaches that Christ gave Apostles, pastors, and doctors "for the consummation of the saints," "until we all meet in unity of faith," "unto a perfect man." We have already often developed this argument.

749. III. If we compare the cited places of the Old and New Testaments, we rightly ask: how would all the things which are said in them about the Church be true, if the Church, even for a time, could lose one or another of her properties and endowments? For 1) suppose that unity in faith and government should fail, so that the Church, split into two or more parts, is no longer one. It is evident that of the Church thus divided it could no longer be affirmed that she is not dissipated, that she stands forever, that she breaks in pieces and consumes all other kingdoms; rather, on the contrary, that she is torn apart, broken in pieces, and consumed. It is evident that the enemy has prevailed against her, conquered her, and that she has been abandoned by Christ. 2) Nor can it be said that the predictions and promises concerning the perpetual indefectibility of the Church were conditional, if, namely, she remained faithful. For a) promises of this kind were made by Christ not only to the Church, but to Christ himself, to whose merits the reward of an everlasting kingdom is paid; whence to him himself, who acquired the Church by his blood, it is said: "Ask of me, and I will give thee the nations for thy inheritance." Is there any condition on the part of Christ, or, if there is any, can it fail on his part? b) The promises made to the Church express no condition at all. Indeed, since they were made to the universal Church, they exclude conditions of fidelity on the part of the Church herself; for then promises of this kind would have this meaning: the Church will not err, if she has not departed from the truth; she will hand down pure doctrine, if she has not corrupted it, etc.; which are surely ridiculous. c) There is added the common sense of the Fathers.

750. IV. From the Fathers. Their testimonies are innumerable; but we select a few in which the Church is said not only to endure perpetually, but always to flourish, shine, grow, never grow old, not only not be conquered, but not even be inclined, and so forth. All these things certainly show adequate indefectibility. St. Ambrose (book On Solomon, chapter 4) says: "By the ship we ought to understand the Church... Although she is often vexed by the waves or storms of the waters, nevertheless she can never suffer shipwreck, because on her mast, that is, on the Cross, Christ is raised; at the stern the Father sits as Governor; the Paraclete Spirit guards the prow. Twelve rowers lead her through the narrow straits of this world into port," that is, the twelve Apostles. St. Jerome (commentary on Isaiah, chapter 4): "The Church founded upon the rock is shaken by no tempest, overthrown by no whirlwind and winds." St. John Chrysostom (in the Oration That Christ Is God): "From the day on which it was said, the Church stands solid and stable and unconquered, flourishing and shining, and day by day more and more vigorous, growing and taking more strength, and furnishing to all who will exist from that day even to the coming of the Lord that they may take from her the greatest fruits and ineffable utility." And in the Homily on the Capture of Eutropius, no. 6: "Do not abstain from the Church, for nothing is stronger than the Church. Your hope is the Church, your salvation is the Church, your refuge is the Church. She is higher than heaven and broader than earth. She never grows old, but is always vigorous. Therefore, demonstrating her firmness and stability, Scripture calls her a mountain," etc. St. Augustine (on Psalm 71): "They [the gentiles] think that the religion of the Christian name is to live in this world up to a certain time, and afterward will not exist. Therefore it will remain with the sun: as long as the sun rises and sets, that is, as long as these times roll on, the Church of God, that is, the Body of Christ on earth, will not be lacking." And in the Enarration on Psalm 103, sermon 2, no. 5: "He has established the Church upon the firmament of the Church. What is the firmament of the Church? What is the foundation of the Church except... Christ Jesus? And therefore, supported by such a

foundation, what did she deserve to hear? 'She shall not be moved forever and ever...' The Church will totter if the foundation has tottered. But whence will Christ totter, who before he came to us and took flesh, all things were made through him and without him nothing was made; who contains all things by majesty, and us by goodness? Since Christ does not totter, 'she shall not be moved forever and ever.' Where are those who say that the Church has perished from the world, when she cannot even be inclined?"

751. V. From theological reason. For - 1) the Church was instituted by Christ so that she might continue his mission on earth for the sanctification and salvation of souls (no. 482 ff.). Therefore she must endure as long as there are men to be saved through Christ, or even to the end of the ages, so that for all and always Christ may be the way, the truth, and the life. But unless she endured truly indefectible, she could not pursue her end and continue her mission. For this it is required that men be able to approach her in order to obtain salvation through her; and therefore it is necessary that the Church be recognizable as the true Church of Christ (no. 462). But if she could ever fail in even one of her properties or endowments, the Church is not recognizable. This can be proved in many ways. To suggest something, we say that this is clear from the intimate bond by which those things which constitute the Church, or follow upon her constitution, are mutually connected. Suppose, for example, that visibility perishes; apostolic succession, which depends upon it, will already perish, and therefore unity also. Suppose that apostolic government perishes; the efficient principle of unity will now cease, and the Church will no longer be a society. But if you substitute another government, it will no longer be that society which Christ instituted. Suppose that infallibility perishes; the extrinsic principle of unity of faith will now cease. Protestants say that the Church can fail as to faith. But if you take away or change this, you overturn the radical germ of the soul of the Church; and what will become of holiness when that is lacking which is called the beginning and root of all justice? Each person can pursue these things further. 2) If the Church could ever fail, at no time could she exercise her mission and authority efficaciously. For if it were established antecedently that the mission of the Church could either entirely collapse or at least be interrupted, it would now be rendered of no weight, or would have no practical force. For every refractory person would immediately say that the mission of the Church had failed or been corrupted, and therefore that faith should no longer be given to her, nor obedience to her. Indeed, the example of the Innovators confirms this, who, from that supposition, conducted themselves in this way and invented an extraordinary mission.

752. Scholion. Almost all the objections have in part been anticipated in this article, and in part are the same as those which are usually urged against unity of government and catholicity. There is, however, one which is drawn from the synagogue, and to which it is helpful to respond briefly. Therefore they say I: The Synagogue of the Jews often failed; therefore the Church also can fail. The antecedent is proved: 1) because in the time of Moses, Aaron with the whole people adored the calf (Exod. 32); 2) in the time of Elijah, when he complained (3 Kings 19.4), saying: "I have been left alone, and they seek my life, that they may take it away"; 3) the same occurred in the time of Isaiah and Jeremiah (Isa. 1.7; Jer. 2.13), which is confirmed from those words (2 Chron. 15.3): "Many days shall pass in Israel without the true God, and without a priest teacher, and without law." I respond. 1) Whatever may be the case concerning the antecedent, the consequence must be denied. For it was said not of the synagogue, but of the Church of Christ: "the gates of hell shall not prevail against her." 2) But the antecedent must also be denied. Indeed, as regards the first point, a part of the synagogue, and not the whole synagogue, failed in faith in the time of Moses; for Moses himself did not fail, nor did the Levites and Priests. Whence also it is said (Exod. 32): "Therefore Moses, seeing the people, said: if anyone is the Lord's, let him be joined to me. And all the sons of Levi were gathered to him. Now the sons of Levi were twenty-two thousand." As regards the second and third points, it must be recalled that in the time of Elijah, Isaiah, and Jeremiah two kingdoms belonged to the Synagogue: the kingdom of Judah, which consisted of two tribes, and the kingdom of Israel, which consisted of the remaining ten tribes. The latter indeed declined into idolatry, yet not in such a way that there were none who adored the true God. Hence, when Elijah thought that he alone had been left, God answered him (3

Kings 19.18): "I have left to myself in Israel seven thousand men, whose knees have not been bent before Baal." But the kingdom of Judah underwent diverse vicissitudes according to the diverse kings, good or bad, which it had; yet even to the Babylonian captivity the use of Sacrifices according to the Mosaic law always persevered, as is clear from those words (2 Macc. 1): "when our Fathers were being led into Persia, the Priests who then were worshippers of God secretly hid the fire taken from the altar in a valley where there was a deep and dry well."

753. II. They say: at least the whole synagogue with its ceremonies expired in the time of Christ; and yet promises of perpetual permanence seemed to have been made to it. Therefore likewise the Church of Christ can fail. I respond. 1) The synagogue indeed ceased in the time of Christ, insofar as it was then repudiated with its ceremonies and sacrifices, and in its place the Church of Christ succeeded. "Since in the law and prophets," says Maldonatus on the words "Do not think that I have come to destroy the law," etc., "there were four parts, promises and prophecies, precepts of the Decalogue, ceremonial things, and judicial things, Christ fulfilled them all: the promises and prophecies by exhibiting the things which had been promised and predicted; the moral precepts of the Decalogue by interpreting them better; the ceremonial things by exhibiting the things which were signified through the ceremonies, as for the circumcision of the flesh, baptism and the circumcision of the heart; the judicial things because he changed corporeal and temporal rewards and punishments into spiritual and eternal ones. In what way, therefore, did he abrogate the law? Not by dissolving, but by fulfilling; not by violating, but by perfecting; just as a painter, as Theophylact says, when he applies the final hand and uses colors on an image begun and sketched only with the outermost outlines, abolishes the prior image and brings in a new one. But he abolishes it not by dissolving, but by completing; not by deleting, but by perfecting." 2) Of the promises made to the synagogue, some were made to it as such and were to be fulfilled in it, as, for example, the promise of temporal happiness according as the people would observe or transgress the law. Others were made to it insofar as it was a figure of the Church of Christ, and were to be fulfilled in this Church, as, for example, the promise of the aggregation of the nations into it, and other things of this kind. Hence St. Augustine (The City of God, book 17, chapter 6, no. 1) says: "When eternity was promised to it [the Aaronic priesthood], it was promised not to the shadow and figure itself, but to that which was shadowed and figured through it." Certainly if in some testimonies the indefectibility of the Jewish church seems to be promised, in very many others the same is circumscribed within certain limits. But there is no text limiting the indefectibility which is everywhere promised to the Church of Christ. 3) Therefore Becanus rightly concludes (Manual of Controversies, book 1, chapter 3, no. 47) that from the fact that the synagogue was repudiated it does not follow that the Church of Christ is similarly to be repudiated: "Indeed, the contrary follows. First, because the maidservant of Abraham, who was repudiated, represented the Synagogue; but the wife of Abraham, who was not repudiated, represented the Church. Secondly, the Synagogue was further repudiated because it was neither perfect nor sufficient for salvation, according to that saying (Heb. 7.19): 'The law brought nothing to perfection...' But the Church of Christ is perfect and sufficient for salvation... Whence Augustine (on Psalm 73): 'the sacraments of the New Testament give salvation; the sacraments of the Old Testament promised the Savior.' Thirdly, the Synagogue contained the shadow of future things (Heb. 10.1); the Church contains the light, which is Christ (John 1.9). But the shadow necessarily fails when the light approaches; therefore the synagogue with the Mosaic sacrifices had to cease when the Church came with Christ. Fourthly, the synagogue was instituted for servants, the Church for sons; but servants receive temporal wages from their lords and are thus dismissed; sons, however, succeed to the perpetual inheritance. The Apostle intimates this (Gal. 4.30): 'Cast out the bondwoman and her son. For the son of the bondwoman shall not be heir with the son of the free woman.'"

Article 6. Whether, and What Sort of, Authority Is to Be Attributed to the Church of Christ

754. The things which pertain to the power of the Church are immediately inferred from those things which we established in the preceding disputation, especially where we vindicated the true hierarchy and the nature of the Church as a perfect society. Nevertheless, it will be useful, whether for the fullness of doctrine or for overthrowing certain errors, to treat directly of the power of the Church, establishing at least the principles, while their application to diverse objects is left to the canonists.

755. "There is a twofold spiritual power," says St. Thomas (2-2, q. 39, a. 3), "one sacramental, the other jurisdictional. Sacramental power is that which is conferred through some consecration; and such power, according to its essence, remains in the man who has obtained it through consecration as long as he lives, whether he fall into schism or into heresy... But jurisdictional power is that which is conferred by the simple injunction of a man, and such power does not adhere immovably; whence it does not remain in schismatics and heretics." The Council of Trent sufficiently suggests the same division, when in session 23 it requires two things in a Bishop, namely legitimate ordination and legitimate mission: the former confers the power of order, the latter the power of jurisdiction.

756. We gave the reason for this distinction, which proves it to be adequate, at no. 516. Nevertheless it pleased certain more recent theologians and canonists to propose a new distinction, according to which ecclesiastical power is one thing of ministry, another of magisterium, another of command. By the power of ministry they understand that which we, with the common opinion, call the power of order. But they distinguish the power of magisterium and of command, while we, according to the common mode of speaking, call each the power of jurisdiction. But as Cardinal Tarquini rightly observes (book 1, no. 4, note): "The third kind of power, which he called that of magisterium, the distinguished Phillips introduced in vain. For if it is pure magisterium, it cannot be called power; but if it is so conceived that a right is present in it of inclining the Faithful to the obedience of faith and of commanding their assent, it is part of the power of jurisdiction. Therefore one ought not to depart from the doctrine common in Catholic schools." The power of order is treated in the treatise On the Sacraments; we shall speak in the following article about the power of jurisdiction insofar as it regards the office of teaching; the rest must be treated here.

757. Now the power of jurisdiction is divided in three ways. For either 1) the means to the proper end of a perfect society are determined and proposed to its members in such a way that an obligation to use them is induced; and there is had legislative power. 2) Or it is brought about that the means already proposed are rightly applied, with consideration of the true sense of the law and the nature of the action which is conformable to it or difform from it; and there is had judicial power. 3) Or finally those refusing to apply the same means, or impeding them, are compelled or coerced; and there is had coercive power. But power is called coercive not because it precisely inflicts physical force, for that can also be done through injury, but because it imposes an obligation to a penalty and brings that obligation upon even the unwilling.

758. Heterodox writers have attacked the legislative power of the Church in two ways. For 1) many of the Innovators taught that the Prelates of the Church have no authority for making Ecclesiastical laws. Among these are chiefly numbered the Poor of Lyons, or Waldenses, Marsilius of Padua, John Wyclif, John Hus, John of Wesel, Calvin, and Luther. Luther, in the book On the Babylonian Captivity, chapter on Baptism, writes thus: "By what right does the Pope establish laws over us? Who gave him the power of capturing our liberty, given to us through baptism, when neither Pope, nor Bishop, nor any man has the right to establish one syllable over a Christian man, unless it is done with that man's consent?" 2) Others, flatterers of Princes, indeed admit that there is in the Church a power of making Ecclesiastical laws, but they suppose that it depends upon the civil power; and with M. Antonius de Dominis, Richer, and others they contend that it was conceded to the Church by lay Princes, not given by Christ himself to the Apostles and transmitted from the Apostles to their Successors.

759. But if it is once proved that legislative power belongs to the Church, that the same belongs to her by her own right, or divine right, and not by concession of princes, is both concluded by the same arguments and is clear from what has been said (nos. 582 ff.) concerning the independence of the Church from civil society. In this matter it can be noted that although civil power also is from God, nevertheless it is from him in a different way from ecclesiastical power. For if the question concerns the institution itself of authority, and not its actual conferral upon a determinate subject: 1) civil power is from God insofar as God is the author of man's nature, which is social and therefore requires authority; but Ecclesiastical power was immediately instituted by Christ the Lord himself. 2) Hence God did not himself determine the form of government for civil society; but Christ the Lord determined the form of government in the Church. Compare Bellarmine, On Laymen, chapter 6.

760. From the independent legislative power of the Church, however, it is evidently perceived that the following propositions were rightly condemned in the encyclical Quanta cura: "The laws of the Church do not bind in conscience unless they are promulgated by the civil power; the acts and decrees of the Roman Pontiffs concerning Religion and the Church need the sanction and approval, or at least the assent, of the civil power; the Apostolic Constitutions by which secret Societies are condemned, whether in them there is required, or is not required, an oath concerning the keeping of secrecy, and their followers and supporters are punished with anathema, have no force in those regions of the world where aggregations of this kind are tolerated by the civil government." To these can be added several propositions condemned in the Syllabus, sections 5-6.

761. The proper function of judicial power, as we said, is to bring it about that established laws are rightly applied. But this imports two things: 1) that they be applied according to the sense and mode in which they were made; 2) that the actions of subjects be measured according to this norm. Therefore a twofold judgment is required, namely concerning the sense of the law and concerning the relation which individual actions have to it; and for this reason this power is deservedly called judicial. But all who attack legislative or coercive power, as is clear of itself, deny this power of the Church. Nevertheless, it is helpful to recall proposition 31 condemned in the Syllabus: "The ecclesiastical forum for temporal cases of Clerics, whether civil or criminal, is entirely to be removed, even without consulting and despite the protest of the Apostolic See."

762. The coercive power of the Church has been attacked in manifold ways. For 1) some have denied every power of this kind to the Church. Thus, among other errors of Marsilius of Padua proscribed by John XXII, the famous proposition is: "Neither the Pope, nor the whole Church gathered together, can punish any man, however evil, with a coercive penalty, unless he has power from the Emperor." 2) Others indeed concede to the Church the power of inflicting spiritual penalties, but deny that she can also employ temporal penalties, even through the aid of the secular arm. This the Donatists once taught in Africa, as St. Augustine writes in the books against the letters of Parmenian, Petilian, and Gaudentius, Donatists. Having embraced their doctrine, the Innovators of more recent times, Waldenses, Albigenses, etc., on this account accused the Church of cruelty. John Hus, proposition 14 among those condemned by the Council of Constance, says: "Doctors who posit that someone to be corrected through Ecclesiastical censure, if he refuses to be corrected, is to be handed over to the secular judgment, certainly follow in this the Pontiffs and Scribes and Pharisees, who, when Christ was unwilling to obey them in all things, saying, 'it is not lawful for us to kill anyone,' handed him over to the secular judgment, and such persons are murderers worse than Pilate." 3) Others finally acknowledge the coercive power of the Church even as regards temporal penalties; yet they hold that she can inflict these not through her own magistrates, but through civil magistrates.

763. To understand Catholic doctrine in this matter, we note with Suarez (On Faith, disp. 20, sect. 3, no. 13): "Since the evil of penalty consists in the violent privation of some good, as many as are the kinds of goods, so many kinds of penalties can be distinguished. Therefore spiritual penalties

are those which deprive one of spiritual goods, with which the Church can deprive her subjects, such as ecclesiastical censures, irregularities and inabilities for ecclesiastical offices, and similar things. Temporal penalties, however, are those which deprive one of external goods of fortune, such as confiscation of goods and inability for temporal offices or honors. Corporal penalties, however, are those which touch the body itself, among which exile also is counted." But concerning temporal and corporal penalties the same reasoning holds.

764. These things being posited: 1) it is certain that "the Catholic Church has power for punishing and coercing heretics, and the same reasoning applies to other delinquents, ... which must be held as certain by faith." Compare Suarez, loc. cit., no. 10. 2) It is certain that this power extends also to temporal penalties. Pius VI, in the bull Auctorem fidei, condemns as inducing into a system elsewhere condemned as heretical the proposition of the Synod of Pistoia affirming that "much less does it pertain to her [the Church] to exact by exterior force subjection to her decrees." Proposition 24 condemned in the Syllabus reads thus: "The Church does not have the power of inflicting force, nor any temporal power, direct or indirect." In the encyclical Quanta cura, the Supreme Pontiff Pius IX condemned, among others, these propositions: "The Church ought to decree nothing which can bind the consciences of the faithful in order to the use of temporal things; the Church does not possess the right of coercing violators of her laws by temporal penalties." Therefore Suarez rightly taught (loc. cit., no. 21): "I say, therefore, that the power of punishing heretics even by temporal and corporal penalties exists by divine right in the pastors of the Church, and especially in the Roman Pontiff, although secondarily it also pertains to Catholic princes, especially as protectors of the Church, and according to the determination of the same Church." 3) The right itself of coercing by temporal penalties must be distinguished from the mode of using that right. If the right is considered, the Church can inflict them even through her own magistrates, as the documents which Suarez himself brings forward prove. But the mode can be accommodated to the circumstances of places, times, and persons, as has always been done by the Church.

765. These things therefore having been declared: If, however, someone asks whether this coercive power of the Church extends even to the right of the sword, behold what Cardinal Tarquini has (p. 42 ff.): "As regards the matter itself of which we are treating, the immediate exercise of power of this kind has been forbidden only by ecclesiastical law, and indeed to the inferior magistrates of the Church. But as regards the supreme magistrate of the Church, that is, the Roman Pontiff and a general Council, whose power can be restricted by no ecclesiastical law, these things are to be noted: "a) This must without any doubt be held, that at least mediately a right of this kind belongs to them; that is, that they have the right of requiring from a Catholic Prince that he punish delinquents with that penalty, if the necessity of the Church demands it. For the Church would not have been sufficiently provided for unless a true right had been given to her for those things which are necessary for her. "b) But that such a right cannot be exercised immediately, when necessity demands, by the supreme magistrate of the Church, can be proved by no reason; since from natural law, from the fact that the Church is a perfect society, the contrary is indeed demonstrated. From positive divine law, however, no passage can be adduced by which it has truly been forbidden. For the things objected are most inept, whether from Matthew 26.52, where Christ says to Peter, a private man at that time, 'Put thy sword back into its place,' etc.; or from 2 Corinthians 10.4, where Paul, declaring the force of his power, writes: 'The weapons of our warfare are not carnal [that is, not fragile and futile], but mighty to God for the destruction of fortifications.' With equal ineptness the argument drawn from the meekness of the Church becomes worthless, as though the administration of necessary justice were opposed to the virtue of meekness. But that one argument which can be opposed a little more solidly from perpetual non-use does not rise to the just force of proof, since it cannot be defined whether this happened from defect of power or rather from defect of opportunity, either because graver harm was feared from the use, or because the ministry of civil society was at hand." Section II. The Proposed Question Is Solved. Proposition XXXIII. 1. To the Church, as being a society perfect by Christ's institution, there belongs by

native right, and not by concession of princes, supreme and independent power, both legislative and judicial. 2. Moreover, she can so sanction her laws that she coerces violators of them by penalties not only spiritual, but also temporal.

766. I. The first part is proved, as regards legislative power. Christ Jesus (Matt. 18.18) said to the Apostles: "Amen I say to you, whatsoever you shall bind upon earth shall be bound also in heaven, and whatsoever you shall loose upon earth shall be loosed also in heaven." But these words comprise legislative power. Therefore. The minor is proved. 1) To bind and to loose suppose some bond; therefore not a material and physical bond, but a moral bond. But law is a certain moral bond, since it obliges, or binds the wills of men to doing or omitting something. The words of Christ are most universal: whatsoever you shall bind. Therefore the cited words comprise legislative power. 2) This is also clear from the common usage of speaking among the Jews; for to them to bind and to loose was the same as to make and to abrogate law. Hence in the Talmud those words are frequently used in the same sense. 3) Indeed Christ himself, wishing to show that he had not come to abrogate the law, said (Matt. 5.17-19): "I have not come to loose the law or the prophets, but to fulfill." And speaking of the Pharisees (Matt. 23.4), he says: "They bind heavy and unbearable burdens and impose them upon the shoulders of men." In this same sense the Apostle says (Rom. 7.2): "The woman who is under a husband is bound to the law while her husband lives; but if her husband has died, she is loosed from the law of the husband." From this testimony it is also clear that the legislative power of the Church is supreme. For a legislator whose laws are always ratified by God himself has supreme legislative power. But the laws of the Church are always ratified by God himself, as is clear from the cited words of Christ. Therefore. Compare what was said at no. 558.

767. II. The Apostles used legislative power. For in the Council of Jerusalem (Acts 15.29) they passed a true law, commanding the faithful that "they abstain from things sacrificed to idols, and from blood, and from what is strangled." Nor can it be said that the Apostles merely declared an already existing law, and did not establish a new law. For the first Christians certainly were not bound by that law, either because Christ had abrogated it, or because it was not passed with the intention that it would oblige after Christ. Otherwise that law would still be in force, for it would be a divine law, which the Church cannot abrogate, just as an inferior cannot abrogate the law of a superior. Likewise the Apostle (1 Tim. 3) established a law that bigamists are not to be ordained; in 1 Corinthians 11 he commands a woman to pray with veiled head; in 2 Corinthians 8 he commands that collections be made on the Sabbaths for those who had deposited all their goods at the feet of the Apostles in Jerusalem. The same thing could be confirmed from the most ancient practice of the Church, which commanded many things to the faithful, as is established from the Acts and Canons of Councils, both General and particular; but the matter is so obvious that we would gather testimonies in vain.

768. III. Legislative power is proper to every perfect society. But the Church is a perfect society; therefore legislative power belongs to the Church. Moreover, she was constituted as such a society by Christ the Lord himself; therefore she possesses that power by her own right and not from the concession of princes. The minor of this argument, as also the subsumption, was proved at no. 557 ff.; but the major can be assumed from the very concession of the adversaries, who cannot deny legislative power to a perfect society. But it can be confirmed from what was said at no. 430. For to a perfect society there must be conceded the power of requiring that which is necessary for the attainment of its end. But legislative power is necessary for this; for through it the means which must be employed by all are determined, so that all may conspire toward the same end. Considering the diversity of human disposition and the inconstancy of the human will, that mutual agreement in employing the same means would be impossible without law. Therefore all the arguments by which we vindicated for the Church the nature of a perfect society confirm this part of the thesis.

769. The first part is proved, as regards judicial power. I. Christ the Lord (Matt. 18.15-17) says: "If thy brother has sinned against thee... tell the Church; but if he will not hear the Church, let him be to thee as a heathen and a publican." Now if the Church could not judge him, it would be useless to denounce him to her; but if, when he had been denounced, the Church should hold him as a heathen and a publican without any judgment and sentence, that would be unjust. Therefore Christ, who commanded that the sinner be denounced to the Church and, unless he heard her, be held as a heathen and a publican, conferred judicial power upon the Church.

770. II. The Apostles used this power. Thus Peter brought judgment upon Ananias and Sapphira (Acts 5). Paul judged the incestuous Corinthian; whence he wrote (1 Cor. 5.3): "I indeed, absent in body but present in spirit, have already judged, as though present, him who has so acted," that is, from knowledge of the crime, fame, or received information, although he delayed the sentence (no. 617). But if the Apostle could bring judgment concerning the most shameful action of the Corinthian, the Church also can do this, in which apostolic authority remains. The same Paul says (ibid., 12): "For what have I to judge those who are outside?" Therefore he could judge those who are inside, that is, in the Church. This is confirmed from the opposition; for he adds in verse 13: "for those who are outside God will judge."

771. III. To the Church, a perfect society, belongs legislative power; but judicial power is comprised in it or necessarily follows upon it; therefore judicial power is also to be attributed to the Church. The minor is proved. 1) It contributes little or nothing to the end of society to determine the means, which is done through legislative power, unless those same means are rightly applied. But without judicial power the due application of the means would be lacking. For once that power is removed, each one of the associates would be left to himself in the application of the means; and, supposing the variety of human disposition and considering the passions, the associates would easily disagree. Therefore there would not be unity of operation, which is necessary for attaining the common good of the whole society. 2) In fact, judicial power imports a twofold judgment (no. 761), one concerning the true sense of the law, the other concerning the relation of conformity or difformity of an operation to the law. But if there were no authority bringing these judgments, and to which all would be bound to obey, each one would easily twist the law to his own sense and excuse his own action as not difform from the law.

772. The second part is proved. I. From Scripture. For 1) it is said (Matt. 18): "If he will not hear the Church, let him be to thee as a heathen and a publican." From this we argue thus with Valentia (On the Efficacy of Excommunication, chapter 3): by Christ's concession, the Church can conduct herself toward the refractory person as toward a heathen or a publican. But toward those persons the Church is accustomed to conduct herself so as not to communicate to them certain spiritual goods of common suffrages; nor does she have with them that custom of external conversation which she has with her members. Therefore the Church can deprive her refractory subjects of that same kind of goods. Therefore she can excommunicate them, since excommunication is nothing other than an ecclesiastical censure depriving a baptized person of the communion of the goods of the Church. 2) It is read (Matt. 16): "Whatsoever thou shalt bind upon earth shall be bound also in heaven." Certainly one is bound unwillingly. The question concerns, as we have said, a moral bond. One of the moral bonds is obligation to undergo a penalty. Among penalties there are also privations of temporal goods. There is no restriction in the cited words. Therefore they comprise also the power of inflicting temporal penalties. The Apostle, however, says (1 Cor. 4.18-21): "As though I were not coming to you, certain persons have been puffed up... What do you wish? Shall I come to you with a rod, or in charity and a spirit of meekness?" And (2 Cor. 13): "I have foretold and now foretell, as present and now absent, to those who sinned before and to all the rest, that if I come again I will not spare. Do you seek an experiment of him who speaks in me, Christ?" And (10.6): "having in readiness to avenge every disobedience." But the power of avenging is the power of punishing even the unwilling. In fact, not rarely the Apostle did not spare, but handed over the incestuous Corinthian "to Satan for the destruction of

the flesh, that the spirit may be saved" (1 Cor. 5). Likewise he handed Hymenaeus and Alexander over "to Satan, that they may learn not to blaspheme." These things should be noted: "I... have judged to hand over such a one to Satan for the destruction of the flesh." That excommunication and "handing over to Satan" was for detriment, "for the destruction of the flesh." Therefore that notable sinner of Corinth was afflicted, tormented in body, "in the flesh," through the ministry indeed of Satan, but by the handing over of Paul. "For," as Anthony Paulutius rightly notes (On the Church, chapter 2), "one handed over to Satan in that first age was often seized by demons as by torturers, as Baronius testifies from Hilary and Jerome. Whence also demons were often called by the holy Fathers the executioners of the Christian Republic."

773. II. From the Fathers. St. Jerome, in his letter to Theophilus of Alexandria, writes: "That you bear much patience concerning the impious heresy, and think that those brooding over the entrails of the Church can be corrected by your gentleness, displeases many holy men, lest while you await the repentance of a few, you nourish the pertinacity of the lost, and the faction become stronger." Again, in the letter to Vigilantius: "I wonder that the Bishops in whose parish Vigilantius is said to be a presbyter acquiesce in his madness, and do not with the apostolic rod and the iron rod break the useless vessel and hand him over to the destruction of the flesh, that the spirit may be saved." What is the iron rod? What is it to break a vessel, to hand over to the destruction of the flesh? The question concerns a rod which falls upon the body, which hands over the body to the destruction of the flesh, and which therefore is coercive and afflictive. St. Augustine, whom the adversaries try to draw over to their own opinion, in book 2 of the Retractations, chapter 5, retracting what he had earlier said, that this compulsion of schismatics did not please him, says: "I said, it does not please me, because I had not yet experienced either how much evil their impunity would dare, or how much the diligence of discipline could contribute to changing them for the better." And he pursues the same thing more broadly in letter 48 to Vincent and letter 30 to Boniface, where, speaking of the laws of Emperors against Heretics, he says: "these laws are more for them, although they seem adverse to them, since many have been corrected through them and are corrected daily; for by these laws the raging are terrified and the intelligent is corrected." And the same holy Doctor, the text being found in chapter `Si Ecclesia`, Cause 23, question 4, says: "If the true Church is the one which suffers persecution, not the one which makes it, let them ask the Apostle what Church Sarah signified when she made persecution against the handmaid. For he says that our free mother, the heavenly Jerusalem, that is, the true Church of God, was figured in that woman who afflicted the handmaid. But if we discuss it better, the latter was persecuting Sarah more by being proud than Sarah was persecuting her by coercing her. For the former was doing injury to her mistress; the latter was imposing discipline upon pride. Then I ask, if the good and holy make persecution against no one, but only suffer it, whose voice they think it is in the Psalm where it is read (Ps. 17): I shall pursue my enemies and overtake them, and I shall not turn back until they fail. Therefore, if we wish to speak or recognize the truth, there is an unjust persecution which the impious make against the Church of Christ, and there is a just persecution which the Church of Christ makes against the impious. Therefore the latter is blessed, which suffers persecution for justice; but the former are miserable, who suffer persecution for injustice. Accordingly this one persecutes by loving; they by raging. This one, that she may correct; they, that they may overthrow. That one, that she may recall from error; they, that they may plunge into error."

774. III. From the Practice of the Church. For there are abundant pontifical constitutions and decrees of ecumenical Councils, for example, Lyons II, Lateran IV, Vienne, Constance, etc., which establish temporal penalties, of prison, monetary fine, or even graver bodily affliction, upon criminals. Anyone can read these penalties in book 5 of the Decretals, in the entire titles On Heretics and On Penances and Remissions, and very broadly in Cause 13, question 4. But you will find many monuments of Councils, Pontiffs, and Fathers already collected in Suarez (On Faith, disp. 20, sect. 3).

775. IV. Here can be added the testimonies of the Innovators themselves, who in this matter, as in the rest, are little consistent with themselves. Calvin never rested until he moved the Senate of Geneva to consign Michael Servetus, the parent of the Antitrinitarians of our time, to the flames. Soon afterward he published a book whose title is Defense of the Orthodox Faith, and in which, refuting the errors of Servetus, he proves at length that heretics are to be coerced by right of the sword. But when Sebastian Castellio, hiding under the name of Martin Bellius, opposed a little book in which he took up the cause of Heretics, Theodore Beza, to defend the opinion of Calvin his master, wrote a book On Heretics to Be Punished by the Civil Magistrate. In it he not only maintains that heretics can be punished with capital punishment by the civil Magistrate, but also cites as supporters of this opinion Luther in the Lesser Postils, the fifth Sunday after Epiphany; Melanchthon, in the book On the Office of a Prince; Brentius, in the little book On the Well-Administered Republic; Bucer, in the Enarration on chapter 12 of St. Matthew; Capito, in the book On the Right of the Magistrate in Religion; etc.

776. V. From reason. For Suarez, loc. cit., no. 12, 1) establishes generally the coercive power of the Church against heretics, and the same applies to those infected with other crimes, saying: "Power to punish evildoers is necessary in every well-instituted Republic for its preservation and good government... This is so evident that, even setting aside Faith and divine revelation, all men have understood by force of reason that this power is connatural and given by the Author of nature by the very fact that men are gathered into the mystical body of one republic. But Christ the Lord instituted his Church so that it would be one mystical body through one Faith, to be led to one supernatural end. Therefore he left in it power to punish and coerce evildoers, who can especially harm this body and disturb it from that end toward which it tends." 2) Then, loc. cit., no. 16, he asserts the same power specifically concerning corporal penalties. "For," he says, "without them, spiritual penalties alone are usually little able to move carnal men; because although in reality they are graver, their harm is not perceived so sensibly. But those common men are especially led and compelled by sense. And this chiefly has place with respect to heretics, because the whole force and efficacy of spiritual penalties depends upon faith, by which both the power of the Church and the truth of censures are believed. Hence, since heretics cast aside the faith, they regard penalties of this kind as almost nothing... and therefore whenever Augustine defends and persuades this coercion of heretics, he speaks of that coercion which is bodily." 3) Finally, loc. cit., no. 26, he shows that the same power belongs by proper right to the Church. "For," he says, "this power was necessary for the right governance and preservation of the Church, as I proved above... therefore such power ought to have been in the Church, as the Church was instituted by Christ... and not, as it were, by accident begged from an inferior power: both because the government of the Church in itself and intrinsically ought to have been perfect; and also because otherwise the superior power would depend upon an inferior in a matter most necessary; and furthermore because it can happen that a temporal prince is unwilling to concede this power to the Church, or that he is unwilling to give it except subordinated to himself, and with recourse and appeal to himself, which would be the greatest inconvenience; and especially because it could not be universal over all the sheep of Christ, for at least the temporal kings themselves would have to be excepted, which would yield to the great loss of the Church."

777. Scholion. The objections which we solved above (nos. 529 ff.; 562 ff.; 586 ff.) must be recalled here. It is useful besides to report a few others. And I. Against the legislative power of the Church they oppose several places in which the Apostle proclaims our liberty through Christ. But law, they say, imposing obligation, is opposed to that liberty. The answer is: Certainly the Apostle does not preach a liberty which excludes law; for he himself, as we have seen, made laws. Therefore sometimes he extols the liberty by which we have been freed from the legal ceremonies by which the Jews, even after Christ's coming, considered themselves bound. Thus, for example, he writes (2 Cor. 3.17): "where the Spirit of the Lord is, there is liberty." But immediately before he had said (verse 15 ff.): "Even to this day, when Moses is read, a veil is placed over their heart. But when it shall be turned to the Lord, the veil shall be taken

away. Now the Lord is Spirit," etc. Sometimes also he treats of the liberty proper to the sons of God, by which through Christ's grace we are free from the servitude of sin. Thus (Rom. 6.14) it is said: "for you are not under law, but under grace"; but it is added in verse 20: "For when you were servants of sin, you were free from justice." Sometimes the Apostle wills nothing else than that we are free from servile fear, to which the Jews were subject, willingly and with love observing the law. Compare On God the Creator, no. 913.

778. II. They say: By the will of Christ himself, liberty must be preserved both in the pursuit of the spiritual end proposed to the Church, and especially in faith. The Church herself professes that coercive power is not to be employed so that unbelievers may be converted; and therefore, they say, neither for recalling heretics or schismatics, nor for preserving the faithful. Therefore the Church does not have this power. The answer is: in this difficulty, physical liberty, exemption from intrinsic necessity, is confused with moral liberty, exemption from obligation; and it is also falsely supposed that external force, or coercion properly so called, takes away liberty. Therefore we could be content with those things which we said at nos. 58 and 88, and in the treatise On the Infused Virtues, no. 851. But since this difficulty is often renewed, it is useful to report the words of Suarez, which, while they fully solve it, at the same time show that it is ancient and not new. "The same difficulty," says Suarez (loc. cit., no. 17), "can be objected against every coercion which is made through similar penalties, so that other evil deeds may be avoided or good works done, because other moral works also are done freely, and sins must be freely avoided. Whence we further say that free is said in two ways, namely either from natural necessity, which is in a naturally acting cause, or from necessity, so to speak, moral, that is, from obligation to do something. Therefore the first necessity is repugnant to Faith, by force of the liberty required for it. But this penal coercion does not induce this necessity, as is known of itself, and therefore it is not repugnant to the liberty required for Faith; indeed it helps toward that liberty by inducing a man to believe freely. And although in the beginning such coercion in some way seems to lessen the indifference of liberty, nevertheless it leaves the act simply free; and it is a lesser evil to believe thus than simply not to believe. And then the very vexation is accustomed to give understanding, so that now the man believes with perfect liberty. But if simulated conversions sometimes occur, that is accidental, and is permitted from the malice of men and for avoiding greater evils. But speaking of liberty in the second way, thus Faith is not free, especially in the baptized. I say this because in this the baptized differ from the non-baptized; for even for these Faith is not entirely free, because they are bound by divine precept to receive it. Nevertheless that obligation is only with respect to God. But the baptized are bound both to God and to the Church by reason of baptism, and therefore they can especially be compelled by the Church, either to persevere in it, or to return to it." Compare, however, what we said at nos. 66 and 764.

779. III. Marsilius of Padua and Richer (On Ecclesiastical Power, book 3, chapter 3) oppose several testimonies of the Fathers, in order to deny to the Church the power of compelling through temporal penalties. The limits of the present treatment do not allow us to examine each one; nor is it truly necessary after those things which we have disputed both in this article and where we treated of the Church as a perfect society and of her relation to civil society. Therefore it is enough to observe: 1) that even if some Fathers had taught what Richer contends, nevertheless he would gain nothing by it; for the consensus of the Fathers presents an irrefragable argument, but the testimonies cited by us would sufficiently show that consensus to be lacking. 2) And even if the truth which we defend here could not be demonstrated from the consensus of the Fathers, which nevertheless we by no means concede, it would still be sufficiently demonstrated from Scripture and from other documents of tradition, as is clear from what has been disputed thus far. 3) But to touch something more directly concerning this head of the difficulty: a) Let the diverse acts which could be attributed to this power be distinguished; for there are some acts which the Fathers teach are by no means to be exercised by the Church, for one reason or another, without its following that the power itself is lacking, or that its legitimate exercise is lacking with respect to other acts. Thus, for example, St. Ambrose, whose authority the adversaries abuse very much, denies that the Church ought to stir up

sedition against kings; but how can it be inferred from this that the Church lacks coercive power? b) Let the persons against whom the coercive power of the Church would be employed be distinguished. For the Fathers deny that it can be employed against unbelievers who are not subject to the Church; they also deny that, in certain circumstances of affairs, it is to be employed directly so that certain persons may be recalled to the faith. But from these things it by no means follows that that power is lacking in the Church, or that it cannot be employed for the protection of order or the correction of the wicked. 3) Let the circumstances be distinguished in which certain Fathers were writing, or in which the Church can be placed. For the Church, living under the hostile empire of the pagans, could not exert the fullness of her power; and therefore the Fathers rather assert historically what was being done, but do not juridically deny the power of the Church. Thus also the use of a legitimate power can sometimes be illicit, when the circumstances are considered; but from the fact that the exercise of the power is then excluded, neither is the power itself denied, nor is its use in other circumstances of affairs excluded.

Article 7. Whether the true Church of Christ ought to be infallible

780. By the name infallibility is signified immunity from error. But immunity from error can be understood either insofar as someone, although liable to error, nevertheless does not in fact err; and then there is what is better called inerrancy: or the very possibility of erring is excluded; and then there is what is properly called infallibility. Yet these two names are often used promiscuously.

781. We are speaking of immunity from error which excludes the very possibility of erring. This is twofold: one is essential, and is proper to God; the other is participated, which is communicated by God to rational creatures in that measure and under that law which God himself wills. This will be supernatural, however, if it surpasses the powers and exigency of nature, so that it is not owed to it.

782. The infallibility which we assert for the Church is participated and supernatural; hence it can generally be described as "a privilege granted by Christ to the Church, by which, in matters of faith and morals, she can neither be deceived nor deceive." Therefore it is already clear how little they understand the Catholic doctrine concerning the infallibility of the Church who attack it either because, they say, God alone is infallible, or because every man is liable to error. God alone is infallible by essential infallibility, and man naturally is liable to error; but the infallibility which we attribute to the Church is participated and supernatural.

783. This participated and supernatural infallibility is further divided in two ways: one is called passive, which they also call infallibility in believing; the other is active, which is also usually called infallibility in teaching. The subject of the former is the universal Church, which for that reason is called (1 Tim. 3.15) "the pillar and ground of truth," and of which it is said (Matt. 16.18) that it is "built upon the rock, and the gates of hell shall not prevail against it." But the subject of the other infallibility is the Pastors and Doctors, whom (Eph. 4) Christ gave for the building up of his mystical body. This latter is the extrinsic efficient principle of the truth which is always in the Church as in a most firm seat; the former has the character of a final cause.

784. Now, concerning infallibility in believing, two things chiefly must be noted. The first is this: although the faith and sense of the faithful can be considered and investigated separately, nevertheless it can never in reality be separated from the faith of the teaching Church, or be diverse from it and opposed to it. For the obedience of faith which is found in the faithful corresponds, as an effect, to the authority of teaching which resides in the Pastors. Therefore, just as there will always be a multitude of the faithful professing the true faith, so there will always be with it Pastors and Doctors teaching the true faith; and thus there will always remain the bond of unity which, from Christ's institution, ought to exist between the Pastors and the people.

785. The other thing which must be noted concerning infallibility in believing is that it is not necessary here expressly and directly to demonstrate its existence. For 1) it is sufficiently gathered from what has been said: since we have shown that the Church is one also by unity of faith; apostolic also by apostolicity of doctrine; indefectible in her constitutive properties and endowments. But if the universal Church could err in faith, either by believing as divinely revealed what has not been revealed, or by denying that what has been revealed is revealed, the Church would fail in unity, apostolicity, and so forth. Therefore. Hence of her it is said (Hos. 2): "I will espouse thee to myself in faith: I will espouse thee to myself forever." 2) Indeed, not rarely the adversaries themselves seem to concede the passive infallibility of the Church, although they mix several errors into this concession. Thus Calvin (Institutes, book 4, chapter 8, sections 11-15) says that this proposition, "The Church cannot err," is true if it is understood of the universal Church alone, but not if it is extended to the Bishops, who are the Church representatively. Compare Bellarmine, On the Church Militant, book 3, chapter 14. And Hodge (Systematic Theology, vol. 1, p. 183) establishes Scripture as the only rule of faith; but at the same time he adds that in the interpretation of the Scriptures "they should also pay the greatest deference to the faith of the Church." But all stubbornly deny infallibility in teaching, or the authentic and living magisterium. Compare On the Infused Virtues, no. 956 ff. Therefore it is chiefly in establishing this that labor must be spent. 3) Besides, the infallibility of the Church in believing is, as we have said, the effect of infallibility in teaching, which consequently, as we have also indicated (no. 633), is the principle of the former. Hence the active infallibility of the Pastors necessarily vindicates to itself the passive infallibility of the faithful. Therefore, if once the existence of active infallibility in the Church is proved, with Christ's institution and his promises supposed, passive infallibility is necessarily inferred from it.

786. Therefore we must deal here with the infallibility of the Church in teaching. With respect to this three things can be considered: 1) its nature and existence; 2) its object; 3) its subject. But we shall investigate the object of infallibility in the following article; a few things must be declared here for the understanding of the matter concerning its subject. The present question, therefore, is properly concerning the existence of active infallibility.

787. Concerning the subject these things must be noted. 1) It is twofold: namely, the successor of Peter, the visible Head of the Church considered in himself; and the body of the Pastors, or of the successors of the Apostles, together with the Head. The Vatican Synod seems to indicate this distinction (Constitution Pastor Aeternus, chapter 4), where, defining the infallibility of the Roman Pontiff, behold one subject, it teaches that he "possesses that infallibility with which the divine Redeemer willed his Church," behold the other subject, "to be furnished in defining doctrine concerning faith or morals." 2) The infallibility of the Supreme Pontiff considered in himself will be treated directly in the following disputation. But the other Pastors, or Bishops, can be considered singly or joined together. Among Catholics it is agreed that individual Bishops, the Roman Pontiff excepted, can err; nor do the Innovators, who deny every active infallibility of the Church, attribute it in any way to individual Bishops. It remains, therefore, that it be attributed to them joined together, insofar as they constitute the Body of Pastors. Indeed, as will appear a little below, the promises concerning infallibility were made to the body of Apostolic succession in common, insofar as they are the teaching Church. 3) That Body of Pastors can be considered as separated from the visible Head of the Church, or as joined with him and subordinated to him. If it is considered as separated, it is not infallible; for the office of teaching infallibly in the Apostles, ordinary, that is, to be transmitted to successors and to persevere in them, was declared by Christ the Lord in words which were never directed to individuals, but always to the whole college in union with Peter. Hence Bellarmine (On Councils and the Church, book 2, chapter 19) says: "Although a Council without the Pope cannot define new dogmas of faith, nevertheless in a time of schism it can judge who is the true pope, and provide the Church with a true pastor, when she has none or has a doubtful one; and this is what the Council of Constance rightly did." Therefore the proper infallibility of the body of Pastors belongs to it insofar as it is joined with the successor of Peter.

Hence it is clear that that twofold subject of active infallibility is not adequately distinct; for one is the Roman Pontiff alone; the other is the body of Pastors, in which the Roman Pontiff is necessarily included. 4) The Body of Pastors agreeing with the Roman Pontiff can be either assembled in a Council or, outside a Council, dispersed throughout the world. In either way infallibility in teaching is attributed to it; for Christ, in promising infallibility to it, made no distinction between Pastors gathered together or dispersed throughout the world. 5) It is not necessary here directly to show that the subject of active infallibility is the body of the Pastors adhering to the visible Head. For by the very testimonies by which the existence of active infallibility in the Church is shown, if you except those which demonstrate the infallibility of Peter's successor, it is openly concluded that it resides in the body of Pastors as in its subject. Footnote 1 begins. Hence, Schrader writes excellently (On Roman Unity, book 2, p. 338), there is drawn, as it were, the very rationale of the economy, the order, and almost the path by which the charism and protection of infallibility explains itself in the Church. Namely, it is not otherwise than with someone who, according to the Savior's parable, proposes to have for himself a firm house: he brings firmness first and chiefly to the foundation, so that the same thing, established in itself, may stand absolutely, and that, if it totters, all things may not collapse. Then indeed he takes counsel for the columns in such a way that he does not attribute to them a firmness by which they stand in themselves absolutely, but by placing those same columns in that firm foundation; as long as they stand upon it, although they sustain a great force of the house, they will not draw ruin upon themselves. But as soon as they turn aside from it, having collapsed, they will at once bring ruin, even though they have a very slight weight to bear. Here also this appears: in a large house, and one solid from its foundation, in which very many columns sustain a vast mass, it can happen that some of them fall away from the foundation, without the house itself collapsing entirely or even seeming to suffer notable damage. Yet the care of the wise provider must be directed to this, that they not all at the same time deviate from their foundation, and thus the house, reduced to the mere ruins of its base, be found to be no longer anything at all, or scarcely anything. But while most of those columns stand firmly in a firm foundation, the individual parts will be held together by internal bonds with these and by interwoven connections, and the whole joined house will stand firmly. But this is the accurate and true image of the Church, because it was used by the founder of the Church himself, then more than once repeated by the Apostles, and explained by the Fathers. Therefore Christ, in the Holy Spirit, who takes counsel and provides for the firmness of the Church, used no other economy in dispensing the charism of infallibility toward its foundation, I mean the Roman Pontiff, and the columns of the Church, the Bishops. Footnote 1 ends.

788. It is enough to have touched upon these things concerning the subject of infallibility for now. Let us now proceed to declare the nature of infallibility itself. It can be described thus: "the supernatural assistance of God in Christ through the Holy Spirit, by which the teaching Church, in defining matters of faith and morals, is preserved immune from every error."

789. It is said, I: assistance. By this, first of all, it is expressed that the gift of infallibility in teaching is not to be confused with inspiration. We have declared the nature of inspiration elsewhere, On the Infused Virtues, no. 939; but for our matter it is enough to note that the gift of infallibility does not import a new revelation, but a special divine providence by which the Church is kept immune from error in guarding, explaining, and defending the revelation already made and completed in the Apostles. The Church herself has expressly declared this more than once in her definitions. Compare On the Infused Virtues, no. 479 ff.

790. Therefore it is clear: 1) how little they understand the concept of infallibility who attack it as though the Church, in defining some dogma, received a new revelation by which she added something to the doctrine of Christ and the Apostles, and thus changed the Apostolic faith. Compare On the Virtues, no. 579 ff. 2) How undeservedly it is objected by some: if the Church is infallible, why in her dogmatic decrees does she bring forward the testimonies of others? She brings them forward in order to show

that the doctrine which she proposes is not new, but is contained in the word of God, whether written or handed down; in order that the glory of faith may shine forth more clearly; in order that she may beat back the calumnies of adversaries.

791. It is said, II: assistance. This is so that it may also be understood that the infallibility of the Church does not exclude, but requires, human industry; for, as the very word indicates, God assists the teaching Church lest she err, and therefore he wills that she apply her work to avoiding error. The Church herself has confessed this by her constant practice. Compare On the Virtues, no. 581. Hence there falls of itself another difficulty common among Protestants: if the Church, they say, were infallible in teaching, why would she put before her definitions such great and diligent investigations and deliberations? Certainly the Church existing at any time does not have a more perfect assistance than that which was granted to the Apostles; but of the Apostolic Council held in Jerusalem it is read (Acts 15.6-7): "The Apostles and elders came together to consider this word. And when there had been much inquiry, Peter rising," etc.

792. Here, however, one must carefully distinguish the efficient cause of infallibility, which is the promised assistance of the Spirit of truth, from the obligation of the Pastors to investigate diligently and to pray. For Valentia rightly observes, expressing the common doctrine (tom. 3, disp. 1, q. 1, point 7, section 41): 1) "Whether the Pontiff, the same must be said of the body of Pastors defining with the Supreme Pontiff, employs study in defining or does not employ it, provided, however, that he defines the controversy, he will certainly define infallibly, and therefore in reality he will use the authority conceded to him by Christ. This we most certainly gather from the divine promises made concerning truth through the magisterium of the one pastor of the Church, as we have often argued. Therefore study and diligence are necessary to the Pontiff, not so that he may define at all, and use his infallible authority, but so that he may use it fittingly and rightly, that is, without sin." 2) "But if the diligence of the Pontiff were necessary so that he might define at all, nevertheless we would have to believe with the same faith that when he defines a controversial matter, he has employed sufficient diligence; by which it has been demonstrated above that we ought to believe that then he defines infallibly and truly. The reason is that by the very fact that Christ promised the Church that it would never happen that she be deceived, and therefore neither that the Pontiff should define a controversy falsely, he would have to be judged also to have promised that it would never happen that he define while the due diligence had been omitted, if indeed diligence of this kind were altogether necessary to the Pontiff for defining. Just as, if God should promise us that there would be a great abundance of crops in the following year, he would by this very fact also be judged to promise the temperature of the air which would be necessary for that effect, as Melchior Cano says aptly for this matter (book 5, On Theological Places, chapter 5)." 3) And a little before, treating of the case in which the Pontiff, imbued with some private error, should proceed to define it, he says: "It belongs to the fidelity of God toward the Church that he would impede, in that case, lest through that Pontiff the controversy be falsely defined. God could do this either by removing the Pontiff from the midst, so that not he himself, but rather his successor, would decide the matter; or by an internal illumination of the mind, or in some other way by recalling the Pontiff from error. Nor indeed would a providence of God of this kind in similar cases have to be judged miraculous; rather it would be a certain effect of that ordinary law by which God, through the promises made concerning truth, has bound himself to the Church." And then he confirms this by an example. From these things there plainly vanishes the difficulty of those who say: no definition can be held as certain, since it cannot be known with certainty whether the teaching Church employed due diligence or not before she issued the definition.

793. It is said, III: in defining doctrine of faith and morals. Leaving aside the object of infallibility, about which below, which is expressed by these words, two things must be noted for the understanding of those words. The first touches the very mode by which some doctrine is infallibly

proposed by the Church; for this proposal can be implicit or explicit. "Moreover," says the Vatican Council (Constitution Dei Filius, chapter 3), "all those things are to be believed with divine and Catholic faith which are contained in the word of God, written or handed down, and are proposed by the Church, whether by solemn judgment or by the ordinary and universal magisterium, to be believed as divinely revealed." For the Church, as a diligent teacher of truth, instructs the faithful also by her daily ministry, both by living voice and by practice. Hence in the liturgy, in the public administration of the sacraments, in worship, by erecting churches and altars, by exposing the relics and images of the saints to the public veneration of the faithful, and so forth, she implicitly teaches those truths without which practices of this kind could not stand. Compare On the Infused Virtues, no. 432.

794. The other thing which is indicated by those words in defining doctrine, and so forth, is that the Church is not infallible except in the definition itself. Hence the infallibility of the Church not only is not extended to the investigations which precede the definition, but not even to all those things which are read in the very documents containing the definition. In these, for example, if anything is found said incidentally and by the way, it is a sign that the intention of the teaching Church is not directed to defining that thing. For this reason Theologians deny, compare On God the Creator, no. 279, that it is of faith that the nature of Angels is purely spiritual. But concerning these matters compare what we discussed above, no. 385.

795. Therefore, these things having been noted beforehand: Section II The Proposed Question Is Solved. Proposition XXXIV. Christ constituted in the Church a visible, authentic, and perpetual Magisterium, to which he promised and conferred the special charism of infallibility, by which, through the assistance of the Holy Spirit, in defining doctrine concerning faith and morals, it can never deflect from the truth; just as, therefore, it has the very right of teaching the doctrine of Christ with authority, so on the part of all the faithful there is owed to it the assent and obedience of faith.

796. Proof I. From the words which are read in Matthew (28.16-20): "And the eleven disciples went into Galilee, unto the mountain where Jesus had appointed them... And Jesus coming spoke to them, saying: All power is given to me in heaven and on earth. Going therefore, teach all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit, teaching them to observe all things whatsoever I have commanded you. And behold, I am with you all days, even to the consummation of the age." With these should be compared what Mark has (16.15): "And he said to them: Going into the whole world, preach the Gospel to every creature. He who believes and is baptized shall be saved; but he who does not believe shall be condemned." Hence: 1) in these words Christ the Lord promises his assistance to the Apostles as exercising the office of teaching all things whatsoever he himself had commanded; 2) he promises the same assistance to the successors of the Apostles, to last until the end of the world; 3) this assistance imports infallibility in teaching. Therefore in the successors of the Apostles active infallibility is always present and perseveres in the Church.

797. And first indeed: Christ promised that he would be present to the Apostles as teaching. This is drawn 1) from the sequence of the discourse; for either those words "behold I am with you" have a connection with the words immediately preceding, "going, teach... teaching them to observe," etc., or they have no connection; 2) from that conjunction and, "and behold, I am with you," which altogether manifests a connection with those things which immediately precede. In the same way, if a King sending his ambassador to fulfill some office were at the same time to say, "and I will be with you," everyone would understand that the King had said: I will be with you, your helper, your sponsor, in fulfilling this office; 3) from the scope of the discourse, as Grotius himself observes on this place. For Christ forestalls the secret and obvious difficulty of the disciples. Namely, the office which was imposed on them was most grave, and at the same time Christ was about to withdraw from them his visible presence. Therefore the disciples could fear that, deprived of this aid, they would be unequal to the office of teaching all nations. Hence Christ, to

raise their spirit, said: "behold I am with you"; just as if he said: be of strong mind; I will be an aid to you in this office, no otherwise than if I were to remain visibly with you. Hence St. John Chrysostom, on this place, writes: "'Behold I am with you all days, even to the consummation of the age.' Do you see again the authority? Do you see how he said those things for the sake of accommodating himself? Do not tell me, he says, the difficulty of the things; for I am with you, who make all things easy. For this he was wont to say to the prophets in the Old Testament: to Jeremiah objecting his youth, and to Moses and Ezekiel evading, 'I am with you,' he says." Compare also the very beautiful words of Eusebius of Caesarea, which we gave at no. 312.

798. Secondly: Christ promised that he would be with the successors of the Apostles. For 1) Christ promised that he would be with the Apostles until the consummation of the age; but this could not be fulfilled in the very persons of the Apostles, who, dying by the common lot, were not going to teach all days until the consummation of the age. Therefore, unless we wish to say that Christ did not fulfill his promise, it is necessary to say that in this promise Christ regarded the Apostles not as individual men, but as a moral person which always perseveres and lives in its successors. 2) The assistance which Christ promises, whatever it may be, is ordered to aiding effectively the Apostolic mission of baptizing and teaching, so that the mission and the assistance are, as it were, one institution: "going, teach... and behold I am with you." But the mission of the Apostles did not cease with them, but is to last until the end of the world, no. 482 ff. 3) The same assistance is promised for fulfilling the office of teaching all nations; but the Apostles could not accomplish this by themselves. 4) Hence, besides Grotius, very many Protestant interpreters, whom Murray cites in a long array at no. 62, concede what we contend here.

799. Thirdly: Christ promised infallibility to the Apostles and their successors. In order that this may become clearly known, let it be noted: 1) That a certain singular and extraordinary assistance is certainly promised here is clear from the very great gravity of the mission which is conferred; from the sublime manner in which Christ begins, invoking the supreme and divine power given to him; and finally from the very form of the promise, so grave and remarkable: "and behold, I am with you," etc. Surely these things cannot be understood merely of the common assistance which is conferred on all who are rightly disposed. 2) It is also certain that such an assistance is promised as imports the happy outcome of the work for which it is given. This is most openly established from the usage of the Scriptures, according to which that phrase, "behold I am with you," constantly has this sense. Hence if God promises that he will be with someone in carrying out some work or office, the happy outcome of it is signified; if prayer is offered to God that he may be with us in some work, the happy outcome of the same is sought; if, on the contrary, it is affirmed that God is not with someone in carrying out some work or office, this signifies the unhappy outcome of the same. Thus, for example, it is said (Exod. 3.11 ff.): "And Moses said to God: Who am I that I should go to Pharaoh, and bring the children of Israel out of Egypt? And he said to him: I will be with thee." And (Judg. 6.12 ff.): "The Angel of the Lord appeared to him [Gideon], and said: The Lord is with thee... And Gideon said to him... if the Lord is with us, why have all these things seized us?... I beseech, my Lord, by what shall I deliver Israel?... And the Lord said to him: I will be with thee, and thou shalt strike Midian as one man." And (Isa. 43.2): "When thou shalt pass through the waters, I will be with thee, and the rivers shall not cover thee." And (Jer. 15.20): "They shall fight against thee, and they shall not prevail, because I am with thee, to save thee and to deliver thee." And (Judith 6.18): "May God be with thee in our midst." But you will find almost innumerable testimonies of this kind. Hence: Christ promised that he would be with the Apostles and their successors while teaching, all days even to the consummation of the age; therefore the office of teaching of the Apostles and their successors will have a happy outcome all days even to the consummation of the age. But the outcome would be unhappy if they taught error for truth; and it would be the more unhappy, the greater the number of those who were imbued with error. Indeed, the first thing required so that the office of teaching may be exercised and have a happy outcome is that nothing but truth be taught and that this be persuaded; if error were persuaded to another, the outcome of the magisterium would be unhappy.

This can be confirmed from parallel places, in which it is more explicitly stated what that promise of Christ comprehends: "going, teach... and behold, I am with you." For at the Last Supper, pouring forth his immense charity, Christ promised the sorrowful Apostles the Spirit, the Consoler, and said (John 14.16): "I will ask the Father, and he will give you another Paraclete, that he may remain with you forever, the Spirit of truth," who "will remain with you and will be in you." And (ibid. 26): "He will teach you all things, and will suggest to you all things whatsoever I shall have said to you." Compare John 15.26 and 16.13. Therefore Christ, promising that he would be with his Apostles, promised the permanent Spirit of truth in teaching, namely, so that in the preaching of the Gospel they could in no way err.

800. II. The Apostle writes (Eph. 4): "And he [God] gave some indeed as Apostles, and some as Prophets, and others as Evangelists, and others as pastors and doctors, for the consummation of the saints, unto the work of ministry, unto the building up of the body of Christ, until we all meet in the unity of faith and of the knowledge of the Son of God unto a perfect man... that now we may not be children tossed to and fro, and carried about by every wind of doctrine, in the wickedness of men, in craftiness unto the circumvention of error." Hence: 1) The Magisterium was instituted by Christ in the Church so that men might acquire perfect doctrine, by which they would be made worthy members of the mystical body of Christ; and so that they would adhere so firmly to the doctrine proposed through the Apostolic magisterium that they would be removed from it by no craftiness or circumvention of men. But the office of a magisterium of this kind ought to endure until we all meet in the unity of faith and of the knowledge of the Son of God. But this same magisterium would be unequal to attaining the end for which it was instituted, unless it were infallible. For a fallible magisterium does not suffice so that an assent firm and irreformable above all things, such as the assent of faith is, could be commanded; nor by its aid could we sufficiently guard against the wickedness and craftiness of men. Therefore. 2) Hence all the testimonies can be recalled here by which we showed, no. 650 ff., that Christ willed that all should hold the doctrine preached by the Apostles and their successors. Therefore either he furnished them with infallibility in teaching, and we have what we intend; or he did not furnish them with infallibility, and then the whole Church could defect from the faith, which is repugnant to the indefectibility of the Church.

801. III. But in a matter of such great moment, let it not be irksome to recall the argument often proposed, cited at no. 650, and more fully declared in the treatise On the Infused Virtues, disputation 4, articles 2, 3, and 5, which is sought from the economy of faith which Christ instituted. It can be proposed thus. It is absurd to say that God himself and Christ directly will error, and directly and positively lead us into it. But if the Apostolic magisterium had not been increased by the prerogative of infallibility, that absurdity would follow. Therefore. For proving the minor, let us first note these things. 1) Just as God the Father sent his Son, and commanded him to be heard, saying (Matt. 17.5): "This is my beloved Son, in whom I am well pleased; hear him"; so Christ sent the Apostles, saying (John 20.21): "As the living Father has sent me, so I send you"; and he willed that they teach all nations, preach the Gospel to every creature, be witnesses to him even to the end of the earth, carry his name before nations and kings, and so forth. And so that they might discharge this office well, he promised them the Spirit of truth, who would teach and suggest all things; he promised that he would be present to them all days even to the consummation of the age. 2) Just as, by Christ as author, the office of teaching lies upon the Apostles, so from the faithful there is required the obedience of faith to the preaching of the Apostles, and indeed under the penalty of eternal damnation. Thus (Matt. 10.14), Christ sending the Apostles to announce the kingdom of God, says to them: "Whosoever shall not receive you, nor hear your words, going forth out of the house or city, shake off the dust from your feet; amen I say to you: it will be more tolerable for the land of Sodom and Gomorrah in the day of judgment than for that city." And (Mark 16): "He who does not believe shall be condemned." And (John 3.18): "He who does not believe has already been judged." And (Luke 10.16): "He who hears you, hears me; he who despises you, despises me; and he who despises me, despises him who sent me." 3) But the Apostles, having received the mission, as is said (Mark 16.20), "going forth preached everywhere." They also proposed their preaching

as the sole norm of believing, Galatians 1.6 and 1 John 2.24; and they protested against teachers to whom they themselves had not given a mandate, Acts 15.24. But when a controversy had arisen whether the Mosaic legal observances still obliged or not, the Apostles, although individually infallible, nevertheless, as a norm for future ages, held a Council at Jerusalem to end the controversy, Acts 15.28, requiring subjection from all. A little afterward Paul "went through Syria and Cilicia, confirming the Churches, commanding them to keep the precepts of the Apostles and Elders," ibid. 41. 4) Moreover, in order that he might conciliate authority for the preaching of the Apostles, God confirmed it by signs and wonders. When the days of Pentecost were fulfilled (Acts 2), the Apostles "were all filled with the Holy Spirit," who came upon them in a visible manner, "and they began to speak in various tongues, as the Holy Spirit gave them to speak." From this time (Mark 16.20): "They, going forth, preached everywhere, the Lord working with them and confirming the word with signs that followed." And (Acts 14.3), of the Apostles generally it is said: "They abode a long time, acting confidently in the Lord, who bore testimony to the word of his grace, granting signs and wonders to be done by their hands." 5) Furthermore, a little before we showed that the office of teaching conferred upon the Apostles was to endure in their successors even to the consummation of the age; and this very thing is immediately and clearly inferred from what has been said, nos. 482 ff., 524 ff., 650 ff., and 730 ff. But although we were to grant what we showed to be false, no. 688, that after the sufficient promulgation of the Gospel those extraordinary gifts ceased in the Church, nevertheless, since by the aid of those gifts the first faithful betook themselves into the Church, and therefore by them, as by motives of credibility, the Church conciliated authority for herself even to later posterity, it is all the same for our purpose. For it would always be true that God sealed by prodigies the mission of that Church which could at any time lead men into false doctrine, and indeed in the name and by the authority of God himself. Wherefore he would be led into error by God himself who erred by applying faith to the magisterium which God instituted; which he commanded all to hear, lest they incur eternal destruction; which he approved by miracles. But if the magisterium of the Apostles were not infallible, men would err by applying faith to the magisterium instituted by God, to which he willed that all should obey, and which he approved by miracles. Therefore if that magisterium were not infallible, God himself would lead men into error. Footnote 1. We could here heap up many arguments from the nature of revelation, which divine providence cannot permit to the judgment of men without any infallible rule; from the unity and universality of faith which Christ willed in the Church; from other rules which the Innovators, after rejecting the visible infallible magisterium, introduced, for those rules are proved insufficient both a priori and a posteriori; from the most ancient and constant practice of the Church; indeed from the testimony of heretics themselves with respect to their preceding heresies condemned by the Church. But we abstain from setting these out; for they can be sought from the cited places in the treatise On the Infused Virtues, where we were treating of the rule of faith. Footnote 1 ends.

802. Scholion. Several objections of the Innovators were forestalled in the exposition of this question; others were answered in the preceding articles. Thus I., for example, they oppose that passage of Isaiah: "I will set... sons... taught by the Lord"; that passage of Jeremiah: "a man shall no longer teach his neighbor"; that passage of John: "they shall all be teachable of God." Moreover, if these testimonies were taken in the sense of the adversaries, they would exclude not only an infallible magisterium, but also any visible magisterium whatever. For this reason compare what we said above, no. 468. Besides, since the magisterium of the Church is the continuation of the magisterium of Christ himself, and the Church teaches in his name and authority, those who are taught by the Church are deservedly said to be teachable of God and taught by God.

803. II. But if the matter stands thus, why, they urge, did Christ the Lord say (Matt. 23): "But do not be called Rabbi, for one is your teacher"? The answer is: Christ the Lord said this to exclude ambition and vanity from the exercise of the magisterium, but not to exclude the magisterium itself. Compare what was said at no. 529. In reality Christ said this by opposition to the Pharisees, who "love the first places at feasts... the first chairs... salutations in the marketplace, and to be called Rabbi by men" (ibid.,

verse 6 ff.). Hence he also adds (ibid., verse 9): "call no one your father upon earth"; and yet the office and name of father is not eliminated from this. But so that these offices may be exercised with humility, it is especially helpful to remember and acknowledge that there is one supreme teacher and father, "one is your teacher... one is your father, who is in heaven," from whom, just as all gifts, so also the office of teaching and the helps for rightly exercising it, proceed. Did not Christ say, "going, teach all nations"? Did not the Apostle (2 Tim. 1) call himself a doctor and teacher?

804. III. They object against the first argument given: 1) The promise of infallibility, insofar as it is referred to the very persons of the Apostles, regards individuals, and not only all collectively; therefore if the words of Christ are referred also to the successors of the Apostles, individual Bishops would be infallible. 2) In reality, they say, that phrase "even to the consummation of the ages" does not signify the end of the world, but the destruction of the synagogue, the overthrow of Jerusalem, or the consummation of the Jewish state. 3) Besides, the promises of Christ would always be under a condition, namely, so long as the successors of the Apostles adhere to true doctrine; from which it certainly does not follow that it will be the case that they always adhere to it. I answer to the first. From the demonstration given it is altogether established that the promise of infallibility regards both the Apostles and their successors. But how it regards them, whether distributively or taken collectively, so far as concerns the very words themselves (Matt. 28), can seem ambiguous. Indeed, since Christ directed the words to all the Apostles together, it could be denied from the tenor of these words that the individual Apostles were infallible. But if the very words of Sacred Scripture bear a certain ambiguity, the true understanding of the matter must be sought from ancient and constant Tradition. But always, everywhere, and by all it has been believed that the individual Apostles were infallible, but that their successors possess the privilege of infallibility only collectively and joined with the head. To the second. That the promises of Christ were to persevere in the successors of the Apostles is not proved only from the words "even to the consummation of the age," as appears from the exposition of the argument. But besides this, the interpretation of the adversaries is false. For the destruction of Jerusalem is indeed called a consummation (Matt. 24.14), but not the consummation of the age. This last expression (Matt. 28.20) certainly signifies the end of the world. This is established from verbal parallelism, since (ibid. 13.39 ff.) it is said: "the harvest is the consummation of the age... So shall it be in the consummation of the age"; where this expression openly signifies the end of the world. It is also established from real parallelism; for the kingdom of Christ is said to be perpetual, according to that saying (Luke 1.55): "and of his kingdom there shall be no end." Finally, it is clear that Christ with emphasis embraced all times even to the consummation of the age. To the third. There is no condition expressed either in the same text or elsewhere which affects the promise about which we are treating; therefore it is asserted gratuitously. Indeed, in the text a condition is excluded whose defect could frustrate the effect of the assistance promised by Christ; since those words "and behold, I am with you," as we have seen, announce beforehand the happy outcome of the office imposed. But especially any condition whatever is excluded by the end for which infallibility was promised to the Apostles and their successors: the end is the stability of the universal Church in faith, and this is absolutely indefectible, no. 749.

Article 8. What Is the Object of Infallibility

805. This question, as is clear of itself, cannot be discussed except among those who already acknowledge the existence of active infallibility in the Church; hence we shall especially use those arguments which ought to be valid and fixed for them. The Vatican Council, defining the infallibility of the Roman Pontiff, teaches that he "possesses that infallibility with which the divine Redeemer willed his Church to be furnished in defining doctrine concerning faith or morals." By these words it expressly declared that the object of infallibility is "doctrine concerning faith or morals."

806. But what is the true understanding of these words, and what is their extension? In order to answer this question, a twofold deposit of Christian faith must be distinguished: one taken strictly, the other taken broadly. The first is usually called the direct object of infallibility; the other, the indirect object.

807. The deposit of Christian faith taken strictly comprehends all those truths which, explicitly or implicitly, are so contained in the word of God, written or handed down, that they are truly revealed by God, and therefore are certainly to be believed with divine faith. Compare On the Infused Virtues, no. 473 ff. But the deposit of faith taken broadly comprehends those truths which, although they have not been revealed, nevertheless are so intimately connected with revealed truths that without them the deposit, strictly taken, of Catholic revelation either cannot be preserved, explained, and defended integrally, or can be so less well. Namely, if some truth is so related that, if error concerning it were admitted or permitted, faith in revealed truths would be rendered impossible or at least endangered, that truth belongs to the indirect deposit of faith.

808. Moreover, from what was demonstrated in the preceding article it is manifest that at least the deposit of faith taken strictly is the object of the Church's infallibility. Hence her infallible authority, under the promised assistance of the Holy Spirit, pertains chiefly to guarding, proposing, and explaining revealed truths, and therefore to warding off errors directly opposed to these, or to condemning heresies.

809. Therefore the whole question is contracted to the deposit of faith taken broadly. But so that this may be well understood, two things chiefly must be noticed. First: two questions very distinct from one another are not to be confused: 1) "whether truths pertaining to the deposit of faith taken broadly are the object of the infallible authority of the teaching Church"; 2) "whether this or that truth, which in the judgment of all is subject to the infallibility of the Church, pertains to the direct or the indirect deposit of faith; and consequently, whether it must be believed with divine faith or not." To the first question Theologians unanimously answer affirmatively, as we shall see, and others call the contrary opinion a most grave error, many even a heresy. But with respect to the other question the answer of Theologians is not always the same.

810. To illustrate the matter by an example, it can be asked whether it must be believed with divine faith that this ecumenical Council in the individual case has authority over the universal Church. Some affirm it; for, they say, by the very fact that the universal proposition "all ecumenical Councils legitimately celebrated have authority over the universal Church" is revealed, the particular proposition, which is contained in it formally and implicitly, is also revealed: "this ecumenical Council legitimately celebrated has authority over the universal Church." Nor is it an obstacle that it is not revealed that this Council is legitimately celebrated; for it is enough, they say, that this be certainly established. In the same way it is enough that it be certainly established that Peter was born from Adam by natural generation, so that we believe that he is infected with original sin, and that he is mortal; since it has been revealed that all naturally generated from Adam, unless a privilege is established, contract original sin and are subject to death. But others hold that the truth about which we are treating is not properly revealed, but only connected with revealed truths, insofar as, if the certitude of the authority of this individual Council were made unstable, the certitude of those things which it defines would be made unstable. Hence they say that that truth cannot be believed on account of the authority of God revealing, or with divine faith, but with faith which some call ecclesiastical, others mediately divine: ecclesiastical, insofar as those truths are believed on account of the infallibility of the Church; mediately divine, insofar as this very infallibility, on account of which they are believed, is believed on account of the authority of God revealing. Compare what we have disputed concerning this matter in the treatise On the Infused Virtues, no. 499 ff.; compare also, if you like, Muzzarelli, Whether a Dogmatic Fact Is an Object of Theological Faith.

811. But it is established among all that the truth which we have adduced as an example, and other similar truths, fall under the infallibility of the Church. If therefore that truth is not revealed, and consequently not believable by immediate divine faith, it must be said that the object of the Church's infallibility extends more widely than the object of divine faith. For the latter comprehends only truths divinely revealed; the former, besides these, comprehends also truths having a necessary connection with revealed truths, about which we have spoken. Hence he would argue badly who said: this or that truth is not revealed; therefore the Church cannot define it infallibly.

812. The other thing which must be noted here is the distinction between the general question and certain special questions. Namely, it can be asked: 1) Does the infallibility of the Church extend to the indirect deposit of faith? 2) Is the Church infallible in defining this determinate object? To the first question Theologians unanimously answer affirmatively; but with respect to some particular objects they disagree. Yet from this disagreement it does not follow that they doubt concerning the infallibility of the Church with respect to the indirect deposit of faith; rather, they doubt whether some determinate object pertains to it.

813. Let us illustrate the matter by examples. If it is asked, for example, whether the Church is infallible in the Beatification of the Servants of God, there is a twofold opinion of the Doctors; Benedict XIV brings forward the arguments of each, On the Canonization of Saints, book 1, chapter 42. But if it is a question of the Canonization of Saints, although a few older authors denied that the Church is infallible in it, as Benedict XIV reports, loc. cit., chapter 43, no. 3, nevertheless he himself with the common opinion teaches, ibid., no. 27: "If not a heretic, nevertheless rash, bringing scandal upon the whole Church, injurious to the Saints, favoring heretics who deny the authority of the Church in the canonization of Saints, savouring of heresy, as laying a path for unbelievers to mock the faithful, an assertor of an erroneous proposition, and liable to the gravest penalties, we shall call him who would dare to assert that the Pontiff erred in this or that canonization, and that this or that Saint canonized by him is not to be honored with the cult of dulia; just as even those agree who teach that it is not of faith that this or that canonized person is a Saint." Footnote 1. It will be enough for us on this matter to indicate what St. Thomas has (Quodlibet 9, q. 8, no. 1). a) "In the Church," he says, "there cannot be a damnable error; but this would be a damnable error, if one who was a sinner were honored as a saint, because some persons knowing his sins would believe this to be false, and if it so happened, they could be led into error; therefore the Church cannot err in such things." b) "Furthermore Augustine says in the Epistle to Jerome that if some lie is admitted in canonical Scripture, our faith, which depends on canonical Scripture, will waver. But just as we are bound to believe what is in Sacred Scripture, so also what has been determined by the Church; hence he is judged a heretic who thinks contrary to the determination of Councils. Therefore the common judgment of the Church cannot be erroneous, and thus the same as before." c) But responding to objections, he says: "To the first it must be said that the Pontiff, whose office it is to canonize saints, can be certified concerning the state of someone through the instinct of the Holy Spirit," who searches all things, even the deep things of God, as is said in 1 Corinthians 2. "To the second it must be said that divine providence preserves the Church, lest in such things she be deceived through the fallible testimony of men." Footnote 1 ends.

814. Similarly it is usually asked whether the Church is infallible in the approval of Religious Orders. In this matter it must first be noted with Valentia (tom. 3, disp. 1, q. 1, point 7, section 41): "When the Pontiff approves some Religion, that is, some definite institute of life, two things must be considered in such an act of the Pontiff. One is placed in the very definition and judgment of the Pontiff: namely, that he asserts that that institute of life is not evil, but rather wholly consonant with Evangelical perfection. The other pertains to a certain prudence of the Pontiff in governing: namely, that to such an institute of life, at such a time, etc., he grants a certain place of its own in the Church." Now, with respect to the first, all concede that the Church cannot err. But with respect to the other, Bannez, Sylvius, Tanner, and

others deny this. Nevertheless Valentia, loc. cit., with several others, affirms it, saying: "Yet that opinion is rightly and deservedly reprehended. For it must in no way be conceded that the Pontiff can oblige the universal Church to some matter which itself would pertain, not to the edification, but to the destruction, in whatever way at last, of the Church, as can now be understood sufficiently and more than sufficiently from what has been said. But when the Pontiff grants a place in the Church to some Religion, certainly he also binds and obliges the universal Church to that extent in that matter, so that it cannot resist so as to prevent such Religious Orders from being able to live among the faithful themselves. Therefore, if this could be a disadvantage to the Church herself, the Pontiff would now oblige her to a matter which would not regard the edification of the faithful, but rather their destruction."

815. Therefore, these particular questions having been omitted, we first treat the general question, namely, whether besides the direct object of infallibility an indirect object must also be acknowledged, so that the infallibility of the Church is not to be restricted only to those things which, if defined, according to all must be believed by immediately divine faith. But since a special question has been raised concerning two determinate objects, we shall inquire especially whether the Church is infallible: 1) in condemning propositions with a note lower than heresy; 2) in dogmatic facts. Each of these objects needs to be declared briefly.

816. With respect to the first it must be noted that, if it is established that the judgment of the Church is infallible in decreeing censures below heresy, by that very fact the opinion of certain more recent writers in Germany is refuted; proclaiming the absolute independence of science, compare On the Infused Virtues, nos. 1058 ff., they say (Syllabus, proposition 11): "The Church not only ought never to take action against philosophy, but even ought to tolerate the errors of philosophy itself, and leave it to correct itself." For either 1) philosophy or another human science teaches something which has no connection with revealed doctrine, no opposition to it; and then the Church, as we said in the treatise On the Virtues, no. 1044, does not judge concerning it. Hence the Vatican Council (Constitution Dei Filius, chapter 4) teaches: "Nor indeed does she [the Church] forbid disciplines of this kind to use, each in its own sphere, their own principles and their own method; but, acknowledging this just liberty, she carefully guards lest, by opposing divine doctrine, they receive errors into themselves, or, transgressing their proper boundaries, they occupy and disturb those things which belong to faith." Or 2) it teaches something which is directly and immediately opposed to revealed doctrine; and since this is heresy, the Church infallibly judges it by the force of the authority which she has with respect to the deposit of faith strictly taken. Or 3) it teaches something which has an indirect or mediate opposition to revealed doctrine; and then this is precisely what the Church either simply reproves, with no theological censure affixed, or marks with a censure lower than heresy. But when the Church condemns some proposition as rash, scandalous, and so forth, she infallibly declares that such a note belongs to that proposition. Whether, however, she infallibly decides that the same proposition is false depends on the notion of those censures. Compare what we said in the treatise On the Infused Virtues, nos. 520 and 537.

817. Now, with respect to a dogmatic fact, we first suppose that it is one which is so connected with dogma that knowledge of that fact is necessary for teaching the dogma, or for preserving it safely. Moreover, several dogmatic facts are usually distinguished. Thus some call it a dogmatic fact that "this Pontiff is the legitimate successor of St. Peter"; that "the Council of Trent is a legitimate Council, and therefore has authority over the universal Church," and so forth. But we are treating by name of one of these: namely, whether the Church is infallible in deciding that this or that book contains depraved doctrine, or that this doctrine is found in some proposition insofar as it is in this book.

818. The Jansenists gave occasion to this question, for, in order to elude the condemnation brought by Innocent X (Cum occasione, May 3, 1653) and confirmed by Alexander VII (Ad sacram, October 16, 1656), of the five propositions which had been excerpted from the Augustinus of

Jansenius, they began to distinguish between right and fact. They professed that those propositions, considered in themselves, had deservedly been proscribed, and that they too condemned them from the heart even as heretical; but they refused to believe and profess that they were contained in Jansenius's Augustinus, and were heretical in the mind and sense of Jansenius. For, they said, this fact is merely human; and concerning a human fact it is admitted among all that the Church by no means possesses infallibility. Hence that celebrated case of conscience, in which a cleric is imagined to whom sacramental absolution had been denied because he had declared "that he truly condemned the five propositions simply and absolutely, and indeed had subscribed to the formula of faith of Alexander VII; nevertheless, with respect to the question of fact or the attribution of those five propositions to the book of Jansenius, he judged that a respectful silence sufficed." Forty Parisian doctors solved this case thus: "The undersigned doctors, having seen the exposition of the case, judge that the opinion of this ecclesiastical man is neither new, nor singular, nor condemned by the Church, nor such that the confessor can deny him sacramental absolution unless he retracts it. Deliberated in the Sorbonne on July 30, 1701." Yet Clement XI condemned this solution (Vineam Domini Sabaoth, February 13, 1703), saying: "So that every occasion of error in the future may be entirely cut off, and all the children of the Catholic Church may learn to hear the Church herself, not only by keeping silence, for even the wicked grow silent in darkness, but also by obeying inwardly, which is the true obedience of an orthodox man, by this our constitution, to have perpetual force, we decree and declare," etc., "that the obedience which is owed to the above-inserted apostolic constitutions is by no means satisfied by that obsequious silence."

819. In order rightly to determine the sense of the question on this point, several things are usually noted, which Sardagna nevertheless briefly and clearly touches upon, nos. 215 ff. Therefore, when it is asked whether the Church is infallible in defining the Orthodoxy or Heterodoxy of propositions in relation to the sense of the author: 1) the question is not whether the judgment of the Church is infallible by which she judges that this book belongs to this or that author; or whether it is necessary to believe that the propositions which the Church condemned in some book are read in it expressed in just so many words or syllables; or whether the Author whose propositions are condemned bore in mind that sense, which they call subjective, which the words display. These are questions of mere fact, which the Church prudently supposes, not defines, when she judges concerning books. 2) Nor, however, is the question about the merely external and literal sense of some proposition, separated from the author whose it is, and from the book in which it is, and considered only in itself; for in a judgment of this kind, if the proposition touches matters of faith or morals, even the Jansenists confess that the Church cannot err. 3) Therefore the question turns on this: whether the Church, by an infallible judgment, can establish that the sense, which they call objective, of one or more propositions, insofar as it is drawn from the whole doctrine, book, or system of an author, for example of Jansenius or Quesnel, is true and orthodox, or on the contrary false and heterodox.

820. Hence it is clear: 1) that the present question is not about a mere fact, but about a fact connected with right, or with dogma. For whether the sense of some proposition is orthodox or heterodox pertains to right; but whether the Author expressed that sense in his book, when the whole sequence, texture, and system of the book are considered, is referred to fact. 2) This fact is deservedly called dogmatic. For if the fact is denied, namely, that the author, Nestorius or Jansenius, considering the whole sequence, texture, and system of his book, expressed that sense which the Church condemned, then it is also denied that anything was defined by the Church against Nestorius or Jansenius. On the contrary, it is asserted that the Church fought with a fantastic and imaginary enemy, and that she is either malicious, because by calumny she accused Nestorius or Jansenius of error, or unskilled and foolish, because she in no way grasped their literal sense.

821. Therefore, these things having been laid down beforehand: Section II The Proposed Question Is Solved. Proposition XXXV. 1. The object of the infallibility of the Church ought not to be restricted to those truths which are certainly divinely revealed; but it is extended also to those truths which

are so connected with certainly revealed truths that without them the deposit of Christian faith cannot be integrally guarded, explained, and defended. Therefore they err who think the judgment of the Church fallible, whether when she proscribes science falsely so called, or condemns doctrines with a note below heresy; 2. or when she declares the orthodoxy or heterodoxy of propositions in the objective sense of the Author.

822. The first part is proved. I. How far the object of the Church's infallibility extends cannot be known better than from the sense of the Church herself; for since it is now established that the Church is infallible at least in the custody and true understanding of the deposit of faith strictly taken, and since this infallibility is revealed, it pertains to the Church to judge concerning the true sense of infallibility and concerning its extension and intension; or, what is the same, concerning the object and conditions of her infallible authority. But by her perpetual magisterium the Church has constantly taught that her infallible authority extends also to truths without which certainly revealed truths cannot be integrally guarded, rightly explained, and defended. Therefore. The minor is proved. In documents which are held by all to be dogmatic, together with propositions upon which the note of heresy is branded, others are condemned with notes lower than heresy. Yet neither Councils nor Roman Pontiffs put any difference between the manner in which they condemn heretical propositions and other depraved propositions, as though their authority and judgment were safer with respect to the former than with respect to the latter. On the contrary, they establish all and individual censures in the same manner, by the same authority, and command that firm internal assent be given to them all. But the adversaries whom we are attacking here admit that the Church is infallible in bringing the censure of heresy. Therefore. The major of this argument can be illustrated by several things; but we select the following. 1) In condemning the errors of John Hus, "This most holy Synod of Constance declares and defines that the articles written below... are not Catholic, nor to be dogmatized as such, but that several of them are erroneous, others scandalous, others offensive to pious ears," etc. Moreover, the same Council willed that from all followers of Hus and Wycliffe there be asked "whether he believes the sentence of the holy Council of Constance... namely, that the aforesaid 45 articles of John Wycliffe and 30 of John Hus are not Catholic, but some of them are notoriously heretical, some erroneous, others rash and seditious, others offensive to pious ears." 2) Clement XI, in the proemium of the Bull Unigenitus, says: "Thus, namely, the errors [of Quesnel] having been laid bare and set, as it were, in the open, not one or another, but very many and most grave errors, both those condemned long ago and also those newly devised, we plainly trust, with the Lord blessing, that it will be the case that all at last are compelled to yield to the truth now opened and manifest." Toward the end of the same Constitution these things are had: "We command all the faithful of Christ of either sex that concerning the said propositions they not presume to think, teach, or preach otherwise than is contained in this same our constitution." But in the Bull Pastoralis Officii the same Supreme Pontiff declares all who would not receive the Bull Unigenitus to be plainly alien from the bosom of the Roman Church. 3) Pius VI, at the end of the Constitution Auctorem Fidei, by which he condemned the doctrine of the Synod of Pistoia, says: "Therefore we command all the faithful of Christ of either sex that concerning the said propositions and doctrines they not presume to think, teach, or preach contrary to what is declared in this our constitution; so that whoever shall teach, defend, publish them, or any of them, jointly or separately, or shall treat of them, even by disputing, publicly or privately, unless perhaps by attacking them, is subject by the very fact, without any other declaration, to ecclesiastical censures and other penalties established by law against those perpetrating similar things." 4) In the Encyclical Quanta Cura the Supreme Pontiff Pius IX condemned several propositions, of which the tenth is this: "That assent and obedience can be refused without sin and without any loss of Catholic profession to those judgments and decrees of the Apostolic See whose object is declared to regard the general good of the Church, and her rights and discipline, provided that it does not touch dogmas of faith and morals." And at the end: "All and individual depraved opinions and doctrines commemorated individually in these Letters, by Our Apostolic authority We reprove, proscribe, and condemn; and We will and command that they be held by all the children of the

Catholic Church altogether as reproved, proscribed, and condemned." 5) The Vatican Council (Constitution Dei Filius, chapter 4) teaches: "Moreover the Church, which together with the apostolic office of teaching received the mandate of guarding the deposit of faith, also has from God the right and office of proscribing science falsely so called, lest anyone be deceived through philosophy and vain fallacy. Therefore all Christian faithful are not only forbidden to defend opinions of this kind, which are known to be contrary to the doctrine of faith," it does not say only immediately and directly, "especially if they have been reproved by the Church, as legitimate conclusions of science; but rather are altogether bound to hold them as errors," it does not say as heresies, "which bear before themselves the fallacious appearance of truth." But it concludes that Constitution by saying: "But since it is not enough to avoid heretical depravity, unless those errors also are diligently shunned which approach it more or less, we admonish all of the duty of observing also the Constitutions and Decrees by which depraved opinions of this kind, which are not expressly enumerated here, have both been proscribed and prohibited by this Holy See."

823. II. The right and office of infallibly guarding the deposit of faith strictly taken certainly belongs to the Church. Therefore the right to the means without which she cannot protect that right and fulfill that office must be attributed to her; unless we wish to say, which is absurd, that Christ imposed a most grave mandate on the Church, without conferring on her the necessary means by which she could satisfy it. But a necessary means for rightly guarding the deposit of faith strictly taken is infallible authority in proscribing false science opposed to faith and morals, and in condemning errors which indirectly and mediately attack faith or morals. For: 1) When attention is paid to the character of the human mind and to the corruption of our nature, it is easily understood that one who did not retain altogether firmly in his mind that errors of this kind, condemned by the Church, are to be rejected absolutely, would gradually dispose himself to the loss of faith itself. For by reasoning from those errors he would arrive at conclusions which sometimes openly fight against faith; and since he makes little of the Church's authority with respect to the condemned errors themselves, he would easily give first place, even in conclusions openly repugnant to faith, to his own judgment rather than to the Church. This is confirmed by the very perversion and manner of acting of heretics. For both at the beginning they themselves, adhering to some error often not yet openly against the faith, by degrees made shipwreck concerning the faith; and always, using excessive cunning, they proposed not first open heresy, but ambiguous and captious propositions. Hence to the point Pius VI (Constitution Auctorem Fidei) says: "They [the Pontiffs] knew the crafty art of the innovators in deceiving, who, fearing the offense of Catholic ears, very often strive to cover the snares of their deceits under deceitful wrappings of words, so that error lying hidden amid differences of meanings may flow more gently into minds, and so that, the truth of the sentence having been corrupted by a very brief addition or change, a confession which was working salvation may by a certain subtle transition turn toward death." "For these [books which contain doctrine openly false and evil] deceive only those who are willing, or perhaps the altogether ignorant; but those which bear hidden poison deceive even the more prudent. Hence it happens not rarely that they are more pernicious, and spread their poison more widely, than those whose open corruption discourages the faithful, not unmindful of their salvation, from reading." 2) Hence the Apostles and their successors, just as they received "apostleship for obedience to the faith among all nations" (Rom. 1.5), so in this very preaching of faith they have "weapons of warfare that are not carnal... destroying counsels and every height that exalts itself against the knowledge of God, and bringing every intellect into captivity unto the obedience of Christ" (2 Cor. 10.4-5). Does not doctrine condemned by the Church as rash, false, scandalous, and so forth, exalt itself against the knowledge of God? Fulfilling the office of apostleship, they confirm the faithful, lest they "be deceived by loftiness of speech, through philosophy and vain fallacy according to the tradition of men" (Col. 2.4, 8), and they proscribe "science falsely so called, which some promising have fallen away concerning the faith." Would not the faithful be deceived through doctrines in any way opposed to certain faith? Hence the Apostle himself (2 Tim. 1.13-14) commands that the form of words not be changed when it is a matter of guarding the deposit of faith. "Hold," he says, "the form of sound words which thou hast heard

from me in faith and in love in Christ Jesus. Guard the good deposit through the Holy Spirit who dwells in us." 3) Obeying this command of the Apostle, the Church has always been solicitous in defining forms of sound words. The Council of Trent, for example, consecrated the word Transubstantiation to signify the conversion of the substance of bread and wine into the body and blood of Christ: "Which conversion is fittingly and properly called transubstantiation by the holy Catholic Church" (session 13, chapter 4); and in canon 2: "Which conversion indeed the Catholic Church most aptly calls transubstantiation." In the Constitution Auctorem Fidei, proposition 29, the omission of the word Transubstantiation in the exposition of the faith concerning the Eucharist is condemned as an omission "of the word consecrated by the Church for protecting the profession of that [faith] against heresies." But what would happen if, under the pretext that the Church cannot take action against science, when three Persons in God and one Person in Christ are spoken of, it were permitted to each one to embrace the Guntherian concept of Person? If, when one divine substance and two natures in Christ are spoken of, anyone were to use the words substance and nature with impunity in a Pantheistic sense? etc. 4) Therefore let us conclude this argument with the words of the Supreme Pontiff Pius IX (Gravissimas, December 11, 1862): "The Church, from her divine institution, ought most diligently to guard the deposit of divine faith whole and inviolate, and with the greatest zeal continually to watch over the salvation of souls, and with the greatest care to remove and eliminate all those things which either can oppose faith or in any way bring the salvation of souls into danger. Wherefore the Church, from the power committed to her by her divine Author, not only has the right, but especially the office, not of tolerating, but of proscribing and condemning all errors, if the integrity of faith and the salvation of souls shall so require. And upon every philosopher who wishes to be a son of the Church, and also upon philosophy, there lies the duty never to say anything against those things which the Church teaches, and to retract those things about which the Church has admonished them. But the opinion which teaches the contrary we pronounce and declare to be altogether erroneous and most especially injurious to the faith of the Church itself and to her authority."

824. III. From the consensus of the Doctors. The Vatican Council, as we have seen, no. 805, declared that the Roman Pontiff, just as the Church, is infallible "in doctrine concerning faith and morals"; and the Council of Trent (Labbe, Councils, vol. 20, p. 23) had said the same thing, namely, that the Church is infallible "in matters of faith and morals." Now, if the words alone are considered, they can indicate either those things which strictly are matters of faith insofar as they are truly revealed, or those things which, although not revealed, nevertheless are joined with revealed things by an intimate connection. For those things which pertain to guarding faith integrally, explaining it rightly, and protecting it are rightly called matters of faith. Which, then, of these two senses is subject to those words "in matters of faith and morals"? The following words of the Council of Trent suggest the latter; for the Council adds, "pertaining to the edification of Christian doctrine." Do not truths without which revelation cannot be integrally guarded, explained, and defended pertain to the edification of Christian doctrine? But so that every doubt may be dispelled, it will be useful to investigate the sense of the Doctors antecedent and consequent to those definitions. And 1) we have already seen, no. 813, that in the doctrine of St. Thomas the Church is infallible in the canonization of Saints; which certainly is held by the adversaries as an object not pertaining to the deposit of faith strictly taken. 2) All theologians teach that the Church is infallible in bringing censures lower than heresy; and to deny this, some judge a) to be heretical: thus De Panormo (Sacred Doctrine, chapter 3, article 13, nos. 9 ff.); Diana (On the Infallibility of the Roman Pontiff, resolution 10, nos. 8 ff.); Amici (On Faith, disputation 7, no. 55); Viva (Theses Condemned, prodromal question, no. 18); to whom Malderus, Coninck, Oviedo, and others must be added. b) Others either doubt whether this is heretical, erroneous, or proximate to error, or they call it erroneous. Thus de Lugo (On Faith, disputation 20, section 3, nos. 109-113); Ripalda (tom. 3, disp. 1, section 7, no. 59); Herinx (Summary of Scholastic and Moral Theology, dub. 9, no. 98); Ferraris (under the word condemned proposition, no. 37); Cardenas (Theological Crisis, proemial disputation, no. 140); Turrianus (Solution of Theological Disputations, part 1, disputation 30, dub.

3), and others. 3) The Doctors also expressly extend those words "in matters of faith and morals" to the deposit taken broadly. Suarez (On Faith, disputation 5, section 6) teaches: "It is Catholic truth that the Pontiff defining ex cathedra is a rule of faith which cannot err when he authentically proposes something to the whole Church as to be believed of faith." But speaking (On the Religion of the Society of Jesus, book 3, chapter 4, no. 5) concerning the Bull Ascendente Domino, by which Gregory XIII declared that simple vows can constitute a religious state, he adds that in this declaration the Supreme Pontiff was "altogether infallible, so that it cannot be denied without error in faith. The reason is that the sentence of the Pontiff in those things which pertain to doctrine contains infallible certitude from Christ's institution and promise: 'I have prayed for thee...' But the providence of Christ the Lord concerning his Church would have been greatly diminished if, in deciding such questions ex cathedra, he permitted his Vicar to slip." De Valentia (tom. 3, disp. 1, q. 1, point 7, section 40) extends infallibility to all things which regard piety; and (q. 5, section 27) to those things which pertain to the good state of the Church; and (section 36) to those things which pertain to the good of the Church. It is pleasing to transcribe only what he teaches (section 40): "It must not be denied," he says, "that what has been said concerning the infallible certitude of the definitions of the Pontiff has place first of all in those things which the Pontiff has proposed to the faithful for ending controversies of doctrine and exterminating errors, as revealed by God and to be believed by faith. Besides, since the Church is always bound to hear her Pastor, and divine Scripture absolutely proclaims the Church to be the pillar and ground of truth (1 Tim. 3), and therefore she can never err as a whole, there ought to be no doubt that in asserting all other matters also which regard piety and concern the whole Church, the authority of the Pontiff is infallible. Nor indeed do I think that this can be denied without error... This certitude indeed rests upon those same promises of God from which we have ascertained that it will never happen that the universal Church is deceived in matters of religion." Compare also Bellarmine (On the Roman Pontiff, book 4, chapter 5).

825. The second part is proved, by applying the arguments already brought forward to dogmatic facts. I. By her constant practice the Church has asserted that the right of judging concerning the objective sense of books belongs to her; she has often struck this sense with the same anathema as the doctrine itself considered in itself, enjoining the faithful to acquiesce in this sentence of hers. But, as we have said, it belongs to the Church to declare and define the intension and extension of her infallibility. Therefore. The major is proved. In the fourth century the Nicene Fathers, in the Synodical Letter to the Church of Alexandria (in Socrates, book 1, chapter 6), say: "It pleased the Council by common votes to denounce with anathema both him himself and his wicked opinion, and the execrable words and sentences which he used to load the Son of God with blasphemies." The same Socrates (book 2) testifies that the book of Arius, which he had inscribed Thalia, was likewise proscribed by the Nicene Fathers. In the fifth century Pelagius was compelled to condemn the erroneous sense which the Church had detected in his writings. Hence Innocent I (in the letter to the five Bishops, which among the Augustinian letters is 183) writes: "We unrolled the book which was said to be his, in which we read that many things had been written against the grace of God, many blasphemous things, nothing that pleased, and almost nothing that did not utterly displease, to be condemned and trampled upon by anyone... Therefore let him anathematize those things which he thought." In the Council of Ephesus (Act 1), first a lengthy Letter of St. Cyril of Alexandria to Nestorius was read, which the Fathers approved in all things. Afterward, however, the Letter of Nestorius to St. Cyril was also read, which they declared to be alien from the orthodox faith, saying: "All things which this Letter comprises openly fight against the Nicene faith, and are altogether alien from the same; wherefore we judge that all who believe thus are alien from the right faith. All the Bishops together cried out: Whoever does not anathematize Nestorius, let him be anathema. We all anathematize the Letter and dogmas of Nestorius... we anathematize the impious faith of Nestorius." Famous is the case of the Three Chapters, that is, the works of Theodore of Mopsuestia, certain writings of Theodoret, and the letter of Ibas. The Second Council of Constantinople (Collation 7) says: "Keeping in memory the promises made concerning the Holy Church, and him who said that the gates of hell shall not prevail against her... we have thought it necessary to

comprehend in chapters both the preaching of truth and the condemnation of heretics and of their impiety." Then it adds (canon 12): "Therefore if anyone defends the aforesaid impious Theodore and his impious writings, in which he poured forth both the aforesaid and other innumerable blasphemies... but does not anathematize him and his impious writings... let such a one be anathema." And (canon 13): "If anyone defends the impious writings of Theodoret, which he wrote against the right faith and against the first holy Synod of Ephesus and St. Cyril... let such a one be anathema." And (canon 14): "If anyone defends the Letter which Ibas is said to have written to Maris the Persian, a heretic... If anyone therefore defends the mentioned impious letter, but does not anathematize it... and those who say that it is right... let such a one be anathema." Pope Vigilius held ratified the condemnation of the Three Chapters (Letter to Eutychius of Constantinople), saying: "Therefore we anathematize and condemn the aforesaid Three Chapters... Moreover, whoever shall believe at any time that those Chapters ought to be received or defended, or shall have attempted to overturn this present condemnation, we subject to a like anathema." Footnote 1. So that these things may be vindicated from cavils, let it be recalled: 1) that at the beginning the Latins falsely thought against the Greeks that the Council of Chalcedon had approved the letter of Ibas; which the Latins themselves, the error of fact having been detected, afterward acknowledged. 2) Although heretical writings are worthy of condemnation, nevertheless there can be circumstances in which, the depraved doctrine having been condemned, from a certain prudent economy silence is preserved for a time concerning the writings in which it is contained. Thus it was done in the Council of Ephesus with respect to the works of Theodore of Mopsuestia, "namely lest, as Cyril testifies (Letter to Proclus, Bishop of Constantinople), some persons, looking to the great reputation of the man, should separate themselves from the Churches." 3) It is false that Vigilius retracted the condemnation first issued by him before the Fifth Synod; using only a prudent dispensation, lest he give an occasion to the threatening schism, he remitted something from the severity of discipline. But when the danger had passed, since few defenders of the Three Chapters remained, Vigilius confirmed the preceding condemnation, and the dissenters were not received into communion unless they had first condemned the Three Chapters. 4) The Bishops of Venetia and Istria, still dissenting, became schismatics. Compare Natalis Alexander (Ecclesiastical History, sixth century, dissertation 3). Footnote 1 ends.

826. II. Christ instituted the Church so that through her he might supply to men so great a means unto salvation; and for this reason, as we have shown, he furnished her with infallibility. But infallibility in dogmatic facts is no less necessary for obtaining this end than infallibility with respect to the deposit of faith strictly taken. Therefore, unless we wish absurdly to affirm that Christ by no means gave his Church a suitable means for obtaining the end, it is necessary to confess that he conferred on her infallibility in deciding dogmatic facts. The minor is proved. 1) Christ (John 21) said: "Feed my sheep... feed my lambs"; Peter exhorts the Bishops (1 Pet. 5), writing: "Feed the flock of God which is among you"; and Paul (Acts 20) thus addresses the elders whom he had gathered from Ephesus: "Take heed to yourselves and to the whole flock, in which the Holy Spirit has placed you Bishops to rule the Church of God." But giving the reason for an admonition of this kind, he adds: "I know that after my departure ravening wolves will enter in, not sparing the flock. And from among yourselves men will arise speaking perverse things, that they may draw away disciples after themselves. Therefore watch." Now the office of feeding, in order to be rightly fulfilled, requires that poisonous pastures be certainly discerned, and that thus the sheep be safely kept from them; just as it is necessary to know wolves with certainty, lest the sheep be torn by their ways. But the Church cannot effect this unless she were infallible in the dogmatic facts about which we are treating; for however much she condemned the blasphemies of heretics, they themselves would always except that the Church had not attained their mind, and therefore had wrongly condemned their doctrine. 2) The Jansenists themselves ought to confess that the Church is infallible in discerning the sense of the individual Fathers by whom the series of tradition is shown; for otherwise how could she judge that this or that doctrine has come to us also from tradition, unless she had first judged that the Fathers handed it down thus? Therefore, if the Church judges infallibly concerning sound doctrine as it is exhibited in the writings of the Fathers, she also

judges infallibly concerning depraved doctrine as it stands forth in the writings of heretics. 3) This argument has still greater force against the Jansenists, who assert that the Church by an infallible judgment approved the doctrine of St. Augustine on Grace, no. 349. Hence Claude Pajot, a Calvinist preacher, in the celebrated debate which he had with Antoine Arnauld, author of the book On the Perpetual Faith of the Church Concerning the Real Presence of Christ in the Eucharist, says: "If it is permitted to you, Arnauld, to dispute concerning the sense of Jansenius after the definition of the Church, why will it not be permitted to us to dispute concerning the sense of Augustine, Chrysostom, and others in our discussion concerning the real presence?" 4) Wherefore Fenelon deservedly (dissertation 1, On the Infallibility of the Church Concerning Dogmatic Texts, chapter 2, in Perrone) demonstrates that, "this infallibility being removed, the whole infallibility of the Church falls. For she could always be deceived in understanding the texts of the Fathers, in understanding the propositions of heretics, and the decrees of Councils; and consequently she could present as heretical a doctrine which in reality is orthodox, or conversely judge as orthodox a doctrine which is heretical, and thus any judgment of the Church could be eluded. From this besides it would follow that the infallibility of the Church would always be admitted theoretically, always eluded practically; all her anathemas brought against doctrine which she judged heretical, for example, that of Nestorius, Pelagius, Luther, Calvin, would be an empty terror; then she herself, unarmed, and the nerve of censure having been cut, would lie powerless; whence the gates of hell would prevail against her." Moreover, he illustrates all these things with examples.

Article 9. Which Is the True Church of Christ

827. Those things which we have disputed thus far provide sufficient knowledge of the Church considered, as it were, in the abstract, no. 625. For since we have scrutinized Christ's institution by investigating its nature, properties, and endowments, the answer to the question is easy: what and what kind of thing the Church of Christ is. In order that we may take the fruit of the whole disputation, we turn our mind to contemplating the Church in the concrete. For if, as Tertullian says (Against the Valentinians), "wasps also make honeycombs, and Marcionites make churches," it is necessary that, considering the diverse assemblies which wish to seem to be churches, we be able to discern the true Church from the false, and thus to answer the question: which is the true Church of Christ.

828. After all those things which we have already established, it is permitted to dispatch this question briefly. For first it is not necessary expressly to prove here that the true Church of Christ can certainly be known; for 1) the Church is a necessary society. Therefore, unless we wish to say that God fails in necessary things, it must be said that the true Church is certainly knowable. 2) The Church is formally visible. Therefore the true Church can certainly be discerned. Recall, therefore, what we discussed, no. 159, and in the treatise On the Infused Virtues, no. 885.

829. But if the true Church can certainly be discerned, everyone understands that there are some notes through which it is certainly manifested. For unless these existed, since there are several assemblies which vindicate for themselves the name of Christian Church, the true Church could by no means be discerned from false churches. Hence the Innovators themselves, although they often said that the Church is invisible, nevertheless, agreeing little with themselves, do not refuse to admit external notes by which the true Church of Christ is known. Thus, for example, it is read in the Apology of the Augsburg Confession (article 4, section 144): "The Church is not only a society of external things, as other polities are, but principally is the society of faith, hope, and the Holy Spirit in hearts, which nevertheless has external notes, so that it can be known." Recall what was said, no. 160.

830. The nature and office of the notes is also easily understood from what has been laid down above. Nevertheless it is useful to recall something here. Therefore the notes of the Church can be described thus: "external, proper, and permanent characters, through which the true Church of Christ

can certainly be known easily and by all." It is said: 1) external characters, for the question concerns discerning the Church, which is a society essentially visible; nor, if they were altogether internal, could they be known by men. 2) Proper. "For if," says Bellarmine, "I wished to designate to you with certainty a man whom you have never seen, so that as soon as you see him you may distinguish him from others, I ought not to say: he is a certain man who has two eyes, two hands, etc.; for these things are common to all." 3) Permanent. For since the Church is a society always necessary, it must always be able to be known. Therefore the characters through which it is known ought always to remain. Besides, as we shall see at once, the notes of the Church are her properties insofar as they are manifested externally; but these either regard the very essence of the Church or necessarily follow it. Therefore as long as the Church exists, so long the characters by which it is known ought to remain. 4) Through which the Church is known. Namely, the notes are a means leading us to knowledge of the Church; therefore they ought to be better known and known by us prior to the Church itself, for our mind proceeds only from things known to things unknown in the acquisition of truth. Yet observe that the notes lead us into knowledge of the true Church of Christ in the concrete and in the individual case, but not of the Church in the abstract. Therefore they ought to be better known to us than the Church in the concrete, but not known by us prior to the Church in the abstract. Indeed, knowledge of the notes presupposes knowledge of the Church in the abstract; for the notes of the Church cannot be invented at pleasure, but must be derived from the very nature of the Church according to Christ's institution. Therefore it must first be known what and what kind of thing the Church of Christ is, so that from this, the notes having been established, through them we may discern among the various assemblies which glory in the Christian name which one is the true Church. 5) Easily and by all. For the Church was instituted for all men, learned and unlearned, and is necessary for all. Therefore the characters through which the Church is known must be such that they can manifest her even to the untaught. Compare On the Infused Virtues, no. 884. Observe, however, that the demonstration concerning the true Church of Christ in the concrete instituted through the notes is the same in substance, whether it is instituted for the learned or for the unlearned; for it rests on entirely the same principles. But the manner in which the demonstration is proposed, the breadth with which it is developed, and the force with which it is defended, are diverse according to the diversity of minds, culture, and prejudices. Hence the simple and obvious application of the notes, which suffices for simple and sincere souls, would have to be proposed and defended by a certain scientific method for those whose mind has been preoccupied by prejudices and difficulties. To this point pertain those things which we disputed more fully concerning this matter when treating of the manner of forming the judgment of credibility, which is prerequired for the act of divine faith, On the Infused Virtues, no. 814 ff.

831. From these things the office of the notes of the Church is already understood. But in order to determine it more clearly, let it be noted: 1) at this stage of the question we no longer consider the Church under the generic aspect of true religion, comparing it with the other anti-Christian sects. This question was completed in the second disputation, through the notes of true revelation which we indicated in the first disputation. Here, therefore, the question is among those who already confess that the Christian religion alone is true; and the comparison is instituted among assemblies which, although diverse, nevertheless all contend that they are the true Church of Christ. If this observation is kept before the eyes, several difficulties are avoided, as being out of place. If someone objected, for example: in the Mohammedan religion also unity of doctrine flourishes; therefore unity of this kind cannot be a note of the true Church; one could answer, prescinding from the multiplicity of sects among the Mohammedans, that not unity of just any doctrine, but unity in the profession of Christian doctrine, is a note of the Church; but that the doctrine and religion of Mohammed is proved false by other characters, whether intrinsic or extrinsic. 2) Nor is it necessary to call back to the scales absolutely all heretical or schismatic sects. For many are extinct, and others are already almost extinct. Theodoret counts 76 different heresies, of which, as he himself testifies, very few were surviving in his time; St. Augustine enumerates 88, but says in Psalm 57 that very many of

them have perished; Bellarmine (On the Notes of the Church, chapter 6), having counted 200 heresies down to the time of Luther, adds: "But of these there survive only certain remains of the Nestorians and Eutychians in the East, and of the Hussites in Bohemia; all the rest have utterly perished." Therefore it will be enough to conduct the question concerning the Roman Church, the assembly of Protestants, and the assembly of the Greek Schismatics; what is said concerning these can easily be adapted also to others, if there are any. 3) But in judging these from the notes, we can proceed negatively or positively. For a) if even one of the notes is lacking to some sect, it is at once permitted to conclude that it is not the true Church of Christ; b) if all together agree with some assembly, it is certainly established that it constitutes the true Church of Christ; c) but if the individual notes are applied, some judge that some of them accomplish the matter positively, others only negatively. Yet if any note whatever is taken adequately, any one seems positively to discern the true Church of Christ. Compare what was said, no. 165. 4) Finally, to avoid cavils, let it be noted that the denomination Roman Church can be taken in two ways. For either it signifies the particular Church which formerly was and still is at Rome; or the collection of all the faithful who, dispersed throughout the whole world, formerly adhered and still adhere to the Roman Pontiff. In this latter sense we take the denomination Roman here. Hence the same Church is usually called Catholic, or universal; Pontifical, because she adheres and obeys the Supreme Pontiff; Roman, from the nobler part of herself.

832. But what, indeed, are those notes? Luther (book On Councils and the Church) first assigned seven notes, always excluding those which are found in the Creed, and especially Apostolicity. But afterward the Innovators commonly acknowledged only two, namely, the sincere preaching of the word of God and the legitimate use of the Sacraments. These two comprehend Luther's first five. Compare Bellarmine, book 2, chapter 2.

833. But these two notes can in no way be admitted; for those conditions are lacking which are required for constituting a note. In reality, 1) they are not notes proper to the true Church alone. For according to the truth of the matter they can be found in those assemblies which certainly are not the true Church of Christ. Among pure schismatics, both sincere doctrine and the legitimate use of the Sacraments can flourish for a time, as happened among the Luciferians and Donatists at the beginning of the schism. But according to the opinion of those whom we are attacking, any sect whatever vindicates for itself the sincere preaching of the word of God and the sincere use of the Sacraments. Therefore another indication is needed, so that we may discern among which of them the preaching of the word of God is truly sincere, and among which it is falsely boasted. 2) Nor are these same two notes better known to us than the Church itself. For the sincerity of preaching and the use of the Sacraments, as the adversaries contend, must be taken from conformity with the word of God. But it is more difficult to know the true word of God than the Church; for who will easily judge the authenticity of copies, the fidelity of versions, the truth of interpretation, and so forth? Hence it is that the Fathers teach that the truth of doctrine must be judged only through the Church; compare the testimonies already given, no. 653, and what we said in the treatise On the Infused Virtues, disputation 4. 3) Hence through these same two notes the true Church of Christ could not be discerned from false sects easily and by all; for can all easily know what is the genuine word of God, in what version it is faithfully exhibited, what is its genuine sense, and so forth?

834. But the Innovators allege in vain, for establishing these two notes: 1) certain testimonies of Sacred Scripture. For all these, as is easily established by all, either in no way pertain to the matter, or at most prove that the sincere preaching of the word of God pertains to the true Church of Christ, and therefore discerns it ontologically; but not that through that same preaching the true Church of Christ becomes known to us, or that it is discerned through it logically and with respect to us. 2) In vain also they allege certain testimonies of the Fathers, in which they seem to teach that the true Church of Christ is known through Scripture. For a) they teach that the Church shines forth of herself to all: "The Church," says Origen (Homily 30 on Matthew), "is full of brightness from East even to West"; and St. Cyprian (On the Unity of the

Church): "The Church of the Lord, suffused with light, stretches forth her rays through the whole world"; and St. Augustine (Tractate on the Epistle of John): "Do we point out the Church with a finger? Is she not open?" b) As we indicated a little before, they constantly teach that we receive Scripture from the Church. c) Hence they teach that through the Scriptures the true Church of Christ is known in the abstract, I concede; in the concrete, I distinguish; absolutely and of itself, I deny; hypothetically and by accident, I concede. Namely, if the matter is being handled with adversaries who already admit something in Scripture as pertaining to the Church, according to their nature, they can be convicted from the Scriptures that they do not pertain to the true Church of Christ. Compare Bellarmine, loc. cit., chapter 2.

835. Therefore, these having been rejected, what are the notes of the true Church? St. Augustine (Against the Epistle of the Foundation, chapter 4) enumerates six notes; St. Jerome (Against the Luciferians) two; St. Vincent of Lerins (Commonitorium) three, and so forth; and thus also the older Theologians assign more or fewer notes. But now by unanimous consent we all acknowledge and employ four, without on that account disagreeing in reality from the ancients. For the Fathers themselves employed those four notes: by assigning fewer, they by no means rejected the rest, but reduced these to those; but by enumerating more, they taught that they were contained in those four. Hence Bellarmine, for example, who weighs fifteen notes, says (loc. cit., chapter 3): "We shall propose fifteen notes, which, if anyone wishes, can in some way be recalled to those four which are commonly assigned by more recent authors from the Constantinopolitan Creed: One, Holy, Catholic, and Apostolic." Therefore it is ours to establish these notes, and by their aid to define the true Church of Christ in the concrete. Section II The Proposed Question Is Solved. Proposition XXXVI. 1. Unity, Sanctity, Catholicity, and Apostolicity are the notes of the true Church. 2. By these rightly applied, just as it is certainly established that the Roman Church is the one true Church of Christ, so all the other assemblies which, outside her communion, vindicate for themselves the Christian name are proved by conviction by no means to constitute the true Church of Christ.

836. The first part is proved. I. Any thing whatever is best and certainly known from its properties, if they become known externally. If, for example, you have the definition of man, and from speech or other signs you see in some individual the use of reason, from this you gather that in the same individual there is a rational soul; and then, since you see the body in itself, you rightly conclude that this individual is a man. But Unity, Sanctity, Catholicity, and Apostolicity, as has already been demonstrated, are properties of the Church; and they become known externally, as we shall confirm at once. Therefore Unity, and so forth, are notes of the Church of Christ, or characters through which the true Church of Christ is certainly known.

837. II. To Unity, Sanctity, Catholicity, and Apostolicity belong all the conditions which we said are required for constituting a note of the Church. Therefore they are notes of the true Church. The antecedent is proved. And 1) they are something proper and not common; for, as is clear from their concept as explained and demonstrated, they either pertain to the very essence of the Church, or at least are her properties. 2) Hence it follows that the same are permanent in the Church. 3) They are also external and knowable. Indeed, unity of faith is manifested through the external profession of faith, which cannot be hypocrisy in the whole assembly, no. 464; the government of men ought to be external, just as obedience ought to be external. Sanctity is manifested externally through excellent exercise of virtues even in a heroic degree, through marvelous fruitfulness, through miracles, which are sensible facts. Apostolic succession is also external. But since, from what has been said, Apostolic succession comprehends adequate Apostolicity in itself, no. 720 ff., the Apostolicity of the Church is simply visible, or certainly knowable. Catholicity likewise, factual and simultaneous, is something external; but that the catholicity of the Church is of this kind has already been demonstrated. 4) They are besides knowable easily and by all. This will be clear from the very application of those notes. But, to illustrate the matter at once, anyone will easily understand, for example, that the Church of Christ ought to be one by unity of doctrine; for it cannot be said that Christ

taught contradictories, or taught and did not teach one and the same thing. But anyone also will easily perceive that in his own sect there are almost as many opinions as heads, nor is there any sufficient principle of unity in faith; just as, on the contrary, in the Catholic Church, the very common profession of some external and infallible magisterium argues unity of doctrine. So likewise, anyone will easily understand that the government of the Church ought to be Apostolic, for no one is ignorant that the Church was founded by Christ in the Apostles. But the very name of the diverse sects, the epoch of their foundation, and so forth, manifests the defect of Apostolicity in them; while, on the contrary, in the Catholic Church, Apostolic succession in the Roman See and the communion of the others with it is conspicuous. Anyone will be able to pursue these things, and the matter will be evident, especially if the observation already made is retained concerning the diverse manner of proposing the whole demonstration according to the diverse dispositions of minds, no. 830, and the things which we said in the treatise On the Infused Virtues, no. 313 ff. 5) Finally, the same characters of Unity, and so forth, are better known with respect to us than the true Church itself considered in the concrete and in the individual. For since they are external, they first and immediately, as it were, strike the eyes; but from them, with knowledge of the true Church of Christ in the abstract supposed, we gather as by reasoning that this assembly and not others is the true Church of Christ. But that which leads us to knowledge of another thing is better known with respect to us than that thing. Therefore. Hence the Fathers always used these same notes for discerning the true Church, nos. 653, 661, 689, 707, and 736.

838. The second part is proved. I. From the Unity of the Church. And first indeed: the Roman Church is One. Indeed, there belongs to her 1) unity of faith with respect to fact, no. 633. For all the faithful dispersed throughout the world have the same profession of faith, by which they believe the truths defined by the Church; truth once authentically defined has never been retracted; new definitions indeed have been brought forth with the succession of time, but by these the same ancient revelation has been proposed more expressly and more explicitly. Compare On the Infused Virtues, no. 533 ff. There can be disagreement among Catholics concerning certain truths not yet defined by the Church, but all profess themselves ready to accept her judgment. The Church has constantly cast out from her bosom anyone who denied even one of the truths certainly revealed. Compare On the Infused Virtues, no. 990. So great is the unity and stability in the same faith in the Catholic Church that the adversaries turn this into a fault against her, either because, they say, that stability is a sign of death, or because it is hostile to progress. Compare On the Infused Virtues, nos. 930 and 517. 2) To the same Church belongs unity of faith with respect to right, since she acknowledges an extrinsic effective principle of unity, that is, the apostolic magisterium, to which she attributes infallibility in teaching. 3) But all members, wherever they may be, adhere to One Head, namely, the Roman Pontiff, in whom they acknowledge the primacy of jurisdiction over the universal Church; and therefore unity of government belongs to the Roman Church. Secondly: no sect has the note of unity. And 1) the very authors of the Reformation fight with themselves. Luther taught that the Saints are to be invoked (Sermon on the Ten Commandments), which he denied when writing to the Waldenses (Sermon on Mammon); he affirmed that the Church is infallible (Reply to the Dialogue of Sylvester Prierias), which he denied (Postil on the First Sunday after Epiphany); he affirms (On the Power of Excommunication) that Prelates are to be obeyed, which he denies (On the Babylonian Captivity), and so forth. Nor was the inconstancy of Calvin less; for (Institutes, book 1, chapter 18) he affirms that God is the author of sin, which he denies (Harmony, and on Matthew chapter 4); he affirms (on John chapter 3) the necessity of baptism, which he denies (Institutes, book 4, chapter 16), and so forth. Compare Cardinal Gotti (On the True Church of Christ, chapter 10). Hence first of all that saying of St. Hilary fits them (book Against Constantius): "Now you force one council, now another, and in each one you vary the faith. What usually happens to unskilled builders, to whom their own works are always displeasing, happens to you: that you always destroy what you always build." 2) The authors of the Reformation fight among themselves a fortiori; the insults of the Lutherans against the Calvinists, and conversely, are known; sects are daily dissolved into sects, until they betake themselves into rationalism. Compare On the Infused Virtues, no. 979 ff. Hence to the Innovators can

be applied what St. Athanasius writes (Oration 1 against the Arians): "That also," he says, "is altogether remarkable, that all heresies, as many as there are, in inventing bring forward diverse and mutually conflicting things, and agree nowhere except in falsity"; or also what St. Jerome has (on Isaiah chapter 7): "Those who disagree among themselves agree in attacking the Church, according to that saying that Herod and Pilate, disagreeing among themselves, are joined in friendship in the Passion of the Lord." 3) The principle of unity in faith is lacking to them; indeed there is in them a principle destructive of unity, namely private judgment, which they hold as the supreme rule of faith. Therefore of them can be repeated what Tertullian writes (On Prescription, chapter 42): "I lie if they do not also vary among themselves from their own rules, while each one likewise tunes according to his own judgment the things he has received, just as the one who handed them down composed them according to his own judgment. The progress of the thing recognizes its own nature and the custom of its origin. The same thing was permitted to the Valentinians as to Valentinus; the same to the Marcionites as to Marcion: to innovate faith according to their own judgment." 4) With respect to unity of government, they would contend absurdly that they possess it. Indeed, the diverse sects are mutually independent. Individual sects have a shadow of government, since, as we have seen, they deny true power to it. The same sects, existing in diverse regions, form diverse and independent communities. Certainly, if they affect any government, it is not apostolic, as we shall prove at once.

839. II. From the Sanctity of the Church. And first indeed: the Roman Church is Holy. Indeed, 1) in her there have always flourished those who both professed the life of perfection in the practice of the evangelical counsels, and reached the heroic degree of virtue; and indeed in so great a number that their most brilliant light of sanctity illumines the whole Church to which they belonged. Religious profession, just as it is conspicuous in the Catholic Church, so has always stirred up the hatreds of non-Catholics. The holy Fathers, whom the whole world venerates, lived and died in Roman communion. In the first eight centuries of the Church, scarcely three or four of the Roman Pontiffs were not numbered among the Saints. St. Augustine recounts marvelous examples of sanctity (On the Morals of the Church, book 1, chapter 31 ff.) concerning anchorites, cenobites, holy women, and clerics. Luther himself (on Galatians chapter 5) admires the sanctity "of Benedict, Gregory, Bernard, Francis, and the like"; Calvinist writers (in Bohours, Life of St. Francis Xavier, book 6) esteem St. Francis Xavier so highly that they say: "If Xavier had been of our religion, even among us he would with truth have to be esteemed as another Paul"; indeed Luther (Letter to Two Pastors on Anabaptism) writes: "I say that under the Papacy there is true Christianity, indeed the kernel of Christianity, and many pious and great Saints." But that the series of Saints has never failed is clear from the causes of Beatification and Canonization; and it is enough to consult the collection of the Bollandists. The very great number of martyrs belongs only to the Roman communion. 2) Also conspicuous is the fruitfulness of the Roman Church, by whose ministry alone unbelieving nations have been converted to the Christian faith. Protestants invent the beginnings of corruption in the Roman Church especially from the sixth century. Nevertheless in that same century St. Gregory the Great sent monks into Great Britain, who brought the Angles to the faith of Christ. In the seventh century, by the work of St. Kilian, sent by Pope Conon, the Franks were converted. In the eighth century, a great part of Germany was brought to the faith by the work of St. Boniface, whom Gregory II had sent. In the ninth century, through the monks of Corbie, the Vandals were converted to the faith; the Bulgarians, Poles, Danes, and Moravians were subjected to the Roman Pontiff. In the tenth century, Albert, archbishop of the Bohemians, and Methodius, archbishop of the Moravians, enrolled entire kingdoms to Christ. In the eleventh century, the Hungarians, having received the faith of Christ, received Bishops from the Roman Pontiff. In the twelfth century, Adrian II before his Pontificate, having been sent by Eugene, converted Norway. It is known by whose work in more recent times the faith of Christ has been disseminated in the East Indies, Japan, in the broad empire of the Chinese, and so forth. 3) Nor is it marvelous, since the gift of miracles and of the other charisms has been perennial in the Roman Church. For the more remote age, one can consult St. Irenaeus (Against Heresies, book 2, chapter 32, 66), St. Basil (On the Holy Spirit, chapter 29), St. Gregory of Nyssa (in the Life of St.

Gregory Thaumaturgus), St. Jerome (Catalogue of Ecclesiastical Authors), St. Hilary (book Against Constantius the Emperor), St. Gregory Nazianzen (Oration 18), St. Augustine (On the City of God, book 22), and Theodoret (Oration 8 against the Greeks). For more recent times, the other things being omitted, let those things be recalled which are contained in the lives of the Saints and in the Acts for their Canonization. Compare what was said, no. 210. Secondly: the note of Sanctity belongs to no sect. And 1) the life and morals of the authors of the Reformation, and the occasion of the same, are the greatest prejudice. Luther, a monk and priest, against the faith given to God, married a nun, from whom he received a son a few days after the wedding had been celebrated. If you judge him from his writings, you will find him blasphemous against God, abusive toward neighbor, puffed up with remarkable pride. Zwingli (in Gretser, tom. 13) gave examples of insolence and foul lust at Glarus and Zurich; he himself testifies concerning himself that a genius, whom he does not know whether he was black or white, was the author to him of denying the real presence of Christ in the Eucharist. Calvin, marked with a stigma for an infamous crime, blasphemous against God, desirous of revenge, poured out his soul amid blasphemies, execrations, and invocations of demons. What was the occasion in England of departing from the ancestral religion, and by what most atrocious means they attempted to eradicate the Roman faith, is known to all. Who would believe that these and others like them were sent by God to reform the Church of Christ? 2) Protestant doctrine certainly is not that which conduces to sanctity. Namely, they teach that faith alone justifies, that good works are not necessary for salvation, that men sin whatever they do, that God does not punish sins if someone through faith applies to himself the justice of Christ, that free will is extinguished, that God is the author of sin, and so forth. If therefore any good persons are found among them, either they are such by a certain natural or external honesty, or, remaining in error in good faith, some are divinely illumined and aided by an extraordinary means, as can also happen among unbelievers, and they establish their life contrary to the principles of their sect. 3) Hence it is no wonder if those distinguished marks of sanctity are lacking, which both redound upon the assembly itself and render its sanctity conspicuous and certain. The practice of the evangelical counsels is proscribed rather than promoted; men distinguished by sanctity, who had flourished before in great number, are no longer found among those who were separated from Roman unity; miracles rather are mocked, nor do they judge that they are to be sought, nos. 680 and 734; and these things are common also to the Greek schismatics. 4) With respect to fruitfulness, these things are certain: the Greek schismatics do not even contend that they possess it; Protestants from the beginning judged that one should not even think about the conversion of unbelievers; toward the end of the seventeenth century, in imitation of the Roman Church, they established missions; although they abounded in material means, those missions were altogether sterile with respect to the conversion of unbelievers; the whole labor of Protestant missionaries is directed to this, that Catholics be perverted, or that they themselves become rich. You will find documents for all these things indicated in Perrone (On True Religion, part 2, proposition 10).

840. III. From the note of Catholicity. It is permitted to dispatch the application of this note more briefly. Material diffusion is broader in the Roman communion than in all the sects taken together, no. 307. Now, just as in the time of St. Augustine, the Roman communion is distinguished from the sects among all by the denomination Catholic, no. 707. All the sects taken together always lack formal catholicity, no. 693. Therefore to this point pertain the things which St. Augustine writes (sermon 46, otherwise 165, On Time, chapter 8, no. 18): "Not all heretics," he says, "are over the whole face of the earth, but nevertheless heretics are over the whole face of the earth. Some here, others there... they themselves do not know one another. One sect is in Africa, another heresy in the East, another in Egypt, another in Mesopotamia... In diverse places there are diverse ones... But nevertheless that one [the Roman Church] knows all, because she is spread with all. For example, the party of Donatus is in Africa; the Eunomians are not in Africa; but the Catholic is here with the party of Donatus. The Eunomians are in the East; there the party of Donatus is not; but the Catholic is there with the Eunomians. That one is thus like a vine spread everywhere by growing; those are thus like useless branches cut off by the sickle of the farmer because of the

merit of their sterility, so that the vine might be pruned, not amputated."

841. IV. From the note of Apostolicity. Moreover, we have already proved, no. 736 ff., that the Roman Church is Apostolic. But that Apostolicity belongs to no sect can easily be proved by many things. And 1) Apostolic succession, in which the whole of Apostolicity is comprehended, no. 720, supposes Episcopal consecration, no. 723. But Calvin was not even a priest, although he was called Bishop of Geneva; Luther, Zwingli, and Oecolampadius, as is certainly established and as they themselves confess, were never ordained Bishops. Hence neither do they acknowledge the distinction by divine right between clerics and laity, nor the hierarchy instituted by Christ in the clerical order, which error we refuted above. 2) But from whom did the Innovators receive the mission itself? The Roman Church, from which they were separating, according to them was no longer the true Church of Christ; this, they say, had failed at that time. Therefore from her, according to their own principles, they could not have received a mission. Hence against them we rightly urge the argument which the Fathers commonly used against the ancient heresies. "Who are you," asks Tertullian (On Prescription), "whence and when did you come? Where have you lain hidden so long?" And St. Optatus (Against Parmenian, book 2): "Show the origin of your chair, you who wish to claim the holy Church for yourselves." And St. Hilary (On the Trinity, book 6): "This age of the present world has brought forth these most pious Doctors for me late. My faith, which you instructed, had these teachers late; having heard none of all these, therefore I believed in you," etc. And St. Augustine (On Baptism, book 3, chapter 2): "Whence, therefore, did Donatus appear? From what land did he sprout? From what sea did he emerge? From what heaven did he fall?" 3) Hence it is almost superfluous to show that Apostolicity of doctrine is lacking to Protestant sects; for when Apostolic succession is lacking, the principle by which doctrine is safely guarded is lacking. Bellarmine (On the Notes of the Church, chapter 9) both reports testimonies of Calvin expressly professing the repugnance of his doctrine with antiquity, and then composes a catalogue of heresies condemned long before the Reformation, which were renewed by the Innovators. 4) But the defect of Apostolicity in the sects of the Innovators is so evident that they invoke an extraordinary mission, which we rejected above, no. 733 ff. 5) To deny Apostolic succession among the Greek schismatics, it would be enough to recall the things which we have already established, nos. 724 ff. and 736 ff. But we add one thing for the full evidence of the matter: it is known that the Greek Church before the separation adhered to the Roman Church, and in the Roman Pontiff acknowledged the center of unity. Either, therefore, before the separation it was the true Church; and by the very fact that it was separated from the true center of unity, by schism it was constituted outside the Church of Christ, and consequently has no apostolic mission; or before the separation it was a false Church of Christ, and through separation began to become the true Church; and it is asked from whom it then received mission. These things have force a fortiori for the Russian Church, which toward the end of the seventeenth century was separated from the Patriarch of Constantinople, for whom, by the authority of the Emperor, a Synod was substituted, of which the Emperor himself is president. Who does not see that this Church, guilty of a double schism, lacks apostolic mission? Did the Emperor of the Russians possess it, so that he could communicate it; or could he communicate to others what he himself did not have? And these same things can be applied, if there is need, to the Anglican Church.

842. V. We have scarcely sketched the demonstration of this thesis, and it is better to complete it here with three observations, which each one can develop for himself, so that he may obtain the full demonstration of the matter. And 1) the notes themselves considered in themselves, and, as it were, prescinding from the positive institution of Christ, constitute motives of credibility by which the Christian religion is shown to be divinely revealed and the one true religion. Moreover, sanctity comprehends miracles; unity is a true miracle in the moral order, for naturally it cannot happen that innumerable men dispersed throughout the world subject their intellect to one visible magisterium, constantly believing all things which it teaches; apostolicity and catholicity are recalled to the propagation and conservation of the Christian religion, no. 303, concerning which we treated in the second disputation. Hence the Vatican Council

(Constitution Dei Filius, chapter 3) said: "The Church by herself, namely, on account of her admirable propagation, eminent sanctity, and inexhaustible fruitfulness in all good things, on account of Catholic unity and unconquered stability, is a certain great and perpetual motive of credibility, and an irrefragable testimony of her divine legation. Whence it happens that she herself is like a sign lifted up among the nations," etc. 2) From the things disputed thus far, one perspicuous demonstration can be formed thus: either there is now no Church of Christ, or that Church is the Roman Church; but it cannot be said that the Church which Christ promised and willed to be indefectible no longer now exists; therefore the Roman Church is the true Church of Christ. For proving the major, it must be recalled that there is no sect in which the notes fit at least as well as they do in the Roman Church. This is the Church which at least comes nearer to the primitive Church, which, by the confession of all, was the true Church of Christ. She alone constantly appeals to ancient tradition, preserves the same principle of unity, is equally tenacious of unity and impatient of heresy and schism, has always been visible, and no occasion, time, place, or author of her defection can be assigned by the adversaries. The contrary altogether happens with all the other sects. 3) He who has once demonstrated the institution of the Primacy in Peter, and its perpetual duration in the Roman Pontiffs, Peter's successors, will now easily judge that the Roman Church is the true Church of Christ. For in the Roman Pontiff there is had the center of unity, and therefore apostolic succession, the principle of unity of faith, unity of religion, and the principle of formal catholicity. Hence deservedly St. Cyprian, no. 736, taught that an easy and compendious demonstration of the true Church of Christ is contained in that Primacy.

843. Thus far, considering the whole Body of the Church, we have looked into its intimate constitution, properties, and endowments; now we turn our study and investigation to the principal visible part of the visible Church, which is its Head. Bellarmine clearly expressed of how great moment an investigation of this kind is, when he wrote (preface to the book On the Supreme Pontiff): "What matter is being treated when the Primacy of the Pontiff is being treated? I shall say very briefly: the sum of the Christian matter. For this is asked: whether the Church ought to continue to stand longer, or whether rather she is to be dissolved and fall down. For what else is it to ask whether the foundation ought to be removed from a building, the shepherd from a flock, the commander from an army, the sun from the stars, the head from the body, than whether the building ought to fall, the flock to be scattered, the army to be routed, the stars to be obscured, the body to lie dead? Moreover the adversaries, that is, the heretics, although in almost all other dogmas they disagree no less among themselves than from us, nevertheless in this one they all agree, that with all their strength and with the highest exertion of mind they attack the See of the Roman Pontiff. There have never been any enemies of Christ and of the Church who have not at the same time waged war against this See."

844. Nor do the enemies of the Catholic Church now think otherwise. Among them Palmer (p. 7, On the Roman Pontiff, chapter 1, in Perrone) does not hesitate to assert: "The doctrine concerning the primacy of the Bishop of Rome over the universal Church is the hinge around which all the other controversies turn which grow hot between the Roman Church and the other churches; since if Christ the Lord instituted in the Catholic Church a primacy proper by office to some Bishop, which ought always to endure, and the Roman Bishop has inherited this primacy, it at once follows that the Catholic Church is restricted to the Church alone of Roman obedience, and that the councils, doctrine, and traditions of that Church have been sealed by the authority of the whole Christian world."

845. Hence the Vatican Council (Constitution Pastor Aeternus) says: "Since the gates of hell, in order to overthrow the Church if it could be done, rise up from every side day by day with greater hatred against its foundation divinely laid, We judge it necessary for the custody, safety, and increase of the Catholic flock, the sacred Council approving, to propose to all the faithful, as to be believed and held according to the ancient and constant faith of the universal Church, the doctrine concerning the institution, perpetuity, and nature of the sacred Apostolic Primacy, in which the strength and solidity of the whole

Church consists, and to proscribe and condemn contrary errors so pernicious to the Lord's flock."

846. Therefore, insisting on the safest way which the Council has opened for us, we shall treat first of the institution of the Primacy in Blessed Peter; then of its perpetual duration in the Roman Pontiffs, the successors of Blessed Peter; of its force and nature; and finally of its preeminent prerogative, which is placed in the infallible magisterium.

Disputation V — On the Visible Head of the Church

Article 1. Whether Christ Instituted in Blessed Peter the Primacy Over the Universal Church

847. The Vatican Council (the cited Constitution, chapter 1) 1) proposes the Catholic doctrine concerning the Primacy of Peter, saying: "Therefore we teach and declare, according to the testimonies of the Gospel, that the primacy of jurisdiction over the universal Church of God was promised and conferred immediately and directly upon Blessed Peter the Apostle by Christ the Lord." 2) It indicates the two principal testimonies of Sacred Scripture by which the doctrine concerning the Primacy is most clearly handed down. "For the Lord," it says, "spoke to Simon alone, to whom he had already said: Thou shalt be called Cephas, after he had issued his confession, saying: Thou art the Christ, the Son of the living God, in these solemn words: Blessed art thou, Simon Bar-Jona, because flesh and blood has not revealed this to thee, but my Father who is in heaven; and I say to thee, that thou art Peter, and upon this rock I will build my Church, and the gates of hell shall not prevail against it; and I will give to thee the keys of the kingdom of heaven; and whatsoever thou shalt bind upon earth shall be bound also in heaven; and whatsoever thou shalt loose upon earth shall be loosed also in heaven. And to Simon Peter alone Jesus conferred after his resurrection the jurisdiction of supreme pastor and ruler over his whole fold, saying: Feed my lambs; Feed my sheep." 3) It sets forth the errors opposed to this doctrine, adding: "To this so manifest doctrine of the sacred Scriptures, as it has always been understood by the Catholic Church, there are openly opposed the depraved opinions of those who, perverting the form of government constituted by Christ the Lord in his Church, deny that Peter alone, before the other Apostles, whether singly one by one or all together, was furnished by Christ with the true and proper primacy of jurisdiction; or who affirm that the same primacy was delivered immediately and directly not to Blessed Peter himself, but to the Church, and through her to him as minister of the Church herself." 4) Finally it expressly defines the truth, concluding: "If anyone therefore shall say that Blessed Peter the Apostle was not constituted by Christ the Lord prince of all the Apostles and visible head of the whole Church militant; or that the same received from the same our Lord Jesus Christ directly and immediately a primacy of honor only, but not of true and proper jurisdiction: let him be anathema."

848. To understand these things it will be enough to note a few matters. And first, a twofold Primacy can be distinguished: one of honor, the other of jurisdiction. The first is "preeminence, authority prescinded from, such as is usually competent to the first among equals in a college of equals." But the other is "a prerogative by which someone is constituted a true superior of others, and as having true power over them as over subjects to himself." Or, as Valentia says (tom. 3, disp. 1, q. 1, point 7, section 27): "By the name of Primacy of this kind we understand nothing other than such an authority to which all the faithful, in both forums, internal and external, ought to obey in those things which regard either morals, worship, or faith, that is, in the business of salvation." Let these things suffice for now, since below we must treat directly of the force and nature of the Primacy.

849. Although among the adversaries there are not lacking those who concede, or at least do not deny, that a certain primacy of honor was conferred on Peter, nevertheless all deny the Primacy of jurisdiction. Proposition 25 condemned in Luther is this: "The Roman Pontiff, the successor of Peter, is not the vicar of Christ over all the Churches of the whole world, instituted by Christ himself in Blessed Peter." But in Catholic doctrine each primacy must be asserted for Peter; yet there is no reason for us to linger in vindicating the primacy of honor. For from the primacy of jurisdiction the whole notion also of the primacy of honor in Peter arises, or rather this is contained in that; for he who has supreme jurisdiction over all, by that very fact holds before all the supreme place of honor and dignity.

850. But the denial of the institution of the primacy of jurisdiction in Blessed Peter does not have the same account among all. For to the Innovators, 1) it is a certain consequence of their whole system concerning the constitution of the Church. For since they denied the distinction by divine right between clerics and laity, the hierarchy of true name instituted in the clerical order, and consequently asserted that the form of government which flourishes in the Church is democratic, no. 518, it was necessary to deny the institution of the Primacy in Peter alone. 2) Others, although they seem to concede that authority was not immediately conferred on the whole faithful people, but on the Apostles, nevertheless contend that an equal power of ruling the Church was conferred by Jesus Christ on all the Apostles, without any prelation among them. Hence among the articles of Marsilius of Padua condemned by John XXII (Licet iuxta, 1327), the second is: "Blessed Peter was not more head of the Church than any of the other Apostles, nor did he have more authority than the other Apostles had: Christ left no head to the Church, nor did he make anyone his Vicar." 3) There was also another way of attacking the Primacy of Peter. For in 1645 there were published in France writings of certain Jansenists, in which several heads of depraved doctrine were handed down. Innocent X condemned the following propositions, excerpted from them for our matter, in the Congregation of the Inquisition, January 24, 1647: "The most Holy One judged and declared heretical this proposition: 'St. Peter and St. Paul are two princes of the Church, who make one'; or, 'They are two leaders and supreme commanders of the Catholic Church joined together in the highest unity'; or, 'They are the twin summit of the universal Church, who most divinely coalesced into one'; or, 'They are two supreme pastors and presidents of the Church, who constitute one head,' explained in such a way that it posits an equality in every respect between St. Peter and St. Paul, without subordination and subjection of St. Paul to St. Peter in the supreme power and government of the universal Church." 4) Finally not a few pseudo-Catholics attacked the Primacy, not indeed by denying its divine institution, but by saying that it was conferred immediately on the Church, by which it was, as it were, transferred to Peter, who would exercise the offices of the Primacy as the instrument of the Church herself. In this matter the first parts are owed to Edmund Richer, from whom, as from a common source, all the other haters of pontifical power enriched their own streams: Febronius, Dupin, the apostate de Dominis, Ricci, Tamburini, the Jansenists generally, the patrons of the liberties of the Gallican Church, and finally all those who even in our age do not fear to insist on their footsteps, no. 520 ff. A system of this kind, often condemned by the Church, as we have seen, when it was renewed by the Synod of Pistoia, was again condemned by Pius VI (Auctorem fidei, censure 2): "The proposition which establishes that 'the Roman Pontiff is the ministerial head,' so explained that the Roman Pontiff receives the power of ministry not from Christ in the person of Blessed Peter, but from the Church, by which, as successor of Peter, true vicar of Christ, and head of the whole Church, he has power in the universal Church. Heretical."

851. From these things we easily understand the whole breadth of the doctrine concerning the institution of the Primacy which the Vatican Council declared, and the contrary errors which it proscribed. Therefore, so that we may protect this part of the Constitution Pastor Aeternus integrally, we establish the following: Proposition XXXVII. 1. Just as from the words of Christ (Matt. 16) it is established that the Primacy of jurisdiction over the universal Church was promised to Blessed Peter, 2. so from the words of the same Christ (John 21) it is drawn out that it was conferred on Peter immediately and directly. Therefore they are altogether opposed to the manifest doctrine of the Scriptures who 3. deny that Peter alone, before the other Apostles, whether singly one by one or all together, was furnished by Christ with a true and proper primacy of jurisdiction; 4. or who affirm that the same primacy was delivered immediately and directly not to Blessed Peter himself, but to the Church, and through her to him as minister of the Church herself. Section II The Primacy of Peter Is Demonstrated from the Words of Matthew 16.

852. Therefore it is read (Matt. 16.13 ff.): "And Jesus came into the parts of Caesarea Philippi, and he was asking his disciples: Whom do men say the Son of man is? But they said: Some John the Baptist, and others Elijah, and others Jeremiah, or one of the prophets. Jesus says to them: But whom do you say that I am? Simon Peter answering said: Thou art the Christ, the Son of the living God. And

Jesus answering said to him: Blessed art thou, Simon Bar-Jona, because flesh and blood has not revealed this to thee, but my Father who is in heaven. And I say to thee: that thou art Peter, and upon this rock I will build my Church; and the gates of hell shall not prevail against it. And I will give to thee the keys of the kingdom of heaven; and whatsoever thou shalt bind upon earth shall be bound also in heaven, and whatsoever thou shalt loose upon earth shall be loosed also in heaven."

853. The argument which is formed from these words can be stated thus: the promise of Christ which these words contain regards Peter directly and immediately. But by those words Christ promises the primacy of jurisdiction over the universal Church. Therefore a primacy of jurisdiction of this kind was promised directly and immediately by Christ to Peter.

854. Before we prove the major and the minor, it will be useful to note two things. The first is this: since Christ spoke in the Chaldaic or Syriac language which the Jews then used, beyond doubt he employed the same word Kepha in both clauses: "Thou art Kepha, and upon this Kepha." This is confirmed from the words of Christ when Peter was first brought to him (John 1.42): "Thou art Simon the son of Jonah; thou shalt be called Cephas, which is interpreted Peter." And this was confessed, among other Protestants, also by Beza, who did not hesitate to write on this text of Matthew: "The Lord, speaking Syriac, used no paronomasia, but in each place said Cepha; just as also the vernacular name, Pierre, is said both of the proper name and of the appellative." But if you ask why the Latin interpreter did not translate, "Thou art rock, and upon this rock," the immediate answer is that he followed the Greek codex. But why did the Greek interpreter use words of diverse gender? The reason is that, although petros and petra signify the same thing, nevertheless the masculine termination is more fitting for a man; and therefore in the first clause petros is placed. But in the second clause the feminine gender is used, because although petros could also signify a stone or rock, in the whole of Scripture there is not even one example of its use; while the use of the word petra to signify a rock is very common. Thus Exodus 17.6; Exodus 33.21-22; Numbers 20.8, 10; Deuteronomy 8.15; 1 Kings 19.11; Isaiah 2.10; Matthew 7.24-25; Matthew 27.51, 60; and so forth. Compare Bellarmine (On the Roman Pontiff, book 1, chapter 10). Hence the remaining versions constantly have rock in both places; and from among these the Persian, in Walton, energetically renders: "And I say to thee: thou art the rock of my religion, and the foundation of my Church will be constructed upon thee, and the gates of hell shall not destroy it." Footnote 1. Others simply affirm this meaning of petros; compare Parkhurst under Kephas, Bloomfield on this place. But others deny it, as Liddell, who writes: "petros, a piece of a rock, a stone, and thus distinguished from petra." Footnote 1 ends.

855. The other thing which must be noted here is this: if it is a question of the whole text of Matthew cited above, what Bellarmine observes from Cajetan is verified (On the Roman Pontiff, book 1, chapter 12), namely, that Christ in the whole context designated the person of Peter in so many ways that notaries who draw up public instruments are accustomed to describe some definite man with no more circumstances. For he expressed the substance of the singular person by the pronoun to thee; then he added the name imposed in birth, when he said: "Blessed art thou, Simon." He joined the name of the father when he said: "Son of Jonah." Soon also he adds the name recently imposed by himself, adding: "I say to thee, that thou art Peter." But nothing is more absurd than such an accurate designation of the person, if nevertheless Christ did not really intend to designate the very person of Peter. Therefore the whole question is whether also these words, "upon this rock I will build my Church," are referred directly and immediately to Peter.

856. Now the major is proved: the promise of Christ regards Peter directly and immediately. This is clear 1) from the very form of speaking. For a) the whole discourse of Christ from beginning to end is directed to Peter, and Christ addresses no one other than Peter himself face to face: "... Jesus said to him: Blessed art thou... has not revealed to thee... I say to thee, that thou art Peter... to thee I will give the keys... whatsoever thou shalt bind... whatsoever thou shalt loose..." If therefore the words "this

rock," placed in the middle of the discourse, signified not Peter but another person or thing, this would have to be indicated in some way; otherwise the narration of the Evangelist would lead the reader into inevitable error. b) Especially since Christ said: "Thou art Kepha, and upon this Kepha," or, "Thou art rock, and upon this rock." For when the same name is used in two clauses immediately joined, it signifies the same object, whether a thing or a person, in each clause, unless a diverse supposition of the name can be drawn from the added words or from the character of the subject. Common usage of speaking requires this, and it is necessary lest one hearing or reading be led into error. c) But in the context there is a reason requiring identity of supposition for rock in both clauses. For the demonstrative pronoun is used: "and upon this rock." Now the pronoun this must necessarily be referred to that rock which was named most nearly; but the rock most nearly named is no other than the rock which is Peter: "Thou art Cephas, and upon this Cephas I will build my Church." Indeed, unless the pronoun this is referred to Peter just named, there is no subject in the whole preceding context to which it could be referred; for there is nothing in it which had been exhibited under the concept of rock, so that correlatively to it there could be added: "and upon this rock." Footnote 1 begins. Altogether marvelous is the invention of certain Protestants; namely, they say that Christ pointed his finger toward himself, and consequently, when he said "upon this rock," designated himself; just as, they say, when (John 2.19) he said: "Destroy this temple, and in three days I will raise it up." But 1) Protestants admit nothing which is not read in the Scriptures; where, therefore, is it said that Christ, saying "upon this rock," designated himself with his finger? 2) The example which they bring forward proves nothing, since before those words "destroy this temple" a material temple is not found to have been named by Christ, just as rock is found to have been named before the words "upon this rock." Moreover John at once warns the reader, saying: "But he spoke of the temple of his body"; why did Matthew omit a similar explanation? 3) The reasons which are brought forward in the argument positively and absolutely exclude the Protestant invention. 4) Finally the Protestants themselves acknowledged this. Thus Marsh (Comparative View, appendix, note D) says: "But though it was so easy to confute the arguments of the Romish writers on this subject," as will be seen below, "both the Lutheran and the Calvinist divines from the very commencement of the reformation had recourse to the uncritical expedient of torturing the words of our Saviour to a meaning which they cannot convey... The Lutheran and Calvinist divines saw no other expedient of confuting their adversaries than by asserting that the latter of the passage ['and upon this rock I will build my Church'] applied not to Peter at all... It seems a desperate undertaking to prove that our Saviour alluded to any other person than to St. Peter; for the words of the passage can indicate no one else." And Bloomfield, on this place, says that "almost every modern [Protestant] expositor of note" holds the Catholic interpretation; so Bloomfield himself, Kuinoel, Alford, Bengel, Rosenmuller, Whitby, Hammond, S. Clare, Schleusner, Parkhurst under Kephas, Stanley (Sermons and Essays on the Apostolic Age, p. 118), and so forth. Footnote 1 ends. 2) The same thing is drawn from those things which precede in the context. For if the promise of Christ does not regard Peter accepted in his own person, the sense of Christ's discourse here will be: "Blessed art thou, Simon Bar-Jona, because flesh and blood has not revealed to thee... And I say to thee": thou indeed hast been surnamed Cephas by me; but thou thyself wilt not be Cephas, or the Rock of the Church. I called thee Cephas, but another subject distinct from thee will be that upon which I will build my Church. Nothing more absurd than this discourse can be imagined. This is all the more so because here there is manifestly an allusion to the name Cephas imposed by Christ on Simon (John 1.42), and the mystery of that imposition is here revealed. For Peter did not have the name Cephas from birth; and therefore the words "Thou art Cephas" necessarily import: "Thou art by surname Cephas," or "thou wast surnamed Cephas by me." But when Christ adds: "And upon this Cephas I will build my Church," he openly reveals the reason why he imposed the name Cephas on Peter, and discloses the mystery of this deed done by himself. 3) The same thing is confirmed from those things which follow in the context. For he a) is called rock to whom soon it is said: "And to thee I will give the keys of the kingdom of heaven; and whatsoever thou shalt bind upon earth shall be bound also in heaven," etc. But all these things are said to Peter alone exclusively. Therefore. Indeed, as to the major, no one fails to see that the promise of the keys is closely joined with him who had antecedently

been designated as the rock of the Church, and is referred to the same one as by reason of consequence. But as to the minor, the promise of the keys is made to Peter; the personal pronoun to thee openly shows this, which can designate absolutely nothing except the person of Peter. The words "thou shalt bind and thou shalt loose" confirm the same thing; since they express individual and personal acts, they again can fit in the context only the person of Peter. b) The reason why Christ makes this promise to Peter before the others confirms the matter; for it is clear that that promise is a certain reward, which certainly is referred to him who set down the merit. For Peter alone had said: "Thou art the Christ, the Son of the living God"; and therefore Christ, as if repaying in turn, says: and I say to thee, that thou art Peter, and upon this rock, etc. Otherwise behold the sentence which would come forth from the words of Christ: Thou, Peter, hast celebrated the praise of my name; and I say to thee that thou art Peter, but I will not build my Church upon thee, but upon another rock!

857. The minor is proved: Christ promises the primacy of jurisdiction. This is clear 1) from the very words "upon this rock I will build my Church." For Christ, by changing the name of Simon into that of Kepha, or Peter, certainly wished to signify something; for it is foreign to a prudent man to change someone's name without a just cause. Hence whenever in the Scriptures a similar change or imposition of a name divinely made is reported, we understand that it was the symbol of some singular dignity. "It is God himself," says Chrysostom (Homily 18 on John), "who fittingly imposes names. He who called Abram Abraham, Sarai Sarah, and Jacob Israel. To many he imposed names from birth, such as Isaac and Samson, and those whom Isaiah and Hosea mention. For some he changed the appellation which they received from their parents, as for the aforesaid and for Jesus. It was also the ancient custom that names be imposed from things. Elijah also did this. But this is not done rashly, but so that that appellation be imposed which may be a perpetual monument of divine benefit, and the memory may be impressed upon the minds of hearers through the aforesaid names." See also St. Thomas, part 3, q. 37, article 2. Now the new name which Christ imposed on Simon was that of Kepha, which, as we have seen, does not signify any rock whatever, but a solid and unbreakable stone, indeed a cliff and stone upon which a building to be constructed may suitably rest. Hence Christ added: "upon this rock I will build my Church." This indeed corresponds to the idea which Scripture often employs concerning the Church, when it calls her a house which the Holy Spirit inhabits, whose faithful are stones, and which finally is God's building, no. 442. These things having been set down, behold the argument: Peter is in the Church what the foundation is in a building. But the office of the foundation is that in it and through it first and of itself the unity of the building be composed; for upon the foundation all the stones are gathered, and the individual parts from which the building coalesces, which, although they must also be joined mutually, nevertheless constitute one building insofar as they are built over only one foundation. Likewise the notion of foundation chiefly demands that from it the building borrow solidity and immobility; and therefore its conservation and unity chiefly depend upon the foundation. Therefore the office of Peter is that through him unity be had in the Church and be preserved, and through him there be had the firmness of the Church which is never dissolved. But this imports a primacy not of honor only, but of jurisdiction. For a) the Church, as we showed above, is a true and perfect society; therefore that gives unity and firmness to the Church which also gives them to any Society whatever. But that is authority. Therefore authority was conferred on Peter, upon whom the unity and firmness of the Church depends. b) Certainly the unity which Christ willed in the Church is both of faith and of government, as we also demonstrated above. But unity of government is had through subjection to one supreme authority; unity of faith through adherence to one authentic and infallible magisterium. Therefore to Peter, upon whom the unity of the Church depends, that supreme power was conferred which also includes an authentic magisterium. c) This is confirmed from the immediately following words, "and the gates of hell shall not prevail against it." By the gates of hell here are openly understood all the enemies of the Church. And that sentence, "the gates of hell shall not prevail against it," is certainly connected with the preceding words, "And upon this rock I will build my Church," unless we wish to say that those words were inserted by Christ

incongruously, apart from the matter being treated and without any connection. But it is the same whether that word it, "against it," is referred to the rock named a little before, or to the Church itself. For if you refer it to the rock, the sense will be that the gates of hell are not going to prevail against Peter, who is the rock of the Church. But if you refer the same to the Church, it is signified that the gates of hell are not going to prevail against the Church insofar as she is founded on Peter and borrows stability from him. For if she could have stability from herself, she would be taught in vain by Christ to be founded on Peter, or upon the rock. Hence: Peter was constituted in the Church so that through him the enemies would never prevail against her; or to Peter there was promised the office of invincibly defending the Church against all dangers and all enemies. But for this the primacy of jurisdiction is required. For in any society, in order that someone may be able to watch effectively over its safety and defend it unconquerably against all hostile attacks, it is necessary that he have the power to establish subordinate rulers Footnote 1 begins. Some have asserted, in Bloomfield on this place, that by the gates of hell is understood death, which they contend to confirm from those words (Isa. 38.10): "I said: In the midst of my days I shall go to the gates of hell"; and which therefore, they say, David calls the gates of death, saying (Ps. 9.15): "Who exaltest me from the gates of death." Hence the sense of Christ's promise would be that death is not going to prevail against the Church, because the faithful will rise gloriously. The whole account of the context and the scope of Christ's discourse openly exclude an interpretation of this kind, as is clear from what has been said. But it is useful to add that pylai hadou properly signifies the seat of souls after death, especially of the impious. This is shown very well by the illustrious Patrizi (On the Interpretation of Sacred Scripture, book 2, q. 10, article 3, section 1, argument 2). Hence the Protestants themselves admit our interpretation. Thus Rosenmuller says: "Which [my Church] no force, not even of the most powerful enemies, will destroy... Pylai hadou: tartarean powers, counsels, and efforts of demons, tyrants, and enemies of the Church. For pylai denotes such a gate where judgment or rule is held, the court of a prince, the power of ruling; whence the royal court of the Emperor of the Turks is called the Porte. But Hades is the underworld, Orcus, Tartarus, the whole republic of shades." Kuinoel holds the same thing (Commentary on the Historical Books of the New Testament, on this place), and Calvin himself (Commentary on the Harmony from the Three Evangelists). Footnote 1 ends. who are able to administer the society rightly, to bring those laws which are required for the good of the society, and to compel subjects to that which the defense of the society demands. But these things can be furnished only by him who obtains supreme authority. This indeed has place all the more in the Church, the more numerous, crafty, and hostile her enemies are; the greater the unity and firmness which is required in her; and the greater the necessity of preserving her unharmed even to the consummation of the age. 2) A new argument is taken from the added promise: "And to thee I will give the keys of the kingdom of heaven." First let it be noted that the kingdom of heaven, mention of which often occurs in the Scriptures, and which is also often called the kingdom of God, or simply the kingdom, is a spiritual and supernatural kingdom. Compare Patrizi, On the Gospels, book 3, dissertation 46. Moreover it is called the kingdom of heaven either by reason of its origin, compare John 18.36 and Apocalypse 21.2, or by reason of the seat of its king, or by reason of the term toward which it tends. Now this kingdom is the Church; but sometimes that appellation signifies the Church triumphant, more often the Church militant on earth, especially in the parables, and sometimes with an adequate signification it embraces both. But here the kingdom of heaven signifies that Church of which mention immediately precedes, "I will build my Church, and to thee I will give the keys of the kingdom of heaven," or the Church militant on earth, at least by direct signification. For it is a question of that Church in which to Peter is promised the power of binding and loosing, or jurisdiction; but Peter obtained this only over the Church militant on earth. For this reason almost all Protestant interpreters concede this, such as Schleusner, Rosenmuller, Kuinoel, Bloomfield, and others; and Robinson wrote ineptly when he said that here is signified the Church "as perfected in the future world." Compare what we said, nos. 440 and 747. These things having been set down, behold the argument: in the cited words there is contained the promise 1) of true power, 2) indeed of supreme power in the Church. But these words, as we said, regard Peter directly and immediately. Therefore supreme power, or the Primacy of jurisdiction over the Church, was promised to

Peter. The major is proved as to the first point: the conferral or handing over of keys is a sign of power. Hence in the time of the Hebrew monarchy the steward of the royal house carried the key on his shoulder as an insignia of power. For this reason (Isa. 22.22) we read concerning Eliakim, son of Hilkiah: "And I will give the key of the house of David upon his shoulder; and he shall open, and there shall be none who shuts; and he shall shut, and there shall be none who opens." Indeed also the supreme power of Christ (Apoc. 3.7) is designated by the same symbol of keys: "These things says the holy and true one, who has the key of David, who opens and no one shuts; shuts and no one opens." But although the use of symbols had greater force among the ancients, especially orientals, nevertheless traces of the symbol of the keys for signifying power remain even now. Hence one who is said to hold the keys of a city presides over the city; keys were accustomed to be offered to a king entering a city as a symbol of his supreme power. This use persevered even after cities, no longer enclosed by walls, did not have gates; the surrender of a besieged fortress also was completed by the handing over of keys. The major is proved as to the second point: the power of the keys is supreme in its order; but here the keys of the kingdom are promised to Peter. Therefore his power is royal, namely supreme. Hence if he shuts, no one opens, and vice versa; which certainly would be false if he had a superior power on earth upon which he depended. 3) Finally it is confirmed from the other words: "Whatsoever thou shalt bind," etc. For these words 1) import true legislative, judicial, and coercive power, nos. 766 and 772; 2) power universal with respect to object, "whatsoever thou shalt bind," etc.; 3) power universal with respect to persons, for it is power over the whole kingdom; and the Church, of which Peter is called the foundation, is the universal Church, as we have shown, no. 658; 4) independent power, and therefore supreme, as we also showed, no. 558.

858. The exegetical interpretation of the text of Matthew, evident of itself, can also be confirmed by the consensus of the Fathers. Indeed, if it is a question of that first promise, "upon this rock I will build my Church," which the Innovators especially attack, it is certain 1) that before the Arian heresy, the reason for this distinction between Fathers writing before and after Arianism will appear below, our interpretation was handed down from the Orientals by Firmilian, Bishop of Caesarea, in the letter to Cyprian; by Origen (on Exodus, tom. 5, p. 145; ed. Migne, tom. 2, p. 329), who calls Peter "that great foundation of the Church and most solid rock, upon which Christ founded the Church"; but that the Latins departed from them in no way is established among all, and St. Cyprian (letters 60-73) and Tertullian (On Prescription, chapter 22) testify lucidly. 2) After the Arian controversies, however, that the same interpretation flourished among the Greek Fathers is easily clear. For St. Epiphanius (Ancoratus, chapter 9) says that Peter is "first among the Apostles, that solid rock, upon which the Church of God was founded, and the gates of hell shall not prevail against it." St. Basil, speaking of Peter (on Isaiah, chapter 2, no. 66), says: "upon which Rock the Lord had promised that he would build his Church." St. Gregory Nazianzen (Oration 26) teaches that one of the disciples of Christ "was called rock of the sublime and exalted things and of those worthy of choice, and receives the foundations of the Church into his faith." St. John Chrysostom (on the passage I Saw the Lord, homily 4, no. 3) says that "Peter is the base of the Church, the foundation of faith, the leader of that choir, the mouth of all the apostles, the head of that family, prefect of the whole world, foundation of the Church, burning lover of Christ, first of the Apostles, foundation of the Church, prince of the company of the disciples, and leader of all." Cyril of Alexandria (on John 1.42) relates that Jesus did not wish Peter, coming to him, any longer "to be called Simon, claiming him for himself by his own power already then as his own; but by a fitting likeness it pleased him that he be called Peter from rock, namely, as the one upon whom he was going to found his Church"; and hence he calls him "prince of the most holy Apostles." 3) The Latin Fathers also have the same opinion. St. Hilary of Poitiers (Commentary on Matthew 16) exclaims: "O in the naming of a new name, happy foundation of the Church, and rock worthy of her building, which would dissolve the infernal laws and the gates of Tartarus and all the bars of death!" St. Jerome (letter to Damasus 57) calls Peter "prince of the Apostles; upon whom the Church is founded; who for that reason is chosen as one among the twelve, so that, the head having been constituted, the occasion of schism may be removed."

St. Ambrose (On Virginity, single book, chapter 16, etc.) describes Peter as "a wise and grave man, in whom there was the firmament of the Church and the magisterium of discipline." Pacian of Barcelona (letter 3 to Symphorian) relates that "the Lord spoke to Peter, to one, therefore, so that he might found unity from one." St. Leo the Great (to the metropolitan bishops through Illyricum, constitution, letter 5, chapter 2) writes: "And because our care is stretched out through all the churches, the Lord requiring this from us, who entrusted the primacy of his faith to the most blessed Apostle Peter as a reward, constituting the universal Church in the solidity of his foundation, we share the necessity of the solicitude which we have with those who are joined to us by the charity of the college." The Fathers gathered in the Synods of Ephesus and Chalcedon pronounced this same thing. 4) Finally St. Augustine himself, who sometimes, as we shall soon see, indicated another interpretation, in many places interpreted Peter as being called by Christ the rock and foundation of the Church. Thus in the sermon On the Chair of Peter (15, On the Saints) he says: "The Lord named Peter the foundation of the Church, and therefore the Church fittingly honors this foundation, upon which the height of the ecclesiastical building rises." Likewise (on Psalm 69): "Peter had confessed Christ as the Son of God, and in that confession he had been called the rock, upon which the Church would be built." Likewise (Tractate 11 on John): "Peter, that rock, answered with the voice of all: Lord, to whom shall we go?" But concerning the very principate which Peter had in the Church, and which is usually signified metaphorically by the word rock, head, foundation, gatekeeper of heaven, St. Augustine never doubted in any way. Wherefore (Tractate 56 on John) he writes: "Who does not know that the most blessed Peter is first of all the Apostles?" Likewise (Question 75 from the New Testament): "The Lord constituted him," he says, "to be their head, so that he might be shepherd of the Lord's flock." Likewise (first exposition on Psalm 108): "He had the Primacy among the disciples." Likewise (book 2, On Baptism against the Donatists, chapter 1): "Who does not know that that principate of the Apostolate of Peter is to be preferred to any episcopate?"

859. But if the discourse is about the other promise, "To thee I will give the keys," etc., the Fathers unanimously interpret it as we do. Compare, if you like, their testimonies in Schrader (On Roman Unity, part 1, nos. 174-184). You will also find many testimonies of the Fathers for each promise in Valentia (tom. 3, disp. 1, q. 1, point 7, section 28) and in Bellarmine (On the Roman Pontiff, book 1, chapters 10 and 12). Recall also the testimonies which we gave at no. 547. Section III The Difficulties Against the Argument Brought Forward Are Satisfied.

860. You will say, I: The Apostle (1 Cor. 3.11) says: "No one can lay another foundation besides that which has been laid, which is Christ Jesus." Hence: the Church cannot have another foundation of herself besides Christ. Therefore if in Matthew 16 by the name of rock the foundation of the Church is designated, no one other than Christ can be understood by it. I answer by distinguishing the antecedent. The Church cannot have another foundation of herself besides Christ that is primary and unparticipated, I concede; secondary and participated, such as Peter is, I deny. That Paul speaks only in the former sense is clear: 1) from the fact that Paul himself (Eph. 2.20) says that the Church is built "upon the foundation of the Apostles and Prophets." Therefore, according to the Apostle, Christ is not the foundation in such a way that he excludes any other whatever. 2) Hence the Apostle himself in this place, to the Ephesians, distinguishes the primary foundation, which is Christ, from the secondary, which is the Apostles; for he adds: "Christ Jesus himself being the chief cornerstone." 3) The purpose of the Apostle confirms the same thing, who in the place objected, to the Corinthians, reproves those ministers of the Gospel who, seeking vain glory under the appearance of a certain loftier preaching, were trying to diminish Paul's authority among the Corinthians. Answering these, the Apostle says that they can build in various ways upon the foundation once laid by himself among the Corinthians, but by no means can they furnish what he had done, namely, lay a new foundation. He gives this reason for the matter: that no other Christ is to be preached besides him whom he himself had preached, nor another faith, another hope, another charity: "As a wise architect I have laid the foundation; but another builds upon it. But let each one see how he builds upon it. For another foundation," etc.

861. You will say, II: Even among the Fathers there are various interpretations of that rock, "upon this rock": for some understand by that rock Christ, others the faith of Peter, others the confession of faith, others Peter. But especially St. Augustine, who more than once had interpreted the rock of Christ, recalling this interpretation (Retractations, book 1, chapter 2), leaves it to the choice of the reader. Therefore. I answer 1) indirectly. The Innovators cannot argue thus against us from their principles, since they reject tradition and interpret Scripture according to the rules of exegesis. Nor can they argue thus against the man; for although we Catholics hold that Scripture is to be understood according to the unanimous consensus of the Fathers, nevertheless we do not say that this consensus is the only means of interpreting Scripture. Wherefore, if in the case such a consensus were lacking, which we altogether deny, by that very fact another means of interpretation would have to be employed. But it is established that the interpretation which we have given is exact according to all the rules of exegesis. I answer 2) generally, by distinguishing the antecedent. The Fathers understand that rock of someone other than Peter in the proper, immediate, and literal sense, I deny; in a less proper, mediate sense, and sometimes by accommodation, I subdistinguish; so that they exclude the primary interpretation, I deny; so that they suppose it, I concede. The same Fathers who seem to understand that rock otherwise, elsewhere, as we have seen, themselves hand down the interpretation given by us. This general answer is confirmed by considering the individual interpretations objected. Hence: I answer 3) with respect to the interpretation concerning faith or the confession of faith, by distinguishing the antecedent. The Fathers hand down this interpretation metonymically and without excluding the proper sense, I concede; otherwise, I deny. By common usage that Metonymy is very well approved by which the name of some quality, whether good or bad, is used for the person in whom that quality is distinguished. Thus, if a prince by his wisdom were to save the republic from the greatest dangers, we would say that the wisdom of the prince saved the republic. It is established that the same usage flourished among the ancients. Hence Cicero, against Verres, says: "What things luxury in outrages, cruelty in punishments, avarice in insults could have effected"; where luxury, cruelty, and avarice are taken for the luxurious, the cruel, and the avaricious man. Nor does Scripture itself refuse this usage; for it is said (1 John 5.4 ff.): "This is the victory which overcomes the world, our faith. Who is he who overcomes the world, except he who believes that Jesus is the Son of God?" I answer 4) with respect to the interpretation concerning Christ, by distinguishing the antecedent. The Fathers by the name Rock understood Christ as the principal and meritorious rock of the firmness of the secondary rock, I concede; to the exclusion of the secondary rock, namely Peter, who is made firm in the principal rock, I deny. Namely, through an interpretation of this kind the Fathers signified that Christ alone is the principal rock of the Church, according to that saying of Paul (1 Cor. 3.11): "No one can lay another foundation besides that which has been laid, which is Christ Jesus." But they by no means deny that Peter is the secondary rock founded in Christ, just as we have seen the exegetical interpretation of the text of Matthew demand. I answer 5) with respect to St. Augustine understanding the rock of Christ: a) he brought forward that interpretation as his private opinion, and in no way as the common tradition or faith of the Church. This is clear both from the fact that he himself testifies that it was not the common interpretation, and also from the fact that elsewhere he made his own the interpretation which truly is common, and finally from those things which he says in his Retractations. For if the interpretation concerning Christ had been in the common faith of the Church, he would not have left it to the choice of readers. b) St. Augustine seems to have come into that interpretation from ignorance of the Hebrew language. For the holy Doctor writes (book 1 of the Retractations, chapter 21): "In that book [against the letter of Donatus] I said in a certain place concerning the Apostle Peter that the Church was founded upon him as upon a rock; which sense is also sung by the mouth of many in the verses of most blessed Ambrose, where he says concerning the cock, 'At this, the rock itself of the Church singing, washed away the fault...' But I know that afterward I very often explained thus what was said by the Lord: 'Thou art Peter, and upon this rock I will build my Church,' so that he whom Peter confessed should be understood, saying, 'Thou art the Christ, the Son of the living God'; and as if Peter, named from this rock, bore the person of the Church, which is built upon this rock and received the keys of the kingdom of heaven. For it was not said to him, Thou art rock; but, 'Thou art Peter.' But the

rock was Christ, whom Simon confessed, just as the whole Church confesses him, and he was called Peter. Of these two opinions, let the reader choose which is more probable." Footnote 1 begins. Wherefore one can conclude with Schrader (On Roman Unity, part 1, no. 180, note 6), who, having reported those four interpretations, adds: "It must be observed that all these four interpretations together express the adequate and fullest meaning of Christ's words; and therefore one neither excludes the other, nor is excluded by the other, but rather all are together required. Certainly the first is required in the immediate literal sense. The second is required, since neither is Peter the rock of the Church from himself and as principal, nor can the Church of Christ be conceived without Christ as its foundation from himself and as principal. The third is required, since from the connection with the preceding things it is understood that the cause on account of which Peter was designated the rock of the Church was his faith, and therefore Peter as having faith is the rock of the Church; as if Christ had said, through faith thou art rock, or even thy faith is the rock upon which I will build my Church. The fourth is required, since the faith of Peter was not completed by an internal act of faith, but was a public profession of faith in Christ the Son of the living God. Therefore, emitting this, Peter was constituted the rock of the Church. If therefore whatever Christ's words signify, both immediately and mediately, both directly and indirectly, both absolutely and relatively, are taken together, their whole and full and adequate sentence comes forth." Footnote 1 ends.

862. You will say, III: The power of binding and loosing which is promised to Peter is the same as the power which is handed over to the other Apostles (John 20.23). But this is the power of remitting or retaining sins. Therefore through the power of binding and loosing the Primacy of jurisdiction is not promised. I answer. The power of remitting or retaining sins is indeed included in the power of binding and loosing; but the latter is not restricted to the former alone, and therefore it is the same with it only inadequately. In reality, 1) the words of Matthew are most universal, "whatsoever thou shalt bind"; the words of John expressly signify a definite matter, "whose sins you shall forgive." 2) Hence in each text the order is inverted; for in Matthew the power of binding, to which the power of retaining corresponds inadequately, is placed first; but in John the power of remitting, which inadequately corresponds to the power of loosing, is placed first. For the power of ruling is primarily and chiefly ordered to coercing the liberty of men by laws, precepts, and penalties, that is, to binding. But the power of remitting and retaining sins is primarily and chiefly, indeed altogether ultimately, ordered to the extinction of sin, that is, to remitting. 3) The preceding words, "upon this rock I will build my Church," and "To thee I will give the keys of the kingdom of heaven," do not allow the power of binding and loosing to be restricted to the remission of sins alone. 4) Finally, always when in Scripture mention is made of the remission of sins, either the word "sin" is used or something else is employed indicating that the question concerns sin. But in the whole context of Matthew 16 neither is the word "sin" used, nor is anything else placed by which sin is in any way signified.

863. You will say, IV: If by the words of Christ (Matt. 16) there had been signified the primacy of jurisdiction promised to Peter, the Apostles would have understood this. But they by no means understood it, since they disputed among themselves who of them would have the primacy. Therefore. I answer 1) Those very contentions of the Apostles sufficiently show that they in some way knew that some primacy was to be constituted. For it was not disputed among them whether there would be some primacy, but "which of them was greater," or who would obtain it. Hence St. Jerome (on Matt. 17.1) writes: "Because they had seen the same tribute paid for Peter and the Lord, from the equality of the price, they thought that Peter had been preferred to all the Apostles, who in the payment of the tribute had been compared to the Lord; therefore they ask who is greater in the kingdom of heaven." I answer 2) by distinguishing the major. The Apostles would have understood this after receiving the Holy Spirit, I concede; at the time when Christ made that promise, I deny. It is certain that Christ more than once rebuked the Apostles, saying: "Are you also still without understanding?" (Matt. 15.16); "Why do you not understand?" (Matt. 16.11), etc. Especially when it was a question of the Passion of Christ, it is said of the Apostles (Luke 9.45): "But they did not understand this word"; and (Luke 18.34): "And they understood none of these things." Yet from this it is not

inferred that Christ did not predict, and indeed often and clearly, his Passion. Hence St. John Chrysostom (on Matthew, homily 65, otherwise 66, no. 2) says: "Let no one be disturbed, seeing the Apostles so imperfect. For the cross had not yet come, the grace of the Spirit had not yet been given. But if you wish to learn their virtue, consider them after these things, and you will see them superior to every disease of soul. For he reveals their imperfections for this reason, that afterward you may know what sort of men they became from grace. That therefore they were seeking nothing spiritual, nor had any knowledge of the heavenly kingdom, is clear from here, verse 22... But they wished, as I think, because they had heard, 'You shall sit upon twelve thrones' (Matt. 19.28), to obtain the first seat. Moreover they knew that they preceded others; but they feared Peter, and they say: 'Say that one may sit,'" etc. And no. 4: "Do you see how imperfect they all were, both these who were trying to precede the ten, and those ten who envied the two? But, as I said, show them to me after these things, and you will see them empty of all these passions. Hear how this same John, who now approached for this cause, always yields first places to Peter, both when he is preaching and when he is performing miracles in the Acts of the Apostles."

864. You will say, V: To bind and to loose properly signifies to declare something illicit or licit, as is established from the Talmudic Writers, among whom the Rabbis bind and loose according as they teach that something is illicit or licit. But a faculty of this kind does not import the Primacy of jurisdiction. Therefore. I answer by distinguishing the major. To bind and to loose sometimes, as for the Rabbis in the Talmud, signifies to declare, etc., I concede; always, and by name in the text about which we are treating, I deny. Therefore we confess that those words bind and loose are taken in the Talmud in the sense objected; but from this it is not proved that this sense is exclusive. Indeed, it is positively established that this sense is not exclusive; for the Greek words employed by the interpreter of Matthew, according to the testimony of Diodorus Siculus, and the Hebrew or Chaldaic words, according to the testimony of Josephus, have a broader signification. Certainly when the power of binding and loosing is asserted of the same subject concerning whom immediately before the power of the keys is asserted, that power cannot be restricted to declaring the illicit and the licit. Hence the maimed interpretation of the Protestants was unknown to all antiquity. Besides, I scarcely understand what the Protestants would gain by this new interpretation of theirs. For even if it were granted, the Primacy of jurisdiction would be sufficiently proved from the preceding parts of the text of Matthew; and elsewhere, if the power of teaching, or of declaring what is licit or illicit, was conceded to Peter, then in this let them obey Peter. Several objections were forestalled in the demonstration itself, or exposition of the argument; others pertain to the following parts of the same thesis, and therefore we shall weigh them below. Section IV The Primacy of Peter Is Demonstrated from John 21.

865. It is read in John (21.15 ff.): "When therefore they had dined, Jesus says to Simon Peter: Simon of John, lovest thou me more than these? He says to him: Yes, Lord, thou knowest that I love thee. He says to him: feed my lambs. He says to him again: Simon of John, lovest thou me? He says to him: Yes, Lord, thou knowest that I love thee. He says to him: shepherd my lambs. He says to him the third time: Simon of John, lovest thou me? Peter was saddened because he said to him the third time, Lovest thou me? And he said to him: Lord, thou knowest all things; thou knowest that I love thee. He said to him: feed my sheep."

866. From these things we argue thus: the office of feeding, concerning which Christ treats in the cited testimony, regards Peter alone, and is imposed on him alone. But that office is nothing other than the Primacy of jurisdiction over the universal Church. Therefore that Primacy was conferred on Peter alone.

867. The major is proved: the office of feeding here regards Peter alone. And indeed 1) from the name "Simon of John," which is proper to Peter. Nor without a mystery, as Bellarmine rightly notes, does Christ call Peter by the same name both when he promises him the keys (Matt. 16) and when he commits the sheep to be fed, John last chapter: namely, so that we might understand that that very

thing is given in reality which had been promised, and that it is given to that same Simon to whom it had before been promised. 2) From those words "Lovest thou me more than these?" For it is said, "Feed my sheep," to him to whom it is said: "Lovest thou me more than these?" But this is said to Peter alone. For the others are excluded by the express words in that comparison "more than these." But the others who are excluded are not just any men, but chiefly the Apostles. For at that time there were present there with Peter Nathanael, whom many think to be Bartholomew, James, John, Thomas, and two other disciples, one of whom it is credible was Andrew. Therefore it is said not to all the Apostles, but to Peter alone: "Feed my sheep." Nor is it an obstacle that Christ asked from Peter what Peter did not know. For Peter, not knowing whether he loved Christ more than the other Apostles, humbly responded: "Thou knowest, Lord, that I love thee." But Christ did not interrogate in order that he might learn from Peter the preeminence of his love, but so that he might teach the others what degree of love he demanded in Peter: "The Lord," says St. Ambrose (book 10, no. 175), "interrogates not so that he might learn, but so that he might teach whom, about to be raised into heaven, he was leaving to us as the Vicar of his love." 3) From the threefold interrogation. For, according to Cyril, St. Augustine, and others on this place, Peter was interrogated three times whether he loved more than the others because he had denied three times. But the threefold denial pertains only to Peter. Therefore Peter alone is interrogated, and consequently to him alone it is said: "Feed my sheep." 4) From those words: "Peter was saddened," etc. For, as St. John Chrysostom notes, Peter was saddened for this reason, because he feared lest perhaps he was mistaken when he answered: "Thou knowest, Lord, that I love thee"; just as he had been mistaken when he said: "Even if it should be necessary for me to die with thee, I will not deny thee." But that cause of sadness is proper to Peter alone, who had denied the Lord. Therefore, just as Peter alone was saddened, so Christ addresses Peter alone when he says: "Feed my sheep." 5) From the words immediately following, verses 18 ff.: "When thou shalt be old, thou shalt stretch out thy hand," etc. For it is said, "Feed," to him to whom crucifixion is predicted; but by these words death on a cross is predicted to Peter alone. Compare Bellarmine, On the Roman Pontiff, book 1, chapter 14.

868. The minor of the proposed argument is resolved into two parts: 1) the words of Christ express the Primacy of jurisdiction; 2) over the universal Church. The first part is proved: 1) From the very force of the word. For, as is clear from the text already recited, Christ the Lord used a twofold verb, boske and poimaine; and although the first does not have so broad and noble a signification as the other, nevertheless when they are used in the same discourse, concerning the same subject and object, they are rightly held as synonyms. Certainly, since the verb poimainein also has been employed, whatever it imports must be retained. Now the same verb with something added signifies the authority of the magisterium, as, for example (Jer. 3.15): "And I will give you pastors according to my heart, and they shall feed you with knowledge and doctrine." But without something added it signifies the authority of ruling. Hence the Ruler of men is called Shepherd, and to feed is taken for to rule with command. This is established a) from the usage of the Scriptures; for, to bring forward some examples, it is said (2 Sam. 5.1 ff.): "And all the tribes of Israel came to David in Hebron, saying... When Saul was king over us, thou wast leading out and leading back Israel; but the Lord said to thee: Thou shalt shepherd my people Israel, and thou shalt be leader over Israel." And (Ps. 48.14): "This is our God forever and ever; he will rule us forever." And (Ps. 80.1): "Thou who rulest Israel, attend: thou who leadest Joseph like a sheep." And (Isa. 40.10-11): "Behold the Lord God will come in strength, and his arm shall rule... Like a shepherd he shall feed his flock." And (Ezek. 34.23-24): "I shall raise up over them one shepherd, who shall feed them, my servant David, who shall feed them... David shall be prince in their midst." And Micah (5.2, 4): "And thou Bethlehem Ephrathah art little among the thousands of Judah: from thee shall go forth for me one who shall be ruler in Israel... and he shall feed in the strength of the Lord." And Matthew (2.6): "And thou Bethlehem, land of Judah, art by no means least among the princes of Judah: for from thee shall come forth a leader, who shall rule my people Israel." And Apocalypse 12.5 and 19.15: "And she brought forth a male child who was to rule all nations with an iron rod." 2) It is also established from the usage of profane writers. One can see what Homer has concerning

Agamemnon (Iliad 2.243), concerning Menelaus (5.566), concerning Achilles (16.2), concerning Hector (14.423); but in Hesychius poimen is explained as basileus. 3) Bellarmine also explains the origin of this metaphor, whose use is so universal; for he notes that among the ancient Orientals, princes of tribes exercised the office of shepherds of sheep, concerning which matter examples are also had in Genesis. Footnote 1. "This term," says Arnold (Fragment of the Church, etc., p. 26), "of feeding as a shepherd feeds his flock is one of the oldest and most universal metaphors to express a supreme and at the same time a beneficent government." Footnote 1 ends. These things having been set down, 1) anyone understands that Christ said to Peter, rule with command my lambs and my sheep, when he said to him, Feed; and therefore that he conferred on him the Primacy of jurisdiction. This indeed can be confirmed by insisting on the word Feed. For a) he is not said to feed others who in any way supplies food, but he who, placed over a family, city, or Kingdom, by office procures and provides food, according to that saying (Luke 12.42): "Who, thinkest thou, is the faithful and prudent steward whom the Lord has constituted over his family, that he may give them their measure of wheat in due time?" b) Nor is it only the shepherd's office to procure food for the sheep, but also to lead them, bring them back, protect them, rule them, and chastise them; all of which, when they regard men, import true preeminence and jurisdiction. Compare what is contained in John 10, Jeremiah 23, and Ezekiel 34, where the offices of a shepherd are described. 2) The same thing can be confirmed by comparing at once the text of Matthew and that of John. For on the one hand we have seen that in Matthew Christ promised to Peter the primacy of jurisdiction; but the promise, as regarding an essential good of the Church, which Christ willed absolutely, was itself absolute. Therefore Christ had to fulfill it at some time. But there is no place in Scripture, besides that place in John which we are weighing, where that promise is better understood to have been fulfilled. Therefore in those words, Feed my lambs... Feed my sheep, Christ conferred on Peter the Primacy of jurisdiction. And conversely one may argue thus: Christ conferred on Peter in John what he had promised in Matthew; but he had promised the primacy of jurisdiction, as has been proved; therefore he conferred this primacy. Therefore certain persons have devised in vain that Christ only exhorted Peter to show his love by feeding the lambs and sheep. For if that word Feed imports Rule with command, Christ could not exhort Peter to feed his flock without conferring on him that command, or power.

869. The minor is proved with respect to the second part. Christ conferred on Peter jurisdiction over the universal Church. Let it be noted: 1) it matters little whether once one ought to read little sheep rather than sheep, as we noted in the text; for it always remains true that Christ committed to Peter the lambs and sheep to be fed. 2) By lambs and sheep the faithful are certainly understood. Hence Christ was foretold by the Prophets as Shepherd, he himself called himself the Shepherd who has sheep, for whom he gave his life; finally the Apostle calls the assembly of the faithful a flock, in which the Holy Spirit placed a Bishop to rule it. 3) But what is the true signification of that distinction of the faithful into lambs and sheep? Some understand Jews and Gentiles; others the perfect and imperfect; finally others, more commonly, the simple faithful and the Pastors. "First lambs," says Bruno of Asti, on this place, Migne, vol. 165; "then he committed sheep to him, because he constituted him not only shepherd, but shepherd of shepherds. Therefore Peter feeds lambs, and he feeds sheep; he feeds sons, and he feeds mothers; he rules both subjects and prelates. Therefore he is shepherd of all, because besides lambs and sheep there is nothing in the Church." Hence: 1) Christ committed to Peter the lambs and sheep to be fed or ruled. But by lambs and sheep, whether Jews and Gentiles are understood, or the perfect and imperfect, or the faithful and pastors, the whole flock of Christ is always signified, or the universal Church. Therefore Christ conferred on Peter primacy over the universal Church. 2) In reality Christ did not say simply, "feed lambs... feed sheep," but "feed my lambs... feed my sheep..." Therefore Christ committed to Peter to be fed those who are lambs or sheep of Christ. But whoever are in the Church are certainly lambs or sheep of Christ. Therefore Christ conferred on Peter the Primacy over the universal Church. Certainly those words "feed my lambs... feed my sheep" are equivalent to this: rule my fold. But the fold of Christ is one, and comprehends all the faithful. 3) As Bellarmine argues, loc. cit., chapter 16, when the Lord says, "Feed my sheep," either he commended to Peter all his sheep, or

none, or certain and definite sheep, or some indefinite sheep. But no one will say that none or certain sheep were commended. For this is manifestly false. Nor even some indefinite sheep, because it does not belong to a wise provider to leave care indefinite when he can define it, especially since certain confusion and disturbance would arise from that indetermination. Besides, to commend some and not indicate which seems to be the same as if none were commended. For which, I ask, will he feed who does not know his flock? It remains, therefore, that Christ assigned absolutely all his sheep to Peter to be fed.

870. This exegetical interpretation of the text is confirmed by the tradition of the Fathers. Thus Origen (on the Epistle to the Romans, chapter 6) says: "When to Peter the sum of affairs concerning feeding the sheep was being handed over, and the Church was being founded upon him as upon a rock, the confession of no other virtue was required from him except charity." St. Ambrose (book 10 on Luke, at chapter 24) says: "The Lord did not doubt, who was interrogating not that he might learn, but that he might teach whom, about to be lifted into heaven, he was leaving to us as the vicar, as it were, of his love... because he alone professes from all, he is preferred to all... The third time the Lord asked, no longer Lovest thou me? but Dost thou love me? and now he is commanded to feed, not lambs, as though to be fed with a certain first milk, nor little sheep, as the second time, but sheep, so that, being more perfect, he might govern the more perfect." Gregory the Great (book 4, letter 32, to the Emperor Maurice) says: "It is clear to all who know the Gospel that by the Lord's voice the care of the whole Church was committed to Peter, the most blessed prince of all the Apostles." Epiphanius (in Ancoratus): "This is he who heard: feed my sheep, to whom the fold was entrusted." Chrysostom, on this place: "The others having been omitted, he addresses Peter alone; he commits to him the care of the brethren." And below: "For when the Lord had communicated great things to Peter, and had entrusted to him the care of the whole world," etc. Theophylact (on the last chapter of John) says: "When the meal had ended, he was commending to Peter the prefecture of the sheep of the whole world; but he handed it over not to another, but to this man." And on Luke chapter 22, he says: "Thou, Peter, having been converted, wilt be a good example of repentance to all, who, although thou hast been an Apostle and hast denied, wilt again receive the primacy of all and the prefecture of the world." Leo (sermon 3, on the anniversary of his assumption): "From the whole world Peter alone is chosen, who is set over both the calling of all nations and all the Apostles and all the Fathers of the Church; so that although in the people of God there are many priests and many pastors, nevertheless Peter rules all whom Christ principally rules." Finally, lest I be excessive, St. Bernard (book 2, On Consideration, chapter 8) thus excellently discusses those words of Christ: "Feed my sheep. Which? The peoples of this or that city, or region, or certain kingdom? My sheep, he says. To whom is it not plain that he did not designate some, but assigned all? Nothing is excepted where nothing is distinguished." Compare the whole text which we gave, no. 548. Footnote 1 begins. Wherefore if certain Fathers sometimes seem to understand the words which we have weighed not of Peter alone, but also of the other Apostles, indeed of Bishops and Priests, they then take those words in a sense not formal and precisive, but extensive, not excluding that sense, but supposing it. Hence Schrader deservedly says, loc. cit., no. 212: "According to the literal sense of the Scriptures, from the common opinion of the Fathers, Christ conferred on Peter and on him alone, immediately and directly, all the power which is read as expressed especially in the places narrated in Matthew and John; and by this power being received Peter is and is called truly and properly the leader of the Apostles. But if power is said to have been conferred on all priests in Peter, then indeed a) this must not be taken so that Peter's prerogative is taken away from him; but b) it must be taken so that Peter's prerogative is supposed. And therefore it must be taken so that Peter is considered as a paradeigma of the others, and as, so they say, the highest juridical person, who, just as in himself, no otherwise than the prince or head of a society or of some body, possesses the summit of all power, so plainly as a typical and juridical person can represent the others. Wherefore if the words of Christ, both in Matthew and in John, are said to be referred also in this typical, juridical, and likewise mediate sense to all the Apostles and priests, they involve a manifest confirmation by which Peter's highest authority and prerogative is asserted." Footnote 1 ends. Section V It Is Expressly Shown That Peter

Obtained the Primacy Over the Apostles Themselves.

871. Although from the arguments set out thus far Peter's preeminence before the Apostles themselves is openly clear, nevertheless it will be useful to demonstrate this more expressly, both for overthrowing special errors and also so that there may be a place for the solution of certain difficulties. But since some have said that all the Apostles, others that at least St. Paul, were altogether equal to Peter, nos. 850 ff., we shall first give arguments by which Peter's Primacy with respect to all the Apostles is established; then we shall add something by which it is established more directly with respect to Paul himself.

872. Therefore Peter had the Primacy over all the Apostles. Proof I, by briefly recalling the arguments explained above. For 1) Peter was constituted the foundation of the whole Church, from which the Church receives firmness and unity; but this, as we have shown, imports supreme power over the universal Church. But the Apostles themselves most of all belonged to the Church. Therefore Peter was constituted over the Apostles themselves. Moreover, if the Apostles had had no dependence on Peter, they could have founded Churches without subjecting them to Peter's authority. But then what would have become of that unity of the Church which Christ willed? How would Peter be called the foundation of the whole Church? 2) Christ committed to Peter alone all the lambs and all the sheep to be fed, all who pertain to Christ's fold. But the Apostles themselves were sheep of Christ. Therefore Peter was constituted over the Apostles themselves. 3) If several are set over some matter to be done equally, it is not the office of the individuals, but of all, to carry out that matter; just as, for example, if the power of making laws is conceded to some assembly, let us say of senators, individuals do not have the power of making laws, but all or the majority, or the assembly itself. Therefore by equal reasoning, if some one person, by a singular mandate, is set over the same work by himself and separately, to him is entrusted the full and supreme office of executing that work. Imagine that one man, by singular mandate, is constituted leader of the whole army in which there are other leaders; it is plain that he is the leader of the whole army, and that he has in himself the fullness of authority, and indeed over the leaders themselves. Since therefore Christ chose one Peter from the twelve Apostles, constituted him the foundation of the whole Church, and gave him the keys of the kingdom of heaven, it is evident that Peter was constituted over all. Compare Veith, On the Roman Pontiff, section 9.

873. II. With these things presupposed, the following observations have their whole force of proving; with these things presupposed, I say, for if those observations, inspected in themselves, did not clearly and apodictically show the Primacy of Peter, nevertheless, considered with the preceding arguments with which they harmoniously cohere, they borrow light from them. Therefore: 1) let the four catalogues of the names of the Apostles be read (Matt. 10.2 ff.; Mark 3.16 ff.; Luke 6.14 ff.; Acts 1.13). Now a) in each Peter is named in the first place; the cause of this was not vocation, since Andrew was called earlier; nor age, for how would it be shown that Peter was older than Andrew? why would John be placed in the fourth or even the second place? nor favor or grace, by which John surpassed Peter. b) Peter is always placed in the first place; and in naming the others, if you except Philip, who is always named sixth, and James of Alphaeus, who is always named ninth, the same order is not always preserved. Andrew, for example, who holds the second place in Matthew and Luke, is named in the fourth place in Mark and Acts. c) In the list of names in Matthew, and in certain manuscripts in Mark, Peter is not only named in the first place, but is increased with the title of Primacy: "But the names of the twelve Apostles are these: First Simon, who is called Peter, and Andrew his brother, James of Zebedee and John his brother," etc. Now if that First had been used only as a numerical adjective, the sequence of speech ought to have been this: "First Simon, second Andrew, third James," etc. Since, therefore, only of Peter is it said first, without second, third, etc., being placed, it is a sign that that first signifies Peter's dignity above the rest. This seems to be confirmed from the usage of Scripture; for it is said (Matt. 20.27): "Whoever wishes to be first among you"; and (Mark 12.28 ff.): "the first commandment of all"; and (Acts 16.12) "the first city of that part of Macedonia"; and

(Acts 28.7): "Now in those places there were estates of the chief man of the island." 2) Not only in those lists of the names of the Apostles, but everywhere Peter, when named with others, is placed in the first place. Thus (Matt. 4.18): "Simon, who is called Peter, and Andrew his brother"; (Matt. 17.1; Mark 5.37; Mark 9.2; Mark 13.3; Mark 14.33; Luke 8.51; Luke 9.28; Matt. 26.37): "Peter and James and John"; and (Luke 22.8; Acts 3.1): "Peter and John"; and (John 21.2): "Simon Peter, and Thomas, who is called Didymus, and Nathanael, who was from Cana of Galilee, and the sons of Zebedee, and two others of his disciples." 3) Only four places are excepted, which nevertheless have an easy and suitable explanation. For a) it is said in John: "But Philip was from Bethsaida, the city of Andrew and Peter." But here the two brothers are commemorated not as Apostles, but as inhabitants of the city, and Andrew perhaps is named first because he was older by birth. b) The text (1 Cor. 1.12) rather favors us: "Each one of you says: I indeed am of Paul, but I of Apollo, and I of Cephas, and I of Christ." Here the Apostle begins from himself for the sake of modesty and humility, according to that saying (ibid. 15.9): "For I am the least of the Apostles, who am not worthy to be called an Apostle"; and he ascends to the greatest, Christ, whom Peter immediately precedes. c) The same must be said of the other text (ibid. 3.22). d) But concerning the text (Gal. 2.9), Estius answers on this place: "He names James in the first place for the honor of the Lord, whose brother he was; and because he was Bishop of Jerusalem, where these things were being done; and because he was of the greatest name among the Jews because of the opinion of sanctity, as is clear from Josephus and Hegesippus." Others add: "It is altogether consonant with the truth of the matter that Paul, coming to Jerusalem, had James first of all meet him, conferred with him, and entered into fellowship with him. For the others, in order to perform the office imposed on them of propagating the evangelical light, were frequently absent from the city, in which James, as its proper pastor, remained stable. Therefore it is a conjecture by no means to be neglected that James is numbered first for this reason, because he first in time declared his agreement with Paul. Wherefore neither is he placed before the rest because he did not excel the rest in dignity." 4) After Christ's ascension into heaven, as the condition of things then bore, Peter at once acted as Primate. For (Acts 1.15), "Peter rising up in the midst of the brethren" proclaimed the election of a new Apostle in place of Judas, according to the oracles of the prophets. After the coming of the Holy Spirit (Acts 2.14), "Peter standing with the eleven lifted up his voice," announced Christ, and commanded believers to be baptized. After the notable miracle had been performed (Acts 3), and filled with the Holy Spirit, he has a grave discourse to the people and to the rulers of the people and elders (Acts 4). Peter (Acts 8) reproves and condemns Simon Magus because he wished to acquire sacred power by money. Peter (Acts 9) passes through all the assemblies in Judea, Galilee, and Samaria, as a commander, as St. Chrysostom observes (Homily 21 on Acts), reviewing his troops. Having had a vision, he learns (Acts 10) that the Gentiles also are to be admitted to the Christian faith, and therefore he himself joins Cornelius with other Gentiles to the Church. While Peter is detained by Herod in prison (Acts 12), "prayer was being made without ceasing by the Church to God for him." In the Council of Jerusalem (Acts 15), Peter, rising, has a discourse, proposes the matters to be handled, and first gives his sentence. Now a) although the Apostles had previously had contentions concerning the primacy, nevertheless in no way after the coming of the Holy Spirit did they rebuke Peter because of the aforesaid manner of acting; indeed it is rather established that they held him in the greatest honor. b) Nor can all these things exhibit a primacy of mere honor. For this first of all would not agree with those things which openly prove the primacy of jurisdiction. And then, the rest being omitted, God willed that the Church be founded in humility, and especially that the Apostles bear before themselves the humility of the cross. He willed that it be manifest to all that his Church is the work of God alone, and not of men, nor to be propagated and preserved by human counsels or powers. Therefore for the beginnings of the Church "God chose the foolish things of the world, that he might confound the wise, and the weak things of the world," etc. But Bellarmine pursues all these things more fully, On the Roman Pontiff, book 1, from chapter 17.

874. III. The Fathers constantly and unanimously affirm that Peter obtained an authority more eminent than the other Apostles. Origen (on Diverse Gospel Passages, homily 2), speaking of

Peter, asks: "Who would be higher among the Apostles than he who is and is called their summit?" St. Hilary of Poitiers, on Matthew 6, says: "Peter first believed, and is Prince of the Apostolate." Eusebius of Caesarea (Ecclesiastical History, book 2, chapter 11) names Peter "the strongest and greatest among the Apostles, and by merit of virtue the prince and patron of all the rest." St. Cyril of Jerusalem (Catecheses 2, 7, and 18) calls Peter "the highest of the Apostles, and Prince and key-bearer of the heavenly kingdom." St. Basil (Proemium on the Judgments of God) says: "Blessed Peter was set before all the disciples, to whom alone greater testimonies were given than to the others, who was proclaimed blessed, to whom the keys of the kingdom of heaven were entrusted." St. Gregory Nazianzen (Poem Concerning Himself and Against the Bishops) calls Peter "Prince of the Apostles" and "Pillar of the Church." St. Gregory of Nyssa (Sermon 2 on Stephen) says: "The memory of Peter is celebrated, who is head of the Apostles, and together with him the other members of the Church are glorified." St. Optatus of Milevis (book 2 against Parmenian) writes: "The chair is one... where Peter sat, head of all the Apostles... in which one the unity of the chair would be preserved." St. Ambrose (on 1 Corinthians 12) writes: "Andrew first followed the Savior, but he did not receive the Primacy; Peter did." St. Epiphanius (in Ancoratus, after the beginning) says: "This the prince of the Apostles [Peter] testifies, whom the Lord constituted first of the Apostles... to whom the fold was entrusted"; and (Heresy 5): "He chose Peter, that he might be leader of the disciples." St. Chrysostom (homily 88 on John) says: "Christ committed to Peter the prefecture of the brethren... and Peter was established by Christ as teacher of the whole world"; and (oration 8 against the Jews) he says: "Peter so washed away that denial that he was even made first of the Apostles, and the whole world was committed to him." He honors Peter with distinguished names; for he calls him "prince of the apostolic choir, mouth and summit of the disciples, pastor and head of the Church, column of the Church, firmament of faith, foundation of confession, fisher of the whole world." St. Augustine (book 2 On Baptism) says: "In the holy Scriptures we have learned that the Apostle Peter, in whom the primacy of the Apostles preeminent by an excellent reason, stands out"; and in the same place he adds: "Who does not know that that Principate of the Apostolate of Peter is to be preferred to any episcopate?" and (exposition on Psalm 108) he says: "For this reason the Lord left blessed Peter a little while, so that for him who was to be future ruler of the Church there might be placed a certain rule of forgiving those who sin."

875. Let these testimonies suffice; for we have given others above, nos. 547 and 736 ff. The things which we exhibited a little before in the interpretation of the text of Matthew 16 and John 21 can also be recalled. We merely note: 1) The Fathers unanimously affirm Peter's preeminence before the other Apostles, and also unanimously affirm that it was instituted by Christ for the good of unity. 2) But they give various reasons why that Primacy was conferred on Peter rather than on another. For some think this was done because of his confession concerning the divinity of Christ; others ascribe it to his zeal and love toward Christ, etc. But, as is clear, diversity of opinions with respect to this second point does not destroy unanimity with respect to the first.

876. Now what we proposed in the second place must be proved, namely, that the Primacy of Peter was not common and divided with Paul. This is chiefly established by recalling again the arguments already given concerning the promise and institution of the Primacy in Peter alone; and therefore these must always be kept before the eyes. But it is proved besides.

877. I. From the Fathers, who expressly say that Paul is inferior to Peter. Thus St. Augustine (book 2 On Baptism, chapter 1) says: "Cyprian commemorates the Apostle Peter, in whom the primacy of the Apostles preeminent by such excellent grace, who was accustomed to act concerning circumcision otherwise than truth demanded, to have been corrected by the later Apostle Paul." Similarly, on the Epistle to the Galatians he calls Paul "the later Pastor"; and in letter 82 to Jerome he adds these things: "Peter received what was being done by Paul with the liberty of charity by the piety of humility; and thus he offered an example to those after him of being corrected even by those later than himself, as Paul was, by

which inferiors might confidently dare to resist even superiors for defending evangelical authority, fraternal charity being preserved." St. Gregory (book 2 on Ezekiel, homily 18), speaking of the same rebuke, writes: "Behold, he does not disdain to be rebuked by his inferior. He does not recall to memory that he received the keys of the kingdom of heaven; he gave himself to agreement with the lesser brother, and he was made one following, so that already even in this he might lead; so that he who was first on the summit of the Apostolate would also be first in humility." Theodoret, concerning Paul visiting Peter in the Epistle to the Galatians, comments thus: "For since Paul did not need human teaching, as one who had received it from the God of all, he rendered to the Prince of the Apostles the honor which was fitting." Hugh of St. Victor (Sermon 64) discusses it thus: "Peter more eminent than the rest by excellence of power, Paul by excellence of preaching; Peter the sun, Paul the moon; Peter the sun by power divinely conferred on him, Paul the moon by wisdom divinely conferred on him," etc.

878. II. By recalling what was established above, this part of the thesis can easily be confirmed. To suggest something, let it be noted: 1) All the arguments by which we showed that the government of the Church, from Christ's institution, is monarchic exclude division of the supreme power in Peter. 2) We have fully demonstrated the institution of the Primacy in Peter; but where is there discourse concerning the Institution of the same Primacy in Paul, who would divide it with Peter? 3) Indeed, the very testimonies which demonstrate the institution of the Primacy manifest that it belongs exclusively to Peter. 4) If Paul had received power altogether equal with Peter, how would it have happened that Peter always had a successor in the Primacy, but Paul never? Section VI Certain Difficulties Against the Things Just Established Are Answered.

879. You will say, I: Whatever Peter received from Christ, the other Apostles also received; therefore it cannot be said that Peter obtained the Primacy over the Apostles themselves. The antecedent is proved. 1) Just as Peter was constituted an Apostle, so also the rest, who are called Apostles. 2) Just as Peter received immediately from Christ a power which would embrace the whole earth, so also the other Apostles. 3) Just as Peter is called the foundation of the Church, so also the other Apostles (Eph. 2.20). 4) Just as the office of feeding the flock of Christ was committed to Peter, so also to the Apostles, and also to others constituted by them (Acts 20.28; 1 Pet. 5.1-4). 5) Just as the power of binding and loosing was given to Peter, so also to the remaining Apostles. 6) Hence St. Cyprian says: "The other Apostles assuredly were what Peter was, endowed with an equal fellowship of honor and power." And St. Jerome (book 1 Against Jovinian): "Upon all the Apostles equally the strength of the Church is founded." Similar things are also read among other Fathers.

880. Since this, in the present matter, is the strongest difficulty, it is better to solve it briefly, so far as can be done, but most fully. Therefore: 1) Certain things must be noted beforehand concerning the third and fourth proofs of the antecedent. And first: Peter himself was called by Christ the Rock or foundation, upon which the Church was to be built; but the Apostles are not in like manner called foundations of the Church. Rather, the Church is said to have been built upon the foundation of the Apostles; and this phrase can signify, not that the Apostles themselves are the foundation, but that they laid the foundation, that is, the doctrine, upon which the Church was built. This interpretation coheres with Ephesians 2, in which "and of the Prophets" is also said; for this seems to imply that the Church is built upon the foundation of the Apostles in the same way as upon the foundation of the Prophets. But since the passage there treats of the Prophets of the Old Testament, as is clear from the immediate context (2.20), where an allusion is made to Isaiah 28.16 and Psalm 117.22, and as St. Augustine testifies (On the Words of the Lord, Sermon 49), the dignity of foundation can be predicated only of doctrine. 2) But even if the Apostles themselves are called the foundation, they will not be the foundation in the same order, but in a different order from Peter; just as Peter himself is not in the same order as Christ (no. 860). In fact, a) Peter alone is called the foundation in Matthew; and, on the other hand, all the Apostles would be called the foundation.

But the same prerogative attributed to one and to many differs at least in intensity. b) Peter is called the foundation of the universal Church, which, since it includes the Apostles themselves, means that they themselves are built upon Peter; but the Apostles in Paul would be the foundation upon which the rest of the faithful are built. With respect to the office of feeding, that office, as we have seen, was committed to Peter in relation to the universal Church; but the texts cited for the same office imposed upon others by the Apostles exhibit a certain and determinate flock to be fed. Thus in 1 Peter 5.2 it is said: "Feed the flock of God which is among you"; and in Acts 20.28: "Take heed to yourselves, and to the whole flock, wherein the Holy Spirit has placed you as bishops to rule the Church of God"; where that "whole" is restricted by the words that follow. 2) Now, to the general argument, I answer first by denying the antecedent, namely, that whatever Peter received from Christ, the Apostles also received. But when it is added that the individual Apostles also received the universal power of binding and loosing, etc., I answer by distinguishing: an ordinary power, I deny; an extraordinary power, I subdistinguish; one altogether equal to the power of Peter and not subordinated to it, I deny; otherwise, I concede. To confirm this answer immediately, let us recall that one class of testimonies exhibits a power given to all the Apostles, while the other exhibits a power given to Peter alone. Therefore, just as the former indicates some equality among the Apostles, so the latter shows a certain preeminence in Peter. Hence if the Apostles are compared among themselves, they all stand forth as distinguished by a universal authority of teaching and ruling; but before the rest Peter puts on the person of the Head, to whom the rest, as Teachers and Pastors, are subject. Indeed, the testimonies which regard Peter must be reconciled with those which are brought forward for the other Apostles. But there is no other way of reconciling them except that some prerogative be attributed to Peter before the rest of the Apostles, by reason of which that was promised and granted to him by name which otherwise would seem common to the rest. But that prerogative must be either one of honor or one of jurisdiction. Yet it cannot be merely one of honor; for the things which Christ declares about it are not referred merely to honor, but chiefly to jurisdiction, as we have seen. Therefore there is promised or conferred upon Peter a prerogative of jurisdiction which is proper and personal to him before the other Apostles, and which they do not share. Accordingly, in Peter there is had a certain singular and chief head among the Apostles themselves.

881. But in order to unfold this answer in a few words, it is helpful here to consider three things: 1) what the Apostles had in common with Peter, and what Peter had before them; 2) what the successors of the Apostles received from the Apostles, and what the successors of Peter received from Peter; 3) from these things there will be understood the exercise itself of the prerogative, both of Peter with respect to the Apostles, and of the successors of Peter with respect to the Bishops, successors of the Apostles.

882. Beginning from the first, we say: 1) it is not necessary here to consider the power of order, since the Primacy imports the power of jurisdiction. Still, it can be noted that all the Apostles were Bishops, and therefore equal in the power of order. But if the origin of this power is sought, in Peter it certainly was immediately from Christ; but in the others some judge that this power proceeded from Christ only mediately, insofar as Christ himself ordained Peter, and Peter ordained the others (compare Bellarmine, On the Roman Pontiff, book 1, chapter 23). 2) Nor is it necessary here to consider several prerogatives granted to the Apostles, such as confirmation in grace, the gift by which they were made organs of new revelations, etc.; for since such prerogatives are not of themselves joined to the Apostolate or the Primacy, they passed neither to the successors of the Apostles nor to the successors of Peter. 3) Therefore the proper prerogative of the Apostolate, and consequently one common to all and only the Apostles, regards the power of jurisdiction; and it comprises two things, as Valencia noted (tom. 3, disp. 1, q. 1, p. 7, sec. 28). One is that the Apostles received from Christ himself immediately the authority of the ecclesiastical ministry. For this reason they are also said to have been sent by him, as he himself had been sent by the Father. Footnote 1. Concerning this matter there can be no doubt at all. For if there were any difficulty, it would affect the mission of Matthias, who was substituted in place of Judas, and of Paul, who after Christ's ascension into

heaven was called to the Apostolate. But concerning the first Bellarmine very well demonstrates (On the Roman Pontiff, book 4, chapter 23): "Matthias the Apostle was not elected by the Apostles, nor was any authority given to him by them; but, after his election had been implored and obtained from God, he was immediately numbered among the Apostles." But the Apostle writes of himself (Gal. 1.1): "Paul, an Apostle, not from men nor through men, but through Jesus Christ"; whence he also adds: "For neither did I receive it [the Gospel] from man, nor did I learn it, but through the revelation of Jesus Christ." Moreover, in order to show that he received his mission from Jesus Christ, by whom he had been called, he notes that before he went to Jerusalem to his predecessors, the Apostles, he went away into Arabia, and returned thence to Damascus (Gal. 1.17), in which city he was preaching Christ (Acts 9.19, 22). Footnote 1 ends. The other is that they received that authority from Christ in such a way that they could duly and legitimately discharge ecclesiastical functions, not only in this or that part of the world, but absolutely everywhere. For, says Matthew 28, "Going, teach all nations." And: "Preach the Gospel to every creature" (Mark 16). In these two things, and therefore in this dignity and prerogative of the Apostolate, all the Apostles were equal.

883. But in what does the character of the Primacy properly consist, or, with respect to the power of jurisdiction, in what was Peter constituted above the other Apostles? Peter excels the other Apostles chiefly in two things with respect to this power. The first is that he received an independent power, and a power over the Apostles themselves, as is clear from the demonstration already given; whereas the other Apostles, individually, did not have power over the other Apostles, and they depended on Peter both individually and collectively. The other is that Peter's power over the universal Church, that is, the Primacy, was ordinary, and therefore to be transmitted to successors, as will be proved more expressly below; whereas the universal power in the individual Apostles was extraordinary, and therefore was to be extinguished with them (compare Valencia, loc. cit.). But you will ask: from where can this be proved? Note: 1) from the Scriptures the universal jurisdiction of Peter, and of all the Apostles together with Peter, is openly proved; but from Scripture alone it would be difficult, at least, to show the universal jurisdiction and infallibility of the individual Apostles. Therefore for those who profess Scripture to be the only rule of faith, it would be ridiculous to reject the Primacy of Peter on the pretext that the universal power of the individual Apostles is an obstacle to it. 2) The Apostles themselves were constituting their successors, Bishops throughout the several cities (Titus 1.5, 7); Peter admonishes "elders" as a "fellow-elder," saying: "Feed the flock of God which is among you." Compare the other testimonies which we gave (no. 523). 3) Hence there has never been any Bishop, except the Roman one, who, as successor of the Apostles, claimed for himself power over the universal Church; indeed you will find the contrary sanctioned even in the earliest Councils and in the Apostolic Canons (compare canons 14, 32, 35). Moreover, the defection of certain Bishops from the true faith itself shows that the infallibility which was attributed to the individual Apostles did not pass to their individual successors.

884. And from these things there is now understood the second point which we proposed, namely, what the successors of the Apostles, that is, Bishops, are with respect to the successors of Peter. Namely, the power of the Primacy, as being ordinary, must be found entire in the successors of Peter; but the power of the Apostles, since it was extraordinary with respect to the things mentioned, did not pass to their successors. Hence the successors of Peter, as we shall see, still rule and teach the universal Church. But the successors of the Apostles can indeed, all together with Peter, teach the universal Church infallibly and make laws for the universal Church; and individually, dependently on Peter, they can govern the part of the flock committed to them, etc. These were ordinary offices. But individually they cannot found or rule Churches everywhere, or exercise universal jurisdiction; they cannot teach infallibly, etc. These in the Apostles were extraordinary offices.

885. Hence there is also gathered the third point proposed, namely, the exercise of the power of Peter and of his successors with respect to the Apostles and their successors. And first, of Peter

with respect to the Apostles. 1) Peter was constituted the head of all and the center of unity; therefore it was necessary that the Apostles should not retain for themselves the Churches which they founded, but should aggregate them to Peter as to the center, and subject them to him. But if, per impossibile, the Apostles had neglected this, those Churches would have been schismatic, as being outside the center of unity and torn away from it. 2) But the Apostles were endowed with personal infallibility; therefore, with respect to the faith to be taught with truth, Peter had nothing that he had to do in the Apostles. 3) Likewise, with respect to undertaking a mission in this or that part of the world, since the Apostles had received from Christ a mission into the whole world. 4) Nor should it be said that perhaps Peter could have restricted the office of some Apostle because of a manifest necessity of the Church, in the way in which Pius VII, at the beginning of this century, took jurisdiction away from the Bishops of France, or because of an admitted fault. For a) with God ruling the Church and the Apostles by his special providence, that necessity could not have existed, and in fact did not exist. b) Through the descent of the Holy Spirit the Apostles were confirmed in grace, and therefore none of them could commit any grave sin. Indeed, it was necessary that the perfection of Christian life be greatest in the Apostles; for they were constituted in the highest degree of perfection, and they received an abundance of the Spirit in every way (compare Suarez, On the Mysteries of the Life of Christ, disp. 8, section 1, no. 9).

886. Secondly, in the successors of the Apostles, because of the absence of the personal offices which were proper to the Apostles, the force of the primacy had to exercise all its faculty, both formerly under Peter and now under the Roman Pontiffs, successors of Peter. And 1) Bishops can defect both in faith and in morals, and violate the holiness and unity of the Church; therefore he who holds the primacy in the Church can exercise every power of ruling and coercing Bishops. 2) Likewise, Bishops, successors of the Apostles, do not have mission and institution immediately from Christ himself; therefore it is necessary that they receive it from him who bears the place of Christ in the primacy of the whole Church, and in whom, as in the center of unity, the fullness of power resides. 3) Finally, the successors of the Apostles, Bishops, do not have, as the Apostles had, a universal mission and power over the whole Church; therefore it is necessary that they obtain from him, into whom the power of taking counsel for the whole world and of everywhere enlarging and preserving the Church was poured from St. Peter, the definite region over which they are to exercise jurisdiction.

887. Moreover, the aforesaid dependence of the Apostles on Peter can be proved even by the very testimonies of the Fathers that are objected. For according to St. Jerome and Cyprian, the Apostles are equal with Peter in the power of order and in the prerogatives proper to the Apostolate; but they were by no means altogether equal in such a way that the dependence of the others on Peter, and consequently his Primacy, would be excluded. Indeed the whole text of St. Jerome is: "Although upon all the Apostles equally the strength of the Church is established, nevertheless for this reason one is chosen among the twelve, so that, a head having been constituted, the occasion of schism might be removed." And the whole text of St. Cyprian is: "The other Apostles indeed were what Peter was, endowed with an equal fellowship of honor and power. But the beginning proceeds from unity, so that the Church may be shown to be one." He splendidly declares this in these words: "The Lord speaks to Peter: I say to thee, he says, that thou art Peter, and upon this rock I will build my Church, and the gates of hell shall not prevail against it: I will give to thee the keys of the kingdom of heaven, etc. And after his resurrection he says: feed my sheep. Upon that one he builds his Church, and to him he commands his sheep to be fed. And although after his resurrection he bestows an equal power on all the Apostles and says: As the Father has sent me, so I send you; receive the Holy Spirit, etc.; nevertheless, in order that he might manifest unity, he arranged by his authority the origin of that same unity beginning from one." The words objected follow; and then the holy Doctor continues: "The Church is one, which is extended more widely into a multitude by the increase of fruitfulness; just as the rays of the sun are many, but the light is one, and the branches of a tree are many, but the strength is one, founded in a tenacious root; and when from one source very many streams flow out,

though a numerousness seems diffused by the abundance of an overflowing supply, nevertheless unity is preserved in the origin. Tear a ray of the sun away from the body: unity does not receive a division of light. Cut a stream off from the source: once cut off, it dries up. So also the Church, etc." These things indeed solve the proposed difficulty most fully.

888. You will say, II: 1) Peter (Acts 11) gave an account of the journey undertaken for instructing the Gentiles; but this is done only with respect to a superior or an equal. 2) Indeed, in Acts 8 he is sent by the brethren to confirm the Samaritans; but one who is sent by another is not superior to him. Therefore Peter is not superior to the other Apostles. I answer to the first: Peter gave an account of the journey undertaken to the Gentiles from an equal condition with the rest, I deny; from a prudent economy, which it was especially fitting to use in those beginnings of things, I concede. Certainly this can be done for either reason; but that in this case it was done for the latter reason, and not the first, is sufficiently shown first of all by the things that have already been said about Peter's preeminence. But besides, as is clear from the objected text (Acts 11.2), it was not the Apostles themselves who raised the difficulty because the Gentiles had been instructed in the faith, but those "who were of the circumcision," or Judaizers. Is Peter then said to be inferior not only to the remaining Apostles, but even to the Judaizers themselves? I answer to the second: Peter was sent with John to Samaria by an authoritative mission, I deny; by one exhortatory and of mere counsel or persuasion, I concede. It is certain that even inferiors can exhort a superior and advise him to do something; in which case, by advising him, they would send him. Thus in Joshua 22.13-14, Phinehas and the princes of the tribes were sent by the Israelites to the Reubenites, who had defected to idolatry; Paul and Barnabas were sent by the Antiochians to consult the Apostles (Acts 15.2); Peter and John were urged to go to Samaria. But this, far from diminishing the preeminence of St. Peter, rather commends it; for since the matter was of great moment, namely, the restraining of the tricks of Simon Magus, it seemed most expedient to oppose to him the very prince of the Apostles with John, the beloved disciple.

889. You will say, III: It is said in 1 Corinthians 12.28: "God indeed has set some in the Church: first Apostles, second Prophets, third Teachers, then powers, etc." Hence: St. Paul enumerates in the first place those who possessed the supreme and most excellent office. But he enumerates the Apostles first, without making any mention of the Primacy. Therefore. I answer: 1) The Apostle here enumerates ecclesiastical offices insofar as the charisms of the Holy Spirit chiefly shine forth in them, not insofar as they pertain to the hierarchy. Hence it by no means pertained to his purpose to set out distinctly either all the grades or the first hierarchical grade. This is clear a) from the whole context; for from the beginning of chapter 12 up to chapter 14, excepting those things which he most beautifully discusses concerning charity in chapter 13, the Apostle treats this matter of charisms; b) from the objected text itself, for in it he enumerates several things that are altogether different from jurisdiction, namely Prophets, powers, graces, healings, etc. I answer: 2) Even if it were granted that the Apostle wished to enumerate the hierarchy, and indeed according to the order of preeminence, he rightly placed the Apostles in the first place, because the Apostles obtained the first grade, although among them there was one first of all, the Apostle of the Apostles. In fact, the Primacy is, as it were, the supreme grade of Apostolate. Therefore the Apostle did not enumerate the Primacy distinctly, but neither did he deny it; in nearly the same way as the Council of Trent taught that the ecclesiastical hierarchy consists of Bishops, Presbyters, and Deacons, although it cannot be inferred from this that, according to the mind of the Council, there is not a first among Bishops, who is Bishop of Bishops.

890. You will say, IV: Paul seems at least equal to Peter. For 1) Paul is called "the Apostle" by antonomasia; this seems to suggest that he was Prince of the Apostles. 2) He equates himself with Peter; writing to the Galatians (2.7-8), he says: "The Gospel of the uncircumcision was entrusted to me, just as that of the circumcision was to Peter; for he who worked in Peter unto the Apostolate of the circumcision worked also in me among the Gentiles." 3) The same one says (ibid., verse 5) that he "did not yield in subjection, not even for an hour"; and (verse 11) that he "withstood Cephas to the face." I answer to

the first: Paul is called "the Apostle" by antonomasia by reason of excellence of power, I deny; by reason of excellence of work, I concede. Augustine had already noted this well, who writes thus (book 3 to Boniface, chapter 3): "When 'the Apostle' is said, if it is not expressed which Apostle, none is understood except Paul; because he is better known by more epistles, and labored more than all." To the second: Paul equates himself with Peter with respect to the primary and special destination of preaching, I concede; with respect to authority and the primacy of the apostolic office, I deny. Hence St. Jerome (on this place) writes that Peter and Paul "divided, not power, but works," insofar as the conversion of the Jews was specially committed to one, and that of the Gentiles to the other. Moreover, from the Acts of the Apostles it is openly clear that Paul also preached to Jews, just as Peter also preached to Gentiles. To the third: The Apostle indeed says that he did not yield in subjection; but he is speaking of "false brethren secretly brought in," as is clear from the preceding verse, to whom alone, and not to Peter, he did not yield, not even for an hour. But that Paul corrected Peter, he did not do this from authority, but from charity, according to which even inferiors can sometimes resist superiors. Hence the Fathers, as we have seen (no. 877), openly say that in this case a superior was corrected by an inferior. We omit, however, the opinion of those who judge that the Cephas of whom this treats is someone other than Simon Peter; for this is not sufficiently proved, and it seems to be contrary to the more common opinion of the Fathers. It can be added that this very correction by Paul rather confirms Peter's Primacy. For what was at issue? Peter had taught by words and example that one must not live Jewishly; but from a certain economy of prudence and charity toward the converted Jews, lest he create a scandal for them, he sometimes withdrew himself from the Gentiles and did not eat with them. But Paul feared rather that this manner of acting by Peter would create scandal, insofar as others, by Peter's example, would be led into Judaizing. Hence St. John Chrysostom notes: "If someone other than Peter had been there, his change would not have had such force as to draw even the other Jews. For he neither exhorted nor counseled, but only withdrew and separated himself; and that withdrawal and separation was able to draw all the other disciples because of the dignity of the person."

891. You will say, V: In the same epistle to the Galatians, the Apostle seems openly to exclude every superior over himself. For he writes (2.6, 9): "But from those who seemed to be something, what sort they once were makes no difference to me... for those who seemed to be something contributed nothing to me... And when James and Cephas and John, who seemed to be pillars, had recognized the grace which was given to me, they gave to me and Barnabas the right hands of fellowship." It is answered. If the general purpose of the Apostle in this Epistle to the Galatians is kept before one's eyes, the explanation of the words objected from it will not be difficult. Certainly the purpose of the Apostle was not to show that he had no superior and was not subject to Peter with respect to the government of the Church; for Paul neither declares this in any way, nor is it gathered from the controversy which he had with the Galatians. The Apostle's purpose was to show that his Gospel was equally divine with that of James, Cephas, and John, and that he had received it, together with the Apostolate, immediately from Christ, no otherwise than they had. For the pseudo-apostles, in order to lessen Paul's authority, kept saying that Peter, James, and John had been taught by the Lord himself, from whom they had also received their mission; but that Paul, on the contrary, was a disciple of men and had been sent by men. From this they inferred that Paul's Gospel was not to be made as much of as the Gospel of the others. Hence it is that the Apostle begins his epistle by saying: "Paul, an Apostle, not from men, nor through man, etc." With these things premised, it is easily understood that Paul denies that he received the Gospel or the Apostolate from men, or from those who seemed to be pillars; he affirms that those who seemed to be pillars did not confer on him the power of preaching the Gospel, nor communicate the Gospel to him, since he had received these things immediately from Christ. But when he says, "what sort they once were makes no difference to me," it imports that he recognizes them to be pillars, although before they had been unlearned men and fishermen; it is enough to know what sort of men they had been constituted by Christ. Nevertheless, he had received nothing from them. Everyone therefore sees that here it is in no way a question of equality with Peter with respect to the

government of the Church, as though Peter's Primacy were denied; for the remaining Apostles also had received immediately from Christ the Apostolate and the Gospel, and yet they were subject to Peter.

892. You will say, VI: 1) The Roman Pontiffs themselves, in their constitutions, often decree and define "by the authority of the blessed Apostles Peter and Paul." 2) Indeed, in the seals of Pontifical documents the images of both Apostles are also expressed, and Paul for the most part occupies the right side. I answer to the first: The Roman Pontiffs define from the authority of Peter and Paul insofar as they invoke the authority of both, I concede; insofar as they ascribe equal authority to both, I deny. Certainly the Roman Pontiffs could invoke the authority of all the Apostles; for since they hold the whole authority of Peter, by that very fact they possess the whole authority of the whole apostolic college. Yet they make special mention of Paul because he, together with Peter, labored for the founding of the Roman Church; both he and Peter closed their final day at Rome and obtained the crown of martyrdom. Therefore both are special patrons both of the Roman Pontiff and of the Roman See. To the second: For the same reason the likeness of both Apostles is expressed in the seals of documents. In fact, the chair and power of a Coadjutor is one and the same with the power of the Ordinary and Pastor, to whom nevertheless the Coadjutor is subject; yet in the Fisherman's ring, by which Apostolic Briefs are sealed, the image of Peter alone is found. It is known, moreover, that the right hand was not always and everywhere regarded as the more honorable: in the Council of Chalcedon, Dioscorus, soon to be condemned, held the right side, while the Pontifical Legates held the left; and it was often the custom that the senior and more honored person should be on the left, while the junior covered the right side for him. Compare on this matter [The first lines of PDF page 712 complete this sentence:] St. Peter Damian and St. Thomas (lecture 2 on chapter 1 of the Epistle to the Galatians); but especially see what Bellarmine has (On the Roman Pontiff, book 1, chapter 27). Section VII The Primacy Was Promised and Conferred on Peter Immediately, and Not Through the Mediation of the Church.

893. This last part of the thesis is also easily demonstrated by recalling the arguments already given. For: I. In the testimonies adduced, Matthew 16 and John 21, no trace is found by which it would be signified that the words of Christ are to be understood immediately and directly, not of Peter, but of the Church. For we have considered the words in which the promise and conferral of the Primacy are contained, both in themselves and in their connection with what precedes and follows in the context; and we have seen, according to every respect, that the speech of Christ promising or conferring the Primacy is so directed to Peter that it can in no way be turned aside to another subject. Let us recall at least one example to mind. Christ said to Peter: "I will give thee the keys: I," he says, "will give," not "the Church will give"; "to thee" I will give, not "to the Church" I will give. Yet in the opinion which we here oppose, it would not have been Christ, but the Church, that gave the keys to Peter, and Christ would have given them not to Peter, but to the Church. Hence, since Christ gave the keys to Peter, he consequently said immediately to Peter: thou thyself will be able to loose and bind on earth whatever can be loosed or bound in the spiritual order. For our matter nothing clearer than these forms of speaking can be desired; for if the adversaries themselves had had to place in the mouth of Christ the opinion which we maintain, they could have suggested no other words than those which have already been used by Christ.

894. II. On the contrary, there are many things in those testimonies which most openly stand against the Richerian interpretation. For 1) in the text of Matthew, the Church to be founded is said to be founded upon the rock; therefore if this rock were immediately the Church, the consequence would be that the Church was to be built upon the Church, or upon itself; nothing more absurd than this can be imagined. 2) Similarly, the gates of hell are said not to prevail against the Church insofar as the Church is to be built upon that rock. Therefore if this rock designated the Church, the sense would be: the gates of hell are not to prevail against the Church, insofar as the Church, built and founded upon itself, would stand. 3) But in the testimony of John, Christ enjoins on Peter the office of feeding his lambs and his sheep, or the whole Lord's flock. But the lambs and sheep of Christ, or the Lord's flock, are the Church itself. Hence, in the

opinion of the adversaries, the Lord's flock would be ordered to be fed by the Lord's flock itself, namely, the Church by the Church. Are not all these things evidently discordant and mutually contradictory? 4) If Christ had wished to confer the power of the keys immediately, not on Peter but on the Church, after he had said, "And the gates of hell shall not prevail against it," he would naturally have continued his speech in this way: "And to it [the Church] I will give the keys of the kingdom of heaven." Why therefore, after those words "against it," did he turn his speech to Peter and say: "And to thee I will give the keys"? 5) Finally, these things are so evident that Richer himself could find nothing to oppose to the interpretation of the texts that has been set forth. Febronius, however, so felt the force of the texts and of the interpretation that he contended (op. cit., chapter 1) that the instituted analysis and exegesis of the passages of Matthew and John belonged to the futile trifles of the scholastics. Hence he concludes that the matter must be defined from tradition, which, through an impudent lie, he asserts to favor himself.

895. III. In fact, it would suffice to recall the testimonies of the Fathers already given; but we add a few which touch our matter more closely. Tertullian (Scorpiace, chapter 10) writes: "Remember," he says, "that the Lord left the keys to Peter, and through him to the Church." According to the adversaries he ought to have said: "The Lord left the keys to the Church, and through it to Peter." St. Optatus (book 7 Against Parmenian, chapter 3): "For the good of unity, blessed Peter both merited to be preferred to all the Apostles, and alone received the keys of the kingdom of heaven to be communicated to the rest." According to the adversaries it ought to have been said: "The Church alone received the keys to be communicated to Peter and the rest," that is, to the Supreme Pontiff and the Bishops. St. John Chrysostom (homily 54 on Matthew) speaks thus: "And to thee I will give," he says, "the keys of the kingdom of heaven"; as if he were saying, just as the Father gave to thee to know me, so also I will give something, namely the keys of the kingdom of heaven. Therefore just as not flesh and blood, but the heavenly Father, revealed Christ's divinity to Peter, and Peter himself confessed, "Thou art the Son of the living God," so also Christ gave to Peter the keys of the kingdom of heaven, with supreme power over the Church. St. Augustine (book 2 Against Gaudentius, chapter 25) says: "Was Razias better than the Apostle Peter, who, when he said, Thou art Christ the Son of the living God, was called so blessed by the Lord that he merited to receive the keys of the kingdom of heaven? Yet he is not therefore believed to be imitated where, immediately afterward at the same moment, having been reproved, he heard: Go behind me, Satan, for thou savorest not the things that are of God." Therefore, according to Augustine, that same man received the keys from Christ who was reproved by Christ in his own person; but in that very chapter 16 of Matthew, scarcely four verses after the promise of the keys, Peter is reproved by Christ, and certainly the Church is not reproved in his name. St. Hilary (on Psalm 134, no. 4), treating the same argument, says: "When [Christ] had spoken certain things about his passion to his disciples, and Peter had rejected this as unworthy of the Son of God, Peter, to whom above he had given the keys of the kingdom of heaven... this man, rejecting this sacrament of the passion, he received with such an insult: Go behind me, Satan, thou art a scandal to me." And in book 6 On the Trinity: "So great," he says, "was his religious zeal for suffering for the salvation of the human race, that he would call Peter, the first confessor of the Son of God, the foundation of the Church, the gatekeeper of the heavenly kingdom, and in earthly judgment the judge of heaven, by the insult of Satan," etc. Hence the Council of Florence, which is also cited by the Vatican Council, under Eugene IV, with Greeks and Latins alike subscribing, solemnly defined: "To him [the Roman Pontiff], in blessed Peter [and not in the Church], full power of feeding, ruling, and governing the universal Church was handed over by our Lord Jesus Christ [and not by the Church]."

896. IV. To this point there truly belong those arguments by which we excluded the democratic form of government from the Church and established the monarchical form; nor can we sufficiently marvel at the contradiction of Richer, who stated: "The Church is a monarchical polity tempered by aristocratic government"; and yet he teaches that supreme power resides as in a subject in the universal Church.

897. You will say, I: The keys, or the power of binding and loosing, as St. Ambrose, St. Augustine, St. Gregory, and other Fathers commonly teach, were given by Christ to the Church itself. Therefore they were not given immediately to Peter. I answer by distinguishing the antecedent: they were given to the Church, namely to the pastors of the Church, to the ruling Church, I concede; to the Church, namely to the whole body of the faithful, I subdistinguish; finally, that is, that power was given for the good of the whole Church, I concede; formally, that is, that it was given to the whole Church as to its subject, I deny. The truth of this answer is clear: 1) from the purpose of the Fathers. For the Fathers who are objected against us were wholly engaged in refuting the Novatians and Montanists. These contended that the Church no longer possessed the power of remitting all crimes; for, according to them, since that power had been given personally to Peter and the Apostles, it expired with them. What else, then, ought the Fathers to have opposed to this error except that the power conferred on Peter was not a personal privilege, but an office instituted for the good of the Church, and therefore to be propagated in it until the end of the ages? 2) It is clear from the express words of the same Fathers. For St. Ambrose (Exposition on Psalm 38, no. 37) says: "To thee," [Christ] says, "I will give the keys of the kingdom of heaven, so that thou mayest both loose and bind. Novatian did not hear this, but the Church of God heard it: therefore he is in lapse, we in remission; he in impenitence, we in grace. What is said to Peter is said to the Apostles. We do not usurp power, but serve the command." And, passing over the rest, St. Augustine (Sermon 149, otherwise 24, On Diverse Matters, no. 7) says: "Peter, in many places of the Scriptures, appears to bear the person of the Church, especially in that place where it was said: To thee I will give the keys of the kingdom of heaven... Did Peter receive those keys, and Paul not receive them? Did Peter receive them, and John and James not receive them, and the rest of the Apostles? Or are not these keys in the Church, where sins are daily remitted?" From these things it is clear that the Fathers intend nothing else except that the power of the keys still perseveres in the Church, not insofar as the universal Church itself received them, but insofar as Peter and the Apostles received the keys for its good. Moreover, here the Fathers treat of the power of the keys insofar as it comprises the power of remitting sins. Do the adversaries whom we are here opposing attribute this power to all the faithful? Compare Bellarmine (On the Roman Pontiff, book 1, chapter 12).

898. II. You will insist: But the power of the keys was immediately given to the whole Church as to its subject. For, according to the same Fathers, the keys were given to Peter insofar as "Peter bore the person of the Church." I answer by distinguishing: Peter represented the Church as a juridical person from the prerogative of head and exemplar of all pastors, I concede; from the delegation either of pastors or of the Church, I deny. Therefore Peter represented the Church not as the legate of a prince, who would receive the keys of a city in the name and place of that prince, but as the prince and moderator of the whole Church constituted by Christ himself; almost in the way in which we say that something is given to a kingdom when it is given to the king himself, if it turns to the public utility. But representation of this kind does not confer, but supposes, the dignity of Head. And that this is the mind of St. Augustine is manifestly gathered from the fact that almost wherever he says that Peter was the figure of the Church and represented the Church, he explains that he asserts this by reason of the primacy. Indeed, in the last tractate on John: "Of this Church," he says, "the Apostle Peter, because of the primacy of his apostolate, bore the person in a figurative universality." And on Psalm 108: "Of this [Church] he is recognized to have borne the person because of the primacy which he had among the disciples." Again, in Sermon 13 On the Words of the Lord: "Peter," he says, "named from the rock, blessed, bearing the figure of the Church, holding the principate of the apostolate," etc. From this the holy Doctor again concludes, according to his purpose, that the power of remitting sins endures in the Church. For if Peter received the keys as supreme prelate of the Church, he signified that all his successors, and the other prelates, would have the same keys; but these were to be communicated by Peter, and not without measure. For Peter received them not so that he alone would use them, but so that he would communicate them with Bishops and Presbyters, with only the Apostles excepted, who by a certain extraordinary reason received them immediately from Christ, as we demonstrated above.

Therefore Peter was the exemplar of the whole body of ecclesiastical ministers, in whose person the possession and use of the keys would never be lacking in the Church. And in this sense Augustine said (tractate 4 on John): "If this was said to Peter alone, the Church does not do this; but if this is done in the Church, when Peter received the keys, he signified the holy Church." Compare Schrader (On Roman Unity, part 1, nos. 185-187).

899. III. You will insist: If these things were true, the Fathers would not have said that the Church itself looses and binds, or remits sins. But St. Augustine, his disciple St. Fulgentius, the Venerable Bede, etc., commonly asserted this. Therefore. I answer by distinguishing the minor: St. Augustine and others teach that the ruling Church itself, that is, the pastors of the Church, binds and looses, I concede; the Church itself, taken for the body of the faithful, I subdistinguish; authoritatively, or from the power of the keys immediately residing in it of itself as in a subject, I deny; through its charity and prayers, and therefore improperly, I concede. "Blessed Augustine," Bellarmine notes (loc. cit.), "because of the Donatists, devised a new mode of speaking about the keys and the remission of sins. For besides that mode by which we say that sins are remitted by priests in the administration of the sacraments of baptism and penance, a mode of speaking which he himself commonly uses with the other Fathers, he also often says that sins are remitted 'by the charity of the Church, by the groaning of the dove, by the prayers of the saints,' and in this mode that the keys of the kingdom belong only to the just, and that Peter signified this when he received the keys... Moreover, by these words St. Augustine does not signify that the Church of the just remits sins from authority, but that sins are remitted to no one, however much he may be baptized or reconciled, unless the charity of the Church extends to him. Hence St. Augustine (book 3 On Baptism, chapter 17, which passage is objected) says: 'For because in the type of unity the Lord gave power to Peter, so that what he loosed on earth would be loosed, it is manifest that that unity is also called one perfect dove.' And below: 'Through the prayers of the spiritual saints, who are in the Church, as through the most frequent groaning of the dove, a great sacrament is carried on, and a hidden dispensation of the mercy of God, so that the sins are also loosed of those who are baptized not through the dove, but through the hawk, if they approach that sacrament with the peace of catholic unity.'"

900. You will say, IV, with Richer himself (On Ecclesiastical and Political Power, chapter 1): God and nature intend the whole supposit more priorly and immediately than any part of the supposit, however noble; the faculty of seeing, for example, was given not so much to the eyes as to the whole man, namely so that man might exercise the faculty of seeing through the eye as through his organ and minister. For the eye exists both through man and for man. Therefore, by parity of reasoning, the same must be said of the Church. I answer by distinguishing the antecedent: God and nature, etc., I distinguish; in the order of end, I concede; in the order of subject, I deny. It is pleasing to explain this in the words of Richer himself (in his last retraction, to proposition 2): "The likeness," he says, "convicts its own author; for just as the faculty of seeing is in the eye formally and subjectively, and the eye alone essentially and immediately sees, while man sees only mediately, namely through the eye, so that the reduction of the likeness to the likeness fits well: the Roman Pontiff and the other Bishops, whom I compared to the eye, possess ecclesiastical jurisdiction formally and essentially. For if ruling the faithful people in spiritual things is not proper and essential to the Roman Pontiff and the other Bishops, what will be proper and essential to the pontifical and episcopal dignity, by which it is distinguished from other human offices and duties of life?" Yet this does not prevent the power itself from being ordered to the good of the whole ecclesiastical republic, just as vision in man is directed to the good of the whole man. "The eye alone sees in the body," says St. Augustine (tractate 22 on John), "but does the eye see for itself alone? It sees for the hand, and it sees for the foot, and it sees for the other members." So it is with ecclesiastical jurisdiction.

Article 2. Whether the Primacy of Peter, from the Institution of Christ, Ought To Be Perpetual, and in Whom It Resides

901. Up to this point we have vindicated the institution of the primacy of jurisdiction in blessed Peter; now follows the controversy whether it was conferred on Peter as a privilege so personal that it ought to have perished with him, or rather whether it ought to have been transmitted to successors and be perpetual in the Church. If this latter point is established, it is asked again who is the legitimate successor of Peter, in whom the Primacy resides.

902. The Vatican Council taught the Catholic doctrine on this matter in the cited constitution Pastor Aeternus, chapter 2. For there 1) it teaches that the primacy, from Christ's institution, ought to be perpetual, saying: "But what the prince of shepherds and great shepherd of the sheep, the Lord Christ Jesus, instituted in the blessed Apostle Peter for the perpetual salvation and lasting good of the Church, must, by the same author, continually endure in the Church, which, founded upon the rock, will stand firm even to the end of the ages." 2) It teaches that the legitimate successor of blessed Peter is the Roman Pontiff. "Indeed, it is doubtful to no one," it adds, "indeed it has been known in all ages, that holy and most blessed Peter, prince and head of the Apostles, column of the faith and foundation of the Catholic Church, received the keys of the kingdom from our Lord Jesus Christ, Savior and Redeemer of the human race; and he, to this present time and always, lives and presides and exercises judgment in his successors, the bishops of the holy Roman See, founded by him and consecrated by his blood." 3) It declares by what right the Roman Pontiff obtains the primacy of Peter. "Whence," it says, "whoever succeeds Peter in this Chair, according to the institution of Christ himself, obtains the primacy of Peter over the universal Church. Therefore the disposition of truth remains, and blessed Peter, persevering in the received strength of the rock, has not abandoned the government of the Church that he undertook. For this reason it has always been necessary that every Church, that is, the faithful who are everywhere, should come together to the Roman Church because of its more powerful principality, so that in that See, from which the rights of venerable communion flow out into all, they might, as members joined to the head, coalesce into the one compact structure of the body." 4) Finally, it concludes the whole matter with a canon: "If anyone therefore shall say that it is not from the institution of Christ the Lord himself, or by divine right, that blessed Peter has perpetual successors in the primacy over the universal Church; or that the Roman Pontiff is not the successor of blessed Peter in the same primacy: let him be anathema."

903. Moreover, the Vatican Council again confirms all these things at the beginning of the following chapter, where it says: "We renew the definition of the Council of Florence, by which it is to be believed by all the faithful of Christ that the holy Apostolic See and the Roman Pontiff hold the primacy over the whole world, and that the Roman Pontiff himself is the successor of blessed Peter, Prince of the Apostles, and the true Vicar of Christ, and exists as head of the whole Church and father and teacher of all Christians; and that to him, in blessed Peter, full power of feeding, ruling, and governing the universal Church was handed over by our Lord Jesus Christ, as is also contained in the acts of the ecumenical Councils and in the sacred canons."

904. In order that we may understand these things properly before they are demonstrated, certain things are to be noted beforehand in the usual way. And first, we have here as adversaries not only those who deny the very institution of the Primacy in blessed Peter, but also others who either, besides this, directly attack the perpetuity of the Primacy in Peter's successors, the Roman Pontiffs, or deny this alone, while the former point is either conceded or passed over. In a word, we here attack schismatics and heretics, Greeks, Protestants, Russians, Anglicans, etc., who have always strained every nerve to attack this prerogative of the Roman Pontiffs.

905. But if, overcome by historical arguments, they cannot deny some constant exercise of primacy in the Roman Pontiffs, they say either that it was only of honor and not of jurisdiction, or even that it was conceded to them by human institution and not divine. Thus long ago Marsilius of Padua, John Wyclif, and John Hus taught that the Roman Pontiff borrowed his authority from Constantine the Great.

Calvin (Institutes, book 4, chapter 7, sec. 19) judged that the primacy over the Greeks was given to the Roman Pontiff by the emperor Phocas, but over the Gauls and Germans first by Pepin and then by Charles, kings of the Franks. Luther (On the Power of the Pope) imagined that the primacy was conveyed to the Roman Pontiff by Constantine IV; elsewhere, however, in On the Supplement of Times, he teaches that the primacy of the Pope was introduced by Phocas. The Centuriators do not dissent from this opinion (Century 6, chapter 1), nor Illyricus (in his history On the Primacy), nor the Smalcald book (On the Primacy of the Pope), nor Theodore Bibliander (in Chronological Tables, table 2), etc. Earlier, however, Nilus, bishop of Thessalonica (Institutes, book 4, chapters 6-7), had already written that the Roman Pontiff does not properly succeed Peter in the primacy of the whole Catholic Church, but only in the Roman episcopate; but that from the decrees of councils he obtained a certain primacy, namely, so that he would be first of the bishops, sit first, give his opinion first, yet not preside over all the rest by power. Compare Bellarmine (book 1, chapter 12).

906. But for the sake of order and clarity, as is already clear, we must distinguish three questions: 1) whether the Primacy of Peter, from the institution of Christ, ought to be perpetual; 2) whether it ought to persevere perpetually in the successors of Peter, so that they possess the Primacy by divine right; 3) whether the Roman Pontiffs are successors of Peter by divine right, and consequently whether, as Roman Pontiffs, they obtain the primacy by divine right.

907. Now it is of faith that the Primacy ought to be perpetual in the Church, and indeed that this perpetuity is of divine right. For just as Christ Jesus instituted the Primacy in the blessed Apostle Peter, so, by the same author, as the Vatican Council speaks, the Primacy itself must continually endure even to the end of the ages.

908. With the same certainty it is established that the same Primacy will remain perpetually in the successors of Peter, and indeed by divine right. For since Christ instituted the Primacy in Peter for the perpetual salvation and lasting good of the Church, he who obtains the Primacy is the successor of Peter, and as successor of Peter, from the very institution of Christ, or by divine right, obtains the Primacy. And this is at least what the words of the Vatican Council import: "whoever succeeds Peter in this [Roman] chair, according to the institution of Christ himself, obtains the Primacy of Peter over the universal Church." Namely, since in fact the Roman Pontiff is the successor of Peter, he, as successor of Peter, obtains the Primacy by divine right; the connection between the Primacy and the successor of Peter is of divine right. "Although," says Bellarmine (book 2, chapter 22), "perhaps it is not of divine right that the Roman Pontiff, because he is Roman Pontiff, succeeds Peter in the prefecture of the whole Church; nevertheless if someone asks absolutely whether the Roman Pontiff is by divine right Pastor and Head of the whole Church, this must altogether be asserted. For nothing else is required for this than that the succession itself be of divine right." Therefore, if once it is demonstrated that the Primacy was instituted by Christ in Peter so that it would be perpetual, it is also sufficiently demonstrated that the successor of Peter obtains the Primacy by divine right.

909. Nor is it an obstacle that the election of a determinate person as successor of Peter is a human fact, not divine. For one can answer 1) with Perrone and other theologians: that election is not the institution, but the mere condition by which what has been constituted by divine right is given its fulfillment. To illustrate this by a familiar example: from divine institution it happens that bread, through consecration, is converted into the body of Christ; yet it depends on the choice of the priest whether he pronounces consecration over this bread numerically rather than over another. But if once he has consecrated some bread, it is no longer in anyone's power to remove the consecration from it, and we would truly say that by divine right, or from divine institution, that bread has been made the body of Christ. Thus, therefore, in our matter, from divine institution it is, according to what has been said, that someone, the Roman Bishop, succeeds to the primacy of Peter. The divine institution is fulfilled through the human fact of election. The one elected, verifying in himself the divine institution, can be said by divine right to bear the dignity which

he bears. Or 2) with Bellarmine (On the Roman Pontiff, book 2, chapter 17): "It must be observed that in the Pontiff there are three things: the Pontificate itself, namely the primacy, which is a certain form; the person, who is the subject of the Pontificate, or primacy; and the conjunction of one with the other. Of these things, the first, namely the Pontificate itself, is from Christ alone; but the person is indeed from his natural causes absolutely, yet, insofar as he is elected and designated to the Pontificate, he is from the electors; for it belongs to them to designate the person. But the conjunction itself is from Christ, through, or with presupposition of, the human act of the electors... Therefore the electors are truly said to create the Pontiff, and to be the cause that such a one is Pontiff; nevertheless they do not give him that power, nor are they the cause of that power. Just as in the generation of a man the soul is infused by God alone, and yet, because the generating father, by disposing the matter, is the cause of the conjunction of the soul with the body, a man is said to generate a man; and yet a man is not said to produce the soul of a man."

910. Once the right by which someone succeeds to the Primacy of Peter and possesses it has been established, it remains to inquire who is the successor of Peter. To this question the Vatican Council answers that the Primacy exists "to this present time and always in his [Peter's] successors, the Bishops of the holy Roman See, founded by him [Peter] and consecrated by his blood"; whence it proposes as to be believed that "the holy Apostolic See and the Roman Pontiff hold the primacy over the whole world, and that the Roman Pontiff himself is the successor of blessed Peter, Prince of the Apostles." But for demonstrating this, the most certain historical thesis concerning Peter's coming to and session at Rome, and his death in the same See, is not absolutely necessary, although it contributes greatly to illustrating the reason of the succession. 1) It is not necessary, because from ancient, perennial, universal tradition, whether considered historically or theologically, it is most openly established that the Roman Bishop, and no one besides him, has always been held by all as the successor of Peter. Therefore either he is Peter's successor, or no one is. But the latter hypothesis is opposed to the institution of Christ, who willed the Primacy to be perpetual; therefore the former must be admitted. 2) Still, it is useful, because to one who asks why the Roman Bishop alone is held as Peter's successor, it must be answered: because Peter was Bishop of Rome and was crowned with martyrdom in that See; therefore he who is Roman Bishop is Peter's successor. Therefore we do not expressly establish this historical thesis here, all the more because it is usually treated diligently by the Professor of Ecclesiastical History in this Archgymnasium. Compare, if you wish, Bellarmine (loc. cit., chapters 1-11), Peter Foggini (On the Roman Journey of St. Peter, etc.).

911. The things which we have set forth up to this point are openly handed down by the Vatican Council. But another question remains: whether the Roman Bishop, as such, obtains the Primacy by divine right. Namely, it is established: 1) that the Primacy ought to be perpetual by divine right; 2) that it is obtained by divine right by the successors of blessed Peter, and therefore that the connection of the Primacy with the successors of Peter is of divine right; 3) that, in fact, the successors of Peter are no others than the Roman Pontiffs; 4) therefore it is asked whether the connection of the Primacy with the Roman See is of divine right, so that the Roman Pontiff, as such, and not only as successor of Peter, obtains the primacy by divine right. If this is affirmed, it surely follows that the Primacy can never be separated from the Roman See by any human authority, not even by the supreme authority of the Church.

912. Now concerning this matter nothing has properly been defined. Not indeed by the Vatican Council, as is clear to one reading the cited decrees; nor by proposition 35 condemned in the Syllabus, which reads as follows: "Nothing prevents, by the sentence of some general council or by the act of all peoples, the supreme pontificate from being transferred from the Roman Bishop and city to another Bishop and another city." For in this matter it is clear to all that the act of peoples can do nothing. Even if Rome were the See of the Primacy from human and not from divine institution, still the change could be made only by the supreme authority of the Church. But it is not certain that in the said proposition, under the name of a general Council, there comes a Council confirmed by the Pope; for then supreme power would be

had. For that proposition is taken from the book of Nuytz, who repeats Febronian and Jansenian errors; but Febronius and the Jansenists, when discussing the authority of general Councils, commonly speak of Councils considered separately from the Pope.

913. Nevertheless, we make our own the affirmative opinion, that the connection of the Primacy with the Roman See is of divine right. Therefore it is better to illustrate it a little before it is established. First, we observe with Bellarmine (On the Roman Pontiff, book 2, chapter 22) that "succession is one thing, the reason of succession another. For the succession of the Roman Pontiff to the pontificate of Peter is from the institution of Christ; but the reason of the succession, by which the Roman Pontiff rather than the Antiochene, or someone else, succeeds, took its beginning from the fact of Peter. The succession itself, I say, is from the institution of Christ and by divine right, because Christ himself instituted in Peter a pontificate that would endure until the end of the world; and therefore whoever succeeds Peter receives the pontificate from Christ. But that the Roman Bishop, because he is Roman Bishop, is Peter's successor, had its origin from the fact of Peter, not from the first institution of Christ. For Peter could have chosen for himself no particular see at all, as he did for the first five years; and then, when Peter died, neither the Roman nor the Antiochene Bishop would have succeeded, but he whom the Church had chosen for itself. He could also have remained always at Antioch; and then the Antiochene Bishop without doubt would have succeeded. But because he fixed his see at Rome and held it until death, from this it happened that the Roman Pontiff succeeds him."

914. Hence certain older theologians thought that the annexation of the Primacy to the Roman See had so arisen from Peter that it was constituted by his authority alone; and therefore they say that it is situated in the power of the Supreme Pontiff to separate the Primacy from the Roman episcopate. The very common opinion, however, which we follow, holds that Peter, from the command and will of Christ the Lord himself, joined the supreme pontificate with the Roman episcopate; and therefore that it cannot be separated from the same by any human authority, for things which are of divine institution cannot be changed by men.

915. But the authors of this opinion carefully distinguish the See, or the place where some church was founded and constituted in this or that dignity, for example episcopal; Residence, or dwelling in that place for carrying out pastoral offices; and Title, or the name of the church itself from which the See is denominated. Among these, residence is not so affixed to one place that, when just causes intervene, it cannot be transferred elsewhere, as often happened, especially in that time when the Roman Pontiffs dwelt at Avignon. This is more easily understood in the Roman Pontiff, who, since he is bishop in the whole Church, wherever he dwells, is not there as a stranger or as a bishop outside his own diocese, but as an Ordinary in the territory of his residence. But the See, insofar as it is Peter's, and the title of the see, cannot be changed by any human authority, nor can the title be transferred into another see. Therefore it can indeed happen that the Supreme Pontiff resides at Naples, Milan, Avignon, etc.; but it can never happen that the Bishop of Naples, Milan, Avignon, etc. is the Supreme Pontiff. Wherever, therefore, he resides, he will always be Bishop of Rome, so that he can be said to be, and truly be, successor in the primacy of Peter.

916. But in order that it may become more clearly known how the conjunction of the primacy with the Roman episcopate is to be conceived, we can consider several dignities in the Supreme Pontiff. For he is: 1) supreme Pastor of the universal Church; 2) Bishop of the particular Roman Church; 3) Metropolitan of the Roman Province; 4) Primate of the Provinces of Italy; 5) Patriarch of the West. Nevertheless it must be observed, says Bellarmine (loc. cit.), that "the Roman episcopate and the prefecture of the universal Church are not two episcopates nor two sees, except in potency. For Peter, instituted by Christ as Pontiff of the whole Church, did not join to himself the episcopate of the city of Rome in the way in which the bishop of some place joins to himself another episcopate, or a canonry, or an abbacy; but he raised the episcopate of the city of Rome to the supreme Pontificate of the whole earth. In the same way, when a

simple episcopate is raised into an archiepiscopate or patriarchate, the bishop or patriarch is not twice or three times a bishop, but only once; and as a sign of this thing, only one pallium is given to the Supreme Pontiff, even if he is bishop, archbishop, patriarch, and supreme pontiff. For all these things are one in act, and many only in potency. From this it follows that he who is elected Roman Bishop, by that very fact is Pontiff of the whole Church."

917. These things having been set forth, in order to preserve integrally the doctrine concerning perpetuity and succession in the Primacy, we establish the following: Proposition 38. 1) The Primacy which Christ instituted in blessed Peter for the lasting good of the Church must, by the same author, continually endure in Peter's successors. 2) Since it is established that the Roman Bishops are Peter's successors, they hold the Primacy over the whole world by divine right. 3) Indeed the connection itself of the Primacy with the Roman See seems to be of divine right; and therefore, just as by no human authority can it happen that Peter's successor is not Primate of the whole Church, so by no authority, not even the supreme authority of the Church, can the Primacy be transferred from the Roman Bishop and city to another Bishop and another city. Section II The Perpetuity of the Primacy According to the Institution of Christ Is Established.

918. Proof I. An office which Christ instituted and ordered solely for the essential good of the Church ought to endure as long as the Church, which is indefectible, perseveres; or, it ought to be perpetual. But the office of the Primacy instituted by Christ in Peter is of this kind. Therefore the Primacy ought to be perpetual.

919. The major is explained. Although it is evident of itself, it can nevertheless suffer difficulty from the fact that the Apostolic office, properly so called, was also instituted for the good of the Church, and yet did not need to be, nor was it, perpetual. In order to meet this exception immediately, we note that for the first founding and constituting of some new society, certain endowments are necessary in the first moderators, which, once the society has already been founded and sufficiently diffused, successors no longer need. This especially has place in the institution and first diffusion of the Church. For since it was a society catholic by its own nature, it needed promulgators who, endowed with universal authority and aided by innumerable miracles, could found Churches everywhere and diffuse the faith of Christ everywhere. Therefore the Apostles were furnished with that authority; but once the Church had already been sufficiently diffused through the world and the number of promulgators increased, the universal authority of the Apostles ceased in their successors. But there are other endowments of moderators which are always required for the good of the society, and therefore of themselves ought to remain as long as the society itself. Such, for example, are the offices which we called ordinary in the Apostles (compare no. 880 ff.). Now the Primacy of Peter pertains to the good of the Church in such a way that it is necessary not only for first founding it, but also for conserving it; and therefore in Peter it was an ordinary office, not an extraordinary one. Hence we have said that the Primacy pertains to the essential good of the Church, and it can be said to be an essential part of the Church instituted by Christ. Therefore:

920. The minor is proved. 1) The supreme power of any society is instituted and ordered to the essential good of that society, and is an essential part of it. But, as is clear from the preceding thesis, the Primacy of Peter is the supreme power constituted by Christ in the Church. Therefore. This argument is confirmed from what was disputed concerning the true indefectibility of the Church. For the Church can never have another form or constitution besides that which it received from its founder Christ: "Every plant which my heavenly Father has not planted shall be rooted up" (Matt. 15.13). But from what has been said, it is established that Christ so constituted his Church that the whole of it would be under one supreme ruler, to whom all, lambs and sheep, would be subject; so that there would be one kingdom under one king, whom all would obey. But Peter was constituted Shepherd or supreme Ruler. Therefore, if the authority of Peter under that form in which Christ instituted it were to perish, it would at once cease to be that

Church which Christ instituted. Can it be that, from Christ's institution, there ought to be one constitution of the Church under the rule of the Apostles, and another under the rule of their successors? But both Greeks and Protestants are able to prove this the less, the more the former contend that they adhere to the ancient faith, and the latter that they cling to the words of Scripture. 2) Indeed, after the times of the Apostles the full power of the Primacy was much more necessary. For although it was fitting that Peter himself should sometimes exercise some primatial office, even as an example for the following ages, nevertheless the use of that power, while the Apostles were still living, and especially with respect to the Apostles themselves, was by no means so necessary (no. 885). On the contrary, when the Apostles had died and the extraordinary gifts in the successor Bishops had ceased, it was necessary that Peter's Primacy exert its full force. Therefore either it must be said that Christ, in instituting the Primacy, willed that it should endure and be exercised so long as there was almost no necessity for its use (I say "be exercised," because he certainly did not institute an office that would never be exercised), and then, when necessity was now urgent, be extinguished; or it must be said that Christ destined that office especially and primarily for the times following the Apostles. Everyone sees that the former hypothesis is absurd. 3) According to the testimony of Matthew 16: a) Peter was created rock or foundation of the Church, namely so that it might stand secure and firm forever; b) through the same rock the Church was made invincible, so that the gates of hell would never prevail against it. c) The Church has the same relation to Peter that a building has to the firm ground upon which it is built. If you remove the ground, the house immediately falls; therefore if you take away the rock, the Church falls. 4) According to the testimony of John 21, when the Lord said to Peter, "Feed my sheep," he constituted the office of supreme shepherd. But this office is ordinary and perpetual, since from the nature of the thing it ought to endure as long as the sheepfold remains. But the sheepfold, which is the Church, remains and will remain even to the consummation of the world. 5) In fact, when the Lord says to Peter, "Feed my sheep," he committed to him all his sheep, as we showed above; all, that is, not only by reason of place, but also by reason of time, since Christ willed to provide no less for us than for the first faithful. But Peter was not going to live always in the flesh; therefore when the Lord said to him, "Feed my sheep," in him he designated all his successors. Hence Chrysostom says (book 2 On the Priesthood): "For what cause did he shed his blood? Certainly so that he might acquire those sheep whose care he was committing both to Peter and to Peter's successors." And St. Leo (sermon on the anniversary of his assumption): "The disposition of truth remains," he says, "and blessed Peter, persevering in the received strength of the rock, has not abandoned the government of the Church which he undertook: clearly Peter perseveres and lives in his successors." Compare Bellarmine (On the Roman Pontiff, book 2, chapter 12, at the beginning).

921. II. The office which Christ instituted for bringing in and protecting the unity of the Church ought to endure as long as that unity itself; and therefore it ought to be perpetual, since, as we showed when treating of the properties of the Church, unity is essential to the Church and can never be absent from it. But the Primacy of Peter was instituted by Christ for constructing and conserving unity. Therefore. The minor is proved: 1) by briefly recalling the testimonies of Matthew and John. For a) supreme authority in a society is constituted for bringing in and conserving unity in a multitude; the Primacy is supreme jurisdiction over the universal Church. b) When Christ said, "Upon this rock," or "upon thee, Peter, I will build my Church," he indicated that the building of the Church was to be gathered only through Peter and in Peter. But for the building of the Church to be gathered is nothing other than for its unity to be formed. c) Likewise, by saying, "Upon this rock I will build," Christ indicated that the building of the Church must be sustained in Peter and through Peter. But a building is sustained by preventing the dissolution of its parts; unity is opposed to dissolution. Therefore this also is required from Peter, that by preventing dissolution he should perpetually conserve the unity of the Church (no. 442). d) The words of the conferral of the primacy suggest the same thing. For when Christ says, "Feed my sheep, feed my lambs," he gathers all under the command of one. And when he says, "feed," or "rule," he imposes upon Peter that he should provide for the conservation of the flock, or guard against its dissolution. 2) From the Fathers. "For the good of unity," so

says St. Optatus of Milevis according to the common opinion (On the Donatist Schism Against Parmenian, book 7, chapter 3, and book 2, chapter 2), "blessed Peter, for whom it was enough if, after he denied, he obtained forgiveness alone, both merited to be preferred to all the Apostles, and alone received the keys of the kingdom of heaven to be communicated to the rest." And again: "So many innocent men stand by, and the sinner received the keys so that the business of unity might be formed; it was provided that the sinner should open for the innocent, lest the innocent should close against sinners, and the unity which is necessary could not exist." St. Cyprian (On the Unity of the Church), after narrating the institution of Peter's Primacy and explaining its force and end, proceeds: "Does he who strives against and resists the Church, who deserts the chair of Peter, upon which the Church is founded, trust that he is in the Church? Since also the blessed Apostle Paul teaches this same thing, to show the sacrament of unity, saying: One body and one spirit, one hope of your calling, one Lord, one faith, one baptism, one God. This unity we ought firmly to hold and vindicate, especially we bishops, who preside in the Church, so that we may prove the episcopate itself also to be one and undivided." St. Jerome has the same things (Against Jovinian, book 1, no. 26, and Against Lucifer, no. 9). Pacian (letter 3) teaches: "As Matthew himself reports, a little earlier the Lord spoke to Peter, to one for this reason, that he might form unity from one." Hence that saying was most received among the Fathers: that the Roman Pontiffs, no less than Peter, are the rock and foundation of the ecclesiastical building. Moreover St. Augustine, in his Psalm Against the Party of Donatus, after listing the Pontiffs of the Roman See, successors of Peter, added: "This is the rock which the proud gates of hell do not conquer." St. Leo (sermon 5, otherwise 4, on the anniversary of his assumption, chapter 4): "For that solidity which he [Peter], being also made rock, received from Christ the rock, pours itself also into his heirs." And Boniface I (letter 4 to Rufus of Thessalonica, no. 1): "This [Roman See] is established to have been raised high by the dignity of the spiritual rock." Compare Schrader (On Roman Unity, part 1, from no. 90). 3) This has been confessed even by the haters of pontifical power, or by those less devoted to it. For a) Grotius the Protestant (in Votum pro Pace, on article 7) has these words: "Order, whether in the parts or in the whole, is contained in a certain principality, or in the unity of one placed over; and this is what Christ taught us in Peter." And a little later: "This order ought always to remain in the Church, because the cause always remains, that is, the danger from schism." Similar things are found in Cowell the Calvinist (in Examination of Doctrine Against the Acts of the Cause of Innocence), Cartwright (in defense of Whitgift), Hospinian (in Sacred History), Hooker (Of Ecclesiastical Polity, in the preface, section 6). b) But the Assembly of the Gallican Clergy in 1682, in the declaration on ecclesiastical power by which, on March 19, the famous articles were established, declared that the Roman See is that one "in which the unity of the Church is preserved." Hence in the letter to all the archbishops and bishops of the kingdom they preface these things from St. Cyprian: "With St. Cyprian we confidently declare that Christ, in order to manifest unity, constituted one chair, and by his authority arranged the origin of unity beginning from one; and that he who deserts the chair of Peter, upon which the Church is founded, is not in the Church; but he who does not hold unity does not have the faith." Bossuet, singing in harmony with these things in his Exposition of Catholic Doctrine, concerning the pontifical primacy, sets this down as certain by faith (chapter 21): "The Son of God, since he willed his Church to be one and firmly built upon unity, instituted the primacy of Peter for protecting and strengthening unity, and the Apostolic See is the center and root of this unity."

922. Therefore Pius VI was setting forth the ancient and universal faith of the Church in the constitution Super soliditate, November 28, 1786, when he said: "Namely, in this principate of the Apostolic Chair Christ willed the bond of unity to be held firm and constrained, by which the Church, to be propagated throughout the whole world, from members however far apart, would, through the mutual association of all in one head, coalesce into one compact structure of the body, and thus it would come about that the force of this power would avail not only for the extent of the first See, but also especially for the integrity and safety of the whole body. Therefore it is by no means wonderful that as many as have existed through all past ages into whom the ancient enemy of the human race poured his hostile hatred against the

Church have been accustomed to rush upon this first See, in which the firmness of unity is contained, so that, if it could be done, the foundation being overthrown, and the conjunction of the Churches with the head being broken - upon which especially they rest, flourish, and bloom - they might deprive the Church itself, its powers broken, miserably afflicted and torn apart, of the liberty with which Christ endowed it, and subject it to an unworthy servitude." Section III It Is Shown That the Roman Pontiffs Are Successors of Peter, and, as Such, Obtain the Primacy by Divine Right.

923. We undertake to prove two things here: 1) that the Roman Pontiffs are successors of Peter; 2) and that as successors of Peter they obtain the Primacy by divine right. But the second can already be judged demonstrated, since he becomes Primate of the whole Church by divine right who becomes such from divine law. But the successor of Peter becomes Primate of the whole Church by divine law; for it has been established by divine law that there is to be perpetual succession in the Primacy of Peter (compare no. 908 ff.). Hence it is that Councils and Fathers, in order to affirm the rights of Primacy in the Roman Pontiff, appeal to the words of the Gospel by which Christ instituted the Primacy in Peter. The Council of Florence, for example, teaches that "the power of ruling" etc. "was handed over by Christ the Lord to the Roman Pontiff in blessed Peter." The Fourth Lateran Council says: "The Roman Church, by the Lord's disposition, obtains the principate of ordinary power over all others." Lanfranc, Bishop of Canterbury, says in an English Synod: "When our Lord Jesus Christ said to Peter: Thou art Peter, etc., he could have added, if he had wished: I grant the same power to thy successors. But the omission of the statement diminishes nothing of reverence toward the successors of Peter... Indeed, it is implanted in the consciences of all Christians that they should no less tremble at the successors of Peter when they threaten than rejoice and applaud when they graciously grant serene dignity; and then at last the dispensation of all ecclesiastical things is ratified, if it has been approved by the judgment of the successors of blessed Peter. What does this effect except the force of divine liberality poured out through the Lord Jesus from blessed Peter into his vicars [successors]?" Therefore, if the rights of the Roman See sometimes seem to be attributed to synodical constitutions, they are attributed to them insofar as they were recognized or asserted by them against those who were rejecting them, not insofar as they were constituted by them.

924. Therefore the first point must rather be demonstrated from ancient, perennial, and universal tradition. But since we have already given very many express testimonies (nos. 547, 661, 736, etc.), we shall be content to exhibit a few monuments of tradition which bear on this matter, in the order in which they are proposed by the Wurzburg authors.

925. Therefore I. Constant tradition ascribes to the Roman Pontiff the very dignity of Primacy. The Fathers in the Council of Chalcedon (Act 16) speak thus: "We have considered that every primacy and chief honor is to be preserved according to the canons for the Archbishop of Old Rome." In the letter of Adrian to Tarasius, read and approved in the Second Council of Nicaea (Act 2), it is read thus: "Whose See, obtaining the primacy throughout the whole world, shines forth and exists as the head of all the Churches of God." We have already given the words of the Fourth Lateran Council. St. Irenaeus (book 3 Against Heresies, chapter 3) says: "To this Church [the Roman] it is necessary that every Church come together because of its more powerful principality." Anastasius II (in his letter to the Emperor Anastasius): "Through my ministry, as it always is, the See of blessed Peter holds in the universal Church the principate assigned to it by the Lord." In equivalent words the Fathers of the First Council of Constantinople also teach the same thing in their letter to Damasus, for they confess that "the Roman Church is the head, but we are the members." The Fathers of Chalcedon (Acts 1, 2, and 3) call Leo "Pontiff of the universal Church." The Fathers of the Third Council of Constantinople, in their Synodical letter to Agatho, have these words: "Therefore to thee, as prelate of the first See of the universal Church, standing upon the firm rock of faith, we leave what must be done. We acknowledge the letters of your confession as divinely prescribed by the highest summit of the Apostles." John II, in his letter to the Emperor Justinian, writes: "Both the rules of the

Fathers and the statutes of Princes declare that the Roman See is truly the head of all the Churches." Theodoret, in his letter to Renatus: "That holy See holds the rudders for governing the Churches of the whole world." St. Ambrose, on 1 Timothy 1: "Although the whole world is God's, nevertheless his house is called the Church, whose ruler today is Damasus," etc.

926. II. Constant tradition attributes to the Roman Pontiff the succession and inheritance of Peter. St. Irenaeus says and enumerates that Roman Pontiffs were given as successors to Peter (book 3, chapter 3), down to Eleutherius; Tertullian (book 3 Against Marcion, final chapter), down to Telesphorus; St. Optatus of Milevis (book 2 Against Parmenian), down to Siricius; St. Augustine (letter 165), down to Anastasius; St. Jerome, in his letter to Damasus on hypostasis, says: "I speak with the successor of the fisherman and disciple of the cross. Following no first one except Christ, I am joined in communion to your Beatitude, that is, to the chair of Peter. I know that the Church was built upon that rock." St. Leo (sermon 1 On the Nativity of the Apostles) writes: "Through the sacred See of blessed Peter, Rome, made head of the world, presides more widely by divine religion than by earthly dominion." St. Prosper, in his poem On the Ungrateful, sings: "Rome, the See of Peter, which, made the head of pastoral honor for the world, holds by religion whatever it does not possess by arms."

927. III. Constant tradition ascribes to the Roman Pontiff the action and authority of Peter. Indeed, in the Council of Ephesus (Act 3), Philip, legate of the Supreme Pontiff, with no one objecting, said: "It is doubtful to no one, indeed it is known to all ages, that St. Peter, prince and head of the Apostles, column of the faith and foundation of the Catholic Church, received the keys of the kingdom from our Lord Jesus Christ, and the power of loosing and binding sins was given to him, who to this present time and always lives and exercises judgment in his successors." In Chalcedon (Act 2), after the letters of Leo were read, the Bishops exclaimed: "This is the faith of the Fathers; this is the faith of the Apostles. We all believe thus. Anathema to him who does not believe thus. Peter has spoken thus through Leo." And in Act 18 the Fathers of the Sixth Synod said: "The supreme prince of the Apostles was fighting together with us; for we had as helper his imitator and successor of his See. Paper and ink were seen, and through Agatho Peter was speaking." Siricius, in his letter to Himerius, writes: "We carry the works of all who are burdened; indeed, rather, Peter the Apostle carries these things in us, who, as we trust, protects and guards us in all things as heirs of his administration." Leo, in letter 2 to Pulcheria, says: "The agreements of Bishops that are opposed to the Nicene rules, with the sole piety of your faith together with us, we send into nullity, and by the authority of blessed Peter the Apostle we annul by a general definition."

928. IV. The care of the universal Church belongs to the Roman Pontiff. This indeed the Fathers of the Council of Chalcedon testify in their letter to Leo, saying: "And after all these things, besides, he extended his madness also against him to whom the custody of the vineyard was committed by the Savior, that is, against your Apostolic Holiness also." Athanasius, in his letter to Felix: "For this reason he constituted you and your Predecessors, namely Apostolic Prelates, in the height of summit, and commanded you to have care of all the Churches." Acacius, in his letter to Simplicius: "Bearing around, according to the Apostle, the solicitude of all the Churches, you unceasingly exhort us." Leo (letter 4): "We are stirred by divine precepts and Apostolic admonitions to watch with tireless affection for the state of all the Churches."

929. V. To the Roman Pontiff is attributed the power of making laws for the universal Church. The Fathers of Ephesus prove this when in Act 1, in the condemnation of Nestorius, they pronounce thus: "Compelled by the sacred canons and by the letter of Celestine, Bishop of the Roman Church, we have necessarily come to this sentence against him." Damasus, in letter 5 to Aurelius, says: "We desire that you guard these things, and we command them to be preached and published to others, so that they may be guarded inviolate by all with due veneration." Leo, in letter 87 to the Bishops of Africa, says: "What we somehow suffer to be venial will afterward not be able to be unpunished, if anyone presumes to

usurp what we altogether forbid." Hence the supreme power of loosing from the obligation of law, whether by dispensation or by abrogation, is proved by Gregory, in letter 13 to Felix, dispensing with the English concerning prohibited degrees of marriage, and with the Sicilians concerning Councils to be celebrated each year; by Adrian, in his letter to the Emperor Basil in the Fourth Council of Constantinople, Act 1, relaxing the Canons because of the multitude of delinquents; and by Gelasius, in letter 1, granting indulgence in many other matters. But Gelasius there prefaces thus: "By the necessary disposition of affairs we are joined together, and by the governance of the Apostolic See we are assembled, so that we may so liberate the decrees of the paternal canons, and measure the precepts of the prelates and our predecessors of earlier times, that those things which the necessity of present times demands be relaxed for restoring the Churches, with diligent consideration applied, we may temper as much as can be done." And Nicholas, in his letter to the Emperor Michael, writes: "Since, according to the canons, where there is greater authority, the judgment of inferiors is to be deferred, namely for dissolving or for strengthening, it is plainly clear that the judgment of the Apostolic See, whose authority is not greater in any other, is to be retracted by no one."

930. VI. The ordering of superior magistracies belongs to the Roman Pontiff. The Council of Chalcedon, canon 28, gave to the See of Constantinople the first place of patriarchate after the Roman See. Yet Leo rescinded this, and therefore it did not have force; although the supplication of the Fathers testifies that it could have obtained firmness from his consent. For they said: "We ask that by your decrees you honor our judgment; and just as we have added harmony to the head in good things, so also let your summit fulfill for the sons what is lawful." It is established by many testimonies that the institution of Bishops belongs to the Roman Pontiffs. Thus Leo, in a letter to the Bishops of Africa, says: "We will that Donatus of Salicine, converted from Novatianism with his people, so preside over the Lord's flock that he remember that the libellus of his faith must be directed to us." Gregory, in letter 34 to the Emperor Constantine, writes: "The Bishop of the city of Salona was ordained without my knowledge and without that of my Responsalis; and a thing was done which happened under no earlier princes." Likewise the deposition of Bishops belongs to them. The fact is taught by Nicholas, in his letter to the Emperor Michael, concerning eight Patriarchs of Constantinople; by Gelasius, in his letter to the Bishops of Dardania, concerning Peter of Alexandria; by Theodoret (Ecclesiastical History, book 5, chapter 23) concerning Flavian of Antioch; and by the Acts of Sixtus III concerning Polychronius of Jerusalem. But the right is asserted by the Fathers of Ephesus in the testimony recently cited. Finally, that the restoration of Bishops belongs to the Roman Pontiffs is testified, besides many other examples, by the fact of Athanasius and Chrysostom supplicating; to these is added the summons in the Council of Ephesus (Act 1), pronounced in these words: "Let the most reverend Bishop Theodoret enter as a participant of the synod, because the most holy Archbishop of Rome has restored the episcopate to him."

931. VII. The judgment of greater causes is reserved to the Roman Pontiff. And indeed: 1) with respect to greater causes generally, the Synod of Sardica testifies in its letter to Julius: "This will seem best and very fitting, if from each and every province the priests of the Lord refer to the head, that is, the See of Peter." Innocent I, in his letter to Victricius of Rouen, appeals to the same thing: "But if greater causes have been brought into the midst, after episcopal judgment let them be referred to the Apostolic See, as the synod has established and blessed custom requires." 2) Gregory IV, in his letter to all the Bishops, speaks of causes greater by reason of the magnitude of the matter, writing: "It is doubtful to no one that not only the cause of a Pontiff, but every relation of holy Religion ought to be referred to the Apostolic See as to the head of the Churches, and from there take its norm, whence it took its beginning, lest the head of the institution seem to be omitted." And Innocent IV, in his letter to the Archbishop of Arles, says: "He understands that the greater causes of the Church, especially those touching articles of faith, are to be referred to the See of Peter, who narrated that when the Lord asked whom the Disciples said him to be, Peter answered: Thou art the Son of the living God; and that the Lord prayed for him, lest his faith fail." 3) With respect to causes greater by reason of the dignity of persons, that those which regard Patriarchs belong to the

Roman Pontiff is established when the Fathers of Ephesus, in their report to Celestine, reserve the cause of John of Antioch to the Supreme Pontiff. And as for those which regard Metropolitans, it is established when the Roman Synod under Damasus addresses the Emperors thus: "May your Piety deign to command that whoever has been condemned either by the judgment of our brother Damasus or by ours, and shall have wished unjustly to retain a Church, be summoned and come to Rome, or be led to the examination of the Metropolitan. Or if he himself is Metropolitan, let him necessarily be commanded without delay to hasten to Rome, or to those whom the Roman Bishop shall have given as judges." Finally, concerning Bishops, Julius I has these words in his letter to the Orientals, canon 9, cause 3, question 6: "Long ago it was decreed by the holy Apostles and their successors in the ancient statutes, and the holy and universal Church has held it up to this point, that Councils ought not to be celebrated apart from the sentence of the Roman Pontiff, nor a Bishop condemned; because they willed the holy Roman Church to be the primate of all Churches." The Council of Trent confirms this same thing in session 24, chapter 5, On Reform, establishing: "The graver criminal causes against Bishops, even that of heresy, which may God avert, which are worthy of deposition or privation, are nevertheless to be heard and terminated by the Supreme Roman Pontiff himself."

932. The simple indication of this constant tradition by itself fully accomplishes the matter. Yet to press the demonstration which arises from it, we add two things, of which the first directly confirms the fact, and the other the right of succession. And I. it is certain: 1) that Christ willed that the Primacy conferred on Peter should be perpetual in his successors. Hence St. Ambrose wrote (on Psalm 40): "Where Peter is, there is the Church"; St. Cyprian testifies (letter 55) that "heresies and schisms arise from this, that one Priest in the Church for the time, and one judge for the time in the place of Christ, is not considered"; St. John Chrysostom (book 2 On the Priesthood) teaches that Christ shed his blood "so that he might acquire those sheep whose care he was committing both to Peter and to Peter's successors." 2) It is equally certain that the successor of Peter at any time can be only one person; otherwise the form of government, which was immediately instituted by Christ, would be changed, and, with a new institution introduced, the constitution of the Church would be changed. Hence St. Cyprian says (letter 52): "Since after the first there cannot be a second, whoever has been made after the one who ought to be alone is no longer second to him, but is nothing." 3) Finally, it is certain that no one can be held as Peter's successor except the Roman Pontiff; for the Church always and everywhere recognized him as such, and no one besides him. Therefore the Roman Pontiff alone is Peter's successor, unless we wish to say, against the institution of Christ, that the succession of Peter in the Primacy has failed; which is absurd.

933. II. From the tradition set forth a little above it is established that, at least at the beginning of the fifth century, the universal Church believed that the Roman Pontiff, as Peter's successor, obtained by divine right the Primacy of the whole Church. But the adversaries whom we here attack say that in the first century the Church believed all Bishops to be so equal by divine right that none of them presided over the rest. On this hypothesis it would have been necessary that, between the first and fifth centuries, the faith of the universal Church concerning this matter had been changed. But this change can in no way be admitted. For: 1) If a change of this kind had happened, since the matter was one of the greatest moment, it ought to have been known to all; hence some historical monuments, or at least some traces, would testify to it. But in all antiquity no monument of this kind exists, no trace of that change. This ought to seem all the more remarkable because mention of the Roman See and the Roman Pontiff frequently occurs; many prerogatives, many deeds concerning them are narrated. Why would it have happened that concerning the gravest fact of all, namely that change affecting the Roman See, deep silence was preserved? 2) Indeed there are many things which exclude a change of this kind. For a) it is a question of a change in faith, which would overturn the unity and government of the Church. Could that have been accomplished without anyone in the Church protesting? But where are the traces of such resistance? Changes in matters of lesser moment, as, for example, in rites, have always stirred up great difficulties; but a substantial change in the faith and government of the Church would have been completed by the consent or silence of all! b) Bishops, Fathers

who always guarded the deposit of faith with the greatest diligence, many of whom flourished with distinguished sanctity, while others were crowned with martyrdom for the faith of Christ - would all of them, forgetful of their office, have permitted so great a change to be made in the Church, with no one protesting! c) But the Roman Pontiffs themselves, who existed at that time, almost all attained the honors of the Saints, and many shed their blood for Christ; and yet they themselves would have been guilty of so great a crime! d) Add finally that even the eastern Bishops recognized the Primacy of the Roman Pontiff. If it seems incredible that so many western Bishops would of their own accord, and against divine right, subject themselves to One, it must be judged still more incredible that all the Bishops of the East would all obey One Bishop in the West. To pass over the rest, six hundred Bishops came together at the Council of Chalcedon; except for the Apostolic Legates, all the rest were eastern. And yet not only were the prerogatives of the Roman Pontiff often asserted there, with no one objecting, but also, as we have seen, all the Fathers, in the letter to St. Leo, openly assert and declare the dogma concerning his Primacy. Section IV Certain Difficulties Are Answered.

934. You will say, I: The Fathers of Chalcedon openly teach that the preeminence of the Roman Bishops, or of the Roman See, is not of divine right, for in canon 28 they say: "To the throne of old Rome, because that city ruled, the Fathers rightly gave privileges. And moved by the same consideration, the one hundred and fifty most beloved of God gave equal privileges to the throne of new Rome [the city of Constantinople], judging rightly that the city which is honored with empire and senate, and enjoys equal privileges with the most ancient queen Rome, should also in ecclesiastical matters be exalted and made great no otherwise than she, existing as second after her." I answer: 1) There is no authority in this canon. For a) that canon was issued by the Greek Fathers alone, while the Pontifical Legates were absent. b) These, when previously asked to assent to the sanctioning of that canon, declared that they did not have a mandate to provide this. c) Hence in the following Act, complaining of fraud, they asked that that canon be deleted; "but if otherwise," they said, "let our contradiction be inserted in these acts, so that we may know what we ought to report to the Apostolic man, the Bishop of the universal Church." d) St. Leo, moreover, rejected that canon; whence not even the Greeks themselves admit it. Indeed the ancient Greek collection, which Dionysius Exiguus rendered into Latin, has only twenty-seven canons and entirely omits the twenty-eighth. Theodore the Reader also omits the same canon in book 1 of his Collectanea, and so does Theodoret in the collection of canons which he himself arranged. Compare Natalis Alexander, Dissertation 15, article 3. 2) In the cited canon there is no discussion of the right of Primacy. For in the letter which the Fathers of Chalcedon gave to Leo, there is an open confession of the Primacy of the Roman See; among those Fathers there was also Anatolius, Bishop of Constantinople. How therefore could they have simultaneously asserted a Primacy of the Church of Constantinople equal to the Roman Primacy? Certainly Anatolius himself suppliantly asks Leo to confirm that canon; therefore he professed the Primacy of the Roman Pontiff over the very See of Constantinople. 3) Therefore in that canon the discussion is about patriarchal right, which, as all confess, is of ecclesiastical right. For the Fathers of Chalcedon speak about those rights in relation to the Roman See which they wanted to obtain and have declared for the Church of Constantinople. But they were certainly striving to vindicate for it no other rights than patriarchal rights. Therefore. Namely, the Fathers of Chalcedon argue from the Roman See to the Constantinopolitan See on the basis of the likeness of political condition; and they say that, just as Constantinople had been made a new Rome, adorned with empire and senate, so after old Rome the Church of Constantinople should hold the patriarchate in place of the Churches of Antioch and Alexandria, with which it had previously flourished.

935. You will say, II: In canon 3 of the First Council of Constantinople it is read: "The bishop of the city of Constantinople ought to have the honor of primacy after the Roman Bishop, because it is new Rome." But this canon was praised by the Fathers of Chalcedon. Therefore the Fathers plainly judged that the right of preeminence by which the Roman Bishop rejoices is derived from the dignity of the first city. I answer: 1) The First Council of Constantinople was not ecumenical either in convocation or in celebration; for it was not convoked by the Roman Pontiff, all the Bishops were not called to it, and only

eastern Bishops assembled in it. Nevertheless, with the assent of the westerners added, and especially with the approval of the Roman Pontiff, it became ecumenical. But in what was it approved? In those things which pertain to faith. "But the Roman Church," says St. Gregory the Great (book 7, chapter 34), "has not up to this point had nor accepted the same canons or acts of that synod; but it accepted that same synod in this, that through it a definition was made against Macedonius. But the rest of the heresies which are commemorated there it rejects as already condemned by other Fathers." 2) The consequence can be denied. For the sense of the canon could here be this: "The Roman Pontiff indeed obtains the primacy by divine right over the universal Church; but since after him there are other dignities introduced by ecclesiastical right, it is fitting that the Bishop of the city which shines with civil principate first after Rome, and is called new Rome, should have the first place among those dignities. Thus therefore we establish."

936. You will say, III: The power of the Roman Pontiff is restricted to certain Provinces by canon 6 of the Council of Nicaea. For if it is read according to the common interpretation, it sounds thus: "Let the ancient custom be observed throughout Egypt, Libya, and Pentapolis, so that the Bishop of Alexandria should have power over all these; because also there is a similar custom for the Bishop of the city of Rome." But if Rufinus the interpreter is heard (book 10 of the History, chapter 6), it is expressed thus: "And that at Alexandria and in the city of Rome the old custom be preserved, so that the former may bear solicitude for Egypt, and the latter for the suburbicarian churches." I answer: 1) It is certain that by this canon a new right is by no means established, but only an old custom is confirmed, as is clear from the words with which it begins: "Let the ancient custom be observed throughout Egypt," etc. Now it is equally certain that Leo I, as successor of Peter, showed himself most firmly as ruler of the whole Church; indeed, with the adversaries freely conceding it, he was the keenest defender of the rights of his See. Yet he fully approved this canon, as is clear from his letter to the Bishops who were present at the Council of Chalcedon: "I admonish you that the rights of the Churches, as they were ordered by those three hundred eighteen divinely inspired Fathers, remain" (Hardouin 2.688). It is certain therefore that he by no means thought that his primacy was in any way harmed by that canon. 2) But, even omitting these things, the objected canon was not composed for prescribing limits to the Roman Pontiff, but for protecting the rights of the Patriarch of Alexandria. For when Meletius, Bishop of Lycopolis, had dared to ordain Bishops in Egypt, the Patriarch of Alexandria raised complaints; hence the Council ordered the ancient custom to be preserved. Therefore if any comparison is made between the Roman and Alexandrian Sees, it regards that in which those Sees agree. But they do not agree with respect to the right of Primacy; for no one ever asserted a Primacy of the Alexandrian See. Therefore the rights of the Roman Primacy cannot be said to have been restricted to certain Provinces. But among critics there is a question whether it was treating of the Roman Pontiff as Primate of the Bishops of Italy, or as Patriarch of the whole West. It matters little to us to settle this dispute, since it is enough for us that it was not treating of the right of Primacy over the universal Church. Yet it seems that in that canon it is rather a question of primatial rights over the Bishops of Italy; for according to Epiphanius, heresy 68, and Theodoret, Ecclesiastical History, book 1, chapter 9, only this one right had been violated by the Meletian ordinations. And in the age of Nicaea, as is also clear from the subscriptions in the Council of Chalcedon, Egypt did not yet have any Metropolitan who would be subject to Alexandria as to a Patriarch. 3) Moreover, that canon, if it is translated literally into Latin, has this: "Let the ancient customs be observed which are in Egypt and Libya and Pentapolis, so that the Bishop of Alexandria may have power over all these, since this also is customary for the Bishop of Rome." Now to what must that "this" be referred, that is, "this is customary"? Certainly to the immediately preceding things, namely to the authority of the Bishop of Alexandria in the provinces mentioned; nor is there anything else in the whole canon to which it could be referred in any way. Hence the sense of the whole canon is clear and genuine: "Let the old custom be observed, according to which the Bishop of Alexandria has jurisdiction in Egypt, etc.; because this is the custom which the Roman Pontiff follows"; or, "which is received among the Roman Pontiff and approved by him"; or in other words: since it is the custom with the Roman Pontiff that the

Bishop of Alexandria have care of Egypt, he has this care by right. Thus Baronius, Bellarmine, and among more recent authors Bouix interpret the canon (On Bishops, part 4, section 1, chapter 1, sec. 2). But what is there in this that imposes limits on the Roman Primacy? Indeed, by the very fact that the question is defined from the custom of the Roman Pontiff, his Primacy is acknowledged. But the version, or compendious paraphrase, of Rufinus ought in no way to move us, both because it is known that Rufinus was often less faithful in translating Greek writings, and because that paraphrase is foreign to the Greek text, as it is had in the Council of Nicaea itself and in the Council of Chalcedon, according to the Legates and Aetius.

937. You will say, IV: The preeminence of the Roman See seems to take its origin from the Synod of Sardica, which decreed almost all the prerogatives for the same See. But once the Roman See had obtained power, it was easy for it to extend that power more and more each day. I answer: It is altogether absurd to ascribe the preeminence of the Roman See to the Council of Sardica. For 1) the Council of Sardica was held in the fourth century of the Church; as we have seen, almost innumerable old monuments exist, belonging to the four earlier centuries, by which it is established that the excellence of the Roman See had long since flourished. Certainly in the second century Tertullian called the Roman Bishop "Bishop of Bishops"; and at the beginning of the same century St. Irenaeus called the Roman Church the center of unity "because of its more powerful principality." 2) Indeed, the Synod of Sardica itself was held by the work and command of Julius I, the Roman Pontiff; Hosius presided over the council as legate of the Roman Pontiff, just as he had presided over the First Council of Nicaea. Finally, the Synod of Sardica was held so that the sentence of restitution, already passed by Julius I, to whom Athanasius, Marcellus, Asclepas, Paul, and Lucius, deposed by the Arians, had appealed, might also be confirmed by the vote of the Council. Therefore the Roman Bishop did not receive the primacy from the Synod of Sardica; on the contrary, from the primacy of the Roman Bishop the Synod of Sardica had its existence and dignity. 3) Finally, the Synod of Sardica openly supposes the primacy of the Roman Bishop. For it recognized the right of appeal from the whole world to the Roman Bishop. The unanimous Fathers give this reason for this matter in canon 3: lest in the person of the successor the honor due to blessed Peter be denied. Everyone sees that this reason would have been futile unless in the successors they recognized those same prerogatives of primacy which had been proper to blessed Peter.

938. You will say, V: The offices which are said to be proper to the Primacy seem to be common to all Bishops; therefore the Roman Bishop does not seem to obtain the Primacy before the rest. The antecedent is proved. To Bishops there belongs: 1) care of the universal Church. St. Ignatius Martyr, in the letter to the Philadelphians, attributes to Bishops "the ministry of the common Church"; St. Cyprian, in his letter to Quintus, hands down to Bishops that "the balance of governing the Church is to be held"; Venantius, in the Council of Carthage under St. Cyprian, "commends the spouse of Christ" to Bishops; Alexander, Patriarch of Alexandria, in his encyclical letter, says that "the body of the Catholic Church has been handed over" to Bishops; finally Hormisdas, in letter 77, writes that "a similar care of the faith has been committed" to him together with himself. 2) To Bishops belongs the power of making laws for the universal Church; for St. Gregory Nazianzen recounts concerning St. Athanasius that "he again prescribed laws to the whole world." But Athanasius himself, in his Synodical letter, testifies that a Council was celebrated by him "from Italy, Arabia, and Libya." 3) But generally St. Jerome writes, in his letter to Evagrius: "If authority is sought, the world is greater than a city. Why do you bring before me the custom of one city? Wherever a Bishop has been, whether at Rome, or Constantinople, or Rhegium, or Alexandria, or Tanis, he is of the same merit, of the same Priesthood." It is answered: the antecedent is denied. To the first, however, I answer by distinguishing: care of the universal Church belongs to Bishops from charity, I concede; from authority, either I deny or subdistinguish: to Bishops collectively taken together with the Roman Pontiff and dependently on him, I concede; otherwise, I deny. Therefore the common Church is not taken by St. Ignatius for the universal Church, but for one body formed from several communities, over which one Bishop of Philadelphia presided. The "balance of governing the Church," according to Cyprian, is indeed to be held by

Bishops, but for the part proper to each and with dependence. The Church in Venantius is certainly the spouse commended to Bishops, yet not the whole Church to each individually, nor to all by equal right and title. Alexander says that the body of the Catholic Church was handed over to Bishops, yet to each one for his own part; hence he teaches that peace and concord in that body are to be preserved under one head. Finally, Hormisdas is not speaking of a proper care, but of a vicarious care, which he had committed to the Bishop of Constantinople. To the second, I answer by distinguishing: Athanasius prescribed laws to the whole world by teaching, I concede; by commanding, I deny. The whole text has: "He also again prescribes laws to the whole world, and turns the minds of all to himself, sending letters to some, summoning others, and instructing certain others who came of their own accord." But if Bishops from another Patriarchate were present in the Council of Alexandria, this was not done by the command of Athanasius, but by the zeal for faith of those Bishops themselves; for since the Pontifical Legates, Lucifer of Cagliari and Eusebius of Vercelli, were then in the East, they were present at the synod. To the third, I answer: St. Jerome is not treating of the authority of the Pontiff, but of the Roman custom according to which Deacons preferred themselves to Presbyters. Moreover he asserts equality among Bishops, but by reason of order, not of jurisdiction.

939. You will say, VI, with Palmer (part 7, chapter 3): The Primacy which the Roman Pontiff held over the other churches in antiquity must be referred not to divine right, but to purely human causes. Certainly these causes were: 1) the immense number of the faithful, both clerics and laity, even though the Roman Church was suffering most terrible persecutions; 2) the great riches and extraordinary charity of the same Church; 3) its apostolic origin; 4) its pure faith and ardent zeal in condemning heretics, even from the earliest times. Indeed, while the Arian madness was favorable, the Roman Church was the bulwark of the faith; 5) the temporal dignity of the city of Rome, etc. I answer: 1) The origin of the Roman Primacy is not to be imagined a priori; its true cause has been sufficiently manifested and demonstrated by us. And indeed, several of the listed circumstances can be conditions introduced by divine providence, so that the Primacy of Peter might fittingly be constituted at Rome; but they are not causes why the prerogatives of that Primacy existed. It was certainly by divine providence that Jerusalem, the metropolis of the Jewish people rejected by God in punishment for the committed deicide, was replaced by Rome, the metropolis of the nations, so that that city which was the center of all nations and of ethnic superstition might become the center of the religion to which all nations were being called: "so that the light of truth," says St. Leo the Great (sermon 83, no. 3), "which was being revealed for the salvation of all nations, might pour itself out more effectively from the very head through the whole body of the world." But once the center of the Christian religion was constituted in the Roman city, it was plainly consequent that the Christian religion would exert its life there in a special way. 2) Hence most of the circumstances mentioned were nothing other than effects of the primacy constituted in the Roman See through Peter. "For therefore the clergy and faithful people abounded so greatly at Rome, because of the presence of the chair of Peter; therefore the Roman Church was called the See of Peter, because, from the things said, Peter joined the primacy to it in his stable residence; the purity of faith was always preserved in the Roman Church 'because of its more powerful principality,' as St. Irenaeus speaks, or because of possession of the primacy; all the more because the Fathers assert the inerrancy of the Roman Church in perpetuity because of the promises of Christ made to Peter, certainly by reason of the primacy." 3) As we have seen, the Fathers and Councils teach that Peter received the primacy immediately from Christ, but they venerate the Roman Bishop in no other way than as the legitimate successor of Peter. Behold, therefore, the reason on account of which they ascribe a more eminent power to the Roman Bishop. It is one thing to ask why the Roman Bishop is the successor of St. Peter, about which below; another thing to ask why the successor of St. Peter, who now is the Roman Bishop, obtains the primacy, about which we are now treating. The reason for this is the divine ordinance which we have asserted; nor could the very many sayings of the Fathers be understood otherwise, when they say with Irenaeus, "it is necessary that all Churches come together to this Church [the Roman]"; with Cyprian, "the unity of the Catholic Church is proved through communion with that [Roman Church]";

with Ambrose, "the Church is where Peter is," namely, the Roman Pontiff; with Jerome, "they are Christ's who adhere to the Roman Bishop"; with Augustine, "the universal flock was handed over by Christ to be fed by the Roman Pontiff in the person of Peter."

940. You will say, VII: Once succession in the Primacy by divine right is admitted, the indefectibility and visibility of the Church seem to be destroyed. For then, from the institution of Christ, the successor of St. Peter would be an essential part of the Church, just as the Head is an essential part of the body. But the successor of St. Peter is lacking when the See is vacant, and is not certainly knowable in the case of a doubtful Pontiff. Therefore then the Church would cease to exist, or would become invisible. I answer: The Church, as we have heard from the Apostle, must indeed be held as a body to which it is essential to have a Head (no. 420), and indeed, since it is a body formally visible as the mystical body of Christ, it must have a visible head. Nevertheless, just as it is not a certain physical body, or physically one body, but a moral body, so it is not necessary that it always have a head in the way required in a physical body, but in the way required in a moral body. Now the nature of a moral body, or of a society, does not allow that the head always be in it in act without any interruption, since he who is the head, who possesses supreme authority, dies, and after his death a successor is had. Therefore in the same way it must be admitted that there is always a visible head in the Church, which is a society. But just as a kingdom does not perish because of the death of the king, if a successor must be had, so the Church does not fail by the death of its supreme Ruler, whose successor is to be elected. Nor does the Church become invisible in any way. For when the Head is lacking, or exists doubtfully, there remains in the Church the necessity of having a certain Head; there remains the means which is able and ought to elect or designate that Head; there remains the common profession of faith concerning the necessity of this kind of Head, and a sincere disposition of souls toward accepting him when legitimately designated; finally, there remains the action both of those who demand, and of those who take care that the Head be designated. Therefore in all these things the true Church of Christ remains visible with its visible Head, who is the successor of St. Peter. Compare what was said (no. 672). Section V The Opinion Is Established Which Affirms That the Primacy Is Annexed to the Roman See by Divine Right.

941. To understand the force of the arguments which will immediately be brought forward, it is helpful to note: 1) that the assumption cannot properly be demonstrated except from revelation; for what is of divine right requires immediate divine institution. But immediate divine institution becomes known only from revelation. Since, however, we have nothing here from Scripture, the word of God handed down by mouth must be investigated. 2) If from tradition it is established that the Primacy is annexed by divine right to the Roman episcopate, by that very fact it is inseparable from it. Yet authors are not lacking who defend this kind of inseparability by some argument which seems to be taken from other principles; we shall also present that argument just as it stands. 3) There are certain considerations, as it were a priori, which, viewed in themselves, if they do not demonstrate the matter, at least make it most probable. These also we shall propose, all the more because, when compared with the testimonies of tradition, they seem altogether to prove the matter.

942. Therefore I. It is a historical fact already demonstrated that up to these times the Roman Pontiff has always been held as the supreme Head of the Church. But this, as is also certainly established, had its origin from the fact that Peter, constituted by Christ as Head of the Church, came to Rome, fixed his See there, and died there. Therefore he joined the Primacy to the Roman episcopate. Indeed, as we heard from Bellarmine, Peter raised the Roman episcopate itself to the supreme Pontificate; and in him first this proposition was verified: The Bishop of Rome obtains the Primacy by divine right over the universal Church. Now, once this fact exists, who will any longer be able to separate the Primacy from the Roman episcopate, with which Peter joined it? Certainly no authority outside the Church; for the Church is independent of that authority. Nor can the body of the faithful or of Pastors without the Head do it, as we

have seen (no. 912). Therefore, if that separation could be made, it would have to be effected only by the successor of Peter himself. But not even the successor of Peter seems to have so great an authority. For although Christ himself did not determine the reason of succession in the Primacy conferred on Peter, but left it to him to be determined, nevertheless once Peter used that faculty, the faculty itself was, as it were, exhausted and ceased; so that the saying has place: "a thing done cannot become undone"; or, the Roman episcopate, having been raised to the supreme Pontificate, can no longer be stripped of that dignity. They explain this in several ways. For they say: 1) that the fact of Peter, even if it were not from divine right, must nevertheless be considered as a constitutive fact belonging to the fundamental statute of the Church; or 2) that the right of the primacy, by the fact of Peter, from a merely personal privilege became also a local privilege, and therefore intransferable; or 3) that if Christ, they say, did not himself immediately determine in the most specific kind the matter and form of certain Sacraments, he gave the Church the power of determining them. But, as all confess, once that determination was made, the power of the Church ceased in this respect, and that matter and form can no longer be changed. Therefore in the same way it would have to be said that, once the condition of succession in the Primacy was determined by Peter, it is no longer in the power of Peter's successors to change that condition. Since, therefore, the Roman episcopate was so raised by Peter to the supreme Pontificate, one who afterward should abdicate from the Roman See and transfer himself to another See would by that very fact fall away from the dignity of the Primacy. And what Perrone writes seems to bear on this. "And this," he says, "was very well known to that Pontiff residing at Avignon, of whom Francis Petrarch speaks (in the book of Letters Without Title, letter 15), in which he deplores the calamity of the city of Rome. For since the Pontiff was hostile to the Italians, one of his intimate associates advised him to snatch the papacy away from Rome and transfer it to Cahors in Gascony, so that in this way he might avenge himself on the Italians. The Pontiff received this counsel with laughter, replying: 'You have deceived me; until now I had not known that you were mad. Do you not know, foolish man, that by this way which you seemed to yourself subtly to have established, both I and those who will succeed me would become bishops of Cahors,... but that he who presided at Rome would be Pope? Thus, while you think you are overthrowing the Italian name, you are lifting it up and restoring it to its ancient dignity... Let us not contend about titles; for whether we wish it or not, Rome will be the head of affairs...' Namely, the Pontiff knew that no one who was not successor to Peter in the Roman chair could obtain the supreme pontificate, which is inseparably connected with succession of this kind."

943. II. We approach certain a priori observations which suggest that Christ the Lord himself determined the reason of succession in the Primacy. And 1) it seems consonant with reason that Christ, who certainly willed the perpetuity of the Primacy, did not leave succession in it uncertain and, as it were, subject to discretion. But so that it would be certain and exposed to no contestation, there was no more suitable way than to define the certain mode by which it would be effected. 2) Indeed, in the Old Testament this certain reason of succession in the supreme Pontificate already obtained; but all the more does it seem to be admitted in the Church of Christ. For the Primacy of Peter, as we have seen, was instituted for preserving the unity of the Church, which is unity of faith and of government; hence for forestalling or restraining schisms, heresies, and dissensions. These goods could be obtained more certainly if not only perpetual succession in the Primacy were established, but also the place in which the Primacy would stand firm. For if the See of the Primacy had remained indeterminate, or at least mutable, dissensions could easily have arisen concerning the very principle of unity viewed in the concrete. Hence it is that the Fathers often exhibited the Roman Chair as a note of the Church; for from it Unity and Apostolicity proceed. 3) Once the See of the Primacy has been immutably established, the election of the successor is certainly made easier; with the successor of Peter always remaining in the same See, the universal practice of government is more safely preserved through usage and continuous tradition; the way of consulting for the necessary safety of the Church becomes clearer and safer, for by providing for the Papacy, the good of the whole Church is provided for. These things are confirmed by the very experience of the Roman Church, in which the Primacy has in

fact remained up to now. But on the contrary, if the See of the Primacy is left uncertain and movable, given the mutability of all human affairs and taking account of human passions, the Primacy could often have migrated from one region to another; by this not only would those advantages be lost which we said arise from stability, but there would also be a cause of contrary evils.

944. III. The preceding a priori observations receive effective confirmation from others which are deservedly called a posteriori; for these seem to exhibit a tacit indeed, but most brilliant, testimony of tradition. And 1) during the first three centuries of the Church, the greatest persecution against Christians was raging especially at Rome; and yet neither the Pontiffs themselves nor others in the Church thought of transferring the See of the Primacy elsewhere. 2) After peace had been granted to the Church, Constantinople was made the capital of the Roman Empire and was therefore called new Rome; and yet no one thought that the See of the Primacy ought to have been transferred there. Indeed not even the Byzantines with all their ambition dared to contend that the See of the Primacy should be established among them, but at most they asked that the See of Constantinople be held second after the Roman. 3) Innumerable heresies arose, and not a few schisms existed. As heretics, so schismatics were condemned by the Roman Pontiff; many tried ways of avoiding a condemnation of this kind; nevertheless they never thought of transferring the Primacy to another See. Indeed, at the beginning of a heresy or schism, they themselves, as St. Cyprian speaks (book 1, letter 3), "sailed to the chair of Peter," so that they might make it friendly to themselves; and the Donatists tried to establish a Bishop of their own sect at Rome, so that from there he might dominate the universal Church. 4) Generally, the Roman Pontiffs suffered the most terrible persecutions from Emperors and Kings, from Greek Patriarchs and Schismatics. It entered the mind of several persecutors to abolish or diminish the Primacy; yet no one hoped that it could be transferred elsewhere. "The Apostolic See remained at Rome," says Bellarmine (On the Roman Pontiff, book 4, chapter 4), "notwithstanding infinite persecutions and occasions for departing. For first there was the greatest occasion for transferring the see from Rome to another place in the times of the ethnic emperors... Then again there was an occasion for transferring the see in the time of the Goths, etc.... A third occasion for transferring the see was in the time of blessed Bernard because of the persecution of the Roman citizens themselves; for through many years the Roman citizens so harassed their own Pontiffs that they very often compelled the Pontiffs to go into exile from the City, as is clear both from the histories and from St. Bernard, in letter 242 to the Roman people and letter 243 to the emperor Conrad. A fourth occasion was when the Roman Pontiffs remained in Gaul for seventy years, etc." Deservedly we ask here: whence did such a constant, such a universal persuasion, of friends and enemies, arise concerning the indissoluble bond between the Primacy and the Roman See? If the constitutive fact of that bond had been judged merely human and mutable by some authority, the haters of Pontifical authority would at some time have tried to break it.

945. IV. But let us see what tradition teaches concerning this matter. And 1) the things which Bellarmine has seem to obtain full force (book 4, chapter 4): "God himself," he says, "commanded the Apostolic See of Peter to be fixed at Rome; but the things God commands cannot be changed by men. That God commanded this, blessed Marcellus, Pope and Martyr, testifies in his letter to the Antiochenes, where he says that Peter, at the Lord's command, transferred his See from Antioch to Rome. Blessed Ambrose also testifies this in his oration On Handing Over the Basilicas, where he relates that Christ altogether willed that Peter should die at Rome. And for this reason, when Peter was fleeing, he said to him: I am coming to Rome to be crucified again. This is a manifest sign that God willed Peter's See to be confirmed at Rome by Peter's death." Certain Protestants, namely Velenus, Peter, and Basnage, of course ridicule this history; but Foggini vigorously defended it (On the Roman Journey of Peter, exercise 17), as did Mazzochi in the Neapolitan Calendar, and others. Moreover, it is incredible that Ambrose would have proposed that history against Auxentius unless in his age the genuineness of it had been established. But the memory of the same history occurs in the Acts which are inscribed to St. Linus, as also in the Acts of Saints Processus and Martinian; Hegesippus also mentions it in book 3; and Origen seems to allude to the same thing in tome 21

on John, referring to it from the Acts of Paul, which perhaps once were published under the title Acts of Peter and Paul, such as those which Combefis reports from the royal Parisian library. Finally, St. Gregory the Great commemorates the same fact on Penitential Psalm 4. 2) The very testimonies which regard the successors of Peter in the Primacy, with no distinction made, and by the same reasoning, speak of the Roman Bishops, so that they seem to say that Christ, when conferring the Primacy on Peter, in him had regard to the Roman Church or the Roman Pontiffs as such. To recall as an example a few from the many that we have given, Pope Gelasius openly writes: "The holy Roman Catholic and Apostolic Church has been placed before the other Churches by no synodical constitutions, but has obtained the primacy by the evangelical voice of our Lord and Savior: Thou art Peter," etc.; just as if the words of the Lord to Peter had been directed immediately to the Roman Church. Similarly Pelagius II, letter 1, says: "The Roman See, by the Lord's institution, is head of all the Churches"; St. Leo the Great, letter 12 to the Africans: "The reason of piety demands that, on account of the solicitude which by divine institution we owe to the universal Church, etc." Recall the Sardican canons, and you will see the Roman Bishop, as such, considered as Head of the Church. 3) The same thing seems to be confirmed by the decrees of Councils. For a) the Second Ecumenical Synod of Nicaea, in Act 2, receives and approves the letter of Pope Adrian to Tarasius, in which these things are contained: "Whose See," he says, "shining as it obtains the primacy throughout the whole world, and existing as the head of all the Churches of God, from the city of Rome, whence even blessed Peter himself, feeding the Church at God's command, omitted nothing at all, but everywhere obtained and obtains the principate." Here it seems altogether to be treating also of the right of the see, and not only of the right of the person. b) The Fourth Lateran Council under Innocent III, in which Greeks and Latins were present together, says in canon 5: "The Roman Church, by the Lord's disposition, obtains over all others the principate of ordinary power, as mother and mistress of all the faithful of Christ." Here that phrase "by the Lord's disposition" affects the Roman Church itself. c) Likewise the Council of Lyons, in which Greeks and Latins were present under Gregory X, calls the Roman Bishop Vicar of Christ, successor of Peter, ruler of the universal Church. Therefore these attributes are ascribed simply to the Roman Bishop, and indeed absolutely and for all time; and on that account they seem to inhere in the Roman Bishop as such, so that the Roman Bishop, as such, is Vicar of Christ, successor of Peter, ruler of the universal Church. 4) But here especially one must recall the definition of the Council of Florence, renewed by the Vatican Council, which we reported above (no. 903). The Council teaches "that it is to be believed by all the faithful of Christ... that the Roman Pontiff holds the Primacy over the whole world... that he himself is the successor of blessed Peter... and that to him, in blessed Peter, full power of ruling the universal Church was handed over by our Lord Jesus Christ." Hence: here it is a question of some matter which, as being infallibly true, is proposed as to be believed, and therefore must always be true. But what is that matter, or what is the object of this definition? That the Roman Pontiff holds the Primacy, is the successor of St. Peter, and that to him in blessed Peter supreme power was handed over. But if the Primacy were separable from the Roman episcopate, it would not always be true that the Roman Bishop holds the Primacy and is Peter's successor. Therefore the Primacy is inseparable from the Roman episcopate. Will it be said that it has been defined that the Roman Bishop, as successor of Peter, and not as Roman Bishop, holds the Primacy, so that the sense of the definition is: the successor of Peter, who now is the Roman Pontiff, holds the primacy? But a) an interpretation of this kind does violence to the words of the Council; for the subject of the definition, to whom the Primacy is attributed, is the Roman Pontiff. Therefore it must always be true of him that he holds the Primacy. b) At least it is never lawful to depart from the obvious and natural sense of a definition without a compelling reason. But here there is no compelling reason, since it is possible that Christ himself ordered the Primacy to be joined with the Roman See; indeed since, independently of this conciliar definition, that conjunction from divine right is at least most probable. c) But furthermore the Council defines not only that the Roman Pontiff holds the Primacy, but also that he himself is the successor of blessed Peter; therefore it must always be true that he is such. But can the sense of this definition be: the Roman Pontiff, as successor of St. Peter, is successor of St. Peter? Everyone sees the absurdity of this interpretation. d) Hence also the Vatican Council, in the cited canon (no. 902), after first

defining perpetual succession by divine right in the Primacy of Peter, adds: "If anyone shall say... that the Roman Pontiff is not the successor of blessed Peter in the same Primacy, let him be anathema." From this it is confirmed that it must be true in perpetuity that the Roman Pontiff is successor of St. Peter. But the successor of St. Peter will always be so by divine institution, and will always hold the Primacy. Therefore the Roman Pontiff will always hold the Primacy; or, the Primacy is inseparable from the Roman See.

946. Scholion. Supposing the truth of the doctrine which we here defend, one may rightly ask what would happen if Rome were destroyed. To this question one could answer: 1) if the doctrine set forth truly implies the perpetual existence of the city of Rome, it must be said that Rome is never to be destroyed, and therefore that it is an eternal city, as the old tradition of the pagans held. "Nor is it an obstacle," says Bellarmine (loc. cit.), "that in the time of Antichrist Rome seems to be desolated and burned, as is deduced from chapter 17 of the Apocalypse. For this will not happen except at the end of the world, and besides, even then the Supreme Pontiff will be called and will be the Roman Pontiff, although he does not dwell at Rome, just as happened in the time of Totila, king of the Goths, as we said above. Add that Augustine and many others do not wish in that place of the Apocalypse the city to be burned to be understood as Rome, but the multitude of the impious, which is the city of the devil." 2) But, as the cited words of Bellarmine suggest, in order that the primacy be indivisibly annexed to the Roman See, it is not necessary that Rome, or even the Roman diocese itself, always exist. It is enough that the title subsist with the true right of ruling the Roman Church, if it exists and as long as it will exist. Now this title and right could subsist even if Rome were destroyed; whence whoever should succeed to this right and this title would be the true successor of Peter and would obtain the primacy over the universal Church. In fact, if the question is one of mere possibility, just as Rome can, with God permitting or disposing it, be destroyed, so it can be raised up again. But meanwhile the right of the Roman Pontiffs legitimately succeeding one another, namely of ruling the Roman Church as soon as it begins again to exist, would stand unchanged. The primacy would remain annexed to this right; nor is this in any way contradictory. Compare Suarez (On Faith, disputation 10, section 3, no. 11).

947. It can also be noted that from the doctrine just established there seems to follow what the same Bellarmine teaches: "Not only can the Roman Pontiff not err in faith, but neither can the particular Roman Church. But it must be observed here that the firmness of the Church in faith must be taken in one sense, and the firmness of the Pontiff in another. For the Pontiff cannot err by judicial error, that is, while he judges and defines a question of faith. But the Roman Church, that is, the Roman people and clergy, cannot err by personal error, so that absolutely all would err and there would be none in the Roman Church adhering to the Pontiff. For although each one separately can err, nevertheless this cannot happen, that all should err together, and the whole Roman Church become apostate." "It must be observed besides," Bellarmine continues, "that the Roman Church cannot err in the way explained... while the Apostolic See persists at Rome." According to this sense, he says, our proposition is most true; for the cited authors, such as Popes and Martyrs Lucius and Felix; Popes and Confessors Agatho and Nicholas; likewise Cyril and Rufinus, asserted that not only the Pontiff, but also the Roman Church, cannot err. Besides, St. Cyprian (book 1, letter 3): "They dare to sail," he says, "to the chair of Peter and the principal Church, nor do they consider that they are Romans to whom perfidy cannot have access." St. Jerome (book 3, Apology Against Rufinus): "Know," he says, "that the Roman See, praised by the apostolic voice, does not receive tricks of this kind; and that, even if an angel should announce otherwise than what has once been preached, it cannot be changed, being fortified by the authority of Paul." St. Gregory Nazianzen: "Old Rome," he says, "from ancient times has the right faith and always retains it, as befits the City which presides over the whole world, always to have an integral faith concerning God." The testimonies of two Pontiffs can also be added. One is Martin V, who in the Bull which he issued with the Council of Constance approving, judged that those are to be held as heretics who think otherwise about the sacraments or articles of faith than the Roman Church thinks. The other is Sixtus IV, who first through the Synod of Complutum, and then also by himself,

condemned the articles of Peter Oxoniensis, of which articles one was: the Church of the city of Rome can err. Although these things must be understood chiefly by reason of the Pontiff, nevertheless because the Roman Church is not the Pontiff alone, but the Pontiff and people, therefore when the Fathers or Pontiffs say that the Roman Church cannot err, they properly assert that in the Roman Church there will always be a Bishop teaching catholically and a people learning catholically. Compare La Civilta Cattolica, April 6, 1867.

Article 3. What the Force and Nature of the Primacy of the Roman Pontiff Is

948. Having asserted and vindicated the institution of the Primacy in blessed Peter, and its perpetuity in the Roman Pontiffs, we proceed to examine more deeply its nature; and in this matter also we have the Vatican Council as guide. For after renewing the definition of the Council of Florence, by which the Roman Pontiffs, successors of Peter, are said to have full power of governing the universal Church (no. 903), the Vatican Council, in the cited constitution Pastor Aeternus, chapter 3: 1) declares the true character of the Primacy, saying: "We therefore teach and declare that the Roman Church, by the Lord's disposition, obtains the principate of ordinary power over all others, and that this power of jurisdiction of the Roman Pontiff, which is truly episcopal, is immediate; toward which pastors and faithful of whatever rite and dignity, both each one singly and all together, are bound by the duty of hierarchical subordination and true obedience, not only in matters which pertain to faith and morals, but also in those which pertain to the discipline and government of the Church diffused throughout the whole world; so that, with unity of communion and of the profession of the same faith with the Roman Pontiff preserved, the Church of Christ may be one flock under one supreme shepherd. This is the doctrine of Catholic truth, from which no one can deviate while preserving faith and salvation." 2) Then it anticipates the objection usually made, saying: "So far, however, is this power of the Supreme Pontiff from standing in the way of that ordinary and immediate power of episcopal jurisdiction by which Bishops, who, placed by the Holy Spirit, have succeeded in the place of the Apostles, as true pastors feed and rule the flocks assigned to them, each his own, that the same power is asserted, strengthened, and vindicated by the supreme and universal Pastor, according to that saying of St. Gregory the Great: My honor is the honor of the universal Church. My honor is the solid vigor of my brothers. Then I am truly honored, when due honor is not denied to each and every one." 3) It then infers certain rights flowing from the power of Primacy, and condemns contrary errors which derive from the nature of the same being wrongly understood. For it says: a) "Furthermore, from that supreme power of the Roman Pontiff of governing the universal Church, it follows that the same Pontiff has the right, in the exercise of this office of his, of communicating freely with the pastors and flocks of the whole Church, so that they may be taught and ruled by him in the way of salvation. Therefore we condemn and reprobate the opinions of those who say that this communication of the supreme head with pastors and flocks can licitly be impeded, or who render the same subject to secular power, so that they contend that the things which are constituted by the Apostolic See or by its authority for the government of the Church do not have force and value unless they are confirmed by the placet of secular power." b) "And since by the divine right of apostolic primacy the Roman Pontiff presides over the universal Church, we also teach and declare that he is the judge of the faithful, and that in all causes pertaining to ecclesiastical examination recourse can be had to his judgment; but that the judgment of the Apostolic See, whose authority is not greater in any other, is to be retracted by no one, nor is it lawful for anyone to judge concerning its judgment. Therefore they wander from the right path of truth who affirm that it is lawful to appeal from the judgments of the Roman Pontiffs to an ecumenical Council as to an authority superior to the Roman Pontiff." 4) Finally it concludes this whole doctrine with a canon, saying: "If anyone therefore shall say that the Roman Pontiff has only an office of inspection or direction, and not full and supreme power of jurisdiction over the universal Church, not only in matters which pertain to faith and morals, but also in those which pertain to the discipline and government of the Church diffused throughout the whole world; or that he has only the more important parts, and not the whole fullness of this supreme power; or that this power of his is not ordinary and immediate either over all

and each of the churches, or over all and each of the pastors and faithful: let him be anathema."

949. In order that the force of these definitions may become known, and at the same time that the limits of the present question may be defined beforehand, we note first that here we suppose the things established above concerning the institution of the Primacy immediately in blessed Peter, and concerning its perpetuity and the succession of the Roman Pontiffs in the same. Hence the present question is not so much against the Innovators as against the Jansenists and their followers; against the pseudo-Catholics who in Italy are called Regalists, in France Parliamentarians; against the Gallicans, who, having admitted the institution of the Primacy, pervert its true nature.

950. Now, in order to oppose the errors of all these, the Vatican Council declared, I, that the Primacy of the Roman Pontiffs, successors of Peter, is "a power of jurisdiction which is truly episcopal"; and therefore that those err who say that "the Roman Pontiff has only an office of inspection or direction, and not full and supreme power over the universal Church." From these things it is clear that the Primacy truly consists in episcopal power; not properly in power of order, since with respect to the power of order the Roman Pontiff agrees with the other Bishops, but in power of jurisdiction; indeed of full and supreme jurisdiction. But since the Primacy is of divine institution and pertains to the intimate and essential constitution of the Church, that episcopal power of full and supreme jurisdiction in which the Primacy consists is intrinsic both to the Primacy and to the Church, and this by divine right.

951. This affirmation of Catholic doctrine is directly against those who, with Febronius, Tamburini (The True Idea of the Holy See, chapter 2), and others, distinguish in the Roman Pontiff a twofold dignity: namely, the episcopal dignity, in which, with no distinction made between the power of order and jurisdiction, they say he is simply equal to the other Bishops, and the primatial dignity. The Roman Pontiff, they say, as Bishop exercises episcopal jurisdiction in the Roman diocese; but as Primate he stands to the whole Church as a Metropolitan or Patriarch stands to the province or provinces respectively subject to him. Therefore the Roman Pontiff is not properly Bishop of the whole Church, as Bishops are those to whom individual dioceses to be governed are handed over, but a mere inspector, to whom the presidency and direction of the whole sheepfold belongs. Hence also, which Tamburini with his followers intends last and primarily, they say that the government of the Church, from Christ's institution, is not monarchical; but that only from error and abuse, and from usurpations of the Roman Pontiffs, did it become monarchical.

952. The Vatican Council adds, II, that that full and supreme episcopal power of jurisdiction is "immediate, whether over all and each of the Churches, or over all and each of the Pastors and faithful." Immediate power is opposed to mediate power. But he has mediate power over some persons who reaches them only through the mediation of their immediate superiors. Therefore immediate power is power which reaches those same persons as its own subjects, with no other power interposed. In fact, after Febronius, some French theologians taught that the whole power of the Primacy consists in this: that the Roman Pontiff moves the bishops of the various dioceses to exercise their proper office rightly, so that he can exercise his jurisdiction over all the faithful only through them as mediators. They affirm, says Bailly, and he himself subscribes to the opinion, "that the Pope cannot, against the will of the Bishops, exercise in the dioceses the usual functions of Bishops; that he cannot, for example, ordinarily approve priests, ordain ministers, or exclude from the communion of the pious the faithful subject to other Bishops; in one word, that the Supreme Pontiff is not the immediate Pastor in alien dioceses. Yet they confess, and it is agreed among all, that universal solicitude falls upon the Supreme Pontiff, as being head of all the churches; that it belongs to him to watch over all dioceses; that he can, by reason of the primacy, if necessity urges, or in other extraordinary cases, and according to the prescriptions of the canons, exercise the functions of Bishops, or delegate another to do this."

953. Therefore, according to this part of the Vatican definition, it must be held that the Roman Pontiff, who by force of the Primacy has universal episcopal jurisdiction, can immediately reach as his own subjects, and not as alien subjects, all the rest of the faithful just as he can reach Bishops; that is, he reaches these faithful not through those Bishops as mediators. Yet note: 1) from this it by no means follows that no one besides the Roman Pontiff possesses jurisdiction; just as in a truly and absolutely monarchical society, although the King by his own power can act immediately upon all subjects, inferior magistrates are by no means excluded on that account. This holds all the more in the ecclesiastical monarchy, in which by divine right there must be Bishops. 2) But it is not necessary that the Roman Pontiff exercise this immediate power over all the faithful through himself; he can also exercise it through his delegates, yet without the aid of the Bishops of particular dioceses. 3) In the Church, mediate and immediate superiors can be distinguished to designate the order of rulers among themselves, insofar as he who exceeds the simple faithful by one grade is called an immediate superior in comparison with those who exceed them by two or more grades, and therefore are called mediate. But they are not so distinguished to designate the order of subjects to rulers, as though they are subject immediately to the jurisdiction of one, and to that of another only through the mediation of the former. Hence, just as the Parish Priest, with respect to the Bishop, is the immediate superior of the faithful, without its following that the Bishop cannot do by himself in his own diocese what Parish Priests can do; so particular Bishops can be called immediate superiors in their own diocese, without denying that the Roman Pontiff can do there, by himself or through his delegates, whatever the Bishop can do, and something more.

954. The Vatican Council declares and defines, III, that the immediate power of the Primacy over the universal Church is ordinary. Power can be called ordinary by opposition either to delegated power or to extraordinary power. In the first way, ordinary power is that which by divine or human right is annexed to some office, so that he who obtains the office exercises jurisdiction by force of that office and not by force of a special delegation. In the second way, ordinary power is that which is always in force, and not only when extraordinary circumstances concur. Now those would call the power of the Primacy delegated who asserted that it was conferred immediately upon the Church, so that the Roman Pontiffs would exercise it only by delegation of the Church; this error was refuted above. But those would call it extraordinary who, as Bailly has already suggested, would indeed concede to the Roman Pontiff immediate power over all Pastors and faithful, but only in certain extraordinary cases, when special circumstances require it, in a case of negligence or malice of Bishops, as Febronius says.

955. The Vatican Council properly condemned this error, for it had already condemned the other in chapter 1 (compare no. 847), when it asserted that the immediate power of the Primacy is ordinary. Therefore it must be asserted that the office of universal and immediate Pastor in the Roman Pontiff is ordinary and native, not accidental; that it flows from the intrinsic nature of the ecclesiastical monarchy, as it was instituted by Christ, and does not arise from occurring circumstances. These indeed provide an occasion for exercising it, but they do not give it origin. Yet it will help to note here that one thing is what cannot be done because of a defect of authority, and another is what is not expedient or not lawful to be done everywhere and at will. A Bishop, for example, can validly join in marriage any of his own diocesans; nevertheless it is not expedient that, continually running about into the parishes of his diocese, he exercise this office. In the same way it is not expedient that the Roman Pontiffs everywhere involve themselves in lesser affairs when no urgent cause exists; in fact they neither do this nor ever have done it. But if the Pope wishes to decide some matter which may seem smaller, either by himself or through his delegate, he uses his own right, and he can in no way be impeded or judged by anyone. To this point belongs that saying of St. Bernard to Eugene III (On Consideration, book 2, chapter 4): "What is so unworthy of thee as, holding the whole, not to be content with the whole, unless thou shouldst somehow strive still to make thine certain small details and tiny portions of that universal thing entrusted to thee, as though they were not thine?... By doing thus you prove that you have the fullness of power, but perhaps not so of justice.

You do this because you can; but whether you ought to do this is the question."

956. Having defined the supreme episcopal, immediate, and ordinary power of the Roman Pontiff, the Vatican Council adds, IV: "toward which [power] pastors and faithful of whatever rite and dignity, both each singly and all together, are bound by the duty of hierarchical subordination and true obedience." By these words it has been defined that the Supreme Pontiff is superior to a Council.

957. "This question, whether the Pope is superior to a Council, arose," says Bellarmine (On Councils, book 2, chapter 13), "at the time of the Council of Pisa; because, when the two Pontiffs who were seated at the same time in the schism, Gregory XII and Benedict XIII, did not seem to be thinking seriously about removing the schism by spontaneous abdication, as each had vowed and sworn before the Pontificate, the Cardinals of both parties withdrew to Pisa and began to treat whether it was lawful for them, against the will of those Pontiffs, to convoke a general Council and depose those Pontiffs... Then, when shortly afterward the Council of Constance was held, and John XXIII, who alone had come to the Council, had secretly departed from the Council, and thus the Council had remained without a head, the Fathers began to treat whether the Council could judge and depose an unwilling Pontiff. But the controversy grew especially at the time of the Council of Basel; for since Pope Eugene IV wished to dissolve the Council of Basel, once begun, and prevent it from proceeding further, the Fathers began to ask whether they were bound to obey the Pontiff, or whether the Pontiff rather was bound to obey them, that is, the general Council. And since a little before they had seen two Pontiffs, John XXIII and Benedict XIII, deposed by the Council of Constance, and thus an end imposed on the greatest schism, they began to fear that if the Pontiff were not bound to obey the Council, schism would again be renewed, and the Church would remain without any remedy. Therefore on this occasion very many then went into that opinion, that the Council was above the Pontiff. But while they wished to close off the way to schisms, they themselves made a new schism, creating the Pseudo-pope Felix V, who afterward, having recognized the error, abdicated the Pontificate."

958. Although the sounder part of the doctors, especially after the Council of Florence and the Lateran Council, constantly adhered to the ancient doctrine, nevertheless certain Gallicans, taking leave of the tradition of their own Church, proclaimed that a Council is above the Pope. The second article of the celebrated declaration issued in the name of the Gallican clergy on March 19, 1682, reads thus: "That the full power of spiritual things so inheres in the Apostolic See and in the successors of Peter, the Vicars of Christ, that at the same time the decrees of the holy ecumenical Synod of Constance, approved by the Apostolic See, confirmed by the use of the Roman Pontiffs themselves and of the whole Church, and preserved with perpetual religious observance by the Gallican Church, concerning the authority of general councils, which are contained in the fourth and fifth sessions, are valid and remain unmoved; nor does the Gallican Church approve those who weaken the force of their decrees as though they are of doubtful authority and less approved, or who twist the sayings of the Council only to the time of schism."

959. But lest we remain in ambiguity, it must be observed: 1) with Bellarmine (loc. cit.), that the Pope can be compared with a Council in two ways: "In one way, so that on one side the true and undoubted Pope alone is taken, and on the other a general Council over which the Pope presides by himself or through legates, so that nothing is defined without his consent. In another way, so that on one side the Pope alone is taken, and on the other a general Council over which the Pope presides neither by himself nor through his legates. But I understand him not to preside through his legates even when a legate sent by him indeed presides over the Council, but acts against the will of the Pontiff himself; for then he is not truly his legate, although he conducts himself as such." The present question does not turn on the first comparison, according to which we would almost ask whether the Pope is greater than himself. "That question is superfluous," says the same Bellarmine (loc. cit.), "whether a Council with the Pope is greater than the Pope alone; for whether it is greater or lesser, it will never judge, condemn, or depose an unwilling Pope. For how would that Council do this, which does nothing without the consent of the Pope? Would the Pope wish

himself, unwilling, to be judged and condemned?" Therefore the question treats of the Pontiff taken by himself, separately from the assembly of Bishops, which likewise is conceived separately from the Roman Pontiff and by itself. 2) It must be observed that here we are not treating of a deceased Pontiff, or especially of a doubtful one, but of a certain one. For if the Pope is doubtful, especially if there are several doubtful claimants having their own obediences, all agree that they are bound to submit themselves to a Council. For, says Suarez (On Faith, disputation 10, section 6, no. 19), "in that case no true Pope is given in the sight of the Church, which therefore is by no means bound to obey him; therefore the right of the Church remains to elect the true Pontiff, whom it is bound to obey, and therefore also to depose the doubtful one." 3) But what if you say: therefore if the Pope becomes contumacious and scandalous, with the greatest danger to the Church - concerning heresy there will be discussion elsewhere - there will be no remedy? I answer: 1) therefore if a Council without the Pope becomes contumacious - we know that this has sometimes happened - there will be no remedy? 2) If the Pope becomes scandalous and contumacious, he can be admonished by a Council; but he is bound to obey this admonition, according to the common opinion, not by its coercive force, but by natural and divine right. But if, not at all obeying the admonition, he perseveres in evil, "it would be unlawful to proceed further, but meanwhile his return to sound mind would have to be committed to the Providence of God, and to be begged from it alone by prayers and groans." Footnote 1. Sylvius notes (Controversies, book 4, q. 3, art. 6, ad 11): "Although the Church cannot cut off or depose the Pontiff in the case in which he becomes a rotten member, there is nevertheless someone who can cut him off, namely he who constituted him and gave pontifical power to him, that is, Christ. Therefore, just as provision has not been badly made for a kingdom, although its nobles cannot depose a vice-king if he becomes harmful, provided the king himself can depose him, so in the present matter." And Bellarmine (loc. cit., chapter 19): "It is not marvelous if the Church remains without an efficacious human remedy, since her salvation does not rest chiefly on human industry, but on divine protection, since her king is God. Therefore, even if the Church cannot depose the Pontiff, nevertheless she can and ought to supplicate the Lord that he himself apply the remedy; and it is certain that God will have care for her salvation, who will either convert such a Pontiff or take him out of the midst before he destroys the Church." Footnote 1 ends.

960. These are the heads of doctrine which we undertake to defend here; whence we establish the following: Proposition 39. 1) The nature of the Primacy which the Roman Pontiffs, as successors of Peter, obtain by divine right, properly consists in an episcopal power of jurisdiction which is full and supreme, indeed immediate and ordinary over all and each, both faithful and pastors. 2) Whether these pastors are considered each singly or all together, the Roman Pontiff is therefore superior to the very body of Bishops, or to all Bishops gathered in an ecumenical synod. Section II It Is Shown That the Nature of the Primacy Is This: That It Is the Supreme Episcopal Power of Jurisdiction, Immediate and Ordinary.

961. And first, the nature of the Primacy consists in episcopal jurisdiction. This is proved by recalling the very testimonies by which we demonstrated the institution of the Primacy. For: I. With respect to the testimony of Matthew 16, the Primacy: 1) is exhibited under the metaphor of foundation, from which the Church receives firmness and unity. But the Primacy cannot be the principle of the firmness and unity of the Church unless it is a true and supreme power of ruling, and not a simple office of inspection and direction (no. 857). Therefore the Primacy consists in that power of ruling. But the power of ruling the Church is episcopal power; for Christ instituted the ecclesiastical hierarchy in clerics, not in laymen (nos. 525 ff.); and among clerics, God placed Bishops to rule his Church. Therefore. 2) In the same testimony the Primacy is exhibited under the symbol of the keys. But the handing over of the keys imports true authority, and not simple inspection and direction. This is clear a) from what has been said (no. 857); b) from the confession of the adversaries, who for this reason say that the power was conferred by Christ on the Church itself and not on Peter, because they imagine that Christ immediately gave the keys to the Church. Therefore. 3) A similar argument is taken from the words, "whatever thou shalt bind," etc. For these import true power, as is clear a) from what has just been said; b) from the repetition of the same words in Matthew 18, where,

according to Tamburini and his followers, they import in the Apostles and their successors true episcopal jurisdiction.

962. II. The same is brought about from the testimony of John 21. For 1) we have seen (no. 868) that that word "feed" imports a true power of ruling; and in no. 869 that "my lambs" and "my sheep" signifies all those who are of the Church, whether faithful or Pastors. But in those words the institution of the Primacy is contained, as has been demonstrated. Therefore the Primacy is a true power of jurisdiction of ruling the universal Church. But this power, as we said a little before, from the very constitution of the Church is nothing other than episcopal power. Therefore. 2) The same is confirmed by biblical and ecclesiastical usage, according to which a Bishop is represented under the symbol of Shepherd, and episcopal power is expressed by the verb "to feed." Thus in 1 Peter 5.2 it is said of Bishops: "Feed the flock of God which is among you"; and in Acts 20.28 Bishops are said to have been placed by the Holy Spirit to feed, poimainein, the Church of God. Indeed, in 1 Peter 2.25 Christ is called "the shepherd and bishop of our souls, and prince of shepherds"; and Paul, in Hebrews 13.20, calls Christ "the great shepherd of the sheep"; Christ himself in John 10 frequently exhibits himself under the symbol of shepherd. Hence the Church calls all the Apostles, and Christ himself, Pastors; for in the Preface of the Apostles it is said: "that, eternal Shepherd, thou mayest not desert thy flock... to which thou hast granted the vicars of thy work to preside as pastors." Since, therefore, "feed" was said to Peter in relation to the universal Church, he was constituted Bishop of the universal Church. 3) Hence we conclude generally: according to the Scriptures and the Fathers, indeed according to the very way in which the adversaries conceive the matter, the episcopal office consists in this: that the bishop feeds or rules, coerces the people of the faithful, makes laws, commands, etc., according to that saying just recited from Acts 20: "Take heed to yourselves and to the whole flock, in which the Holy Spirit has placed you as bishops to rule the Church of God." But there is nothing of these things which, from what has been said, is not demonstrated to have been conferred primarily and of itself on Peter and his successors. Therefore.

963. III. The same thing is drawn from constant and universal tradition. Certainly 1) Councils and Fathers understood the testimonies of Matthew 16 and John 21 in the same way as we understand them. 2) They attributed to the Roman Pontiff in the government of the universal Church those parts which belong to a Bishop in the government of his particular Church. These things are clear from the testimonies exhibited above. 3) They expressly called the Roman Pontiff Bishop of the universal Church; concerning this matter it will help to exhibit some testimonies here.

964. In the Council of Chalcedon, first his Legates called St. Leo the Great "Pope" or "Bishop of the universal Church"; then those who in the same synod gave to the Fathers of the Council a supplicatory libellus against Dioscorus; finally Sophronius, patriarch of Jerusalem, did the same, the synod not disapproving. In the Synodical letter of the Sixth Ecumenical Council to Pope Agatho it is read thus: "Therefore to thee, as Prelate of the first See of the universal Church, we leave what is to be done." The author of the little book on the exile and death of Pope St. Martin calls the Roman Pontiff "chief Priest and apostolic universal Pope." Maurus, Bishop of Ravenna, in the letter to Pope St. Martin which was approved in the Lateran Council in the year 649, calls him "universal Pontiff throughout the whole apostolic world." The synodical letters of three African councils from the Numidian, Byzacene, and Mauritanian provinces to Pope Theodore have this inscription prefixed: "To the most blessed lord, exalted with apostolic eminence, holy Father of Fathers Theodore, Pope and supreme Pontiff of all prelates." The eastern Bishops, in a letter to Pope Symmachus in the year 512, write: "Daily thou art taught by thy sacred teacher Peter to feed the sheep of Christ entrusted to thee throughout the whole habitable world." In the letter of St. Avitus, Bishop of Vienne, written in the name of the Gallican Bishops to the Palmary synod in the cause of Pope Symmachus, these things are read concerning the Roman Pontiff: "He who presides over the Lord's sheepfold will render an account by what administration he dispenses the care of the lambs committed to him; moreover it does not

belong to the flock to terrify its own shepherd." We have already recited the words of Tertullian, who in the book On Modesty, chapter 1, calls the Roman Bishop "Supreme Pontiff and Bishop of Bishops." It is true that he wrote the aforesaid book after his lapse into the heresy of Montanus, and that he reproves the Roman Bishop because he absolves even adulteries, and, as if mocking, says: "But the Supreme Pontiff and Bishop of Bishops gives pardon even to adulterers." Nevertheless by these words he exists as a witness concerning the designation that at that time was customarily given to the Roman Bishop. St. Augustine, in the cited place against Faustus, chapter 7, names the Roman Bishop "Pastor of the whole Church"; and in book 4 Against the Two Letters of the Pelagians, chapter 12, he calls him "Pastor of pastors." To the Roman Pontiff pertain the words which we recited above from the sermon on the birthday of the Apostles: "First he committed lambs to him, then sheep; because he constituted him not only shepherd, but shepherd of shepherds." Hence St. Bernard rightly addresses Eugene III thus: "They [the Bishops] have flocks assigned to themselves, each one his own; to thee all have been entrusted, to one, one. Nor only of sheep, but also of shepherds, thou alone art shepherd of all. Dost thou ask whence I prove this? From the word of the Lord: feed my sheep."

965. IV. From this it is easily shown that the power of the Primacy is immediate. For since 1) it is episcopal power over the universal Church, or over all and each of the pastors and faithful, the authority of the Primacy over all in the Church will be such as the power of a bishop over all the faithful of his own diocese. But, as the adversaries confess, this is immediate. Therefore. 2) Since the Roman Pontiff in blessed Peter was constituted Pastor, he certainly ought immediately to rule some persons. But whom, except those who were handed over to him to be ruled? And who were handed over to him to be ruled, except sheep and lambs? Indeed, just as Christ said to Peter, "feed my sheep," that is, Pastors, so he said, "feed my lambs," that is, the faithful. Therefore Peter and his successors have the same power over Pastors and faithful. But the power over Pastors is certainly immediate. Therefore.

966. V. In the same way it is shown that the immediate power of the Primacy is also ordinary. For 1) the power of the Roman Pontiff over the universal Church is not less than the power of a bishop in his own diocese, since both are episcopal power. But a Bishop has ordinary power in his own diocese. Therefore. 2) As we saw a little before, the power of bishops over particular churches and the power of the Primacy over the universal Church are expressed in the same way in the Scriptures. For just as it is said to bishops, "feed the flock which is among you," so it is said to Peter and his successors, "feed my lambs, feed my sheep." But through that "feed" said to bishops, ordinary power is expressed. Therefore.

967. VI. But the things which we here assert concerning immediate power can easily be confirmed from the things established above. For in any society that power ought to be held as immediate which: 1) depends on no other authority in the same society; 2) extends to all the members of that same society; 3) and in all and each of them can do, by itself alone, all those things which are attributed to any other superior of that same society. But the power of the Primacy in the Church is of this kind. Therefore. And 1) that it is independent is clear: a) because Peter was superior to the Apostles themselves; b) because consequently the successor of Peter is superior to the successors of the Apostles, and therefore, just as Peter, he must feed or rule the sheep themselves, or Bishops; c) because the sentence of Peter alone, with no other authority interposed, is ratified in the heavens; d) because finally if there were any visible power in the Church superior to the Primacy, it would be the power of the ecumenical Council, or the body of bishops; but a little below we shall prove that the Roman Pontiff is superior to that Council. 2) That the power of the Primacy extends to all the members of the Church is shown by the same arguments, and is abundantly clear from things often disputed. 3) That the Roman Pontiff alone, by force of the Primacy, can effect all things which belong to any superior of the Church is clear: a) because it was said to Peter: "Whatever thou shalt bind... whatever thou shalt loose... shall be bound... loosed in heaven"; b) because he who has immediate and ordinary episcopal power over all and each of the pastors and faithful can do in all what bishops can do in their own subjects; c) because Scripture and tradition acknowledge the indivision of supreme power in one

Head of the Church, namely in Peter and his successors.

968. Therefore let us conclude with the words of Pius VI, who in the Response to the Metropolitans of Mainz, Trier, etc., clearly expressed Catholic doctrine: "The Fathers," he says, "and Councils, both before and after Gregory the Great, as if having entered a treaty among themselves, vied with one another in calling the Roman Pontiff Priest of Priests, Father of Fathers, Pastor of Pastors, Bishop of Bishops, and universal Bishop... This authority of feeding, joined with the power of the keys, attributed in a peculiar way to Peter, just as it shows ordinary and immediate authority over all the faithful, so it also shows that same ordinary and immediate authority over all Pastors, who, with whatever dignity they may shine, not only are not equal to the Pontiff, but are so subject to his authority that those who are called and are pastors, if you look at the peoples, are, if you look at the Pontiff, held only in the number of sheep." Section III Certain Difficulties Against the Things Just Established Are Answered.

969. You will say, I: St. Cyprian (On the Unity of the Church, no. 5) writes: "The episcopate is one, of which a part is held by each singly in solidum." Hence: 1) if the episcopate is one, it cannot be supreme and universal in the Roman Pontiff, but inferior or dependent and circumscribed in the other bishops. 2) If a part is held by each singly in solidum, then all bishops are equal, and only all together have the fullness of the episcopate. I answer by distinguishing the text: the episcopate is one by reason of nature, origin, and the body which all bishops together form, I concede; by reason of power, I subdistinguish; of the power of order, I concede; of the power of jurisdiction, again I distinguish: which nevertheless is not possessed by all with the same fullness, I concede; which is possessed by all with the same fullness, I deny. And similarly that phrase is distinguished, "a part is held by each singly in solidum": with the proportion of power proper to each preserved, I concede; equally and in every way possessed by all, I deny. Therefore: 1) the objected words can be considered in themselves, abstracting from the mind of St. Cyprian, and thus they can be understood: the episcopate is one in all Bishops in almost the same way as human nature is one in all men, namely in those things which constitute the essence of human nature. Therefore, just as the unity of essential human nature in all men does not prevent individual men from being more excellent than one another in talent, learning, authority, etc., so the essential unity of the episcopate does not prevent one among the Bishops, possessing the episcopate more fully, from ruling the others. Indeed, the adversaries hold that, with that unity preserved, some can preside over others by human right; and hence Patriarchs and Metropolitans are superior to Bishops. What, therefore, prevents such inequality from being established by the one divine right, while the essential unity of the episcopate remains intact in all? Thus Tournely with other theologians. 2) The words of St. Cyprian, considered according to his mind, display this sense: the episcopate is one insofar as all Bishops effect one body, which is the ruling and teaching Church. "The episcopate," says Ballerini (On the Force, Nature, etc., chapter 12, no. 10), "is one according to the opinion of Cyprian in the way that the Church is one; and therefore a part of the episcopate is held in solidum by each Bishop insofar as his particular church, or his particular flock, which is a part of the whole Church, is ruled by each one. But the Supreme Pontiff, successor of St. Peter, although as Bishop he rules one particular Roman flock, which likewise is part of the Catholic Church, nevertheless, from the primacy by which he presides over the whole Church, is the center and origin of the unity of the whole Church according to the very opinion of Cyprian, etc." And this interpretation is drawn from the context; for the context has: "This unity [of the Church] we Bishops especially, who preside in the Church, ought firmly to hold and vindicate, so that we may prove the episcopate itself also to be one and undivided. Let no one deceive the brotherhood by a lie; let no one corrupt the truth of faith by faithless prevarication. The episcopate is one, of which a part is held by each singly in solidum. The Church also is one, which is extended more widely into a multitude by the increase of fruitfulness." Therefore St. Cyprian affirms the same species of unity concerning the episcopate and concerning the Church. The holy Doctor inculcates this doctrine also in other places: "And since," he says, "there is from Christ one Church divided throughout the whole world into many members, likewise one episcopate diffused by the concordant numerousness of many Bishops," etc. "One Church... and

one faith joined together into the solid unity of the body by the glue of concord." 3) As is clear from the context itself, the episcopate is also one by reason of origin according to the mind of St. Cyprian. For immediately after the words of the context just recited, he adds: "As the rays of the sun are many, but the light is one; and the branches of a tree are many, but the strength is one, founded in a tenacious root; and when from one source many streams flow down, although the numerousness may seem diffused by the largeness of the overflowing abundance, nevertheless unity is preserved in the origin. Tear a ray from the body of the sun; unity does not receive a division of light. Break a branch from the tree; it will not be able to bud forth fruit. Cut a stream off from the source; once cut off, it dries up. So also the Church, flooded with the light of the Lord, stretches her rays through the whole world. Yet there is one light which is spread everywhere, nor is the unity of the body separated." But a little before he had taught that unity proceeds from Peter (no. 887). Therefore, according to St. Cyprian, the episcopate exists originarily and fully in Peter and his successors, but participatively in the rest. Thus the episcopate in Peter and in the others is one, just as the light in the ray and in the sun is of the same nature; the branches are of the same substance with their tree; and streams also with the source. But just as the fullness, dependence, force, and intensity of light is not the same in the ray and in the sun; the fullness, dependence, and quantity of water is not the same in the streams and in the source; so the fullness of the episcopate, the intensity and extension of jurisdiction, is not the same in Peter, from whom it proceeds as from a source, and in the other Bishops, who derive it from Peter.

970. You will say, II: St. Cyprian, in his writings on rebaptizing, and the Councils of Carthage held under him concerning the same controversy, teach many things which openly conflict with the Primacy, or the episcopal jurisdiction of the Roman Pontiff over the other Bishops; and especially in letter 74 to Pompeius, he reproaches St. Stephen with "obstinacy, presumption, blindness of mind, depravity," etc. But a holy man, such as St. Cyprian was, would certainly have abstained from these insults if he had regarded Stephen, the Roman Pontiff, as his superior. I answer: 1) Not a few hold that such writings of St. Cyprian and acts of the Councils are adulterated. Compare the excellent dissertation of Marcellinus Molkenbuhr, which appears in Migne, Patrologia Latina, volume 3, page 1357; Tizzani in the work which he published at Rome in 1862; and Revue des sciences ecclesiastiques, volume 7, pages 221, 305, 419, 513. Nor is this opinion new, since - let it not be wearisome to recall these things - St. Augustine had already written in letter 93 to Vincent the Rogatist, nos. 38 and 40: "But that Cyprian thought otherwise concerning baptism than the form and custom of the Church held is found, not in canonical writings, but in his own letters and in those of the council. But that he corrected this opinion is not found; nevertheless it is not incongruent to judge of such a man that he corrected it, and perhaps it was suppressed by those who were excessively delighted with this error and did not wish to lack so great a patronage. Although there are not lacking those who contend that Cyprian did not think this at all, but that it was fabricated under his name by presumptuous and deceitful men. For the integrity and knowledge of the letters of one Bishop, however illustrious, could not be guarded in the way that canonical Scripture is guarded by the letters of so many languages, and by the order and succession of ecclesiastical celebration; nevertheless against it there have not been lacking those who forged many things under the names of the Apostles." Compare what was said (no. 669). 2) But the insults of St. Cyprian against Stephen the Roman Pontiff would be commemorated here in vain, even if they had truly been uttered. For just as a man can act against faith and the dictate of reason, so he can resist legitimate authority from passion, without nevertheless denying it. Nor is it an obstacle that St. Cyprian was a holy man; for to protect his sanctity it is enough that he was such before the controversy with Stephen arose, and especially at the end of life. But if he uttered those insults against Stephen, while he uttered them he certainly was not holy. Hence St. Augustine writes in the cited place: "But then Cyprian either did not at all think what you Donatists recite him as having thought, or afterward corrected this in the rule of truth; or this as a blemish of his most candid breast he covered with the richness of charity, while he most abundantly defended the unity of the Church growing throughout the whole world, and most perseveringly held the bond of peace. For it is written: Charity covers a multitude of sins (1 Pet. 4). To this was also added that, as a most

fruitful branch, if there was anything to be corrected in him, the Father purged it with the pruning-hook of suffering." But since the objections which are here taken from St. Cyprian can also be solved in another way, we shall also follow that way.

971. You will say, III: St. Cyprian in the Seventh Council of Carthage, which is the third on baptism, says: "Nor does any one of us constitute himself bishop of bishops, or by tyrannical terror force his colleagues to the necessity of obeying." Therefore he denies that the Roman Pontiff is Bishop of Bishops. I answer by denying the consequence. For 1) St. Cyprian speaks of the African Bishops who, assembled in that Council ("any one of us"), were debating the question of rebaptizing; not of the absent Roman Pontiff. And in fact, the decree of Stephen concerning not rebaptizing heretics had not yet reached St. Cyprian; for it was not read in that Council, as similar documents of the Supreme Pontiff were accustomed to be read. How therefore could St. Cyprian complain about it? Compare the dissertation published at Paris in 1724, On the Dissension Between St. Stephen and St. Cyprian. 2) St. Cyprian contends nothing else except that the right is inherent in each Bishop of freely bringing forth his own opinion in Council, without any one being able to force others into his opinion; but he is always treating of the Bishops present there. "Wherefore," he says, "it remains that concerning this very matter we, each one, bring forth what we think, judging no one or removing anyone from the right of communion if he shall have thought differently. For no one of us constitutes himself bishop of bishops, or by tyrannical terror forces his colleagues to the necessity of obeying, since every bishop has, according to the license of his liberty and power, his own judgment; and he can no more be judged by another than he himself can judge another."

972. You will insist: But St. Cyprian denies even of the Roman Bishop that he can judge others, for he adds: "But let all of us await the judgment of our Lord Jesus Christ, who alone and singly has the power both of setting us over the government of his Church and of judging concerning our act." It is answered: these words of St. Cyprian are to be understood of doubtful and obscure matters. For as long as they are such, truth is investigated; and in this investigation St. Cyprian asserts the liberty of Bishops. Hence even if some Bishop in this investigation of matters still doubtful should wander from the right path, he will render an account of this matter to Christ, to whom the secrets of conscience are known. Moreover, if after the investigation is completed, the matter is finally defined, the sentence must be stood by. Indeed, if St. Cyprian had thought that the Roman Pontiff could not pass sentence on bishops, how in letter 67 could he have exhorted St. Stephen to order that Marcian, the Bishop of Arles who had defected to the Novatians, be reduced to order and another be constituted in his place? "Wherefore," he says, "it is fitting that you make very full letters to our co-bishops constituted in Gaul, so that they no longer allow Marcian, perverse and proud and an enemy of divine piety and fraternal salvation, to insult our college."

973. You will insist: St. Cyprian judged that Basilides, bishop of Asturica in Spain, who had been deposed by his fellow provincial bishops and restored by St. Stephen the Roman Pontiff, was not to be held as bishop; indeed he asserted that the one who had been substituted in his place was true and legitimate Bishop. I answer: St. Cyprian did not judge the restoration of Basilides invalid from a defect of authority in the Roman Pontiff, but from a defect of justice, insofar as he judged the sentence of restoration to be surreptitious. This is clear from the very words of St. Cyprian, in the letter to the clergy and people of Asturica: "Nor can it rescind an ordination perfected by right, that Basilides, after his crimes had been detected and his conscience laid bare even by his own confession, going to Rome, deceived Stephen our colleague, who was far away and ignorant of the matter carried out and the truth kept silent, so that he ambitiously sought to be unjustly restored to the episcopate from which he had been justly deposed," etc. Meanwhile, from these things it is established that bishops in Spain, driven from their see, fled to the Roman See; and this indeed further confirms our thesis.

974. You will say, IV: St. Gregory the Great rejects the name "Bishop of the universal Church." For in book 4, letter 32, he says that the appellation "bishop of the universal Church" is "a

name of blasphemy"; and in letter 36 to Eulogius of Alexandria and Anastasius of Antioch he says that none of his predecessors used "so profane a word." Therefore. I answer by distinguishing: he rejects the name Bishop of the universal Church in the sense that he is the only Bishop, I concede; in the sense that, with the jurisdiction of the other Bishops preserved, he rules the universal Church by episcopal authority, I deny. That this is the mind of St. Gregory is clear from the very places objected. For in letter 32 he says: "But let that name of blasphemy be absent from our hearts, in which the honor of all priests is taken away while it is madly arrogated to himself by one." And in letter 36: "But none of my predecessors ever consented to use so profane a word, because, namely, if one patriarch is called universal, the name of patriarch is derogated from the rest."

975. You will insist: if it is so, why then does St. Gregory absolutely reject the very name "Bishop of the universal Church"? I answer: a twofold reason for this matter can be assigned. First, John the Faster, Bishop of Constantinople, had arrogated to himself the title of ecumenical Bishop, which created great scandal. Hence St. Gregory, writing to him in book 5, letter 18, says: "You have been led to this, that, the brothers being despised, you desire to be named Bishop alone." By his humility St. Gregory wished to cure the pride of John. Then, as we said, the name Bishop of the universal Church seemed to display a certain ambiguity; therefore, lest by excluding the false sense St. Gregory seem to vindicate it for himself, he entirely rejects it. And, his biographer testifying, from then on he began to call himself "servant of the servants of God." Moreover, Gregory confesses that this name could belong to him by right. For in book 5, letter 17, he says: "Surely, as your Fraternity knows, through the venerable Council of Chalcedon the prelates of this Apostolic See, which by God's disposition I serve, were called universal with honor offered? But nevertheless no one ever wished to be called by such a word [St. Leo the Great did not call himself universal Bishop, but Bishop of the universal Church]; no one seized this rash name for himself, lest if in the grade of pontificate he seized the glory of singularity, he should seem to have denied it to all the brothers." But St. Gregory constantly asserted for himself the thing itself signified by that name. Thus, for example, he writes in book 5, letter 20 to Maurice: "To all who know the Gospel, it is clear that by the Lord's voice the care of the whole Church was committed to blessed Peter. Behold the care of the whole Church and the principate are committed to him, and yet he is not called universal Apostle; and my most holy fellow-priest John tries to be called universal Bishop?" Compare Schrader, On Roman Unity, part 2, no. 88 ff.

976. V. They object here again the words of St. Jerome: "If authority is sought, the world is greater than a city. Why do you bring before me the custom of one city? Wherever a Bishop has been, whether at Rome, or Eugubium, or Constantinople, he is of the same merit and of the same priesthood. The power of riches and the humility of poverty does not make a Bishop higher or lower." To confirm the answer already given (no. 938), note: 1) St. Jerome certainly speaks of the power of order when he says, "Wherever a Bishop has been... he is of the same merit," since a little before he had said: "For what does a Bishop do, except ordination, that a presbyter does not do?" These things certainly cannot be understood of the power of jurisdiction, since presbyters were and are subject to the jurisdiction of Bishops. 2) But when St. Jerome teaches, "if authority is sought, the world is greater than a city," this must be understood per se and in the subject matter. Per se, indeed, because the authority of a custom is of itself greater the broader it is; but in the subject matter, because the custom then prevailing at Rome, by which deacons were preferred to presbyters, as St. Jerome himself indicates, was not approved by the Roman Bishop, and therefore was rather an abuse to be eliminated. Compare Bellarmine (book 2, chapter 15).

977. You will say, VI: There cannot be two immediate pastors over one and the same flock without confusion arising in the flock and between the pastors themselves. But this would happen if the Roman Pontiff had immediate episcopal jurisdiction over all in the Church. Therefore. I answer by distinguishing the major: there cannot be two immediate pastors of the same order, or without the subordination of one to the other, I concede; otherwise, I deny. "It is unfitting," says St. Thomas (on book 4

of the Sentences, distinction 17, q. 7), "that two be constituted equally over the same flock. But that two, one of whom is more principal than the other, be constituted over the same people, is not unfitting; and according to this, both the Parish Priest and the Bishop and the Pope are immediately over the same people." To confirm this answer, it is helpful to note that the episcopate can stand in three ways: 1) with universal and independent jurisdiction, as is the Primacy of the Roman Pontiff; 2) with universal but dependent jurisdiction, as it was in the Apostles; 3) with particular and dependent jurisdiction, as it is in the other bishops. Now although the Apostles were universal bishops, this nevertheless did not prevent those ordained by the Apostles themselves from being true bishops, with true episcopal power, "placed by the Holy Spirit to rule the Church of God." Certainly Paul left Titus in Crete, so that he might carry out episcopal functions there; yet the Apostle himself was not prohibited from exercising episcopal authority in the Cretan church as before. The same must be said of St. John and the other Apostles with respect to various churches, as is clear from the Epistles, the Acts of the Apostles, and the Apocalypse. Therefore the universal episcopate and the particular episcopates of others over the same flock do not conflict with one another. Indeed in any kingdom it not only is not repugnant, but is required, that under the king, who has supreme and full power, there be other magistrates, prefects, and finally superiors, by whatever name they are called. For the king cannot by himself rule and govern the whole kingdom. Therefore in the same way there can be other superiors in the Church besides him who has supreme and full power, without preventing this power from immediately reaching all. The only difference is that in the Church Christ himself, just as he instituted the Primacy, so under it he instituted the episcopal order, which therefore must always be in the Church, so that Bishops are not properly vicars of the Roman Pontiff (no. 542); whereas in other kingdoms it belongs to the king himself to determine what kind of inferior magistrates there are, who assist him in the administration of the kingdom and who perform their office in his place. Section IV It Is Shown That the Roman Pontiff Is Superior to Bishops Taken Collectively.

978. I. From Scripture. For 1) as we demonstrated above, the authority of the Primacy is contained under the metaphor of foundation, which Christ used when addressing Peter (Matt. 16). But this imports authority over Bishops even taken collectively. Therefore. Proof of the minor. a) It belongs to a foundation to sustain, not the various parts of a building taken separately, but all of them insofar as they grow together at once; nor otherwise does it properly sustain the building. b) It belongs to a foundation to effect firmness and unity; and the question is of the firmness of the building itself, and not only of its parts separately; and unity properly regards the parts insofar as they are gathered together. c) Wherefore, if the Bishops collectively taken were superior to Peter, they themselves would be his foundation, and Peter would not be theirs; which indeed is contrary to the institution of Christ, who constituted Peter the foundation of his whole Church, from whom the Bishops themselves would derive firmness and unity. 2) Peter and his successors are the foundation, or superiors, of that Church against which Christ promised that the gates of hell would never prevail; for Christ constituted the Primacy, that is, the foundation, precisely so that through it the Church might resist its enemies invincibly and have perpetual firmness. But the Church against which the gates of hell will never prevail is the universal Church, or the Church collectively taken, and not the faithful or Bishops taken singly, against whom it is evident that the gates of hell have sometimes prevailed. Therefore. 3) Peter is superior to that Church which Christ simply called his Church: "upon this rock I will build my Church." But this is the whole, universal Church, according to its parts collectively taken; for if they are taken separately, they do not constitute the Church of Christ. Therefore. 4) In like manner the keys were promised and delivered to Peter, but the keys of the kingdom of heaven. But a kingdom imports the whole collection of those who belong to it. Therefore Peter has the keys, or supreme power, over all those who belong to the Church collectively taken. Surely one who received the keys of a city would have power not only over the individual citizens, but over their body; Bishops, who have jurisdiction in a particular diocese, are superior to all the diocesans taken together. Therefore Peter, who received the keys of the kingdom, or of the universal Church, is superior to all who are of the Church collectively taken. Only to this

extent could it be understood that the assembly of Bishops is superior to the Roman Pontiff: insofar as the supreme executive power alone, as they say, were with him, but the legislative power were with that assembly. But we have vindicated for Peter the plenitude of supreme power; and we have shown that the form of government in the Church, by the institution of Christ, is simply monarchical. Therefore. 5) It is evident from the things disputed above that the Pontiff is the head, pastor, father, teacher, and leader of the Church. But a head stands above not only the members taken separately, but the whole body; a father presides not merely over individual sons, but over the whole family; a pastor, not only over individual sheep, but over the whole fold; a teacher, not only over individual disciples, but over the whole school; a leader, not only over individual soldiers, but over the whole army at once. Therefore the Roman Pontiff similarly presides with power not merely over the faithful or Bishops taken separately, but over all at once, or over the whole collection, and thus over the universal Church. No sane person would say that the individual sheep are subject to the shepherd, but that the collection of sheep can stand above the shepherd and command him; that the individual lesser leaders are subject to the supreme leader, but that their assembly stands above him, and so on. 6) Wherefore, if we consider the whole complex of the testimonies of Sacred Scripture, it is evident that Christ willed Peter, after his ascension into heaven, to be in relation to the Church what he himself was while he was visibly dwelling on earth. Hence Peter and his successors have been called the Vicars of Christ on earth. But Christ was in no way subject to the Church or to the Apostles collectively taken. Therefore. Hence it is that the Protestant Mosheim, in his dissertation on the appeals of the French, etc., writes: "That they say the Pontiff presides over all or individual churches, but not over the universal Church, seems to me as judicious as if someone were to affirm that the members indeed are ruled by the head, but not the body which consists of the members; or that all cities, villages, and estates are subject to a king, but not the province itself which is contained by these."

979. From Tradition the doctrine with which we are dealing could be most abundantly confirmed. But, mindful of our plan and consulting brevity, we shall recall certain principal heads, which are sufficient. Therefore, I. from Tradition it is evident that the Pontiff is judged by no one. Nicholas openly teaches this from ancient decrees, writing in his letter to the Emperor Michael: "The first see will be judged by no one"; and: "The first see will be judged neither by the Augustus, nor by Kings, nor by all the Clergy, nor by the people." The synod held under Hadrian II, chapter 4, declares: "We read that the Roman Pontiff has judged concerning the prelates of all the Churches; but we do not read that anyone has judged concerning him." The Third Lateran Council, canon 1, treating the case of a delinquent Pontiff, says: "Recourse cannot be had to a superior." Ivo of Chartres, letter 235, speaking of Paschal the Roman Pontiff, says: "The Pope seems to me to have to be admonished, that he judge himself or retract his deed. But if he does this, let us give thanks to God, and let the Church, which languishes while its head labors under such a weakening affliction, rejoice with us. But if in this languor he shall be incurably sick, it is not ours to judge concerning the Supreme Pontiff." The Bishops of Gaul, called to the cause of Leo III, answer: "We do not dare to judge the Apostolic See; for it itself is judged by no one, as was also the custom anciently."

980. II. Tradition explicitly teaches that the Pontiff cannot be judged even by a general Council. The Synod of Chalcedon first declared this by deed, in the letter to the Emperors and in the letter to Leo, related in Act 3; for it writes that it condemned Dioscorus chiefly for this cause, that he presumed to pass sentence against the first see. But the Third Council of Constantinople, Act 10, canon 21, declares in express words: "If a universal synod shall have been gathered, and any ambiguity and controversy shall even have arisen concerning the holy Roman Church, it is necessary, with veneration and with suitable reverence, to inquire concerning the proposed question, and to receive the solution, or to profit and make progress; nevertheless not boldly to pronounce sentence against the Supreme Pontiffs of elder Rome." Hence Hadrian, in the same place, Act 7, through Peter the Deacon, after condemning the "intolerable presumption of Photius," by which he dared to institute judgment against the Roman Pontiff, teaches and confirms by examples that this cannot be done even by a general Council, unless the Roman See itself concurs or

precedes in judging.

981. III. All these things receive a stronger force from the reasons which are brought forward. For Nicholas assigns this reason: "there is no authority greater than that of the Apostolic See"; Hadrian: "it is not lawful for inferiors to resist superiors"; the Roman Fathers under Symmachus: "a singular power belongs to the Apostolic See in the Churches"; the Gallicans under Leo: "the Pontiff is the head of all the Churches of God"; Ennodius: "to Peter alone it was said, upon this rock I will build my Church"; Avitus: "if the arbiter of heaven commands us to be subject to earthly powers, it is not easily given to be understood by what reason or by what law the more eminent should be judged by inferiors. For when the Apostle cries out with a celebrated precept that an accusation ought not to be received even against a presbyter, what must be judged lawful in accusations against the principate of the general Church?" And: "the See of Peter is no less to be cherished in the Church than the summit of the world in the city"; finally: "if the Pope of the City is called into doubt, the Episcopate will now seem to waver, not the Bishop."

982. IV. For this reason Tradition declares that the causes of the Pontiff are reserved to the judgment of God alone. This is asserted in the Acts of the Fourth Roman Synod under Symmachus, which pronounces this Pontiff immune from every imputation "as far as regards men," but "reserved the whole cause to the judgment of God." The Fathers subscribed to this Council in this form: "we have subscribed to this statute, in which we committed the whole cause to God." Ennodius, in the Apology of this Council, confirmed by the Roman Synod under the same Pontiff, says: "God perhaps has willed the causes of other men to be terminated through men; the prelate of the See of Rome he has without question reserved to his own judgment. He willed the successors of blessed Peter to owe their innocence to heaven alone." Avitus, in the same cause, writing in the name of the Gallican Bishops to the Roman Senators, says: "We understand that Pope Symmachus, if he had first been accused before the world, ought to have received the solace of his fellow-priests rather than their judgment. The synod itself, foreseeing this by a praiseworthy constitution, reserved to divine examination the cause which it had almost rashly undertaken to inquire into." Hence Innocent III, in sermon 2 on the consecration of the Pope, writes: "Faith is necessary to me to such a degree that, although concerning other sins I have God alone as judge, because of the sole sin which is committed in faith I can be judged by the Church." And St. Peter Damian, in the Debate between the Advocate of the King and the Defender of the Church: "The condemnation of a Pope is so grave and inexplicable that it must be treated only by divine judgment, not by human judgment."

983. V. On the contrary, it is evident that the Roman Pontiffs can correct, and have corrected, the decrees of Councils. And 1) this doctrine is expressly handed down. Thus concerning the pseudo-synod of Ephesus, Gelasius wrote in his letter to the Bishops of Dardania: "The Apostolic See by its own authority condemned Dioscorus, the prelate of the second see, and by not consenting set aside the impious synod; and, for the truth, it alone decreed that the Chalcedonian synod be held. Just as that which the first see had not approved could not stand, so what it judged should be judged the whole Church received." The same Gelasius then adds, in a more general formula in the cited letter: "The whole Church throughout the world knows that the see of blessed Peter the Apostle has the right of loosing what has been bound by the sentences of any Pontiffs whatsoever." And in the book On Anathema he says: "The whole matter is placed in the power of the Apostolic See. Thus what the Apostolic See confirmed in synod obtained force; what it rejected could not have firmness." The same is taught by Julius I in Socrates, book 2, chapter 13; Sixtus III in the letter to the Bishops of Illyricum; Pelagius II in letter 4 to the Bishops not assembled with John of Constantinople; Nicholas I in letter 8, etc. Wherefore, in agreement with these declarations of Gelasius, Hincmar writes in his book On the Divorce of Lothar and Theutberga: "By all these things it is shown that a synod of bishops of one province judges the judgments of its provincial bishops, while a general synod either approves or corrects the judgments or dissensions of provincial bishops; but the Apostolic See reviews, reopens, and confirms the judgments both of provincial and of general synods; as the letters of Leo and

Gelasius and of the other Roman Pontiffs, and the Sardican synod, evidently show." Hence also arose that wise saying of Ratherius, Bishop of Verona, in the Itinerary: "Nowhere is that ratified which is there made void, namely with the Apostolic See; nowhere is that made void which has there been ratified"; and of Ratramnus, book 4 Against the Objections of the Greeks: "Whatever Councils were strengthened by its sentence remained ratified; but those which it condemned were reckoned as nothing and could have no authority." 2) All these things are confirmed by the fact itself. We all know that the little Council of Ephesus was rejected by Leo I; Damasus rejected Ariminum; since the Roman Pontiff alone, as we recalled above, had opposed canon 28 of the Council of Chalcedon, that same canon never had any force; hence the Greeks themselves expunged it from the codex of their Church. The Synod of Constantinople, held in the year 755 by 388 Bishops against the cult of holy images, was condemned by Hadrian II, etc. 3) We pass over here the things which pertain to the authority of convoking councils, presiding over them, confirming the same, prescribing to them their norm and rule, etc., which all antiquity acknowledged in the Roman Pontiff; for these things belong to another place. It suffices here to transcribe the testimony of Leo X, who in the constitution Pastor Aeternus, promulgated in the Fifth Lateran Council, session 11, says: "That the Roman Pontiff alone, as having authority over all Councils, has the full right and power of indicating, transferring, and dissolving Councils is manifestly evident, not only from the testimony of Sacred Scripture, from the sayings of the Fathers and of other Roman Pontiffs, and from the decrees of the sacred canons, but also from the proper confession of those same Councils."

984. VI. But in truth that Gallican distinction between the Church collectively and distributively accepted was unknown to all antiquity, and had its origin, as we said in no. 957, at the time of the Council of Pisa. This is also clear from the manner of acting of the adversaries, who, to strengthen their doctrine, could praise no authors other than some who wrote around the times of the Council of Constance, when, namely, blinded by the darkness of the schism, they could not sufficiently attain the truth. Hence Andreas Duval could most truly say, in On the Comparison of the Supreme Pontiff and the Council, question 7, that the doctrine which we here defend glories in such a number and weight of authors that "the whole world, except for a very few doctors, embraces it." Indeed Gerson himself admits that it savored of heresy to say that the Pope is inferior to a Council. For he has these words, On Ecclesiastical Power, consideration 12: "I am mistaken if, before the celebration of this Synod of Constance, this tradition had not so occupied the minds of very many, of letters rather than of learned men, that one dogmatizing the opposite would have been either marked or condemned for heretical depravity. Receive this as a sign of the matter: after the declaration of the same holy Synod, there are found those who do not fear to assert such things everywhere." Hence whatever monuments of ancient tradition extol the Primacy of the Roman Pontiff, those same monuments exhibit the Primacy also over the universal Church, even collectively accepted.

985. From the things said certain theological reasons can be drawn to confirm the matter. And 1) no supreme authority can be acknowledged in the Church unless it is evident that it was constituted by Christ. But nowhere is it read that supreme power was conferred by Christ on a Council without the Pope. Therefore. The minor is proved. If all testimonies both of Scripture and of tradition are brought together, we find a twofold subject of supreme power, inadequately distinct: namely Peter alone, "whatever thou shalt bind," etc.; and the body of the Apostles, Peter included, "whatever you shall bind," etc. But when there is a Council without the Pope, neither of those subjects of supreme power is had. Therefore. 2) If supreme authority were to be attributed to a Council without the Pope, this authority would belong to it either a) by reason of the episcopal authority in which the gathered Fathers rejoice; or b) by reason of the collection itself; or c) by reason of representation, insofar as that Council would represent the universal Church. But supreme authority belongs to the Council of which we are treating under none of these heads. Not under the first, for episcopal power was thus conferred on each one so that it would be determined to certain subjects and dependent on another authority; this is evident from reservations, from the hierarchy which ought to flourish and does flourish in the Church, etc. Not under the second, for the very collection of

Bishops of itself effects jurisdiction extensively greater, insofar as it is extended to more subjects, but not intensively, insofar as it can do more in all of them than the individual Bishops can do in their own subjects. An authority intensively greater could belong to it in no other way than from the institution of Christ; and we have often said that Christ promised nothing of this kind to Bishops without the Head. Not under the third, for first of all all Bishops apart from the Head would represent the Church without its principal and essential part; and this indeed is not to represent the universal Church. Then, too, the representation of the universal Church could confer supreme power only insofar as Christ had conferred it immediately on the Church and not on Peter. But we have shown that supreme power over the universal Church was conferred immediately by Christ on Peter. Therefore. Hence the University of Paris, in the year 1396, in the cause of Peter de Luna, appealing to a future, certain, and legitimate Pontiff, says: "It is certain that the Bishop of Rome, as Vicar of Christ, does not have a superior, since Christ did not have one, and since he handed over the Catholic Church, founded by himself and through himself, to Peter as Head to be governed." And the two principal Doctors of Paris, St. Thomas and St. Bonaventure, taught the same. The first, On Power, question 10, article 4, reply to 13, writes: "But just as a later Synod has the power of interpreting the Symbol composed by an earlier Synod, and of adding certain things for its explanation, as is clear from the things said above, so also the Roman Pontiff can do this by his own authority; by whose authority alone a Synod can be gathered; and by whom the sentence of a Synod is confirmed; and to whom appeal is made from a Synod. All these things are clear from the acts of the Synod of Chalcedon." The other, in the little work On the Ecclesiastical Hierarchy, part 2, chapter 1, says: "The Supreme Pontiff, however, with whom the first authority on earth resides, is not judged by a king, not by a prince, not by a man; he is reserved to the judgment of God alone."

986. SCHOLION. We have already seen, in no. 948, that the Vatican Council, from the established true nature of the Primacy, immediately infers both certain special rights proper to the Primacy and the condemnation of certain special errors which are opposed to it. Nevertheless it is not necessary to pursue these expressly and more at length; for 1) by the very fact that these are immediate corollaries of the defined nature of the Primacy, by those arguments by which this is established, those also are confirmed. 2) Several authorities which we recited in establishing the true nature of the Primacy directly and expressly set forth the same corollaries. 3) A question concerning certain special rights or errors which pertain to the Primacy or are opposed to it cannot be agitated except among those who, on the one hand, acknowledge the Primacy, and to whom, on the other hand, its nature is not yet altogether clear. Such were the Gallicans. But since the Primacy of Peter and of his successors has now been demonstrated, and its nature defined, those questions become almost superfluous. In truth, the head of the Gallican errors in this matter was the superiority of a Council over the Pope. Therefore it will be enough to touch those corollaries briefly.

987. I. The Vatican Council infers the right of the Roman Pontiff "of communicating freely with the Pastors and flocks of the whole Church." Now if the Roman Pontiff has supreme ordinary and immediate power over the individual faithful and Pastors, there belongs to him a right to the means without which he could not exercise his right and fulfill his office. But free communication with the Pastors and flocks is a necessary means for exercising immediate jurisdiction over all. Therefore he has the right to this free communication. In like manner the Council condemns the opinions of those who say that the free communication of the Roman Pontiff with all in the Church "can licitly be impeded." And indeed, by whom could it licitly be impeded? Not by some power external to the ecclesiastical hierarchy, since we have proved that the Church is independent of every civil power and superior to it, dissertation 3, article 10; not by some power in the Church itself, since we have demonstrated that the Roman Pontiff, successor of Peter, obtains supreme and full power above the Council itself.

988. II. The Vatican Council infers that "in all causes belonging to ecclesiastical examination, recourse can be had to his [the Roman Pontiff's] judgment." Now from an inferior authority there is always, of itself, recourse to a superior. But the power of the Roman Pontiff is supreme in the

Church. Therefore in all causes belonging to ecclesiastical examination recourse can be had to the judgment of the Roman Pontiff. In like manner the Vatican Council condemns the error of those who "affirm that it is lawful to appeal from the judgments of the Roman Pontiffs to an ecumenical Council." And indeed it is not lawful to appeal from a superior authority to an inferior; nor is there any appeal from supreme authority. But we have proved that the Roman Pontiff is superior to a Council, and that he possesses supreme power in the Church. Therefore it is not lawful to appeal from the judgments of the Roman Pontiff. In truth, whence did the Gallicans draw the absurd opinion concerning the right of appeal from the Pope to a Council? Precisely from this, that they taught that the Council is above the Pope. Besides, in the demonstration of the thesis we gave several testimonies which both directly establish the right of appeal to the Roman Pontiff and directly exclude appeal from the Roman Pontiff to a Council.

989. III. Here also can be recalled another error of the Gallicans, by which they establish that the power of the Roman Pontiff is bound and restricted by preceding canons. "The use of apostolic power," it is said in the Declaration of the year 1682, "is to be moderated by the canons established by the Spirit of God and consecrated by the reverence of the whole world; the rules, customs, and institutes received by the Kingdom and Church of Gaul also remain valid, and the boundaries of the Fathers remain unshaken; and this pertains to the amplitude of the Apostolic See, that statutes and customs, confirmed by the consent of so great a See and of the Churches, should obtain their proper stability." The author of the Defense of that Declaration, book 11, develops these things more fully and strives to confirm them by many arguments, not without great confusion of things and many contradictions.

990. Therefore, to avoid confusion and to determine the point of the question, let it be noted: 1) the question is not at all about the canons of the Church by which matters of divine or natural right are declared and confirmed. In these the power of the Supreme Pontiff is bound, not precisely by the canons, but by divine or natural right itself, against which he can establish nothing. 2) But in canons which do not touch matters of divine or natural right, but establish matters of merely ecclesiastical right, a twofold force must be distinguished: one directive, the other coercive. Their directive force consists in this, that one ought to follow the canons in order rightly to fulfill his office and thus act licitly, although for a just cause he can also dispense. But the coercive force of canons is placed in this, that one is subject to them as an inferior to a superior, so that unless he follows them he acts invalidly.

991. Now no one denies that canons have directive force over the Roman Pontiff. Therefore he ought to care for their observance, generally to follow them, and not to dispense from them without just cause; otherwise, acting illicitly, he would have to render an account to God. Surely canons which regard the universal Church, having been established not without the special assistance of the Holy Spirit, tend to the good of the Church, and therefore generally require observance, unless the circumstances of things change. But the Roman Pontiff is bound to procure the good of the Church. Therefore he ought generally to follow the canons, unless because of changed circumstances the good of the Church itself requires their change. Therefore, unless he generally follows them, he would transgress the divine or natural law, in the same way as if he neglected to establish a law necessary for the Church.

992. But the question properly concerned the coercive force of canons with respect to the Roman Pontiff; and this certainly must be absolutely denied. For either 1) those canons are considered insofar as they proceed from the other Bishops, and thus they cannot bind the Roman Pontiff, who is superior to them; 2) or they are considered insofar as they proceed from the Roman Pontiff himself, and not even thus can they bind him. For it is known that no one has coercive force over himself; moreover successors, having the same power, can loose what the predecessor bound; 3) or finally they are considered insofar as they proceed from the Roman Pontiff together with the other Bishops, and not even thus can they bind the Pontiff. For the authority of the Bishops together with the Roman Pontiff is not greater than the authority of the Pontiff alone, who, as has been proved, possesses the plenitude of supreme power. Therefore, unless the

divine constitution of the Church is entirely overturned, by denying that its form of government is simply monarchical, it is impossible to assert a coercive force of canons over the Roman Pontiff. But enough concerning these matters. Section V The Difficulties of the Gallicans Are Answered.

993. I. The principal foundation of the Gallicans was the authority of the Council of Constance, which, because a plague was raging, Martin V transferred to Basel. The Council of Constance, session 4, decrees: "This Synod itself, legitimately gathered in the Holy Spirit, making a General Council, representing the Catholic Church militant, has power immediately from Christ, to which anyone, of whatever state or dignity, even if it be papal, is bound to obey in those things which pertain to faith and to the extirpation of the said schism and to the general reformation of the Church of God in head and members." And in session 5: "Likewise it declares that anyone whatsoever, of whatever condition, state, and dignity, even if papal, who shall contumaciously despise to obey the mandates, statutes, ordinances, or precepts of this sacred Synod and of any other General Council legitimately gathered, concerning the aforesaid things or things pertaining to them, made or to be made, unless he comes to his senses, is to be subjected to fitting penance and duly punished, recourse being had even to other remedies of law, if need shall be." But the Council of Basel confirmed the decrees of Constance five times. I answer: This foundation of the Gallicans totters from a double head; for 1) the objected decrees are of no authority; 2) they speak only of a doubtful Pope.

994. As to the first: decrees of a Council not approved by the Pope are of no authority. But the aforesaid decrees were not approved by the Pope. Therefore. The minor is proved as to the Council of Constance. The approval which is usually opposed is that which is attributed to Martin V, who, in session 45, professed "that he wished to hold all and each of the things determined, concluded, and decreed in matters of faith by the Council of Constance in conciliar fashion, and to approve and ratify the things thus done in conciliar fashion, and not otherwise, and not in another manner." But these words do not contain approval of the two decrees of sessions 4 and 5. For: 1) By these words Martin V approves decrees in matters of faith. But the two objected decrees were not in matters of faith, because a) the adversaries wished, without injury to the faith, that it was possible to dispute on either side concerning the present matter; I say they wished, because after the Vatican Council they can no longer still wish this. b) In session 5 itself, this Synod placed these decrees among the synodal constitutions, which it distinguished from the advisements in matter of faith. Nor were they passed under penalty of anathema, or with the note of heresy, as is usually done in definitions of faith, but only under penalty of penance and punishment against contumacious transgressors. 2) By the same words Martin V approves the things which had been done by the Council of Constance in conciliar fashion. But the two objected decrees had not been done in conciliar fashion. This is evident a) from defect of convocation; for it had been made neither by an undoubted Pope, nor by certain or more numerous Cardinals of the Roman Church, nor by another legitimate and universal authority, especially since John XXIII conceded to Gregory, and the Fathers in session 20 conceded to Benedict, that a new convocation of the Council should be celebrated by them. b) From defect of gathering; for from the Acts, in Van der Hardt, the Bishops from the obedience of John alone were present, and not all of them; but from the Bishops furnishing obedience to Gregory and Benedict, of whom there was the greater part, none attended. Hence Eugene IV, in the Bull given at Florence in the year 1439, on the day before the Nones of September, after warning that those decrees had been made at Constance by Fathers of the obedience of John XXIII alone, concludes: "Therefore what was done by the Fathers sitting there ought not to be ascribed to the universal Church, but only to those who were sitting there and were making a synod of one obedience only." And the same is testified by Cardinal Torquemada, book 2, Summa on the Church, chapter 39, and in the Apology for Eugene IV. c) From defect of consent; for, as John testifies in his letters to Ladislaus, King of Poland, and to the Duke of Berry, and as is clear from the Acts relating the protestation of the Cardinals and Nations, many things were done in this Council by force, terror, clamor, and insult. Then it is evident from the relation of the Acts itself that before the fourth session the Cardinals warned the Nations "that they should suspend for a

time the matters which have great difficulties and require mature deliberation." Finally, before the fifth session, the same Cardinals, with the Orators of the King of France, secretly protested that "for the sake of avoiding scandal they were going to the Session, not with the intention of consenting to the things which they had heard had to be established in it"; and in each session, according to the witnesses Torquemada and Eugene, "some of the more serious men, protesting, were forced to be silent by the noisy multitude." The minor is proved as to the Council of Basel. The adversaries contended that it had been approved by Eugene IV in the Bull Dudum, in which, moved both by the armed persuasion of the princes and by fear of schism and the iniquity of the times, the Pontiff revoked the dissolution of the Council made by himself, just as he revoked the Bulls that set it forth, and declared the Council of Basel legitimately begun and continued. But: 1) Here there is not an approval of those decrees which come into controversy. For a) Eugene IV approved "the progress of the Council, but not the decrees"; Cardinal Torquemada testifies that Eugene himself declared this, book 2, Summa, chapter 100. Surely Damasus approved the Council of Constantinople, Leo the Council of Chalcedon, and Martin the Council of Constance; and yet they are not understood to have affirmed all their decrees. b) In the Bull Dudum Eugene neither revokes the dissolution nor approves the continuation simply, but under a double condition: first, "that all and each of the things done and carried out against pontifical authority by the said Council first be entirely removed and restored to their original state"; then, "that the deputies sent by him be admitted effectively to the presidency of the aforesaid Council." Yet neither of these conditions was observed. c) Hence in a letter to his Legates in Germany, in Raynaldus at the year 1446, he writes that "the Councils of Constance and Basel were received by him and had been received, yet without prejudice to the right, dignity, and preeminence of the Apostolic See and of the power granted to him." 2) The Synod of Florence, in the session held in the year 1439 on the day before the Nones of September, condemned the declarations of Basel as impious, scandalous, and tending toward manifest rupture of the Church; and the Lateran Council pronounced the same thing in session 2. But Aeneas Sylvius, afterward Pius II, in the Oration against the Austrians, writes: "Among the bishops and the other conscript Fathers we saw cooks and grooms at Basel, judging the affairs of the world. Who would judge the sayings or deeds of these to have the force of law?" And St. Antoninus, Chronicle, third part, title 22, chapter 10, section 4, says that the Council of Basel was a synod "bereft of strength, a synagogue of Satan, a rash and presumptuous assembly." And St. John of Capistrano, On the Authority of Pope and Council, part 3, calls that synod "profane and excommunicated, a den of basilisks, a band of demons."

995. As to the second, it can be shown by many arguments that the decrees of the Council of Constance regard the case of a doubtful Pontiff. For this is evident 1) from witnesses. For a) Eugene IV, in the Bull Moyses given at Florence, condemns the "wicked sense of the men of Basel" concerning the decrees of Constance. But it could not have been condemned if they had thought only that a doubtful Pope is subject to a Council. Therefore, since the men of Basel subjected a certain Pontiff to a Council, and, as Eugene testifies, had a wicked sense, the sense of the Council of Constance was only concerning a doubtful Pope. b) Aeneas Sylvius, in the cited oration held at Vienna, affirms that the Council of Constance itself implies that an undoubted Pontiff can neither be subjected nor brought before a council. c) Cardinal Torquemada asserted the same in the Council of Florence, namely at that time when the memory of the decrees of Constance was recent, and before those who could have convicted him of manifest falsity if he had proposed an alien interpretation of those same decrees. 2) From the very words of the decrees. For the Council begins thus: "This holy Synod of Constance, making a General Council for the extirpation of the present schism and for the union and reformation of the Church," etc. But in the text of the first decree it is read thus: "He is bound to obey in those things which pertain to faith and to the extirpation of the said schism"; and in the context of the other decree it is had: "Whoever shall contumaciously despise to obey this sacred Synod and any other General Council legitimately gathered concerning the aforesaid things," that is, the extirpation of the present schism and the union and reformation of the Church, "or concerning things pertaining to them," etc. Now it is evident that in that schism there were three Pontiffs dividing the Church

into diverse parts, all then doubtful, and finally deposed. 3) From the purpose. Certainly no question was then being raised concerning the authority of a certain Pontiff; nor was the Council in any way gathered to discuss or define this question. The question, as far as regards the Pope, was a) that the schism be extinguished by constituting a certain Pope; b) that it be established how, in the meantime, action should be taken with doubtful Popes. But it is altogether improbable, nor is it to be admitted without manifest documents, that the Council, as if forgetful of its purpose, in almost the very beginning of its deliberations, wished to issue a definition of faith in a matter about which neither was there any controversy nor did it in any way pertain to the end for which it had been gathered. 4) But in vain would you say that the Council, in the second decree, speaks not of itself alone, but of all Councils generally. For the Council of Constance indeed speaks of any other Council gathered "concerning the aforesaid things," that is, to remove a schism; but not of any other Council simply. Surely that Council, having before its eyes the outcome of the Council of Pisa, could rightly fear that the schism would not even be removed by itself. 5) In vain also would you say that the Pope is declared subject even as to things pertaining to faith which would be decreed, and that the condemnation of Wyclif and others proceeded from this Council. For a) those words, "to faith," are not found in the first editions of the Council. b) It is utterly incredible that by these words the Council looked to heresy to be condemned under a certain Pope; for no question was then being agitated, as we have said, whether a certain Pontiff is bound to obey a Council defining concerning faith. Therefore those words "to faith" were employed by the Council only conjunctively with the extirpation of the schism. In truth, at that time a favorer of schism was held to be "vehemently suspected of heresy"; just as an author of schism, or its principal cause, such as the Antipopes were, was condemned "as a heretic and schismatic," as the Cardinal of Cambrai warns in the schedule exhibited at the beginning of the Council. Hence it also happened that those refusing to lay down the supreme Pontificate were accused of heresy and schism by the Procurator of the Council. Compare Roncaglia concerning all these things, in the observations on dissertation 4 of Natalis Alexander on the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, and on dissertation 8.

996. You will say, II: It is read in Matthew 18.15 ff.: "But if thy brother shall sin against thee, go and rebuke him between thee and him alone... but if he shall not hear thee, take with thee one or two... if he shall not hear them, tell the Church; but if he shall not hear the Church, let him be to thee as a heathen and a publican." Hence they say: 1) these words are directed to Peter. 2) Under the name of brother comes also the Pontiff, who has often been addressed by this name by Bishops, and is a son of the Church. 3) But under the name of Church here comes a general Council. Therefore Peter, if he is guilty, can both be denounced to that Council, and he himself must denounce contumacious guilty persons to it; and thus he is inferior to the same Council. I answer: 1) It can altogether be denied that these words were said to Peter in the singular. For from the beginning of the chapter up to the objected words, Christ addresses all universally, treating of the sin of scandal and of fraternal correction. Not until verse 21 does Peter rise up, asking: "Lord, how often shall my brother sin against me, and I forgive him?" To this question Christ adapts a particular response. But in this very thing, as anyone sees, Peter asks as a private person; for he asks how often an injury by our brother is to be forgiven. And therefore Christ's response regards Peter as a private person. Surely when these words were uttered, Peter was only a private person; for he had not yet been constituted Pontiff. 2) But the name of brother, however it may have been used, certainly detracts nothing from the authority of the Pontiff. The example of Christ, who also addressed the Apostles as brothers, shows this. And similarly the appellation of son can in no way be an obstacle, as Pius II teaches in the Bull of Retraction, year 1463, saying: "Although the Pontiff is a son of the Church because of regeneration, nevertheless because of dignity he is held as father; and just as by reason of sonship he himself ought to venerate the Church as mother, so by reason of prelacy he is preferred to it, as shepherd to flock, prince to people, ruler to family." 3) But how is it shown that under the name of Church here comes a Council? For if a Council with the Head is understood, the text does not bear on the proposed question; but if a Council without the Head is understood, it does not represent the universal Church. Finally, in either sense an absurdity is attributed to the

text, namely the convocation of a general Council for any sin whatever of a refractory brother. Therefore it must be said more rightly that here under the name of Church is understood the Prelate of the Church. Hence St. Thomas, on book 4 of the Sentences, distinction 19, question 2, reply to 4, says: "A Prelate can be considered in two ways: either according as he presides over judgment, and thus to tell the Prelate is to tell the Church, and thus witnesses ought first to be brought in before it is told to the Prelate; or as he exists outside judgment, and thus to tell the Prelate is not to tell the Church, but to tell the person who can profit and not harm. And according to this it ought first to be told to the Prelate rather than to other witnesses."

997. You will say, III: Roman Pontiffs have often confessed that they are subject to the canons of general Councils. Therefore they are inferior to those Councils. I answer by distinguishing the antecedent: they have confessed that they are subject to the canons of general Councils without the Head, I deny; with the Head, I subdistinguish: to canons treating of matters of faith, of divine right, or of natural right, I concede; to canons containing positive ecclesiastical dispositions, I subdistinguish again: they have confessed that they are subject directively, or coercively insofar as this is from natural or divine right, I concede; otherwise, I deny. Therefore let us first note two things: 1) this whole difficulty wanders outside the question; for the sayings of the Pontiffs do not treat of canons issued by headless councils. 2) Many canons were issued not by ecumenical Councils, but by Roman Pontiffs. But if successors were bound by the canons of these, they would be powerful with less authority than their predecessors; that is to say, the authority of the Primacy would gradually and continuously be diminished. That the Roman Pontiff cannot abrogate all canons, because under these both dogmas of faith and determinations of natural and divine right are comprehended, any Catholic admits. But as to canons which contain positive ecclesiastical dispositions, if they have any force for coercing the Pontiff himself, this does not come from their intrinsic force, so to speak, but from an extrinsic one, namely from natural and divine right, as we explained above in no. 991. Hence, for a just cause the Pontiff can dispense in those canons, and, when circumstances have changed, he can also abrogate them both validly and licitly. But if he does this without just cause, the dispensation or abrogation will always be valid; and if it is illicit, concerning this fault he will render an account to God alone. But several authorities which are opposed here carry with them a clear and reasonable explanation. Thus, for example, they object the words of Celestine: "Let the rules lord it over us; let us not lord it over the rules, but let us be subject to the canons." But these words are directed by the Pontiff to the Vicar of Illyricum, to whom, while fixing the just limits of power, the superior, by the courtesy of condescension, speaks in the person common to both of what pertains to the inferior. They oppose the statement of Agapetus concerning "the authority of the canons to be guarded inviolably"; but this regards the attempt of Caesarius, who wished to squander the goods of the Church. The Pontiff, refusing to give a faculty for this matter, which was illicit of itself, said that he was "forbidden by the vengeance of divine judgment." Likewise Leo teaches that "it was not lawful even for the Fathers of Chalcedon to change what the Nicenes had established"; that is, in matters of divine right or things necessary of themselves to the Church, but not in other and diverse matters. Hence, in the same letter, he did not wish to recognize as invalid the ordination of the Bishop of Antioch, made by Anatolius contrary to the Nicene canons; and elsewhere, in the letter to Rusticus of Narbonne, he says: "Just as there are certain things which can be torn away by no reason, so there are many things which ought to be tempered either because of the necessity of times or because of the consideration of ages," etc.

998. You will say, IV: More than once the Pontiffs themselves declared that causes can and ought to be terminated not by themselves, but by Councils. Thus Siricius wrote to the Council of Capua in the cause of Bonosus; Innocent I to the Clergy of Constantinople in the cause of St. Chrysostom; Innocent III, register book 3, letter 15, epistle 18, in the cause of Philip Augustus, King of France. I answer: First, it is evident that the recited testimonies prove nothing, since they would prove too much. For the Councils of which there is question are not general, but particular; and thus the Supreme Pontiff would be inferior to particular Councils, which is so absurd that no one has ever said it. But a brief exposition of the

causes which are objected will settle the matter. And 1) the Synod of Capua had committed the cause of Bonosus, Bishop of Sardica, to Anysius, Bishop of Thessalonica, who, on account of an occurring difficulty, referred the judgment to Siricius. But he refused to hear the matter, not because of a defect of power, but either because, on account of the distance of place and the absence of the parties, it was difficult to receive due information, or because the Pontiff did not wish to seem to judge the matter as if subdelegated by the delegate of the Council. And Siricius touched on each of these reasons in his response. 2) So far was Innocent I from confessing that the cause of Chrysostom could not be defined by himself, that rather he rescinded the sentence of the pseudo-synod at the Oak and restored Chrysostom to his see. Nevertheless he declared that a Council was necessary for the cause to be completely ended; not as if a greater intrinsic authority belonged to the Council than to himself, but because, in that case, the diverse interests of the peoples, the rivalry and hatred of Bishops, and the arts and violence of the court demanded a certain greater extrinsic authority before men, arising from number. 3) Innocent III had written to Philip Augustus that he by no means dared to effect anything for dissolving his consummated marriage; for it was indubitable that this was by no means lawful by divine right. But he added: "If we should attempt to determine anything concerning this without the deliberation of a General Council, besides the offense and worldly infamy which we could incur from it, perhaps danger to order and office would threaten." But by these words he certainly did not assert that the authority of a Council is greater; for otherwise power to establish something contrary to divine right would have to be conceded to the Council, which no one would say. Therefore he employed that way by which he would more easily decline the solicitations of the King in an honorable and even human way.

999. You will say, V: St. Augustine, letter 162, otherwise 43, no. 19, speaks thus concerning the judgment rendered by Melchiades, the Roman Pontiff, against the Donatists in the synod held at Rome: "See, let us suppose that those Bishops who judged at Rome were not good judges; there still remained a plenary Council of the universal Church, where the case could be agitated with those judges themselves, so that, if they were convicted of having judged badly, their sentences would be dissolved." I answer by distinguishing: St. Augustine asserted this, arguing as if ad hominem against the Donatists, I concede; as if from his own opinion it were lawful to appeal from the sentence of the Roman Pontiff to a Council, I deny. That is to say, the Donatists contended that the Roman judges, who had declared Caecilian innocent, had been unjust. But St. Augustine replied: even if this is conceded, nevertheless the plenary Council of the universal Church is against you. That this distinction is according to the mind of the holy Doctor is clear from the whole letter; but here are the words immediately preceding: "But if they [the Donatists] could not [convict Caecilian of false accusation], they would indeed persist in the same perversity, but yet they would as it were have something to say, that they had suffered bad judges. This is the voice of all bad litigants, when they have been overcome even by most manifest truth; as if this could not be said to them for this purpose, and said most justly. See, let us suppose those Bishops," etc. Besides, by the words "plenary Council of the universal Church," St. Augustine signifies the consent of the whole Church with the Roman Pontiff in absolving Caecilian from the accusations of the Donatists, and not an assembly of gathered Bishops. For in the cause of Caecilian or of the Donatists no general Council was ever held. Whoever desires to know the judgment of St. Augustine should recall his celebrated saying, sermon 137, no. 10: "For already concerning this cause [against the Pelagians] two Councils [the Carthaginian and the Milevitan] have been sent to the Apostolic See; from there also rescripts have come. The cause is finished; would that the error might at last be finished." And the holy Doctor often used this principle.

1000. You will say, VI: The Pope is a member of the Church; therefore he is less than his whole, which is the Church represented through all the Bishops. I answer: The Pope is a member of the Church which is compared to the rest of the Church as monarchical head and prince, I concede; as a simple member, I deny. This difficulty sins from many heads, although the Gallicans repeated it rather often. Surely 1) even in the human body the head is less than the whole in quantity of mass; and yet by reason of

dignity and power, it is more powerful than the whole remaining body. 2) But here the question is not of a physical whole, but of a moral whole; but it is absurd to rise from physical magnitude to moral authority, as though this were to be measured by that. On this hypothesis the authority of the army would be greater than that of the leader; of the sons than that of the father of the family; of the Church than that of Christ; for considered according to mass, the leader is less than the army, the father than the family, Christ than the Church. 3) Authority flourishes in the Church only insofar as it has been communicated by Christ. Therefore it is found greater where Christ placed the greater authority. But Christ set not the Church over Peter, but Peter over the Church. 4) Finally, the adversaries perpetually assume that a headless Church is the whole, or the whole Church; but when cut off from its head, it cannot even be called the Church of Christ. 5) Wherefore, if we wish to speak rightly, since the plenitude of power resides in the Roman Pontiff, he together with the Bishops makes more persons having authority, but not a greater authority; just as, because God is the plenitude of being, he together with creatures makes more beings, but not a greater or more perfect entity.

Article 4. Whether the Jurisdiction of Bishops Proceeds from God Immediately, or Through the Mediation of the Roman Pontiff

1001. To understand the nature of the Primacy more deeply, it is very useful to investigate the origin of the power of Bishops. For since episcopal jurisdiction over all and each, not only the faithful but also pastors, belongs to the nature of the Primacy, the better we understand what kind and how great their dependence is on the Primate of the universal Church, the better also is the genuine character of the Primacy established. But the sense of the question must be duly declared.

1002. And I. The question here is not about the designation or election of the person who is to be set over the Church as Bishop. For the original and proper right of electing and confirming Bishops is certainly with the Roman Pontiff. Surely: 1) In any society, or form of society, the creation of inferior powers belongs of itself to the supreme power; for participation in power cannot be sought except from that principle which already possesses both the power and the force of communicating it, no. 722. But in monarchical government the highest power is whole and undivided in the prince. But it has been shown so often that the Roman Pontiff is the supreme head of the Church, whose form of government is simply monarchical. Therefore, by proper and original right, it belongs to the Roman Bishop to elect and confirm the other Bishops, no. 515. 2) The Roman Pontiff is the supreme Pastor constituted by Christ in the Church, to whom belongs the care of the whole fold, concerning which he must also render an account to God. But this universal care, concerning which he must render account, chiefly requires that he himself be able to designate subordinate pastors, on whom the right administration of the Church depends for the greatest part. Therefore. 3) Unless Bishops are constituted by the Roman Pontiff, by whom at last could they be constituted by right? Certainly not by any other Bishop; for, excepting the Roman Pontiff, all the remaining Bishops have authority only over their particular Church, and that dependent authority. Much less could they be designated and confirmed by the faithful people, unless we should wish, with the Protestants, to attribute supreme dominion in sacred matters to the people, and to imagine the government of the Church as democratic, contrary to every sense of Scripture and tradition. Finally, that election cannot be made by secular Princes, who have no authority in the Church, as is clear from the things said about the distinction by divine right between Laymen and Clerics. Therefore.

1003. II. Therefore the question is not about the designation of the subject in whom episcopal power resides, but about the power itself; and we seek the origin of this power in individual Bishops. In this matter, recalling the twofold power, of order and of jurisdiction, no. 755, let us note that these two powers are not only distinct, but also separable. Surely: 1) There can be episcopal power of jurisdiction in some subject without the power of order. It is an ancient discipline in the Catholic Church that

one elected as Bishop and solemnly announced by the Supreme Pontiff administers his Church with jurisdiction of every kind, even if not yet consecrated, and defers his consecration through the whole time established by law. To recall one or another example: Claudianus, the brother of St. Mamertus, Bishop of Vienne, according to Sidonius Apollinaris, letter 11, book 4, was a mere presbyter while he exercised episcopal power in the place of his brother. St. Augustine, after designating the presbyter Heraclius as successor to himself in the episcopate, wished the offices of episcopal governance to be transferred to him while he was still a presbyter. For he says, letter 213, otherwise 110, no. 1: "I beseech you to allow me to pour back the burdens of my occupations upon this young man, that is, upon Heraclius the presbyter, whom today in the name of Christ I designate as Bishop, successor to me." 2) Episcopal power of order can also be found in some subject without the power of jurisdiction. For a) the power of order, once received, can never be lost, so that, unlike the power of jurisdiction, even if bound by some impediment, it would indeed be exercised illicitly, but validly. Theodoret, for example, reports in Ecclesiastical History, book 1, chapter 9, the letter of the Council of Nicaea to the Churches of Egypt, by which jurisdiction is taken away from Melitius, Bishop of Thebais, while there nevertheless remains in him not only episcopal power of order, which cannot be lost, but also dignity and rank, or episcopal honor. The deposition of Bishops, or their spontaneous abdication, confirms the matter. The Cathari or Novatians were held as deposed by the Council of Nicaea, canon 7; and there is discussion of the abdication of Eustathius, Bishop of Pamphylia, in the Council of Ephesus, Synodical Letter to the Synod in Pamphylia. These things certainly show that the present practice of the Church is not new. b) The practice of the Apostles confirms the same thing, when they ordained Bishops who, attached to no see and furnished with no ordinary jurisdiction proper to themselves, were sent here and there as co-workers of the Apostles and their delegates. Compare Bolgeni, The Episcopate, part 1, chapter 7, no. 78. Here also belongs the practice of ordaining Bishops for the sake of honor alone, with the administration of no church handed over to them. But concerning all these things the Canonists can be consulted.

1004. III. Now it is evident among all that the power of order in Bishops is immediately from God. Therefore the whole question concerns the origin of the power of jurisdiction. But it must still be noted that this power of jurisdiction can be considered as if in the abstract, insofar as it generally regards the episcopal order and grade, so that the question is asked "whether by the immediate institution of Christ there ought to be Bishops who, dependently on the Supreme Pontiff, rule the Church"; and in the concrete, insofar as the same power resides in this or that particular individual, so that the question is asked "whether, in individual Bishops, just as the power of order proceeds immediately from God, so also does the power of jurisdiction"; for that it proceeds at least mediately from God is again conceded by all. No one doubts that the power of jurisdiction considered in the abstract is of divine right and immediately from God. For by the immediate ordination of Christ it is the case that in his Church there are pastors and teachers, as the Apostle speaks in Ephesians 4.11; to Peter the sheep were handed over by Christ to be fed, and the Apostles themselves constituted Bishops. Certainly neither the Supreme Pontiff nor any human authority can ever bring it about that the order of Bishops is not in the Church, or that it indeed is there but does not rule the Church. Therefore the whole question is reduced to the power of jurisdiction in the concrete; and concerning it the question is asked "whether it is in the Bishop immediately from God, or through the mediation of the Supreme Pontiff."

1005. IV. Here it must further be observed that the same power of jurisdiction in individual Bishops can be considered in three ways, namely as to exigency or aptitude, actuality, and exercise. It is certain: 1) that as to exigency or aptitude it is immediately from God. For aptitude for episcopal jurisdiction immediately springs from the episcopal character and is annexed to it of itself; but the character immediately proceeds from God; therefore so also that exigency. 2) It is evident both from what has been said thus far about the force and nature of the Primacy, and from ancient, universal, and constant practice, that the power of jurisdiction in Bishops, as to exercise, depends altogether on the Supreme Pontiff, by whom

it can be restricted, enlarged, and even taken away; though not in such a way that all who are Bishops do not rule, or that the episcopal order itself is taken away. 3) Hence the question concerns only the same power taken as to actuality; and it is asked whether Bishops have it by force of ordination itself, and therefore immediately from God, or through the mediation of the Supreme Pontiff.

1006. But this question is also customarily proposed somewhat otherwise. Namely, they say that the power of jurisdiction in Bishops is either complete, already ordered to subjects, and proximately ready to go forth validly into second act; or incomplete, not yet ordered to subjects, nor so ready that nothing else is desired for its valid exercise. The incomplete power, they say, is conferred on Bishops by Christ as proximate and immediate author, together with the power of order, by force of consecration. The question is only about the other. That is to say, it is asked whether the complete power, already ordered to subjects and proximately ready to go forth validly into second act, is also immediately from Christ; or whether it is only through the mediation of the Supreme Pontiff, who, as immediate author, although not principal, for Christ alone is principal, but less principal, confers it by the authority proper to himself.

1007. Now the Vatican Council did not touch this question; but historically it is evident that it was agitated with great contention of minds in the Council of Trent; by which, nevertheless, the matter was left undecided, especially through the action of Cardinal of Lorraine. Compare Pallavicino, History of the Council of Trent, book 18, chapters 14-15, and book 21, chapter 11. Therefore the question is disputed among theologians. Francis de Vitoria, a Spanish theologian who died in the year 1549, is put forward as the first of all to have introduced and defended the opinion that jurisdiction in Bishops flows immediately from God; and Alphonsus de Castro, On the Just Punishment of Heretics, chapter 24; Vasquez, book 2, disputation 152, chapter 3, no. 28; Father Collet, On Order, part 2, chapter 4, article 3; and not a few others agreed with him. But all the highest theologians and princes of the schools held the contrary opinion. Thus St. Thomas, on book 4 of the Sentences, distinction 19, question 1, article 3, little question 1, reply to 1; II-II, question 39, article 3, etc.; St. Bonaventure, in the little work Why the Friars Minor Preach and Hear Confessions; Durandus, on book 4, distinction 24; Natalis Hervaeus, in the treatise On the Power of the Pope; St. Antoninus, Summa, part 2, title 22, chapter 3, section 3; Aegidius Colonna, Archbishop of Bourges, in the book On Papal Renunciation, chapter 8, and the little work Against Exemptions, chapter 2; Thomas of Strasbourg, distinction 25, question 1, article 2; John de Celaya, on book 3 of the Sentences, distinction 20, question 7; Michael Manuclerus, part 2 of On Monarchy, book 4, chapter 10; Nicolas Coeffeteau, discussion 5, chapters 1-2 against M. Antonius de Dominis; John Puteanus, on II-II, question 1, article 6, doubt 3, in the response to the first objection; Antoine Charlas, On the Liberties of the Gallican Church, book 3, chapter 10 ff.; Bellarmine, On the Roman Pontiff, book 4, chapter 24 ff.; Suarez, On Laws, book 4, chapter 4; Vargas, little work On Jurisdiction; Fagnanus, on chapter Perniciosam, On the Office of the Ordinary, no. 30 ff.; Benedict XIV, On the Diocesan Synod, book 1, chapter 4, no. 2; and many others.

1008. According to this latter opinion, the disparity between the origin of jurisdiction in Bishops and in the Supreme Pontiff is better understood. For the latter, having the plenitude of episcopal jurisdiction over the universal Church, over all and each of its parts, can communicate it to Bishops in some determinate measure. Therefore they immediately receive from the Roman Pontiff the jurisdiction which has been divinely instituted. But on the contrary, besides the Roman Pontiff, there is no one in the Church who has supreme, universal, full power. Hence neither the consecrating Bishop, nor the Cardinal electors, nor the universal Church can communicate it to the new Roman Pontiff. When the Roman Pontiff has died, that power is left in the hands of Christ; and therefore the newly elected one can receive the keys of the kingdom of heaven from Christ alone.

1009. These things, therefore, having been noted beforehand: Section II The Proposed Question Is Solved. Proposition 60. By force of episcopal consecration there indeed arises in Bishops a certain exigency for ruling the Church; nevertheless the actual power itself required for this is not

conferred. For although this actual power, by divine right, ought to be in the episcopal body, nevertheless, otherwise than the power of order, it is communicated to individual Bishops only through the mediation of the Roman Pontiff.

1010. Proof I. Actual power of jurisdiction is not had in Bishops by force of consecration and character. Therefore it must be immediately sought from a human cause, and thus from the Roman Pontiff. The consequence is proved from the very sense of the adversaries. For the adversaries contend that the actual jurisdiction of Bishops is immediately from God only to the extent that they think this same jurisdiction is annexed and, as it were, imbibed in the episcopal character and grade, and is received together with the grade and character in consecration. Therefore, if this is shown false, they themselves admit that actual jurisdiction cannot be drawn except from the Roman Pontiff, since they acknowledge, and can acknowledge, no middle between these two: that it is had immediately either from God or from the Roman Pontiff. Therefore: The antecedent is proved. 1) Once consecration has been posited, by its force we can establish in the Bishop no more than what the concept itself of consecration and episcopal character necessarily includes. But the concept of consecration and episcopal character necessarily includes only the exigency for obtaining the power of ruling the Church, and in no way actual jurisdiction itself. In truth, it would be a contradiction in terms if a consecrated Bishop were conceived as having in the character itself no relation to ruling the Church. But once some relation to the governance of the Church is posited, this can be understood, without any conflict of concepts, either immediately to the power itself by which the Church is ruled, or immediately to another from whom that power ought to be received. Hence, as we said in no. 1003, the power of order is separable from the power of jurisdiction. 2) If that actual power existed in the Bishop by force of consecration, it would follow that by no human authority could it be impeded, diminished, or suspended, so that it would be exercised not only illicitly but also invalidly. For what subsists by divine right can be rendered fruitless by no human power, as is manifest in those things which in a Bishop depend on the power of order. Nor should you say that the acts of jurisdiction in a schismatic, suspended Bishop, etc., are invalid, not because the actual power of jurisdiction is lacking to him, but because it is bound and needs to be loosed by one having authority. For in a schismatic, suspended Bishop, etc., the power even of order is constrained by bonds; and nevertheless that Bishop validly confects or ministers the sacraments, which pertains to the power of order. Therefore, if by force of consecration there were actual power of jurisdiction in him, just as there is the power of order, the acts of that power too would be valid, even if illicit.

1011. II. The power of jurisdiction in one is correlative to the subjection which another owes to him; and therefore episcopal jurisdiction is correlative to subjects. Therefore where there are no actual subjects, jurisdiction cannot be actual; for correlatives exist at the same time, and one cannot be or be conceived without the other. If someone, for example, actually has royal power, he cannot actually lack subjects, to whom, unless by fact, at least by right, he commands. But if he has no subjects, he will be called King only mockingly. Hence it is that by way of jest we are accustomed to say: a king without subjects, a leader without an army, indicating namely a ridiculous or even impossible thing. But Bishops receive subjects immediately not from Christ, but from the Roman Pontiff. Therefore from the same one they immediately receive the actual power itself of jurisdiction. The minor, which is clear from fact and constant practice, can also be confirmed, because if Bishops by force of consecration itself, and not through the mediation of the Roman Pontiff, had subjects, these would be either 1) all the faithful, that is, the universal Church; or 2) an indeterminate part of them; or 3) a determinate part of them, that is, some particular Church. But the first cannot be said, since in that hypothesis all Bishops, by force of consecration, would obtain universal power, which nevertheless, as we have shown, was conferred on Peter alone and his successors. Nor can the second be said, since it is repugnant that actual subjects of some determinate superior be given unless they themselves are also determinate. If the third is admitted, it is already clear that Bishops immediately receive subjects from the Supreme Pontiff; for this is taught a) by ancient and universal practice; b) by reason itself. For who would hand over some determinate part of the flock to another to be

ruled, except the one who is set over the whole flock? Hence Suarez fittingly says, On Laws, book 4, chapter 4, no. 8: "Superior and subject are correlatives, and therefore one cannot be made before the other, nor one without the other. Therefore when the matter is applied and subjects are made, the superior receives a new power and right, and as it were dominion over them, because by such power he is formally constituted superior. Therefore that is also the power of jurisdiction; therefore beyond the power given through ordination, there is required a power of jurisdiction given through men." Lainez also in the Council of Trent, in Pallavicino, History, book 18, chapter 15, no. 16, used the same argumentation, asserting that the very matter of episcopal jurisdiction belongs to Bishops by divine right if jurisdiction belongs to them by divine right; since they are correlatives, and one cannot be understood without the other. You have the same in Bellarmine, On the Roman Pontiff, book 4, chapter 24, etc.

1012. III. From Tradition. For 1) it is solemn with the Fathers to affirm that the keys were handed over to Peter alone, so that from him and through him they might be communicated to Bishops. Thus Tertullian, Scorpiace, chapter 10, writes: "If you still think heaven is closed, remember that the Lord left its keys here to Peter, and through him to the Church." St. Leo the Great, sermon 4 on the anniversary of his assumption, says: "If the divine condescension wished anything to be common to the other princes with him [Peter], never except through him did it give whatever it did not deny to the others"; and a little before: "So that, although he [Peter] alone received many things, nothing passed to anyone without his participation." The author of the work On Priestly Dignity, among the works of St. Ambrose, says: "All we priests receive those keys of the kingdom of heaven in blessed Peter the Apostle." Stephen of Larissa, in the libellus to Pope Boniface II, says: "Because, when the Lord said a third time, 'Lovest thou me? Feed my sheep,' he handed over the mandate first to you, showing that through you afterward he bestowed it on all the holy churches throughout the whole world." Gregory IV, Supreme Pontiff, in the letter to all Bishops, no. 1, affirms concerning the Roman Church: "It so imparted its vicariate to other churches that they were called into a part of solicitude, not into the plenitude of power." The Fathers of the Council of Rheims, in the year 800, profess that they are acting "by the authority conferred on Bishops through blessed Peter, prince of the Apostles." Recall the other testimonies of the Fathers already given in nos. 547 and 737. From this doctrine of the Fathers, therefore, St. Thomas rightly concludes expressly, Against the Gentiles, book 4, chapter 76: "To Peter alone he promised, 'To thee I will give the keys,' that it might be shown that the power of the keys was to be derived through him to others, for preserving the unity of the Church." 2) Just as the Fathers everywhere derive the unity of the Church from one episcopate, as testimonies already given in various places show, so they also derive the unity of the episcopate from one origin. But in order to press this idea more closely, according to those things which are read in John 17: "I pray... that they may be one, as thou, Father, in me, and I in thee, that they also may be one in us," etc.; and "all things which thou hast given me are from thee," etc., they teach that the type of the unity of the Church is the unity of God in three Persons. Thus Pope Symmachus, letter 1, says: "After the pattern of the Trinity, whose power is one and undivided, the priesthood is one through diverse prelates." Before Symmachus, however, Cyprian, to explain that "one episcopate diffused by the numerousness of many Bishops, and of which a part is held by each singly in solidum," has recourse to the mystery of the Trinity: "The Lord says," he says, "'I and the Father are one.' And again of the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit it is written: 'And these three are one.'" Hence also, in the letter to Magnus, 66, he adds: "And therefore the Lord, intimating to us unity coming in divine authority, lays it down and says: 'I and the Father are one.' Reducing his Church to this unity, he again says: and there will be one flock and one shepherd." Now in divine things, one and the same essence, which is in the three Persons, is communicated to the Son by the Father, and to the Holy Spirit by the Father and Son as by one principle; and therefore the Father, the unoriginated principle, is as it were the first font from which the Son and the Holy Spirit proceed. Therefore it seems, according to the mind of the Fathers, that there is one principle from which episcopal jurisdiction proceeds into all who participate in it. But that principle ought to be visible, so that in the episcopate and in the government of the Church there may be visible unity.

But no other visible principle can be conceived, from which power is derived into others, besides the supreme head of the Church, the Roman Pontiff, successor of St. Peter, who was the first of all to be instituted Bishop by Christ. Therefore it is necessary that the episcopate emanate from the Roman Pontiff, and that any Bishop whatever "derive his properties from him, as a shoot from a root, a river from a fountain, and a ray from the sun, and that nothing be alienated from the root," as Tertullian speaks concerning the Trinity, Against Praxeas, chapter 8. 3) It is pleasing to confirm all these things by the testimony of Saint Cyprian, which we have exhibited more than once, and especially in no. 887, from which also canon Loquitur, chapter 24, question 1, is taken. Upon one, says the holy Doctor, Christ builds the Church, or to one he gives power; and nevertheless it is evident that there are many Bishops, furnished by reason of episcopal character with an equal partnership of honor and power. But whence is this kind of partnership? From the fact that that one does not reserve the whole power to himself alone, but he himself is the origin, the beginning of another power: Christ by his authority disposed an origin beginning from one. Wherefore Bishops stand toward the Roman Pontiff as rays toward the sun, streams toward the fountain. The former borrow their light from the sun; the latter their waters from the fountain. And for this reason, cut a stream off from the fountain, and once cut off it dries up; which would by no means follow if water came into the stream from somewhere other than the fountain. So, with due proportion, it happens to Bishops: what they have of authority over the people, they borrow from the Roman Pontiff. Cut off, separate a Bishop from him by excommunication, deposition, or suspension: once separated, he dries up; now he can do nothing. The contrary happens as to the power of order, which one deposed and degraded retains and exercises wickedly indeed, but nevertheless validly, against the will of the Pontiff, because he receives it immediately not from the Pontiff, but from Christ. But it is worthy of note that the praised canon hands these things down by reason of the unity of the Church, insofar as this derivation of episcopal jurisdiction proximately from the Roman Pontiff is judged necessary for inducing and preserving unity: "That he might make unity manifest." The unity of the whole body is not separated, because there is one light which is diffused everywhere, that is, into many; but unity is preserved in the origin, that is, not only in dependence, but also in origin. Therefore take away this origin, or the derivation from this origin, derive episcopal power from somewhere else, and now there is not one Church, one mother copious in the successions of fruitfulness, but many and sterile ones.

1013. SCHOLION. All the difficulties are easily recalled to a few certain heads, and they are easily dissolved from the distinctions made in the exposition of the state of the question. Therefore it is enough to indicate them briefly. Hence: I. From Scripture they oppose the places in which 1) it is said, as in Acts 20, that the Holy Spirit placed Bishops to rule the Church of God; 2) or the Apostles are said to have been chosen immediately by Christ, as, for example, in John 6, Galatians 1, and according to that saying, "As the Father has sent me, I also send you," etc. But Bishops, they say, are successors of the Apostles. It is answered: 1) Before we directly explain the objected testimonies, it is useful to observe that from a twofold head it can be shown that the whole argument lacks all force: a) from its very form. For just as Bishops are said to have been placed by God to rule the Church, so every power is said to be from God, kings to reign through God, and lawgivers to decree just things. But from these no one would rightly infer that every power is conferred immediately by God, that all kings reign immediately through God, that just things are decreed immediately by God. Therefore similarly it cannot rightly be inferred that individual Bishops receive jurisdiction immediately from God. b) From the things which would follow if the objected sentences had to be taken without any distinction, rigidly and as they sound; for they would prove more than the adversaries themselves like. For if the Holy Spirit "placed Bishops to rule the Church of God," that is, immediately conferred power on them, then the Holy Spirit also immediately granted subjects; he also immediately defined territory. For certain and definite jurisdiction cannot exist without certain and definite subjects and territory. Likewise, if it was said to Bishops just as to the Apostles, "As the Father sent me, I also send you," with no distinction made, then Bishops do not need to receive mission and canonical institution from anyone; therefore they will be able to run wherever they please and exercise their authority

anywhere, just as the Apostles themselves. 2) Therefore it is clear that some distinction must necessarily be applied in the objected testimonies. Surely a) in order that Bishops may rightly be said to have been placed by the Holy Spirit to rule the Church of God, it is enough that God instituted the episcopal order and grade; that consecrated Bishops have an exigency and ordination toward ruling the Church of God. But it is not necessary that individual Bishops immediately receive the actual power of ruling from the Holy Spirit. b) Similarly Bishops cannot simply be called successors of the Apostles, as Roman Pontiffs are called successors of Peter. For while the Apostles were still living there existed Bishops whom they themselves constituted; Bishops do not obtain power equal with the Apostles; no see exists, except the Roman, elevated by divine right to episcopal dignity. What wonder, then, if Bishops differ from the Apostles also as to the immediate origin of their power? But these things were explained and demonstrated above, no. 880 ff.

1014. II. From the Fathers they object those places in which the Fathers teach that Bishops are constituted by divine ordination to rule the Church. Thus, for example, St. Ignatius Martyr, in the letter to the Ephesians, says that Bishops "have been defined through the boundaries of the earth according to the sentence of Jesus Christ." St. Cyprian, letter 69, says that they "were set over the churches by divine ordination," etc. I answer by distinguishing: these and other utterances of the Fathers are referred to the actual and particular jurisdiction of Bishops, as if it were immediately from God, I deny. They are referred to those respects of the immediate derivation of episcopal power from God which we explained in the thesis, I concede. Such expressions of the Fathers are taken from the utterances of the Scriptures and allude to the same; therefore they must be explained by the same criteria which we have already applied to explaining the places themselves of Scripture. Surely these sentences of the Fathers can be explained very well even if the communication of power made immediately by God to individual Bishops is set aside; and thus they must be explained, according to the testimonies brought by us in the proof of the thesis. Otherwise the Fathers would disagree with themselves.

1015. III. From reason they object: 1) The power of jurisdiction belongs to the essence of the Episcopate, nor would episcopal consecration be valid if jurisdiction were not conferred. 2) If Bishops received jurisdiction not from Christ but from a man, then the authority both of individual Bishops and of all taken together would be human; therefore ecumenical Councils themselves would become human congregations, destitute of every strength of divine authority. Thus Febronius from the Bishop of Segna in the Council of Trent. It is answered: 1) The power of jurisdiction belongs to the essence of the Episcopate as to exigency, I concede; as to actuality, I deny. But if they say that the consecration of a Bishop without assignment of a people is invalid, this we have already demonstrated to be false. Christian Lupus expressly showed the validity of these consecrations from canon 6 of the Council of Chalcedon, and from the consecration of Barses, Lazarus, and Eulogius, concerning which Sozomen speaks in Ecclesiastical History, book 6, chapter 34. Charlas, On the Liberties of the Gallican Church, book 8, chapter 9, fully satisfies the contrary arguments of Thomassin; finally Gerson himself, in the treatise On Ecclesiastical States, consideration 8, on the state of prelates, although he does not approve such ordinations, nevertheless declares them valid. 2) What the Roman Pontiff communicates to Bishops is not some authority drawing its origin from himself or from men; rather it is that very authority which Christ deposited in him when he constituted him as the one in whom there would be the plenitude of the font of all ecclesiastical power. Therefore, if the entity of jurisdiction is considered in itself, it is not a human power, but a divine one. Similarly, when the Roman Pontiff confers actual episcopal jurisdiction on some determinate subject, he confers the grade of power which Christ willed to exist in the Church. Therefore the grade of jurisdiction which a Bishop obtains is not human, but divine; the more so because episcopal character has an exigency for it, or an aptitude toward it. These things would indeed sufficiently show that the inference concerning the human authority of Councils themselves is tasteless; but besides, an ecumenical Council necessarily includes the Roman Pontiff himself. For then it verifies in itself that moral subject to which Christ conferred his gifts according to the promises made; and therefore its authority can in no way be reckoned human.

Article 5. The Principal Heads of Doctrine Concerning Councils are Touched Upon

1016. The solution of the preceding question, as we warned at its beginning, more clearly determines the dependence of individual Pastors on the successors of Peter; but these successors, according to the definition of the Vatican Council, are superior also to Bishops taken together. Therefore it is useful also to determine more clearly this preeminence of the Roman Pontiff over the body of Pastors. For this it is necessary to set forth briefly the doctrine concerning Councils, at least as to its principal heads.

1017. Therefore, "By the name Council," says Bellarmine, On Councils, book 1, chapter 3, "the same thing is signified in the Church as by the name of assemblies in kingdoms. For just as, when a controversy arises in a commonwealth, the princes of the kingdom or magistrates come together into one place and establish what needs to be done, so in the Church, when some controversy concerning religion arises, the prelates of the Churches come together, and, after their judgments have been compared together, establish what seems good." Hence a Council can generally be described as "a legitimate gathering of the Prelates of the Church for judging or establishing concerning ecclesiastical matters." It is called 1) a gathering of Prelates, because although sometimes the word Council has designated the assembling also of other persons, nevertheless for many centuries it has constantly been applied to signify an assembly of Prelates, especially Bishops. 2) It is called a gathering, so that the common action and judgment of Bishops may be expressed; for if someone were to seek and obtain the judgment of several Prelates one by one, that would not properly be a conciliar action or judgment. 3) It is called legitimate; for if a gathering of Bishops did not have all due conditions, it has been customary to call it not a Council, but a brigandage. But what the conditions required for legitimacy are, we shall say below. 4) It is called for judging or establishing, because if a gathering of Bishops were made only for conferring counsels, discussing judgments, etc., without the Bishops authoritatively establishing or judging anything, that gathering would not be called a Council in ecclesiastical usage. 5) Finally, it is called concerning ecclesiastical matters, because if Bishops came together for some end other than treating ecclesiastical business, their gathering would not be called a Council. For, as Bishops, they cannot define by their authority other business than ecclesiastical business.

1018. Councils thus generally accepted are divided into general and particular. A general Council represents the universal Church; a particular Council represents some part of the Church. But according to the part of the Church which it represents, a particular Council can be national or provincial. A national Council is that in which the Archbishops and Bishops of one kingdom or nation come together, over whom a patriarch or primate presides, or, if these are lacking, some delegate from the Apostolic See. A provincial Council is that in which only the Bishops of one ecclesiastical province come together, over whom the Archbishop or Metropolitan presides. To these can be added a diocesan Council, in which the presbyters of one Episcopate come together, with the Bishop presiding. But that is called not a Council, but rather a Synod; for, as Bellarmine observes, chapter 4, "they can scarcely be called Councils [diocesan], since in them ordinarily there is no one who has jurisdiction [in the external forum], except the one Bishop who presides." There are not lacking, nevertheless, particular Councils at which several Bishops from another nation or province were present. These are customarily called mixed. Compare Benedict XIV, On the Diocesan Synod, book 1, chapter 1.

1019. A general Council is also called plenary, universal, ecumenical, although as to this last appellation some discrepancy of name exists among authors. For some, attending to the force of the name, do not call a Council ecumenical if Bishops from the whole world were not present at it; just as, on the contrary, they call that Council ecumenical at which Bishops from all provinces were present, even if the Roman Pontiff was absent. But if we consider the matter itself, just as a Council is rightly called general, so also it is rightly called ecumenical if all Bishops were called to it, even though not all were present, as we

shall explain below. Likewise it is ecumenical if the Roman Pontiff is present, even though not all Bishops came together; for just as, if the Head were lacking, the representation of the universal Church would be lacking, so with him present, while others are absent in part, this representation could be had, as we shall say. Therefore, having regard to the matter rather than to the name, we take the appellation ecumenical as synonymous with general, and we call ecumenical "a Council representing the universal Church, with the Roman Pontiff assenting to the acts." It is called 1) a Council: this is the proximate genus, already declared. 2) Representing the universal Church: this is the ultimate difference, which imports two things: a) that the Roman Pontiff, Head of the Church, be present; for just as the human body is not represented whole if the head is lacking, so neither is the whole Church represented if the Roman Pontiff is lacking; b) that at least some Bishops from the greater part of ecclesiastical provinces be present, so that the universal Church may be morally represented. 3) With the Roman Pontiff assenting to the acts: for if his assent is lacking, the decrees lack all force, and the Council itself will be of no authority. But a Council can be perfectly or imperfectly ecumenical and general, as will at once be clear from what is to be said concerning the celebration and acceptance, or approval, of a Council.

1020. Since we are dealing here with Councils in order that we may more clearly determine the relations of the Roman Pontiff to that Council, and thus better attain the force and nature of the Primacy, omitting those things which directly regard particular Councils, we shall pursue the things which pertain to a general Council. From this it will be clear how the Roman Pontiff is above the Body of Pastors. But so that we may set forth in order the many things which must be touched briefly, we shall treat 1) of convocation; 2) of celebration; 3) of confirmation; and 4) finally of the necessity of a general Council.

1021. I. As to convocation, it must first be established that "the office of convoking general councils properly belongs to the Roman Pontiff; yet in such a way that another also can announce a Council, with the Pontiff consenting; indeed it is enough if he afterward ratifies and confirms the announcement once made. But if neither he himself announces the Council, nor someone else by his mandate or consent, nor does he at least approve the announcement, that will be not a Council, but a little council." This can be proved: 1) From the things already established concerning the Nature of the Primacy of the Roman Pontiff. For he alone has the right of convoking a general Council who has power over all the Bishops of the whole Church; for the question concerns a coercive convocation, which all Bishops are bound to obey. But only the Roman Pontiff has power over all Bishops. The right of convoking a general Council belongs to him alone who has supreme power over the universal Church; for the question concerns establishing and defining those things which regard the universal Church. But the Roman Pontiff alone has supreme power over the universal Church. Suppose that others, for example the Bishops themselves, can convoke a general Council without the consent of the Roman Pontiff; his power would not be full, nor would he be Monarch in the Church. But the Roman Pontiff has the plenitude of power, and the form of government in the Church is monarchical by the institution of Christ. 2) Hence the Church has always acknowledged this right in the Roman Pontiff. Surely in the Council of Chalcedon it was asked by the Legates of the Apostolic See why they wished Dioscorus, Patriarch of Alexandria, excluded; and they answered: "because he dared to make a synod without the authority of the Apostolic See, which has never been done, nor is it lawful to be done." The Fifth Lateran Council under Leo X pronounced: "The Roman Pontiff alone, as having authority over all Councils, has the full right and power of announcing Councils..." Gregory II disapproved the synod of 300 Bishops convoked by Leo the Isaurian for this reason, that it had been celebrated without the authority of the Roman Pontiff. For the same reason the pseudo-ecumenical synod gathered by Constantine Copronymus was rejected by Stephen IV. Hence all the western ecumenical Councils were convoked by the Roman Pontiff, and indeed by him alone; but the eastern Councils, although they are said to have been convoked by the Emperors, were nevertheless never convoked without the consent or ratification of the Roman Pontiff. Certainly as to the Third Council of Constantinople it is read in Act 18, the prosphonetic or acclamatory discourse: "Arius, divider and divider-up of the Trinity, was rising up, and at once Constantine,

ever Augustus, and the praiseworthy Sylvester gathered a great and distinguished Synod at Nicaea." Celestine ratified the convocation of the Council of Ephesus made by Theodosius the Younger, writing in the letter to Theodosius: "To this Synod, which you have commanded to be, we exhibit our presence in those whom we have sent." St. Leo, writing to the Emperor Marcian, who had convoked the Council of Chalcedon, says: "I accepted so willingly the holy zeal of your clemency, by which you willed that a Synod be held for the restoration of ecclesiastical peace, that," etc. Basil the Emperor convoked the Fourth Council of Constantinople; but Hadrian II, writing to him in Act I, says: "But we will that, through the industry of your piety, a numerous Council be celebrated at Constantinople, over which our Legates also, presiding, after the distinction of crimes and men has been inspected, shall at once take away all copies of the impious little council [the Photian one] from those who retain them and hand them over to be burned by fire." And so concerning the rest. 3) Wherefore a) if others than Roman Pontiffs seem to have announced Councils, they are said to have convoked them by exhorting and advising. But if they seem to have acted by authority, they could have effected this either by mandate of the Pontiff, or as a ministerial cause, or with the Pontiff consenting or ratifying. b) But if Pontiffs in their letters seem to have attributed more than was fitting to Emperors, this must not be ascribed to a defect of authority in the Pontiff, or to proper power in the Emperors, but to certain circumstances of affairs that were wholly extrinsic. For ancient laws were in force prohibiting frequent gatherings of men, through fear of seditions; Councils could not conveniently be celebrated except in some city subject to the Emperor; the force of heretics or schismatics, which was feared, had to be restrained by the arms of the Emperors; because of the poverty of the Churches, Bishops from far-separated regions could come together into one place of Council only by the liberality of the Emperors. Therefore for these reasons the Pontiffs permitted something to the Emperors as to the convocation of Councils. Compare Bellarmine, book 1, chapters 12-13.

1022. But who are to be convoked to a Council? First let it be noted with Bellarmine, in the cited place, chapter 15: "In Councils, some can be present for many reasons; for some are present as judges, who are said to have a decisive vote; others so that, by disputing, they may examine difficulties, who are said to have a consultative vote; others so that they may minister, such as notaries and guards, and others so that they may defend the Council and take care that all things within and without are peaceful." Therefore the question concerns those to be convoked as judges, so that they may cast a decisive vote.

1023. The innovators, after denying the distinction by divine right between clerics and laymen, and after asserting a democratic form of government in the Church, consequently hold that Emperors, laymen, etc. are to be convoked to a Council. Hence one of the causes on account of which they resisted the Council of Trent, according to the same authors, is that in it none had a vote except Cardinals, Bishops, Abbots, and Generals of Religious Orders, when all learned men, even laymen, ought to have had a decisive vote. This error, having been more than sufficiently refuted in the principles on which it rests, does not need to be refuted here again. It is enough only to recall the censure passed by Pius VI on proposition 10 of the Synod of Pistoia: "The doctrine by which parish priests or other Priests gathered in Synod are pronounced, together with the Bishop, judges of faith, and at the same time it is implied that judgment in causes of faith belongs to them by proper right, and indeed also by ordination received, is false, rash, subversive of the hierarchical order, derogating from the firmness of the definitions or dogmatic judgments of the Church, at least erroneous."

1024. Therefore, first of all, all Bishops having jurisdiction are to be called to a Council by ordinary right. For 1) in ecumenical Councils the question concerns defining dogmas, condemning heresies, and establishing disciplinary laws. But these offices pertain to those who, constituted by God as Pastors and Teachers, have jurisdiction in the external forum and represent the teaching and ruling Church. But these are the Bishops, whom the Holy Spirit has placed to rule the Church of God. 2) Hence

Bishops having jurisdiction are to be called by divine right. For by divine right there ought to be Bishops who rule particular Churches; but a Council cannot be ecumenical unless the Fathers represent the universal Church. But the Fathers taken together cannot represent the universal Church unless, by ruling particular Churches individually, they juridically represent them. Since therefore by divine right there are Bishops of particular Churches, by divine right their assembly represents the universal Church. 3) There is added the testimony of all antiquity. For Eusebius, book 5, chapter 23, says: "on account of which cause [because of the question of Easter under Pope Victor] gatherings of Bishops and councils were convoked through each province." The Fathers of the Council of Chalcedon, Act 4, exclaimed against the profane persons who had entered the Council: "Send the superfluous ones outside: it is a Council of Bishops." Hosius said to Constantine, in Athanasius, letter to those living the solitary life: "God committed the empire to thee; to us Bishops he entrusted the things which are of the Church." And St. Ambrose against Valentinian, letter 32: "If there is to be consultation concerning faith, that consultation ought to belong to Priests [Bishops], just as was done under Constantine, who gave judgment to the Priests," that is, to Bishops. Compare Bellarmine, cited place, chapter 15.

1025. But among the Bishops to be convoked to a Council there seem also to be Bishops elect and not yet consecrated; for they already have jurisdiction. And, as Cano says, On Theological Places, book 5, chapter 2, "the whole business of an ecclesiastical Council is transacted not by the power of order, but by the power of jurisdiction." But it is controverted whether Bishops in partibus infidelium, or titular Bishops, enjoy the same right. Suarez, On Faith, disputation 11, section 1, no. 15, says: "Titular Bishops can without doubt be called to a Council and have votes. But of itself this is by no means necessary, because they lack episcopal jurisdiction. And thus usage has it." In the Vatican Council Bishops of this kind were admitted, yet with the question of right remaining intact. Compare Cecconi, History of the Vatican Council, book 2, chapter 1, article 1.

1026. It must be noted here that all Bishops having jurisdiction are indeed to be called to a Council, "so that," says St. Leo, letter 80, "with priests called from all provinces, it may truly be a universal Council"; but that it is by no means necessary for the ecumenicity and legitimacy of a Council that all come together. For this is not necessary for the representation of the universal Church, and otherwise one or another could easily impede the Council. Therefore it suffices: 1) that the convocation be universal, so that it becomes known to the principal parts of the Church, and no Bishop having jurisdiction is excluded. 2) Some determinate number cannot be assigned; nor is it required that that number be notably great, since national councils have been celebrated in which the number of Bishops was greater than in certain ecumenical Councils. 3) This certainly is required: that there be a moral representation of the whole Church. But what is required and sufficient for this cannot be known better, says Bellarmine, cited place, chapter 17, "than from the custom of the Church and from those Councils which by the consensus of all were general." Hence he adds that it is required "that at least from the greater part of the Christian provinces some should come; and if indeed the Council is in the East, it has always seemed sufficient if many Bishops come together from all the provinces of the East, while from the whole West some are sent by the Supreme Pontiff who may supply the place of the others; and if it is celebrated in the West, many should come together from all the provinces of the West, while from the East some few should come in the name of the others": which he then confirms from the history of the Councils.

1027. Besides Bishops, there are also to be called to a Council: 1) Cardinals. But by what right is not settled among the Doctors, and, as Suarez observes, On Faith, disputation 11, section 1, no. 17, this depends "on that question, whether the dignity of Cardinals was introduced by human right, as Soto wills... or by divine right, as Torquemada holds." Schmalzgrueber, Introductory Dissertation, section 8, no. 326, says: "Cardinals, even those who are not Bishops, ought to be called. And this either by privilege or custom, as some think, or, as others with Suarez, even by ordinary right. Because acts of jurisdiction which

are ordered to the external government of the Church, and do not depend intrinsically on episcopal consecration, can be communicated to any capable ecclesiastical persons." 2) For the same reason, the General Superiors of religious orders ought to be called, and Abbots who possess quasi-episcopal jurisdiction over some people and over some territory. 3) As to exempt Abbots, however, who have jurisdiction only over their own monks, unless they are Generals, the matter was disputed. Bouix, On the Pope, part 8, chapter 1, section 5, proposition 7, before the Vatican Council strove to prove by many arguments that Abbots of this kind should be called; but they were excluded from the Vatican Council for the reasons which Cecconi indicates, History of the Vatican Council, volume 1, book 2, chapter 1, article 1.

1028. II. As to celebration, the right of presiding over an ecumenical Council must first be established. "All Catholics," says Bellarmine, cited place, chapter 19, "teach that this office is proper to the Supreme Pontiff, so that he presides over the Synod either through himself or through Legates, and moderates all things as supreme judge." Therefore the question concerns not only a presidency of honor, but of jurisdiction, by force of which the president moderates all things. Hence it belongs to him to determine the object concerning which there is to be treatment, the order in which it ought to be treated, etc. That this right belongs to the Roman Pontiff is proved: 1) From the things established above. For a) the right of presiding over a Council belongs to him who has the supreme government of the Church, since this presidency is part of the supreme and universal government of the Church. But the Roman Pontiff obtains the supreme and universal government of the Church. b) It belongs to him to preside over a Council who is superior to all Bishops. But the Roman Pontiff alone, as we have proved, is superior to all Bishops even taken together. Therefore. 2) From the practice of the Church; for over all Councils which were ecumenical in their celebration, the Roman Pontiff presided. Surely the matter is manifest, and is called into doubt by no one, that Roman Pontiffs presided over Councils held in the West. But as to the Eastern Councils, at Nicaea I, according to the testimony of Gregory VII, Apology, chapter 3, "Hosius of Cordoba, Victor and Vincent, presbyters of the Roman Church, presided on the part of Sylvester"; nor can it be understood otherwise that Hosius subscribed first of all. The same is testified by Gelasius of Cyzicus, History of the Council of Nicaea, book 2, chapter 3; Pope Hadrian, canonical letter sent to Charlemagne; concerning Hosius, Athanasius, letter to those living the solitary life concerning the presbyters; Socrates, History, book 1, chapter 5; Theodoret, History, book 1, chapter 2, 7; Photius, book On the Seven Synods, etc. At Ephesus, as is evident from Act 3, there presided in the name of the Roman Pontiff Cyril of Alexandria, Arcadius and Projectus, Bishops, and Philip, Presbyter, all Legates of the Roman Pontiff. To the Council of Chalcedon St. Leo wrote: "In these brothers, Paschasinus and Lucentius, Bishops, Boniface and Basil, presbyters, who have been directed from the Apostolic See, let your Fraternity judge that I preside over the Synod." Concerning Constantinople III it is read in Act 1: "When the holy Synod came together, that is, Theodore and Gregory, presbyters, and John, deacon, acting in the place of Agatho, Archbishop of ancient Rome," etc. In Nicaea II, Peter, Roman Archpresbyter, and Peter, Abbot of St. Sabas, hold the place of the Apostolic See; hence before Tarasius and the remaining Bishops they subscribed thus: "Peter, acting in the place of Hadrian, Pope of old Rome, defining, have subscribed." In Constantinople IV, Hadrian, in the letter to Basil the Emperor, writes: "We will that through the industry of your piety a numerous Council be celebrated there, over which our envoys also preside, namely Donatus and Stephen, Bishops, and Marinus, deacon," etc. Constantinople I was not at first ecumenical in celebration, but became such when in the following year the confirmation of Damasus came in the Roman Council, to which three Eastern Bishops also were sent. "Not much later," writes Photius, in the Book on the Seven Synods, "Damasus also, Bishop of Rome, came in, confirming and thinking the same things." Nor was Constantinople II ecumenical in celebration, since not only did the Roman Pontiff not attend, but the representation of the Westerners was lacking. But afterward it was made ecumenical by the confirmation of Vigilius and the other Roman Pontiffs. Besides, the Fathers of this Synod wrote to Vigilius: "we ask that, with your Beatitude presiding over us, by common treatment these same chapters be proposed in the midst and examined and completed, and an end be placed upon the question." 3) Wherefore, if they

object that Emperors presided over certain Eastern Councils, the answer must be: they presided in place and honor, I concede; by authority, either I deny, or I subdistinguish: by authority for impeding violence and preserving order, or for protecting the Council, I concede; for establishing or defining anything in the Council, I deny. The truth of this answer is historically manifest. For the Council of Chalcedon, letter 98, writes to Leo the Great: "Thou indeed, like a head over the members, didst preside over them [the Bishops], displaying benevolence in those who bore thy place; but the faithful Emperors presided most fittingly for adornment, like Zerubbabel to Joshua, inviting the renewal of the Church, as the building of Jerusalem, concerning dogmas." In the Eighth Ecumenical Council, canon 17, it is read: "But we have repelled from our ears, as something hateful, that which is said by certain inexperienced persons, that a Synod cannot be celebrated without the principal presence; since nowhere have the sacred Canons sanctioned that secular Princes come together in Councils, but only Prelates." The Emperors themselves acknowledged this. Theodosius the Younger and Valentinian, sending Count Candidian to be present at the Council of Ephesus, signify that this is done "on this law and condition, that he have nothing whatever in common with the questions and controversies which arise concerning the dogmas of faith; but that he remove those who can bring some obstacle," etc. Constantine Pogonatus wrote to Gregory the Roman Pontiff: "For neither will I sit with them [the Bishops] as Emperor or speak imperiously, but as one of them; and as the Pontiffs shall establish, I will execute." Basil the Emperor in the Eighth Synod admits that "it is not his, nor that of any Layman, to mix himself in ecclesiastical judgments"; hence he subscribes after all the Patriarchs, and indeed not defining, but "receiving and consenting." Compare Bellarmine, cited place, chapter 19 ff.

1029. The other thing which must be established as to the celebration of a Council is this: although it belongs to the Roman Pontiff to preside over it, nevertheless the other Bishops are true judges. Only the Innovators deny this, according to whose opinion it belongs to a Council to inquire, but Christ alone and the Word of God has the decisive vote. Therefore we say, says Bellarmine, cited place, chapter 18, that the sitting of Bishops in legitimate Councils is truly a sitting of judges, and that their decrees and laws must necessarily be followed. Now from all Councils, from ancient and universal practice, it is manifest that the things defined and established in Councils have always obtained the force of obliging. Hence anathema is pronounced on those who deny the things defined as of faith; decrees are called canons or laws of the Church; against those resisting, action has always been taken as against rebels; and in the Council of Chalcedon, for example, Act 4, ten Bishops who refused to acquiesce in the sentence of the Council were held as heretics. But it cannot be said that the decrees of Councils obtain this force by the Roman Pontiff alone exercising judgment. For although, on account of the supreme and full power with which he alone is endowed, he can define the whole matter alone, nevertheless he does not do this when he convokes a Council and defines with it; otherwise the sentence would not be conciliar, nor would Bishops subscribe: "I, N. N., defining, have subscribed." Therefore it must be said that Bishops defining with the Supreme Pontiff are truly judges and exercise true judgment. Compare Bellarmine, cited place.

1030. From this, however, some have very badly deduced that at least a moral unanimity of votes is necessary for definitions of faith in Councils; nor have others rightly said that the Roman Pontiff ought to follow at least the greater part. In truth, even if he follows the lesser part, he does not judge alone; and therefore the sentence will truly be conciliar. We know from the institution of Christ that Bishops without the Head can ultimately establish and define nothing. But certainly it is not proved that from the divine institution itself the Head ought to be directed by the greater part of the members, since it rather belongs to him to direct all things. Is the greater part of Bishops said to be the foundation upon which Peter himself was built? Is the greater part of the sheep said to have to feed or rule the Shepherd? Wherefore, as Bellarmine rightly notes, cited chapter 18, the Supreme Pontiff is not a simple president of a Council, who is constituted such by a king; rather he is truly king in relation to that tribunal. Hence, just as a King could rescind a sentence passed by the greater part of the judges, so if the greater part of Bishops decreed something, the Roman Pontiff could withdraw from their judgment. Besides, Bellarmine himself observes

that, apart from a case of violence, as in the Council of Ariminum, or of fraud, as in the Council of Chalcedon concerning the decree rejected by Leo, it has never happened that the greater part of Bishops erred. Compare what we wrote on this matter in the treatise On the Infused Virtues, no. 612.

1031. III. As to the confirmation of an ecumenical Council, here first we suppose that, when it is truly ecumenical, it cannot err in matters of faith and morals. This does not require demonstration by other arguments than those by which we established the infallibility of the Church in teaching, no. 787. Hence Bellarmine, after weighing individually the various places of Sacred Scripture, concludes, book 2, chapter 2: "from all these places we can reason thus: if we are commanded by God to hear and follow Bishops as Prelates, Pastors, Teachers, Watchmen, Fathers, certainly either they will not be able to deceive us, or we will be able to cast the fault back upon God. But without doubt individual Bishops can err, and sometimes do err, and sometimes disagree among themselves, so that we do not know which of them is to be followed. Therefore at least all together, especially gathered in the name of the Lord, when with one mouth they teach us, will not be able to err." Compare the arguments given, no. 796 ff.

1032. But in order that a Council may be truly ecumenical and enjoy supreme infallible authority, the approval or confirmation of the Roman Pontiff is altogether necessary. This is proved: 1) From the things established above. For a) a Council is truly ecumenical to the extent that it represents the universal Church. But a Council of all Bishops without any approval of the Roman Pontiff does not represent the universal Church, since it represents the body without its principal part, which is the head. b) The infallibility of which we are treating cannot be had except through the assistance of the Holy Spirit promised by Christ. Therefore it cannot be had unless there is that subject to which Christ promised this prerogative. But a subject of this kind is not the body of Bishops without the Head, as is clear from the testimonies which we gave to prove the promise of infallibility. 2) From the testimony of the Councils themselves. Surely concerning Councils held in the West the matter is manifest; for at all of them, except Trent, the Supreme Pontiff himself was present and consented while present. But the Fathers of Trent in the last session expressly declared that confirmation was to be sought from the Pope. What was done in the Vatican Council for the two Constitutions issued, all know. But as to Councils held in the East: concerning the first, it is read in the Synodical Letter of Rome, written in the year 484 under Felix III: "The three hundred eighteen Fathers gathered at Nicaea, following the voice of the Lord, brought the confirmation and authority of the things done in it to the holy Roman Church"; concerning the second, Photius writes: "Not much later Damasus, Bishop, came in, confirming and thinking the same things"; concerning the third, it is said in Act 5: "Because it is necessary that all things which are customary be signified to your holiness, we could not fail to write"; concerning the fourth, the letter sent to Leo has: "We ask that with thy decrees thou honor our judgment. We have insinuated the force of all the things done to you for the proof of our sincerity, and for the firmness and consonance of the things which have been done by us"; concerning the fifth, it is evident that a legation was sent to Vigilius, and the preface of the sentence against the Three Chapters declares: "because it happens that the most religious Vigilius, dwelling in this royal city, was present at all things which are noted concerning these three chapters, and both without writing and in writings often condemned them," etc.; concerning the sixth, it is read in the letter given to Agatho: "Together with you we have clearly preached the splendid light of the orthodox faith, which we ask your paternal holiness to confirm again through your honorable rescripts"; concerning the seventh, we have as witness the letter of Tarasius to Hadrian I, from which it is evident both that the Pontiff sent his Legates and that the Fathers wrote to him; concerning the eighth, the Synodical Letter to Hadrian II has: "Proclaim that the assembly of us all and the consensus of this universal synod are to be received for consonance; confirm it more and more, as your own, more solidly by evangelical precepts and by your admonitions." 3) Hence a) Councils disapproved by the Roman Pontiff the Church has always disapproved. Thus Damasus rejected the Council of Ariminum, at which 600 Bishops were present; Leo disapproved the Second Council of Ephesus, etc. b) Other Councils partly approved and partly disapproved by the Roman Pontiff obtained force and authority only for that part

which was confirmed by him. Thus the Council of Frankfurt, celebrated, as it seems, in the year 794, was confirmed by Hadrian as to that part in which it is defined that Christ is not the adoptive son of God; but it was disapproved by the same Hadrian as to the other part, in which, through error, it condemned the Seventh Synod. Similarly, the decrees of the Council of Constance partly approved by Martin V the universal Church received; the others not likewise. But you will find many more examples of all these things in Bellarmine, On Councils, book 1, chapters 5-8.

1033. But the approval or confirmation of Councils through the Roman Pontiff can be obtained in many ways. For 1) the Supreme Pontiff himself can be present at the Council with the other Fathers, and at once pronounce his sentence with them. In this case there is already had that body with its Head, to which Christ promised infallibility, and thus its sentence becomes irreformable. 4) The Supreme Pontiff can preside over the Council through his Legates. But Legates, as Bellarmine notes, book 2, chapter 11, are sometimes sent "to the Council with the instruction of the Apostolic See, as we read was done in Councils IV, VI, and VII; sometimes without instruction, as was done in the Council of Trent. The reason for this is that in those first Councils only one question was treated, and therefore the Pontiff could easily explain to the Legates what his sentence was concerning that question; but in the Council of Trent so many and such various questions had to be treated that an instruction of this kind could not conveniently be had." Hence the Legates were bound to refer all things to the Roman Pontiff. Now in the first case, with the Fathers consenting to the sentence of the Roman Pontiff, a decree is formed by the Legates in the name of the Pontiff; and at once there is had a definitive and irreformable judgment. For there is had the consensus of the Head and of the members, or of the whole subject to which Christ promised infallibility in teaching. In truth, the Roman Pontiff is accustomed to send Legates instructed concerning his sentence on this condition: that if the Fathers consent, by their judgment and that of the Apostolic See a decree be formed; but if not, the decree be deferred until the Roman Pontiff, having been consulted, responds, as is clear from the Council of Chalcedon, Act 3. But in the other case, the sentence of the Council, even with the Legates assenting, would not be the ultimate definitive judgment; rather it must be sent to the Roman Pontiff, to whom it is open to approve or disapprove it. Compare the letter of Gelasius to the Bishops of Dardania, the letter of Nicholas to Michael, the Bull of Pius IV by which he confirms the Council of Trent, etc. A fortiori, however, a definitive and irreformable judgment would not be had if the Fathers define with the Legates dissenting, or indeed with the Legates consenting, but against the mandate of the Roman Pontiff. Thus the Second Council of Ephesus erred, because it wished to define with the Legates of Pope Leo resisting; and the Council of Constantinople under Nicholas I, when the Legates acted against the instruction of Nicholas. 3) Hence there can be a confirmation properly so called, or an authority imparted to the judgment of the Fathers, by which the Roman Pontiff, as Supreme Head and Prince of the whole Church, gives obliging force to the sentence passed by the Fathers. Compare Bellarmine, cited place, and Suarez, On Faith, disputation 5, section 7.

1034. IV. As to the necessity of Councils, it is useful first to indicate by what law Councils exist. In this matter the institution of the substance, so to speak, of a Council must be distinguished from the mode not pertaining to the substance and from the time at which Councils are celebrated. If the mode and time are in question, divine institution must be altogether denied; for from Scripture or from tradition nothing can be brought forward which determines certain fixed times for the celebration of Councils. But if the very substance of Councils is in question, "the origin of Councils," says Bellarmine, book 1, chapter 3, "although Albert Pighius contends that it is plainly human and devised by natural reason, nevertheless more probably is divine." And Suarez, On Faith, disputation 11, no. 1, says: "Nor indeed is pleasing what Pighius thinks, that the gathering of these Councils is from human institution, unless perhaps he understands this as to time and ordering, or because it is perhaps not simply from divine precept that these councils be assembled." Surely 1) it cannot be denied that councils have always been the principal means of governing the Church after the supreme means, which is the authority of the Roman Pontiff, successor of Peter. "For always," says Bellarmine, book 1, chapter 11, "there has been in the Church of God this custom,

that for explaining doubtful matters councils of Bishops should be held. But it seems absurd that God did not reveal at least the principal means of governing the Church." 2) Just as Christ the Lord, saying to Peter alone, "whatever thou shalt bind," etc., conferred on him supreme power over the Church, so, saying to the other Apostles together with Peter, "whatever you shall bind," etc., Christ seems to have instituted the judgment of the assembly of Bishops in those things which pertain to the Church. 3) Since it is conceded by all that a truly ecumenical Council is a subject of infallibility in teaching, I do not see how it can be doubted whether it is, as to substance, of divine institution. For infallibility cannot be sought anywhere else in the Church than from the promises of Christ; nor can Christ be thought to have promised infallibility to a subject humanly devised.

1035. But are Councils necessary? To dispatch this complex question briefly, we shall distinctly and in order set forth the various points which answer it. Therefore first we say that Councils are not necessary by reason of intrinsic authority, namely insofar as without them there would be lacking the supreme and full power which can finally settle all controversies of faith. For 1) according to the Council of Florence, we have proved that "in blessed Peter full power of feeding, ruling, and governing the universal Church was handed over by our Lord Jesus Christ" to the Roman Pontiff. But the power of Peter would not be full, nor would Peter's successor truly be Head, Prince, or Monarch of the whole Church, if he himself could not settle some controversies by an ultimate and definitive sentence without a Council. 2) The Council of Florence likewise teaches that the Roman Pontiff "exists as the father and teacher of all Christians." But that would be false if supreme and full power to settle all controversies without a Council did not belong to him; for then, at least in part, he would be taught rather than teach. 3) The office of confirming the brethren was committed to Peter and his successors, as we shall establish more clearly in the following article. But if he lacked the authority which could finally settle controversies of faith without a Council, far from confirming the brethren, he would be confirmed by them.

1036. But secondly, a Council can sometimes be not only useful, but also necessary for effectively obtaining the effects of the supreme sentence which is passed. For, speaking generally, judgment is passed for extirpating heresies or errors, for reducing schismatics to unity, for uprooting abuses and establishing disciplinary matters. Now, although the Roman Pontiff has full authority, as we have said, to pass judgment of this kind, and consequently all are bound to obey him just as if the sentence had been passed by a Council, nevertheless it can happen that in fact some do not obey a sentence passed by the Pontiff alone, who would furnish obedience to the sentence of a Council. In truth, when Bishops are convoked from the whole world, discuss together the things to be defined, raise difficulties and obtain their solution, and finally themselves pronounce sentence together with the Head, it cannot happen that they do not attain a richer understanding of the dogma, that they do not lay aside national prejudices, if there are any, that they are not more ready to publish, explain, and urge everywhere in the world the sentence which, the cause having been duly known, they themselves passed with the Pontiff. These things indeed as to Bishops; but as to others, it cannot be denied that a sentence passed not by the Roman Pontiff alone, but by the whole Council, bears before it a certain greater solemnity and extrinsic authority; that by that sentence the consensus of the whole Church is at once manifested; that this solemnity and this consensus more strongly strike the senses and minds of heretics, schismatics, and any erring persons whatsoever, and more easily bend their spirit to obedience. But if the question concerns extinguishing abuses and establishing discipline, information about the diverse circumstances in which different peoples can be placed is received more easily and more solemnly when Bishops of all nations come together at once, although it could be obtained by other means; and therefore lesser obstacles also are opposed to the execution of those things which have been established in Councils. Each person can develop these things for himself.

1037. From these things, thirdly, the doctrine of Bellarmine, book 1, chapter 10, and of others is shown to be most true: namely, that ecumenical Councils are not absolutely and simply necessary. For 1) without them the full and supreme power of the Roman Pontiff is had, and it can rule the

universal Church. But that heretics and schismatics be in fact recalled to the truth of faith and subjection is not absolutely necessary in order that the Church subsist and attain its end, that is, bring to salvation the number of the elect preordained by God, no. 667. 2) "I easily persuade myself of this," says Bellarmine, cited place, "from the fact that in the first 300 years the Church lacked general Councils, and nevertheless did not perish. For just as in those 300 years the Church remained unharmed without general councils, so also without doubt it could have remained for another 300, and again another 600, and another thousand. For even at that time there were not lacking many heresies, many schisms, many vices and abuses; yet all these things could not oppress the Catholic Church, although it was destitute of the protection of general Councils." Here it could be added that after the Council of Trent, the Church again remained for three centuries without an ecumenical Council, namely until the Vatican Council.

1038. From these things it is permitted briefly to answer certain propositions which are customarily brought forward. They say: 1) Ecumenical Councils are necessary. I answer by distinguishing: they are necessary with a necessity arising from a defect of full authority, and of themselves, I deny; with a necessity arising from extrinsic circumstances, and per accidens, I concede. The authority of the Pontiff alone is so full that none is greater than it; hence the Pontiff alone, defining, produces the same obligation as the sentence of a Council. But because of the fault of the human will, an obstacle can be placed against the execution of the sentence of the Pontiff; and this obstacle is removed through the conciliar sentence. They say: 2) A Council adds something to the definition of the Pontiff. I answer by distinguishing: it adds something of intrinsic force for obliging, I deny; of solemnity and extrinsic authority, I concede or subdistinguish: and this of itself, I deny; per accidens, I concede. Since the authority of the Pontiff alone is full and supreme, nothing of intrinsic strength can be added to it from the consensus of Bishops. If the authority of a Council is said to be greater, it is greater at most extensively, insofar as there are more judging persons; but not intensively, insofar as the judgment is firmer, no. 1000. Therefore the whole thing that is added is extrinsic and per accidens, as we have said. They say: 3) Councils are by divine precept. I answer by distinguishing: as to a certain time and mode not affecting the substance, I deny; as to substance, I subdistinguish: that the precept arises from the intimate constitution of the Church, as though without a council there were lacking authority which could finally define the matter, I deny; that it arises from circumstances, so that the end may be prudently provided for, I concede. Therefore, if there is any law of having an ecumenical Council, it is certainly no other than that by which any social authority is obliged to consult in a suitable way for the good of the society committed to it. But that an ecumenical Council appears to be the one efficacious means, as we have said, can occur only per accidens; and therefore that law would oblige only per accidens.

Article 6. Whether an Infallible Magisterium Is to Be Attributed to the Roman Pontiff

1039. To the question concerning the nature of the Primacy there is immediately joined the question concerning its endowments, which, after the things disputed thus far, does not need a lengthy treatment. For since it is evident that the Roman Pontiff, by reason of the primacy which he divinely obtains, is head of the universal Church, it follows that all the endowments and prerogatives which we vindicated for the Church ought to exist in the Roman Pontiff in a certain more eminent way, just as also in a human individual the head contains in itself in a more eminent way whatever of excellence is found in the members, no. 419. Now we saw three endowments especially to be eminent in the Church, namely indefectibility in being, authority in ruling, and infallibility in teaching. Therefore these same endowments must be attributed to the Primacy in a certain more eminent way.

1040. But concerning indefectibility nothing is to be added here, since it is clearer than midday light that a society cannot stand safe without authority, nor can the Church divinely

constituted be ruled by any other authority except that which Christ instituted. Therefore the very arguments which prove the indefectibility of the Church also establish the indefectibility of the Primacy. Besides, we expressly showed the perpetuity of the Primacy. The same must be said concerning authority; for the things which we discussed in their place concerning the authority of the Church are to be understood chiefly of the Roman Pontiff, in whom we demonstrated that full and supreme power resides as in its subject. Nor is a new demonstration needed for us to understand that laws passed by the Roman Pontiff do not have force dependently on the acceptance of the Church; for this would have no other foundation than that authority had been conferred by Christ immediately on the Church, and not on Peter himself; which we have directly refuted by many arguments in this very disputation. Finally, if anyone were to assert that the authority of the Roman Pontiff is in any way dependent on civil power, he would be refuted by those arguments by which we showed that Christ instituted sacred principality not in laymen, but in clerics, and that the Church is a perfect society independent of any other society whatsoever. Therefore the whole question concerns the infallibility of the Roman Pontiff.

1041. The Vatican Council, chapter 4 of the constitution Pastor Aeternus, teaches: 1) that the infallibility of the Roman Pontiff is comprehended in his Primacy. "Moreover," it says, "that in the apostolic primacy itself, which the Roman Pontiff obtains over the universal Church as successor of Peter, prince of the Apostles, the supreme power also of the magisterium is comprehended, this Holy See has always held, the perpetual usage of the Church proves, and the ecumenical Councils themselves, those especially in which East came together with West in the union of faith and charity, have declared." 2) It then confirms this by the authority of the Fourth Council of Constantinople, of the Second Council of Lyons, and of Florence; from which it indicates that the very testimonies of Matthew 16 and John 21, by which the Primacy is established, also prove its infallibility. 3) It further shows this truth to have been confirmed by the constant and universal sense and practice of the Church; where also a) it declares what we noted concerning the infallibility of the Church: "For the Holy Spirit was not promised to the successors of Peter so that, with him revealing, they might disclose new doctrine, but so that, with him assisting, they might holily guard and faithfully expound the revelation handed down through the Apostles, or the deposit of faith." b) It indicates another testimony of Scripture on which this endowment of Peter rests, saying: "This See of holy Peter always remains unstained by any error, according to the divine promise of our Lord the Savior made to the prince of his disciples: I have prayed for thee, that thy faith fail not; and thou, once converted, confirm thy brethren." 4) After declaring the necessity of solemnly asserting this prerogative of Peter, it adds the formal definition itself: "Therefore, faithfully adhering to the tradition received from the beginning of the Christian faith, for the glory of God our Savior, for the exaltation of the Catholic religion, and for the salvation of Christian peoples, with the sacred Council approving, we teach and define that it is a divinely revealed dogma: that the Roman Pontiff, when he speaks from the Chair, that is, when, exercising the office of Pastor and Teacher of all Christians, by his supreme Apostolic authority he defines a doctrine concerning faith or morals to be held by the universal Church, through the divine assistance promised to him in blessed Peter, possesses that infallibility with which the divine Redeemer willed his Church to be furnished in defining doctrine concerning faith or morals; and therefore definitions of this kind of the Roman Pontiff are irreformable of themselves, and not from the consensus of the Church. But if anyone, which may God avert, shall presume to contradict this our definition, let him be anathema."

1042. To attain the force of this definition, let us first note that here we indeed attack all those adversaries who either assail the rights of the Primacy or pervert its true character, but especially the Gallicans, who in that celebrated declaration, see no. 958, asserted in the fourth place: "In questions of faith too the principal parts belong to the Supreme Pontiff, and his decrees pertain to all and individual churches; nevertheless the judgment is not irreformable unless the consensus of the Church has acceded." This opinion, already before the Vatican Council, had often been condemned by the Holy See. Let it be enough here to bring forward the words by which Pius VI, in the constitution Auctorem fidei, censured

the Synod of Pistoia, which had adopted that declaration: "Wherefore, since the acts of the Gallican assembly, as soon as they came forth, our venerable predecessor Innocent XI, through letters in the form of a brief on the second day of April in the year 1682, and afterward more expressly Alexander VIII, in the constitution Inter Multiplices, on the fourth day of August in the year 1690, by reason of his apostolic office, disapproved, rescinded, and declared null and void, much more does pastoral solicitude require of us that we reprove and condemn the recent adoption of these things made in the synod, affected by so many faults, as rash, scandalous, and especially, after the decrees of our predecessors, highly injurious to this Apostolic See, as by this our present constitution we reprove and condemn it, and will it to be held as reproved and condemned." But the authors themselves of that declaration, in a letter given in the year 1693 to Innocent XII, write: "We profess and declare that we grieve vehemently indeed, and beyond what can be said, from our soul, over the things done in the aforesaid assemblies which greatly displeased your Holiness and your predecessors; and therefore whatever in those assemblies could be thought decreed concerning ecclesiastical power and pontifical authority, we hold as not decreed and declare that it ought to be so held." Likewise Louis XIV retracted the edict by which he had ordered that the declaration be handed down in public schools and academies.

1043. Nevertheless there were not lacking those who, after these things, still dared to deny or call into doubt the infallibility of the Supreme Pontiff. Indeed, at the time when the Vatican Council was being held, the arrogance of certain men increased to such a degree that the Council judged it altogether necessary to define this question.

1044. Therefore, so that the sense of this definition may be established, we must note these things in order. I. The Vatican Council teaches that "the Roman Pontiff... possesses that infallibility with which the divine Redeemer willed his Church to be furnished in defining doctrine concerning faith or morals." By these words active infallibility is asserted of the Roman Pontiff, concerning whose nature nothing remains to be added after the things we disputed above, nos. 780 ff. Nevertheless it will be useful to advert to two things here. First, scarcely explicable is the confusion which some have made between impeccability and infallibility; for it is evidently an altogether different thing that the Pope cannot err in teaching the Church, and that, whether in private life or even in carrying out public office, he cannot sin. This is clearly known from the obvious concept itself of impeccability and infallibility; but it can be further confirmed from the common distinction between grace making one pleasing and grace freely given. For the gift of impeccability belongs to that first genus of grace, which makes us pleasing to God, while the gift of infallibility belongs to the other, namely to grace which is granted for the utility of the Church. Hence, like other freely given gifts, it can be joined with sin in the same man. Certainly inspiration is a higher grace than the assistance of the Holy Spirit which renders the Church teaching infallible. For the former is either joined with revelation, or certainly is such a divine impulse that the things which a man utters while it moves him are truly and properly the word of God. But the assistance promised to the Church is seen in this, that the Holy Spirit so directs a man in investigating revelation, or expounding the word of God, that he cannot be deceived. Therefore, if inspiration can be separated from holiness, much more can assistance. Now Balaam, not only when he was a sinner, but at the very time when he was sinning most gravely, poured forth a sublime prophecy concerning the people of God. Caiaphas, in the council which he had gathered for killing the Son of God, prophesied, since he was Pontiff of that year. Therefore it will not be repugnant to admit the assistance of the Holy Spirit in the Roman Pontiff when he teaches the universal Church, even if perhaps he is not holy. Therefore those who, to assail the doctrine of infallibility, recall the sins and vices by which some Pontiffs stained themselves, accomplish nothing.

1045. Secondly it must be noted that it is one thing that the Roman Pontiff speaking ex cathedra cannot teach heresy, which the Vatican Council defined; it is another thing that he cannot fall into heresy, or become a heretic as a private person. The Council said nothing concerning this

question; and theologians and canonists do not agree among themselves. For some, such as Albert Pighius, On Ecclesiastical Hierarchy, book 4, chapter 8, deny that the Roman Pontiff, even as a private person, can fall into heresy properly so called, namely knowingly and obstinately adhere to an error against faith already condemned. Bellarmine inclines more to this opinion, book 4, chapter 6; Suarez judges it more pious and more probable, On Faith, disputation 10, section 6; and experience, besides other reasons, seems to strengthen the same. For there has scarcely been any episcopal see, he says, in which within a few centuries several heretics have not sat, as at Alexandria, Antioch, Constantinople, and so on; but in the Roman See, through an immense tract of centuries, not even one is to be found who, even privately, was a heretic. Others nevertheless have taught the contrary.

1046. But in this latter opinion the question is asked whether the Roman Pontiff, having fallen into heresy, falls from the Pontificate by the law itself, or is to be removed from it by a judicial sentence; for no one among those who admit the possibility of the case denies or calls into doubt that he is either cast down by the fact itself or at least is to be cast down. Now there are two opinions, says Azor, Moral Institutions, part 2, book 4, chapter 7. One of these affirms that a Pope made a heretic is indeed, by divine law and by the fact itself, deprived of the Pontificate; but that afterward it must be declared by the sentence of the Church that because of the crime of heresy he has fallen from the pontifical dignity. This opinion is defended by Paludanus, Torquemada, Augustine of Ancona, Jacobatius, Alfonso de Castro, Sylvester, Armilla, etc. The aforesaid authors strive to prove it from those words of Christ: "Thou art Peter, and upon this rock," that is, upon thee having such faith, or upon this faith which thou hast confessed. Then they say: the Church is the congregation of the faithful; therefore a heretic is outside the Church and consequently is not held as a member of the Church. How, therefore, can he be head of the Church who is not a member of the Church? Compare, nevertheless, the things we said above, nos. 605 ff.; for those can be called faithful who, having received the sacrament of faith, still profess the faith. In this sense catechumens, although they believe, are not called faithful; that is, account is taken of a solemn and external profession of faith. The other opinion denies that a Pope made a heretic is by the fact itself stripped of his power of jurisdiction; but says that he must be removed by a judicial sentence. This is the opinion of Cajetan, Soto, Corduba, and Cano. For, they say, the other Bishops, as soon as they are heretics, are by no means judged by the law itself to be cast down from the pontifical office and from that jurisdiction until a legitimate sentence declares their crime and they are condemned. What they do in the meantime by reason of the public office which they hold has force, as is commonly held. Therefore the same would have to be said of the Roman Pontiff.

1047. But in this latter opinion a new difficulty arises: by whose authority and sentence, in the given case, will the Pontiff be removed from his grade? For he has no superior by whom he may be authoritatively removed. The cited Azor answers: "But to the objections that the Pope has no superior on earth, I answer that in the case of heresy the Church is superior to him. But, you will say, whence is this deduced? I answer that from the very institution of Christ, by manifest and necessary reason, it can be deduced that in this cause the Church passes sentence concerning the crime of the Pontiff. For by the very fact that he is a pertinacious heretic who does not wish to be corrected when admonished, unless he were subjected to the power of the Church, great and many inconveniences would arise in the Church. But Christ did not leave his Church destitute. Therefore he granted to it the right and power that, if the Pope is a heretic, it can take away the pontificate from him, lest the one whom it ought to have as pastor, teacher, and leader, it have and feel as wolf, enemy, and corrupter." That author brings these things forward, and indeed consistently with his doctrine concerning the possibility of the case, or of the crime of heresy in a Pope. But the reason which he adds can seem wonderful. For no one fails to see that from that process also which he establishes, great and many inconveniences would arise in the Church; but Christ did not leave his Church destitute, as the praised author was just now arguing. Therefore he granted this to it: that the Pope, not even as a private person, becomes a heretic, lest he then have to be removed with great danger to the Church. And to this conclusion I adhere.

1048. II. The Vatican Council teaches that "the Roman Pontiff, when he speaks from the Chair, that is, when exercising the office of Pastor and Teacher of all Christians, by his supreme Apostolic Authority he defines a doctrine concerning faith or morals to be held by the universal Church," etc. To understand these words, let us first note those words "by his supreme Apostolic authority." For the Supreme Pontiff can bear a twofold person of teacher: one which he has in common with all other private teachers, as when he brings forth books or theological commentaries into the light, just as other Theologians do; the other which he assumes when, as supreme authentic teacher, he teaches the universal Church. As a private Doctor he enjoys no pontifical authority, much less infallibility. Compare Benedict XIV, On the Synod, Preface at the end. The same must likewise be said concerning doctrinal letters which he might write as a private doctor, as is that of Benedict XIV, given on December 5, 1744, to the Archbishop of Santo Domingo. But as supreme and authentic Doctor he has infallibility. Hence the Vatican Council defined that the Pope is infallible when, "exercising the office of Pastor and Teacher of all Christians, by his supreme Apostolic authority... he defines."

1049. Secondly let us note that the Roman Pontiff is infallible: 1) when he defines; the explanation of this word is to be sought from what was said in no. 794; 2) in doctrine concerning faith or morals. In this matter those things which we said above, nos. 805 ff., concerning the object of the infallibility of the Church must be recalled; for, as the Vatican Council declared, the object of the infallibility of the Supreme Pontiff is the same. For this reason neither subjective personal facts, nor precepts, nor rescripts, nor opinions which the Roman Pontiffs put forth from time to time, nor particular disciplinary decrees, nor omissions of definition, and many other things of this kind, pertain to the definitions with which we are dealing. Nevertheless, all these things, because of the supreme authority from which they flow, are always to be held in great esteem and received with humble submission of mind and veneration. Compare Ballerini, On the Force and Nature of the Primacy, chapter 15, section 10.

1050. Thirdly, let us note that the Supreme Pontiff is said to be infallible when he speaks ex cathedra. In this matter two questions must be distinguished: 1) "What is it to speak from the Chair?" 2) "Whether in this or that particular case the Supreme Pontiff has spoken from the Chair?" The Gallicans seemed to confuse these two questions when they asserted that it is not evident what conditions are required for the Supreme Pontiff to speak from the Chair. Now 1) we do not deny that doubt can sometimes arise whether this or that pontifical document contains a locution from the Chair, in the same way that it can be doubtful whether in some decree of an ecumenical Council this or that matter has been properly defined. It has been doubted, for example, whether the things which are said concerning the matter and form of the sacraments in the Instruction issued by the Council of Florence for the Armenians are dogmatic definitions or not. But just as from this it does not follow that all decrees of Councils are, as it were, of doubtful authority, and that we generally do not know what it is for a Council to issue definitions of faith, so from the doubt which exists concerning some pontifical document it does not follow that all documents of this kind are of doubtful authority, because we do not know what it is to speak from the Chair. The conditions required for a locution from the Chair, as we shall say at once, are certain and known. It is only sometimes doubted whether all of them are verified in this or that case. In these cases the rules which we handed down in no. 385 are to be applied. 2) In truth, it is manifest what it is to speak from the Chair; for according to the declaration of the Vatican Council itself, the Pontiff is said to speak from the Chair "when, exercising the office of Pastor and Teacher of all Christians, by his supreme Apostolic authority, he defines a doctrine concerning faith or morals to be held by the universal Church." For the apostolic chair is nothing other than the supreme authentic magisterium, whose definitive doctrinal sentence obliges the universal Church to consent. There is indeed required an intention of defining doctrine, or of teaching by a definitive sentence and authority obliging the universal Church to consent; and that intention must be manifested and knowable by clear indications. Nevertheless there is no determinate essential form which the Pontiff must employ in order to manifest this will of his. For although there are some solemn modes which are known from practice to

express locution from the Chair, and which therefore the Pontiff never uses except when speaking from the Chair, such as dogmatic Bulls or Constitutions, nevertheless this form is not essential and exclusive, so that without it the Pontiff cannot, as Pastor and Teacher of all Christians, define doctrine concerning faith or morals to be held by the universal Church, condemn errors opposed to it, and render this will of his manifest.

1051. Therefore, according to the Vatican Council, these conditions are required for definitions from the Chair: 1) on the part of the Pontiff, that he speak as supreme Doctor and Pastor; 2) on the part of the matter, that he teach in matters which are the object of the infallibility of the Church; 3) on the part of the form, that he pass a definitive sentence with an intention therefore manifest of obliging; 4) on the part of the terminus, that he oblige the universal Church to consent. No other condition besides these is required for a locution from the Chair; and especially concerning the preceding investigation of truth, the things we said in no. 792 must be recalled. Therefore those who seek another definition, in order to know what it is to speak from the Chair, are to be received with laughter.

1052. As to the last of the aforesaid conditions, it is customarily asked whether the Pope, directly and immediately addressing some single Bishop or particular Church, speaks from the Chair and is infallible. We suppose that the first three conditions are present; and surely the matter can be some doctrine to be held, which therefore the Supreme Pontiff teaches with the intention of obliging men to hold it. Nor, in order that he exercise the office of supreme Doctor, is it necessary that he directly and immediately address all Christians, just as a King can exercise his supreme power by granting pardon to a guilty man condemned to death. Therefore the difficulty would arise only from this, that he would not write directly and immediately to the universal Church. In this matter one ought to look not so much to whom the Pope directs his speech as for whom he actually speaks; and if indeed from the matter which he hands down, from the form which he employs, or from other circumstances, it is evident that he speaks for all, nothing seems to be lacking by which he may be said to speak from the Chair. Certainly Innocent, in the Pelagian cause, sent his decree only to the Africans, and nevertheless St. Augustine cried out that the cause was finished. St. Leo gave his letter to Flavian, and nevertheless he held it, even before it was known by others, as the norm by which the controversy of faith at Constantinople would be ended. Hormisdas directed the profession of faith to the Easterners alone, etc. But this appears more evidently when the Pope himself causes errors condemned in documents which were not directed to the universal Church to be made known to the universal Church, as happened concerning several propositions which are contained in the Syllabus of December 8, 1864; for then by that very fact he teaches the universal Church that those propositions are to be rejected. [Footnote 1.] It is indeed remarkable that some men, though few, and of no mediocre talent, have called into doubt whether the Syllabus ought to be held as a definition ex cathedra. The simple application of the conditions which, according to the Vatican Council, are required for an act of this kind evidently shows that the character of infallibility can in no way be denied to it. We know that the Syllabus does not exhibit the forms or formalities customarily employed in issuing dogmatic Constitutions; but a defect of this kind cannot diminish its force and value. Certainly they neither prove nor can prove that those formalities are necessary by divine right. But by ecclesiastical right or practice they were introduced for this reason, that the intention of defining or of obliging the universal Church to consent might be evident. Therefore, if that is evident from elsewhere, notwithstanding the defect of those formalities, the Syllabus will retain its entire value. Now 1) whatever the Syllabus embraces, all pertains to the good of the universal Church, with regard to matters of faith and morals; and the title itself manifests that it treats of a law directly prescribing submission of the intellect, since it is called "Syllabus embracing the principal errors of our age," etc. 2) The Syllabus is joined to the Encyclical Quanta Cura not only in time, but also in authority. In it one reads: "In accordance with the duty of our Apostolic ministry, following the illustrious footsteps of our Predecessors, we have raised our voice, and in several Encyclical Letters published to the people, and Allocutions held in Consistory, and other Apostolic Letters, we have condemned the principal errors of our most sorrowful age [behold the very title of the Syllabus], have stirred up your distinguished episcopal vigilance, and again and again have

warned and exhorted all the sons of the Catholic Church most dear to us, that they should utterly abhor and avoid the contagions of so dreadful a plague." And a little after: "Although we have not omitted often to proscribe and reprove the chief errors of this kind, nevertheless the cause of the Catholic Church, and the salvation of souls divinely committed to us, and the good of human society itself altogether demand that we again stir up your pastoral solicitude to put to flight other depraved opinions which burst forth from those same errors, as from their sources." That is to say, Schrader observes, if the streams are condemned, surely in them and with them their signified sources are held by stronger right to be condemned, condemned together with them, and the condemnations made of the chief errors of this kind ratified. Now it is evident that the Encyclical Quanta Cura has full and infallible authority from the words by which it concludes: "In so great a perversity, therefore, of depraved opinions, we, well mindful of our Apostolic office, and being especially solicitous concerning our most holy religion, sound doctrine, and the salvation of souls divinely committed to us, and concerning the good of human society itself, have judged that we must again raise our Apostolic voice. Therefore all and each of the depraved opinions and doctrines individually commemorated in these Letters, by our Apostolic authority, we reprove, proscribe, and condemn; and we will and command that by all sons of the Catholic Church they be held altogether as reproved, proscribed, and condemned." 3) More than once the Supreme Pontiff himself declared that the Syllabus proceeded by his authority; but especially when, responding to the Bishops gathered at Rome from all parts of the world on June 17, 1867, he said that it was to be held as a rule of teaching: "In your presence I now confirm the Encyclical Quanta Cura, and also the Syllabus; and again place them before you as a rule of teaching," as the words of the Pontiff were rendered in English in the Dublin Review. 4) Eminent Cardinal Antonelli, in the letter by which he sent the Syllabus to all Bishops, says: "The same Supreme Pontiff willed that a Syllabus of the same errors, to be sent to all the sacred Prelates of the whole Catholic world, be composed." And: "But he gave me commands that I should see to it that this printed Syllabus be carried to you, most illustrious and most reverend Lord... Therefore, carrying out the commands of the same Pontiff with all alacrity, and, as is fitting, obedience, I hasten to send to you, most illustrious and most reverend Lord, the same Syllabus joined to these letters." He also declares that the Syllabus was composed "so that the same Prelates may have all the errors before their eyes," etc. 5) But the universal consensus of the Bishops itself, and the promulgation of the Syllabus made by them, makes clear its doctrinal value. Indeed, I would like to know whether those who diminish the value of the Syllabus truly hope that any one of the propositions condemned in it will at last be approved or at least tolerated in the Church. But in vain do they thrust forward the authority of Bishop Fessler, The True and False Infallibility, etc., who expressed the contrary opinion, and also the Brief of approval, as they say, of the Supreme Pontiff given to him. For 1) the authority of that Bishop in no way weakens either the intrinsic reasons given or the extrinsic authority of several grave Theologians. 2) Not without equivocation do they call that Brief one of approval, since it is neither exhibited entire, nor was it given expressly for approving the book, but is part of a Brief in which other business was being treated. 3) The very words which are exhibited indeed praise the purpose of the writer, Fessler, of beating back the audacity of Prof. Schulte, etc.; but they present no approval of the work itself, especially of all and each of the things contained in it. 4) Otherwise approval of this kind would not cohere with the praises given by the Supreme Pontiff himself to Father Schrader on account of the work in which he had handed down the same doctrine which we defend. 5) Hence, after investigations had been made at Rome, that approval was found to vanish. But enough here concerning this argument. Whoever desires more, compare Schrader, On Theology in General, page 136 ff.; Etudes Religieuses, etc., May, August, September 1875, and March, May 1876; La Civilta Cattolica, first Saturday of October 1875; Dublin Review, April and July 1875, or Ward, D. Ph., Essays on the Church's Doctrinal Authority, page 480 ff.

1053. III. Finally, the Vatican Council teaches that the definitions of the Roman Pontiff ex cathedra are "irreformable of themselves, and not from the consensus of the Church." To understand these words also, we must recall that the gates of hell will never prevail, neither against the

Church nor against the rock upon which the Church was built by Christ. Hence it can never happen that the consensus of Bishops is not joined to the words of Peter teaching. Nevertheless it is one thing for this consensus truly to be present, another for it to be required as a condition from which the judgment of Peter is confirmed and receives full force. This latter is both opposed to the words of Christ, by which Peter must confirm others, not himself be confirmed by others, and opens the door to the sophisms of those who, condemned by the Roman Pontiff, nevertheless try to defend their errors, as history testifies. Therefore, although the consensus of Bishops will always be present, nevertheless the infallibility of the judgments of the Supreme Pontiff does not depend on it, but precedes it. It is pleasing to transcribe the illustrious words of Cardinal Franzelin, On Tradition and Scripture: "The antecedent consensus of the Church can indeed be an objective means by which the Pontiff arrives at knowledge of a doctrine as definable; but it is not of itself and from the nature of the thing the only and necessary means of knowledge. For doctrines concerning faith or morals can be known as definable also from other sources and means, and questions even within the bounds of the Church, until now doubtful and controverted, can be defined, no. 387. But in no way is consensus of this kind of the Church or of the Bishops, whether antecedent, concomitant, or subsequent, necessary by way of an authentic judgment concurring with the judgment or definition of the Pontiff. The Gallican opinion demanding this consensus of the Church as necessary for the infallibility of the definitions of the Pontiff in such a way that the one subject of infallibility would be the body of the teaching Church, namely the Pontiff with the Bishops, is now a heresy directly and explicitly condemned by the Vatican Council. Nevertheless the subsequent consensus of the whole Church is always the effect of the definition of the Pontiff."

1054. And this is the place to explain certain forms of speaking which seemed to be a scandal to the little ones, the contradictors of the definition to be issued, although they were neither new nor false. Thus 1) the infallibility of the Supreme Pontiff is called a personal privilege; not indeed insofar as it adheres to him as a private person, but insofar as the Primacy itself, by reason of which the Roman Pontiff is infallible, is personal; insofar as it cannot be communicated to another; insofar as what is ascribed to the Roman See or Chair belongs to the very person of the Pontiff; insofar as it belongs to the Supreme Pontiff alone, etc. "I concede," says Toletus, in Summary Exposition, volume 2, page 62, "that it is a personal privilege; for this reason it cannot be communicated." And Ballerini, On the Force and Nature of the Primacy, chapter 3, proposition 3: "This primacy especially of jurisdiction and not of mere order, of St. Peter and of the Roman Pontiffs his successors, is personal, or tied to their persons. And therefore a certain principal personal right of theirs, that is, common to no other, ought to be contained in that primacy... Hence also it follows that whatever of right belongs by reason of the primacy to the Roman See, Chair, or Church, is to be attributed to the person of the Roman Pontiffs in such a way that he needs the assistance or association of no one for exercising that same right." 2) The infallibility of the Roman Pontiff is also called independent, not indeed from Christ and the Holy Spirit, but from any other authority, from the body of Pastors, from the acceptance of the Church. Similarly it is called absolute, not insofar as the Supreme Pontiff can define whatever he wishes; for he must "holily guard and faithfully expound the revelation handed down through the Apostles, or the deposit of faith"; but insofar as it cannot be circumscribed by any condition introduced by any human authority whatsoever. "Nor in that jurisdiction," says Ballerini, in the cited work, chapter 3, section 4, "which is essential to the primacy, ought or can the Roman Pontiff depend on anyone else, especially since the same Christ who instituted that jurisdiction received from Christ as circumscribed by no condition, personal to Peter alone and his successors, instituted the primacy of jurisdiction as personal, which cannot be understood without personal jurisdiction." And in the appendix on infallibility, proposition 7: "Unity with Roman faith is absolutely necessary, and therefore the absolute prerogative of infallibility is to be attributed to it, and likewise the coercive force for unity of faith is absolute; just as the infallibility and coercive force of the Catholic Church itself, which must adhere to the Roman faith, is also absolute." 3) The Roman Pontiff is said to be infallible apart from the Church, not insofar as the adherence of the Pastors and

of the Church to the definition issued by him can be lacking, as we were just saying, but insofar as that definition does not have force from the consensus of the Pastors or the acceptance of the Church; and therefore the Roman Pontiff, as distinct from them, is infallible. For indefectibility is promised to Peter apart from the Church and from the Apostles; therefore Peter, even considered apart from the Church, is infallible.

1055. These things, therefore, having been declared, we say: Proposition 41. The Roman Pontiff, when he speaks from the Chair, that is, when, exercising the office of Pastor and Teacher of all Christians by his supreme Apostolic authority, he defines a doctrine concerning faith or morals to be held by the universal Church, through the divine assistance promised to him in blessed Peter, possesses that infallibility with which the divine Redeemer willed his Church to be furnished in defining doctrine concerning faith or morals; and therefore the definitions of the same Roman Pontiff are irreformable of themselves, and not from the consensus of the Church. Section II The Infallibility of the Roman Pontiff Is Demonstrated from Scripture.

1056. As we saw a little before, the Vatican Council indicated three testimonies of Scripture on which the infallibility of the Roman Pontiff rests. Since the two earlier ones were fully explained where we treated of the institution of the Primacy, supposing the things which we disputed there at greater length, we touch here only those things which directly make for the present question from the same testimonies. But the third must first be explained more accurately here, so that from it we may safely derive the demonstration of the truth with which we are dealing. Therefore: Proof I, from the testimony of Matthew 16. For 1) in it one reads: "Thou art Peter, and upon this rock I will build my Church." Hence: by these words Peter and his successors are designated as the foundation of the Church, from which, namely, the universal Church obtains firmness. But the Church is especially a building which is constructed by faith; for just as in each of the faithful faith is the root of all justice, so the Church, which is proximately ordered to promoting justice, chiefly rests on faith, by which its members are united into one society of believers. Hence St. Ambrose, On Duties, book 3, chapter 3, says: "The Church is a congregation which rises into one connected and compact body by the unity of faith and charity." Therefore the Church must especially obtain firmness in faith through Peter and his successors. But it could not attain this firmness in faith through Peter and his successors if Peter and his successors, teaching the Church, could be deceived. For the Church stands firm in faith with the help of Peter and his successors insofar as it hears them teaching and obeys them. Therefore, if it retained the true faith by not obeying Peter and his successors, it would not obtain faith itself, and consequently firmness of faith, through Peter. But if it obeyed Peter teaching, and he could be deceived in teaching, the Church would receive from Peter not firmness, but defectibility in faith. This will appear still more clearly if we recall that under the metaphor of the foundation supreme and full jurisdiction over the Church itself was promised to Peter. Hence if the Church is constituted especially by true faith, full and supreme power of teaching the true faith was promised to Peter. But to the power of teaching corresponds the office of obeying. Therefore the universal Church is bound to hear Peter teaching. If therefore Peter, teaching the universal Church, could err, the faith of the whole Church could fail. In truth, why did the Gallicans deny to Peter the prerogative with which we are dealing? Because they said that the infallible magisterium is part of the supreme power of ruling the Church. Since, according to them, this supreme power belonged not to the Pope but to the Council, they attributed infallibility to the latter and not to the former. Since therefore it has been demonstrated that full and supreme power belongs to Peter, and that he is superior to the Council itself, it follows fully, even from the principle of the Gallicans, that infallibility in teaching must be attributed to Peter. 2) The same thing follows if we again recall what we demonstrated above, namely that Peter is designated as the principle of unity in the Church by the very fact that he is designated its foundation. For the unity of the Church is first of all the unity of faith. If therefore Peter is the principle of the unity of the Church, he is first of all the principle of the unity of faith. But how can Peter exist as a principle of this kind? We have already seen, when treating of the unity of faith in the Church, that the principle of this unity is the living and authentic magisterium, and that the Church is one in faith to the extent that all the faithful

dispersed throughout the world profess that they believe all the articles which that magisterium proposes as to be believed. Therefore Peter through his magisterium is the principle of the unity of faith; and the Church obtains this unity through Peter to the extent that it believes all the truths which Peter proposes as to be believed. But suppose that Peter exercising his magisterium can be deceived: either the Church would always adhere to him, and thus could fail in faith; or it would withdraw from him, and thus would not remain one in faith through Peter. That is to say, Peter would no longer be the foundation, or the principle from which the unity of faith proceeds in the Church. 3) The same is confirmed from the words immediately following: "and the gates of hell shall not prevail against it." Since Peter is the foundation from which the Church receives firmness and unity, through Peter it becomes invincible, so that enemies will never prevail against it. But certainly, if heresies could exist in the Church, the gates of hell, as all with whom the matter is here treated admit, would prevail against the Church. Therefore through Peter the Church ought to attain that heresies never be, or be able to be, in the Church. But if Peter, teaching the Church, could be deceived, he certainly would not be able to repel heresies from the Church; rather he himself could be a cause of heresies. Therefore it is necessary that Peter's magisterium be infallible. 4) And from these very things it is gathered that sentences passed by the Roman Pontiff, successor of blessed Peter, are "irreformable of themselves, and not from the consensus of the Church." For the foundation sustains the house, not the house the foundation. Therefore, if the house rises from faith, Peter sustains the faith of the Church, not the Church the faith of Peter. The contrary would plainly follow if the sentence of Peter became irreformable from the consensus of the Church. Surely Peter, as foundation of the Church, has the authentic magisterium to which all the faithful ought to be subject. But if the sentence of Peter became irreformable from the consensus of the Church, Peter would rather be subject to the Church. Likewise the Church remains firm in faith, so that the gates of hell cannot prevail against it, because it is founded upon a firm rock. But if the sentence of Peter were not irreformable except from the consensus of the Church, Peter would rather receive firmness from the Church.

1057. II. All these things are confirmed by the authority of the Fathers. We shall choose a few testimonies. 1) From the Latins. St. Hilary, On the Trinity, book 6, nos. 37 ff., commends the confession of Peter thus: "This faith is the foundation of the Church: through this faith the gates of hell are weak against it... Let there indeed be another faith, if there are other keys of the kingdom of heaven. Let there be another faith, if there will be another Church against which the gates of hell will not prevail. Let there be another faith, if there will be another apostolate, binding and loosing through itself on earth, binding and loosing also in heaven," etc. St. Ambrose, On the Sacrament of the Lord's Incarnation, chapters 4-5, after he has introduced Peter as affirming that it belongs to his office "to speak faith, to assert piety, to preach grace"; after he has defined his person as that by which he "exercised the primacy: indeed the primacy of confession, not of honor; the primacy of faith, not of order"; adds: "Therefore this is Peter, who answered for the other Apostles, indeed before the others; and therefore he is called the foundation, because he knew how to preserve not only what was proper to himself, but also what was common." Explaining these things further, he says: "The faith [of Peter], therefore, is the foundation of the Church. For it was not said of the flesh of Peter, but of the faith, that the gates of death will not prevail against it, namely against the faith of Peter; but confession overcame hell. And this confession excluded not one heresy; for since the Church, like a good ship, is often beaten by many waves, the foundation of the Church ought to prevail against all heresies." St. Cyprian, On the Unity of the Church, first laments that "the enemy snatches men from the Church itself... who, walking in darkness, think that they have light... asserting night as day... perfidy under the pretext of faith." Then he proceeds: "This happens for this reason, most beloved brothers, while one does not approach the origin of truth, nor seek the head, nor preserve the doctrine of the heavenly master. If anyone considers and examines these things, there is no need of a long treatment and arguments. The proof for faith is easy by the compendium of truth. The Lord speaks to Peter: 'I say to thee,'" etc. St. Jerome, in letter 15, otherwise 57, to Damasus, On the Name Hypostasis, after he had said: "I know that the Church is built upon that rock," adds: "I beseech that by thy letters there be given to me the authority either of keeping silent or of speaking

of three hypostases. I will not fear to say three hypostases if you command it." St. Augustine, in the Psalm against the party of Donatus, writes concerning the See of Peter: "It itself is the rock which the proud gates of hell do not conquer. If anyone comes to thee full of Catholic faith," etc. Compare Schrader, On Roman Unity, part 2, from no. 178. 2) From the Greeks. Origen, on Matthew 16, says: "It is manifest, even if it is not expressed, that the gates of hell will be able to prevail neither against Peter nor against the Church. For if they prevailed against the rock on which the Church was founded, they would also prevail against the Church." St. Cyril of Alexandria, On the Holy Trinity, dialogue 4, in Migne, volume 75, page 866: "Calling the rock, I think, as if denominatively, nothing other than the unshaken and most firm faith of the disciple, upon which the Church of Christ also has been strengthened and founded without danger of falling, and remains perpetually inexpugnable even to the gates of hell." That is to say, Cyril teaches that the nature of rock belongs to Simon from his faith, which is moreover unshaken and most firm. Hence the Church rests on that same faith without danger of falling, and therefore is inexpugnable even to the gates of hell. This, moreover, is not only for a time, nor only while Peter is living, but perpetually and always. St. Epiphanius, Ancoratus, no. 14, in Migne, volume 43, page 33: "He himself [Peter, who deserved happily to preach] again made the Holy Spirit manifest; for thus it was fitting for him who was first among the Apostles, I say, for that solid rock, upon which the Church of God is founded, and the gates of hell will not prevail against it. By the name of these gates are understood heresies and the founders of heresies. For in all ways faith has been stabilized in him who received the key of heaven, and on earth looses and binds in heaven. In him indeed are found any more subtle questions of faith." St. John Chrysostom, in the fourth homily on "I saw the Lord," no. 3, calls Peter "the base of the Church"; Against the Jews and the Theaters, "the base of faith"; on "Know this," "the chief of that Apostolic choir, set over the whole world, the foundation of the Church"; and in homily 88 on John affirms that "to James indeed the see of Jerusalem was given, but Peter was constituted by Christ the Teacher of the whole world." 3) The liturgies hand down the same interpretation. According to the commonly known sacramentary of Leo the Great, the Western Church prayed thus: "Almighty everlasting God, who dost rescue thy Church, founded in apostolic solidity, from the terror of the gates of hell, so that, standing in thy truth, it may receive no fellowships of the faithless." In the liturgy of the Greeks, Flosculum veritatis, etc., Rome, 1862, one reads: "Upon the rock of thy theology the Lord Jesus strengthened the immovable Church, in which, Apostle Peter, we glorify thee. Thou hast been placed as the foundational rock of the souls of the faithful, Peter of great price, rock of faith." To the same point likewise return the things which are read in the liturgy of the Mozarabs, Mixed Missal, in Migne, Latin Fathers, volume 85, page 706: "Let not the storm of tempest overthrow it [the Church], founded upon the most solid rock. Let the gates of hell prevail in nothing against it through the Tartarean aversions of heretics." 4) Hence in the profession of Hormisdas, to be subscribed by the Easterners, it is asserted: "The first safety is to guard the rule of right faith and not to deviate from the tradition of the Fathers. Because the sentence of our Lord Jesus Christ cannot be passed over, saying: 'Thou art Peter, and upon this rock I will build my Church.' These things which were said are proved by the effects of things, because in the apostolic see the Catholic religion is always preserved inviolate." The Russian Church honors Peter among other titles with these, in the work Catholic Homage, page 435 ff.: rock of faith, foundation of faith, immovable base of dogmas, seat of faith, principle of orthodoxy. Bossuet himself, Defense, book 10, otherwise 15, chapter 7, says that the cited formula of Hormisdas "was approved in the whole Church, and that all the churches, after signing the formula, professed... that the faith of the Apostolic See and of the Roman Church stands with complete and perfect solidity, and that, lest it ever fail, it is strengthened by the certain promise of the Lord." Hence Bossuet himself adds: "Who, then, being Christian, would reject that proposition, 'in the apostolic see the Catholic religion is always preserved inviolate,' inserted in a formula of faith spread everywhere, propagated through all centuries, consecrated by an ecumenical Council?" But if he then explains it of the Roman See and not of the Roman Pontiff, a remarkable distinction, concerning which discussion will recur below, to pass over the rest, this is contrary to the profession itself, in which the words "Thou art Peter," etc., are recited. For both above we proved that these regard Peter himself and his successors, and Bossuet himself

concedes it, when from them he defends the primacy of jurisdiction of the Roman Pontiff.

1058. III. The thesis can be proved from the already explained testimony of John 21. For through it it is evident that Peter and his successors were constituted Pastors of lambs and sheep, namely of the faithful and of Pastors, whether they are taken separately or together. Therefore the office of Peter is to feed or rule, just as the office of all others in the Church is to obey him. But Peter must feed especially with the food of sound doctrine, with which the Church especially needs to be fed. Therefore, just as the authority of Peter comprehends magisterium, so all are bound to subject themselves to his magisterium. But this cannot be understood unless Peter and his successors are infallible in their magisterium; for then neither could Peter demand a full and firm assent, nor could the lambs and sheep furnish it; then again the faith of the whole Church could fail, or the Church would not receive the food of sound doctrine from Peter. Therefore it is necessary that Peter and his successors be infallible in their magisterium. In like manner they must be infallible "of themselves and not from the consensus of the Church." For all, even Pastors taken together, must be fed by Peter, since Peter is the Pastor of them all. But if Peter's magisterium were not infallible, or if his sentence were not irreformable except from the consensus of the Bishops or of the Church, Peter would be fed by his own lambs or sheep, which is both absurd and openly contrary to the institution of Christ. Section III The Testimony of Luke 22.32 Is Considered Singly.

1059. When that hour was near in which he was about to acquire the Church for himself by his blood, Christ the Lord said to Peter, Luke 22.32: "Simon, Simon, behold Satan has desired you, that he might sift you as wheat; but I have prayed for thee, that thy faith fail not; and thou, once converted, confirm thy brethren." Hence we argue thus: This efficacious prayer of Christ regards Peter, and indeed not as a private person, but as the designated Head of the whole Church and Prince of the Apostles, and therefore in Peter it regards his successors also. But Christ asked that Peter's faith not fail, so that he could confirm the brethren in faith, which imports infallibility. Therefore Peter and his successors enjoy the charism of infallibility. But Peter, and his successors, must confirm the brethren in faith, and not be confirmed by them; therefore the decrees of faith which are issued by Peter and his successors are irreformable of themselves and not from the consensus of the Church.

1060. So that this argument may obtain its whole force, and at the same time be vindicated from false interpretations, certain things are to be noted generally before it is confirmed part by part. And first indeed, that the prayer of Christ was efficacious, lest the faith of Peter fail, is evident: 1) because its form is plainly absolute, nor is any condition insinuated in the text or elsewhere; 2) indeed all the prayers of Christ which have as their end the faith or essential good of the Church are absolute and efficacious, nos. 749 and 804. But Christ prayed that the faith of Peter not fail, so that he might confirm the brethren, desired by Satan, and thus the faith of the Church might remain invincible. 3) Hence Christ, knowing well that his prayer had been heard, absolutely imposed on Peter the office of confirming the brethren.

1061. Hence it is that, to weaken the force of the argument, they have entered upon other ways instead. For some 1) denied that the object of the prayer of Christ was Peter's indefectibility in faith, so that he might then confirm the brethren in faith; but they say that it was either Peter's perseverance in grace after his fall, or the confidence by which he would raise up and confirm the cast-down spirits of the Apostles after the passion of Christ. Others 2) indeed concede that the object of the prayer of Christ was indefectibility in faith; but they say that this regarded not Peter himself, but the Church, whose person Peter bore. Hence, they say, Christ obtained this: that the faith of the Catholic Church should never fail. Others 3) finally acknowledge that he prayed for Peter's infallibility in faith; but, they say, this was personal to Peter himself, so that it ought not to have been common to his successors.

1062. To confirm this last error, they interpret that phrase "being converted, confirm," etc., of Peter's conversion after the threefold denial; and then they reason thus: the faith of that one

is not going to fail, and to him it is said "confirm thy brethren," who was going to fall and be converted. But Peter as a private person, and not as Head of the Church, was going to fall and be converted. Therefore the faith of Peter as a private person was going to be indefectible, and therefore there was no privilege to be transmitted to successors.

1063. But an escape of this kind is refuted in two ways. For 1) even with that interpretation of "being converted" granted, I deny the consequence, because the fall of Peter could indeed be the occasion of the prayer of Christ, but not the adequate reason or adequate object of the prayer itself, as will be evident from the arguments by which we shall soon show that the prayer of Christ regards Peter as the designated Head of the Church. Hence Bellarmine rightly says, chapter 3: "To be converted from the sin of denial does not necessarily belong to the successors of Peter, although to confirm the brethren necessarily belongs to them. For to be converted from sin does not belong to men except insofar as they are private persons, and therefore it is a personal gift; but to confirm the brethren belongs to a man as he is head and prince of others, and therefore it passes to successors." 2) But the handed-down interpretation of that word "converted" can be denied with Maldonatus, Grotius, Jansenius, Calmet, etc. For in this place the word "converted" does not contain the notion which would be rendered by the phrase "after thou art converted from the fall," but the notion which is the same as this: "returning the turns, in turn or reciprocally." Thus this sentence of Christ the Lord comes forth: "I have prayed for thee, that thy faith not fail; but thou in turn confirm thy brethren. Indeed I prayed that thou not succumb to the temptations of the devil; and thou repay turns to thy brethren, so that in similar dangers and temptations, strengthened through thee, they may stand immovable." This is confirmed a) by the almost perfect parallelism of the phrases; for member seems accurately to answer member in turn: I have done for thee; thou do someday in return for the rest: that thou not fail in faith; that firmness not be lacking to thy brethren. b) It is also confirmed from the condition of the persons. For it is not credible that Christ the Lord would say and command that which neither Peter nor the other Apostles present there could understand. But no mention had occurred concerning the fall of Peter and his consequent conversion. How therefore could the hearers have understood the words of Christ in the sense which is objected? Certainly when a little afterward Christ warned Peter of the imminent fall, this warning came upon Peter so much as something new, that with all his strength he resisted the master affirming it, which is a manifest indication that Peter and the Apostles had by no means thought before of the fall. Compare Schrader, On Roman Unity, part 2, from page 179.

1064. These things having been laid down beforehand, anyone sees that, to defend the force of the argument with which we are dealing, we must prove three things: 1) that the object of the prayer of Christ is indefectibility in faith; 2) that this directly regards not the Church or the remaining Apostles; 3) that it regards Peter, indeed as the designated Head of the Church, whose prerogative therefore must be transmitted to successors.

1065. Therefore I. Christ prayed for indefectibility in faith. For 1) the words of Christ are: "I have prayed for thee, that thy faith fail not." But he would speak wholly without point if he had willed to obtain for Peter something other than indefectibility in faith. 2) Christ opposed his prayer to the hatred of the enemy. But what did the enemy, Satan, attempt? "He desired you, that he might sift you as wheat"; that is, he wished to shake and separate you. "For in sifting," says Cameron, Myrothecium Evangelicum, on this place, "there are two things: one, that shaking and agitation by which all things are turned upside down; the other, segregation and separation." Therefore Satan wished to snatch away that by which the Apostles were united with Christ. But this is chiefly faith, through which we approach Christ, and which is the principle of union and society with Christ. By the worst of all temptations he wished to snatch away that by which, once it is lost, not only the fruit, but the very root of the fruitful tree is lost. Therefore Christ, opposing his prayer to the temptation of Satan, prayed that the faith of Peter not fail, that he, turned toward the brethren, might confirm them. 3) Against the interpretation concerning Christ's prayer for Peter's

perseverance, and not for faith, there stand a) the words themselves; for Christ said: "I have prayed for thee, that thy faith fail not." b) If only the words "thy faith" are considered, it is certain that Christ prayed for the indefectibility of faith in Peter, even if it were granted that he prayed for perseverance; for this necessarily includes faith. But if the following words, "confirm thy brethren," are considered at the same time, it is certain that an office was imposed by Christ on Peter before the other Apostles. Hence he asked something for Peter which was not common to the rest; and certainly the question is of a common temptation, "Satan has desired you," and nevertheless Christ prays specially for Peter, "I have prayed for thee." But the gift of perseverance, indeed of confirmation in grace, was common to all the Apostles. Therefore. 4) Against the interpretation concerning confidence there stand a) its very novelty and foundation. For this interpretation was unknown to the haters themselves of pontifical infallibility, and was first proposed while the question concerning the definition of this prerogative of Peter was being agitated in the Vatican Council. But as foundation it has the assertion of Protestants, namely that faith in Scripture signifies confidence; we have more than once refuted this error, compare On the Grace of Christ, no. 1091, and On the Infused Virtues, no. 656 ff. b) The constant and universal interpretation of the Fathers stands against it, as will be clear from the testimonies to be handed down a little below. c) Confidence or hope, if it is true, rests on faith, so that without this it cannot stand. Therefore if, from the prayer of Christ, Peter's confidence was going to be indefectible, his faith was also indefectible. Compare On the Infused Virtues, no. 241. d) If the same interpretation is restricted to the confidence of the Apostles alone, to be raised up at the time of the passion of Christ, it is excluded also by all those things by which we shall soon show that the prayer of Christ regards Peter as Head of the Church.

1066. II. We say that the prayer of Christ is referred directly to the person of Peter, and not equally to all the Apostles or to the Church, although Peter's firmness in faith will yield to the good of the Church. For 1) Christ could not have designated the person of Peter more accurately; for he both says twice, "Simon, Simon," and adds the pronoun "for thee"; likewise, "thy faith," and "thou... confirm thy brethren." 2) If Christ had wished to address the Church, or equally all the Apostles, he would not have said, with the form of speech suddenly changed, "for thee," but "for you," just as immediately before he had said, "he has desired you." 3) Christ says that he prayed for the one who ought to confirm the brethren or Apostles. But the Church ought not to confirm the Apostles, but to be confirmed by them; nor does the Church have brethren, but sons. 4) Indeed Christ distinguishes Peter from the remaining Apostles as one confirming from those to be confirmed. Nor is it an obstacle that the Apostles, by force of an extraordinary prerogative, did not need to be confirmed in faith, since each of them was infallible. For according to ordinary power they were fallible individually, and according to this power to be transmitted to successors, they represented Bishops who need to be confirmed by Peter and his successors. 5) Therefore whatever things teach that the words of Christ are referred to Peter as Primate, the same prove that the discourse is not about the Church or about all the Apostles equally, but directly about Peter.

1067. But here it should be noted that the infallibility of Peter in faith imports not only that Peter's faith is inamissible, but that Peter altogether does not err. For someone could without pertinacity, through ignorance or error, deny something pertaining to faith, without losing faith. But indefectibility in faith is promised, I say promised, for here it is not yet conferred, to Peter so that he may confirm his brethren, and so that the Church may remain indefectible in faith. Therefore indefectibility of faith in Peter properly regards the magisterium which he exercises in the Church, and in it he is infallible. But the Church cannot err in faith even through ignorance; and therefore it is promised to Peter that he altogether cannot err in faith.

1068. III. We say that the words of Christ are referred to Peter as Head of the Church, and therefore that the question concerns a prerogative to be transmitted to Peter's successors. For 1) Satan desired to attack all the Apostles by the same temptation; nevertheless Christ willed by his prayers to

provide immediately for Simon alone by name. By this manner of acting he wished to ratify and confirm the word and counsel by which he had made Simon the rock of all and had called him Peter; that is to say, since Peter had been designated as the rock of faith, the foundation of the Church, the principle of unity and firmness, to Peter as such, as future Primate of the universal Church, is enjoined the office of confirming the brethren in faith. St. Leo the Great, sermon 4, otherwise 3, 3, splendidly explains this in this way: "The danger from the temptation of fear was common to all the Apostles, and they equally needed the help of divine protection, since the devil wished to agitate all, to crush all. And nevertheless the special care of Peter is undertaken by the Lord, and prayer is made properly for the faith of Peter, as if the state of the others would be more certain if the mind of the prince had not been conquered." And Theophylact, Commentary on this place: "Because I have thee," he says, "as prince of the disciples, after thou hast denied me and wept, confirm the rest; for thus it befits thee, who after me art the rock and foundation of the Church." Hence Bossuet himself, Meditation, day 72: "Peter," he says, "had always to be present in the Church, to confirm his brethren in faith. That was the suitable remedy, so that unity of judgments might be preserved, which the Savior desired most of all; and this authority was the more necessary under the successors of the Apostles, the less firm their faith was than that of the Apostles themselves." Wherefore, in the first pastoral letter on the promises of Christ made to the Church, he concludes concerning the chair of Peter: "In it alone, to use the formulas of the holy Fathers, unity has been preserved by all; if we adhere firmly to it, we shall be safe concerning the promises of Christ... For to him this care was given, that he confirm the brethren, and therefore become the rock upon which an immortal building was to be raised." 2) This is confirmed from the things which precede in the context. For it is said that a contention arose among the disciples "which of them seemed to be greater." Christ, excluding pride and ambition, said: "The kings of the nations lord it over them... but you not so; but he who is greater among you, let him become as the lesser." But from this profession of humility the Apostles could fall in spirit. To raise them up, Christ added: "But you are they who have remained with me in my temptations. And I dispose to you, as my Father disposed to me, a kingdom, that you may eat and drink at my table in my kingdom, and sit upon thrones judging the twelve tribes of Israel." But in truth, from this future equality of lot the Apostles could forget that the Head of all had been designated, as long as they were dwelling on earth. Hence Christ says: "Satan has desired you," and "I have prayed for thee"; "Thou... confirm thy brethren." Bossuet himself acknowledged this evident interpretation, writing in Meditation, day 70: "Since [Christ], in restraining the ambition of his Apostles, had spoken in such a way, and it could have been believed by those who did not sufficiently weigh his words that no primacy had been left, indeed that the primacy which he had handed over to Peter had been diminished, in this place he speaks in such a way as plainly to demonstrate the opposite. 'Satan,' he says, 'has desired you, that he might sift all: but I, Peter, have prayed for thee,' for thee in particular, for thee distinct; not because he neglected the others, but because, as the Fathers explain, by strengthening the head he wished to prevent the members from wavering. Therefore he says: 'I have prayed for thee,' not, however, I have prayed for you." 3) Christ turns away from Peter a lapse in faith insofar as he ought to confirm the brethren. But Peter ought to confirm the brethren not only at the time of the passion, which the adversaries contend, but always thereafter, and much more in the future. For a) then he was only the designated Head of the Church; afterward he was going to be Head in act. The Apostles themselves, because of extraordinary prerogatives, needed less to be confirmed by Peter than their successors did. Shall we say that Christ gave to the Church this means of preserving faith for that time in which it needed that means less, but took it away when the necessity of that means pressed? Surely the words of Christ are indeterminate and of themselves can be extended to all times. Moreover, since the faith of Peter is opposed to the temptation of Satan, it ought to last as long as Satan's attack against the Church lasts; but the Church is always attacked by Satan. Therefore just as that phrase "the gates of hell" most aptly corresponds to those words "Satan has desired you," so that phrase "that thy faith fail not... confirm thy brethren" most aptly corresponds to those words "upon this rock I will build my Church." b) Surely it is impossible for the prayer of Christ to be referred to the imminent temptation; for he prayed by name for Peter before the other Apostles, and nevertheless Peter fell more than the other Apostles.

He prayed that Peter's faith not fail, and nevertheless Peter denied that he knew his master. He prayed that Peter could confirm the brethren, but during the temptation, namely at the time of the dispersion of the Apostles, Peter most needed to be confirmed. But in the time following the resurrection of Christ, Christ himself exercised the office of confirmer. 4) Hence Dollinger himself, when he still remained faithful to Christ and the Church, used the same interpretation in The Religion and Church of Christ, page 32, first edition. For commenting on this very place, he wrote: "The Chair of Peter [according to the mind of Jesus Christ] ought to remain the seat of truth and the citadel of stable faith, by which all would be confirmed. For the words and prayer of the Lord regarded not only the singular person and the proximate time, but laid and built a foundation; they pertained before all things to the Church and to its future necessities foreseen by the spirit."

1069. This exegetical interpretation of the text is confirmed by the ancient and constant tradition of the Fathers. But since a certain writer, in the time of the Vatican Council, in the little work whose title is Considerations, no. 10, following Launoy, letter 1, book 5, letter 6, did not hesitate to assert that Pope Agatho was the first to draw the words of Christ to the Roman chair and the Roman Pontiffs, we shall be content to exhibit a few testimonies preceding him. Before Agatho, St. Ambrose wrote, On Faith, book 5, chapter 1: "Jesus said to Peter: 'I have prayed for thee, that thy faith fail not.' But to the same one, saying above, 'Thou art the Christ, the Son of the living God,' he responded: 'Thou art Peter, and upon this rock I will build my Church, and to thee I will give the keys of the kingdom of heaven.' Therefore, to him to whom by his proper authority he was giving the kingdom, could he not strengthen this one's faith? When he calls him rock, he indicated the foundation of the Church." St. Cyril, sermon 4, otherwise 3, no. 4, says: "'And thou, once converted, confirm thy brethren,' that is, be the firmament and teacher of those who through faith approach me." St. Leo the Great exhorts that we give thanks to the eternal King, the Lord Jesus Christ, "because he gave so great power to him whom he made prince of the whole Church, that if anything even in our times is rightly done through the Roman Pontiffs and rightly arranged, it is to be credited to his works and to his governances, to whom it was said: 'And thou, converted, confirm thy brethren,' and to whom after the resurrection... he said: 'Feed my sheep.'" St. Gregory the Great, letter 1, book 4, letter 4, says: "It is clear to all who know the Gospel that by the Lord's voice the care of the whole Church was committed to the holy Apostle and prince of all the Apostles. For to him it is said: 'Peter, lovest thou me? Feed my sheep.' To him it is said:... 'I have prayed for thee, that thy faith fail not, and thou, once converted, confirm thy brethren.' To him it is said: 'Thou art Peter,'" etc. Pope Gelasius, letter 5 to Honorius, had written: "the care of the whole Lord's fold is carried on by him, which was delegated to blessed Peter by the voice of our Savior himself: 'And thou, converted, confirm thy brethren'; and likewise: 'Feed my sheep.'" Pelagius II, warning the Bishops of Istria to subject themselves to the sentence of the Holy See, says: "You know the Lord proclaiming in the Gospel: 'Simon, Simon,'" etc. "Consider, dearest ones, that truth could not lie, nor will the faith of Peter be able to be shaken or changed forever." Stephen of Dora, in the oration held in the Lateran Council, after he had said that through him the Bishops of the East flee to the Holy See because this See is placed over all, first brings forward for confirmation the words of Christ concerning the power of the keys and concerning the mandate of feeding lambs and sheep, and then concludes thus: "And again he [Peter] especially and particularly, having before all others a firm and immutable faith in our Lord Jesus Christ, deserved at some time to turn and confirm his shaken companions and spiritual brethren, as one receiving dispensatively over all from him who for our sake is God incarnate, power and sacerdotal authority." You will find a more abundant harvest of testimonies in Schrader, On Roman Unity, part 2, from page 187. It will be enough for us to note that even if these testimonies did not exist, nevertheless from Agatho's own letter there would exist an indubitable argument that our interpretation was at that time commonly received. For it is that same celebrated letter which was received by the Fathers of Constantinople with the same acclamation as Leo the Great's was by the Fathers of Chalcedon: "Peter has spoken through Agatho."

1070. SCHOLION. Almost all the objections usually made against the arguments given we have anticipated in the exposition itself of the arguments. It will be useful only to add two here briefly. The first is: If the handed-down exposition of the text of Luke 22 were true, from it it would follow that the Roman Pontiff not only cannot err while he teaches the faith ex cathedra, that is, while he confirms the brethren, but also cannot become a heretic, since Christ prayed for Peter that "thy faith fail not, and thou, once converted, confirm," etc. But not a few Catholic Doctors deny this inference, no. 1045. Therefore. I answer: 1) From the gifts conceded to Peter, only those ought to be transmitted to successors which were promised and conferred on him by reason of the office of supreme Pastor, and which are necessary for duly performing that office. But for the office of supreme Doctor in faith it is certainly necessary that Peter and his successors, while they authentically teach the faith, cannot err, whereby it happens that they so confirm the brethren that these are bound to be subject to them and therefore are contained in unity. But it is not necessary that Peter's successors, as private persons, always retain the true faith, especially internal faith, no. 792. Therefore. 2) If to anyone from the same text it should seem rightly inferred that there is indefectibility in faith, even internal faith, of the Roman Pontiffs, even as they are private persons, through us he may adhere to this inference; certainly not a few Catholic Doctors adhere to it, as we saw in no. 1045.

1071. The other objection is: From the arguments given, only this follows: that Peter and his successors are infallible insofar as they ought to preserve firmness and unity of faith by confirming the brethren. But for this it is required and sufficient that they be infallible in matters decided, as they say, not in doubtful matters or in matters to be decided. Therefore. I answer: 1) Indirectly: by equal reason it could be shown that an ecumenical Council, we are assailing the Gallicans, is not infallible in matters to be decided, but in matters decided; and thus there would now be no supreme tribunal in the Church by which questions arisen concerning faith and morals could be defined infallibly. 2) The supreme power in the Church is the same now and always will be, and the same as that which Christ instituted and which existed from the beginning. Now, in the beginning did the Church, Pope or Council, have power of defining questions not yet defined? If it had, therefore even now the same power is in the Church. But if it did not have, there was never any active infallibility in the Church: not in matters to be decided, according to the hypothesis of the adversaries; not in matters decided, because before the first exercise of infallibility there were no matters decided. 3) Active infallibility, or the infallible magisterium, was instituted by Christ for guarding, defending, and explaining the word of God, or the integral deposit of Christian revelation, "holily to guard and faithfully to expound," says the Vatican Council. But this necessarily requires infallibility in deciding questions which arise concerning the deposit of revelation, and infallibility in proposing decided matters does not suffice. In truth, faith does not waver only when decided matters are immediately and directly deserted, but also when doubts arise concerning decided matters which indirectly harm their firmness. For the things which are had in the Scriptures or Tradition can be twisted to establish false dogmas; errors can be mixed in any way with truths of faith, etc. Therefore unless all these things can be removed, the precept of confirming the brethren cannot be fulfilled. Therefore he who has that office must be able to establish concerning matters not yet decided. Suppose, as often happens, that some doubt arises concerning decided matters, insofar as by some subtle interpretation they are evaded and twisted into an alien sense: what will the Roman Pontiff be able to provide for the guarding of the same? To propose again and again what was decided? But no one is ignorant of this, and that is not what the question concerns. To pronounce sentence concerning the doubt that has arisen? But this exceeds his powers, since by hypothesis he has force in matters decided, not in matters to be decided. Therefore, once that hypothesis is made, the Pontiff will not even be able to be the guardian of matters decided, and much less will he be able faithfully to expound the same. 4) When it is doubtful whether some truth is comprehended in the deposit of Christian revelation, or whether this is or is not the sense of that revelation, only one of the mutually contradictory opinions can be objectively true. But it is lawful to adhere to either opinion only to the extent that it is not yet evident which of them is true. But if, notwithstanding this doubt, unity in faith can be preserved, this certainly does not arise

from the fact that, if afterward what is now doubtful becomes evident, it can still be denied; rather it arises from the fact that all are prepared to acknowledge that which is manifested as true. But authentic manifestation is had through the infallible magisterium. Therefore they are prepared to obey this; and consequently they admit that it has authority even in matters to be decided. Section IV The Infallibility of the Roman Pontiff Is Demonstrated from Tradition.

1072. The monuments of ancient Tradition in favor of the infallibility of the Roman Pontiff are almost innumerable, and have already been diligently collected into one by several authors. For our present purpose it will be enough to touch upon the principal heads and to indicate the sources from which each one, if there is need, will be able to draw them.

1073. I. From Councils. The opponents of Pontifical infallibility have not hesitated to assert that formerly all things in the Church were conducted through Councils; in each century, they say, if you except the two most recently elapsed, at least one was held. But historically it is certain that, even before the Council of Trent, about six centuries elapsed, namely three before the First Nicene Council and almost as many after the Fourth Constantinopolitan, during which no general council was assembled. From this at once there arises a new argument for our matter. For if the Roman Pontiff were not infallible, Christ, on the one hand, would have required from the Church a perpetual integrity and unity of faith for every time; but, on the other hand, he would not have provided a suitable means which would always be at hand. For a general council cannot always be had at will, nor is it an easy thing to assemble it. It is enough, in order to remove every prejudice concerning this matter, to recall the history of the Council of Trent, which could scarcely be completed in twenty years, and not without great obstacles. Moreover all know that in the first three centuries general councils could not be held because of the persecutions of the pagans. Therefore all these things openly show that Christ had to place the organic means for obtaining and preserving stability of faith in the Church and unity in some other assistance than in a general council.

1074. But it is better at least to taste the positive arguments which can be derived from Councils. And 1) to this point belong whatever things we have shown from the Councils, no. 979 ff. 2) Express testimonies of Councils exist. For the Fourth Council of Constantinople, act 1, presents the libellus subscribed by all the Fathers, speaking thus: "Because the sentence of Christ saying, 'Thou art Peter,' etc., cannot be passed over: these things which have been said are proved by the events of things: because in the Apostolic See the Catholic religion has always been reserved immaculate and holy doctrine celebrated... following the Apostolic See in all things, we hope that we may deserve to be in one communion with that See, in which there is the entire and true solidity of the Christian religion." In the Second Council of Lyons, the profession of faith of the Greeks, accepted by all, has this: "As the Roman Church before the rest is bound to defend the truth of faith, so also, if any questions concerning faith should have arisen, they ought to be defined by its judgment." Similar things concerning the Roman Church are reported by the Council of Vienne, in the Clementines, On the Supreme Trinity, and by the Council of Florence in the decree of union with the Greeks. Likewise in the Council of Ephesus, act 2, [Footnote 1 begins:] The Council of Florence, in the decree confirmed by the Vatican Council, proposes "that all the faithful must believe... that the Roman Pontiff holds primacy over the whole world... and exists as Head of the whole Church, and father and teacher of all Christians; and that to him in blessed Peter was delivered by our Lord Jesus Christ full power of feeding, ruling, and governing the universal Church; just as is contained also in the acts of the ecumenical Councils and in the sacred canons." The vain attempts of Dollinger to overthrow the force of this decree are known. That is to say, he contended that the true reading was "just as and in the acts of the ecumenical Councils," etc.; from which, with De Marca, The Concord of Priesthood and Empire, 3.8, he inferred that these words, "accepted in their sincere sense, impose upon the exercise of pontifical power a mode similar to that which the Gallican Church defends"; namely, that decrees of the Supreme Pontiff are irreformable dependently upon the tacit or express consensus of the Bishops. Whereas, if "also" is read, by Dollinger's

own admission, the sense will be that the acts and canons of the Councils recognized in the Roman Pontiff the prerogatives previously asserted. Philip, legate of the Supreme Pontiff, says: "It is doubtful to no one, indeed it has been known in all centuries, that St. Peter, prince and head of the Apostles, column of faith and foundation of the Catholic Church, received from Jesus Christ the keys of the heavenly kingdom, and moreover through his successors has always lived up to this time, decided causes, and will always live." In the Third Council of Constantinople, in the epistle to Agatho, the Fathers say: "And so to thee, as prelate of the first See, head of the universal Church, standing upon the firm rock, we leave what is to be done, acquiescing in the letters of true confession, through which, as divinely written by the highest summit of the Apostles, we have driven away the heretical sect of manifold error lately arisen." 3) Toward the first eight general Councils, while no one contradicted, the Roman Pontiffs conducted themselves in such a way that they openly asserted and exercised their superior and infallible authority. For they themselves always prescribed what things were to be defined. Certainly, according to Athanasius, Letter to Those Living the Solitary Life, Hosius, legate of the Roman Pontiff, from the authority of Pope St. Sylvester, condemned Arius before the First Nicene Synod; the Fathers themselves acquiesced, and according to the symbol afterward called Nicene, recited by him, they formed canons and decrees. Before the First Constantinopolitan Synod, the second ecumenical, was celebrated, Pope Damasus, anticipating the judgment of the council, condemned the heresies of Sabellius, Macedonius, and Eunomius; and, having given a libellus to Bishop Paulinus, he commanded that his sentence and censures be published through the churches of the East. Concerning the Synod of Ephesus, the third ecumenical, Gennadius rightly asserts, On Ecclesiastical Writers, chapter 54: "Pope Celestine dictated the decrees of the synod against Nestorius, and gave the written volume to the churches of the East and West." The Pelagian heresy also was condemned, session 9, [Footnote 1 continued from page 861:] But this objection errs in two ways. 1) If that reading "and" were conceded, the inference which they draw from it would be false: the words of the Florentine decree according to this reading could have the same sense as in the other reading, "also," as is evident to the reader. But that they must be taken in the same sense is easily shown. For it is an evident canon of hermeneutics, and admitted by all, that a later sentence which is in some way ambiguous ought not to be so understood as to contradict a prior one that is clear and express. But in the first part of that decree it is clearly and expressly asserted that the power conferred on the Supreme Pontiff by Christ is supreme and full, and therefore that the form of government in the Church is properly monarchical. According to the Gallican interpretation of the second part, that same power would be dependent and circumscribed, and therefore the form of government in the Church would truly be aristocratic. Therefore. 2) But that reading "and" must be denied; for the other, "also," is had in three manuscripts of the fifteenth century preserved in the Vatican Library; the same is found most clearly in the original which exists in the Archive of the Vatican Basilica; in another which exists in the Laurentian Library at Florence, etc. But see La Civilta Cattolica, second Saturday of February, 1870. according to the prescription of the commentaries which Celestine had composed at Rome, as is clear from the acts of the council and from its synodal letter, the twelfth among those at Cyril. Insisting on the footsteps of Celestine, St. Leo I prescribed to the Synod of Chalcedon the boundaries within which the Fathers ought to remain; namely, he prescribed the norm of the things to be defined, declared that it was not lawful for those assembled to depart from it, and only on that condition, once accepted, did he consent that the Council of Chalcedon should be celebrated. In the fifth ecumenical synod, or Second Constantinopolitan, the judgment of Vigilius, as decretory, was sought and awaited in all things; nor did the disturbances there and elsewhere, in Africa, Illyricum, Hibernia, etc., concerning the controversy of the Three Chapters come to rest except after the decree of the Roman Pontiff became plainly known. Pope Agatho had forbidden the Fathers of the sixth ecumenical synod, or Third Constantinopolitan, to depart even a nail's breadth from his definitions transmitted to the council. For, transmitting the sentence issued by himself concerning the error of Sergius, he commanded that "nothing be diminished, nothing changed or added, from those things which were regularly defined in that sentence, but that the same things be preserved inviolate in words and meanings." He commanded his legates that "they should presume to add or change nothing, but simply

narrate the traditions of this Apostolic See, as they had been established by the predecessor Apostolic Pontiffs." He demanded this because "all the faithful of the Catholic Church and the universal synods, faithfully embracing the authority of the Roman Church, as of the prince of all the Apostles, have followed it in all things." But the Fathers, act 18, acclaimed Agatho's letter thus: "The highest prince of the Apostles was contending with us: for we had as helper his imitator and successor of the See. Paper and ink were seen, and Peter was speaking through Agatho." Similarly Hadrian I forbade the Fathers of the seventh synod, in the letter to Patriarch Tarasius, to move the limits fixed by the Roman Pontiffs concerning the cult of holy images; and the Fathers responded: "The whole holy synod so believes and so teaches"; and again: "We follow, receive, and approve." Finally, without awaiting the sentence of the eighth synod, Hadrian II condemned Photius and commanded that he be condemned by the council.

1075. II. From the Fathers. The Fathers proclaimed the doctrine of which we are treating in a manifold way. For 1) as we have seen, they understood Matthew 16, John 21, and Luke 22 in the same way as we do, and from them they plainly inferred the infallibility of the Roman Pontiff. 2) They extol the Roman Church as the genuine seat of Apostolic tradition, or of apostolic faith, no. 736. 3) They exhibit the doctrine of the Roman See as the form of truth. 4) The Roman See is shown by express words and by practice to be the one that preforms judgments of faith. 5) Roman sentences are held in the same manner as the judgments of Councils. 6) They extol the necessity of Roman doctrine. 7) They represent the Roman See as guardian of orthodoxy. 8) They have always held the Roman Pontiff as confirmer of Councils. 9) In express words they proclaim the Roman Pontiff or the Roman See as the supreme tribunal of faith. 10) They propose the doctrine of the Roman See as the token of truth. 11) They say and practically acknowledge the Roman See as the overthrower of heresies. 12) They admit the judgment of the Roman See as the end of controversies. 13) They hold that the sentence of the Roman See is subject to no one's judgment. 14) Finally, in express words they teach that the Roman Pontiff, the successor of Peter, is infallible. Concerning all these heads we have already given several testimonies; others also, with a great apparatus and study of erudition, Father Schrader has collected into one and aptly arranged, On Roman Unity, part 2, especially from page 223. Let it be permitted us to recite the words of St. Bernard, who is the chief glory and ornament of the Gallican Church. Writing, letter 190, to Innocent II, he says: "It is fitting that every danger and scandal arising in the kingdom of God be referred to your apostolate, especially those things which happen concerning faith. For I judge it worthy that damages of faith be repaired there most of all where faith cannot experience defect. This indeed is the prerogative of this See. For to what other one was it ever said: I have prayed for thee, Peter, that thy faith fail not? Therefore what follows is required from the successors of Peter: And thou, once converted, confirm thy brethren."

1076. III. From ancient and perpetual usage. For 1) in the first three centuries many heresies were condemned by Roman Pontiffs: and especially the heresy of Cerdo and Valentinus in the year 155 by Hyginus, according to Eusebius, History, book 1, chapter 10; that of Theodotus in the year 196 by Victor, according to the same, book 5, chapter 27; that of Montanus in the year 215 by Zephyrinus, according to Tertullian, On Fasting, book 1, chapter 1; that of Novatian in the year 254 by Cornelius, according to Eusebius, book 6, chapter 43; that of Paul of Samosata in the year 273 by Felix, according to Cyril in the Apology for the Twelve Anathemas. Now those heresies were condemned a) without Councils; for to these especially pertains Augustine's statement, book 4 to Boniface, last chapter: "Heresies, far more and incomparably more numerous, were condemned outside Councils than in them." b) They were condemned irreformably, since none of those condemnations was ever retracted. c) They were condemned irreformably before the consensus of the Church; for in that time of persecutions the consensus could hardly become known, nor nevertheless did the lack of it suspend the faith of the Catholics who were aware of the Pontifical condemnation. 2) The Roman Pontiffs vindicated as a right proper to themselves that all causes of faith from whatever provinces should be referred to them. This is evident, for example, from Innocent's letter to the Milevitans and Carthaginians; from Zosimus's letter to the former; from Gregory, book 4, letter 52; and

from the African Councils themselves. But Bishops everywhere judged that acquiescence must be given to the Pontifical sentence pronounced in these judgments. Witnesses of this, besides the African Fathers, are Basil, letter 52; Ambrose, synodal letter of the Council of Milan to Siricius; Sophronius, in the allocution of his legate at the Lateran Council under Martin; Ignatius of Constantinople, letter to Nicholas, etc. Therefore both parties declared, by fact and practice, that the judgment of the Pontiff is infallible and irreformable. 3) To this point belongs the celebrated saying of St. Augustine, which we reported above. For, sermon 2 On the Words of the Apostle, chapter 10, concerning the Pelagian cause he pronounced: "For already concerning this cause two Councils [they were particular Councils] have been sent to the Apostolic See; from there also rescripts have come. The cause is finished; would that the error sometime be finished!" From these words it is clear: a) by the sentence of Innocent alone, issued against the Pelagian errors, the whole matter was so completed that this cause of faith could no longer even be called into doubt. b) Irreformability belonged to the Pontifical sentence before the consensus of the Church; since from January 27 in the year 417, on which the Pope had replied, until September 23 of the same year, on which Augustine gave the sermon, the Roman responses could in no way have been carried to all the Churches of the world and thence the consensus of the Churches, whether tacit or express, reported back to Africa. Indeed this was the less possible because only in the following year did Zosimus, and not Innocent, send the Tractoriae letters concerning this cause to the universal Church.

1077. IV. Finally it is pleasing to touch upon a few things concerning the sense of the ancient Gallican Church. Avitus, Archbishop of Vienne, writing to Hormisdas, says: "Already secure, I promise, I will not say concerning the devotion of Vienne, but concerning that of all Gaul, that all await your sentence concerning the state of faith. Pray that the deceitful confession of the aforesaid persons may not so deceive us, nor the truth once learned separate us from the unity which you govern." The Gallic prelates, in the cause of Arnulph, Bishop of Paris, write thus to John XV: "Be present, Father, to the recent Church, and bring forth the sentence into the midst: let us perceive in you another Peter. Let the Roman Church give sentence, so that we may understand why we ought to prefer your Apostolate among the rest." The nobles of the Kingdom, in the libellus given to Clement V, say: "for neither could he as Pope be a heretic... nor has any Pope ever, insofar as Pope, been a heretic." The Council of Arles, in the year 455, synodal letter, writes thus to Leo: "Whoever does not neglect the sacraments of redemption inscribes the writings of your Apostolate upon the tablets of his heart as the symbol of faith, and has committed them to memory to be held, so that he may be more ready to confound the errors of heretics." The Second Council of Orange, in the year 529, has this: "What seemed good to us according to the admonition and authority of the Apostolic See, namely that we ought to bring forth, to be observed by all, a few chapters transmitted to us by the Apostolic See for teaching those who think otherwise than they ought, and to subscribe them with our hands." The Council of Tours, in the year 567, established: "Who of the priests should presume to act against such decrees as have proceeded from the Apostolic See? Whose preaching can be valid, except those whom the Apostolic See has approved? Our fathers have always kept this, because their authority commands it." The Gallican Clergy, in its general Assemblies in the year 1579, pronounced thus: "Clerics and laymen, by open profession, pronounce that faith which the Holy Roman Church, teacher, column and firmament of truth, professes and cultivates; for to this Church, on account of its principality, every Church must come together"; and, at the end: "All these things we subject to the judgment and authority of the Holy Roman Church, by whose precepts the faithful people ought to be instructed, and the certain rule of faith and correction of morals constituted." The same Clergy, in the year 1626, in admonitions to Archbishops and Bishops, writes: "They will also venerate our holy Father the Pope, visible head of the universal Church, Vicar of God on earth, Bishop of Bishops and Patriarchs, finally the successor of Peter, from whom the Episcopate and Apostolate took their beginning, and upon whom Christ founded the Church, to whom, handing over the keys of heaven, he gave the infallibility of faith, which, not without a miracle, we discern to have persevered immovable in his successors even to the present day." Three Bishops, namely Ceretius, Salonius, and Veranus, writing to

Leo in the year 455, speak thus concerning his letter to Flavian: "That page of your special doctrine is so celebrated through all the assemblies of the Churches, that by the truly concordant sentence of all it is declared that the principate of the Apostolic See was deservedly constituted there, whence even now the oracles of the Apostolic Spirit are reported." Hincmar of Rheims, On Predestination, chapter 14: "This ought to suffice for Catholics, what the mother of all Churches teaches: one must follow what that Roman Church believes." Ivo of Chartres, letter 8 to Richer: "To stand against the judgments and constitutions of this See is plainly to incur the mark of heretical depravity." Compare, if you please, the Wurzburg authors, nos. 191 and 197 ff. Section V The Same Truth Is Confirmed by the Consensus of Theologians.

1078. I. It is certain that before the Council of Constance there was by no means heard in the schools the opinion, now heresy, concerning the fallibility of the Supreme Pontiff speaking ex cathedra. This is clear: 1) from the testimony of Ruard Tapper, dean of the faculty of Louvain and theologian in the Council of Trent, who, Theological Oration 3, writes: "For from the time of the Councils of Constance and Basel certain doctors teach that the privilege of infallible sentence is in the ecumenical Council alone. But the older writers concordantly hand down from the Scriptures that this privilege of infallible sentence is proper to Peter, placed over the whole family of Christ, and to the Roman Pontiff, supreme vicar on earth after Peter, as to him who alone received the keys of the house, of binding and loosing anything whatever, and to his chair." 2) Andrew Duval, dean of the Paris faculty, who died in the year 1638, has these words: "Whether the adversaries wish it or not, it is clearly certain that the ancient leaders of the Gallican Church always acknowledged this infallibility in the Supreme Pontiffs, successors of Peter; that the prayer of Christ the Lord did not stop in Peter; and that those who attempted to fight against this truth began two hundred or about two hundred years ago, when dreadful schisms burst into the Church," according to Zaccaria, Antifebronius, part 1, dissertation 1, chapter 10, no. 8. 3) Cardinal de Aguirre, Defense of the Chair of Peter, disputation 7, section 2, no. 12, concerning the doctrine which we here defend, does not hesitate to assert that "all the Theologians without exception, as many as wrote before the Council of Constance, begun in the year of Christ 1415, embraced it. For no one is found up to that point, unless perhaps a heterodox or schismatic person, who denied infallible authority to the Roman Pontiff, whenever from the chair of the Apostolic See he defines something as to be believed by all the faithful concerning faith or morals." 4) Gerson himself is compelled to confess these things: "Flattery further concedes that he [the Pope] is above the law,... and that it is in no way possible either to appeal from him, or to summon him judicially, or to withdraw obedience from him, especially outside the case of heresy. He alone can compose a symbol of faith; he alone can treat the causes of that same faith and the other greater causes. He alone, as has already been done, establishes definitions, rules, laws, and canons; otherwise whatever is defined, decreed, established, or ordained by others is void and empty. Nor can anything of those things which he has established be annulled or broken in any way except through him; but no constitution of anyone else, of whatever sort, binds him. I am mistaken if, before the celebration of this most sacred Synod of Constance, this tradition had not so occupied the minds of very many of the lettered rather than of the learned, that one who dogmatized the opposite would have been either marked or condemned for heretical depravity. Receive the sign of this matter: because after a declaration clearer than light from the principles of theology, and what is more urgent, after the determination and practice of the same holy synod, there are found those who do not fear to assert such things openly: so rooted, and like a creeping cancer so inwardly drunk in, was this lethal poison of ancient flattery!" On Ecclesiastical Power, consideration 12, of the works arranged by Ellies Dupin, volume 2, page 247, Antwerp edition, 1706. 5) But here we could recite the words of the Theologians themselves who wrote before the Council of Constance. We shall be content to indicate one or another. And first St. Thomas, II-II, question 1, article 10, writes: "It must be said that a new edition of the symbol is necessary for avoiding errors that arise. Therefore the publication of a symbol belongs to that authority to whose authority it belongs finally to determine those things which are of faith, so that they may be held by all with unshaken faith. But this belongs to the authority of the Supreme Pontiff, etc. And the reason for this is that there ought to be one

faith of the whole Church, according to that word of 1 Corinthians 1.10, etc.; and this could not be preserved unless a question of faith that has arisen were determined by him who presides over the whole Church, so that thus his sentence would be firmly held by the whole Church." He has the same things in the same place, reply to the second objection; question 11, article 2, reply to the ninth; and On Power, question 10, article 4, reply to the thirteenth. 6) The Paris Academy, in the theological treatise offered to Clement VII, then held in Gaul as legitimate Pope, discusses thus: "The first conclusion is that it belongs to the holy Apostolic See, by supreme judicial authority, to define judicially concerning those things which are of faith. And this is proved, because it belongs to the authority of that one, as supreme judge, to define judicially in faith, whose faith never fails; because concerning this holy See, in the person of Peter presiding in it, it was said: 'Peter, I have prayed for thee, that thy faith fail not' (Luke 22). On account of this Cyprian says: He who deserts the chair of Peter, upon which the Church was founded, demonstrates that he is not in the Church. And Jerome says: Upon him the Church was founded, and whoever does not gather with the Roman Pontiff scatters." And in the year 1387, in the Consistory before the said Clement, through Master Peter d'Ailly, it professed the irreformable judgment of the Roman Pontiff in causes of faith in these words: "This is the faith, most blessed Father, which we have learned in the Catholic Church; in which, if perhaps anything has been placed less skillfully or less cautiously, we ask that it be corrected by you. But we most firmly hold, and have in no way doubted, that the holy Apostolic See is that chair of Peter, upon which, with the same Jerome as witness, the Church was founded, as is had" in the same question, in the chapter Quoniam vetus. And just as Cyprian says, distinction 93, Qui cathedram: "Concerning which See, in the person of Peter the Apostle sitting in it, it was said: 'Peter, I have prayed for thee, that thy faith fail not' (Luke 22). Therefore this is the See to which the determination of faith, and the approval of Catholic truth, and the detestation of heretical impiety, chiefly belongs."

1079. II. But at the time of the Council of Constance there were indeed some Doctors who denied the infallibility of the Supreme Pontiff; but their authority is of no moment. For 1) they were very few in comparison with the others who taught the contrary truth. 2) Some of them were led into error chiefly by the danger of the present schism. 3) But several taught other manifest errors, so that it is no wonder that they erred also in this matter. That we may mention some example of this last assertion: a) Peter d'Ailly, Gerson's teacher, was accused of denying transubstantiation in the Eucharist; he was most ruinously addicted to judicial astrology; he taught that, in the time of schism, the decisive vote in councils should be attributed not merely to simple priests, but also to lay princes and their legates; finally, in order to prove the superiority of a council above the Pontiff and the right of appeal from the Pontiff to a council, he did not blush to use documents manifestly fictitious. b) As to Gerson himself, Richer judges, in the Life of Gerson prefixed to the edition of the year 1606, that he needs an apology, especially on account of the book published by him On the Removability of the Pope. Moreover he taught, volume 2, in the moral rules, title On the Precepts of the Decalogue, that there can be many cases in which it is lawful for any subject to kill the Pontiff. Finally he asserted, On the Mode of Uniting and Reforming the Church in Council, Works, volume 2: "The universal Church can be saved in the smallest old woman, and for the salvation of the universal Church the convocation of a council can be made by the smallest old woman!" But soon after the Council of Constance, the opinion denying the infallibility of the Roman Pontiff was rejected. This also can be proved by manifold testimony; let us select a few. St. John of Capistrano, who died in the year 1456 and was contemporary with the events in the Council of Constance, published, after the aforesaid Synod of Constance, a treatise On the Authority of the Pope and Council, which exists in the collection entitled Treatises of Universal Law Gathered into One. In it, adhering to the common opinion of St. Thomas and of the other Fathers and Doctors, and making light of the novelties of the Synod of Constance, he stood forth as a most keen defender both of the infallibility of the Roman Pontiff and of his superiority over a council. The Louvain Faculty, in the year 1544, by command of Emperor Charles V, published thirty-two articles against the errors of Luther. Of these, article 22 has this: "It must be held with firm faith that there is on earth one

true and Catholic Church of Christ, and that this is visible; founded by the Apostles, persevering even to this our age, it retains and receives whatever concerning faith and religion the chair of Peter, upon which it has been so built by Christ its spouse that in those things which belong to faith and religion it cannot err, has handed down, hands down, and will hand down." And in article 25: "Those things must be held with certain faith, not only which have been expressly delivered in the Scriptures, but also which we have received as to be believed through the tradition of the Catholic Church, and which have been defined concerning affairs of faith and morals through the chair of Peter, or through general councils legitimately assembled." Mauclerc, a Sorbonic doctor, in the celebrated work On Monarchy, volume 1, page 513 and following, Paris edition, 1622, which he published under Louis XIII, teaches thus: "We ought to bear this before us in conscience as true and Catholic, and to testify it by firmly asserting it with a constant and truly Christian mind: that the Roman Pontiff, insofar as he is the supreme doctor of the universal Church, cannot define anything in matters pertaining to faith that is stained by any error. No one of the Catholics will presume to deny this, since the summit of the scholastic theologians, St. Thomas, has said so clearly and plainly, with assertion, that the authority of defining matters of faith resides principally in the Supreme Pontiff." St. Antoninus, Archbishop of Florence, who died in the year 1459, when he proves that there must be one supreme prince by whom the whole Church is ruled, uses this reason, Summa, part 3, title 22, chapter 2, section 23: "In the whole Christian universe there ought to be conformity concerning those things which pertain to the truth of faith and good morals in matters necessary for salvation. But such conformity cannot be preserved except in order to one head or one presiding person, to whom it belongs to pronounce sentence as to what must be believed and what must not be believed. Therefore." And below, chapter 3, section 1, he adds: "But it is certain that in the Church there cannot be any such head except the Pope alone." Certain contrary things occur in the works of St. Antoninus, but from a manifest corruption of the works. Concerning this matter see La Civilta Cattolica, February 5, March 5, and March 19, 1870. To these let it be permitted to add three illustrious Theologians from diverse nations. Bellarmine, who died in the year 1621, says concerning the opinion denying the inerrancy of the Roman Pontiff, On the Roman Pontiff, book 4, chapter 2: "It is not properly heretical; for we still see that it is tolerated by the Church; yet it seems altogether erroneous and proximate to heresy." But afterward he himself emended this passage in this way: "Where we say: the opinion of those who teach that infallibility of judgment is not in the Pope but in a general council is not plainly heretical, but erroneous and proximate to heresy, we will say more rightly: that we do not dare to judge that opinion plainly heretical, because those who follow that opinion have neither themselves been condemned by the Church, nor have their books ever been prohibited; nevertheless it seems to us so manifestly erroneous that it can deservedly be declared heretical by the judgment of the Church." Suarez, who died in the year 1617, proposes the question thus, On Faith, disputation 5, section 8, no. 4: "Whether, if the Pope alone defines without a general council, he has the same infallibility and is the rule of faith, or whether he can err"; but he responds: "It is a Catholic truth that the Pontiff defining ex cathedra is a rule of faith which cannot err, when he authentically proposes something to the universal Church as to be believed with divine faith. Thus do all Catholic doctors teach at this time; and I judge it a matter certain by faith." St. Francis de Sales, who died in the year 1642 and is now Doctor of the Church, On the Controversies of Faith, chapter 10, has these words: "The Church always has need of an infallible confirmer to whom one can have recourse, of a foundation which the gates of hell, and principally error, cannot overturn, and that its pastor cannot lead its children into error. Therefore the successors of St. Peter have all these same privileges, which do not follow the person, but the dignity and the public office."

1080. III. The opinion denying the infallibility of the Roman Pontiff, which arose at the time of the Council of Constance and was immediately rejected, did not properly revive except in the Assemblies of the Gallican Clergy held in the year 1682. Nevertheless, 1) it did not revive except among some doctors in Gaul; for as Benedict XIV testifies, in his letter to the General Inquisitor of Spain, and as is historically certain, the opinion concerning the infallibility of the Roman Pontiff "has been received

everywhere outside Gaul." 2) In Gaul itself many resisted the innovation, which, as is clear from documents very recently published, cannot be attributed even to the Paris faculty. 3) From the same documents it is evident with how much fraud and force they acted to introduce that new opinion. D. de Harlay himself, the royal procurator general, testifies that the Bishops who subscribed the declaration "would at once and gladly have declared the contrary, if this had been permitted to them by the king." We refrain from reciting the aforesaid documents, since they are now known to all and can be seen in Bouix, On the Pope, part 2, from chapter 4. 4) Finally, always after that declaration, the Gallic Bishops acknowledged in practice the infallibility of the Roman Pontiff, whether by asking his decretory judgment, or by acquiescing in it with sincere and most prompt submission of mind, before every consensus, indeed before every notice, of the other Churches. Thus it was done with regard to the constitution Cum alias of Innocent XII, Vineam Domini of Clement XI, Unigenitus of the same Clement, etc. Section VI The Principal Difficulties Are Satisfied.

1081. There is no need here to pursue all and singular difficulties of the Gallicans; for some are so futile that, once heard, each person easily solves them; but several have already been dissipated by what has been disputed thus far. Indeed: 1) the difficulties which arise from the badly understood nature either of infallibility or of the infallibility of the Roman Pontiff are dissolved from the exposition already given of each concept. 2) Those which are sought from the fact of the Asian Churches with St. Victor, of St. Cyprian with St. Stephen, etc., have already been solved, nos. 668 ff. and 969 ff. 3) Likewise we have solved the difficulties sought from the Council of Constance, nos. 993 ff. Here it is pleasing only to confirm what we said there by the authority both of the most learned Bishop Hefele and of a witness by no means suspect, Dollinger. The first, History of Councils, volume 8, page 140, writes: "But the assertion of the Gallicans that even the earlier sessions, namely those which preceded the forty-first, and consequently the decrees of the fifth session, were approved by Martin V, is certainly false." The other, Ecclesiastical History, volume 2, pages 306 ff., 325 ff., 338-340, demonstrates at length that neither the Council of Constance nor the Council of Basel was legitimate when they issued the decrees of which there is question. He denies in express words that these decrees were ever confirmed by the Holy See, indeed even that they were held as firm by the Gallican Bishops themselves who were present at the Synods.

1082. Likewise the difficulties against the arguments given, especially those drawn from Scripture, have been anticipated in the very exposition of them. Only the marvelous fiction of the Gallicans for eluding their force can be recalled. Namely, they said that one must distinguish between the See and the sitter. The sitter, they said, as distinct from the See, is the Pontiff himself actually teaching; but the See is the series of Pontiffs, or even the same Pontiff insofar as they remain for a long time in the same sentence. The sitter, they said, can err; but the See is infallible and the true rule of truth. For all the prerogatives of Primacy, and hence infallibility itself in teaching, properly affect the See and not the sitter. But if individual sitters can err in the act of teaching, how does the See remain infallible? This happens, the Gallicans replied, because the error of one Pontiff is corrected and amended by his successor, or even by himself; thus error will never take root in the very series of Pontiffs. These things indeed are from Cardinal de Luzerne, part 2, chapter 2, no. 4; Bossuet, Defense, book 10, otherwise 15, chapter 5, etc. It is answered: A manifold distinction can indeed be thought up between the See and the sitter. Thus the See, metaphorically accepted for the thing signified, imports authority; the sitter is the subject of that authority. The See, or authority, at least as to exigency, always remains; the sitter dies, and the See is said to be vacant until a successor-sitter is elected. Especially the See is distinguished from the sitter insofar as the rights of the See do not depend on the personal merits or demerits of the sitter for the time being. And in this sense are understood the words of St. Leo, letter 106, no. 5: "for the sees are one thing, those presiding another," and other sayings of this kind. But these things being supposed, the distinction of the Gallicans is false and absurd, when they say that the prerogatives of Primacy pertain to the See, not to the sitter; and that the See indeed cannot err in faith, but the sitter, while he teaches the universal Church, can err. For 1) Primacy, and its prerogatives, can pertain only to him on whom they are conferred by Christ. They were conferred by

Christ first on the person of Peter; in him they were conferred on his successors. His successors are the persons of the Roman Pontiffs; the person of the Roman Pontiff for any given time is one, just as Peter was one person. Therefore Primacy, with all its prerogatives, and therefore infallibility, must be attributed, as to its subject, to the very person of the Roman Pontiff for the time being, and not to the successive group of Pontiffs. Hence from the Councils of Florence and the Vatican it must be believed that the Roman Pontiff is the successor of blessed Peter, and that to him in the person of Peter was delivered the supreme and full power of feeding and ruling the Church. 2) Primacy, all its prerogatives, and consequently infallibility, cannot be ascribed except to the successors of Peter. For the notion of a successor consists in this, that he himself obtains all the rights and all the prerogatives of that dignity in which he succeeds, which the predecessor possessed. But individual Roman Pontiffs are the successors of Peter. Therefore each Roman Pontiff, and not only the group of them, enjoys Primacy, all its prerogatives, and infallibility itself. 3) Certainly, when the Fathers speak of the authority and infallibility of the Roman See, they suppose the Roman Pontiff and take the See and the sitter as one and the same subject. "I," writes St. Jerome to Damasus, "am joined in communion with your blessedness, that is, with the Chair of Peter." And Maximus the Martyr, letter 1 to Peter the illustrious: "Let him implore," he says, "the most blessed Pope of the most holy Roman Church, that is, the Apostolic See." And Sergius, Bishop of Cyprus, writes to Theodore: "Christ has constituted thy Apostolic See as a divinely fixed and immovable firmament. For thou art Peter, and upon thy foundation the columns of the Church have been confirmed." Hence the Fathers everywhere proclaim concerning the Roman See that it is the Rock which the gates of hell do not conquer, since it is certainly established from the words of Christ that that Rock is Peter and his successors. Hence also, when occasion is given, they assert concerning any Pontiff that he is Peter, and that Peter lives and speaks in him. 4) But in reality there are as many arguments for this matter as there are testimonies exhibited for the Primacy and infallibility of Peter and his successors, as is evident to one recalling them. For is the See, and not the sitter, called the foundation of the Church, pastor of the universal Church, confirmer of the Brethren? Are all and each of the Pastors and faithful bound to obey the See and not the sitter? Hence praises of infallibility sometimes attributed to the See are not attributed to the See by itself, but to the See because of the Pontiffs who sit in it and preside over all the rest. For, according to the Scriptures and the Fathers, the Primacy is not attributed to the Roman bishops because it was conferred on the Roman See; rather, they acknowledge the Primacy in the Roman See because it was conferred on Peter and his successors.

1083. Therefore, these things being dismissed, you will say I: If the Roman Pontiff alone were infallible, since an ecumenical Council, as all Catholics confess, is also infallible, it would follow that there are two supreme infallible powers in matters of faith and morals; and this certainly is repugnant. 2) Indeed, one would have to say that Councils are not only not necessary, but altogether useless. I answer to the first: I distinguish. If there were subjects of supreme infallible power adequately distinct, I deny; inadequately distinct, I concede, no. 787. But no repugnance is found in this, since there can never be any conflict between the Pontiff alone and an ecumenical Council defining something; both because each subject of infallibility is assisted by the Holy Spirit, who cannot contradict himself, and because a Council without the Pope can define nothing infallibly. To the second I distinguish: If Councils were required for conferring intrinsic force on pontifical dogmatic constitutions, I concede. If for adding extrinsic authority, when the circumstances of things so demand, I deny. Certainly, if the discussion is about intrinsic authority, the same is found in definitions of the Pontiff ex cathedra and of Councils; for in each case there is the same assistance of the Holy Spirit communicating infallibility. But it by no means follows from this that Councils are useless. For there is a manifold usefulness which redounds from the celebration of synods, as is clear from what has been said, no. 1035 ff.

1084. II. You will insist: But Councils are necessary for the intrinsic authority of definitions, for these do not seem to be irreformable without the approval of a Council. For 1) the usage of Western General Councils teaches that Pontiffs, even when presiding over them, did not issue decrees except

with the sacred Council approving. 2) More than once, questions already defined by the Roman Pontiffs were treated again in ecumenical Councils. 3) And indeed these Councils confirmed definitions previously issued by Pontiffs only after an accurate examination had been instituted. 4) But St. Leo himself thought this, for, writing to Theodoret, he says: "the things which [God] had first defined through our ministry, he confirmed by the irretractable assent of the universal brotherhood"; therefore before that it was not irretractable, or irreformable. And he adds: "thus the authority of the highest is preserved, so that the liberty of the lower is thought diminished in nothing." I answer: I deny the subsumption. To the first, moreover, I say: 1) that formula, "with the sacred Council approving," would at most show that definitions of faith, when they are issued by Councils, require the approval both of the Pontiff and of the Bishops. But from this it would not follow that the Pontiff cannot also alone and outside a Council define questions of this kind infallibly. 2) I say that formula is more recent; for it began to be employed in Lateran III. By these words, moreover, nothing else is expressed except the consensus of the Council, or the sentence joined and subordinated to the judgment of the Pontiff. 3) Hence it is clear how diverse is the approval or confirmation which is required on the part of the Roman Pontiff. Certainly Anatolius, Bishop of Constantinople, in order to excuse himself concerning the Chalcedonian canon contrary to Nicaea, writes, letter to Leo: "Since even thus all force and confirmation of the acts had been reserved to the authority of your Blessedness." Concerning the Synod of Rimini, Damasus, in the letter to the Easterners, says: "The number of Bishops who had been assembled at Rimini ought not to have the force of prejudice, since that thing was done without the consent of the Roman Bishop, whose sentence ought to have been awaited before others." Concerning the Robber Synod of Ephesus, Gelasius pronounces, letter 13 to the Bishops of Dardania: "The Apostolic See condemned Dioscorus, prelate of the second See, by its own authority, and by not consenting removed the impious Synod." Furthermore the confirmation of the Roman Pontiff cannot be called mere adherence, as some have dared to say; for mere adherence is not involved where the authority of the Roman See is required, as the Roman Synod under Felix III testifies concerning the Nicene Synods; where the Apostolic See consents and confirms by the authority of blessed Peter, as St. Leo writes in the letter to the Sixth Synod; where Councils are not received without letters sent by the Pontiff to the Church, as Hadrian declares in the Apology; where it is declared that Synods "need the Roman See, that they may be strengthened and preserved," as Nicholas shows, letter 8, concerning Leo. But see what we have said, nos. 983-1032. To the second I answer: 1) indirectly: General Councils again confirmed the sentences of other General Councils. Thus, for example, the Council of Florence again treated the questions of dissension between the Greeks and Latins already treated and defined by the Second Council of Lyons. A third Council, if the Greeks wished to approach it, probably would not refuse to treat the same questions a third time. Does it follow from this that General Councils are not infallible? Similarly, Councils again confirmed definitions of Pontiffs that had already been accepted by the whole West and the greatest part of the East before the Councils. Thus, for example, the Synod of Ephesus again condemned Nestorius, already condemned by Celestine; Chalcedon condemned Eutyches, already condemned by Leo; the Third Constantinopolitan condemned the Monothelites, already condemned by Martin and Agatho. After the decrees of the Pontiffs and before those Councils, definitions of this kind had already been accepted by the Church. Therefore, if examinations of this kind take away anything of authority, they take it away not from the Pontiff alone, but from the Church joined with the Pontiff, contrary to the opinion of all Catholics. It should be kept before the eyes that we are not here acting against Gallicans who conceded that definitions of the Pontiffs accepted by the Church are irreformable. 2) Directly: Therefore the cause of this manner of acting was that the heretics, not yet acquiescing in the sentence of the Pontiff, had obtained several and powerful patrons of their obstinacy. Against their insolence, we established above, no. 1036, that Councils are useful, indeed necessary. It is more insolent to resist all than one; but to yield is less shameful. To the third I answer: 1) indirectly, as above, since also definitions of preceding Councils, and of Pontiffs already accepted by the Church, were sometimes subjected to a new examination. Directly, I distinguish: a new confirmatory examination was instituted, I concede; a doubtful examination, or one ordered to assent or dissent, I deny. To understand these things, it must be observed that scarcely had the

letter of St. Leo been brought forth and read in act 2 of the Council of Chalcedon, when the Fathers universally acclaimed: "Anathema to him who does not so believe. Peter has thus spoken through Leo," according to Harduin, volume 2, column 305. Therefore the examination of St. Leo's letter, which was permitted near the end of that same act for the sake of the Illyrian and Palestinian Bishops, was not, nor could it be, doubtful, namely with liberty of assent or dissent; but confirmatory, "so that those who were doubting might be taught," as is said in the same place, column 307. Compare what was said, no. 983. To the fourth I answer: 1) That irretractable assent of St. Leo certainly does not affect the pontifical definition, so that the sense would be that the definition itself was not irreformable before the adherence of the Bishops, and afterward became irreformable through their consensus. For a) although St. Leo granted to Marcian that a council should be celebrated at Chalcedon, he nevertheless warned the Emperor, letter 82, that by no cunning that was bold and shameless should he allow inquiry to be made "as if it were uncertain what ought to be thought"; nor that "what sort of faith is to be held" should be treated, but rather "whose petitions should be granted, and in what way." And the same thing in other letters, letter 90, he urged upon the same Marcian, namely that he should not allow the faith to be treated again in the synod as though it were doubtful. b) This is confirmed from the very words which are objected; for St. Leo says: "The things which [God] first defined through our ministry." Otherwise we would absurdly have to admit that things "defined by God" can be retracted. 2) What therefore is the sense of the following words: "He confirmed by the irretractable assent of the universal brotherhood"? These words affect the very adherence of the Fathers, and by them St. Leo signified that the assent of the Chalcedonian Fathers had become "irretractable" because of their adherence to the pontifical definition. For the whole irretractable force of the decrees of a general council, especially in those things which pertain to faith, depends on unity with the apostolic faith of the Roman See, or of the Roman Pontiff. Certainly, if the definitions of general councils were irretractable apart from the authority of the Roman Pontiff, the Chalcedonian Fathers would in vain have earnestly asked for pontifical confirmation, so that their decrees might become "irretractable," as we have already seen that they did.

1085. III. You will say: Bishops are born judges of controversies of faith. But they would not be such if the Roman Pontiff alone, defining ex cathedra, were infallible. Therefore. I answer: I distinguish the major: they are supreme judges, I deny; subordinated judges, I subdistinguish. That they always, or always in the same way, ought to exercise judgment, I deny; that they ought sometimes to judge, without however always exercising judgment in the same manner, I concede. It is answered. That this whole difficulty may be briefly unfolded, and its solution clearly and fully proposed, let us recall: 1) that he is called a judge who, from public authority, gives sentence concerning some controversy, a sentence which must be obeyed; 2) that those also are true judges from whose sentence appeal can be made to a higher tribunal; 3) that individual Bishops in their own Church are judges of faith, for since they have truly been placed by the Holy Spirit to rule the Church of God, and the principal part of this rule is the magisterium in matters of faith and morals, the power of judging in these matters cannot be denied to Bishops; 4) nevertheless, since individual Bishops are not infallible and are dependent on the successor of Peter, their judgment is not irreformable, and appeal can be made from their sentence; 5) nevertheless, as long as their sentence is not proved false, juridically their doctrine must be presumed Catholic, both because each one, in those things which he does with authority, is presumed to act rightly, and because the plurality of Bishops cannot depart from the doctrine of Peter; and consequently, in order that we may judge that some particular Bishop has departed from it, this must be proved. But the objection properly proceeds concerning the office of judge which belongs to Bishops gathered together in Council; for then they seem not to be judges, precisely because the Pope, even alone, is infallible. Therefore, that the objection may be directly solved, let us first note that a definition of faith can be issued in three ways: 1) by the Pontiff alone defining ex cathedra; 2) by a Council to which, however, the Supreme Pontiff proposes for approval a definition already issued by himself; 3) by the same Council, in such a way, however, that a matter not yet defined is brought into an examination of doubt and disputation, and at last is defined by it. Now in the first case, Bishops do not

exercise judgment; and therefore it is true, as we have said, that although they are judges, nevertheless they do not always judge. But in this there is no inconvenience. For although it has been given to Bishops that they can define things not yet defined, if they agree among themselves and with the Roman Pontiff, it does not follow that nothing can be defined in the Church without them. For since Christ conceded to Bishops that power in his kingdom, yet in such a way that he also delivered the keys of the kingdom to Peter alone, it follows that Bishops cannot use their power without the consent of the successors of Peter; but it does not conversely follow that these cannot bind and loose without the consent of the Bishops. Therefore from the doctrine concerning the supreme authority of the Holy See in teaching, it cannot be deduced that there is not in Bishops a true power of judging concerning faith; but only that there are two ways in which this judgment is legitimately exercised in the Church: one, more expeditious, through the sentence of the Supreme Pontiff alone; the other, more solemn, through the judgment of the universal Church. Thus, namely, it has been disposed by eternal Wisdom, that the necessity of the Church might be provided for in every way according to the variety of times. In the second case, it is true that there is not left to Bishops an examination of doubt, but only of knowledge, instruction, and confirmation, by which they can render the reason of the dogma, refute adversaries, and instruct their own. It is also true that there is not left to them a judgment indifferent to either side, by which uncertain things are made certain, but only a judgment of adherence. Yet from this it does indeed follow that Bishops exercise the power of a judge of faith sometimes more amply, sometimes less amply, and therefore, as we have said, that they do not always judge in the same manner; but it by no means follows that they do not exercise true judgment when they pronounce a judgment of adherence. In reality the assent of Bishops, in this case, is not an act of mere submission, as in the rest of the faithful, but is at the same time an act of authority. For assenting to the definition of the Pontiff, joined with him and among themselves, they form the judgment of the universal Church. In reality it has happened more than once that ecumenical Councils treated again those things which had already been defined by preceding Councils, not indeed by doubting, but by confirming, as is clear. Nevertheless, when the Fathers sanctioned the same heads of doctrine by new decrees and condemned the same errors by new anathemas, no one will deny that a true judgment with power was made by them. Nor is it an obstacle that, in the case, the judgment of the Bishops cannot be carried to either side. For this is not of the essence of judgment. The force and notion of judgment consists in this: that sentence is given with knowledge of the cause and with power; or in this, that the truth or falsity of some proposition is recognized and affirmed, and that this is done by a person whose affirmation is not common and private, but legitimate or authoritative. All these things are verified even in a judgment of adherence. "To judge," says Fenelon, Pastoral Instruction, April 20, 1715, "after the judgment of the Pontiff, is to join one's own judgment with the pontifical." And he continues: "In this way the Bishops formerly subscribed to the decrees of the general Councils themselves. Their submission was judgment, and their judgment was submission. By subscribing, they at once submitted themselves and confirmed the decision of the synod." And with all these things the acts of the Councils agree, in which these and other similar formulas of subscriptions are read: "judging, I subscribed - recognizing, I consented - obeying the sentence of the most holy and most blessed Bishops, consenting, I also subscribed - recognizing the discussion of the holy fathers, and since I must follow it, I subscribed." See Ballerini, On Ecclesiastical Power, chapter 2, section 1, no. 3. In the third case, finally, it is evident that Bishops exercise judgment, and indeed such a judgment by which a matter becomes certain from uncertain; although even in this case their judgment does not have full firmness unless the consent of the Roman Pontiff is added. From this it is clear that they are never supreme judges, but subordinated ones; for they do not constitute that subject to which Christ promised infallibility, except joined with the Head.

1086. IV. Nevertheless you will insist: Does it not seem, even in this case, that the assistance of the Holy Spirit, and consequently infallibility, is conceded only to the Roman Pontiff? For Bishops do not seem to have assistance of this kind while they pronounce judgment, when they say, for example, "it pleases," and before the consent of the Roman Pontiff is added; for then their judgment can be

reformed. Nor do they seem to have it after they have pronounced their judgment and when the Roman Pontiff confirms it; for then the Bishops do or say nothing. Therefore. It seems that one can answer: 1) The assistance of the Holy Spirit and infallibility have also been promised to the Council; but in order that its judgment in a cause of faith be infallible, it is not necessary that the Holy Spirit immediately assist each Bishop consenting with the Pope, but it is enough that he assist in such a way that at last the sentence of the Council cannot be false. God can accomplish this in many ways, and there are not lacking those who think that he accomplishes it through the mediation of the Supreme Pontiff, insofar as the immediate subject of assistance and infallibility is the Pope alone, through whom the body of Bishops consenting with him becomes infallible. For if the Supreme Pontiff, through the assistance of the Holy Spirit, is infallible while he himself consents, since that consent is nothing other than the confirmation of the judgment of the Bishops with which he makes one sentence, the whole judgment becomes infallible. 2) It can also be said that the Bishops whose judgment afterward receives the consent of the Supreme Pontiff had the assistance of the Holy Spirit while they were pronouncing their sentence; yet this did not become known except when that consent was added, without which the necessary condition was lacking for constituting the true subject of infallibility. Section VII The Remaining Objections of the Gallicans Are Solved.

1087. I. You will say: Whatever must be thought about the matters thus far disputed, it is certain by fact that many of the Roman Pontiffs lapsed into very shameful errors, of which errors indeed a long catalogue could be exhibited. It is answered: In the beginning innumerable errors customarily were ascribed falsely to the Roman Pontiffs. In St. Peter alone the Magdeburg authors enumerated fifteen; then in the other Pontiffs, in Bellarmine, On the Roman Pontiff, book 4, chapter 8 ff., forty are reviewed. But in the course of time that catalogue was greatly diminished by the adversaries, until it was contracted to two, or only three, errors of this kind: namely to the lapse of Peter when he denied Christ; that of Liberius; and finally that of Honorius.

1088. But truly the lapse of St. Peter must be set aside, since Peter then issued no definition of faith, nor at that time had the Church been solemnly instituted, nor had the primacy been conferred in act upon blessed Peter, but only promised. But as to the lapse of Liberius, besides the fact that there the matter is not about a definition of faith given to the universal Church, but at most about a personal lapse through a subscription extorted by force and fraud, and indeed to the Sirmian formula, which bore a Catholic sense, it is now established among critics that a lapse of this kind is fictitious. For this reason Bossuet himself confessed: "I have struck out from my treatise On Ecclesiastical Power everything which regards Pope Liberius, as not proving well what I wished to establish," according to de Maistre, On the Pope, book 1, chapter 15. And Bailly, page 255, writes: "What does it profit them [certain Gallican authors] to heap together various errors and ascribe them to some Pontiffs? What does it matter to report various decisions of questions rendered by Pontiffs which they think fight with one another, since it neither is true nor can be proved that the Roman Pontiffs defined by apostolic authority, or ex cathedra, when they spoke such things?" Thus also Tournely, etc. But concerning Liberius, compare Stilting, Acta Sanctorum, volume 6, September 23; Zaccaria, On the Fictitious Lapse of Liberius. This dissertation is available in the Theological Thesaurus, volume 2, part 2, book 1, opusculum 6. Therefore only the case of Honorius remains.

1089. II. Now it does not belong to the present undertaking to vindicate Honorius from every fault, or to polish his case by a lengthy historical inquiry. This one thing will be enough for us: to show that the case of Honorius creates no difficulty for the dogma concerning the infallibility of the Roman Pontiff. For clarity of the matter, however, it will help to recall from history that in the year 633 Sergius, Patriarch of Constantinople, an eminent Monothelite, gave to Honorius, the Roman Pontiff, letters full of deceit, by which he strove to persuade him that it would especially conduce to the good of the Church that neither one nor a double will and operation of Christ be spoken of. This letter exists in act 12 of the sixth Synod, Harduin, 3.1311. Therefore, not having sufficiently perceived the circumstances of things, the

Supreme Pontiff yielded to the counsels and solicitations of Sergius, and judged that silence should be observed, to the grave harm of the faith, as the event afterward proved. Concerning this matter he wrote four letters: one to Sergius, which is most celebrated and is had in the same act of the Sixth Council, 1319; another to Cyrus, Patriarch of Alexandria, a Monothelite; a third to Sophronius of Jerusalem, orthodox; and finally a fourth, of which only fragments survive, in the same place, act 12, 1315, again to Sergius. From this it is gathered that Honorius demanded from the legates whom Sophronius, the recent Bishop of Jerusalem, had sent to him with a synodical letter, a promise that the same silence be observed by Sophronius. Nevertheless Sophronius, a man most illustrious for zeal for the faith, without approving the promised things, sent Stephen, Bishop of Dora, the chief of his suffragans, to the Apostolic See, so that the Supreme Pontiff might be made more certain concerning the danger to faith and bring to it a prompt remedy. But because of the letters given to Sergius, Honorius was condemned by the Sixth Synod, in the year 681, together with Theodore, Sergius, Cyrus, and the other leaders of the Monothelites, act 13. And so the sum of the matter is this: to Honorius is attributed the error of the Monothelites, who denied in Christ a double will and operation, divine and human, and asserted one, namely the divine. They say that this error is contained in Honorius's two letters to Sergius; and they judge that on this account he was condemned by Synod VI.

1090. Therefore, to dissolve this difficulty, Theologians have entered upon a threefold way. According to the first, it is asserted that the documents brought forth against Honorius were fabricated or interpolated, except for the condemnation pronounced by the Sixth Synod; but that this condemnation does not have the force of an ecumenical decree, since it was never received by the Roman Pontiffs. In this opinion, Honorius neither positively taught Monothelitism; nor did he offend negatively by prescribing that the word either of one or of double operation be omitted; nor finally did he contract any fault of negligence or of depraved economy. According to the second, it is established that from the documents which are brought forward, it is in no way certain that Honorius taught the error of the Monothelites; indeed the contrary is shown. According to the third, it is asserted that, whatever Honorius said in his letters to Sergius, it is certain that he did not teach the error of the Monothelites ex cathedra. Although serious reasons, both intrinsic and extrinsic, are not lacking for the first opinion, nor serious authorities, as can be seen in Baronius, Bellarmine, On the Roman Pontiff, book 4, chapter 11, etc.; nevertheless, since it is not the more common one, we dismiss it, so that we may pursue other ways of solution.

1091. Hence I. Honorius did not teach the error of the Monothelites. For 1) Honorius expressly professes the Catholic dogma concerning a double will and operation in Christ. In reality, in the later letter to Sergius, Honorius has these words: "But we ought to confess both natures, joined in one Christ by natural unity, acting and operative with the communion of the other: and indeed the divine nature working the things which are God's, and the human accomplishing the things which are of the flesh." And a little afterward he proceeds thus: "It is necessary for us... to proclaim with you the two natures, that is, of divinity and of assumed flesh... acting their proper things without confusion, without division, and without conversion." But in the earlier letter he had said: "Confessing the Lord Jesus Christ... to have worked divine things;... and the same one to have worked human things... distinctly, without confusion, and without conversion." 2) Honorius spoke in the same way as St. Leo, who certainly taught in a Catholic manner. For St. Leo, in the letter to Flavian, had said: "For each form does what is proper to it with the communion of the other; that is, the Word working what belongs to the Word, and the flesh accomplishing what belongs to the flesh." When these words of Leo were recited in the Sixth General Synod, the legates of the Roman See said: "Behold, the present most holy father manifestly proclaims two natural operations, without confusion and without division, in our Lord Jesus Christ." But the Synod assented to this statement of the legates, nor did anyone contradict except the most blinded Monothelite Macarius. Moreover, as we have seen, Honorius had said the same thing as St. Leo, except that he expressed the matter more clearly and strongly. 3) It is true that Honorius in the earlier letter said: "We confess one will of our Lord Jesus Christ"; but Cardinal Orsi rightly warned: "Honorius proclaims one will of Christ, but of the humanity; he keeps another will away from him,

but that of the flesh." For Sergius, in his crafty letter, in order to persuade Honorius to silence concerning one or a double will, brings forward, among other reasons, this one: that if two wills were admitted in Christ, they would be contrary to one another. But Honorius, omitting the other reasons, weighed the question whether in Christ there are, as in us, those two contrary wills remembered by the Apostle, which we call of the spirit and of the flesh; and he denies this in Christ, when he asserts one will in him. This is clear: a) from the context; for he says: "Whence also we confess one will of our Lord Jesus Christ, because surely our nature was assumed by the divinity, not our fault; surely that nature which was created before sin, not that which was vitiated after transgression." Moreover, the Monothelites themselves admitted the divine will in Christ. But if the things Honorius says about one will had to be understood of the divine will, his argument would be so manifestly foolish that it would reveal Honorius not so much as a heretic as as one taken in mind. For the sense would be: there is only one will of Christ, and that divine, because he assumed human nature not stained by sin, but immune from sin; as though a human will could be found only in stained human nature! b) Hence St. Maximus, a contemporary author, writing to Marinus the presbyter, according to Labbe, volume 5, column 1763, says: "I think that Honorius, the Roman Pope, does not deny the duality of wills naturally in Christ in the letter which he wrote to Sergius, because he said one will, but rather confesses it, and perhaps even establishes it. For he said this not in rejection of the human and natural will of the Savior, but because no will of the flesh or vicious thought in any way preceded his conception, which was without seed, or his incorrupt birth." c) And John Symponus, who had written the letter of Honorius, testifies, according to Labbe in the same place: "We said one will of the Lord, not of his divinity and humanity, but of the humanity alone. For when Sergius had written that certain men said there were two contrary wills in Christ, we said that Christ did not have two contrary wills, I mean of flesh and spirit, as we have after sin, but one only, which naturally denotes his humanity." The same thing John IV taught in his letters to Emperor Constantine. 4) Nor is it an obstacle that Honorius says: "Whether, however, on account of the works of divinity and humanity, one or two operations, energeiai, ought to be said or understood as derived, these things ought not to pertain to us; but we leave them to grammarians or to writers of arts.... Your fraternity will preach these things with us.... We ask you, fleeing the introduced appellation of the new word of one or two operations, to preach with us, in orthodox faith and Catholic unity, one Lord Jesus Christ, Son of the living God, true God, operating in two natures, which are of divinity and humanity." These things, I say, are not obstacles. For a) if Honorius erred in this, the error is not of dogmatic definition, but rather of economic dispensation. For this error would consist in this: that he judged it more prudent that that controversy be left to grammarians than that Bishops should care about it. But whence did this happen? Sergius had set forth in his letters that the Severians or Acephali, and other heretics throughout Egypt, Libya, and neighboring provinces, especially those infected with the Eutychian heresy, could easily be brought to unity if speech either of one or of a double operation in Christ were omitted. Therefore Honorius in his response looked to two things: the matter, or the substance of the dogma, and this he expressly taught, as we saw a little before; and the words, or the formula expressing the dogma, and this, persuaded by the false reasons of Sergius, he thought should be pressed down in silence, lest scandals arise, and lest those recently converted fall back from Catholic unity. b) Nor should this very economy of silence be judged from present circumstances. For since the formula concerning two wills and operations in Christ has now been authentically defined by the Church against the Monothelites, one who rejected it would be judged to deny the dogma itself. But in the time of Honorius the Church had not yet confirmed that formula by her judgment; and moreover the sense of that double energeia was not one. For some by this word understood person; others, will; others, operation; others, double human operation, etc. Hence Honorius said: "It is not fitting to twist to ecclesiastical dogmas these things which neither synodal writings examining the matter nor canonical authorities seem to have explained, so that someone would presume to proclaim one or two energies of Christ the God, which neither evangelical or apostolic letters, nor synodal examination held concerning these matters, seem to have determined."

1092. II. Honorius in his letters to Sergius issued no definition ex cathedra. For 1) he concludes the first letter with these words: "Let your fraternity preach these things with us, just as we also preach them unanimously with you: exhorting you, while fleeing the introduced term of a new word of one or double operation, to preach with us, in orthodox faith and Catholic unity, one Lord Jesus Christ, Son of the living God, most true God, working divinely and humanly in two natures." He exhorts; he does not command nor threaten any penalty. 2) But in the later letter he has: "Therefore, removing, as we said, the scandal of a novel invention, it is not fitting for us to preach by defining one or two operations; but instead of one operation, which some speak of, it is necessary for us truthfully to confess one operator, Christ the Lord, in both natures; and instead of two operations, the term of double operation having been removed, rather to preach with us the two natures themselves, that is, of divinity and of assumed flesh, in the one person of the only-begotten of God the Father, operating their proper things without confusion, without division, and without conversion." Therefore, since Honorius expressly says, "it is not fitting for us to preach by defining one or two operations," by this very fact he most openly testifies that he is issuing no dogmatic definition. For he who says, "it is not fitting that the matter be defined by me," equivalently says, "I do not wish to define it, and I do not define it." 3) Certainly, provided that one willing and operating in two natures is believed, whether two wills or operations are also spoken of, according to Honorius, these are useless minutiae, these subtleties of words to be left to grammarians. But this certainly does not pertain to establishing or defining something concerning faith, but rather to suspending definition. 4) Hence in the letter of Pope St. Agatho to Emperor Constantine, according to Mansi, volume 11, column 234, it is read: "By the assistance of his [St. Peter's] protection, this Apostolic Church of his has never turned aside from the way of truth in any part of error; whose authority, as that of the prince of all the Apostles, the whole Catholic Church of Christ and the universal synods have always embraced and followed in all things." How could Agatho have affirmed these things, if a little before Honorius had issued an erroneous definition?

1093. III. But you will say: if these things are true, how could Honorius have been condemned by Synod VI? It must altogether be said that Honorius was condemned not because he taught or defined heresy, but because, as supreme Pastor, deceived by Sergius, by omitting a definition he favored heresy. This is clear: 1) from the confirmatory letter of Synod VI, in which Leo II, successor of Agatho, openly calls the others condemned by the council inventors of a new error; but concerning Honorius he speaks thus: "And also Honorius, who did not attempt to illuminate this Apostolic See by the doctrine of apostolic tradition, but permitted the immaculate one to be stained by profane tradition." 2) From the letter of the same Leo II to the prelates of Spain. For in it, after enumerating the others condemned by the synod, he adds these words: "Together with Honorius, who did not, as befitted apostolic authority, extinguish the flame of heretical dogma as it was beginning, but by neglect fostered it." 3) The same thing is confirmed from the letter of the same Leo II to Erwig, king of Spain, in which, after he has reviewed the others condemned by the synod, he adds: "And together with them Honorius the Roman, who permitted the immaculate rule of apostolic tradition, which he received from his predecessors, to be stained." 4) Nor is it an obstacle that in the Acts of Synod VI Honorius is more than once called a heretic. For all know that not only those who professed and taught heresy are called heretics, but also those who favored them. But in the acts of the Council, since there is no place in which it is explicitly said that Honorius taught heresy, he is distinguished more than once by express words, as we have seen, from those who taught it. Therefore we concede that Honorius was condemned by the synod as a heretic, but in the sense that he stood forth as a supporter of heretics, and indeed negatively; not however insofar as he himself taught heresy. 5) Nor again do these words of the Synod concerning Honorius stand in the way: "In all things he followed his [Sergius's] mind and confirmed impious dogmas." For Honorius followed the mind of Sergius in all things which Sergius himself was asking in his letter; but not in all things which that heretic intended and thought. Sergius asked that Honorius write back that the preaching either of one or of a double operation should be omitted, and that he bring Sophronius and others to the same. And in all these things indeed Honorius followed the mind of

Sergius. But that he followed him with regard to the heresy of Monothelitism, the synod does not say, and it is altogether false. Concerning the word "confirmed," moreover, there is no difficulty; for heresy can be said to be confirmed by one who favors it and is the cause, at least negatively, why it is strengthened and propagated more widely. Whoever desires more concerning the case of Honorius, compare La Civilta Cattolica, February 19 and March 5, 1870; and Bouix, On the Roman Pontiff, part 2, section 5, where he will find gathered together all the documents which refer to that case.

1094. While the Vatican Council was being conducted, some repeatedly said that the whole doctrine concerning the infallibility of the Roman Pontiff had been derived from the Isidorian collection of canons; which, already concerning the veneration of the Primacy, Febronius and Launoy, from whom they had learned it, had affirmed. But I do not know whether in this assertion they exhibited a specimen of bad faith more than of ignorance. For from what has been disputed before, it is clear that the doctrine concerning the infallibility of the Roman Pontiff flows down from the very words of Christ and from all the sources of Tradition. Therefore it would be beside the matter to institute here a lengthy inquiry about that collection. But since very many things are usually babbled about this matter, it will not be beside the matter to explain something about it more distinctly; and for doing this, it will be enough to transcribe here a few, but clear, words of Cardinal Tarquini, Institutions of Public Ecclesiastical Law, page 105 and following.

1095. Therefore concerning a collection of this kind these things must be observed. 1) "That a collection of this kind is said, in this sense and especially for these reasons, to be filled with spurious canons: a) Because it attributes to Roman Pontiffs belonging to the first three centuries those canons which were written in later centuries, especially the fourth and fifth, or were excerpted from the sentences of the holy Fathers of that age, as the Calvinist man Blondel, and most bitter enemy of Isidore, taught; he also brought into the open those passages of the Fathers from which they seem to have been copied. b) Because in certain genuine and sincere canons, the writing of the manuscripts perhaps corrupted by antiquity, Isidore himself restored the integrity of the sentence by himself; or perhaps even, imprudently, inserted into the text certain annotations made by an ancient hand; nevertheless in such a way that interpolations of this kind in no way disagree with the doctrine of the other canons. c) Because in certain canons, always of equal doctrine and not differing from the others, error in the chronological notes is found. d) Finally, because, although the authors are said to be diverse, nevertheless the style seems to be uniform in all." 2) "The aforesaid causes, as each one easily sees, are partly futile and of lighter moment, and partly rather overthrow the Febronian assertion. Namely: a) The Febronian assertion is overthrown because the Isidorian canons are said to have been copied from sentences of the Fathers of the fourth and fifth century. For this proves that that doctrine concerning the Primacy of the Roman Pontiff, which Febronius attributes to the Isidorian collection, that is, to the ninth century, had already been handed down and approved in the Church in the fourth and fifth century. b) From the arguments which are drawn from interpolations and arbitrary restorations, it may rightly be deduced that those interpolated and added parts are adulterine; nevertheless it is perversely deduced that the doctrine of Primacy was born from them, since the doctrine contained there in no way disagrees with the doctrine of the other canons. c) The arguments which are drawn from uniformity of style and from chronological notes wrongly designated are exaggerated beyond sound criticism, since every learned man knows well that errors in chronological notes are found more than once even in genuine monuments. But as to uniformity of style, although there are said to be diverse writers of the canons, it must be observed: 1. That an argument drawn from style is of itself unreliable and uncertain; 2. That most of the ancient canons were written in Greek, and therefore, from the hand of the translator who turned them into the Latin language, could easily have put on uniformity. Moreover it is enough that a doctrine by no means contrary to the genuine canons is handed down there, so that Febronius's calumny concerning the origin of Primacy as to be traced back to them immediately vanishes."

1096. These are the things which this year, not without the special help of God, we have been able to hand down concerning true Religion and the Church. Would that they may avail to bring those who are outside to the one sheepfold, and to confirm those who are within in its true spirit and love! "Let us believe, brothers," said St. Augustine, On John, tractate 32, "that as much as each one loves the Church, so much he has the Holy Spirit." Imprimatur. Prato, 20 December 1904. Canon Archdeacon Joachim Gori, Vicar General.

The Analytic Index

The page references are those of the printed pages of the 1905 edition; each is a link to the corresponding paragraph of the translation.

Proemium: Page [III](/works/de-religione-et-ecclesia/01-preface/#pref-III).

Disputation I

On Religion Generally

Article First - The Genuine Notion of Religion Is Handed Down.

The etymon of religion: from rereading, Tullius; from re-choosing, St. Augustine; more correctly from binding again, Lactantius. Religion as to the thing, in the strict sense, says a bond joining man to God: declaration. Religion has two kinds of acts: immediate, as adoration; mediate, as works of mercy. Religion considered theoretically comprises the sum of truths; practically, the sum of duties. It is considered subjectively, in man himself, or objectively, in itself. It is defined: "The virtue by which due honor and worship are rendered to the true God." St. Thomas. To this return the definitions handed down by St. Augustine, Taparelli, etc. Religion is divided into true and false; into natural and supernatural; into primeval, Jewish, and Christian: what each is. False opinions: Pseudomystics place religion in the bare practice of external works; Sentimentalists, in a certain spiritual feeling; materialists, in a religious instinct; Pantheists, in the feeling of the infinite, etc. These are briefly refuted. Pages [1](/works/de-religione-et-ecclesia/02-article-1-the-genuine-notion-of-religion-is-handed-down/#p2)-7.

Article Second - Whether It Is Necessary to Admit Some Religion.

Section I. The State of the Question Is Declared.

The questions usually treated, namely whether some religion exists; whether it is, as it were, physically necessary; whether it is useful to man; remain solved from the arguments by which the obligation of professing some religion is established. Here properly the question is not about revealed religion, but about some religion in general. The thesis fights against Atheists,

Pantheists, Materialists, and Fatalists; more directly it attacks absolute indifferentists. The opinion of the Eudaemonists and of Machiavelli is overthrown by the same arguments. Pages [8](/works/de-religione-et-ecclesia/03-article-2-whether-it-is-necessary-to-admit-some-religion/#p15)-10.

Section II. The Proposed Question Is Solved.

Proposition I. 1. From principles known by the natural light it is evidently shown that there is in man a moral necessity of professing religion; 2. nor without religion can moral obligation exist or be conceived. Therefore those depart from the truth who establish the autonomy of human reason in such a way that they teach it to be the sole arbiter of good and evil, and a law to itself. Pages [10](/works/de-religione-et-ecclesia/03-article-2-whether-it-is-necessary-to-admit-some-religion/#p20)-17.

Part 1: pages [10](/works/de-religione-et-ecclesia/03-article-2-whether-it-is-necessary-to-admit-some-religion/#p20)-14;

Part 2: pages [14](/works/de-religione-et-ecclesia/03-article-2-whether-it-is-necessary-to-admit-some-religion/#p26)-17.

Article Third - Whether Religion Is Necessary to Society.

Section I. The State of the Question Is Set Forth.

Who teach that society can stand without religion and be safely governed. Bayle. R. Owen. The origin of the error in the philosophical atheism of the last century. What evils flow from neglect of religion. Pius IX, encyclical Quanta cura. Pages [17](/works/de-religione-et-ecclesia/04-article-3-whether-religion-is-necessary-to-society/#p31)-18.

Section II. The Proposed Question Is Solved.

Proposition II. Religion, which is the only foundation of right and justice, is so necessary to civil society that this society cannot stand safe without it. Therefore those who try to introduce political atheism substitute material force for true justice and legitimate right; and under the appearance of progress, they truly attempt the ruin of civil society. Pages [19](/works/de-religione-et-ecclesia/04-article-3-whether-religion-is-necessary-to-society/#p36)-23.

Scholion. Something is touched upon concerning Worship. Worship is the exercise of Religion. It comprises all the acts of this virtue. The worship of God is of an altogether different and superior order from the cult of the Saints and of the Blessed Virgin Mary; hence it is properly called Latria. It comprises three kinds of acts: of the mind, of the heart, and of the body. Hence the division into internal and external worship, which is private or public. The necessity of worship, internal, external, and public, is briefly demonstrated. The quibbles of Tomasius and Kant are answered. Pages [23](/works/de-religione-et-ecclesia/04-article-3-whether-religion-is-necessary-to-society/#p43)-28.

Article Fourth - Whether It Is Indifferent to Profess Any Religion Whatever.

Section I. The State of the Question Is Set Forth.

Indifferentism is twofold: absolute, already exploded; and relative, to be weighed here. But this is particular or universal. Universal indifferentism contends that all religions are equally good. Particular indifferentism indeed teaches that there is one true religion, but judges that there is no essential difference between this

religion and its sects. Pius IX denounces both, in the encyclical Qui pluribus and in the Syllabus. In the thesis the question is chiefly about universal relative indifferentism. The same error under the form of Religious tolerance, which is twofold, dogmatic and civil; or under the form of liberty of conscience, liberty of cults, etc. The notion of liberty is briefly declared. What Liberals contend; what the Church says about Liberalism. Can political tolerance be admitted? Absolutely, never; hypothetically, or in certain circumstances, it can be; but this must be left to the judgment of the Roman Pontiff. Declaration of the matter from Becanus, Tarquini, and St. Thomas. Pages [29](/works/de-religione-et-ecclesia/05-article-4-whether-it-is-indifferent-to-profess-any-religion-/#p54)-35.

Section II. Dogmatic Tolerance Is Rejected.

Proposition III. There is one true religion, which all men are bound to embrace and profess; and therefore the system concerning dogmatic tolerance is impious and absurd, by which to each person a right is attributed of freely thinking and speaking about religion, and of offering to God that worship which, according to the variety of regions and peoples, or according to each one's pleasure, he judges better. Pages [36](/works/de-religione-et-ecclesia/05-article-4-whether-it-is-indifferent-to-profess-any-religion-/#p68)-41.

Section III. The True Doctrine Concerning Civil Tolerance Is Established.

Proposition IV. 1. Unity in the true religion of itself conduces very greatly to the true good of civil society; 2. and the supreme authority has the right and office of preserving and promoting it; 3. nevertheless, if at times graver evils are feared from that unity, plurality of cults can be tolerated to avoid them. Therefore civil or political tolerance can be admitted not absolutely, but only hypothetically. Pages [42](/works/de-religione-et-ecclesia/05-article-4-whether-it-is-indifferent-to-profess-any-religion-/#p76)-47.

Part 1: pages [42](/works/de-religione-et-ecclesia/05-article-4-whether-it-is-indifferent-to-profess-any-religion-/#p76)-45; Part 2: pages [46](/works/de-religione-et-ecclesia/05-article-4-whether-it-is-indifferent-to-profess-any-religion-/#p82)-47.

Section IV. The Difficulties Are Satisfied.

They say that political tolerance must be admitted absolutely: 1. because civil authority has no right to promote or preserve the unity of religion, since it lacks infallibility; 2. civil society can do nothing in those things which regard religion, for it has a diverse end and, from the end, diverse rights; 3. otherwise the same right would belong to heterodox persons with regard to false religion; 4. nor should any danger be feared, since truth is stronger than error; 5. because we enjoy liberty; peace would be disturbed; minds would be alienated from the Church. To all these things answer is made. Pages [47](/works/de-religione-et-ecclesia/05-article-4-whether-it-is-indifferent-to-profess-any-religion-/#p84)-54.

Article Fifth - Whether Divine Revelation Is Possible.

Section I. Certain Things Concerning the Nature of Revelation Are Established Beforehand.

Religion is necessary from what has been said. One can be true.

Which one? Whether revealed? Method of treatment. The constitution Dei Filius. Revelation in the most universal sense means the manifestation of truth. It is human if it is made by man; divine if by God. The question concerns this latter. This is either natural or supernatural, which is properly called Revelation. It is "the manifestation of truths made by God through a medium placed beyond the powers of nature." Considered with respect to the revealing subject, it is mediate or immediate; considered with respect to the medium, it is sensory, imaginary, or intellectual. It can be considered subjectively and objectively. The object of Revelation is twofold. It also comprises mysteries, namely truths which absolutely and of themselves exceed the grasp of reason: declaration. The adversaries in this matter are Naturalists and Rationalists. The former simply deny revelation; the latter seem to admit it, but only in name. Both exclude all mysteries. Some attack only the possibility of mediate revelation. Pages [55](/works/de-religione-et-ecclesia/06-article-5-whether-divine-revelation-is-possible/#p93)-62.

Section II. The Proposed Question Is Solved.

Proposition V. Divine revelation, or the manifestation of truth through a medium not owed to nature, whether 1. immediate or 2. mediate, must be said to be possible. 3. Indeed it is evidently shown that not only truths to which natural reason can attain, but also mysteries, or truths which absolutely and of themselves exceed the grasp of reason, can be contained within the scope of supernatural revelation. Pages [62](/works/de-religione-et-ecclesia/06-article-5-whether-divine-revelation-is-possible/#p105)-70.

Part 1: pages [62](/works/de-religione-et-ecclesia/06-article-5-whether-divine-revelation-is-possible/#p105)-65; Part 2: pages [65](/works/de-religione-et-ecclesia/06-article-5-whether-divine-revelation-is-possible/#p109)-66; Part 3: pages [66](/works/de-religione-et-ecclesia/06-article-5-whether-divine-revelation-is-possible/#p110)-70.

At the end of the thesis certain objections are met.

Article Sixth - Whether Divine Supernatural Revelation Is Necessary.

Section I. The State of the Question Is Set Forth.

Documents of the Church. The object of Revelation is twofold: truths which of themselves are not impassable to human reason, and others which absolutely surpass human reason. Revelation is absolutely necessary, once elevation is supposed. It is necessary also with regard to truths of the natural order. The question in this thesis concerns those truths of the natural order which pertain to religion, insofar as they must be known by all men, by the whole human race. We prescind from the supernatural mode of knowing them, which mode would absolutely require revelation. The question turns on the very substance of cognition; and indeed, in the present order, revelation of these truths is necessary. Against the Rationalists. Moreover this necessity is not physical and absolute, against the Traditionalists, but moral, on account of the moral impotence in which the human race finds itself for knowing them: what this is; in what it differs from physical impotence. Pages [71](/works/de-religione-et-ecclesia/07-article-6-whether-divine-supernatural-revelation-is-necessar/#p114)-77.

Section II. The Proposed Question Is Solved.

Proposition VI. So far is it from being the case that all truths of religion derive from the native force of human reason, that, even if the question concerns truths pertaining to natural religion, reason is morally impotent for attaining them. For in the present condition of the human race, they cannot be known by all, readily, with firm certainty, and with no admixture of error,

without revelation. Pages [77](/works/de-religione-et-ecclesia/07-article-6-whether-divine-supernatural-revelation-is-necessar/#p126)-86.

Article Seventh - Whether All Cognition of Religious Truth Can Be Attributed to the Continual Progress of Reason, with Revelation Excluded.

Section I. The State of the Question Is Set Forth.

Documents of the Church: the encyclical Qui pluribus; the Syllabus; the constitution Dei Filius. A twofold error: 1. of those subjecting Revelation to reason, rejected in the treatise On the Virtues; 2. of the Progressists. What progress is. Its nature is briefly declared: it is a change for the better. St. Thomas, St. Augustine. Progress of reason must be admitted, not only negative, namely by repudiating errors which were mixed with truths previously known, but also positive, which is a fuller attainment of truth; but not necessarily continuous, especially in Religion. Rationalists and Naturalists teach otherwise. Their system is set forth. They consider all religions, even those altogether opposed, as relatively true and legitimate in their own age. For this reason they suppose the theory of relative and mutable truth, which theory the Eclectics of France and the Pantheists expressly assert. Pages [86](/works/de-religione-et-ecclesia/08-article-7-whether-all-knowledge-of-religious-truth-can-be-at/#p132)-92.

Section II. The Proposed Question Is Solved.

Proposition VII. 1. With divine revelation rejected, the human race cannot be recalled from ignorance of truths concerning the natural law and religion by the help of philosophy or philosophers. Nor will humanitarian progress, invented by the Rationalists, help for this: 2. if it is asserted as continuous, it contradicts history and experience; 3. if it is also transferred to religion, insofar as all religions are said to be successively more perfect diverse forms of one primitive religion, it is impious and absurd; 4. finally, if it is asserted under this name, that every truth is relative and mutable, it is not only absurd and impious, but also overturns all certainty of human cognition. Pages [92](/works/de-religione-et-ecclesia/08-article-7-whether-all-knowledge-of-religious-truth-can-be-at/#p144)-102.

Part 1: pages [92](/works/de-religione-et-ecclesia/08-article-7-whether-all-knowledge-of-religious-truth-can-be-at/#p144)-95; Part 2: pages [95](/works/de-religione-et-ecclesia/08-article-7-whether-all-knowledge-of-religious-truth-can-be-at/#p147)-98; Part 3: pages [98](/works/de-religione-et-ecclesia/08-article-7-whether-all-knowledge-of-religious-truth-can-be-at/#p152)-99; Part 4: pages [99](/works/de-religione-et-ecclesia/08-article-7-whether-all-knowledge-of-religious-truth-can-be-at/#p154)-102.

Article Eighth - The Character and Necessity of the Notes of Revelation Are Sketched.

The means of knowing revelation are called notes, criteria, motives of credibility. The necessity of knowing, and indeed with certainty, the fact of revelation is easily understood by all. Proof was expressly given in the treatise On the Virtues; here it is only suggested. From this it is inferred that there can be some means of certainly knowing revelation; indeed that they exist, once the hypothesis of revelation is made. What are they? Rationalists who admit revelation in name only judge that the only means is "the conformity of doctrine with the principles of reason"; but wrongly, for this would show that the doctrine is true, but in no way that it is revealed. Once this criterion is received, any doctrine containing mysteries would have to be excluded. Several Protestants assert that the criterion of revelation is revelation itself, insofar as either through the testimony of the spirit or through a certain instinct, revelation becomes immediately known to each person. This error was rejected in the treatise On the Virtues. The true doctrine concerning the criteria of revelation: 1. some are negative; the chief of these is the conformity of the doctrine which is exhibited as revealed with the principles of reason, with morals, and with the other heads of revealed doctrine. This criterion is not of itself necessarily to be applied and can rarely be applied with fruit. 2. Others are positive, of which some are intrinsic: the perfection, sublimity, and beauty of the doctrine; some, and the principal ones, are extrinsic: miracles and prophecies. The question is chiefly about the last. Pages [103](/works/de-religione-et-ecclesia/09-article-8-the-character-of-the-notes-of-revelation-and-their/#p159)-109.

Article Ninth - Whether Miracles Are Possible.

Section I. The Genuine Concept of Miracle Is Declared.

The importance of the question. The possibility of miracle defined in the Vatican Council. Miracle from wondering. In order that wonder be moved, it is required that the cause be hidden, both in itself and with respect to us, and that there be a contrary disposition in the thing. Declaration of these matters. 1. The first condition for a miracle is that it be beyond the order of nature. By defect of this, creation and the justification of the impious, although they are done by God alone, are not miracles. The order of nature is threefold: particular, universal, and most universal, according as either one being only, or all created things together, or the divine ordering itself is considered. Some effect is not therefore a miracle because it is beyond a particular order of nature; it must be beyond the universal order, although it is not beyond the most universal, since nothing happens outside the divine ordering. It surpasses every created nature. What nature is; what the order and course of nature are. Possible modes of working miracles. They are not simply against nature, but only in a certain respect, on account of obediential potency. They are against the physical order, not the moral.

2. The second condition: a hidden cause. God - or also an Angel? Here the question concerns the principal cause efficiently acting by its own natural power. The truth of the work must be distinguished from the truth of the miracle. As to the truth of the work, angels can do certain things through local motion, or by applying active things to passive things; yet dependently on God. Not as to the truth of miracle. Reason. Divisions of miracles from St. Thomas. Pages [109](/works/de-religione-et-ecclesia/10-article-9-whether-miracles-are-possible/#p171)-122.

Section II. The Proposed Question Is Solved.

Proposition VIII. Having regard both to the order existing in things and to the divine attributes, miracles, or "events exceeding the faculty and customary order of all created nature," must be said to involve no repugnance. Indeed the perfection of divine power, even as it becomes known by natural light, altogether vindicates to itself the power of performing them. Pages [122](/works/de-religione-et-ecclesia/10-article-9-whether-miracles-are-possible/#p199)-128.

Article Tenth - Whether Miracles Have the Force of Proving That in Confirmation of Which They Are Done.

Section I. The State of the Question Is Set Forth.

The force of proving in itself is clear from what has been said; with respect to us it is weighed. It is necessary that we be certain about the objective truth of miracles, which is threefold: historical, philosophical, and relative; what each is; they can be known with certainty. The adversaries deny the first, because human testimony begets probability only and because witnesses are fallible: Hume. They deny the second, because the powers of nature are unknown, and because diabolical power is potent; consequently, they say, it is not lawful for man to know who is the author of those works. What we contend: it is enough to show that it can be certain for us that God alone is the author of certain effects. They deny the third, because the grace of miracles is a grace gratuitously given, and a man could use that power to strengthen falsity; nor, they say, would God in that case concur toward a lie. Pages [129](/works/de-religione-et-ecclesia/11-article-10-whether-there-is-in-miracles-a-force-of-proving-t/#p205)-134.

Section II. The Proposed Question Is Solved.

Proposition IX. If miracles are employed in confirmation of divine revelation, there is in them an unconquered force for proving it, 1. not only in itself, but also with respect to us; for although it may not be certain for us concerning all and singular miracles, nevertheless it can be certain concerning many: 2. both that they truly existed as they are narrated; 3. that they truly are miracles; 4. and finally that the same were performed to confirm revealed doctrine. Pages [134](/works/de-religione-et-ecclesia/11-article-10-whether-there-is-in-miracles-a-force-of-proving-t/#p214)-146.

Part 1: pages [134](/works/de-religione-et-ecclesia/11-article-10-whether-there-is-in-miracles-a-force-of-proving-t/#p214)-136; Part 2: pages [136](/works/de-religione-et-ecclesia/11-article-10-whether-there-is-in-miracles-a-force-of-proving-t/#p217)-139; Part 3: pages [139](/works/de-religione-et-ecclesia/11-article-10-whether-there-is-in-miracles-a-force-of-proving-t/#p220)-144; Part 4: pages [145](/works/de-religione-et-ecclesia/11-article-10-whether-there-is-in-miracles-a-force-of-proving-t/#p227)-146.

Article Eleventh - Whether Prophecy Is Possible, and What Its Force of Proving Is.

Section I. The State of the Question Is Set Forth.

The nominal definition of prophecy. In the broadest sense a prophet is an interpreter, composer of sacred hymns, doctor, indeed sometimes a singer. In the proper and less strict sense, prophecy is prediction of a hidden thing, past, present, or future. In the strictest sense it is "sure foreknowledge and prediction of a freely future event." To this returns the definition of Cassiodorus, which is declared. Questions to be treated: 1. the possibility of prophecy, which comprises two things:

a) whether God can foreknow those things which are freely future; b) whether he can manifest the same to others. This second is certain from the things said concerning the possibility of revelation. The first is attacked chiefly by a twofold reason: either because those future things do not have objective truth, Voltaire; or because cognition of future acts would destroy liberty. An ancient objection solved by the Scholastics and renewed by the Rationalists: Kant, Wegscheider. 2. The force of proving of prophecy, or its knowability. Prophecy is compared with miracle: in what they agree, in what they differ. What must be proved. Pages [146](/works/de-religione-et-ecclesia/12-article-11-whether-prophecy-is-possible-and-what-is-its-forc/#p228)-154.

Section II. The Proposed Question Is Solved.

Proposition X. 1. Right reason evidently shows that God knows future free things and can communicate that knowledge to others; therefore prophecy, which is the certain prediction of a freely future event, must be said to be possible. 2. But since certain cognition of future free things belongs to God alone, prophecy brought forward in confirmation of revealed doctrine supplies an inescapable argument of its divine origin. Pages [154](/works/de-religione-et-ecclesia/12-article-11-whether-prophecy-is-possible-and-what-is-its-forc/#p239)-164.

Part 1: pages [154](/works/de-religione-et-ecclesia/12-article-11-whether-prophecy-is-possible-and-what-is-its-forc/#p239)-159; Part 2: pages [159](/works/de-religione-et-ecclesia/12-article-11-whether-prophecy-is-possible-and-what-is-its-forc/#p245)-164.

Disputation II

On Christian Revelation

Revealed religion, from what has been said, is possible, fitting, and necessary; it can be known with certainty through miracles and prophecies. We take a step toward investigating its existence. The investigation is restricted to Christian revelation. Reason. Pages [165](/works/de-religione-et-ecclesia/12-article-11-whether-prophecy-is-possible-and-what-is-its-forc/#p251)-166.

Article First - Whether the Four Gospels and the Acts of the Apostles Are Authentic Books.

Section I. The State of the Question Is Set Forth.

Miracles and prophecies are chiefly gathered from the books which among us have the authority of Sacred Scripture. These are to be considered here as a historical monument. In the thesis the question concerns the historical authenticity of the four Gospels and the Acts of the Apostles, also their genuineness and integrity. An authentic book is not the same as a genuine one. The integrity of a book means immunity from corruption, which can occur in three ways: by interpolation, mutilation, and deformation of sense. When these three are not present, integrity is substantial. If immunity from even accidental corruptions is added to this, integrity is called absolute. In this thesis it will be enough to prove the substantial integrity of these books. Certain things are noted concerning the four Evangelists. Pages [166](/works/de-religione-et-ecclesia/13-article-1-whether-the-four-gospels-and-the-acts-of-the-apost/#p253)-171.

Section II. The Proposed Question Is Solved.

Proposition XI. That the four Gospels of Jesus Christ are 1. genuine,

2. substantially integral, and 3. truthful, is demonstrated by such force of arguments that no one can deny or even call into doubt their historical authenticity, unless he rejects all historical faith and obstinately contradicts the evident principles of reason. Pages [171](/works/de-religione-et-ecclesia/13-article-1-whether-the-four-gospels-and-the-acts-of-the-apost/#p260)-187.

Part 1: pages [171](/works/de-religione-et-ecclesia/13-article-1-whether-the-four-gospels-and-the-acts-of-the-apost/#p260)-178; Part 2: pages [178](/works/de-religione-et-ecclesia/13-article-1-whether-the-four-gospels-and-the-acts-of-the-apost/#p263)-183; Part 3: pages [183](/works/de-religione-et-ecclesia/13-article-1-whether-the-four-gospels-and-the-acts-of-the-apost/#p266)-187.

Scholion. It rejects certain things which are usually brought against the genuineness, integrity, and truthfulness of the Gospels. Pages [187](/works/de-religione-et-ecclesia/13-article-1-whether-the-four-gospels-and-the-acts-of-the-apost/#p269)-190.

Article Second - Whether the Truth of Christian Revelation Is Proved by Miracles.

Proposition XII. The miracles issued in confirmation of Christian revelation are so many and so splendid that any mind, unless it is willingly blind, is most easily convinced that an altogether divine origin must be ascribed to the religion of Christ. Pages [190](/works/de-religione-et-ecclesia/14-article-2-whether-the-truth-of-christian-revelation-is-confi/#p275)-204.

Scholion. It treats the mythical explanation of Strauss and Renan. Pages [204](/works/de-religione-et-ecclesia/14-article-2-whether-the-truth-of-christian-revelation-is-confi/#p281)-205.

Article Third - Whether the Truth of the Christian Religion Is Demonstrated by the Resurrection of Christ.

Proposition XII. 1. Just as it is certain that Christ predicted more than once that he would rise again, so 2. it can in no way be doubted that the matter happened as it had been predicted by him. 3. But since this resurrection from the dead is a divine work and the principal foundation of our faith, the same, whether considered as a prophecy or as a miracle, stands as an unconquered argument of the truth of the Christian religion. Pages [206](/works/de-religione-et-ecclesia/15-article-3-whether-by-the-resurrection-of-christ-the-truth-of/#p283)-218.

Part 1: pages [206](/works/de-religione-et-ecclesia/15-article-3-whether-by-the-resurrection-of-christ-the-truth-of/#p283)-208; Part 2: pages [208](/works/de-religione-et-ecclesia/15-article-3-whether-by-the-resurrection-of-christ-the-truth-of/#p284)-215; Part 3: pages [215](/works/de-religione-et-ecclesia/15-article-3-whether-by-the-resurrection-of-christ-the-truth-of/#p290)-218.

Scholion. Certain difficulties are satisfied. Pages [218](/works/de-religione-et-ecclesia/15-article-3-whether-by-the-resurrection-of-christ-the-truth-of/#p293)-222.

Article Fourth - Whether the Divine Origin of the Christian Religion Is Rightly Proved from Its Propagation and Conservation.

Section I. Certain Things Are Noted Beforehand.

The propagation and conservation of Christianity has a twofold force of proving: 1. as a miracle, not in the physical order, but in the moral order, a work surpassing all human industry and power, without however excluding human means; 2. as a prophecy. In what way. The Religion of Christ, although it can be distinguished mentally, nevertheless cannot be separated from the Church of Christ; for he instituted Religion in such a way that

there would be a Church. What follows from this. Pages [223](/works/de-religione-et-ecclesia/16-article-4-whether-the-divine-origin-of-the-christian-religio/#p300)-225.

Section II. The Proposed Question Is Solved.

Proposition XIV. The most rapid and universal propagation of the Christian religion, and its wonderful perpetual conservation, 1. were clearly predicted by Christ more than once; 2. are a fact placed before the eyes of all; 3. and cannot be explained by any human industry or created power, but require the special protection of God. Therefore, both as prophecy and as miracle, they render constant and infallible testimony to the divine origin of the same religion. Pages [225](/works/de-religione-et-ecclesia/16-article-4-whether-the-divine-origin-of-the-christian-religio/#p305)-246.

Part 1: pages [225](/works/de-religione-et-ecclesia/16-article-4-whether-the-divine-origin-of-the-christian-religio/#p305)-227; Part 2: pages [227](/works/de-religione-et-ecclesia/16-article-4-whether-the-divine-origin-of-the-christian-religio/#p306)-233; Part 3: pages [233](/works/de-religione-et-ecclesia/16-article-4-whether-the-divine-origin-of-the-christian-religio/#p309)-246.

Scholion. What Wegscheider and Gibbon oppose to the given arguments. Pages [246](/works/de-religione-et-ecclesia/16-article-4-whether-the-divine-origin-of-the-christian-religio/#p315)-249.

Article Fifth - Whether Christian Revelation Is Contained Only in Written Books, or Also in Unwritten Traditions.

Section I. The State of the Question Is Set Forth.

Limits of the question. It is asked whether, besides the written word of God, oral traditions must be admitted. 1. Concept of Tradition. In the broadest sense, tradition imports any doctrine or institution transmitted to posterity in whatever way. This tradition can be considered objectively, actively, or comprehensively. In a less broad sense, tradition is restricted to that which is transmitted without writing. In the strict and theological sense, it comprises only that which regards faith and morals, transmitted to us by living voice. Concerning this we here treat. 2. Divisions of Tradition: a) by reason of object, tradition is divided into dogmatic and moral; b) by reason of subject, into universal and particular; c) by reason of duration, into perpetual and temporary; d) by reason of obligation, into necessary and free; e) by reason of author, into divine, apostolic, and ecclesiastical. Apostolic tradition is subdivided into simply apostolic and apostolic-divine. What each is. The same force of proving is not in these. Hence Catholics ask for the criterion by which simply apostolic tradition may be distinguished from divine tradition. For this, the matter itself of tradition must be inspected, and by whom and how some doctrine or institution is proposed. The supreme rule is the judgment of the Church. 3. What the innovators contend concerning traditions and their force of proving. What the Catholic Church teaches. The Council of Trent. Pages [249](/works/de-religione-et-ecclesia/17-article-5-whether-christian-revelation-is-contained-only-in-/#p318)-256.

Section II. The Proposed Question Is Solved.

Proposition XV. Christian revelation is contained not only in written books, 1. but also in unwritten traditions, which, received by the Apostles from the mouth of Christ himself, or handed down as it were from hand to hand by the Apostles themselves at the dictation of the Holy Spirit, have come down even to us. 2. Indeed, so great is the breadth of Christian tradition that it both exhibits dogmas contained in the Scriptures

and stands as the sole source of several others. Therefore Tradition, considered in the order of comprehension, extends more broadly than Scripture. Pages [256](/works/de-religione-et-ecclesia/17-article-5-whether-christian-revelation-is-contained-only-in-/#p329)-268.

Part 1: pages [256](/works/de-religione-et-ecclesia/17-article-5-whether-christian-revelation-is-contained-only-in-/#p329)-263; Part 2: pages [264](/works/de-religione-et-ecclesia/17-article-5-whether-christian-revelation-is-contained-only-in-/#p332)-268.

Section III. The Principal Objections Are Satisfied.

Some objections are from certain testimonies of Sacred Scripture. These testimonies can be reduced to three classes, insofar as they either teach that nothing is to be added to the word of God, or expressly teach that the Scriptures are sufficient, or openly condemn traditions. The true sense of these testimonies is indicated, and it is shown that they do nothing against the thesis. Other objections are from sayings of the Fathers; but the Fathers unanimously and clearly, both theoretically and practically, admit divine traditions. Certain rules are established for rightly understanding sayings of the Fathers which, as to appearance, are repugnant. Pages [269](/works/de-religione-et-ecclesia/17-article-5-whether-christian-revelation-is-contained-only-in-/#p336)-276.

Article Sixth - Whether the Writings of the Holy Fathers Are Means of Preserving and Knowing Divine Traditions.

Section I. The State of the Question Is Set Forth.

The monuments in which traditions are found are of manifold kinds. Here we treat only of the Holy Fathers, insofar as they are doctors and witnesses of tradition. What a Father of the Church is. Fathers of the Church

are called men who excel in doctrine, flourish in sanctity, are vigorous by antiquity, and enjoy the express or tacit designation of the Church. To have this designation, the Church requires the three qualities named. When one or another of these is lacking, while the rest remain, Doctors or Ecclesiastical Writers are had. In these, eminence of sanctity is lacking; in doctors, antiquity is lacking. The title of doctor requires more ample doctrine than the name of Father. In the writings of the Fathers there is a twofold kind of doctrine, profane and sacred. With regard to the former, their authority is worth as much as the reasons which they bring forward. The question concerns sacred doctrine. Concerning this it is asked what the authority of the Fathers is. A twofold excess: the Innovators make little of the authority of the Fathers; but to the Jansenists the authority even of one Father seemed to be preferred to the authority of the Church. True doctrine. Pages [276](/works/de-religione-et-ecclesia/18-article-6-whether-the-writings-of-the-holy-fathers-are-means/#p342)-28 6.

Section II. The Proposed Question Is Solved.

Proposition XVI. 1. The morally unanimous consensus of the Fathers in matters of faith and morals exhibits an irrefragable testimony of divine tradition. Nor is it necessary that that consensus always be demonstrated directly and immediately; rather it is excellently inferred: 2. from the established suffrage of all Western Fathers; 3. from the testimony of several men distinguished in doctrine and reputation, who flourished in diverse ages, while the rest do not protest; 4. indeed even from the testimony of a few,

if it is brought forward in such circumstances that it is evident that it reports the common faith of the Church. Pages [286](/works/de-religione-et-ecclesia/18-article-6-whether-the-writings-of-the-holy-fathers-are-means /#p353)-295.

Part 1: pages [286](/works/de-religione-et-ecclesia/18-article-6-whether-the-writings-of-the-holy-fathers-are -means/#p353)-290; Part 2: pages [290](/works/de-religione-et-ecclesia/18-article-6-whether-the-writings-of -the-holy-fathers-are-means/#p355)-292; Part 3: pages [292](/works/de-religione-et-ecclesia/18-article-6-wh ether-the-writings-of-the-holy-fathers-are-means/#p359)-293; Part 4: pages [294](/works/de-religione-et-ecc lesia/18-article-6-whether-the-writings-of-the-holy-fathers-are-means/#p360)-295.

Article Seventh - Whether the Consensus of Theologians and the Sense of the Faithful Exhibit a Certain Testimony of Divine Tradition.

Section I. The State of the Question Is Set Forth.

The institution of the Schools was had in the twelfth century. Its office is to propose and teach, by a new and more exact method, the doctrine received from the Fathers. The Scholastics accomplished this. The defects of certain men ought not to be transferred to the School itself. The functions of Scholastic Theology from Cano. How great its authority is. The question is not about merely human doctrine, but about sacred doctrine; nor is the question what one or another thinks while the rest contradict. The question concerns the authority of Theologians when by unanimous consensus they teach something as a certain sentence, either of faith or theologically certain. With regard to the common sense and consensus of the faithful, two things are noted: that it is manifested both by explicit theoretical sentences and implicitly by usages, rites, prayers, etc. With regard to certain heads of doctrine, the sentence only of the learned and wise is to be sought; the common people profess these implicitly, insofar as in these matters they profess to believe and think what the Church believes and thinks. Pages [296](/works/de-religione-et-ecclesia/19-article-7-whether-the-consensus-of-theol ogians-and-the-sense/#p364)-299.

Section II. The Proposed Question Is Solved.

Proposition XVII. 1. The concordant doctrine of Theologians concerning a matter pertaining to faith or morals is a legitimate and certain criterion of divine tradition. 2. And the same thing must be attributed to the Catholic sense and consensus of the whole Christian people, whether it is declared by explicit profession or is

contained implicitly in facts and practice. Pages [300](/works/de-religione-et-ecclesia/19-article-7-whether-the-consensus-of-theologians-and-the-sense/#p370)-305.

Part 1: pages [300](/works/de-religione-et-ecclesia/19-article-7-whether-the-consensus-of-theologians-and-the-sense/#p370)-303; Part 2: pages [303](/works/de-religione-et-ecclesia/19-article-7-whether-the-consensus-of-theologians-and-the-sense/#p373)-305.

Scholion. What is to be thought about certain opinions which are said once to have been commonly received and afterward either were found false, or at least were called back into doubt. It is proved that those opinions were never truly common. Pages [305](/works/de-religione-et-ecclesia/19-article-7-whether-the-consensus-of-theologians-and-the-sense/#p375)-308.

Article Eighth - What the Use of Scripture and Tradition Is in Theology.

What properly comes under the name of supernatural theology. What the functions of theology are. Theology has sources from which it draws its arguments; these are called theological places. These are properly contained in divine revelation. Nevertheless the help of human sciences is not rejected. An argument rightly taken even from one place of Scripture is irrefragable. The place must be from canonical Scriptures,

from the authentic edition. The sense must be retained which either the Church or the unanimous interpretation of the Fathers has declared. The sense of Scripture is one thing literal, another spiritual. The literal sense is either proper or figurative. The spiritual or mystical sense is one thing allegorical, another tropological, another anagogical; to these can be added the accommodative sense. From the literal sense an argument can always be taken as certain; from the mystical sometimes; from the accommodative never. The words of Scripture must be taken in the proper sense unless something absurd would follow from it. Rules concerning the use of tradition are handed down. Tradition has a twofold authority, human and divine; hence there is diverse force for proving. The monuments of tradition are chiefly definitions of the Church, then writings of the Fathers. Certain things are added concerning the authority of Theologians and concerning the common sense of the faithful. Pages [308](/works/de-religione-et-ecclesia/20-article-8-what-the-use-of-scripture-and-tradition-is-in-theo/#p377)-316.

Series of Roman Pontiffs. Pages [317](/works/de-religione-et-ecclesia/20-article-8-what-the-use-of-scripture-and-tradition-is-in-theo/#p387)-323.

Ecumenical Councils. Page [324](/works/de-religione-et-ecclesia/20-article-8-what-the-use-of-scripture-and-tradition-is-in-theo/#p387).

List of Ecclesiastical Writers. Pages [325](/works/de-religione-et-ecclesia/20-article-8-what-the-use-of-scripture-and-tradition-is-in-theo/#p387)-329.

Disputation III

On the Institution and Constitution of the Church

We have thus far considered the Christian religion as it were in the abstract. Now the question is set in the concrete: what is the Christian religion? Importance of the question. Division and method of treatment. Pages [331](/works/de-religione-et-ecclesia/20-article-8-what-the-use-of-scripture-and-tradition-is-in-theo/#p391)-332.

Article First - Preliminary Notions Are Handed Down.

By force of the name, Church is an assembly of those called; it is transferred to mean the place in which assemblies are held. In the broadest sense it comprises all the faithful: wayfarers, those being purified, those comprehending, and even Angels. In a less broad sense it means all wayfarers from the beginning to the end of the world. According to this signification a threefold state of the Church can be distinguished: of the law

of nature, of the written law, and of the law of grace. In the first state it had no determined form; in the second, the form of the Church was determined for a time with regard to the Hebrew people; in the third, the Church received a new and perfect form. In the strict sense, the Church comprises wayfarers in the New Testament; we retain this sense. The teaching Church is the assembly of Pastors. The learning Church, as distinguished from those placed over it, is the faithful people. The assembly coalescing from both is called simply the Church. Taken thus, one Church is particular, another universal. The latter is treated here. Why the true

real definition of the Catholic Church is here handed down. Certain things are noted concerning definitions handed down by doctors before and after the Council of Trent. The true definition is declared, but not yet asserted or defended. Chiefly the definitions of heretics are indicated. Pages [332](/works/de-religione-et-ecclesia/21-article-1-preliminary-notions-are-handed-down/#p394)-339.

Article Second - General Concept Concerning the Constitution of the Church.

In the Church a twofold element is contained: something of itself invisible, but also something visible. The reason of each. The former is customarily called the soul, the latter the body of the Church. Its foundation in the Scriptures. In the Church there is something like a continuation of the Incarnation; in what sense. This is confirmed from the Scriptures and Fathers. What constitutes the soul, what the body of the Church, is developed more fully. From what has been said it is gathered: a) that the Church of the promises is the visible Church; reason. b) That the Church is an essentially supernatural society. c) That it is deservedly called the dwelling-place of God, the spouse of the Holy Spirit; indeed that the Holy Spirit is the heart of the Church. d) That there is a perpetual union between Christ, the head of the Church, and the Church, the body of Christ. e) That graces gratuitously given are not given to all members of the Church, and therefore that the Church itself is an unequal society. f) That the gifts themselves which are ordered to all are not possessed by all in the same measure, nor always, nor with the same perfection, and therefore that not all are members of the Church in the same manner. Pages [340](/works/de-religione-et-ecclesia/22-article-2-general-survey-concerning-the-constitution-of-the-/#p407)-350.

Article Third - Whether Christ Is the Immediate Author of the Church and Gave It the Form of a True Society.

Section I. The State of the Question Is Set Forth.

A twofold truth to be defended here. The mythical Rationalists deny that the Church was instituted by Christ; they teach that it began in the second century. In what way. From diverse principles the Socinians arrived at the same conclusion. Three things must be vindicated. 1. Christ himself immediately instituted the Church. What conditions are required that Christ may be said to be and may be the founder of the Church, and indeed immediate founder. The Church was conceived before the death of Christ, born in the death of Christ, promulgated on the day of Pentecost. 2. Christ instituted the Church in the form of a true society. Arguments to be brought forward. The definition of society is handed down and declared. 3. This society is distinct from the synagogue. The Church of Christ in some way existed from the very beginning of the world; but as to generic reason it began from Adam, not from Abel, as some would wish. Their reasons are briefly solved. The primitive Church is the more express the nearer the coming of Christ is. Nevertheless the Church founded by Christ differs from the synagogue in state and form, namely as to faith, efficacy of sanctifying, government, privileges, and prerogatives. Pages [350](/works/de-religione-et-ecclesia/23-article-3-whether-christ-is-the-immediate-author-of-the-chur/#p423)-358.

Section II. The Proposed Question Is Solved.

Proposition XVIII. Although in some true sense the Christian Church existed from the beginning of the world, nevertheless 1. having regard to its present state and form, it must be said to have had Christ as its

immediate Author. 2. But since Christ, who is God, founded and instituted it in the form of a true society, it openly follows that the Church, considered in its immediate origin, is a divine society. Pages [358](/works/de-religione-et-ecclesia/23-article-3-whether-christ-is-the-immediate-author-of-the-chur/#p439)-364.

Part 1: pages [358](/works/de-religione-et-ecclesia/23-article-3-whether-christ-is-the-immediate-author-of-the-chur/#p439)-360; Part 2: pages [360](/works/de-religione-et-ecclesia/23-article-3-whether-christ-is-the-immediate-author-of-the-chur/#p440)-364.

Scholion. The principal objections are satisfied. Pages [364](/works/de-religione-et-ecclesia/23-article-3-whether-christ-is-the-immediate-author-of-the-chur/#p444)-367.

Article Fourth - Whether from Christ's Institution the Church Is Essentially Visible.

Section I. The State of the Question Is Set Forth.

The Innovators have attacked and do attack the visibility of the Church in diverse ways, in order to elude the mark of novelty in their sects. These can be reduced to several classes: some deny it altogether; others say that the Church is visible from divine ordination, but not essentially and indefectibly; others fabricate a double Church, visible and invisible, and call only this latter the Church of the promises; others profess visibility in words but deny it in fact. True doctrine: the Church is visible not only materially, which is evident, but also formally, as the true Church of Christ. In it can be distinguished soul, body, and properties. As to the body, it is visible through itself; as to the soul, through another; as to the properties, partly through themselves and partly through another. Declaration. Moreover the Church is essentially visible, and indeed as a truly divine fact. Nevertheless we believe that the Church exists; but the motive on account of which it is believed is different from that by which the Church is seen. How some Theologians solved this question. Pages [367](/works/de-religione-et-ecclesia/24-article-4-whether-from-christ-s-institution-the-church-is-es/#p446)-374.

Section II. The Proposed Question Is Solved.

Proposition XIX. The Christian Church is so formally visible, or visible as the true Church, as the Church which they call of the divine promises, that, from Christ's institution, visibility pertains to its very essence. Therefore the Church, considered in its nature, must be called not merely a divine or human society, but indivisibly a divine-human society. Pages [374](/works/de-religione-et-ecclesia/24-article-4-whether-from-christ-s-institution-the-church-is-es/#p462)-380.

Scholion. Difficulties are satisfied. Pages [380](/works/de-religione-et-ecclesia/24-article-4-whether-from-christ-s-institution-the-church-is-es/#p468)-383.

Article Fifth - What End Christ Set Before Himself in the Institution of the Church.

Section I. The State of the Question Is Declared.

The essence of a society must be determined from its end. The end of the Church is to make perpetual Christ's mission on earth. Christ's mission: the glory of God to be procured through the salvation of men. This is proved from the Scriptures. Hence the Church is a spiritual and supernatural society; nevertheless this does not prevent it from having a right to means that are also material, since it is composed of men. It is a religious Society; indeed it is the Christian religion itself. Hence, as there is no Church of Christ not imbued with Christianity, so there is no true Christianity outside the Church of Christ. Pages [384](/works/de-religione-et-ecclesia/25-article-5-what-end-christ-set-before-himself-in-the-institut/#p472)-387.

Section II. The Proposed Question Is Solved.

Proposition XX. The end which Christ set before himself in instituting the Church was this: that in the Church and through the Church he might make perpetual his visible mission on earth; and therefore that

through it, by procuring the eternal salvation of men, he might promote the glory of God. Therefore the Church, considered especially in its end, is a religious, spiritual, and supernatural society; namely it is the Christian religion itself in the concrete, plainly diverse from every other society. Pages [387](/works/de-religione-et-ecclesia/25-article-5-what-end-christ-set-before-himself-in-the-institut/#p482)-391.

Article Sixth - Whether the Church of Christ Is a Legal Society and Ethically Necessary.

Section I. The State of the Question Is Set Forth.

A twofold question. 1. Whether the Church is a legal society. A legal society is called one which exists according to law. Law is threefold: natural, positive-divine, and positive-human. No Christian denies that the Church was instituted by positive-divine right; therefore it is legal in relation to divine right. Whether it also has force from natural right. Absolute natural right must be distinguished from hypothetical natural right. The Church is of positive institution and beyond every exigency of natural right; therefore from absolute right there is no positive determination and prescription, at least none that touches ecclesiastical society. One must speak otherwise if hypothetical natural right is considered. Here legality properly concerns positive-human right. The question is whether the Church has the right of establishing and propagating itself in some kingdom without the rights of government being violated. 2. Whether the Church is ethically necessary. Necessity, moreover, is twofold: of means and of precept; what each is. To belong to the soul of the Church is necessary by necessity of means; to belong in fact to the body is necessary by necessity of precept. Hence inability and invincible ignorance excuse from entering it. Hence it is clear how that saying must be understood: "Outside the Church there is no salvation." Pages [391](/works/de-religione-et-ecclesia/26-article-6-whether-the-church-of-christ-is-a-legal-society-an/#p487)-397.

Section II. The Proposed Question Is Solved.

Proposition XXI. 1. Just as the Church, having regard either to the constitution of the Jewish people or to the state of Gentile societies, was legitimately instituted, so 2. it now has the right of propagating itself among all nations; 3. indeed, from Christ's institution, the necessity of adhering to it so lies upon all that for those knowingly dwelling outside it there is no hope of salvation. Therefore the Church is a society both legal and also ethically necessary. Pages [397](/works/de-religione-et-ecclesia/26-article-6-whether-the-church-of-christ-is-a-legal-society-an/#p498)-406.

Part 1: pages [397](/works/de-religione-et-ecclesia/26-article-6-whether-the-church-of-christ-is-a-legal-society-an/#p498)-399; Part 2: pages [399](/works/de-religione-et-ecclesia/26-article-6-whether-the-church-of-christ-is-a-legal-society-an/#p501)-401; Part 3: pages [401](/works/de-religione-et-ecclesia/26-article-6-whether-the-church-of-christ-is-a-legal-society-an/#p504)-406.

Article Seventh - Whether from Christ's Institution the Church Is an Unequal Society.

Section I. The State of the Question Is Set Forth.

An unequal society is one in which both the exercise of rights and the rights themselves are diverse among diverse persons. 1. The true doctrine is established. From the documents of the Church which are brought forward, it is clear: a) that the body of the Church is distinguished into clerics and laymen; b) that in the clerical order there is a true hierarchy of order. The concept is unfolded; c) that both the distinction between clerics and laymen and the hierarchy are of divine right. Hence the democratic form is removed from the Church. Therefore the people have no right of choosing pastors. It is one thing to choose pastors, another to petition; one thing to choose, another to render testimony concerning them. The election of Bishops belongs of itself to the Roman Pontiff; this right can rightly be transferred by him to others. Hierarchy is defined and declared. 2. Errors. a) Marsilius of Padua, in the book Defender of Peace, taught that the supreme power of the Church resides in the assembly of the faithful, from which it was transmitted to secular Princes, and that it is destitute of coercive force. b) The Innovators deny every distinction between clerics and laymen; they

teach that the fullness of power is among the people; hence the necessity of popular suffrage in the election of ministers. c) The error of Edmund Richer: the keys were delivered to the whole Church; power is exercised ministerially through one. Van Espen, Febronius, and more or less the Jansenists adopted this system. Pages [407](/works/de-religione-et-ecclesia/27-article-7-whether-from-christ-s-institution-the-church-is-an/#p510)-413.

Section II. The Proposed Question Is Solved.

Proposition XXII. 1. From Christ's institution an essential distinction flourishes between Clerics and Laymen; 2. and in the clerical order a hierarchy properly so called, or sacred principate, was instituted, to which Christ attributed not only the faculty of directing, but the power of ruling. Therefore the Church by divine right is an unequal society, and entirely alien from a democratic form of government. Pages [414](/works/de-religione-et-ecclesia/27-article-7-whether-from-christ-s-institution-the-church-is-an/#p523)-423.

Part 1: pages [414](/works/de-religione-et-ecclesia/27-article-7-whether-from-christ-s-institution-the-church-is-an/#p523)-416; Part 2: pages [416](/works/de-religione-et-ecclesia/27-article-7-whether-from-christ-s-institution-the-church-is-an/#p525)-423.

At the end of the thesis objections are met.

Article Eighth - What Form of Government Christ Instituted in the Church.

Section I. The State of the Question Is Set Forth.

The simple forms of government are three: Aristocracy, Oligarchy, Democracy.

From these there are four mixed forms. From what has been said, the government of the Church is not democratic. It is established among Catholics that a true monarchy was instituted by Christ in the Church. This monarchy, however, is new and singular, because the Supreme Pontiff is the Vicar of Christ, and the other Bishops are truly princes. But the monarchy of the Church, according to many, is altogether simple; the Gallicans say it is tempered by aristocracy; others also by democracy. Bellarmine. The difference between Theologians of the first opinion and Bellarmine is not of the thing, but of the name; this is clear from the way in which each side explains its opinion. Monarchy is defined by Aristotle: "supreme command in one, without partnership of a superior or equal, whether people or another prince." Hence three things are required: 1. unity of command in the head; 2. universality of subjection in the members; 3. indivision of supreme power residing in one head. Hence diverse opinions are easily composed. Zallinger, Devoti. Pages [424](/works/de-religione-et-ecclesia/28-article-8-what-form-of-government-christ-instituted-in-the-c/#p534)-430.

Section II. The Proposed Question Is Solved.

Proposition XXIII. Although the form of government in the Church is new and singular in more than one respect, nevertheless, if monarchical government is reduced to that concept which philosophers commonly handed down, namely that it is "supreme command in one, without partnership of a superior or equal, whether people or another prince," no one can doubt that in the Church of Christ, from the institution of its Author, a true and simple monarchy flourishes. Pages [430](/works/de-religione-et-ecclesia/28-article-8-what-form-of-government-christ-instituted-in-the-c/#p545)-437.

Article Ninth - Whether from Christ's Institution the Church Is a Perfect Society.

Section I. The State of the Question Is Set Forth.

Those subject the Church to civil society: 1. who assert that right in sacred matters is the patrimony of the people; 2. the Regalists, who think of the Church as almost a certain college existing within civil Society. Pius IX assigned the source, cause, and consequences of these errors in several allocutions. A perfect society

is one which is complete in itself, and therefore has sufficient means for obtaining its end. It does not necessarily have those means really, but virtually, insofar as it can by right demand them from another society. Pages [437](/works/de-religione-et-ecclesia/29-article-9-whether-from-christ-s-institution-the-church-is-a-/#p552)-440.

Section II. The Proposed Question Is Solved.

Proposition XXIV. The Church founded by Christ, having regard both to the end proposed to it and to the positive will of its divine institutor, must be judged to obtain the form of a perfect society. Therefore, powerful in its own and constant rights, it vindicates for itself that liberty by which, in fulfilling its office, it is subject to no civil power. Pages [440](/works/de-religione-et-ecclesia/29-article-9-whether-from-christ-s-institution-the-church-is-a-/#p557)-446.

Objections are satisfied after the proof of the thesis.

Article Tenth - What the Relation of the Church Is to the Remaining Societies.

Section I. The State of the Question Is Set Forth.

A wonderful analogy between errors concerning Christ the Redeemer and errors concerning the Church. Every Society is ecclesiastical or civil.

Of the latter there are three species. 1. Of infidels: what the Church can do with regard to them, and what it cannot. 2. Of heretics: these are subjects of the Church, although they are not members; the Church of itself could punish them; when it ought to use this right is left to the judgment of the Church itself. 3. Of Catholics: what the relation of this society is to the Church. It is not a relation of equality, nor of superiority; this is proved. Therefore it is a relation of inferiority, not indeed directly, but indirectly. What indirect subordination requires: both that civil society do nothing to the harm of the Church, and that it furnish the helps necessary to the Church for its proper end. Declaration. The constitution Unam Sanctam is weighed; it is proved to be dogmatic. In it Boniface VIII expressly teaches the subjection of civil power to the spiritual power of the Church. Therefore that doctrine is not a mere opinion; at least it certainly belongs to the deposit of Catholic doctrine. Pages [446](/works/de-religione-et-ecclesia/30-article-10-what-the-relation-of-the-church-is-to-the-remaini/#p565)-454.

Section II. The Proposed Question Is Solved.

Proposition XXV. If the question concerns the relation between the Church and the civil society of Catholics, this relation 1. consists neither in separation, by which civil society would hold itself indifferently in those things which pertain to religion, 2. nor in such subjection that, in temporal matters and under the aspect of the temporal end, civil society is subject to the Church, 3. but in that subjection by which, in matters even temporal, when the reason or necessity of the spiritual end concurs, civil society ought to yield to the Church. Therefore the Church is deservedly said to be superior to civil society. Pages [455](/works/de-religione-et-ecclesia/30-article-10-what-the-relation-of-the-church-is-to-the-remaini/#p578)-464.

Part 1: pages [455](/works/de-religione-et-ecclesia/30-article-10-what-the-relation-of-the-church-is-to-the-remaini/#p578)-458; Part 2: page [458](/works/de-religione-et-ecclesia/30-article-10-what-the-relation-of-the-church-is-to-the-remaini/#p581); Part 3: pages [459](/works/de-religione-et-ecclesia/30-article-10-what-the-relation-of-the-church-is-to-the-remaini/#p583)-464.

Difficulties are answered toward the end of the thesis.

Article Eleventh - Who Are the Members of the Church.

Section I. The State of the Question Is Set Forth.

Among those who are of the Church, not all pertain to it with the same perfection. Here the question is not about living and perfect members, but about those who are members of the body of the Church. A member of the Church is one who has by no means broken the external bonds. These bonds are faith received through baptism, communion of the sacraments, and subjection to legitimate authority. Hence: 1. Catechumens pertain perfectly or imperfectly to the soul, but by no means to the body of the Church. This is drawn from Councils and Fathers. The reason is that the bonds, especially baptism, are lacking. 2. Public heretics are not members of the Church. The reason is that subjection to authority and profession of the same faith are lacking; nor is it an obstacle that they are punished by the Church, or that they retain the character of the Sacraments, or that they have true sacraments. Reason. 3. Concerning hidden heretics there are various opinions: the negative opinion of Suarez, the affirmative of Bellarmine.

We assent to the latter opinion, which is common among the Fathers, more common among Theologians, conformable to the established principles, and sometimes employed by the Church itself. What about the difficulty which seems to arise from the bull Ineffabilis Deus? 4. That schismatics are not members of the Church is clear from the doctrine of the Fathers and is demonstrated by reason. 5. Those excommunicated by major excommunication are some tolerated, others to be avoided. That the former are members of the Church is an almost common opinion. That the latter are members Suarez affirms with others; Bellarmine denies. His opinion, to which we adhere, is proved from the very practice of the Church, from the Scriptures, and from the Fathers. What is to be proved in the thesis. Pages [465](/works/de-religione-et-ecclesia/31-article-11-which-persons-are-members-of-the-church/#p593)-475.

Section II. The Catholic Doctrine Concerning the Members of the Church Is Established.

Proposition XXVI. Once the genuine nature of the Church of Christ has been grasped, it ought to be evident to all that it coalesces as members 1. neither from all and only the predestined, 2. nor from the perfect alone, 3. nor from the just alone. For with the idea of a visible society, which all are bound to enter lest they perish, all those things can in no way be composed. Pages [476](/works/de-religione-et-ecclesia/31-article-11-which-persons-are-members-of-the-church/#p612)-482.

Part 1: pages [476](/works/de-religione-et-ecclesia/31-article-11-which-persons-are-members-of-the-church/#p612)-477;
Part 2: pages [477](/works/de-religione-et-ecclesia/31-article-11-which-persons-are-members-of-the-church/#p615)-478;
Part 3: pages [478](/works/de-religione-et-ecclesia/31-article-11-which-persons-are-members-of-the-church/#p617)-482.

Scholion. Difficulties are met. Pages [482](/works/de-religione-et-ecclesia/31-article-11-which-persons-are-members-of-the-church/#p621)-485.

Disputation IV

On the Properties and Endowments of the Church

The properties of the Church are four from the Constantinopolitan Symbol: Unity, Sanctity, Catholicity, Apostolicity. They can be considered in the abstract, as properties; in the concrete, as notes. The endowments are three: Indefectibility, Authority, Infallibility. Pages [487](/works/de-religione-et-ecclesia/31-article-11-which-persons-are-members-of-the-church/#p627)-488.

Article First - Whether the Church of Christ Ought to Be One.

Section I. The State of the Question Is Set Forth.

The unity of the Church is manifold. Some unity is admitted by all. Which unity must be defended. The concept of unity is unfolded. One unity of the Church is successive, to be treated later; another is

simultaneous: the unique Church, to be discussed here. Unity of faith and government; in these unity of communion and rite is included. Internal or external; the latter is chiefly treated. 1. Catholic doctrine. a) Unity of faith is essential in this, that all believe all and the same articles which the Church proposes to the faithful as to be believed; not all necessarily explicitly. Declaration. b) Unity of government is not of likeness, namely the same form of government, but of identity, by which all are subjected to the same supreme government. It is essential. Therefore heresy and schism separate from unity. What heresy is, what schism is. 2. Errors. a) Unity of faith is placed 1. either as none or in faith in Christ alone;

2. in admitting the truths contained in Scripture; 3. in consensus concerning fundamental articles: Jurieu. b) Universal unity of government is none; particular Churches are of their own right; arbitrary confederation. c) For the Oxford men: 1. essential unity of faith must be established by the assembled Church, which consists of the Roman-Catholic, Greek, and Anglican; 2. unity of government is at most from precept, but not essential to the Church. Pages [488](/works/de-religione-et-ecclesia/32-article-1-whether-the-church-of-christ-ought-to-be-one/#p629)-496.

Section II. The Unity of the Church in Faith Is Established.

Proposition XXVII. 1. The true Church of Christ is unique; 2. and first it vindicates to itself that unity of faith by which the faithful, spread through the world, believe all and the same articles which the Church proposes to them as to be believed. Therefore any heresy separates from unity; 3. nor in any way can the distinction introduced by the Innovators between fundamental articles be admitted, which, instead of establishing the unity of the Church, rather overturns it. Pages [496](/works/de-religione-et-ecclesia/32-article-1-whether-the-church-of-christ-ought-to-be-one/#p647)-507.

Part 1: pages [496](/works/de-religione-et-ecclesia/32-article-1-whether-the-church-of-christ-ought-to-be-one/#p647)-497; Part 2: pages [497](/works/de-religione-et-ecclesia/32-article-1-whether-the-church-of-christ-ought-to-be-one/#p650)-503; Part 3: pages [503](/works/de-religione-et-ecclesia/32-article-1-whether-the-church-of-christ-ought-to-be-one/#p655)-507.

Section III. Unity of Government Is Established in the Church.

Proposition XXVIII. 1. The Church is one also by unity of government, by force of which all the faithful who are in the world are subjected to one supreme authority. Therefore any schism, as the very name indicates, separates from true unity; 2. nor for any reason whatever is it ever lawful to introduce it or remain in it. Pages [508](/works/de-religione-et-ecclesia/32-article-1-whether-the-church-of-christ-ought-to-be-one/#p658)-517.

Part 1: pages [508](/works/de-religione-et-ecclesia/32-article-1-whether-the-church-of-christ-ought-to-be-one/#p658)-513; Part 2: pages [513](/works/de-religione-et-ecclesia/32-article-1-whether-the-church-of-christ-ought-to-be-one/#p663)-517.

Section IV. Certain Difficulties Are Satisfied.

A certain general principle. Heretical and schismatical separations do not touch the matter. St. Victor and the Asian Churches; St. Cyprian and St. Stephen; the Councils of Nicaea and Florence, whether rejected by the Gallicans; the Western Schism. Pages [517](/works/de-religione-et-ecclesia/32-article-1-whether-the-church-of-christ-ought-to-be-one/#p666)-525.

Article Second - Whether the Church of Christ Ought to Be Holy.

Section I. The State of the Question Is Set Forth.

The sanctity of the Church is manifold. In what sense it is admitted by the Innovators; in what sense it is denied. Sanctity generally is cleanness from sin. It is acquired through infusion of sanctifying grace. A holy society is one whose end is to procure sanctifying grace, and which has within it the means for procuring it,

and which has holy members. The sanctity of the Church can be considered actively: the continuous action and efficacy of the Church. This should rather be called sanctification. It can be considered passively: internal grace flourishing in the members. Whether necessarily in all. Otherwise. The principal reason: the reluctance of the members. Nevertheless it is called holy and is holy, by denomination from the more powerful part and from that which exists of itself in holy members. Three grades of sanctity; in each, diverse grades also. Deeper investigation of sanctity. Moehler. Its manifestation also through heavenly charisms. The errors of Protestants are indicated. Pages [526](/works/de-religione-et-ecclesia/33-article-2-whether-the-church-of-christ-ought-to-be-holy/#p675)-532.

Section II. The Proposed Question Is Solved.

Proposition XXIX. To the Church of Christ, which in sacred letters is proclaimed holy in a manifold way, sanctity must chiefly be attributed, both 1. active sanctity, by which it continually labors for the sanctification of men by most efficacious means, and 2. passive sanctity, by which holy members are never lacking in its bosom. 3. Moreover each is so excellent that not only by profession of faith and exercise of good works, but also by their wonderful fecundity, miracles, and the other heavenly charisms, it renders itself conspicuous to all as a body living by supernatural life. Pages [532](/works/de-religione-et-ecclesia/33-article-2-whether-the-church-of-christ-ought-to-be-holy/#p682)-539.

Part 1: pages [532](/works/de-religione-et-ecclesia/33-article-2-whether-the-church-of-christ-ought-to-be-holy/#p682)-533; Part 2: pages [533](/works/de-religione-et-ecclesia/33-article-2-whether-the-church-of-christ-ought-to-be-holy/#p686)-536; Part 3: pages [536](/works/de-religione-et-ecclesia/33-article-2-whether-the-church-of-christ-ought-to-be-holy/#p688)-539.

Article Third - Whether the True Church of Christ Ought to Be Catholic.

Section I. The State of the Question Is Set Forth.

Catholicity is an ancient and known name. St. Ignatius Martyr; St. Polycarp. Catholicity by reason of place, persons, doctrine, and time. Here the question concerns the first two. They are generally described. One catholicity is material, another formal; the latter is treated. It is "wide diffusion through the world with a great and conspicuous multitude of members, while identity of faith, communion, and government is preserved." Another is of right; concerning this there is no controversy. Another is of fact: actual wide diffusion. This is physical or moral; each is simultaneous or successive. Which must be vindicated for the Church. Not physical-simultaneous. Declaration. Moral catholicity proper to the Church. Whether successive or simultaneous. Successive, if the beginning of the Church is considered; simultaneous, if the continuation of the life of the Church is considered. The Church certainly had this at least in the fifth century. It has been constant to our times, indeed increased. Absolute moral catholicity of fact certainly belongs to the Church. Whether also relative. It must be affirmed with regard to heretical sects taken distributively; with regard to the same taken collectively it is not necessary, although in fact it exists. It must be denied with regard to sects of infidels. Suarez. Pages [540](/works/de-religione-et-ecclesia/34-article-3-whether-the-true-church-of-christ-ought-to-be-cath/#p692)-546.

Section II. The Proposed Question Is Solved.

Proposition XXX. The Church, having received from its Divine Author the mission and power of propagating itself everywhere, 1. also had to be actually diffused, and has been widely diffused through the whole world, not indeed by physical universality, but by moral universality, 2. which nevertheless is not only successive, but also simultaneous. Therefore the Church is a society Catholic by right and by fact. Pages [547](/works/de-religione-et-ecclesia/34-article-3-whether-the-true-church-of-christ-ought-to-be-cath/#p705)-553.

Part 1: pages [547](/works/de-religione-et-ecclesia/34-article-3-whether-the-true-church-of-christ-ought-to-be-cath/#p705)-551; Part 2: pages [551](/works/de-religione-et-ecclesia/34-article-3-whether-the-true-church-of-christ-ought-to-be-cath/#p708)-553.

Scholion. Some difficulties have already been solved; others are to be solved elsewhere. The Church is sometimes a little flock. The Church was not Catholic at some time, especially in the time of the Arian heresy. Nor will it always be Catholic. Answer is made. Pages [553](/works/de-religione-et-ecclesia/34-article-3-whether-the-true-church-of-christ-ought-to-be-cath/#p710)-556.

Article Fourth - Whether the True Church of Christ Ought to Be Apostolic.

Section I. The State of the Question Is Set Forth.

Some apostolicity is admitted by all. Which must be defended. Under a general acceptance, an apostolic Church is one that preserves identity with the Church of the Apostles. In the primitive Church three kinds of institutions must be distinguished: divine, apostolic-divine, and simply apostolic. Identity with regard to the first two is altogether necessary for apostolicity. Thus understood, apostolicity is not something distinct from the constitutives and properties of the Church taken together. Properly, the Church is called apostolic 1. in origin, insofar as founded by the Apostles; 2. in doctrine, insofar as it retains the faith preached by the Apostles; 3. in succession or mission, insofar as it comprises within its bosom those who in the hierarchical order legitimately descend from the Apostles. Once this third is established, the first two are rightly inferred. Therefore this must be declared: "the public, legitimate, never interrupted substitution of persons into the place of the Apostles for ruling and feeding the Church." The definition is set forth. Therefore it contains consecration and mission, to which a twofold power corresponds. Consecration is supposed if mission is certain. Mission itself is supposed or supplied through adherence to the center of unity. The question is reduced to this adherence. It is confirmed by the authority of Tertullian. The errors of the innovators are indicated. The error proper to this place is extraordinary mission. Pages [556](/works/de-religione-et-ecclesia/35-article-4-whether-the-true-church-of-christ-ought-to-be-apos/#p715)-563.

Section II. The Proposed Question Is Solved.

Proposition XXXI. 1. The Church of Christ, founded upon the Apostles, must always persevere Apostolic, both in origin and doctrine, and in public and perpetual succession, by which it is always joined with the same Apostles through a never-interrupted series of pastors proceeding from the Apostles. 2. Nor can the hypothesis of extraordinary mission introduced by the Innovators be admitted in any way, according to Christ's institution and promises. 3. But just as Apostolic succession alone sufficiently shows apostolicity of origin and doctrine, 4. so the legitimate succession of the center of unity alone manifests the true Apostolic Church. Pages [563](/works/de-religione-et-ecclesia/35-article-4-whether-the-true-church-of-christ-ought-to-be-apos/#p729)-571.

Part 1: pages [563](/works/de-religione-et-ecclesia/35-article-4-whether-the-true-church-of-christ-ought-to-be-apos/#p729)-565; Parts 2 and 3: pages [565](/works/de-religione-et-ecclesia/35-article-4-whether-the-true-church-of-christ-ought-to-be-apos/#p733)-567; Part 4: pages [567](/works/de-religione-et-ecclesia/35-article-4-whether-the-true-church-of-christ-ought-to-be-apos/#p736)-571.

Article Fifth - Whether the True Church of Christ Is Indefectible.

Section I. The State of the Question Is Set Forth.

In what the indefectibility of the Church agrees with perpetuity, and in what it differs from it. Taken adequately, it regards both the essential constitutives, the essential properties, and the remaining endowments, and all times of the existence of the Church until the end of the world. Hence it differs from apostolicity taken in its general acceptance. It is "the perpetual permanence of the Church in the same essence and state, namely properties and endowments, which Christ conferred upon it." It is proper to the

universal Church. Any particular Church, except the center of unity, can defect; nor nevertheless does catholicity cease, for the defection of some is compensated by the aggregation of others. All the Innovators err against the true indefectibility of the Church, yet in diverse degree: some deny it absolutely; others say it is by no means essential; others restrict it to visibility; others restrict it to the invisible Church, etc. Certain things are noted concerning the arguments to be brought forward. Pages [572](/works/de-religione-et-ecclesia/36-article-5-whether-the-true-church-of-christ-is-indefectible/#p740)-575.

Section II. The Proposed Question Is Solved.

Proposition XXXII. Christ instituted the Church in such a way that it would be the final economy of salvation, destined to endure ceaselessly and perpetually not only as to essentials, but also as to state, as they say. Therefore it enjoys true indefectibility, by force of which it perseveres, until the end of the world, in the internal and external constitution, in the same properties and endowments, with which it began to exist. Pages [576](/works/de-religione-et-ecclesia/36-article-5-whether-the-true-church-of-christ-is-indefectible/#p747)-580.

Scholion. Why certain difficulties are to be abstained from here. Several difficulties which are sought from the Synagogue are first set forth and then solved here. Pages [581](/works/de-religione-et-ecclesia/36-article-5-whether-the-true-church-of-christ-is-indefectible/#p753)-583.

Article Sixth - Whether and What Sort of Authority Must Be Attributed to the Church of Christ.

Section I. The State of the Question Is Set Forth.

Spiritual power is adequately divided into power of order and power of jurisdiction. Why we do not admit the division of some into power of ministry, magisterium, and command. St. Thomas, Tarquini. The power of jurisdiction has a twofold office, namely of teaching and of ruling. The latter is to be treated. The power of jurisdiction is divided into legislative, judicial, and coercive. Heterodox persons either deny legislative power altogether, or say that it is received from civil power. Consequently the same deny judicial power. Some deny coercive power to the Church; others restrict it to spiritual penalties; others indeed extend it to temporal penalties, but say that it must necessarily be exercised through civil magistrates. The true doctrine is set forth in the words of Suarez. Whether the coercive power of the Church extends even to the right of the sword. Answer is made from Tarquini. Pages [583](/works/de-religione-et-ecclesia/37-article-6-whether-and-what-sort-of-authority-is-to-be-attrib/#p755)-588.

Section II. The Proposed Question Is Solved.

Proposition XXXIII. 1. To the Church, as being, from Christ's institution, a perfect society, there belongs by native right, and not by the concession of princes, a supreme and independent legislative as well as judicial power. 2. Moreover it can so sanction its laws that it restrains their violators by penalties not only spiritual, but also temporal. Pages [589](/works/de-religione-et-ecclesia/37-article-6-whether-and-what-sort-of-authority-is-to-be-attrib/#p766)-596.

Part 1: pages [589](/works/de-religione-et-ecclesia/37-article-6-whether-and-what-sort-of-authority-is-to-be-attrib/#p766)-591; Part 2: pages [592](/works/de-religione-et-ecclesia/37-article-6-whether-and-what-sort-of-authority-is-to-be-attrib/#p772)-596.

Scholion. Which difficulties are to be recalled here: liberty preached by Christ through the Apostle; liberty of faith, and liberty in the pursuit of the end of the Church; sayings of the Fathers which seem contrary. Answer is made. Pages [596](/works/de-religione-et-ecclesia/37-article-6-whether-and-what-sort-of-authority-is-to-be-attrib/#p778)-598.

Article Seventh - Whether the True Church of Christ Ought to Be Infallible.

Section I. The State of the Question Is Set Forth.

Infallibility properly excludes the very possibility of erring. One infallibility is essential, proper to God; another is participated. This latter is natural and supernatural. The infallibility of the Church is participated and supernatural. It is twofold: 1. passive, or infallibility in believing; 2. active, or in teaching. The subject of the former is the universal Church itself, namely teaching and learning; the faith of the faithful can never be diverse from the faith of the teaching Church. The existence of passive infallibility does not need to be proved directly; it is gathered from what has been said; the adversaries seem to concede it. It is the effect of active infallibility. Therefore the question concerns this latter. Three things must be weighed: its existence, object, and subject. Concerning these last two, later; nevertheless certain things are indicated. The subject of active infallibility is twofold, although not adequately distinct: the Supreme Pontiff, and the body of Pastors together with him. No one says that individual Pastors, except the Supreme Pontiff, are infallible. The body of Pastors apart from the head is not infallible; joined with him, whether assembled in Council or dispersed through the world outside a Council, it enjoys infallibility. Declaration. The nature of active infallibility is declared. 1. It is a supernatural assistance of the Holy Spirit, because no new revelation is required, and because human industry is not excluded. Industry is necessary not so that the Church may define at all, but so that it may define licitly. If industry is supposed necessary for defining infallibly, then, when something is defined, that it has been employed must be believed by the same faith. 2. It is in defining doctrine of faith and morals without error. It is explained when the Church is said to define something. The Church is not infallible except in the definition itself. Things said in passing or incidentally are not judged defined, though they have grave authority. Pages [599](/works/de-religione-et-ecclesia/38-article-7-whether-the-true-church-of-christ-ought-to-be-infa/#p783)-606.

Section II. The Proposed Question Is Solved.

Proposition XXXIV. Christ constituted in the Church a visible, authentic, and perpetual Magisterium, to which he promised and conferred the special charism of infallibility, by which, through the assistance of the Holy Spirit, in defining doctrine concerning faith and morals, it can never turn aside from truth. Therefore, just as it itself has the right of teaching the doctrine of Christ with authority, so on the part of all the faithful there is owed to it the consent and obedience of faith. Pages [606](/works/de-religione-et-ecclesia/38-article-7-whether-the-true-church-of-christ-ought-to-be-infa/#p796)-612.

Scholion. Several objections have been anticipated; to others satisfaction has been given elsewhere. "One is your teacher." The individual Apostles are infallible. "The consummation of the ages" denotes the destruction of Jerusalem. The promises are conditioned. Answer is made. Pages [612](/works/de-religione-et-ecclesia/38-article-7-whether-the-true-church-of-christ-ought-to-be-infa/#p802)-614.

Article Eighth - What the Object of Infallibility Is.

Section I. The State of the Question Is Set Forth.

The object of active infallibility from the Vatican Council is "doctrine concerning faith or morals." This must be declared. The deposit of Christian faith is twofold. 1. Taken strictly, it comprises truths which are certainly divinely revealed. That these are the object of infallibility, direct, as they say, is clear from what has been said. 2. Taken broadly, the indirect object of infallibility comprises all those truths without which the object of faith strictly taken cannot be integrally guarded, explained, and defended. Concerning these there is a twofold question. a) Are those truths the object of the Church's infallibility? This must be affirmed; several call the contrary opinion heretical. b) Granted that they are and are defined by the Church, must they be believed by divine faith or by ecclesiastical faith, or mediately divine faith? Each opinion has its patrons. Their arguments are indicated by reference. Here we inquire only whether those truths are the object of infallibility. Concerning these, taken generally, there is no controversy among Theologians; all affirm it. Some dissent concerning this or that particular object, such as the canonization of Saints and the approval of Religious orders: what is to be thought about each. Omitting particular questions here, we ask whether the

Church is infallible in other objects besides things certainly revealed, especially a) in condemning propositions with a note inferior to heresy, who deny this; and b) in dogmatic facts, whether, for example, the Church is infallible in declaring the orthodoxy or heterodoxy of some proposition in the author's sense, not indeed subjective, but objective. Declaration. The system of the Jansenists is briefly indicated. Pages [615](/works/de-religione-et-ecclesia/39-article-8-what-is-the-object-of-infallibility/#p807)-622.

Proposition XXXV. 1. The object of the Church's infallibility must not be restricted to those truths which are certainly divinely revealed, but is also extended to those which are so connected with certainly revealed truths

that without them the deposit of Christian faith cannot be integrally guarded, explained, and defended. Therefore those err who think that the judgment of the Church is fallible, whether when it proscribes falsely named science or condemns doctrines with a note below heresy, 2. or when it declares the orthodoxy or heterodoxy of propositions in the objective sense of the Author. Pages [622](/works/de-religione-et-ecclesia/39-article-8-what-is-the-object-of-infallibility/#p822)-632.

Part 1: pages [622](/works/de-religione-et-ecclesia/39-article-8-what-is-the-object-of-infallibility/#p822)-629; Part 2: pages [629](/works/de-religione-et-ecclesia/39-article-8-what-is-the-object-of-infallibility/#p825)-632.

Article Ninth - What Is the True Church of Christ.

Section I. The State of the Question Is Set Forth.

Here it is asked which, in concrete, is the true Church of Christ. It can certainly be known; hence there must be notes by which it is known. Description of notes and exposition of it. The proper function of notes: the question here concerns distinguishing the true Church from false Churches. Which communions are to be compared. In what sense the Church is here called Roman and true. The probative force of the notes is negative and positive. The notes assigned by Protestants are rejected, together with their difficulties. Which are the true notes. The true consensus of Catholics, notwithstanding apparent disagreement. Pages [633](/works/de-religione-et-ecclesia/40-article-9-which-is-the-true-church-of-christ/#p829)-638.

Section II. The Proposed Question Is Solved.

Proposition XXXVI. 1. Unity, Sanctity, Catholicity, and Apostolicity are true notes of the Church. 2. When these are rightly applied, just as it is certain that the Roman Church is the one true Church of Christ, so all the remaining assemblies which, outside its communion, vindicate the Christian name for themselves are shown by proof to by no means constitute the true Church of Christ. Pages [639](/works/de-religione-et-ecclesia/40-article-9-which-is-the-true-church-of-christ/#p837)-648.

Disputation V

On the Visible Head of the Church

How great the importance of this investigation is, from Bellarmine, the Vatican Council, and the Protestants themselves. Division of the treatment. Pages [649](/works/de-religione-et-ecclesia/40-article-9-which-is-the-true-church-of-christ/#p844)-650.

Article First - Whether Christ Instituted in Blessed Peter the Primacy over the Universal Church.

Section I. The State of the Question Is Set Forth.

The Vatican Council proposes the doctrine, indicates the arguments for proving the primacy, sets forth the errors, and expressly defines this truth. Primacy is twofold: one of honor, preeminence without authority; another of jurisdiction, importing true power over those subject to it. They deny the primacy of jurisdiction, in which the primacy of honor is contained, 1. who either acknowledge no distinction between clerics and

laymen, or deny that a hierarchy properly so called was instituted in the clerical order; 2. certain Jansenists asserting Paul to be altogether equal to Peter; 3. not a few pseudo-Catholics, who, with Richer as leader, hold that it was immediately conferred on the Church, from which it was transferred, as it were, to Peter. Richer's system is briefly

set forth. It was often condemned by the Church. The true doctrine is established. Pages [650](/works/de-religione-et-ecclesia/41-article-1-whether-christ-instituted-in-blessed-peter-the-pri/#p847)-653.

Proposition XXXVII. 1. Just as from the words of Christ, Matthew 16, it is certain that the primacy of jurisdiction over the universal Church was promised to blessed Peter, 2. so from the words of the same Christ, John 21, it is drawn out that it was immediately and directly conferred on Peter. Therefore those openly oppose the manifest doctrine of the Scriptures 3. who deny that Peter alone before the other Apostles, whether each singly or all together, was furnished by Christ with a true and proper primacy of jurisdiction; 4. or who affirm that the same Primacy was delivered not immediately and directly to blessed Peter himself, but to the Church, and through the Church to him as minister of the Church itself. Page [654](/works/de-religione-et-ecclesia/41-article-1-whether-christ-instituted-in-blessed-peter-the-pri/#p853).

Section II. The Primacy of Peter Is Demonstrated from the Words of Matthew 16.

The words of the promise are recited. A general argument is made. Christ said: "Thou art Kepha and upon this Kepha," etc. The person of Peter is directly and most clearly designated everywhere. The question concerning that phrase "upon this rock," etc. 1. The promise regards Peter immediately and directly. 2. It contains the primacy of jurisdiction. The first is proved. This whole discourse is directed to Peter; therefore also the words "this rock" placed in the middle of the discourse. Christ used the same word "Kepha" in each phrase. The pronoun "this" cannot be referred to anything other than the rock just named, which is Peter. The same is drawn from the preceding words: "Blessed art thou," etc. Those words reveal the reason why the name Cephas had previously been imposed on Peter. Those words are directed to him to whom it is said, "To thee I will give the keys," who certainly is Peter. Those words express the reward promised to Peter because of the profession of faith made. Finally, almost all Protestant interpreters concede this; the ridiculous exception of certain men. The second is proved. 1. Peter is in the Church what the foundation is in a building. It is proper to the foundation that in it and through it the firmness and unity of the building be constituted and preserved. Peter cannot provide this in the Church without primacy of jurisdiction. 2. To Peter is committed the office of invincibly protecting the Church against all dangers and all enemies; but this requires primacy of jurisdiction. 3. To Peter are given the keys of the kingdom of heaven; this contains supreme power. It is confirmed from the words "whatever thou shalt bind," etc., which import power contracted by no limits. The interpretation of the whole text that has been exhibited is confirmed by the consensus of the Fathers. Pages [654](/works/de-religione-et-ecclesia/41-article-1-whether-christ-instituted-in-blessed-peter-the-pri/#p853)-664.

Section III. Difficulties against the Argument Brought Forward Are Satisfied.

Paul, 1 Corinthians 3, teaches that Christ is the one foundation of the Church. Among the Fathers there are various interpretations of that rock.

Especially the authority of St. Augustine is brought forward. The power of binding and loosing promised to Peter is to be restricted to the power of remitting sins. The Apostles themselves did not understand the words of Christ concerning Peter's Primacy, since they disputed who was greater. To bind and loose means to declare the licit and the illicit. Answer is made. Pages [665](/works/de-religione-et-ecclesia/41-article-1-whether-christ-instituted-in-blessed-peter-the-pri/#p861)-670.

Section IV. The Primacy of Peter Is Demonstrated from John 21.

The Evangelical words are reported. A general argument from them. Two things to be proved. 1. The office of feeding regards Peter alone, for the word "Feed" is directed to him who is called Simon of John, from whom the threefold profession of love is exacted, who is saddened when questioned the third time, to whom crucifixion is predicted, etc. All these things belong to Peter alone. 2. This office of feeding is a) the primacy of jurisdiction. This is clear from the word "feed." He feeds who procures and provides food for another, etc. To feed is the same as to rule, both from common usage of speech and from the usage of speech in Scripture. Examples are cited. It is established from the very word poimaine, which signifies to rule with command. b) It is over the universal Church. This is drawn from the words "my lambs," "my sheep," which indicate the whole fold of Christ. The same is clear from the word "my," etc. The exegetical interpretation of the text is confirmed by the tradition of the Fathers. Pages [671](/works/de-religione-et-ecclesia/41-article-1-whether-christ-instituted-in-blessed-peter-the-pri/#p867)-677.

Section V. It Is Expressly Shown That Peter Obtained Primacy over the Apostles Themselves.

This is certain: 1. from what has been said, for Peter was instituted as the foundation of the whole Church. To Peter the whole fold of Christ is committed to be ruled, and to it the Apostles themselves belong. 2. In the four lists of the names of the Apostles, Peter is always named in the first place. This order is by no means preserved with regard to the other Apostles. Indeed Peter in Matthew 10.2 is increased with the title of Primacy. That in four places Peter is not named first by no means weakens the force of the argument. After the Ascension of Our Lord, Peter at once conducted himself as Primate. 3. The Fathers unanimously affirm Peter's preeminence before the other Apostles, which they say was instituted by Our Lord for the good of unity. Moreover they give various reasons why that Primacy was conferred on Peter rather than on another. These same arguments establish that Paul was not equal to Peter, which is confirmed by express testimonies of the Fathers and other reasons. Pages [677](/works/de-religione-et-ecclesia/41-article-1-whether-christ-instituted-in-blessed-peter-the-pri/#p872)-683.

Section VI. Certain Difficulties against the Things Just Established Are Satisfied.

It is altogether false that the other Apostles received from Christ all that Peter received. Three things are weighed: a) what the Apostles had in common with Peter, and what he had before them; b) what the successors of the Apostles received from the Apostles, and what Peter's successors received from Peter; c) what exercise of the power of Peter and his successors there is with regard to the Apostles and their successors.

In what way Peter is said to have rendered an account of a certain journey, or to have been sent to carry out some work. Why Paul, 1 Corinthians 12.28, lists Apostles in the first place; why the same one is called Apostle by antonomasia; why he equates himself with Peter or says that he is inferior to no one. Special difficulties from the letter to the Galatians. In what way the Supreme Pontiffs define "in the authority of blessed Peter and Paul," and in seals the image of each is expressed. Pages [684](/works/de-religione-et-ecclesia/41-article-1-whether-christ-instituted-in-blessed-peter-the-pri/#p880)-695.

Section VII. The Primacy Was Promised and Conferred on Peter Immediately and Not through the Mediation of the Church.

In the testimonies of Scripture already brought forward there is nothing which favors Richer. For each phrase regards Peter taken in his own person. Indeed all things openly stand against the Richerian interpretation. If the rock signified the Church and not Peter, the Church would have to be founded upon itself; the gates of hell would not prevail against the Church insofar as it would stand built and founded upon itself; the Lord's flock, the Church, would be ordered to be fed by the Lord's flock itself, that is, by the Church. Nothing is more absurd than these things. Moreover there would have been no reason why Our Lord, after he had named the Church, should at once have said to Peter: "To thee I will give the keys," etc. Testimonies of the Fathers for confirming the thesis. In what sense the Fathers say that the power of binding and loosing was handed to

the Church itself, or that Peter bore the person of the Church, or that the Church itself forgives sins, etc. Pages [695](/works/de-religione-et-ecclesia/41-article-1-whether-christ-instituted-in-blessed-peter-the-pri/#p894)-701.

Article Second - Whether the Primacy of Peter, from Christ's Institution, Ought to Be Perpetual, and in Whom It Resides.

Section I. The State of the Question Is Set Forth.

Catholic doctrine from the Vatican Council. The adversaries. Three questions to be distinguished: 1. whether Peter's Primacy ought to be perpetual; 2. whether it perseveres in the Roman Pontiffs, successors of Peter; 3. whether the Roman Pontiff, successor of Peter, has the primacy by divine right. This third needs declaration. It can be taken in three ways. 1. The Roman Pontiff, successor of Peter, has the primacy which is of divine right, or the perpetuity of the primacy is of divine right: a proposition of faith from the Vatican Council. 2. The Roman Pontiff has by divine right the primacy which is of divine right, and he has it by divine right insofar as he is successor of Peter: a proposition of faith. Nor is it an obstacle that election is a human fact; that election is not an institution, but a mere condition. Other answers from Bellarmine. 3. The Roman Pontiff has by divine right the primacy which Christ instituted, and he has it by divine right also insofar as he is Bishop of Rome; namely, the connection of the Primacy with the Roman See is from Christ's institution. This has not been defined. The historical thesis concerning Peter's coming to Rome and his sitting there, although most certain, is not necessary for showing the Primacy of the Roman Pontiff. Certain older authors thought that the annexation of the Primacy to the Roman See was constituted by the authority of Peter alone,

so that, if he had fixed his See somewhere other than Rome, someone other than the Bishop of Rome would succeed him. Nevertheless the most common opinion, which we make our own, holds the contrary. The state of the question is declared. See, residence, title. Several dignities in the Roman Pontiff. He who is elected Roman Bishop, by that very fact obtains the Primacy. Pages [702](/works/de-religione-et-ecclesia/42-article-2-whether-the-primacy-of-peter-from-the-institution-/#p902)-709.

Proposition XXXVIII. 1. The Primacy which Christ instituted in blessed Peter for the perennial good of the Church must, by the same author, endure continually in Peter's successors. 2. But since it is certain that the Roman Bishops are Peter's successors, they hold the Primacy over the whole world by divine right. 3. Indeed the very connection of the Primacy with the Roman See seems to be of divine right; and therefore, just as by no human authority can it happen that Peter's successor is not Primate of the whole Church, so by no authority, not even the supreme authority of the Church, can the Primacy be transferred from the Roman Bishop and city to another Bishop and another city. Page [709](/works/de-religione-et-ecclesia/42-article-2-whether-the-primacy-of-peter-from-the-institution-/#p917).

Section II. The Perpetuity of the Primacy According to Christ's Institution Is Asserted.

1. The Primacy of Peter was instituted by Christ and ordered solely to the good of the whole Church. Therefore it ought to be perpetual, as the Church itself is. The antecedent is declared and proved: because supreme power, such as the Primacy is, in every society is instituted and ordered to the good of that society; because the Church must always remain the same in the same state and form, therefore always with the same power instituted by Christ; because otherwise the primacy would have been instituted for that time in which it existed as less necessary, and would be extinguished when it was altogether necessary; because the perpetuity of the primacy is evidently drawn from Matthew 16 and John 21. 2. The Primacy of Peter was instituted by Our Lord for constructing and preserving the unity of the Church. Therefore, as unity is essential and perpetual, so also is the Primacy. The antecedent is established from the fact that this is the office of supreme authority in every society. Christ willed that through Peter and in Peter the building of the Church would not only be formed, but also sustained. A building is sustained by preventing its dissolution; unity is opposed to dissolution; therefore the Church is sustained by preserving unity. The same thing is clear

from the word "feed." It is confirmed from the Fathers and from the very haters of Pontifical power, etc. Pages [710](/works/de-religione-et-ecclesia/42-article-2-whether-the-primacy-of-peter-from-the-institution-/#p920)-715.

Section III. It Is Shown That the Roman Pontiffs Are Peter's Successors, and, as Such, Obtain the Primacy by Divine Right.

Two things are to be proved here. 1. The successor of Peter, whoever he is, obtains the Primacy by divine right. This is briefly gathered from what has been said and is confirmed. 2. The successor of Peter is the Roman Pontiff. This is proved: 1. from constant tradition, which ascribes to the Roman Pontiff the very dignity of primacy,

the succession and inheritance of Peter, the action and authority of Peter, care of the universal Church, the ordination of higher magistrates, and the judgment of greater causes, whether by reason of object or by reason of persons. 2. Christ willed that the Primacy conferred on Peter should be perpetual in his successors. But the successor of Peter at any time can be only one person; for the primacy must be preserved in the way in which it was instituted, namely in one. But none except the Roman Pontiff is had, or can be had, as successor of Peter. 3. From the things said in the first argument, in the fifth century all believed that the Roman Pontiff succeeded Peter by divine right. If the same had not been the faith from the beginning, there would have been a change, and indeed one of the greatest moment. But there is no trace of this change, indeed no trace of any protest. Pages [715](/works/de-religione-et-ecclesia/42-article-2-whether-the-primacy-of-peter-from-the-institution-/#p923)-722.

Section IV. Certain Difficulties Are Satisfied.

Canon 28 of the Council of Chalcedon is objected; but this is of no authority. It was drawn up while the pontifical legates were absent; it was rejected by St. Leo the Great. Moreover, in it the question concerns patriarchal right. Nor was canon 6 of the Council of Constantinople approved by the Supreme Pontiff; besides, it can be rightly explained. In canon 4 of the Council of Nicaea the question concerns the Roman Pontiff as Metropolitan of the Bishops of Italy, or as Patriarch of the whole West. Rufinus's paraphrase has no authority. The preeminence of the Roman See cannot be ascribed to the Synod of Sardica, since it was earlier than that synod, which was held by the work and command of the Roman Pontiff and openly supposes the Primacy. In what sense certain Fathers say that the care of the universal Church, the power of laws, and the institution of magistrates belong to Bishops. Palmer wrongly refers the Primacy of the Roman Pontiff to merely human causes. Succession in the Primacy by divine right does not entail the defectibility or invisibility of the Church. Pages [723](/works/de-religione-et-ecclesia/42-article-2-whether-the-primacy-of-peter-from-the-institution-/#p934)-731.

Section V. The Opinion Affirming That the Primacy Is Annexed to the Roman See by Divine Right Is Asserted.

Certain things are noted concerning the arguments to be brought forward. The assertion is proved: 1. In fact it is certain that Peter raised the Roman Episcopate itself to the Supreme Pontificate. From this, the right of Primacy, which previously was a personal privilege, became local, and therefore fixed and immutable. A manifold explanation of the matter. 2. It seems consonant with reason that Christ designated the manner of succession itself. The manner of succession in the supreme pontificate had been defined in the Old Testament. The end for which the Primacy was instituted, namely to prevent dissensions and schisms, seems to require this. If the manner of succession is determined, election of the Pontiff is more easily had; tradition is more securely preserved; the practice of governing is more easily learned. 3. Many causes existed why the See might be transferred to another city; yet there was not even one who hoped that it could be transferred elsewhere. This establishes the most certain persuasion in which they were, namely that the connection of the Primacy with the Roman See is from divine institution. 4. Both the Fathers and Councils speak no otherwise

of the Roman See than of the Primacy itself. Testimonies are cited. Pages [731](/works/de-religione-et-ecclesia/42-article-2-whether-the-primacy-of-peter-from-the-institution-/#p942)-737.

Scholion. 1. What would happen if the city of Rome were utterly destroyed? 2. Can the Roman Church, insofar as it is a particular Church, err in faith? Answer is made. Pages [738](/works/de-religione-et-ecclesia/42-article-2-whether-the-primacy-of-peter-from-the-institution-/#p947)-739.

Article Third - What the Force and Nature of the Primacy of the Roman Pontiff Is.

Section I. The State of the Question Is Set Forth.

Certain things concerning the endowments of the primacy are noted. Here only the infallibility of the Roman Pontiff is to be treated. Catholic doctrine declared and defined in the Vatican Council. The adversaries. The Vatican Council declares: 1. that the Primacy is a power of jurisdiction which is truly episcopal. Therefore the Roman Pontiff is not a mere inspector or director, as Tamburini and others wished, but a true superior. 2. That this power is immediate over all and each of the Pastors and faithful. By this, episcopal government, which is of divine right, is not removed; but the error of Bailly and others is excluded, who wished that the Pope could not, against the will of Bishops, exercise in dioceses the offices customary to Bishops. 3. That this power is ordinary, namely insofar as it is opposed not only to delegated power, which was defined in chapter 1 of the same Constitution, but also to extraordinary power, against those who acknowledged this supreme power only in certain special circumstances. 4. That it is a power by which the Roman Pontiff is superior to the council itself; not indeed to a Council over which the Supreme Pontiff presides either by himself or through legates, for to ask and define this would be superfluous, but to a Council apart from the Pope, not indeed doubtful but certain. What if the Pope became contumacious? Answer is made. Pages [740](/works/de-religione-et-ecclesia/43-article-3-what-the-force-and-nature-of-the-primacy-of-the-ro/#p948)-748.

Proposition XXXIX. The nature of the Primacy, which the Roman Pontiffs as successors of Peter obtain by divine right, properly consists in an episcopal power of jurisdiction that is full and supreme, indeed immediate and ordinary over all and each of both the faithful and the Pastors, whether these are considered singly and apart, or all together. Therefore the Roman Pontiff is superior to the very assembly of Bishops, or to all Bishops gathered in an ecumenical synod. Page [748](/works/de-religione-et-ecclesia/43-article-3-what-the-force-and-nature-of-the-primacy-of-the-ro/#p961).

Section II. It Is Shown That the Nature of the Primacy Consists in This: That It Is a Supreme Episcopal Power of Jurisdiction, Immediate and Ordinary.

1. The nature of the Primacy consists in Episcopal jurisdiction. The Primacy is the principle of unity and firmness of the Church, for it is exhibited under the metaphor of foundation, Matthew 16; therefore it is the supreme power of ruling; therefore episcopal, for God placed bishops to rule his Church. This is confirmed from the words "to thee I will give the keys," likewise from the words "whatever thou shalt bind," etc. The same is established from the testimony of John 21: "Feed my lambs, feed my sheep." By these words the primacy is expressed, and they import power of jurisdiction over the universal Church. But this power is episcopal power. This is confirmed by biblical and ecclesiastical usage, according to which episcopal power

is expressed by the word "Feed." The same is drawn from Councils and Fathers. 2. The power of primacy is immediate and ordinary. For the power of Bishops over their own particular Churches is immediate and ordinary; therefore such must be the power of primacy, which is episcopal over the universal Church. 3. The power of primacy is full and supreme. This is established from what has been said and confirmed by a special argument. Pages [748](/works/de-religione-et-ecclesia/43-article-3-what-the-force-and-nature-of-the-primacy-of-the-ro/#p961)-753.

Section III. Certain Difficulties against the Things Just Established Are Satisfied.

The words of St. Cyprian, "The episcopate is one," etc., do not attack the thesis; nor does his way of acting toward St. Stephen, if the genuineness of the documents themselves must be admitted; nor the words which he brought forward in the Eighth Council of Carthage; nor the judgment given by the same in the cause of Bishop Basilides prove the contrary. In what sense St. Gregory the Great rejected the name of universal Bishop. In what sense St. Jerome said that Bishops are of the same merit and the same priesthood. What is to be said to that assertion that two immediate pastors cannot be over one and the same flock. Pages [753](/works/de-religione-et-ecclesia/43-article-3-what-the-force-and-nature-of-the-primacy-of-the-ro/#p969)-761.

Section IV. It Is Shown That the Roman Pontiff Is Superior to Bishops Taken Collectively.

1. From Scripture. The Primacy is exhibited under the metaphor of foundation; it is proper to this to sustain the various parts of the building as they are gathered together. Peter is superior to that Church against which the gates of hell will not prevail, which Christ simply called his, which is called the kingdom of heaven. But this is the whole Church, or the Church taken collectively. Other arguments from Scripture. 2. From Tradition, which teaches that the Pontiff is judged by no one; that causes of the Pontiff are reserved to the judgment of God alone; that the Pontiff can amend and has amended the decrees of Councils. All these things are confirmed from the reasons which are brought forward by the Fathers and Councils. The distinction between the Church taken collectively and distributively was unknown to all antiquity. 3. The assumption is confirmed by theological reasons. Pages [761](/works/de-religione-et-ecclesia/43-article-3-what-the-force-and-nature-of-the-primacy-of-the-ro/#p978)-769.

Scholion. From the established true character of the Primacy, the Vatican Council infers certain corollaries. Why these must be treated briefly. 1. The Supreme Pontiff has the right of freely communicating with Pastors and each of the flock. 2. This free communication can be impeded by no one. 3. Appeal to the Supreme Pontiff. 4. No appeal from his sentence. 5. According to the Gallicans, the power of the Roman Pontiff is bound by canons. Of which canons there can be discussion. The question concerns the coercive force of canons. The truth is established against the Gallicans. Pages [769](/works/de-religione-et-ecclesia/43-article-3-what-the-force-and-nature-of-the-primacy-of-the-ro/#p987)-772.

Section V. Satisfaction Is Given to the Difficulties of the Gallicans.

The decrees of the Council of Constance, sessions 4 and 5, which are objected, have no authority. They were not approved by the Supreme Pontiff. The approval of Martin V regards only decrees in matters of faith, and the present question was not had as such by those decrees,

and those decrees which were made conciliariter. Eugenius IV by no means approved the Basel declarations, which the Synod of Florence declared impious. Moreover, the objected decrees regard the case of a doubtful Pontiff. This is established from witnesses, from the words themselves, from the purpose, etc. The words of Matthew 18.15 are wrongly objected. Whether and in what sense the Roman Pontiffs confessed that they were subject to the canons of general Councils. Why the Supreme Pontiffs committed the causes of Bonosus, St. Chrysostom, and Philip Augustus to Councils. The genuine sense of the words of St. Augustine concerning the judgment given by Pontiff Melchiades against the Donatists. In what way the Supreme Pontiff is a member of the Church. Pages [772](/works/de-religione-et-ecclesia/43-article-3-what-the-force-and-nature-of-the-primacy-of-the-ro/#p994)-782.

Article Fourth - Whether the Jurisdiction of Bishops Proceeds from God Immediately, or through the Mediation of the Roman Pontiff.

Section I. The State of the Question Is Set Forth.

The creation or institution of Bishops belongs to the Supreme Pontiff; this is proved. Here the question concerns the power itself. This is twofold: of order and of jurisdiction. One is separable from the other. The power of order in Bishops is immediately from God. Whether also the power of jurisdiction. This can be

considered in abstract and in concrete. In the former sense it is immediately from God. The question concerns the power of jurisdiction considered in concrete, namely insofar as it resides in this or that particular individual. Taken thus it can be considered in three ways: a) as to exigency, it is immediately from God; b) as to exercise, it is entirely certain that it depends on the Supreme Pontiff; c) as to actuality, the greatest Theologians teach that Bishops have it immediately from the Supreme Pontiff and mediately from God. Who thought the contrary. The distinction between the origin of jurisdiction in the Supreme Pontiff and in Bishops. Pages [782](/works/de-religione-et-ecclesia/44-article-4-whether-the-jurisdiction-of-bishops-proceeds-from-/#p1002)-787.

Section II. The Proposed Question Is Solved.

Proposition XL. By force of episcopal consecration there indeed arises in Bishops a certain exigency of ruling the Church; nevertheless the actual power itself required for this is not conferred. For this, although by divine right it must be in the Episcopal assembly, nevertheless, otherwise than the power of order, is communicated to individual Bishops only through the mediation of the Roman Pontiff. Pages [787](/works/de-religione-et-ecclesia/44-article-4-whether-the-jurisdiction-of-bishops-proceeds-from-/#p1010)-792.

Scholion. Difficulties can be recalled to a few heads: Bishops have been placed by the Holy Spirit to rule the Church; the Apostles received mission immediately from Christ; the Fathers teach that Bishops are constituted by divine ordination to rule the Church; jurisdiction pertains to the essence of the Episcopate; ecumenical Councils would be human congregations. Answer is made. Pages [792](/works/de-religione-et-ecclesia/44-article-4-whether-the-jurisdiction-of-bishops-proceeds-from-/#p1013)-794.

Article Fifth - The Principal Heads of Doctrine concerning Councils Are Touched Upon.

Why Councils are treated here. The definition of Councils and its exposition. General and particular Councils; the latter are national or provincial. A Diocesan Synod is not properly called a Council.

What an ecumenical council is; its description is set forth. Here one must deal only with an ecumenical council, concerning which four questions are asked:

1. What convocation is. It belongs by proper right to the Roman Pontiff alone. This is proved. In what sense others, besides the Roman Pontiff, are said to have summoned a council. Why, in the first councils, more was attributed to the emperors. Who are to be called to a council with the right of definitive suffrage. The error of the innovators. By what right bishops are to be called. Whether bishops merely elected, and not consecrated, are to be called. Whether titular bishops are to be called. Whether it is necessary that all be present. By what right cardinals are to be called; the generals of religious orders; abbots having quasi-episcopal jurisdiction. Whether exempt abbots are to be called who are not generals and do not have jurisdiction over outsiders.

2. The celebration of a council. To the Roman Pontiff belongs the right of presiding with authority. This is proved. How emperors are sometimes said to have presided in a council. Bishops are true judges in definitions; nevertheless, moral unanimity is not required, nor indeed is the pope bound to accede to the greater part.

3. The decrees of an ecumenical council are infallible, as was stated by reference; but the approval of the Roman Pontiff is required. This is proved. In how many ways this approval can be given.

4. The necessity of councils. Councils are of divine right as to their substance. Councils are by no means necessary by reason of intrinsic authority; accidentally they are necessary by reason of solemnity and extrinsic authority. They are never absolutely necessary. Whether they are necessary by a divine precept. Pages [795](/works/de-religione-et-ecclesia/45-article-5-the-principal-heads-of-doctrine-concerning-council/#p1017)-812.

Article Sixth - Whether an infallible magisterium must be attributed to the Roman Pontiff.

I. The state of the question is set forth.

Certain things are noted concerning the qualities of the primacy. Here one must deal solely with the infallibility of the Roman Pontiff. The Catholic doctrine declared and defined in the Vatican Council. The adversaries. Infallibility is not to be confused with impeccability. The Supreme Pontiff, speaking ex cathedra, cannot teach heresy: this is of faith from the Vatican Council. Whether, as a private person, he could become a heretic. A twofold opinion. Some deny it; Bellarmine says that this opinion is the more probable. Others affirm it. In this latter opinion it is asked whether the Roman Pontiff, having fallen into heresy, falls from the pontificate by the law itself, or whether he is to be removed from it by a judicial sentence. The theologians are divided into two parties.

Certain observations concerning the definition ex cathedra. Four conditions are required from the Vatican Council: a) that the Pontiff speak as supreme teacher and pastor; b) that he teach in matters of faith or morals; c) that he pronounce a definitive sentence with a manifested intention of obliging; d) that he oblige the universal Church to assent. What if the Supreme Pontiff teaches a particular bishop or a particular church? The Vatican Council teaches that definitions ex cathedra are irreformable "of themselves, and not from the consent of the Church." Certain forms of speaking are explained.

Whether the infallibility of the Roman Pontiff is personal, independent, and absolute. Whether the Roman Pontiff is infallible apart from the bishops. Note, pages [822](/works/de-religione-et-ecclesia/46-article-6-whether-an-infallible-magisterium-is-to-be-attribu/#p1052)-823: the Syllabus must be held as a definition ex cathedra. Pages [813](/works/de-religione-et-ecclesia/46-article-6-whether-an-infallible-magisterium-is-to-be-attribu/#p1040)-825.

Proposition XLI. When the Roman Pontiff speaks from the chair, that is, when, exercising the office of pastor and teacher of all Christians, according to his supreme apostolic authority, he defines a doctrine concerning faith or morals to be held by the universal Church, by the divine assistance promised to him in blessed Peter he possesses that infallibility with which the divine Redeemer willed his Church to be endowed in defining doctrine concerning faith or morals; and therefore definitions of this kind of the Roman Pontiff are irreformable of themselves, and not from the consent of the Church. Page [826](/works/de-religione-et-ecclesia/46-article-6-whether-an-infallible-magisterium-is-to-be-attribu/#p1056).

II. The infallibility of the Roman Pontiff is demonstrated from the Scriptures.

The Vatican Council indicates three testimonies of the Scriptures on which the infallibility of the Roman Pontiff rests. Here the two former are examined: Matthew 16 and John 21. Peter cannot be the foundation of the Church, or guard and preserve the unity of faith, unless he is endowed with infallibility. The argument is developed. If, moreover, the gates of hell cannot prevail against the Church, much less can they prevail against the foundation of the Church. Hence it is clear that the definitions of the Pontiffs are irreformable of themselves; otherwise the Church would sustain Peter, and not Peter the Church. This very interpretation is handed down both by the Latin and Greek Fathers, and by the liturgies. The same truth is proved from John 21. Pages [826](/works/de-religione-et-ecclesia/46-article-6-whether-an-infallible-magisterium-is-to-be-attribu/#p1056)-832.

III. The testimony of Luke 22:32 is set forth individually.

Certain things are set down beforehand. It is established that the prayer of Christ that the faith of Peter might not fail was efficacious. To weaken the argument, the adversaries contend that the object of Christ's prayer was something else. Some assign it to Peter's perseverance after his fall; others to the infallibility of the Church; others to Peter's infallibility, but insofar as this was a personal privilege, not at all to be transmitted to Peter's successors. They confirm this from the word "converted." This evasion is shut off. The genuine sense of that word is set forth. From Luke's testimony three things are proved: 1. that the object of Christ's

prayer is indefectibility in faith; 2. that this directly regards Peter, not the Church; 3. and indeed Peter as the designated head of the Church, whose prerogative must be transmitted to his successors. The hermeneutical interpretation of the text is confirmed by the ancient and constant tradition of the Fathers. Pages [832](/works/de-religione-et-ecclesia/46-article-6-whether-an-infallible-magisterium-is-to-be-attribu/#p1060)-841.

Scholion. The objections against this argument have nearly all been anticipated. It would seem to follow from it that the Roman Pontiff, even as a private person, cannot fall into heresy. From the argument there seems to follow infallibility in things decided, but not in things to be decided. Response is made. Pages [841](/works/de-religione-et-ecclesia/46-article-6-whether-an-infallible-magisterium-is-to-be-attribu/#p1071)-843.

IV. The infallibility of the Roman Pontiff is demonstrated from tradition.

The principal monuments of tradition for the infallibility of the Roman Pontiff are briefly touched upon. 1. Councils: certain direct testimonies are cited. Dollinger attempts in vain to weaken the force of the decree of the Council of Florence; see the note on pages [844](/works/de-religione-et-ecclesia/46-article-6-whether-an-infallible-magisterium-is-to-be-attribu/#p1074)-845. The manner of acting of the Roman Pontiff toward councils. 2. The Fathers: their testimonies are reduced to certain classes. 3. Ancient and perpetual usage: for many centuries heresies were condemned by the Roman Pontiff without councils, and indeed irreformably. The Roman Pontiffs always claimed this right as proper to themselves. The celebrated statement of St. Augustine is examined. Pages [843](/works/de-religione-et-ecclesia/46-article-6-whether-an-infallible-magisterium-is-to-be-attribu/#p1073)-850.

V. The same truth is confirmed by the agreement of theologians.

Before the Council of Constance, the opinion concerning the fallibility of the Roman Pontiff speaking ex cathedra was entirely unheard of. This is established by the explicit testimonies of Ruard Tapper, A. Duval, Cardinal de Aguirre, and Gerson himself; likewise from the words of St. Thomas and others, and also from the doctrine of the University of Paris. At the time of the Council of Constance certain men denied the infallibility of the Roman Pontiff; but they were few, and they also taught other manifest errors. Immediately after the Council of Constance, the opinion denying the infallibility of the Roman Pontiff was rejected. St. John Capistran, the Louvain Faculty, the assembly of the Gallican clergy in the year 1579, Mauclerus, St. Antoninus, and others are cited. The authority of Bellarmine, Suarez, and St. Francis de Sales is brought forward. This opinion indeed revived in the assemblies of the Gallican clergy in the year 1682, but it had few patrons; it was introduced by force and fraud, without ever truly having been the opinion of the Church of France. Pages [850](/works/de-religione-et-ecclesia/46-article-6-whether-an-infallible-magisterium-is-to-be-attribu/#p1078)-856.

VI. The principal difficulties are answered.

Many difficulties have already been solved from what has been said. The distinction between the See and the occupant of the See, as proposed by the Gallicans, is futile and must be utterly rejected. The infallibility of councils cannot be called useless once the infallibility of the Roman Pontiff has been posited; there is a manifold reason. Those two infallibilities are not adequately distinct. Councils are not necessary in order to give force to pontifical definitions. The documents that are opposed do not prove the contrary. In what manner bishops are called the judges born for controversies of faith: they are not supreme, but subordinate; nor must they always, or always in the same manner, exercise judgment. A threefold case is declared. Pages [856](/works/de-religione-et-ecclesia/46-article-6-whether-an-infallible-magisterium-is-to-be-attribu/#p1081)-866.

VII. The remaining objections of the Gallicans are solved.

The fall of St. Peter is not to the point. That the fall of Liberius is fictitious is now established among critics; this is confirmed by the words of Bossuet himself and by Bailly. What is to be said concerning the fall of Honorius? There is a manifold way of solving the question. Passing over the rest, we say: 1. Honorius did not teach the error of the Monothelites; 2. he issued no definition ex cathedra. How, therefore, could he be condemned by the Sixth Synod? Response is made. What is to be said concerning the collection of canons that is attributed to Isidore Mercator? Pages [866](/works/de-religione-et-ecclesia/46-article-6-whether-an-in fallible-magisterium-is-to-be-attribu/#p1088)-875.

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1. That an argument drawn from style is of itself unreliable and uncertain; 2. That most of the ancient canons were written in Greek, and therefore, from the hand of the translator who turned them into the Latin language, could easily have put on uniformity. Moreover it is enough that a doctrine by no means contrary to the genuine canons is handed down there, so that Febronius's calumny concerning the origin of Primacy as to be traced back to them immediately vanishes."

1096. These are the things which this year, not without the special help of God, we have been able to hand down concerning true Religion and the Church. Would that they may avail to bring those who are outside to the one sheepfold, and to confirm those who are within in its true spirit and love! "Let us believe, brothers," said St. Augustine, On John, tractate 32, "that as much as each one loves the Church, so much he has the Holy Spirit."

Imprimatur.

Prato, 20 December 1904.

Canon Archdeacon Joachim Gori, Vicar General.