Camillo Cardinal Mazzella, S.J.

ON GOD
THE CREATOR

Scholastic-Dogmatic Lectures

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English translation

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Title Page and Address to the Students

On God the Creator

Scholastic-Dogmatic Lectures

which

Father C. Mazzella, of the same Society,

delivered

in the Seminary of the Society of Jesus at Woodstock

in the year 1872-73.

From the press of the College.

Dedication

To the most sacred Heart of God and Lord Jesus,

at whose eternal love, calling,

things which did not yet exist

stood forth rejoicing,

and who, shining in them,

summons to a corresponding love:

may these lectures on God creating

be consecrated

for love's sake.

Address to the Students

To the students of theology in the Seminary of the Society of Jesus at Woodstock, in the year 1873.

Often, Reverend Fathers and dear Brothers, while I have been occupied, by reason of my office, with the works of theologians, it has spontaneously occurred to me, I would say, that not a few in these our times, being little solicitous for the fuller refinement of Catholic truth, devote themselves wholly to refuting errors hostile to it. This has not always been done unjustly; sometimes it has even been done with the highest right. But if it is given to polemical theology to scatter errors, it will certainly not be denied to dogmatic theology, by the scholastic method yet according to the norm of revelation, to examine more accurately the understanding of dogmas and, as far as each matter permits, to place it in clear view. Indeed, if you act as a theologian, and do not separate the one from the other, as is fitting, this work must be performed by him. For when you have dispelled errors, what Catholic truth does not have has become known, not what it has. But once Catholic truth has been diligently set forth, contrary errors either collapse of themselves or will very easily be torn away.

Accordingly, it has seemed to me especially necessary to labor at opening up the understanding of dogmas. But although the understanding of dogmas must be drawn from revelation itself and from faith, nevertheless what faith and revelation contain is rightly sought, authentically indeed from the Church, but doctrinally, as they say, from the scholastic Doctors, with the Angelic Doctor as guide. For they, after interrogating all the sources of revelation, and after also calling in the aids of human wisdom, illustrated dogma itself, as far as it concerns us, in a wonderful way. Therefore, to this end the documents of the Church, where they are present,

have carried the torch before our investigations, furnishing beginnings for the questions; while the works of the scholastic Doctors - with more recent authors by no means neglected - and especially the labors of St. Thomas and Suarez, have either confirmed a mind sometimes wavering, or brought it about that it went more boldly along the path once undertaken.

Perhaps I shall seem excessive in reporting the opinions of these doctors. But especially in St. Thomas's *Summa Theologiae* there are certain things which one may despair could be said more briefly, more fully, or more clearly. Then, in the rules for the professor of theology, it is prescribed: "and let them put all their effort into this, that their hearers be as well disposed as possible toward him [St. Thomas]." To this end the very savor of his words is wonderfully suited. Moreover, while the minds of young men drink in wisdom, as it were by repeated draughts, from such great doctors, they gradually become accustomed to their manner of treating questions and to their adopted language, not without great usefulness, as is clear. Finally I shall mention this: everything must be completed within the space of eight months, and a portion must be assigned to each single day; therefore it must often be wished either to speak in the words of others, or to pass over many things otherwise excellent.

These things concern the matter itself, already known to you, Reverend Fathers and dear Brothers. As for what now concerns me, there is this one thing only: that in this little work, however small, I have set before myself both the fuller knowledge, for all of you, of God the Creator, and the greater glory of God himself.

C. Mazzella, S.J.

The Author's Index

The page references are those of the printed pages of the 1873 edition; each is a link to the corresponding numbered section of the translation.

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On the Origin of the World

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Sixth Article. How the soul is united to the body for forming man substantially one.

§ I. Documents of the Church are brought forward and briefly noted. Council of Vienne, Lateran IV, Pius IX - twofold exposition of the words of the Council of Vienne - according to this it must be absolutely held that the soul is the form of the body - the word form is to be taken in the proper sense, and in the sense determined at the time of the definition - what form is - how many kinds of form - human soul an informing form - what substantial form is - according to all, three things belong to the notion of substantial form - that it be a principle communicating the being of substantial unity - what one per se is - that it be a principle of operation - what form signifies: *per se*, essentially, immediate - the human soul as substantial form - it does not communicate intellective being to the body, but certainly sensitive being - what theologians and Fathers say about vegetative life. [240](/works/de-deo-creatore/18-article-6-how-the-soul-is-united-to-the-body-for-forming-man/#p196)

§ II. Whether the human soul is so the form of the body that it gives to it not only the being of a living thing, but the very being of a body. The question is proposed. The opinion of St. Thomas - how highly he esteemed it - the opinion of Scotus - the opinion of more recent authors - in what these last two agree, in what they differ - whether the question is merely philosophical - in what way it certainly concerns the theologian - whether the opinion of St. Thomas should be called the opinion of the Thomists. [250](/works/de-deo-creatore/18-article-6-how-the-soul-is-united-to-the-body-for-forming-man/#p197)

§ III. The proposed question is solved. Prop. XXI. With both Scotus's opinion and the opinion of more recent authors excluded, we assert that the human soul is so the form of the body that it gives to it not only the being of a living thing but the very being of a body. [258](/works/de-deo-creatore/18-article-6-how-the-soul-is-united-to-the-body-for-forming-man/#p206)

§ IV. Certain difficulties are answered. Whether Christ's body during the three days of death was the same in species and number. St. Thomas, Suarez - whether Christ's body was subject to corruption - whether a cadaveric form is to be admitted in Christ's body separated from the soul - the sense of that axiom, "what the Word once assumed he never dismissed" - whether Christ's soul is under the species of bread by force of the words or by force of concomitance. Cardinal de Lugo - whether the soul should be called an essential part of the body - how the same accidents are said to remain in a corpse - how matter and soul are called incomplete substances in the opinion of St. Thomas and Scotus - the mystery of the Incarnation. [268](/works/de-deo-creatore/18-article-6-how-the-soul-is-united-to-the-body-for-forming-man/#p207)

Third Disputation

On Man's Elevation to the Supernatural State

Connection - Pelagians - Reformers - Catholic doctrine. [277](/works/de-deo-creatore/19-article-1-general-notion-of-the-diverse-states-of-human-natu/#p209)

First Article. General notion of the diverse states of human nature. What a state is - its manifold acceptance - which is used here - state of the end, state of the way - three real states of the way - what the state of original justice is - of fallen nature - of fallen and repaired nature - possible states - how they can be had - what the state of pure nature is - of elevated nature - of integral nature - other possible states - the state of the Blessed Virgin Mary. [279](/works/de-deo-creatore/19-article-1-general-notion-of-the-diverse-states-of-human-natu/#p212)

Second Article. General idea of the state of original justice. What is meant by the name original justice - natural and supernatural justice - the latter adequate and inadequate - why the state of original justice is called the state of innocence - parts of adequate original justice - inadequate original justice - sanctifying grace - the diverse connection of the other things with it - two corollaries. [283](/works/de-deo-creatore/19-article-1-general-notion-of-the-diverse-states-of-human-natu/#p220)

Prop. XXII. Among the gifts of original justice, sanctifying grace must be held as the root and foundation of the others. [286](/works/de-deo-creatore/20-article-2-general-idea-of-the-state-of-original-justice/#p226)

Third Article. Idea of a supernatural being or gift.

§ I. The concept is set forth. The relative and absolute concept of the supernatural - relative by opposition to the natural - six acceptations of the word natural - the supernatural as undue - physical and moral debt - debt of nature constitutively, consecutively, exigently - in what sense God is said to owe something to a creature - what is meant here by the name nature - divisions of the supernatural - the division of order into natural and supernatural is logically accurate - yet the preternatural can be added - what this is - how it can be counted as natural or supernatural - the supernatural taken absolutely is something of the divine order - immediate union with God; example - the deification of the creature is not effected by destroying nature, nor by mixing grace with it, but by elevating nature - elevation not through an intrinsic unfolding of the goods of nature, but through the infusion of a new gift of the divine order. [289](/works/de-deo-creatore/21-article-3-idea-of-a-supernatural-being-or-gift/#p231)

§ II. Documents of the Church are reported and briefly elucidated. Various documents of the Church - propositions of Baius condemned on account of doctrine - what censure they deserve in the sense intended by their defenders. [299](/works/de-deo-creatore/21-article-3-idea-of-a-supernatural-being-or-gift/#p243)

§ III. The true concept of the supernatural is established according to the mind of the Church. Prop. XXIII. According to the mind of the Church, that must be called supernatural which is 1. undue - 2. per se - 3. to nature - 4. constitutively, consecutively, exigently. [306](/works/de-deo-creatore/21-article-3-idea-of-a-supernatural-being-or-gift/#p251)

Note. By what method false notions of the supernatural are to be refuted. [314](/works/de-deo-creatore/21-article-3-idea-of-a-supernatural-being-or-gift/#p253)

Fourth Article. On sanctifying grace conferred upon Adam.

§ I. Whether Adam was established in sanctifying grace. What sanctifying grace is - documents of the Church. [315](/works/de-deo-creatore/22-article-4-on-sanctifying-grace-conferred-upon-adam/#p254)

Prop. XXIV. It is clear by divine revelation that the first parents were established in holiness and justice, or received sanctifying grace from God. [316](/works/de-deo-creatore/22-article-4-on-sanctifying-grace-conferred-upon-adam/#p255)

§ II. Whether Adam received grace in the first instant of creation. A twofold opinion - the reason for doubting among those who held the negative - the qualification of the affirmative position - Adam disposed himself for sanctifying grace - how, if he had it in the first instant. [321](/works/de-deo-creatore/22-article-4-on-sanctifying-grace-conferred-upon-adam/#p260)

Prop. XXV. The first parents, in creation itself, were established by God in justice and holiness; and therefore at one and the same time he was both the Creator of nature and the most gracious Giver of sanctifying grace. [324](/works/de-deo-creatore/22-article-4-on-sanctifying-grace-conferred-upon-adam/#p263)

§ III. Whether the sanctifying grace conferred upon Adam was an undue gift. Certainly undue to the whole of created nature - some doubted whether it is also undue to creatable nature - from the sources of revelation it is proved undue to every nature, even creatable nature. [327](/works/de-deo-creatore/22-article-4-on-sanctifying-grace-conferred-upon-adam/#p266)

Prop. XXVI. Sanctifying grace must be called supernatural in such a way that there is no created or creatable nature to which it can be due. [328](/works/de-deo-creatore/22-article-4-on-sanctifying-grace-conferred-upon-adam/#p266)

An objection drawn from accidents intrinsically supernatural is solved. [333](/works/de-deo-creatore/22-article-4-on-sanctifying-grace-conferred-upon-adam/#p269)

Fifth Article. On the first man's immunity from concupiscence.

§ I. Whether Adam was immune from concupiscence. A twofold appetite in man - concupiscence in first act and in second act - a twofold movement of concupiscence - integrity is immunity from movements outside and against the command of reason - it is a habitual gift which consisted both in God's extrinsic providence and in an intrinsic disposition - wherein this latter consists. [334](/works/de-deo-creatore/22-article-4-on-sanctifying-grace-conferred-upon-adam/#p270)

Prop. XXVII. Among the gifts conferred upon the first parents must be numbered immunity from concupiscence, or integrity, by which the faculty of sensing and desiring would be wholly subjected to the rational will. [337](/works/de-deo-creatore/23-article-5-on-the-first-man-s-immunity-from-concupiscence/#p274)

§ II. Whether the integrity of the first condition was undue. Concupiscence considered in three ways - concupiscence as a faculty good in itself - and from God - to which, nevertheless, from the primary intention, there is by no means to be attributed the power of concupiscence tending to evil - although it is attributed to it from the secondary intention - a movement of concupiscence toward what is unlawful before every consent of the will is not sin - yet it is an evil of nature, or a physical evil, in some way touching the moral - why we are ashamed of concupiscence - the state of the question between St. Augustine and Julian - certain corollaries thence for understanding the mind of St. Augustine - a certain special objection from the holy Doctor is solved. [340](/works/de-deo-creatore/23-article-5-on-the-first-man-s-immunity-from-concupiscence/#p276)

Prop. XXVIII. Integrity or immunity from concupiscence which Adam had in his first condition was a gift undue to human nature. [346](/works/de-deo-creatore/23-article-5-on-the-first-man-s-immunity-from-concupiscence/#p282)

Note I. Spiritual concupiscence and its analogy with sensible concupiscence. Note II. How the human race was to be propagated in the state of original justice. [350](/works/de-deo-creatore/23-article-5-on-the-first-man-s-immunity-from-concupiscence/#p285)

Sixth Article. On the immortality of the first man.

§ I. Whether the first man made by God was immortal. Documents of the Church - reason for doubting - threefold incorruptibility - how, then, Adam was immortal: Suarez, St. Augustine - violent or natural death - how Adam was to be preserved from the former - natural death can happen in a twofold way - how Adam was to be preserved from the first way - how from the other - the tree of life was not only a figure of incorruption - how, by an imparted power, it conferred immortality - how often it was to be taken. [353](/works/de-deo-creatore/23-article-5-on-the-first-man-s-immunity-from-concupiscence/#p288)

Prop. XXIX. God conferred upon the first parents the gift of immortality, by which, immune from the necessity of dying, they would never have died if they had persevered in the justice received.

[360](/works/de-deo-creatore/24-article-6-on-the-immortality-of-the-first-man/#p299)

§ II. Whether immortality was an undue gift. In what sense death is natural to us - the soul, although immortal, does not require to be joined to incorruptible matter - difficulties from authorities are anticipated - difficulties from reason; whether resurrection is due - this is considered in two ways - in one way certainly undue - but also in another way - what the Fathers and theologians say - whether the separated soul is more perfect - whether naturally blessed - whether in a violent state. [362](/works/de-deo-creatore/24-article-6-on-the-immortality-of-the-first-man/#p302)

Prop. XXX. Immortality granted to the first parents was a gift undue to innocent human nature. [373](/works/de-deo-creatore/24-article-6-on-the-immortality-of-the-first-man/#p309)

Seventh Article. Whether man in his first condition was impassible through grace. What we include here - doctrine of the Church - contrary errors - twofold passion - what passions existed in innocent Adam - whether he needed sleep - food - whether he labored. [374](/works/de-deo-creatore/24-article-6-on-the-immortality-of-the-first-man/#p310)

Prop. XXXI. The first parents 1. were constituted free from hardships and pains, in a singular state of external happiness - 2. which nevertheless was undue to their nature. [378](/works/de-deo-creatore/25-article-7-whether-man-in-his-first-condition-was-impassible-/#p313)

A point to be noted for the solution of difficulties. [383](/works/de-deo-creatore/25-article-7-whether-man-in-his-first-condition-was-impassible-/#p315)

Eighth Article. On the knowledge of the first man in the state of innocence.

§ I. Whether Adam had knowledge of natural things. Knowledge of natural things infused into Adam - of the same species as ours - supernatural as to mode - corollaries which follow from this - what the object of this knowledge was - corollaries - Adam's infused knowledge compared with ours - whether Adam could advance in it. [384](/works/de-deo-creatore/25-article-7-whether-man-in-his-first-condition-was-impassible-/#p316)

Prop. XXXII. Adam, as soon as he was created, had natural knowledge imparted to him by God. [389](/works/de-deo-creatore/26-article-8-on-the-knowledge-of-the-first-man-in-the-state-of-/#p322)

Note. Whether Adam's children would have been born with perfect knowledge, if Adam had not sinned.
[392](/works/de-deo-creatore/26-article-8-on-the-knowledge-of-the-first-man-in-the-state-of-/#p325)

§ II. Whether and of what sort was Adam's infused cognition of supernatural things. In what sense supernatural - not inferior to faith - whether true faith - Adam had supernatural knowledge - the object of this knowledge - the mystery of the Trinity - of the Incarnation. [393](/works/de-deo-creatore/26-article-8-on-the-knowledge-of-the-first-man-in-the-state-of-/#p326)

Ninth Article. Whether the first parents were immune from error and from venial sin. Error can occur in three ways - what sort of error was possible in innocent Adam - error without fault impossible - rectitude of will in Adam - whether he had moral virtues - what is to be said of penance and mercy - venial sin is committed in two ways - innocent Adam was immune from it. [398](/works/de-deo-creatore/27-article-9-whether-the-first-parents-were-immune-from-error-a/#p330)

Tenth Article. On the end to which the first parents were destined.

§ I. What the intuitive vision of God is. Documents of the Church - whence the name of vision - vision differs from simple cognition in three ways - in what sense it is called clear - in what sense intuitive - and immediate - fourfold medium - the medium under which, in which, and through which is excluded - why the

medium by which is necessary for cognition in general - threefold likeness of the object - offices of the impressed species - no impressed species in the intuitive vision of God - whether possible - what the mental word is: St. Thomas - whether there is a word in the intuitive vision of God - certain things established - what is in dispute - reason for doubting - diverse opinions. [405](/works/de-deo-creatore/27-article-9-whether-the-first-parents-were-immune-from-error-a/#p337)

§ II. Whether the intuitive vision of God is possible. Difficulties from a threefold source - observations concerning difficulties from Scripture - what from reason - no difficulty against the possibility of the supernatural order on God's part - and on the part of the created order - what on the part of the nature to be elevated - what obedientiary potency is - whether it exists - in what it consists - whether it should be called supernatural - twofold object of the intellect - what is the proper and proportioned object of our intellect - what is adequate - the distinction between intellect and sense. [418](/works/de-deo-creatore/28-article-10-on-the-end-to-which-the-first-parents-were-destin/#p357)

§ III. Whether the intuitive vision of God is supernatural. Certainly supernatural with respect to every created nature - documents of the Church - it cannot be called natural as to appetite and supernatural as to attainment - what some theologians have thought about its supernaturalness with respect to every creatable nature. [427](/works/de-deo-creatore/28-article-10-on-the-end-to-which-the-first-parents-were-destin/#p372)

Prop. XXXIII. The intuitive vision of God is an end so exceeding every exigency of nature that there is no created or creatable nature to which it can be due. [429](/works/de-deo-creatore/28-article-10-on-the-end-to-which-the-first-parents-were-destin/#p374)

§ IV. On the light of glory. The light of glory is not the uncreated light itself, but a created gift - it is not the vision itself - it is not an intelligible species - the light of glory is defined - the necessity of the light of glory is not on the part of the object, against Scotus - what Cardinal Toletus has concerning his opinion - the true office of the light of glory. [439](/works/de-deo-creatore/28-article-10-on-the-end-to-which-the-first-parents-were-destin/#p378)

Prop. XXXIV. There is in the blessed a light of glory supplying, on the part of the potency, the natural defect of their intellect, by which, helped, the blessed elicit the act of vision. [444](/works/de-deo-creatore/28-article-10-on-the-end-to-which-the-first-parents-were-destin/#p384)

How the light of glory concurs toward vision - three things to be distinguished in vision - its three principles - both intellect and the light of glory, besides the divine essence, certainly concur toward vision - the mode in which each concurs is explained. [446](/works/de-deo-creatore/28-article-10-on-the-end-to-which-the-first-parents-were-destin/#p387)

§ V. The chief difficulties against the supernaturalness of the intuitive vision are untied. Innate and elicited appetite - innate appetite of exigency and of aptitude - elicited appetite efficacious and absolute, and inefficacious and conditioned - what sort of appetite for the intuitive vision is, or is not, in man - what is to be said of the manner of speaking of certain Scholastics - what especially concerning St. Thomas - natural and supernatural love - points to be noted for the remaining objections. [450](/works/de-deo-creatore/28-article-10-on-the-end-to-which-the-first-parents-were-destin/#p391)

Eleventh Article. Whether the state of pure nature is possible. What is properly asked - the opinion of certain theologians - God's absolute and ordained power according to the mind of St. Thomas - of Suarez - how others understood each of those powers - the true state of the question. [458](/works/de-deo-creatore/28-article-10-on-the-end-to-which-the-first-parents-were-destin/#p402)

Prop. XXXV. The state of pure nature must be called possible not only by absolute power, as they say, but also by ordained power. [463](/works/de-deo-creatore/29-article-11-whether-the-state-of-pure-nature-is-possible/#p410)

Note for the objections. Whether original sin can be known from the miseries of this life. [467](/works/de-deo-creatore/29-article-11-whether-the-state-of-pure-nature-is-possible/#p412)

Fourth Disputation

On Man's Fall, or On Original Sin

First Article. On the sin of the first parents.

§ I. Whether the first parents sinned gravely. Documents of the Church - whether a true precept was imposed upon the first parents - the reason for that precept - whether it was necessary - why the tree was called the tree of knowledge of good and evil. [470](/works/de-deo-creatore/30-article-1-on-the-sin-of-the-first-parents/#p414)

Prop. XXXVI. Upon the first parents 1. a true precept was imposed - which 2. they transgressed - 3. they sinned gravely and 4. lost original justice. [473](/works/de-deo-creatore/30-article-1-on-the-sin-of-the-first-parents/#p417)

Whether Adam and Eve obtained salvation. [479](/works/de-deo-creatore/30-article-1-on-the-sin-of-the-first-parents/#p423)

§ II. Certain points on the nature of the sin of the first parents. Several malices in one act - what sins Adam committed - and Eve - the first sin was pride - St. Thomas explains its nature best - why it is called disobedience - St. Thomas, Suarez - whether that sin occurred with some perverse judgment of mind - how this could have happened. [480](/works/de-deo-creatore/30-article-1-on-the-sin-of-the-first-parents/#p424)

Second Article. On the propagation of the first parents' sin.

§ I. Whether Adam's sin was poured into his posterity. What original sin is - the importance of the question - documents of the Church - ancient errors, more recent errors - what must be proved. [487](/works/de-deo-creatore/31-article-2-on-the-propagation-of-the-first-parents-sin/#p435)

Prop. XXXVII. Adam's sin was poured into his posterity by propagation, not by imitation; or, true original sin is given. [490](/works/de-deo-creatore/31-article-2-on-the-propagation-of-the-first-parents-sin/#p438)

From the Old Testament - from the New Testament - the testimony of the Apostle in Romans 5, set forth and vindicated from Tradition. [490](/works/de-deo-creatore/31-article-2-on-the-propagation-of-the-first-parents-sin/#p438)

§ II. The chief difficulties are proposed and untied. From Scripture - from the Fathers. [506](/works/de-deo-creatore/31-article-2-on-the-propagation-of-the-first-parents-sin/#p442)

§ III. Some little questions concerning sin derived from Adam into his posterity. Which sin of Adam is derived into his posterity - if Adam had committed another sin, whether that would have been poured into his posterity - what, if he had sinned only internally - what if, Adam not sinning, one of his sons had sinned - whether one sin of Adam is poured forth - whether, Adam not sinning, his children would have been born confirmed in grace. [514](/works/de-deo-creatore/31-article-2-on-the-propagation-of-the-first-parents-sin/#p443)

Third Article. Whether the Blessed Virgin Mary was immune from original stain.

§ I. The true notion of the Immaculate Conception of the Blessed Virgin Mary. Pius IX - what "in the first instant of conception" signifies - active and passive conception - passive conception inadequate and adequate - in this latter, a twofold instant of nature - the matter concerns adequate passive conception, excluding every real instant of sin - hence certain sayings of the Fathers and Scholastics are understood -

what "from the stain of original fault" signifies - hence certain things apparently contrary among some ancient Doctors are explained - what "in view of the merits of Christ" means - reparative and preservative redemption - the idea of the latter in Scripture and among the Fathers - hence many difficulties are anticipated.
[520](/works/de-deo-creatore/32-article-3-whether-the-blessed-virgin-mary-was-immune-from-or/#p454)

§ II. The question is solved. Prop. XXXVIII. The most blessed Virgin Mary, from the first instant of her Conception, in view of the merits of Christ, was preserved immune from every stain of original fault.
[526](/works/de-deo-creatore/32-article-3-whether-the-blessed-virgin-mary-was-immune-from-or/#p464)

It is proved from Tradition.
[533](/works/de-deo-creatore/32-article-3-whether-the-blessed-virgin-mary-was-immune-from-or/#p465)

On the mind of St. Bernard and St. Thomas. Difficulties from St. Bernard - a threefold response - from St. Thomas - diverse responses - certain other difficulties are untied.
[537](/works/de-deo-creatore/32-article-3-whether-the-blessed-virgin-mary-was-immune-from-or/#p466)

§ III. What sort of debt of original sin there was in the Blessed Virgin Mary. What debt is - what remote and proximate debt are - Suarez - authors denying proximate debt.
[545](/works/de-deo-creatore/32-article-3-whether-the-blessed-virgin-mary-was-immune-from-or/#p470)

Prop. XXXIX. The Blessed Virgin Mary was immune from the proximate debt of contracting the stain of origin.
[546](/works/de-deo-creatore/32-article-3-whether-the-blessed-virgin-mary-was-immune-from-or/#p472)

§ IV. Whether there was in the Blessed Virgin Mary the tinder of sin. Why this question is treated here - what the tinder of sin is - in what all agree - concerning what theologians dispute - what it is for the tinder to be bound or extinguished - the Blessed Virgin Mary did not have an act of the tinder - the tinder seems to have been extinguished in her from the first sanctification - an objection is solved.
[552](/works/de-deo-creatore/32-article-3-whether-the-blessed-virgin-mary-was-immune-from-or/#p476)

Fourth Article. On the nature of original sin.

§ I. False opinions are rejected. The Tridentine Fathers did not wish to define the nature of original sin - what things must be held by all.
[557](/works/de-deo-creatore/33-article-4-on-the-nature-of-original-sin/#p483)

The most absurd heresy of Illyricus.
[558](/works/de-deo-creatore/33-article-4-on-the-nature-of-original-sin/#p484)

The error common to Lutherans and Calvinists.
[562](/works/de-deo-creatore/33-article-4-on-the-nature-of-original-sin/#p490)

Opinions of certain theologians.
[566](/works/de-deo-creatore/33-article-4-on-the-nature-of-original-sin/#p496)

§ II. The true opinion concerning the nature of original sin is explained. How the nature of original sin ought to be explained - the manifold acceptance of sin - what sin is properly - actual - habitual - this considered in the hypothesis of elevation, and outside this hypothesis - in the order of elevation, the privation of sanctifying grace - how privation differs from defect - privation of sanctifying grace the same as aversion from God as supernatural end - the same as stain - original sin originating, originated - sin of the person, of nature - originated original sin is not actual - in what it consists - in what sense it can be called privation of original justice - how privation of sanctifying grace can have at once the character of sin and of punishment of sin - how it is called a cause of sin - original sin is not properly a habit - whether its material element is

concupiscence - what fault adds beyond defect and privation - in what the whole character of original sin consists - corollary. [568](/works/de-deo-creatore/33-article-4-on-the-nature-of-original-sin/#p498)

Prop. XL. The formal character of original sin consists in habitual aversion from God as supernatural end, or in the privation of grace and charity, induced into posterity through an act of sin freely committed by the first parent. [579](/works/de-deo-creatore/33-article-4-on-the-nature-of-original-sin/#p513)

Fifth Article. On the manner in which the first parent's sin is handed on into posterity. A difficult question - yet not insoluble - it is divided into three parts. [583](/works/de-deo-creatore/33-article-4-on-the-nature-of-original-sin/#p516)

§ I. How the sin of one man could infect all. St. Thomas illustrates the matter - the law given to Adam not only as he was a singular person, but also as he was Head of the whole of nature - in what sense - whence that law had this force - a formal and virtual pact - a simple positive law of God - Adam knew this positive institution of God - this alone, with pacts excluded, is admitted - why Adam's sin infected all, and his repentance did not save all. [584](/works/de-deo-creatore/34-article-5-on-the-manner-in-which-the-first-parent-s-sin-is-h/#p518)

§ II. How the character of the voluntary is found in original sin. Original sin voluntary. Condemned propositions - in what sense it is voluntary - twofold opinion.

Prop. XLI. Original sin is not voluntary by the proper and personal will of the little child, but relatively and mediately by reason of the will of Adam, the juridical head of the human race. [593](/works/de-deo-creatore/34-article-5-on-the-manner-in-which-the-first-parent-s-sin-is-h/#p531)

Objections are solved. [600](/works/de-deo-creatore/34-article-5-on-the-manner-in-which-the-first-parent-s-sin-is-h/#p535)

§ III. What is the cause by which individual human beings are stained with original sin. Four things can be considered - not infants by their own personal will - but Adam, the juridical head of the whole human race - what is the proximate cause as if communicating sin to infants - no efficient physical cause is required - why sin is said to be contracted by generation - how the body is said to infect the soul - in what sense lust is called the cause of sin - marriage is not evil - the soul is created by God, without God therefore being the author of sin - whether the soul is created good by God. [602](/works/de-deo-creatore/34-article-5-on-the-manner-in-which-the-first-parent-s-sin-is-h/#p536)

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Sixth Disputation

On Angels

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Disputation I — On the Origin of the World

Article 1. The True Idea of Creation

LatineEnglish

On God the Creator

1. Verbum creare tripliciter sumi potest. 1. Pro quacumque rei productione : sic, ex. gr., de sapientia dicitur Eccli. 24. 14. "Ab initio et ante sæcula creata sum. " 2. Creari dicitur qui ad altiorem statum evehitur, quomodo dicitur quis creari Cardinalis, Episcopus etc.: Sic Eph. 2. 10. dicimur "creati in Christo Jesu in operibus bonis." 3. Magis proprie significat aliquid facere ex nihilo : sic Ps. 148. 5. dicitur : "Ipse mandavit, et creata sunt ;" et Genes. 1. 1. “In principio creavit Deus cælum et terram." Hoc proprio sensu sumitur hic creatio , quæ proinde definiri potest : productio rei ex nihilo seu productio entis in quantum ens-seu, ut inquit D. Th . 1. p. q. 65. a. 3. c. "productio alicujus rei secundum suam totam substantiam, nullo præsupposito." Expendendo singula definitionis verba, sat clarus habebitur creationis conceptus. 1. The word to create can be taken in three ways. First, for any production whatsoever of a thing: thus, for example, of wisdom it is said in Sirach 24:14, "From the beginning and before the ages I was created." Second, one is said to be created who is raised to a higher state, in the way someone is said to be created a Cardinal, Bishop, and so forth. Thus in Ephesians 2:10 we are said to have been "created in Christ Jesus in good works." Third, more properly, it signifies to make something out of nothing: thus Psalm 148:5 says, "He commanded, and they were created"; and Genesis 1:1, "In the beginning God created heaven and earth."

In this proper sense creation is taken here; and accordingly it can be defined as: the production of a thing out of nothing, or the production of being insofar as it is being - or, as St. Thomas says, Summa Theologiae I, q. 65, a. 3, corpus, "the production of some thing according to its whole substance, with nothing presupposed." By weighing each word of the definition, the concept of creation will be had sufficiently clearly.

2. Dicitur itaque 1. creatio esse productio. Quæ vox in data definitione locum tenet generis proximi,

2 De Deo Creatore. creatio enim est quædam effectionis species. Est autem cujuslibet effectionis ut aliquid fiat, quod ante non erat ; nam quod jam est non fit . " Quod autem procedit, ait D. Th. 1. p. q. 45. a. 1. c., secundum emanationem particularem, non præsupponitur emanationi ; sicut si generatur homo, non fuit prius homo , sed homo fit ex non homine , et album ex non albo. " Unde quidquid fit producitur ut dici consuevit, ex nihilo sui, non quod in quacumque effectione nihil rei productæ, nulla pars ejus, nullum subjectum præexistat ; sed quod res tota prout est effectionis terminus antea non fuerit. 2. Therefore it is said, first, that creation is a production. This word, in the definition given, holds the place of the proximate genus, for creation is a certain species of effecting. But it belongs to every effecting that something come to be which previously was not; for what already is does not come to be. "But that which proceeds," says St. Thomas, Summa Theologiae I, q. 45, a. 1, corpus, "according to a particular emanation is not presupposed to that emanation; just as, if a man is generated, a man did not previously exist, but a man comes to be from non-man, and white from non-white." Hence whatever comes to be is produced, as it is customary to say, from the nothing of itself: not because in every effecting nothing of the produced thing, no part of it, no subject preexists; but because the whole thing, precisely as it is the terminus of the effecting, did not exist before.

3. Quemadmodum vero generatim quod fit non est actu antequam fiat ; ita, si agatur de emanatione alicujus rei a causa particulari, antequam fiat debet esse in potentia. "Illud quod generatur, " D. Th. (de pot. q. 3. a. 8. c..) "oportet quod præexistat potentia, et non

actu ; si enim non præexisteret potentia, fieret ex nihilo ; si vero præexisteret actu, non fieret : quia quod est, non fit. " Unde scholastici Doctores inter rerum naturalium principia posuerunt privationem , quæ non est purum non-ens, sed non-ens cum aptitudine ad essendum ; et est quidem generationis principium non per modum partis influentis, sed per modum termini, qui relinquitur, seu termini a quo. 3. Now just as, generally, what comes to be is not in act before it comes to be, so, if the question concerns the emanation of some thing from a particular cause, before it comes to be it must be in potency. "That which is generated," says St. Thomas, De potentia, q. 3, a. 8, corpus, "must preexist in potency and not in act; for if it did not preexist in potency, it would be made from nothing; but if it preexisted in act, it would not be made, because what is does not come to be." Hence the scholastic Doctors placed privation among the principles of natural things; and privation is not pure non-being, but non-being with an aptitude for being. And indeed it is a principle of generation, not after the manner of an influencing part, but after the manner of a terminus which is left behind, or of the terminus from which.

4. Cum diversæ sint particularium causarum effectiones (generatio, alteratio , augmentatio, translatio de loco in locum), diversæ etiam distingui possunt potentiæ ad essendum. Quod pulchre exponit Card. Tolet. apud Reeb , Thausaurus Phil. pag. 190. "Adverte igitur actum opponi potentiæ, ut id actu dicatur quod est ; id potentia, quod non est, sed esse potest. Invenimus au

Disp. I. De Mundi Origine. 3 tem quadruplicem potentiam in rebus, et consequententer quadruplicem actum. Prima potentia est generationis, secundum quam aliquid dicitur posse recipere esse, quod non habet. Altera est augmentationis , secundum quam potest acquirere quantitatem, qua caret ; quam postquam habuerit, dicitur in actu respectu talis potentiæ. Tertia est alterationis, secundum quam aliquod accidens in se recipere potest sive spirituale, sive corporale ; quo acquisito dicitur esse in actu tali. Quarta est ad locum, ad quem moveri potest. Juxta hos actus et potentias philosophi invenerunt quatuor entium gradus. Primus eorum, quæ in omni potentia sunt, quales sunt substantiæ antequam ducantur ad ortum. Secundus eorum quæ iam producta sunt, sed nondum debitam quantitatem qualitatemque habent ; qualia viventia imperfecta nondum ad augmentum ducta, quæ etiam susceptiva sunt qualitatum , et secundum locum mutabilia. Tertius eorum, quæ duplici potentia carent ad esse et ad quantitatem, quum iam sint quantitatemque debitam habeant ; manent tamen in potentia ad accidentia et qualitates alias, ad motumque localem , Quartus est eorum, quæ in nulla potentia sunt, sed in omni actu ," etc. 4. But since the effectings of particular causes are diverse - generation, alteration, augmentation, and transfer from place to place - diverse potencies to being can also be distinguished. Cardinal Toletus explains this well, in Reeb, Thesaurus Philosophiae, p. 190: "Observe, therefore, that act is opposed to potency, so that that is said to be in act which is; that is said to be in potency which is not, but can be. We find, moreover, a fourfold potency in things, and consequently a fourfold act. The first potency is that of generation, according to which something is said to be able to receive the being which it does not have. The second is that of augmentation, according to which it can acquire the quantity which it lacks; after it has this quantity, it is said to be in act with respect to such potency. The third is that of alteration, according to which something can receive in itself some accident, whether spiritual or corporeal; once this is acquired, it is said to be in such act. The fourth is toward place, to which it can be moved. According to these acts and potencies, philosophers have found four grades of beings. The first is of those things which are in every potency, such as substances before they are brought to birth. The second is of those things which have already been produced, but do not yet have their due quantity and quality; such are imperfect living things not yet brought to growth, which are also receptive of qualities and mutable according to place. The third is of those things which lack a twofold potency, namely to being and to quantity, since they already are and have their due quantity; nevertheless they remain in potency to accidents and other qualities, and to local motion. The fourth is of those things which are in no potency, but in every act," etc.

5. Quæcumque autem sit potentia ad essendum, et privatio, requirit semper aliquod subjectum, in quo sit ; ac proinde quæcumque sit effectio causæ particularis, cum semper præsupponatur ei aliqua potentia, semper etiam præsupponitur aliquod subjectum ex quo effectum educat. Unde aliqui distinxerunt inter nihilum, quod est pura negatio, et nihilum, quod est negatio in subjecto : illud habetur cum nullum, subje

4 De Deo Creatore. ctum adest ex quo et in quo effectus producatur ; hoc vero, cum adest hujusmodi subjectum. Hinc dicunt emanationem a causa particulari supponere nihilum privativum ; emanationem vero primam a causa universali supponere nihilum, quod est pura negatio : seu , quod idem est, effectum primo modo productum esse ex nihilo sui tantum ; altero vero modo, esse ex nihilo tum sui tum subjecti. 5. Whatever the potency to being and the privation may be, however, it always requires some subject in which it exists; and consequently, whatever the effecting of a particular cause may be, since some potency is always presupposed to it, some subject is also always presupposed, from which it draws forth the effect. Hence some have distinguished between nothing, which is pure negation, and nothing, which is negation in a subject. The former is had when no subject is present from which and in which the effect is produced; the latter, when a subject of this kind is present. Hence they say that emanation from a particular cause supposes privative nothing, but that the first emanation from the universal cause supposes nothing which is pure negation; or, what is the same thing, that an effect produced in the first mode is from the nothing of itself only, but in the other mode is from the nothing both of itself and of a subject.

6. Dicitur II. creatio esse productio ex nihilo. Illud ex nihilo in definitione creationis locum tenet differentiæ ultimæ, per quam creatio distinguitur ab omnibus aliis effectionis speciebus. Ex dictis autem patet 1. ex nihilo hic significare ex nihilo tum sui, tum subjecti-2. non vero negationem causæ efficientis ; cum enim creatio sit quædam productio, tam impossibile est ut aliquid creetur ex nihilo causæ efficientis , quam ut detur effectus sine causa. 6. It is said, second, that creation is production out of nothing. That phrase out of nothing, in the definition of creation, holds the place of the ultimate difference, by which creation is distinguished from all other species of effecting. From what has been said, however, it is clear: first, that out of nothing here signifies out of the nothing both of itself and of the subject; second, that it does not signify the negation of an efficient cause. For since creation is a certain production, it is as impossible that something be created out of nothing with respect to an efficient cause as that there be an effect without a cause.

7. Sed insuper tria notanda hic sunt. 1. Quando excluditur a creatione subjectum præexistens, ex quo et in quo res fiat, ac proinde potentia effectus ad essendum antequam fiat ; hoc intelligendum est de potentia reali physica. Si enim sermo sit de illa potentia objectiva, quæ est rei faciendae possibilitas ; haec non excluditur, sed supponitur, ut patebit inferrius, ubi de causa exemplari creationis. 2. Præpositio ex (ex nihilo) significare potest vel ordinem successionis inter terminum priorem et posteriorem , ut cum dicitur ex ægro fit sanus, nempe prius erat æger, modo est sanus : vel dependentiam a causa materiali, ut cum dicitur ex marmore fit statua : utramque significationem importat præpositio illa in definitione creationis ; ita tamen, ut ordo successionis

Disp. I. De Mundi Origine. 5 affirmetur saltem juxta nostrum concipiendi modum, causa vero materialis excludatur. "Cum dicitur, " inquit D. Th. 1. p. q. 45. a. 1. ad 3., aliquid ex nihilo fieri, hæc præpositio, Ex, non designat causam materialem, sed ordinem tantum : sicut, cum dicitur, ex mane fit meridies, id est, post mane fit meridies. Sed intelligendum est, quod hæc præpositio, Ex, potest includere negationem importatam in hoc, quod dico nihil, vel includi ab ea. Si primo modo, tunc ordo remanet affirmatus, et ostenditur ordo ejus, quod est ad non esse præcedens. Si vero negatio includat præpositionem, tunc ordo negatur, et est sensus : Fit ex nihilo, idest, non fit ex aliquo : sicut, si dicatur, Iste loquitur de nihilo, quia non loquitur de aliquo. Et utroque modo verificatur, cum dicitur, ex nihilo aliquid fieri. Sed primo modo hæc præpositio, Ex, importat ordinem, ut

dictum est. Secundo modo importat habitudinem causæ materialis quæ negatur. 3. Non est mens D. Th. quod sit ordo realis inter nihil et totam rem, quæ producitur ; nihil enim non potest reipsa habere ordinem ad aliquid, vel reipsa præcedere, cum sit nihil : sed solum vult D. Th. esse ordinem quemdam inter nihil et rem, secundum nostrum modum intelligendi, nimirum concipimus ipsum nihil ut terminum a quo productionis rei, quæ creatur. Unde patet quam turpiter errent qui ad impugnandam creationis possibilitatem dicunt nihilum non posse converti in realitatem : nos enim nullo pacto admittimus hanc conversionem . 7. But three additional points are to be noted here. First, when a preexisting subject from which and in which a thing comes to be is excluded from creation, and consequently the potency of the effect to being before it comes to be, this must be understood of real physical potency. For if the discussion concerns that objective potency which is the possibility of the thing to be made, this is not excluded, but presupposed, as will be clear below, where the exemplary cause of creation is treated.

Second, the preposition from (out of nothing) can signify either an order of succession between an earlier and a later terminus, as when it is said that from a sick man a healthy man comes to be, that is, he was previously sick and now is healthy; or dependence upon a material cause, as when it is said that from marble a statue is made. That preposition carries both meanings in the definition of creation, yet in such a way that the order of succession is affirmed at least according to our mode of conceiving, while a material cause is excluded. "When it is said," says St. Thomas, Summa Theologiae I, q. 45, a. 1, ad 3, "that something is made out of nothing, this preposition from does not designate a material cause, but only order: as when it is said, from morning comes midday, that is, after morning comes midday. But it must be understood that this preposition from can either include the negation imported in what I call nothing, or be included by it. If in the first mode, then the order remains affirmed, and the order of that which is to the preceding non-being is shown. But if the negation includes the preposition, then the order is denied, and the sense is: It is made out of nothing, that is, it is not made from something; just as, if one should say, This man speaks about nothing, because he does not speak about anything. And in both ways it is verified when it is said that something is made out of nothing. But in the first mode this preposition from imports order, as was said. In the second mode it imports the relation of a material cause which is denied."

Third, St. Thomas's meaning is not that there is a real order between nothing and the whole thing which is produced; for nothing cannot in reality have an order to anything, or really precede, since it is nothing. Rather, St. Thomas means only that there is a certain order between nothing and the thing according to our mode of understanding; namely, we conceive nothing itself as the terminus from which of the production of the thing that is created. Hence it is clear how shamefully they err who, in order to attack the possibility of creation, say that nothing cannot be converted into reality; for we in no way admit this conversion.

8. Dicitur III. creatio esse productio rei ex nihilo. Ac patet 1. ex dictis vocem illam rei significare hic totam realitatem effectus. Unde Conc. Vat. Const .

6 De Deo Creatore. Dei Filius, can. 5. in cap. I. ait : "Si quis non confiteatur mundum, resque omnes , quæ in eo continentur, et spirituales et materiales , secundum totam suam substantiam a Deo ex nihilo esse productas anathema sit. " Quod ut melius intelligatur sciendum est inter alias effectionis species numerari, ut diximus, etiam generationem. Generationem autem communiter sumebant Scholastici non modo stricto sensu, prout dicit originem viventis a vivente principio conjuncto in similitudinem naturæ ; sed etiam lato sensu, prout dicit actionem qua una substantia creata producit aliam. At vero productio substantiæ a causa creata supponit semper subjectum ex quo forma substantialis educatur , supponit juxta communem omnino Scholasticorum doctrinam materiam primam , quæ non est substantia sed elementum substantiale, de se in potentia ad hoc ut sit hæc vel illa substantia per determinationem quam accipiet a forma, cum qua facit unam substantiam compositam. Propterea nulla est generatio quæ producat totam substantiam, seu omnes partes ejus et ex nullo subjecto. Creatio e contra est productio rei secundum totam suam substantiam . " Hoc igitur," inquit D. Th. 1 p. q. 44. a. 2. c., " quod est causa rerum, in quantum sunt entia, oportet esse causam

rerum, non solum secundum quod sunt talia per formas accidentales, nec secundum quod sunt hæc per formas substantiales sed etiam secundum omne illud quod pertinet ad esse illorum quocumque modo. Et sic opportet ponere etiam materiam primam creatam ab universali causa entium. " Patet 2. cur creatio dicitur etiam productio entis in quantum ens. " Unde, si consideretur,"

Disp. I. De Mundi Origine. 7 ait idem S. Doctor q. 45. a. 1. c., " emanatio totius entis universalis a primo principio, impossibile est quod aliquod ens præsupponitur huic emanationi. Idem autem est nihil quod nullum ens. Sicut igitur generatio hominis est ex non ente, quod est non homo, ita creatio, quæ est emanatio totius esse , est ex non- ente, quod est nihil." 8. It is said, third, that creation is the production of a thing out of nothing. From what has been said, it is clear, first, that the word thing here signifies the whole reality of the effect. Hence the Vatican Council, in the Constitution Dei Filius, canon 5 on chapter I, says: "If anyone does not confess that the world and all things which are contained in it, both spiritual and material, were produced by God out of nothing according to their whole substance, let him be anathema." In order that this may be better understood, it must be known that among the other species of effecting, as we have said, generation is also numbered. But the Scholastics commonly took generation not only in the strict sense, insofar as it denotes the origin of a living thing from a joined living principle unto a likeness of nature, but also in a broad sense, insofar as it denotes the action by which one created substance produces another. But the production of a substance by a created cause always supposes a subject from which the substantial form is educed; according to the wholly common doctrine of the Scholastics, it supposes prime matter, which is not a substance but a substantial element, of itself in potency to being this or that substance through the determination which it will receive from the form with which it makes one composite substance. Therefore there is no generation which produces the whole substance, or all its parts and from no subject. Creation, by contrast, is the production of a thing according to its whole substance. "Therefore this," says St. Thomas, Summa Theologiae I, q. 44, a. 2, corpus, "which is the cause of things insofar as they are beings, must be the cause of things not only according as they are such through accidental forms, nor according as they are these things through substantial forms, but also according to everything that pertains to their being in whatever way. And thus it is necessary to posit prime matter also as created by the universal cause of beings." It is clear, second, why creation is also called the production of being insofar as it is being. "Hence," says the same holy Doctor, q. 45, a. 1, corpus, "if the emanation of the whole universal being from the first principle is considered, it is impossible that any being be presupposed to this emanation. But nothing is the same as no being. Therefore, just as the generation of a man is from non-being, which is non-man, so creation, which is the emanation of the whole of being, is from non-being, which is nothing."

9. Sed ut melius innotescat quid proprie importet vox illa rei in definitione creationis, in mentem revocanda est doctrina D. Th. 1. q 45. a. 4. , ubi docet creari esse proprium subsistentium, sive sint simplicia, sive sint composita. Cujus assertionis sensus non est quod formæ substantiales materiales seu dependentes a materia, accidentia, etc., nec mediate nec immediate sint producta ex nihilo ; hoc enim aperte repugnat non modo doctrinæ S. Thomæ, sed et fidei : sed sensus est quod cum hæc non sint per se et secundum se. dici quidem possunt concreata cum composito, cujus forma illa est pars, cum subjecto, cui accidens inest, sed proprie terminus creationis est ipsum compositum subsistens. Assertum autem sic probat S. Doctor : " Creari est quoddam fieri, ut dictum est. Fieri autem ordinatur, ad esse rei. Unde illis proprie convenit fieri, et creari, quibus convenit esse. Quod quidem convenit proprie subsistentibus, sive sint simplicia, sicut substantiæ separatæ, sive sint composita, sicut substantiæ materiales ; illi enim proprie convenit esse, quod habet esse, et quod est subsistens in suo esse . Formæ autem , et accidentia, et alia hujusmodi non dicuntur entia, quasi ipsa sint, sed quia eis aliquid est ; ut albedo ea ratione dicitur ens, quia ejus subjectum est album.

8 De Deo Creatore. Unde secundum philosoph. accidens magis proprie dicitur entis, quam ens. Sicut igitur accidentia, et formæ, et hujusmodi. quæ non subsistunt, magis sunt coexistentia, quam entia ; ita magis debent dici concreata, quam creata . Proprie vero

creata sunt subsistentia. "-Uti patet, juxta D. Thomam, formæ substantiales dependentes a materia, accidentia, etc. , quamvis sint vera quædam realitas, non habent tamen perfectam rationem entis ; quod qui concedunt, nescio quomodo possint dictis formis propriam existentiam tribuere, quasi in uno ente composito sint plures existentiæ. Confirmatur a quibusdam sic :-Quod creatur, ita pendet a Creatore ut a nullo alio pendeat in quovis alio genere causæ ; atqui formæ substantiales, de quibus agitur, accidentia, etc., pendent, uti patet, a causa materiali ; ergo. Mirum est aliquos hoc unum argumentum in re præsenti urgere, et deinde asserere animas brutorum proprie creari ; cum tamen certum sit quod anima humana est substantia a materia ita independens, ut sine ea esse et operari possit ; atque hac maxime immaterialitate, essentialis ejus ab anima bruti differentia ostenditur. Vid. Sylv. in cit. 1. S. Th. 9. But in order that what the word thing properly imports in the definition of creation may become better known, the doctrine of St. Thomas, Summa Theologiae I, q. 45, a. 4, must be recalled, where he teaches that to be created is proper to subsistent things, whether they are simple or composite. The sense of this assertion is not that material substantial forms, or forms dependent upon matter, accidents, and so forth, are not produced out of nothing either mediately or immediately; for this openly conflicts not only with the doctrine of St. Thomas, but also with faith. Rather, the sense is that, since these are not per se and according to themselves, they can indeed be said to be concreated with the composite of which that form is a part, or with the subject in which the accident inheres, but the proper terminus of creation is the subsisting composite itself.

The holy Doctor proves the assertion thus: "To be created is a certain coming-to-be, as has been said. But coming-to-be is ordered to the being of a thing. Hence coming-to-be and being-created properly belong to those things to which being belongs. Now this properly belongs to subsistent things, whether they are simple, as separate substances are, or composite, as material substances are; for being properly belongs to that which has being and which is subsistent in its being. But forms, accidents, and other things of this kind are not called beings as though they themselves were, but because by them something is; thus whiteness is called a being for this reason, that its subject is white. Hence, according to the Philosopher, an accident is more properly called 'of a being' than a being. Therefore, just as accidents, forms, and things of this kind, which do not subsist, are more coexistent things than beings, so they ought rather to be called concreated than created. Properly, however, subsistent things are created."

As is clear, according to St. Thomas, substantial forms dependent upon matter, accidents, and so forth, although they are a certain true reality, nevertheless do not have the perfect notion of being. Those who concede this, I do not know how they can attribute proper existence to the said forms, as though in one composite being there were several existences. This is confirmed by some in this way: what is created depends upon the Creator in such a way that it depends upon no other in any other genus of cause; but substantial forms of the sort under discussion, accidents, and so forth, depend, as is clear, upon a material cause; therefore. It is astonishing that some press this one argument in the present matter, and then assert that the souls of brute animals are properly created, although it is certain that the human soul is a substance so independent of matter that it can be and operate without it; and by this immateriality especially its essential difference from the soul of a brute animal is shown. See Sylvius on the cited place of St. Thomas.

10. Ex dictis facile patet 1. creationem proprie non esse mutationem. " Creatio," inquit D. Th . 1. p . q. 45. a. 2. ad 2., "non est mutatio, nisi secundum modum intelligendi tantum. Nam de ratione mutationis est quod aliquid idem se habeat aliter nunc et prius. Nam quandoque quidem est idem ens actu aliter se habens nunc et prius, sicut in motibus secundum quantitatem et qualitatem ; quandoque vero est idem ens in potentia tantum, sicut in muta

Disp. I. De Mundi Origine. 9 tatione secundum substantiam, cujus subjectum est materia. Sed in creatione per quam producitur tota substantia rei, non potest accipi aliquid idem aliter se habens nunc et prius, nisi secundum intellectum tantum ; sicut si intelligatur aliqua res prius non fuisse totaliter, et postea esse." Vid. etiam de pot. q. 3. a. 2., et c. g. 1. 2. c. 17. 2. Quomodo generatio verbi nequeat dici creatio ; cum enim Filius Dei sit

coæternus Patri, nullus est, ne quidem secundum nostrum intelligendi modum, ordo successionis esse ipsius post nihil ; et quamvis non sit productus ex aliqua materia vel subjecto, est tamen genitus de ipsa substantia Patris. 3. Quod etsi transubstantiatio vocetur aliquando a Patribus creatio, hæc est minus propria denominatio ; in transubstantiatione enim non producitur corpus Christi ex nihilo, sed convertitur panis præexistens in corpus Christi. Vid. 3. p. q. 75. a. 8. 10. From what has been said it is easily clear, first, that creation is not properly a mutation. "Creation," says St. Thomas, Summa Theologiae I, q. 45, a. 2, ad 2, "is not a mutation except according to the mode of understanding only. For it belongs to the notion of mutation that something the same have itself differently now and before. For sometimes, indeed, it is the same being in act having itself differently now and before, as in movements according to quantity and quality; but sometimes it is the same being in potency only, as in mutation according to substance, whose subject is matter. But in creation, through which the whole substance of a thing is produced, there cannot be taken something the same having itself differently now and before, except according to the intellect only; as if some thing is understood previously not to have been at all, and afterwards to be." See also De potentia, q. 3, a. 2, and Contra Gentiles II, c. 17.

Second, it is clear how the generation of the Word cannot be called creation. For since the Son of God is coeternal with the Father, there is no order of succession of his being after nothing, not even according to our mode of understanding; and although he is not produced from any matter or subject, he is nevertheless begotten of the very substance of the Father.

Third, although transubstantiation is sometimes called creation by the Fathers, this is a less proper denomination. For in transubstantiation the body of Christ is not produced out of nothing, but the preexisting bread is converted into the body of Christ. See Summa Theologiae III, q. 75, a. 8.

11. Necesse non est hic afferre testimonia, ad ostendendum conceptum creationis a nobis traditum doctrina catholica contineri ; nam exhibituri ea sumus, ubi factum creationis adstruemus. 11. It is not necessary here to bring forward testimonies in order to show that the concept of creation handed down by us is contained in Catholic doctrine; for we shall present them where we establish the fact of creation.

Article 2. Whether Creation is a Transient or Immanent Action

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Second Article. Whether Creation Is A Transient Or Immanent Action.

12. Actio immanens communiter dicitur ea, cujus terminus manet in ipso agente ; actio vero transiens est illa, cujus terminus est extra principium a quo procedit. "Est, " inquit D. Th. c. g. 1. 2. c. 1 , " duplex rei operatio. Una quidem, quæ in ipso operante manet, et est ipsius operantis perfectio, ut

10 De Deo Creatore. sentire, intelligere et velle ; alia vero, quæ in exteriorem rem transit, quæ est perfectio facti quod per ipsam constituitur, ut calefacere, secare et ædificare." Non desunt qui ad constituendam actionem transeuntem , præter terminum extra principium agens positum, requirant applicationem virtutis agentis ad aliquod subjectum in quo operatur. 12. An immanent action is commonly said to be one whose terminus remains in the agent itself; a transient action, however, is one whose terminus is outside the principle from which it proceeds. "There is," says St. Thomas, Contra Gentiles II, c. 1, "a twofold operation of a thing. One remains in the operator itself and is the perfection of the operator itself, as sensing, understanding, and willing; the other passes over into an exterior thing, and is the perfection of the thing made which is constituted through it, as heating, cutting, and building." There are some who, in order

to constitute a transient action, require, besides a terminus placed outside the acting principle, the application of the agent's power to some subject in which it operates.

13. His positis, qui actionem transeuntem sola termini positione extra principium agens constitui doceret, facile responderet creationem esse actionem transeuntem, si quidem creatura est extra Deum creantem ; qui vero applicationem virtutis agentis ad subjectum ulterius requireret, consequenter diceret creationem, cum nullum præsupponat subjectum, non esse actionem transeuntem. Sed nec potest dici simpliter immanens, nam terminus creationis est certe extra Deum : unde solum pantheistæ docuerunt : "Deus est omnium rerum causa immanens, non vero transiens. " Spinoza, Eth. Pars. I. de Deo, prop. XVIII . 13. These things having been posited, one who taught that a transient action is constituted solely by the placing of the terminus outside the acting principle would easily answer that creation is a transient action, since indeed the creature is outside God creating. But one who further required the application of the agent's power to a subject would consequently say that creation, since it presupposes no subject, is not a transient action. Yet neither can it be called simply immanent, for the terminus of creation is certainly outside God. Hence only the pantheists have taught: "God is the immanent, not the transient, cause of all things." Spinoza, Ethics, Part I, On God, proposition XVIII.

14. Quid ergo ? Dicunt creationem esse actionem formaliter immanentem et virtualiter transeuntem , quatenus manet quidem in Deo, sed vim habet ponendi effectum ad extra, Suarez Met. dist. 20. sect. 4. n. 3. Quare cum certum sit apud Theologos creationem non esse actionem simpliciter immanentem, disputatur utrum sit formaliter transiens, vel formaliter immanens et virtualiter transiens. 14. What then? They say that creation is an action formally immanent and virtually transient, insofar as it indeed remains in God, but has the power of placing an effect outside himself. Suarez, Metaphysics, disputation 20, section 4, n. 3. Therefore, since it is certain among theologians that creation is not an action simply immanent, the question is disputed whether it is formally transient, or formally immanent and virtually transient.

15. Vera ratio dubitandi petenda est ex iis quæ docent plures Philosophi de natura actionis, quæ breviter in mentem hic revocanda sunt. In quolibet effectu possumus tria considerare . Primo ejus habitudinem ad causam, a qua pro-

Disp. I. De Mundi Origine. 11 cedit ; secundo ejus habitudinem ad subjectum, in quo recipitur ; tertio ipsum fieri talis effectus, seu quemdam ab agente in factum effluxum, qui est medius inter effectum et causam ejus. Hic effluxus est motus, qui dicitur actio relate ad causam, passio relate ad subjectum. Calefactio, ex. gr., prout producitur ab igne effundente suum calorem, dicitur actio ; prout recipitur in ligno, quod immutatur et calefit, dicitur passio ; prout est via et tendentia ad terminum dicitur motus . Et quamvis hæc tria (motus , actio , passio) entitative non distinguantur, videntur tamen distingui modaliter. Si quæratur ubinam subjectetur effluxus ille, respondent plures, in actionibus transeuntibus , in quibus proprie verificatur ratio motus, effluxum esse quidem agentis ut a quo , sed non ut in quo ; seu subjectum ejus non esse ipsum agens, sed potius patiens , cujus proinde dicitur esse perfectio . 15. The true reason for doubting must be sought from those things which many philosophers teach about the nature of action; these are to be briefly recalled here.

In any effect we can consider three things: first, its relation to the cause from which it proceeds; second, its relation to the subject in which it is received; third, the very coming-to-be of such an effect, or a certain efflux from the agent into the thing made, which is intermediate between the effect and its cause. This efflux is motion, which is called action in relation to the cause, and passion in relation to the subject. Heating, for example, insofar as it is produced by fire pouring forth its heat, is called action; insofar as it is received in

wood, which is changed and heated, it is called passion; insofar as it is a way and tendency toward a terminus, it is called motion. And although these three - motion, action, passion - are not distinguished entitatively, nevertheless they seem to be distinguished modally.

If it is asked where that efflux is subjected, many answer that in transient actions, in which the notion of motion is properly verified, the efflux is indeed of the agent as that from which, but not as that in which; or, its subject is not the agent itself, but rather the patient, of which therefore it is said to be the perfection.

16. Jamvero quando disputatur inter Theologos utrum creatio sit actio formaliter transiens, vel formaliter immanens et solum virtualiter transiens ; tota quæstio versatur in eo, utrum admittendus sit ille effluxus medius inter Creatorem et terminum creationis. Qui enim doctrinam expositam de actione generatim, applicant etiam creationi, consequenter dicunt : 1. Volitionem divinam esse principium creationis, sed non ipsam actionem creativam. (Vid. Becanum, de attrib. div. cap. XVII., 2.) 2. Actionem creativam formaliter sumptam esse ipsum fieri creaturæ, seu ejus effluxum a Deo ; cumque hic effluxus sit extra Deum, a quo veluti egreditur, creationem vocant actionem formaliter transeuntem. "Supponi

12 De Deo Creatore. mus ergo," inquit Suarez, 1. c., n. 21., "cum Arist., 9 Met. , text. 16, actiones, quæ habent terminum factum extra causam agentem, esse in ipso passo seu termino, et non in agente. Et juxta hanc sententiam dicimus, dependentiam creaturæ, ut est quidam fluxus a Deo, habere veram rationem actionis transeuntis . Et probatur primo, quia in calefactione ignis et omnibus similibus, dependentia, qua fit calor in passo, non alia ratione est actio caloris existentis in igne, nisi quia est fluxus quidam caloris ab illo manans ; sed dependentia qua fit creatura a Deo est fluxus quidam manans ab ipso Deo ; ergo habet veram rationem actionis ." 3. Creationem in creatura esse modum quemdam realiter distinctum ab ipso esse creaturae . "Dico tertio," ait idem Eximius Doctor, n. 15.: "hæc dependentia, quæ est in creatura, non est res omnino distincta realiter a termino creationis, neque est sola relatio resultans ex termino creationis, sed est modus quidam ex natura rei distinctus ab ipso termino. In his omnibus æquiparamus creationem omnibus aliis dependentiis, in quibus omnia illa fere sunt certa, et ab eis sumitur argumentum satis efficax per inductionem et similitudinem, quia differentia, quod actio sit ex subjecto, vel non ex subjecto, nihil ad hæc omnia refert, ut facile ex dictis patet, et magis constabit ex solutionibus argumentorum.” 16. Now when theologians dispute whether creation is an action formally transient, or formally immanent and only virtually transient, the whole question turns on this: whether that efflux intermediate between the Creator and the terminus of creation must be admitted. For those who apply the doctrine set forth concerning action generally also to creation consequently say: first, that the divine volition is the principle of creation, but not the creative action itself. See Becanus, On the Divine Attributes, chapter XVII, 2. Second, that creative action, taken formally, is the very coming-to-be of the creature, or its efflux from God; and since this efflux is outside God, from whom it proceeds as it were, they call creation an action formally transient. "Therefore we suppose," says Suarez, in the cited place, n. 21, "with Aristotle, Metaphysics IX, text 16, that actions which have a terminus made outside the acting cause are in the patient itself, or terminus, and not in the agent. And according to this opinion we say that the dependence of the creature, as it is a certain flux from God, has the true notion of a transient action. And it is proved first, because in the heating by fire and in all similar cases, the dependence by which heat comes to be in the patient is an action of the heat existing in the fire for no other reason than because it is a certain flux of heat flowing from it; but the dependence by which the creature comes to be from God is a certain flux flowing from God himself; therefore it has the true notion of action." Third, that creation in the creature is a certain mode really distinct from the very being of the creature. "I say third," says the same Excellent Doctor, n. 15, "this dependence, which is in the creature, is not a thing entirely really distinct from the terminus of creation, nor is it only a relation resulting from the terminus of creation, but it is a certain mode distinct from the terminus itself by the nature of the thing. In all these things we equate creation with all other dependencies, in which nearly all those things are certain, and from them a sufficiently effective argument is taken by induction and likeness, because the difference,

namely that the action is from a subject or not from a subject, makes no difference to all these things, as is easily clear from what has been said, and will be clearer from the solutions of the arguments."

17. Qui e contra vel non admittunt totam illam doctrinam de actione, vel saltem, applicari posse negant creationi, consequenter docent : 1. Creationem active sumptam esse ipsam volitionem divinam. "Deus enim, " inquit D. Th. de pot. q. 3. a. 3. c., "non

Disp. I. De Mundi Origine. 13 agit actione media inter ipsum et effectum, sed ejus actio considerata ex parte Dei , una est, et realiter eadem cum ejus potentia et essentia (ad distinctionem actionis creaturæ , quæ realiter differt ab ipsa) licet etc. " Unde c. g. 1. 2. c. 10. ait : " Quia vero nihil est suiipsius principium, quum divina actio non sit aliud quam ejus potentia, manifestum est ex prædictis quod potentia non dicitur in Deo sicut principium actionis, sed sicut principium facti. Et quia potentia respectum ad alterum importat in ratione principii (est enim potentia activa principium agendi in aliud, ut per philosophum Metaphysic. v, text. comm. 17 patet) manifestum est quod potentia dicitur de Deo per respectum ad facta, secundum rei veritatem, non per respectum ad actionem, nisi secundum modum intelligendi, prout intellectus noster diversis conceptionibus utrumque considerat, scilicet divinam potentiam et ejus actionem. " 2. Negant effluxum veluti medium inter Creatorem et terminum creationis . 3. Tradunt creationem in creatura esse ipsum esse ejus cum reali relatione ad Creatorem . " Unde relinquitur, (1. p. q. 45. a. 3.,) quod creatio in creatura non sit nisi relatio quædam ad Creatorem ut ad principium sui esse. " 17. Those, on the contrary, who either do not admit that whole doctrine concerning action, or at least deny that it can be applied to creation, consequently teach: first, that creation taken actively is the divine volition itself. "For God," says St. Thomas, De potentia, q. 3, a. 3, corpus, "does not act by an action intermediate between himself and the effect, but his action, considered on the part of God, is one, and really the same as his power and essence, in distinction from the action of a creature, which really differs from it, although, etc." Hence in Contra Gentiles II, c. 10, he says: "But because nothing is the principle of itself, since the divine action is nothing other than his power, it is manifest from the foregoing that power is not said in God as a principle of action, but as a principle of the thing made. And because power imports a respect to another in the notion of a principle - for active power is a principle of acting upon another, as is clear through the Philosopher, Metaphysics V, text 17 - it is manifest that power is said of God by respect to things made, according to the truth of the thing, not by respect to action, except according to the mode of understanding, insofar as our intellect considers both by diverse conceptions, namely divine power and his action." Second, they deny an efflux as though intermediate between the Creator and the terminus of creation. Third, they hand down that creation in the creature is the very being of it, with a real relation to the Creator. "Hence it remains," Summa Theologiae I, q. 45, a. 3, "that creation in the creature is nothing but a certain relation to the Creator as to the principle of its being."

18. Ex his manifestum est cur Auctores primæ sententiæ creationem vocant actionem formaliter transeuntem ; actio enim creativa, juxta eos, formaliter consistit in illo effluxu, qui est extra Deum : cur e contra Auctores alterius sententiæ creationem dicunt actionem formaliter immanentem et virtualiter transeuntem ; nam, juxta illos, creatio active sumpta formaliter est ipsa Dei voluntas, quæ vim habet ponendi effectum extra se .

14 De Deo Creatore. 18. From these things it is manifest why the authors of the first opinion call creation an action formally transient: for creative action, according to them, formally consists in that efflux which is outside God. It is also manifest why, on the contrary, the authors of the other opinion say that creation is an action formally immanent and virtually transient: for, according to them, creation taken actively is formally the very will of God, which has the power of placing an effect outside itself.

19. Nos abstinemus hic a quæstione generali, utrum actio, sive sit creaturæ sive Dei, præter creationem, dicat illum effluxum medium inter causam et effectum. Nec tamen putamus præsentem quæstionem dirimi posse negando generatim dari modos ex natura rei distinctos a substantiis . Licet enim aliquis asseruerit hos modos communiter rejici a philosophis , notum est a plurimis Theologis, qui et præstantissimi philosophorum sunt, agnosci. Suarez , ex . gr., si quid peccat in hac re, est quia plures admittit quam fortasse par sit ; sed et D. Th. en, inter cætera , quæ docet , (Totius Logicæ Summa inter opusc. Aquinatis recensetur n. 44.) : " Modus autem essendi alicujus rei potest accipi dupliciter. Uno modo, ut est proprietas realis alicujus realiter differens ab eo, sicut dicimus de aliquo , iste habet bonum modum , quia est mansuetus et concors. Constat autem quod mansuetudo et concordia quas dicimus modos, res sunt differentes ab eo cujus sunt. Secundo modo dicitur modus res concepta : uno modo respectu suiipsius : alio modo , ut est concepta : qui quidem diversi modi considerandi non sumuntur ex diversis in re existentibus, sed ex habitudine ad diversa, sub qua habitudine res intelligitur ; verbi gratia : substantia secundum quod est subjectum accidentium, significatur per modum substantiæ, quia substantia dicitur a substando : secundum autem quod a nullo priore dependet cui innitatur, significatur ut ens per se : et isti modi sunt idipsum quod substantia, differentes sola ratione animæ concipientis ipsam secundum diversas habitudines : quæ ratio non est ficta, sed accipitur a re, ita enim in re est : nam et substantia substat accidentibus et nulli innititur."

Disp. I. De Mundi Origine. 15 19. We abstain here from the general question whether action, whether it belongs to a creature or to God, apart from creation, denotes that efflux intermediate between cause and effect. Nor do we think that the present question can be settled by generally denying that there are modes distinct from substances by the nature of the thing. For although someone has asserted that these modes are commonly rejected by philosophers, it is known that they are acknowledged by very many theologians, who are also most excellent philosophers. Suarez, for example, if he errs at all in this matter, errs because he admits more such modes than perhaps is fitting. But see St. Thomas among the other things which he teaches - the Summa of All Logic is numbered among the opuscula of Aquinas as n. 44: "Now the mode of being of some thing can be taken in two ways. In one way, as a real property of something really differing from it, as when we say of someone, this man has a good mode, because he is gentle and harmonious. But it is clear that gentleness and harmony, which we call modes, are things differing from that of which they are modes. In a second way, a mode is called a thing conceived: in one way with respect to itself; in another way, as it is conceived. These diverse modes of considering are not taken from diverse things existing in reality, but from a relation to diverse things, under which relation the thing is understood. For example: substance, according as it is the subject of accidents, is signified by the mode of substance, because substance is so called from standing under. But according as it depends on no prior thing on which it rests, it is signified as being per se. And these modes are the very same thing as substance, differing only by the reason of the soul conceiving it according to diverse relations. This reason is not fictitious, but is taken from the thing; for so it is in reality: substance both stands under accidents and rests on nothing."

20. Quare præsenti quæstioni unice attendentes , dicimus : PROP . I. Creatio est actio ex sese immanens, et solum virtualiter transiens . Prob . I. arg. D. Th. 1. c., quod sic exponi potest : Creatio active sumpta vel est actio simpliciter immanens , vel formaliter transiens, vel formaliter immanens et solum virtualiter transiens ; atqui primum et alterum dici nequit. Ergo . Prob. min. Quod non sit simpliciter immanens conceditur hic ab omnibus. Sed nec est formaliter transiens . Nam eatenus esset formaliter transiens, quatenus, ex dictis , consisteret in effluxu medio inter Creatorem et creaturam ; atqui hujusmodi effluxus non datur ; ergo . Prob . hæc min. Effluxus medius inter causam agentem et effectum, ex dictis de natura actionis, proprie vocatur motus, qui dicitur actio vel passio prout refertur ad causam vel ad subjectum ; atqui in creatione non datur motus ; tum quia motus est actus existentis in potentia, et ante creationem nihil est in potentia ; tum quia realis motus requirit duos terminos reales , et in creatione terminus a quo est nihil. Ergo . Prob . II. Creatio active sumpta est Dei volitio, vi cujus ex nihilo

aliquid producitur extra Deum ; atqui talis volitio est ex sese immanens et solum virtualiter transiens. Ergo . Decl. Nulli dubium est creationem active sumptam esse aliquo sensu volitionem divinam, sive intelligatur hæc esse principium actionis creativae, sive ipsa formaliter actio. Pariter certum est, in præ

16 De Deo Creatore. senti quæstione, vi hujus volitionis divinæ poni terminum extra Deum ; ac proinde creationem esse actionem aliquo modo transeuntem.-Solum ergo probari debet eamdem volitionem esse ex sese immanentem ; ideoque etc. Prob. min. quoad hanc partem. Quod identificatur cum divina essentia est certe immanens Deo ; atqui volitio divina, vi cujus aliquid ex nihilo producitur, identificatur cum divina voluntate, quæ idem est cum divina essentia. Ergo . Prob. hæc min. Si non identificaretur cum divina essentia, vel esset in seipsa, vel in termino creationis. Atqui non in seipsa, actio enim natura sua requirit subjectum, in quo sit ; non in termino creationis siquidem omnis actio est natura sua prior termino, ac proinde etiam creatio est natura prior re creata. Ergo . Verum est quod creatio est instantanea ; ut enim docet D. Th. 1. p. q. 45. a 3. ad 3. "in his quae fiunt sine motu, simul est fieri et factum esse . Et in his quod fit, est ; sed cum dicitur fieri, significatur ab alio esse, et prius non fuisse. Unde cum creatio sit sine motu, simul aliquid creatur et creatum est." Possumus tamen distinguere diversa naturae instantia, et sic concipere prius voluntatem divinam principium creationis, deinde actionem (in hypothesi adversariorum), et tandem terminum actionis creativae. Actio illa videtur exigere aliquod subjectum in quo sit, actio enim transiens, qualis illa esset, est accidens. At in illo medio instanti quodnam esset ejus subjectum ? Non quidem Deus ; tum quia repugnat ut Deus sit subjectum alicujus accidentis, tum quia

Disp. I. De Mundi Origine. 17 jam actio illa esset immanens et non transiens. Neque creatura, quae erit solum in instanti posteriori. Dices cum Suarez 1. c. n. 27. "Multi ergo negant hanc dependentiam, quæ est creatio, esse accidens, asserentes esse modum substantialem rei quae creatur. Unde quatenus illud fieri concipitur ut prius natura suo termino , concedendum est non esse in subjecto, sed concipi quasi in se ; quod non est inconveniens ." Resp. Videri valde inconveniens concipere existentem in illo instanti medio, de quo agimus, modum rei creatae sine re creata cujus est modus. Hoc saltem admitti nequit, nisi gravi cogente ratione, quae hic deesse videtur. 20. Therefore, attending only to the present question, we say:

Proposition I. Creation is an action of itself immanent, and only virtually transient.

The first proof is from the argument of St. Thomas in the cited place, which can be set forth as follows: Creation taken actively is either an action simply immanent, or formally transient, or formally immanent and only virtually transient. But the first and the second cannot be said. Therefore.

Proof of the minor. That it is not simply immanent is conceded here by all. But neither is it formally transient. For it would be formally transient only insofar as, from what has been said, it would consist in an efflux intermediate between the Creator and the creature. But no efflux of this kind is given. Therefore.

Proof of this minor. An efflux intermediate between an acting cause and an effect, from what has been said about the nature of action, is properly called motion, which is called action or passion according as it is referred to the cause or to the subject. But in creation no motion is given: both because motion is the act of something existing in potency, and before creation nothing is in potency; and because real motion requires two real termini, and in creation the terminus from which is nothing. Therefore.

Second proof. Creation taken actively is God's volition, by the force of which something is produced out of nothing outside God. But such volition is of itself immanent and only virtually transient. Therefore.

Explanation. It is doubtful to no one that creation taken actively is in some sense the divine volition, whether this be understood to be the principle of creative action, or formally the action itself. Likewise it is certain, in the present question, that by the force of this divine volition a terminus outside God is placed; and consequently that creation is in some way a transient action. Therefore it remains only to prove that the same volition is of itself immanent; and therefore, etc.

Proof of the minor as to this part. What is identified with the divine essence is certainly immanent to God. But the divine volition, by the force of which something is produced out of nothing, is identified with the divine will, which is the same as the divine essence. Therefore.

Proof of this minor. If it were not identified with the divine essence, it would be either in itself or in the terminus of creation. But it is not in itself, for action by its nature

requires a subject in which it is; nor is it in the terminus of creation, since every action is by nature prior to its terminus, and consequently creation too is by nature prior to the thing created. Therefore.

It is true that creation is instantaneous; for as St. Thomas teaches, Summa Theologiae I, q. 45, a. 3, ad 3, "in those things which come to be without motion, the coming-to-be and the having-been-made are simultaneous. And in these things, what comes to be, is; but when it is said to come to be, it is signified to have being from another and previously not to have been. Hence, since creation is without motion, something is simultaneously created and has been created." Nevertheless, we can distinguish diverse instants of nature, and thus conceive first the divine will as the principle of creation, then the action - on the hypothesis of the adversaries - and finally the terminus of the creative action. That action seems to require some subject in which it is, for a transient action, such as that would be, is an accident. But in that middle instant, what would be its subject? Certainly not God, both because it is repugnant that God be the subject of any accident, and because that action would already be immanent and not transient. Nor would the creature be its subject, since the creature will be only in the later instant.

You will say with Suarez, in the cited place, n. 27: "Many therefore deny that this dependence, which is creation, is an accident, asserting that it is a substantial mode of the thing which is created. Hence, insofar as that coming-to-be is conceived as prior by nature to its terminus, it must be conceded that it is not in a subject, but is conceived as if in itself; and this is not inconvenient."

I reply: it seems very inconvenient to conceive, as existing in that middle instant of which we are speaking, the mode of the created thing without the created thing of which it is the mode. This at least cannot be admitted unless some weighty reason compels it, and such a reason seems to be lacking here.

21. Ex dictis facile est intelligere doctrinam, quam D. Th. tradit cit. a. 3. q. 45. Paucis sic exponi potest. Creatio considerari potest active et passive. Active considerata significat actionem divinam, quæ est ejus essentia, cum relatione ad creaturam. Unde Dei volitio potest quidem dici principium creationis passive, at nullo modo creationis active ; siquidem est ipsa creatio activa, quatenus ei conjungitur connotatio relationis ad creaturam . Et quamvis relatio de se non sit activa, satis est quod sit conjuncta practicæ volitioni divinæ , quæ certe est activa. 21. From what has been said, it is easy to understand the doctrine which St. Thomas hands down in the cited article 3 of question 45. It can be set forth briefly as follows. Creation can be considered actively and passively. Considered actively, it signifies the divine action, which is his essence, with relation to the creature. Hence God's volition can indeed be called the principle of passive creation, but in no way the principle of active creation, since it is active creation itself, insofar as the connotation of a relation to the creature is joined to it. And although relation of itself is not active, it is enough that it be joined to the practical divine volition, which certainly is active.

22. Passive autem considerata "creatio," inquit D. Th. q. 3. de pot. a. 3., "nihil aliud est realiter quam relatio quædam ad Deum cum novitate essendi. " Quæ relatio est dependentiæ ; "non enim," inquit c. g. 1. 2. c. 18., "creatio est mutatio, sed est ipsa dependentia esse creati ad principium, a quo in

18 De Deo Creatore. stituitur. " Quibus conformiter in Sum. The. I. c. ait : "Relinquitur quod creatio in creatura non sit nisi relatio quædam ad Creatorem ut ad principium sui esse creatio passive accepta est in creatura et est creata." 22. Considered passively, however, "creation," says St. Thomas, De potentia, q. 3, a. 3, "is really nothing other than a certain relation to God with newness of being." This relation is one of dependence; for, he says in Contra Gentiles II, c. 18, "creation is not mutation, but is the very dependence of created being upon the principle by which it is established." In conformity with these statements, he says in Summa Theologiae I, in the cited place: "It remains that creation in the creature is nothing but a certain relation to the Creator as to the principle of its being. Creation taken passively is in the creature and is created."

23. Advertendum tamen est quod " Cum ... Deus sit, " (1. p . q. 13. a. 1. c.) " extra totum ordinem creaturæ et omnes creaturæ ordinentur ad ipsum, et non e converso ; manifestum est quod creaturæ realiter referuntur ad ipsum Deum ; sed in Deo non est aliqua realis relatio ejus ad creaturas , sed secundum rationem tantum, in quantum creaturæ referuntur ad ipsum. " Est quidem realis hæc relatio in creatura, siquidem nihil deest ex iis , quæ, uti docet D. Th. Opusc. 48. , requiruntur ad relationem realem constituendam . Dantur enim duo termini reales, Deus et creatura - hi termini sunt inter se realiter distincti-fundamentum relationis est reale in creatura, est enim ipsum ejus esse a Creatore acceptum. Est autem creatio relatio solum rationis in Deo ; nam nihil reale ei advenit ex hoc quod creaturas producat in iisque operetur. Nec tamen sequitur Deum esse Dominum creaturarum secundum rationem et non secundum rem. Etenim ait D. Th. cit. a. q. 13 . ad 5. "cum ea ratione referatur Deus ad creaturam , qua creatura refertur ad ipsum ; cum relatio subjectionis realiter sit in creatura ; sequitur quod Deus non secundum rationem tantum, sed. realiter sit Dominus : eo enim modo dicitur Dominus quo creatura ei subjecta est ."

Disp. I. De Mundi Origine. 19 23. Yet it must be noted that, "since God," Summa Theologiae I, q. 13, a. 7, corpus, "is outside the whole order of creatures, and all creatures are ordered to him and not conversely, it is manifest that creatures are really referred to God himself; but in God there is no real relation of him to creatures, but only according to reason, insofar as creatures are referred to him."

This relation is indeed real in the creature, since nothing is lacking from those things which, as St. Thomas teaches in Opuscule 48, are required for constituting a real relation. For two real termini are given, God and creature; these termini are really distinct from each other; and the foundation of the relation is real in the creature, for it is the very being of it received from the Creator.

But creation is a relation only of reason in God, for nothing real comes to him from the fact that he produces creatures and operates in them. Nor, however, does it follow that God is Lord of creatures according to reason and not according to reality. For St. Thomas says in the cited article, q. 13, ad 5: "Since God is referred to the creature according to that reason by which the creature is referred to him, and since the relation of subjection is really in the creature, it follows that God is Lord not only according to reason but really; for he is called Lord in the mode in which the creature is subject to him."

24. Dices : Dici nequit creationem in creatura nihil aliud esse, quam ipsum ejus esse cum relatione inde resultante. Nam eodem manente esse creaturæ potest diversa in ea haberi realis relatio ; atqui diversa realis relatio postulat diversum fundamentum ; ergo.-Prob. maj.: potest idem esse creaturæ produci per creationem a Deo solo, vel a Deo cum creatura ut instrumento elevato ; potest idem esse accidentis produci naturaliter in subjecto et ex subjecto, vel supernaturaliter sine subjecto ; atqui in his casibus, eodem manente esse creaturæ, diversa haberetur relatio ; ergo. Atque hæc dicitur esse præcipua ratio, ob quam Suarez, 1. c. nn. 12. 13., admittit modum substantialem, in quo formaliter constituit actionem creativam. Resp. Nobis , ut suo loco dicetur, probabilius est creaturam nec per elevationem esse posse causam instrumentalem creationis ; nihil ergo dicendum de hoc casu. Sed videtur concedendum accidens posse produci sine subjecto, seu creari ; sicut enim per miraculum conservari potest sine subjecto ita et fieri, et sic fieret ad modum substantiæ. Jamvero ut cætera prætereamus, quando naturaliter producitur accidens ex subjecto et in subjecto, ad mentem Suarez admitti potest effluxus ille veluti medius ; tota enim ratio cur hic effluxus negatur in creatione est quia deest subjectum in quo recipiatur : quando vero idem accidens producitur ad modum substantiæ per creationem, juxta dicta negandus est idem effluxus. Quare si diversa exurgit relatio in utroque casu, ratio non erit quia datur diversus modus ex natura rei distinctus ab esse accidentis ; sed quia in uno casu datur, in alio deest idem modus.

- 20 De Deo Creatore 24. You will say: it cannot be said that creation in the creature is nothing other than its very being with the relation resulting from it. For, while the being of the creature remains the same, there can be a diverse real relation in it; but a diverse real relation requires a diverse

foundation. Therefore. The major is proved: the same being of a creature can be produced by creation from God alone, or from God together with a creature as an elevated instrument; the same being of an accident can be produced naturally in a subject and from a subject, or supernaturally without a subject. But in these cases, while the being of the creature remains the same, there would be a diverse relation. Therefore. And this is said to be the principal reason why Suarez, in the cited place, nn. 12-13, admits a substantial mode in which he formally constitutes creative action.

I reply: for us, as will be said in its own place, it is more probable that a creature cannot be an instrumental cause of creation, not even through elevation; therefore nothing need be said about this case. But it seems that it must be conceded that an accident can be produced without a subject, or be created; for just as by a miracle it can be conserved without a subject, so also it can come to be without a subject, and thus it would come to be after the manner of a substance. Now, to pass over the rest, when an accident is naturally produced from a subject and in a subject, according to the mind of Suarez that efflux as though intermediate can be admitted; for the whole reason why this efflux is denied in creation is that the subject in which it would be received is lacking. But when the same accident is produced after the manner of a substance through creation, according to what has been said, the same efflux must be denied. Therefore, if a diverse relation arises in each case, the reason will not be that there is given a diverse mode, distinct by the nature of the thing from the being of the accident, but that in one case the same mode is given, and in the other it is lacking.

Article 3. Whether God is the Efficient Cause of the World

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Third Article. Whether God Is The Efficient Cause Of The World.

25. Exposita vera creationis natura ad factum investigandum progredimur, utrum Deus creando mundum condiderit. Cumque aliqui veritatem catholicam hac in re impugnaverint non modo ex principiis rationis, verum ex ipsis revelationis fontibus, asserentes ideam creationis a nobis exhibitam nec in Scripturis contineri, nec Patribus fuisse notam, operæ pretium erit singillatim expendere quid Scriptura-quid Patres- quid recta ratio doceat quoad dogma creationis. § I. Status quæstionis . 25. Having set forth the true nature of creation, we proceed to investigate the fact: whether God, by creating, founded the world. And since some have attacked Catholic truth in this matter not only from principles of reason, but even from the very sources of revelation, asserting that the idea of creation as presented by us is contained neither in the Scriptures nor was known to the Fathers, it will be worthwhile to weigh one by one what Scripture, what the Fathers, and what right reason teach concerning the dogma of creation.

§ I. State Of The Question.

26. Antiquos errores circa dogma de creatione mundi paucis complectitur D. Th. opusc. 5. de articulis Fidei et de Sacramentis Ecclesiæ : " Contra hunc articulum, primo quidem erravit Democritus et Epicurus, ponentes quod nec materia mundi, nec ipsa mundi compositio est a Deo, sed quod mundus est casu factus per concursum corporum indivisibilium, quæ rerum principia existimabant ; contra quos dicitur in Psal. 32. Verbo Domini cæli firmati sunt ; idest, secundum rationem æternam , non autem casu. Secundus est error Platonis et Anaxagore, qui posuerunt mundum factum a Deo, sed ex materia præjacente ; contra quos dicitur in Psal. 148. Mandavit et creata

Disp. I. De Mundi Origine. 21 sunt : idest, ex nihilo facta. Tertius est error Aristotelis, qui posuit mundum a Deo factum non esse, sed ab æterno fuisse ; contra quod dicitur Genes. 1 . In principio Deus creavit cœlum et terram. Quartus est error Manichæorum , qui posuerunt Deum factorem invisibilium, sed visibilia a diabolo facta ; contra quos dicitur Hebr. 11. Fide intelligimus aptata esse sæcula verbo Dei, ut ex invisibilibus visibilia fierent. Quintus est error Simonis Magi, et Menandri ejus discipuli , et multorum

aliorum hæreticorum eos sequentium, qui creationem mundi non Deo, sed Angelis attribuunt ; contra quos dicit Paulus, Act. 17. Deus qui fecit mundum et omnia quæ in eo sunt. Sextus est error eorum qui posuerunt Deum per seipsum non gubernare mundum, sed per quasdam partes sibi subjectas ; contra quos dicitur Job. 34. Quem constituit alium super terram , aut quem posuit super orbem quem fabricatus est ? Et contra hos errores dicitur in symbolo : Factorem vel creatorem cæli et terræ, visibilium omnium et invisibilium." Opusc. V. De articulis Fidei et Sacramentis Ecclesiæ . Cf. Opusc. VI. Expositio super Symbolo Apostolorum , Cap. III. His addi possunt Sociniani et non pauci protestantes, qui contendunt doctrinam de mundi creatione ex nihilo non esse ita clare expressam in Scripturis, ut quisque teneatur illam credere-Philosophi sæculi XVIII . , Voltaire, Rousseau etc., qui etsi non semper sibimetipsis cohærentes , dogma tamen creationis non raro uti absurdum traduxere-Pantheistæ omnes denique, qui sub quacumque forma suum systema exponunt, idem dogma inficiati sunt.

22 De Deo Creatore. 26. St. Thomas briefly gathers the ancient errors concerning the dogma of the creation of the world in Opuscule 5, On the Articles of Faith and the Sacraments of the Church: "Against this article, first indeed Democritus and Epicurus erred, holding that neither the matter of the world nor the very composition of the world is from God, but that the world was made by chance through a concourse of indivisible bodies, which they considered the principles of things. Against them it is said in Psalm 32: By the word of the Lord the heavens were established; that is, according to eternal reason, and not by chance. The second is the error of Plato and Anaxagoras, who held that the world was made by God, but from preexisting matter. Against them it is said in Psalm 148: He commanded and they were created; that is, made out of nothing. The third is the error of Aristotle, who held that the world was not made by God, but existed from eternity. Against this it is said in Genesis 1: In the beginning God created heaven and earth. The fourth is the error of the Manichaeans, who held God to be the maker of invisible things, but visible things to have been made by the devil. Against them it is said in Hebrews 11: By faith we understand that the ages were framed by the word of God, so that visible things might be made from invisible things. The fifth is the error of Simon Magus, and Menander his disciple, and of many other heretics following them, who attribute the creation of the world not to God but to angels. Against them Paul says in Acts 17: God who made the world and all things that are in it. The sixth is the error of those who held that God does not govern the world through himself, but through certain parts subject to himself. Against them it is said in Job 34: Whom has he appointed another over the earth, or whom has he placed over the world which he fashioned? And against these errors it is said in the Creed: Maker or creator of heaven and earth, of all things visible and invisible." Opuscule V, On the Articles of Faith and the Sacraments of the Church. Compare Opuscule VI, Exposition on the Apostles' Creed, chapter III.

To these can be added the Socinians and not a few Protestants, who contend that the doctrine of the creation of the world out of nothing is not so clearly expressed in the Scriptures that everyone is bound to believe it; the philosophers of the eighteenth century, Voltaire, Rousseau, and others, who, although not always consistent with themselves, nevertheless not rarely presented the dogma of creation as absurd; and finally all pantheists, who, under whatever form they set forth their system, have denied the same dogma.

27. Fides vero Ecclesiæ continetur in symbolo Apostolico, cujus primus articulus est : " Credo in Deum Patrem omnipotentem Creatorem cæli et terræ"-Symb . Nicaeno-Constpno, ubi dicitur : “ Credo in unum Deum, Patrem omnipotentem , factorem cœli et terræ, visibilium omnium et invisibilium"-Concil. Later. IV. cap. Firmiter, ubi legitur ; "Firmiter credimus et simpliciter confitemur, quod unus solus est verus Deus unum universorum principium : cre- ... ator omnium visibilium et invisibilium, spiritualium et corporalium : qui sua omnipotenti virtute simul ab initio temporis utramque de nihilo condidit creaturam spiritualem et corporalem : angelicam videlicet et mundanam : ac deinde humanam, quasi communem ex spiritu et corpore constitutam. "-Conc. Vatic. Const. Dei Filius , cap. I. "Hic solus verus Deus bonitate sua et omnipotenti virtute non ad augendam suam beatitudinem, nec ad

acquirendam, sed ad manifestandam perfectionem suam per bona, quæ creaturis impertitur, liberrimo consilio simul ab initio temporis utramque de nihilo condidit creaturam, spiritualem et corporalem, angelicam videlicet et mundanam , ac deinde humanam quasi communem ex spiritu et corpore constitutam." Et can. 1. "Si quis unum verum Deum, visibilium et invisibilium Creatorem et Dominum negavit ; anathema sit ;" et 5. "Si quis non confiteatur, mundum resque omnes, quæ in eo continentur, et spirituales et materiales, secundum totam suam substantiam a Deo ex nihilo esse productas ; anathema. sit." 27. But the faith of the Church is contained in the Apostles' Creed, whose first article is: "I believe in God the Father almighty, Creator of heaven and earth"; in the Nicene-Constantinopolitan Creed, where it is said: "I believe in one God, the Father almighty, maker of heaven and earth, of all things visible and invisible"; in the Fourth Lateran Council, chapter Firmiter, where it is read: "We firmly believe and simply confess that there is one only true God, the one principle of all things: creator of all things visible and invisible, spiritual and corporeal, who by his omnipotent power, at once from the beginning of time, established out of nothing each creature, spiritual and corporeal, namely the angelic and the mundane, and then the human, constituted as it were common from spirit and body"; in the Vatican Council, Constitution Dei Filius, chapter I: "This one true God, by his goodness and almighty power, not for increasing his blessedness, nor for acquiring it, but for manifesting his perfection through the goods which he imparts to creatures, by a most free counsel, at once from the beginning of time established out of nothing each creature, spiritual and corporeal, namely the angelic and the mundane, and then the human, constituted as it were common from spirit and body." And canon 1: "If anyone has denied the one true God, Creator and Lord of visible and invisible things, let him be anathema"; and canon 5: "If anyone does not confess that the world and all things which are contained in it, both spiritual and material, were produced by God out of nothing according to their whole substance, let him be anathema."

28. Quare catholicum dogma, quod ad præsentem quæstionem spectat, est Deum-et quidem solum

Disp. I. De Mundi Origine. 23 esse effectricem mundi causam per creationem. Ne tamen ambiguitati sit locus, tria animadvertimus. 28. Therefore the Catholic dogma which pertains to the present question is that God, and indeed God alone, is the efficient cause of the world through creation. But lest there be room for ambiguity, we make three observations.

29. Primo quidem nomen Mundi multiplicem habet acceptionem in Sacra Scriptura. Quandoque enim nomine mundi venit orbis terrarum, ut Marc. 16. 15. "Euntes in mundum universum prædicate Evangelium omni creaturæ."-Quandoque significatur totum genus hominum, ut Jo. 3. 16. "Sic Deus dilexit mundum, ut Filium suum Unigenitum daret. "- Quandoque intelliguntur homines perversi, ut Jo . 15. 18. “Si mundus vos odit, scitote, quia me priorem vobis odio habuit. "-Quandoque tandem, cæteris omissis , nomen mundi significat universitatem rerum contingentium, ut 2. Mach. 8. 18. " Potest (Deus) universum mundum uno nutu delere ; " et Jo . 1. 10. "mundus per ipsum factus est. " Hoc idem vero solet aliis vocibus designari, ut Gen. 1. per " cælum et terram" ; quibus adjungitur Gen. 2. 1. " omnis ornatus eorum ;" et Act. 4. 24. "mare, et omnia, quæ in eis sunt ;" ut etiam Col. 1. 16. per "visibilia, et invisibilia. " In præsenti quæstione su - mitur nomen mundi hoc ultimo sensu, ad significandum nempe complexum rerum omnium existentium extra Deum. 29. First, the name world has multiple acceptations in Sacred Scripture. Sometimes by the name world is meant the globe of the earth, as in Mark 16:15: "Going into the whole world, preach the Gospel to every creature." Sometimes the whole human race is signified, as in John 3:16: "God so loved the world that he gave his only-begotten Son." Sometimes wicked men are understood, as in John 15:18: "If the world hates you, know that it hated me before you." Finally, omitting the rest, the name world sometimes signifies the universe of contingent things, as in 2 Maccabees 8:18: "God can destroy the whole world by one nod"; and John 1:10: "the world was made through him." This same

thing is also commonly designated by other expressions, as in Genesis 1 by "heaven and earth," to which is joined Genesis 2:1, "and all their adornment"; and Acts 4:24, "the sea, and all things that are in them"; and also Colossians 1:16 by "visible and invisible things." In the present question the name world is taken in this last sense, namely to signify the whole complex of all things existing outside God.

30. Secundo, optime animadvertit De Valentia T. 1. Disp. 3. q. 2. p. 2. "Res omnes produci a Deo per creationem, dupliciter intelligi potest. Uno modo ita ut nulla res sit quam secundum se totam Deus non creet. Altero modo ita, ut nulla res sit quam secundum se totam (ut res incorruptibiles) vel secundum aliquid sui, puta secundum materiam primam, Deus non producat ex nihilo . Priori modo non omnes

24 De Deo Creatore. res productæ sunt aut producuntur a Deo per creationem. Nam de ipso homine legimus Genes. 2. quod formavit Deus illum de limo terræ ; et quotidie una cum causis secundis producit res ex subjecto . Posteriori autem modo ex fide certum est, Deum omnia producere per creationem, videlicet aut secundum totum quod est in rebus (quomodo creavit Angelos, et creat animas rationales) aut secundum aliquid quod est rebus intimum, puta secundum materiam. Recte enim et orthodoxe D. Augustinus lib. I. de Genesi contra Manichæos, cap. 6. "Ideo," inquit, Deus rectissime creditur omnia de nihilo fecisse, quia etiamsi omnia formata de ista materia facta sunt, hæc ipsa tamen materia de omnino nihilo facta est. " Qua in re juverit etiam notare communem nunc loquendi modum. Distinguunt inter creationem primam et secundam . Primam vocant productionem ex nihilo materiæ informis seu indigestæ , ut Gen. 1.; secundam vero ejusdem expolitionem, seu formationem, ex ea, rerum corporearum quibus mundus adspectabilis constat, ut Sap. 11. 18. Alii tamen sub eodem nomine aliud intelligunt : dicunt enim creationem primam eam, qua substantiæ omnes cum suis viribus esse incipiunt ; secundam qua aliæ res producuntur per evolutionem harum virium juxta naturæ leges. Aliis denique creatio prima est illa, qua mundum ante multa annorum millia factum putant ; secunda, qua mundus fuit veluti restitutus. 30. Second, De Valentia very well observes, tome 1, disputation 3, question 2, point 2: "That all things are produced by God through creation can be understood in two ways. In one way, so that there is no thing which God does not create according to its whole self. In another way, so that there is no thing which God does not produce out of nothing either according to its whole self, as incorruptible things, or according to something of itself, namely according to prime matter. In the former way not all things have been or are produced by God through creation. For of man himself we read in Genesis 2 that God formed him from the slime of the earth; and daily, together with secondary causes, he produces things from a subject. But in the latter way it is certain from faith that God produces all things through creation, namely either according to the whole that is in things - in the way he created the angels and creates rational souls - or according to something that is innermost in things, namely according to matter. For rightly and orthodoxly St. Augustine says in book I of On Genesis Against the Manichaeans, chapter 6: 'Therefore God is most rightly believed to have made all things from nothing, because even if all things formed from that matter were made, nevertheless that matter itself was made from absolutely nothing.'"

In this matter it will also be useful to note the common manner of speaking now. They distinguish between first and second creation. They call the production out of nothing of unformed or unordered matter the first creation, as in Genesis 1; but the refinement or formation of the same matter, from it, into the corporeal things of which the visible world consists, the second, as in Wisdom 11:18. Others, however, understand something else under the same name: for they call the first creation that by which all substances begin to be with their powers; the second, that by which other things are produced through the evolution of these powers according to the laws of nature. Finally, for others the first creation is that by which they think the world was made many thousands of years ago; the second, that by which the world was, as it were, restored.

31. Tertio, dicimus Deum solum esse causam mundi effectricem ad excludendum errorem tum Simonis Magi, Menandri, etc. qui contendebant mundum per Angelos tamquam per causam principalem crea

Disp. I. De Mundi Origine. 25 tum fuisse ;

tum Marcionitarum, Manichæorum, Priscillianistarum tribuentium mundum corporeum principio malo. Nullo pacto vero attingimus hic quæstionem, utrum Deus in creatione et formatione rerum usus sit Angelorum ministerio. 31. Third, we say that God alone is the efficient cause of the world in order to exclude both the error of Simon Magus, Menander, and others, who contended that the world was created through angels as through a principal cause, and the error of the Marcionites, Manichaeans, and Priscillianists, who attributed the corporeal world to an evil principle. But we do not in any way touch here the question whether God, in the creation and formation of things, used the ministry of angels.

§ II. The Dogma Of Creation From Scripture.

32. His rite constitutis expendimus imprimis § 11. Dogma creationis ex scriptura. PROP. II. Ex scripturis clare edocemur Deum, ipsumque solum, de nihilo mundum condidisse. Prob. la Pars, nempe Deum, ipsumque solum, condidisse mundum. Creatio, in Sacra Scripura, a) describitur ut actio divina, et ceu nota characteristica Dei ; dicitur in Sacra Scriptura 6) Deus creavisse omnia ; expresse asseritur c) Deum solum omnia condidisse. Ergo. Prob. antec. Ex V. T. Ps. 32, 6-9. Verbo Domini, ait Psalmista, cæli firmati sunt : et spiritu oris ejus omnis virtus eorum, Quoniam ipse dixit, et facta sunt : ipse mandavit et creata sunt. Et iterum Ps. 145, 6. Qui (Deus) fecit cœlum, et terram, et omnia quæ in eis sunt. Atque Ps. 134, 6. Omnia quæcumque voluit, Dominus fecit in cælo, et in terra, in mari et in omnibus abyssis, Porro Isaias, 40, 26. Levate in excelsum oculos vestros, videte, quis creavit hæc : qui educit in numero militiam eorum, et omnes ex nomine vocat : præ multitudine fortitudinis, et roboris, virtutisque ejus, neque unum reliquum fuit. Et 44, 24. Hæc dicit Dominus redemptor tuus, et for

26 De Deo Creatore. mator tuus ex utero : Ego sum Dominus, faciens omnia, extendens cælos solus, stabiliens terram, et nullus mecum. Jeremias, 10, 12. Qui fecit terram in fortitudine sua, et prudentia sua extendit cælos. 2 Esdr. 9 , Tu ipse, Domine solus : tu fecisti cælum et cælum cælorum, et omnem exercitum eorum : terram, et universa, quæ in ea sunt : maria, et omnia, quæ in eis sunt : et tu vivificas omnia hæc, et exercitus cœli te adorat. Et auctor libri Sapientiæ, 9, 1. Deus patrum meorum, et Domine misericordiæ, qui fecisti omnia verbo tuo. Ex N. T. Act, 14, 14. Viri quid hæc facitis ? et nos mortales sumus, similes vobis homines, annuntiantes vobis ab his vanis converti ad Deum vivum, qui fecit cœlum, et terram, et omnia, quæ in eis sunt. Et Paulus, Col. 1, 16. Quoniam in ipso (Filio) condita sunt universa in coelis, et in terra, visibilia, et invisibilia, sive throni, sive dominationes, sive principatus, sive potestates : omnia per ipsum, et in ipso creata sunt. Atque iterum, Heb. 11, 3. Fide intelligimus, aptata esse sæcula verbo Dei : ut ex invisibilibus visibilia fierent. Et Joannes, Apoc. 4, 11. Dignus es Domine Deus noster accipere gloriam, et honorem, et virtutem, quia tu creasti omnia, et propter voluntatem tuam, erant et creata sunt. Prob 2a. Pars , nempe Deum condidisse mundum ex nihilo. Gen. 1., 1. seq. legitur : "In principio creavit Deus cælum et terram.. Terra autem erat inanis et vacua, et Spiritus Dei ferebatur super aquas. Dixitque Deus : Fiat lux. Et facta est lux."-Et 2. 1. "Igitur perfecti sunt cæli et terra et omnis ornatus eorum."

Disp. I. De Mundi Origine. 27 Plures Theologi ad probandum veram creationem, nempe productionem mundi ex nihilo, vim faciunt in ipso verbo hebraico barah ; idque eruditissimis animadversionibus conficere student. Non desunt tamen qui ex sola illa voce propositum dogma probari posse negant ; sive quia verbum barah non habet ex se vim significandi solam productionem ex nihilo, sive quia nec habet, aiunt, ex usu Scripturarum (Cf. Petav. De oper, sex dierum, 1. 1., c. 1. a. n. VIII.- Perrone, de Deo Creatore, de Mundo cap. 1. in not.- Schwetz, Theol. dogm. etc.) Satius ergo erit ab hoc argumento abstinere, eo vel magis quod in promptu sint aliæ evidentissimæ rationes ad rem ostendendam. Dato enim quod verbum barah possit significare tum productionem ex nihilo, tum productionem ex præexistente subjecto ; ex aliis regulis exegeseos determinari potest quo sensu adhibeatur in 1. Gen. Adhiberi autem ad significandum veram creationem, constat a) Ex scopo Moysis. Agnoscunt omnes Moysem rerum productionem describere ut Israelitas doceret tum unitatem Dei, tum Deum esse rerum omnium principium et Auctorem, atque ita eos averteret ab erroribus et fabulis

gentium. Data opera igitur loquitur de origine mundi, et non, ut aiunt, per transennam ; ac proinde si aliqua materia infecta existeret, ex qua facta sint omnia, et de illo principio mentionem facere debuisset, ut Israelitæ recte de hac re sentirent. Atqui nihil de materia infecta dicit ; ergo. Argumentum hoc est Tertulliani c. Herm. c. 20. dicentis : "Quum in omni operatione tria sint principalia, qui facit, quod facit, et ex quo facit, tria

28 De Deo Creatore. nomina sunt edenda in legitima operis enarratione, persona factoris, species facti, forma materiæ. Si materia non editur, ubi et opera et operator eduntur, apparet, ex nihilo eum operatum ... Eo ipso dum non ostenditur ex aliquo factum, manifestatur ex nihilo factum, et non periclitatur, ne ex aliquo factum existimetur, quando nihil ex quo factum ostenditur." b) Ex contextu. In cit 1. Gen. vel agitur de prima omnino rerum origine, vel de rei (materiæ) jam existentis formatione ; vel de creatione prima, vel de creatione secunda. Atqui non agitur de secunda. Ergo. Prob. min. In sequentibus versibus loquitur Moyses de creatione secunda, et quidem in oppositione versus primi ; ergo in versu primo de prima omnino creatione agit-semper ac agit de creatione secunda mentionem injicit de materia præexistente. Ita, ex. gr. , terra est, quæ "protulit herbam virentem et facientem semem juxta genus suum ;" et "formavit Dominus Deus hominem ex limo terræ." In primo autem versu nulla fit mentio de materia præjacente. -Si illud creavit in 1. Gen. significaret secundam creationem, dicendum esset Deum formavisse "terram inanem et vacuam ;" quod quam absurdum sit facile apparet, præsertim supponendo materiam ingenitam et æternam-Cum certo constet in versibus seqq . loqui Moysem de creatione secunda, si de eadem loqueretur etiam in primo versu, nullo pacto aperuisset veram rerum originem, contra scopum, quem fatentibus omnibus sibi proposuerat. c) Ex sensu Hebræorum . Concedere videtur ipse Larroque recentiores rabinos sentire cum Christianis

Disp. I. De Mundi Origine. 29 in hac re. Plura documenta de eodem sensu antiquorum videre est apud Paulum Fagium "Annotata ad Genesim" cap.1. Extat in "Biblia critica, Amstelædami 1690.-Contenti erimus textu, qui habetur 2 . Machab . 7., 13. seqq. "Peto nate, ut aspicias ad cælum et terram et ad omnia quæ in eis sunt, et intelligas quia ex nihilo fecit illa Deus, et genus humanum. " Quibus verbis Mater Machabæorum hortatur filium suum natu minimum ad tyranni tormenta sustinenda. Unde didicerat mulier illa quod effugerat aciem vel præstantissimorum inter gentes philosophorum ?-cæterum hoc testimonium, vel solum, thesim probat, uti patet. d) Ex aliis locis. In pluribus ex antea recitatis testimoniis dicitur Deus fecisse omnia : sed si ex subjecto præexistente fecisset, illud subjectum non ipse fecisset, ideoque non omnia fecisset ; ergo. In aliis testimoniis dicitur Deus omnia fecisse solo imperio suæ voluntatis, verbo virtutis suæ ; sed hoc falsum esset, si ex aliqua præexistente materia res fecisset, ergo. In cit. testimonio Isaiæ. 48. et alibi dicitur Deus primus et novissimus ; sed non posset sic dici primus, si et materia aliqua æterna esset ; ergo.- quod argumentum est Tertulliani c. Hermog. c. 6. "Ego primus, et quomodo primus, cui materia coæterna est ? Inter coæternos autem et contemporales prior non est, aut et materia prima est. Extendi cælos solus ; ex Hermogene simul materia coextendit." 32. Having duly established these things, we first examine the dogma of creation from Scripture.

Proof of the first part, namely that God, and God alone, founded the world. Creation, in Sacred Scripture, is described as a divine action and as a characteristic mark of God; in Sacred Scripture it is said that God created all things; and it is expressly asserted that God alone founded all things. Therefore.

Proof of the antecedent. From the Old Testament: Psalm 32:6-9. "By the word of the Lord," says the Psalmist, "the heavens were established, and by the spirit of his mouth all their power. For he spoke, and they were made; he commanded, and they were created." And again Psalm 145:6: "He [God] made heaven and earth and all things that are in them." And Psalm 134:6: "All things whatsoever the Lord willed, he made in heaven and on earth, in the sea and in all abysses." Moreover Isaiah 40:26: "Lift up your eyes on high and see who created these things: who brings out their host by number and calls them all by name; because of the multitude of his strength and power and might, not one was missing." And 44:24: "Thus says the Lord, your redeemer and your former from the womb: I am the Lord, making all things, stretching out the heavens alone, establishing the earth, and no one with me." Jeremiah 10:12: "He made the earth by his strength, and by his prudence he stretched out the heavens." 2 Esdras 9: "You yourself, Lord, alone: you made heaven and the heaven of heavens and all their host; the earth and all things that are in it; the

seas and all things that are in them; and you give life to all these things, and the host of heaven adores you." And the author of the book of Wisdom, 9:1: "God of my fathers and Lord of mercy, who made all things by your word."

From the New Testament: Acts 14:14: "Men, why do you do these things? We also are mortal, men like you, announcing to you that you should turn from these vain things to the living God, who made heaven and earth and all things that are in them." And Paul, Colossians 1:16: "For in him [the Son] all things were founded in the heavens and on earth, visible and invisible, whether thrones, or dominations, or principalities, or powers: all things were created through him and in him." And again Hebrews 11:3: "By faith we understand that the ages were framed by the word of God, so that visible things might be made from invisible things." And John, Apocalypse 4:11: "You are worthy, Lord our God, to receive glory and honor and power, because you created all things, and because of your will they were and were created."

Proof of the second part, namely that God founded the world out of nothing. In Genesis 1:1 and following it is read: "In the beginning God created heaven and earth. But the earth was empty and void, and the Spirit of God was borne over the waters. And God said: Let there be light. And light was made." And Genesis 2:1: "Therefore the heavens and the earth were perfected, and all their adornment."

Many theologians, in order to prove true creation, namely the production of the world out of nothing, lay stress on the Hebrew word barah itself; and they endeavor to establish this by very learned observations. Nevertheless, there are some who deny that the proposed dogma can be proved from that word alone, either because the word barah does not of itself have the force of signifying only production out of nothing, or because, they say, it does not have this force even from the usage of the Scriptures. Compare Petavius, On the Work of the Six Days, book I, chapter 1, from n. VIII; Perrone, On God the Creator, On the World, chapter 1, in the note; Schwetz, Dogmatic Theology, etc. Therefore it will be better to abstain from this argument, all the more because other most evident reasons are ready at hand for showing the matter.

For, granted that the word barah can signify both production out of nothing and production from a preexisting subject, it can be determined from other rules of exegesis in what sense it is used in Genesis 1. That it is used to signify true creation is clear:

First, from the purpose of Moses. All acknowledge that Moses describes the production of things in order to teach the Israelites both the unity of God and that God is the principle and Author of all things, and thus to turn them away from the errors and fables of the nations. Therefore he speaks deliberately about the origin of the world, and not, as they say, in passing. Consequently, if some unmade matter existed from which all things were made, he ought to have made mention of that principle, so that the Israelites might think rightly about this matter. But he says nothing about unmade matter. Therefore. This argument belongs to Tertullian, Against Hermogenes, chapter 20, where he says: "Since in every operation there are three principal things, the one who makes, what he makes, and that from which he makes, three names must be given in the legitimate narration of the work: the person of the maker, the kind of thing made, and the form of the matter. If matter is not named, where both the works and the worker are named, it is clear that he worked from nothing ... By the very fact that it is not shown to have been made from something, it is manifested to have been made from nothing; nor is there danger that it be thought to have been made from something, when nothing from which it was made is shown."

Second, from the context. In the cited Genesis 1, either the absolutely first origin of things is being treated, or the formation of a thing, that is, matter, already existing; either the first creation, or the second creation. But the second is not being treated. Therefore.

Proof of the minor. In the following verses Moses speaks of the second creation, and indeed in opposition to the first verse; therefore in the first verse he treats the absolutely first creation. Whenever he treats the second creation, he introduces mention of preexisting matter. Thus, for example, it is the earth which "brought forth green herb making seed according to its kind"; and "the Lord God formed man from the slime of the earth." But in the first verse no mention is made of preexisting matter. If that word created in Genesis 1 signified the second creation, it would have to be said that God formed "the earth empty and void," and how absurd this is easily appears, especially if unbegotten and eternal matter is supposed. Since it is certain that in the following

verses Moses speaks of the second creation, if he were speaking of the same in the first verse also, he would in no way have opened up the true origin of things, contrary to the purpose which, by everyone's admission, he had set before himself.

Third, from the sense of the Hebrews. Larroque himself seems to concede that the more recent rabbis agree with Christians in this matter. Many documents concerning the same sense among the ancients may be seen in Paulus Fagius, Annotations on Genesis, chapter 1. It exists in the Biblia Critica, Amsterdam, 1690. We shall be content with the text which is found in 2 Maccabees 7:13 and following: "I ask you, son, to look at heaven and earth and all things that are in them, and to understand that God made them and the human race out of nothing." By these words the mother of the Maccabees exhorts her youngest son to endure the torments of the tyrant. From where had that woman learned what escaped the sharpness of even the most excellent philosophers among the nations? Besides, this testimony, even alone, proves the thesis, as is clear.

Fourth, from other places. In several of the testimonies cited above, God is said to have made all things; but if he had made them from a preexisting subject, he would not himself have made that subject, and therefore he would not have made all things. Therefore. In other testimonies God is said to have made all things by the sole command of his will, by the word of his power; but this would be false if he had made things from some preexisting matter. Therefore. In the cited testimony of Isaiah 48, and elsewhere, God is called the first and the last; but he could not be called first in this way if some matter too were eternal. Therefore. This is Tertullian's argument, Against Hermogenes, chapter 6: "I am the first; and how first, if matter is coeternal with me? But among coeternals and contemporaries there is no prior one, or matter too is first. I stretched out the heavens alone; according to Hermogenes, matter at the same time stretched them out with him."

33. NOTA. Objectiones ex Scriptura fere omnes præocupatæ sunt. Etenim ad tria capita facile omnes revocantur. 1. Arguunt ex verbo barah, dicentes

30 De Deo Creatore ex nativa vi et usu Scripturarum non importare productionem ex nihilo. Jam dictum est ex aliis adjunctis evidentissime determinari sensum illius vocis in 1. Gen. 2. Arguunt ex verbis latino creare, et græco ἐποίησε, quæ non habent ex se vim significandi productionem ex nihilo . At nil mirum si latinis et græcis deerat verbum ad significandum rem fere penitus ipsis ignotam. Cæterum quidquid sit de vi vocis in se inspectæ ; iterum ex aliis fontibus sensus determinatur.-3 . Objiciunt quod legitur sap. 11. 18. "Non enim impossibilis erat omnipotens manus tua, quæ creavit mundum ex materia invisa, immittere illis multitudinem ursorum , aut audaces leones." Sed illud creavit ex materia invisa intelligi debet de creatione secunda, de qua loquitur ipse Moyses ; inde tamen non excluditur prima quæ continetur in 1. Gen. Hunc esse verum sensum objecti testimonii patet, sive ex scopo commendandi Dei sapientiam, quæ maxime elucet in rerum varietate aptaque earumdem dispositione, sive ex S. Aug. L. 1. cont. advers . leg. et Proph. ex S. Jo. Damasceno. Lib. 2. de fid. orthod. c. 5. Vide Perrone .

Disp. I. De Mundi Origine. 31 in qua solvitur quæstio utrum philosophorum a vera Relig. aversorum aliquis mundum a Deo ex nihilo creatum esse docuerit.) Præsertim vero Bosobrius, (Histoire des Dogmes de Manichee etc, Tom. II.) in dubium saltem revocavit orthodoxiam Origenis et Tertulliani in hac re : quibus Roussean (Lettre a M. de Beaumont) addidit S. Justinum, Clementem Alexandrinum et alios. Unde statuendum est : 35. PROP. III. Dogma de mundi creatione ex concordi SS. Putrum testimonio certo eruitur. Prob . Innumera sunt SS. Patrum testimonia, quibus integrum dogma catholicum de creatione adstruitur ; sed cum diversi contra diversos errores huic dogmati contrarios magis directe istud propugnaverint, juverit ex ordine eadem testimonia exhibere. a) Contra errorem de materia æterna ingenita. S. Theophilus Antioch, (ad Autol. 1. 2. n. 4. Oper. S. Justini) " Quid autem magni esset, si Deus ex materia subjecta mundum faceret ? Opifex enim apud nos, cum materiam ab aliquo acceperit, ex eo quidquid placuerit effingit. Dei autem potentia in eo spectatur, ut ex nihilo faciat, quæcumque voluerit : quemadmodum animam et motum dare, non est alterius cujusquam præterquam Dei." Et n. 10. Ac primo quidem summo consensu docuere (Prophetæ), Deum ex nihilo omnia creasse. Nihil enim Deo coævum ; sed cum sibi ipse locus sit, nec ulla re egeat, at sæculis antiquior sit, hominem facere voluit, cui innotesceret : huic homini mundum præparavit."- Tatianus (cont.

Græcos. n. 5.) "Universoruni Dominus, quatenus quidem mundus nondum erat creatus, solus erat. Non enim caret initio materia, quemad 33. Note. Nearly all objections from Scripture have been anticipated. For they are all easily reduced to three headings.

First, they argue from the word barah, saying that by its native force and the usage of the Scriptures it does not import production out of nothing. It has already been said that the sense of that word in Genesis 1 is most evidently determined from the other circumstances.

Second, they argue from the Latin word creare and the Greek word ἐποίησε, which do not of themselves have the force of signifying production out of nothing. But it is no wonder if the Latins and Greeks lacked a word for signifying a thing almost entirely unknown to them. Besides, whatever may be the force of the word considered in itself, again the sense is determined from other sources.

Third, they object from what is read in Wisdom 11:18: "For your almighty hand, which created the world from unseen matter, was not unable to send upon them a multitude of bears or bold lions." But that phrase created from unseen matter must be understood of the second creation, of which Moses himself speaks; nevertheless the first creation, which is contained in Genesis 1, is not thereby excluded. That this is the true sense of the objected testimony is clear, whether from the purpose of commending God's wisdom, which shines forth especially in the variety of things and in their fitting disposition, or from St. Augustine, book I Against the Adversary of the Law and the Prophets, and from St. John Damascene, book II On the Orthodox Faith, chapter 5. See Perrone.

§ III. The Dogma Of Creation From The Holy Fathers.

34. Quemadmodum Sociniani et alii, ut diximus, negaverunt dogma creationis ex nihilo clare contineri in scripturis ; ita non defuerunt qui temere assererent illud esse Scholasticorum inventum , Ecclesiæ Patribus ignotum (Vid. Jo. Laur. Moshemii Dissert.

Disp. I. De Mundi Origine. 31 in qua solvitur quæstio utrum philosophorum a vera Relig. aversorum aliquis mundum a Deo ex nihilo creatum esse docuerit.) Præsertim vero Beausobrius, (Histoire des Dogmes de Manichee etc, Tom. II.) in dubium saltem revocavit orthodoxiam Origenis et Tertulliani in hac re : quibus Rousseau (Lettre a M. de Beaumont) addidit S. Justinum, Clementem Alexandrinum et alios. Unde statuendum est : 34. Just as the Socinians and others, as we have said, denied that the dogma of creation out of nothing is clearly contained in the Scriptures, so there have not been lacking those who rashly asserted that it is an invention of the Scholastics, unknown to the Fathers of the Church. See Johann Lorenz Mosheim's dissertation in which the question is solved whether any of the philosophers turned away from true religion taught that the world was created by God out of nothing. Especially, however, Beausobre, in Histoire des Dogmes de Manichee, tome II, at least called into doubt the orthodoxy of Origen and Tertullian in this matter; to whom Rousseau, in Lettre a M. de Beaumont, added St. Justin, Clement of Alexandria, and others. Hence it must be established:

35. PROP. III. Dogma de mundi creatione ex concordi SS. Patrum testimonio certo eruitur. Prob . Innumera sunt SS. Patrum testimonia, quibus integrum dogma catholicum de creatione adstruitur ; sed cum diversi contra diversos errores huic dogmati contrarios magis directe istud propugnaverint, juverit ex ordine eadem testimonia exhibere. a) Contra errorem de materia æterna ingenita. S. Theophilus Antioch, (ad Autol. 1. 2. n. 4. Oper. S. Justini) " Quid autem magni esset, si Deus ex materia subjecta mundum faceret ? Opifex enim apud nos, cum materiam ab aliquo acceperit, ex eo quidquid placuerit effingit. Dei autem potentia in eo spectatur, ut ex nihilo faciat, quæcumque voluerit : quemadmodum animam et motum dare, non est alterius cujusquam præterquam Dei." Et n. 10. Ac primo quidem summo consensu docuere (Prophetæ), Deum ex nihilo omnia creasse. Nihil enim Deo coævum ; sed cum sibi ipse locus sit, nec ulla re egeat, at sæculis antiquior sit, hominem facere voluit,

cui innotesceret : huic homini mundum præparavit."- Tatianus (cont. Græcos. n. 5.) "Universorum Dominus, quatenus quidem mundus nondum erat creatus, solus erat. Non enim caret initio materia, quemad

32 De Deo Creatore. modum Deus : nec Deo , ut principii expers, parem habet potestatem, verum creata est : nec ab alio facta est, sed a solo universorum opifice producta." Athenagoras (Legatio pro Christi. n . 4.) " Nobis autem qui Deum a materia disjungimus,-ac plurimo utrumque intervallo distare demonstramus (Deum enim increatum et æternum esse, ac sola mente ac ratione cognosci posse, materiam autem creatam et corruptioni obnoxiam), nonne immerito atheorum nomen imponitur ?" Origenes (Tom. 1. Com. in Jo., in illud : In principio creavit Deus.) "Secus vero apud nos (Christianos) est, qui credimus ex non entibus Deum entia fecisse, ut Mater illa septem Martyrum in Machabæorum gestis, et Pœnitentiæ Angelus in Pastore docuit. "-Et (de Princ. Præf. n. 4.) "Species eorum, quæ per prædicationem Apostolicam manifesto traduntur, sunt istæ : primo quod unus Deus est, qui omnia creavit atque composuit, quique cum nihil esset, esse fecit omnia."-S. Athanasius (De Incarnat. Verb. D. n. 3.) "Novit enim (Christi fides), res non fortuito factas esse, quia providentia gubernantur : neque ex materia prius existente , quia Deus imbecillis non est : sed Deum omnia, neutiquam prius existentia, ex nihilo per Verbum fecisse, ut essent, uti per Moysem ait 'In principio fecit Deus cœlum et terram. " Tertullianus (Apol. n. 17.) " Quod colimus , Deus unus est, qui totam molem istam cum omni instrumento elementorum, corporum, spirituum , verbo quo jussit, ratione qua disposuit, virtute qua potuit, de nihilo expressit in ornamentum majestatis suæ, unde et Græci nomen κόσμον accommodaverunt." Et (de præscript. cap. 12.) Regula est autem fidei, ut

Disp. I. De Mundi Origine. 33 jam hinc quid defendamus profiteamur, illa scilicet, qua creditur unum omnino Deum esse, nec alium præter mundi conditorem, qui universa de nihilo produxerit, per verbum suum." Sed Vid. integrum 1. cont. Herm.-S. Augustinus (De Gen. cont. Manich. 1. 1. c. 6. n. 10.) "Non enim debemus similes esse istis, qui omnipotentem Deum non credunt aliquid de nihilo facere potuisse, cum considerant fabros et quoslibet opifices non posse aliquid fabricare , nisi habuerint, unde fabricent.-Omnipotens autem Deus nulla re adjuvandus erat, quam ipse non fecerat, ut quod volebat, efficeret. Si enim ad eas res , quas facere volebat, adjuvabat eum aliqua res, quam ipse non fecerat, non erat omnipotens : quod sacrilegum est credere . " Similia habet S. Ambrosius, Hex. 1. 1. c. 5.-S. Fulgentius de fide ad Pet. c. 3. n. 25. b) Contra errorem de creatione visibilium facta ab Angelis. S. Irenaeus (Cont. haer. 1. 2. c. 2. n. 1-4.) " Qui autem ab Angelis mundum dicunt fabricatum, vel ab alio quodam mundi fabricatore, præter sententiam ejus, qui super omnia Pater est, primo quidem ex hoc ipso peccant, præter voluntatem Dei talem et tantam conditionem Angelos fecisse dicentes : quasi efficaciores sint Angeli, quam Deus, etc. Si autem non præter voluntatem ejus, sed volente et sciente ; -jam non Angeli, vel mundi fabricator causae erunt fabricationis istius, sed voluntas Dei. Sit fortasse hic sermo suasorius , sive seductorius apud eos, qui ignorant Deum, et qui hominibus assimilant eum inopibus, et his, qui non possunt statim aliquid ex parato fabricare, sed indigentibus multis organis ad eorum fabricationem : non autem verisimilis in totum

34 De Deo Creatore. apud eos, qui sciunt, quoniam nullius indigens omnium Deus, Verbo condidit omnia et fecit, neque Angelis indigens adjutoribus ad ea, quæ fiunt : neque virtute aliqua valde inferiori ab illo, et ignorante Patrem ; neque aliqua labe, neque ignorantia, ut is, qui inciperet eum cognoscere, homo fieret : sed ipse in semetipso, secundum id, quod est inenarrabile, et inexcogitabile nobis, omnia prædestinans fecit, quemadmodum voluit ; omnibus consonantiam, et ordinem suum, et initium creationis donans ; spiritualibus quidem spiritualem et invisibilem, et supercœlestibus cœlestem, et Angelis angelicam, et animalibus animalem, et natantibus aquatilem, et terrigenis terrigenam, omnibus aptam qualitatis substantiam : omnia autem, quæ facta sunt, infatigabili Verbo fecit. "- S. Cyrillus Alex. (Thes. 1. 6. c. 2.) "Præcipua Dei veri proprietas est, ut a nihilo possit substantias producere. " Et (Cont. Juli. 1. 2.) "Potestas creandi divinæ solummodo inest naturæ : hæc est inter alias Deo convenientes dignitates præcipua." Vid. Patres qui consubstantialitatem Verbi defenderunt. c) Contra errorem Emanatismi et Pantheismi generatim. S. Aug. (De Gen. imperf. c. 1. n. 2.) "Hanc ergo Trinitatem dici unum Deum, eumque fecisse , et creasse omnia, quæ sunt, in quantum sunt, Catholica disciplina credi jubet, ita ut creatura omnis sive intellectualis sive corporalis, non de Dei natura, sed a Deo sit facta de nihilo." Et (De Gen. c. Manich. 1.

1. c. 2. n. 4.) "Hæc facta sunt : nec ea genuit de se ipso, ut hoc essent, quod ipse est ; sed ea fecit de nihilo, ut non essent æqualia nec ei, a quo facta sunt, nec Filio ejus, per quem facta sunt. " Lactantius (De

Disp. I. De Mundi Origine. 35 inst . 1. 2. c. 6.) "Si Deus est mundus, et partes ejus utique immortales sunt ; ergo et homo Deus est, quia pars est (ut dicitis) mundi. Si homo ; ergo et jumenta, et pecudes, et cetera genera bestiarum, et avium, et piscium ; quoniam et illa eodem modo sentiunt, et mundi partes sunt. At hoc tolerabile est : nam et hæc colunt Ægyptii. Sed res eo pervenit, ut et ranae, et culices, et formicæ dii esse videantur, quia et ipsis inest sensus , et partes mundi sunt. Ita semper argumenta ex falso petita ineptos et absurdos exitus habent. "-Vid. etiam Origenem (De Orat. n. 23.) ; S. Maximum (Schol. in Dionys. c. 2. § 3.) ; S. Aug. Enarr. in Ps. 85. n. 12. 35. Proposition III. The dogma of the creation of the world is certainly drawn from the concordant testimony of the holy Fathers.

Proof. The testimonies of the holy Fathers by which the whole Catholic dogma concerning creation is established are innumerable. But since different Fathers more directly defended this dogma against different errors contrary to it, it will be useful to present those testimonies in order.

First, against the error of eternal, unbegotten matter. St. Theophilus of Antioch, To Autolycus, book II, n. 4, in the works of St. Justin: "But what great thing would it be if God made the world from subject matter? For a craftsman among us, when he has received matter from someone, fashions from it whatever he has wished. But the power of God is seen in this, that he makes from nothing whatever he has willed; just as to give soul and motion belongs to no one other than God." And n. 10: "And first, indeed, with highest agreement they [the Prophets] taught that God created all things out of nothing. For nothing is coeval with God; but since he is his own place and needs no thing, and is older than the ages, he willed to make man, to whom he would become known; for this man he prepared the world." Tatian, Against the Greeks, n. 5: "The Lord of all, insofar as the world had not yet been created, was alone. For matter is not without a beginning as God is; nor, as lacking a principle, does it have power equal to God. Rather, it was created, and was not made by another, but was produced by the sole maker of all things." Athenagoras, Legation for the Christians, n. 4: "But as for us, who separate God from matter and demonstrate that each is distant from the other by a very great interval - for God is uncreated and eternal and can be known by mind and reason alone, but matter is created and liable to corruption - is the name of atheists imposed on us undeservedly?" Origen, tome I of the Commentary on John, on the words In the beginning God created: "But it is otherwise among us [Christians], who believe that God made beings from non-beings, as that mother of the seven martyrs in the deeds of the Maccabees, and the Angel of Repentance in the Shepherd, taught." And in On First Principles, preface, n. 4: "The kinds of things which are manifestly handed down through the apostolic preaching are these: first, that there is one God, who created and composed all things, and who, when nothing existed, made all things to be." St. Athanasius, On the Incarnation of the Word of God, n. 3: "For [the faith of Christ] knows that things were not made by chance, because they are governed by providence; nor from matter previously existing, because God is not weak; but that God made all things, not at all existing before, out of nothing through the Word, so that they might be, as he says through Moses: 'In the beginning God made heaven and earth.'" Tertullian, Apology, n. 17: "What we worship is one God, who, by the word by which he commanded, by the reason by which he disposed, and by the power by which he was able, brought forth from nothing this whole mass, with the whole apparatus of elements, bodies, and spirits, for the adornment of his majesty; whence also the Greeks adapted the name kosmos." And in On Prescription Against Heretics, chapter 12: "Now the rule of faith, that we may profess from this point what we defend, is namely that by which it is believed that there is altogether one God, and no other besides the founder of the world, who produced all things from nothing through his Word." But see the whole book Against Hermogenes. St. Augustine, On Genesis Against the Manichaeans, book I, chapter 6, n. 10: "For we ought not to be like those who do not believe that almighty God could have made something from nothing, when they consider that craftsmen and any artisans cannot fabricate something unless they have something from which they may fabricate. But

almighty God needed to be helped by no thing which he himself had not made, in order to effect what he willed. For if, for those things which he willed to make, some thing which he himself had not made helped him, he was not almighty; and it is sacrilegious to believe this." St. Ambrose has similar things, Hexaemeron, book I, chapter 5; and St. Fulgentius, On the Faith to Peter, chapter 3, n. 25.

Second, against the error concerning the creation of visible things as made by angels. St. Irenaeus, Against Heresies, book II, chapter 2, nn. 1-4: "But those who say that the world was fashioned by angels, or by some other maker of the world, contrary to the opinion of him who is Father over all things, first indeed sin from this very fact, saying that the angels made such and so great a constitution contrary to the will of God, as though angels were more effective than God, etc. But if not contrary to his will, but with him willing and knowing, then neither angels nor the maker of the world will be the causes of this fabrication, but the will of God. Perhaps this discourse is persuasive or seductive among those who do not know God, and who liken him to needy men and to those who cannot immediately fabricate something from what is ready, but need many instruments for their fabrication. But it is not at all plausible among those who know that God, needing nothing, founded and made all things by the Word, needing neither angels as helpers for the things which are made, nor some power very inferior to him and ignorant of the Father, nor some stain, nor ignorance, so that a man might be made who would begin to know him. Rather, he himself in himself, according to that which is unspeakable and inconceivable to us, predestining all things, made them as he willed, giving to all things their harmony and order and beginning of creation: to spiritual things a spiritual and invisible nature, to supercelestial things a celestial nature, to angels an angelic nature, to living things an animal nature, to swimming things an aquatic nature, to earth-born things an earthly nature, and to all things the substance of a quality suited to them. But all things which were made, he made by his indefatigable Word." St. Cyril of Alexandria, Thesaurus, book VI, chapter 2: "The chief property of the true God is that he can produce substances from nothing." And Against Julian, book II: "The power of creating belongs only to the divine nature; this is chief among the other dignities fitting to God." See the Fathers who defended the consubstantiality of the Word.

Third, against the error of emanatism and pantheism generally. St. Augustine, On Genesis Unfinished, chapter 1, n. 2: "Catholic teaching commands that this Trinity be believed to be one God, and that he made and created all things which are, insofar as they are; so that every creature, whether intellectual or corporeal, is not from the nature of God, but was made by God from nothing." And On Genesis Against the Manichaeans, book I, chapter 2, n. 4: "These things were made; nor did he beget them from himself so that they would be what he is, but he made them from nothing, so that they would be equal neither to him by whom they were made, nor to his Son through whom they were made." Lactantius, Divine Institutes, book II, chapter 6: "If God is the world, then certainly its parts are immortal; therefore man too is God, because he is a part, as you say, of the world. If man is God, then also beasts of burden, cattle, and the other kinds of beasts, birds, and fish are God, since these too sense in the same way and are parts of the world. But this is tolerable, for the Egyptians worship even these. Yet the matter comes to this, that frogs, gnats, and ants seem to be gods, because sense exists in them also and they are parts of the world. Thus arguments taken from what is false always have foolish and absurd outcomes." See also Origen, On Prayer, n. 23; St. Maximus, Scholia on Dionysius, chapter 2, § 3; St. Augustine, Exposition on Psalm 85, n. 12.

36. NOTA. Quoad S. Justinum martyrem, certum est eum expresse docuisse dogma de creatione ex nihilo. Nam (Apolog. 2. n. 22.) ait : "Atque illud etiam necessarium est, ut mihi quidem videtur, animadvertere , non creatorem illum a Platone, sed opificem appellari deorum ; cum inter utrumque plurimum sit, ipsius Platonis judicio, discriminis. Creator enim, nulla re alia indigens, sua virtute et potestate id quod fit efficit. Opifex vero, accepta ex materia condendi facultate, opus suum constituit." Et n. 23. "Nam materiæ vim, utpote ingenitam, et, ut opinatur Plato, æqualem opifici et coævam, obluctari par est ipsius voluntati. Ei enim qui non creavit, nulla est in id, quod est increatum,

potestas ; unde nec vis ulla ei inferri potest, cum ab omni externa necessitate liber sit. Ad hæc respiciens Plato sic scripsit : Necesse est ut vim Deo inferri non posse dicamus. " Vid. etiam Dial. cum Tryph. n. 5. Quæ igitur ab eo dicta repugnare videntur veritati catho-

36 De Deo Creatore. licæ, facile explicantur, sive quia agit de creatione secunda, uti cum dicit : "omnia illum ab initio ex informi materia condidisse accepimus ;" sive quia aliqua ex Platone simpliciter refert, sed non approbat, iisdemque aliquando utitur ad redarguendum philosophos ex veritatibus ab iis concessis. Vid. Gatti, Institutiones Apologetico-Polemicæ, tom. 1. diss. 2. § 2 . Quoad S. Methodium, certum est totum in eo esse (de lib. arb. ap. Photium cod. 236.), ut demonstret Deum ex nihilo omnia produxisse. Solummodo ad id probandum utitur quibusdam minus validis argumentis ; uti est illud : creantur qualitates ex nihilo , ergo et substantiæ produci possunt. Quoad Eusebium Cæsaræensem, plura objiciuntur ex iis quæ scribit in Demonstr. Evang. 1. IV. c. 1. , ubi improbare videtur illam expressionem "res factas ex nihilo . " Sed diximus (n. 6.) illud ex nihilo plures habere sensus. Eusebius illud improbat eo sensu , quod nihil sit causa efficiens, vel materialis. Unde dicit : " Quomodo nihil esse possit alteri causa subsistendi ?" Vid. De Aguir. Theol. S. Anselmi, Tom . I tr. 2. disp. 15. c. 7. sec. 2. 36. Note. As to St. Justin Martyr, it is certain that he expressly taught the dogma of creation out of nothing. For in Apology II, n. 22, he says: "And it is also necessary, as it seems to me, to observe that he is called by Plato not the creator but the craftsman of the gods, since, by Plato's own judgment, there is very great difference between the two. For a creator, needing no other thing, effects by his own power and authority that which comes to be. But a craftsman, having received from matter the faculty of founding, establishes his work." And n. 23: "For it is fitting that the power of matter, as being unbegotten and, as Plato thinks, equal to and coeval with the craftsman, should resist his will. For one who did not create has no power over that which is uncreated; hence no force can be brought against it, since it is free from every external necessity. Looking to these things Plato wrote thus: It is necessary that we say force cannot be brought against God." See also the Dialogue with Trypho, n. 5. Therefore, the things said by him which seem to conflict with Catholic truth are easily explained: either because he is treating the second creation, as when he says, "we have received that he founded all things from the beginning from unformed matter"; or because he simply reports certain things from Plato, but does not approve them, and sometimes uses the same things to refute the philosophers from truths conceded by them. See Gatti, Apologetico-Polemical Institutions, tome 1, dissertation 2, § 2.

As to St. Methodius, it is certain that his whole effort in On Free Will, according to Photius, codex 236, is to demonstrate that God produced all things out of nothing. Only, in order to prove this, he uses certain less valid arguments; such as this one: qualities are created out of nothing, therefore substances too can be produced.

As to Eusebius of Caesarea, many objections are made from those things which he writes in Demonstratio Evangelica, book IV, chapter 1, where he seems to disapprove that expression "things made out of nothing." But we have said, n. 6, that out of nothing has several senses. Eusebius disapproves it in the sense that nothing is an efficient or material cause. Hence he says: "How can nothing be for another the cause of subsisting?" See De Aguirre, Theology of St. Anselm, tome I, tract 2, disputation 15, chapter 7, section 2.

§ IV. The Dogma Of Creation Compared With The Prescription Of Reason.

37. Increduli generatim, sed præsertim Philosophi elapsi sæculi , eorumque sectatores, ut Renan, creationem ex nihilo cum rationis principiis pugnare statuunt. Saltem, aiunt nonnulli, inter quos Rousseau, hujusmodi creatio est incomprehensibilis. Ju

Disp. I. De Mundi Origine. 37 verit ergo hanc veritatem catholicam ad normam rationis exigere ; paucis tamen, ne fusius in philosophia pertractata ex integro repetamus. 37. Unbelievers generally, but especially the philosophers of the past century and their followers, such as Renan, hold that creation out of nothing conflicts with the principles of reason. At least, some say, among whom is Rousseau, that creation of this kind is incomprehensible. It will

therefore be useful to examine this Catholic truth according to the norm of reason; yet briefly, lest we repeat in full what has been treated more extensively in philosophy.

38. Constat quidem productionem ex nihilo veteribus philosophis fuisse vel penitus incompertam, vel saltem valde obscuram ; eamque eos docuisse qui jam revelatione divina erant edocti. At hoc ostendit quanta veritate dictum sit in Conc. Vat . Const. 1. c. IV. "Fides et ratio opem quoque sibi mutuam ferunt ; cum recta ratio fidei fundamenta demonstret, ejusque lumine illustrata rerum divinarum scientiam excolat ; fides vero rationem ab erroribus liberet ac tueatur, eamque multiplici cognitione instruat. " Verum ex philosophorum ignorantia nullo pacto arguitur dogma creationis sola revelatione cognosci ; ut enim statim patebit, ex principiis naturali lumine notis evidenter deduci potest. 38. It is indeed established that production out of nothing was either entirely unknown to the ancient philosophers, or at least very obscure, and that those taught it who had already been instructed by divine revelation. But this shows with how much truth it was said in the Vatican Council, Constitution, chapter IV: "Faith and reason also bring mutual help to each other; since right reason demonstrates the foundations of faith, and, enlightened by its light, cultivates the science of divine things; while faith frees and guards reason from errors, and furnishes it with manifold knowledge." But from the ignorance of the philosophers it is in no way argued that the dogma of creation is known by revelation alone; for, as will immediately be clear, it can be evidently deduced from principles known by the natural light.

39. Itaque in creatione possumus considerare possibilitatem et factum ; quoad utrumque indicabimus quid possit, quid debeat ratio. 39. Therefore in creation we can consider possibility and fact. With respect to both we shall indicate what reason can do and what it must do.

40. Ac imprimis, possibilitas spectari potest negative vel positive. Negative, si nulla ratione creationis repugnantiam probari contendimus ; quod fit solvendo objectiones : ex dictis autem art. I. hoc quisque facile præstabit. Positive, si positivis argumentis directe ostendimus posse Deum aliquid ex nihilo producere. Hæc vero positiva demonstratio possibilitatis creationis haberi potest tum a priori tum a posteriori : a priori, quatenus inspecta vel sola Dei infinita perfectione, talis modus agendi ad extra est ei tribuendus ; a posteriori, quatenus admissa rerum contingentium existentia, necesse est admittere fa-

38 De Deo Creatore. ctum, ac proinde ejusdem possibilitatem ; ab esse enim ad posse valet illatio. Hujus duplicis demonstrationis exemplum paulo inferius dabitur. 40. And first, possibility can be considered negatively or positively. Negatively, if we contend that no contradiction in creation can be proved by any argument; this is done by solving objections, and from what was said in article I anyone will easily accomplish this. Positively, if by positive arguments we directly show that God can produce something out of nothing. This positive demonstration of the possibility of creation can be had both a priori and a posteriori: a priori, insofar as, once even the infinite perfection of God alone has been considered, such a mode of acting outside himself must be attributed to him; a posteriori, insofar as, once the existence of contingent things has been admitted, it is necessary to admit the fact, and consequently the possibility of the same; for the inference from being to possibility is valid. An example of this twofold demonstration will be given a little below.

41. At vero demonstratio possibilitatis creationis non debet necessario antevertere demonstrationem facti ; licet enim rei possibilitas ontologice præcedat ejusdem existentiam, logice tamen potest hæc illam antecedere . Revera existentia rerum creatarum præsens nobis fit experientia tam interna quam externa : possumus ergo statim inquirere causam earum efficientem, modumque ipsum, quo productæ sunt ; atque ita ratiocinando agnoscere factum productionis ex nihilo . Quo

in casu notitia de possibilitate creationis latet quidem implicita in aliqua ex præmissis, sed explicite non demonstratur nisi post cognitionem facti. Hoc autem non obesse certitudini de facto creationis, facile patet consideranti numquam impossibile demonstrari posse quod factum evidenter ostenditur. 41. But the demonstration of the possibility of creation need not necessarily precede the demonstration of the fact. For although the possibility of a thing ontologically precedes its existence, nevertheless logically the latter can precede the former. In reality, the existence of created things becomes present to us by both internal and external experience. Therefore we can immediately inquire into their efficient cause and the very mode by which they were produced; and thus, by reasoning, recognize the fact of production out of nothing. In this case the knowledge of the possibility of creation lies indeed implicit in some one of the premises, but it is not explicitly demonstrated until after knowledge of the fact. But that this does not harm certitude concerning the fact of creation is easily clear to one considering that what is evidently shown to be a fact can never be demonstrated to be impossible.

42. Quoad methodum demonstrandi factum creationis, voluerunt aliqui illud probari posse a priori. At falluntur omnino. Etenim demonstratio a priori est demonstratio per causas ; causa autem creans est Deus. Jamvero vel Deus in se inspectus habet necessariam connexionem cum creatura ; et jam non libere creat, contra id quod ratio et fides docent, ut videbimus : vel non habet hanc necessariam connexionem, et jam ex cognitione Dei nequit inferri existentia creaturæ, seu factum creationis. Hæc quidem juxta doctrinam communiter receptam ; non enim hic est locus ad trutinam revocandi systemata quædam singularia. Superest igitur ut factum creationis probetur a posteriori.

Disp. I. De Mundi Origine. 39 42. As to the method of demonstrating the fact of creation, some have wished that it could be proved a priori. But they are entirely mistaken. For an a priori demonstration is a demonstration through causes; but the creating cause is God. Now either God, considered in himself, has a necessary connection with the creature, and then he does not create freely, contrary to what reason and faith teach, as we shall see; or he does not have this necessary connection, and then from the knowledge of God the existence of the creature, or the fact of creation, cannot be inferred. This indeed follows the commonly received doctrine; for this is not the place to recall certain singular systems to the scales. It remains, therefore, that the fact of creation be proved a posteriori.

43. His delibatis, ad rem nostram sufficit statuere sequentem PROP. IV. Doctrina de origine mundi per veram creationem non modo a præscripto rationis nullatenus dissidet ; sed cum eodem penitissime convenire evidenter ostenditur. Prob. I. Convenit cum præscripto rationis ut aliqua tribuatur Deo actio ad extra, quæ sit omnino independens ; sic enim ejus operatio ejus essendi modo respondebit. Atqui, sublata creatione, nulla superest actio ad extra, quæ sit omnino independens ; siquidem quæcumque alia operatio necessario supponit subjectum ex quo et in quo Deus operetur. Ergo . Prob . II. Admittenda est in Deo potentia aliquid faciendi : hæc potentia enim per se dicit perfectionem-est etiam in creaturis. Atqui nihil posset Deus facere, nisi possit aliquid creare. Ergo. Decl. min. Non loquimur hic de Dei operationibus ad intra ; quia illas solum ex fide tenemus, et qui dogma Trinitatis admittit, facile admittit etiam creationem- quia operationes ad intra proprie non tribuuntur potentiæ Dei-quia quemadmodum potentia in creatura dicit potestatem ponendi actum, et non actum ipsum ; ita in Deo dicit potestatem ponendi terminum, et non terminum ipsum : termini autem operationum Dei ad intra identificantur re cum ipsa natura divina. Cæterum iisdem argumentis indicatis in maj. prop. ostenditur tribuendam Deo esse potentiam aliquid producendi extra se. Unde prob. min. Si aliquid posset Deus facere extra se, et nihil posset creare ; aliquid posset producere ex subjecto, quod esset vel ipse Deus, vel ali

40 De Deo Creatore quid a Deo distinctum ; atqui neutrum dici potest ; ergo nisi posset creare, nihil posset facere. Prob. hæc min. quoad 1am partem. Si Deus aliquid extra se produceret ex se tamquam subjecto, destrueretur Dei simplicitas--immutabilitas-incideremus in omnia absurda Pantheismi. Prob. eadem

minor quoad 2am partem. Illud subjectum a Deo distinctum vel esset aliquid productum, vel aliquid improductum ; si primum dicas, redibit semper eadem quæstio, a quo et quomodo fuit productum ; et tunc vel devenimus tandem ad aliquod subjectum productum ex nihilo, et habemus assumptum ; vel admittenda esset series infinita, quæ aperte repugnat. Sin vero alterum dicas, tunc admittenda essent duo entia improducta, seu entia ex se ; quod multis argumentis ostenditur impossibile in metaphysica. Satis nobis erit eloquentissimis verbis Tertulliani (con. Hermog. c. 7-8.) unum afferre argumentum ad probandum non potuisse Deum mundum condere ex subjecto improducto, ex materia ingenita. " Quomodo ergo, ita subjicere Deo materiam, æternam æterno, innatam innato, auctricem auctori ? dicere audentem : et ego prima, et ego ante omnia, et ego a quo omnia : par fuimus, simul fuimus, ambo sine initio, sine fine : ambo sine auctore, sine Deo . Quis me Deus subjicit contemporali, coætaneo ? Si quidem Deus dicitur ; habeo et ego meum nomen. Aut ego sum Deus, aut ille materia : quia ambo sumus quod alter est nostrum. Putas itaque materiam Deo non comparasse quam scilicet subjiciat illi ? Atqui etiam præponit illam Deo, et Deum potius subjicit materiæ, cum vult de materia cuncta fecisse. "

: Disp. I. De Mundi Origine. 41 Prob. III. argumento D. Thomæ (1. p. q. 44. a. 1., et q . 45. a. 2.). Quidquid est per participationem debet esse causatum ab illo, quod est per essentiam ; atqui solus Deus est per essentiam et omne aliud a Deo est ens per participationem : ergo omne aliud a Deo est causatum a Deo. Atqui non omne aliud a Deo esset causatum ab ipso, si nihil Deus fecisset ex nihilo ; siquidem tunc omnia fecisset ex aliquo præsupposito, quod non fuisset causatum ab ipso . Ergo. Decl. Multiplici sensu dicitur Deus esse per essentiam, et dicuntur alia a Deo entia per participationem. Sic ex. gr. dicitur Deus ens per essentiam , quatenus illud ens convenit ei essentialiter. Sed non hæc est significatio, quæ assumitur in hoc argumento ; nam etiam homo est animal per essentiam, quatenus illud animal convenit ei essentialiter, nec tamen inde sequitur hominem esse causam efficientem omnium animalium. Sic etiam ex. gr. quidquid existit extra Deum dicitur ens per participationem, quatenus esse participat, accipit a Deo. Sed neque hæc est significatio, quæ assumitur in præsenti argumento ; secus enim, uti patet, assumeretur ut principium probationis id, quod est probandum. Cæteris ergo omissis, dicimus hic Deum ens per essentiam quatenus est ipsa essendi plenitudo per se subsistens : et aliud a Deo ens per participationem, quatenus prædicatum ens ei competit cum limitatione, ac proinde quidquid est extra Deum est finitum. Quo posito : Prob. illa maj . Omne finitum est mutabile, siquidem est capax augmenti ; omne mutabile est contingens ; omne contingens non habet in se rationem essendi, sed ultimo in ente necessario. Ergo omne

42 De Deo Creatore. finitum, seu quidquid est ens per participationem, debet esse causatum ab ente necessario, seu ab eo quod est ens per essentiam , nempe a Deo. NOTA. I. Ex datis probationibus facile innotescit dogma creationis ex nihilo non modo penitissime cum præscripto rationis convenire ; sed esse unicum modum explicandi rerum originem, qui rectæ rationis principiis respondeat. Etenim rerum contingentium existentia supposita, vel numquam devenimus ad aliquod ens necessarium, quod eas produxerit, admittendo absurdam seriem infinitam ; et habetur atheismus : vel dicitur Deus eas ex se produxisse , et habetur pantheismus : vel produxisse ex materia ingenita, et habetur dualismus : vel tandem produxisse ex nihilo , et habetur dogma creationis. Nihil aliud excogitari potest. Atqui atheismus, pantheismus, dualismus repugnant rectæ rationi, Ergo dogma creationis est unica via rerum originem explicandi modo rationi conformi. NOTA. II. Abstinemus a multiplicandis, atque a datis argumentis fusius evolvendis quia hæc supponimus ex philosophia. Qui plura cupit, consulat D. Th. de pot. q. 3. a. 1. 5.; et c. g. 1. 2. cap. 15. 16. 43. These things having been touched on, it is enough for our purpose to establish the following:

Proposition IV. The doctrine concerning the origin of the world through true creation not only in no way differs from the prescription of reason, but is evidently shown to agree with it most deeply.

First proof. It agrees with the prescription of reason that some action outside himself be attributed to God which is altogether independent; for thus his operation will correspond to his mode of being. But if creation is removed, no action outside himself remains which is altogether independent, since every other operation necessarily supposes a subject from which and in which God operates. Therefore.

Second proof. A power of making something must be admitted in God; for this power of itself denotes a perfection, and it is also in creatures. But God

could make nothing unless he could create something. Therefore.

Explanation of the minor. We are not speaking here of God's operations within himself: because we hold those only from faith, and one who admits the dogma of the Trinity easily admits creation also; because operations within God are not properly attributed to the power of God; and because, just as in a creature power denotes the power of positing an act, and not the act itself, so in God it denotes the power of positing a terminus, and not the terminus itself. But the termini of God's operations within himself are really identified with the divine nature itself. Moreover, by the same arguments indicated in the major of the proposition, it is shown that a power of producing something outside himself must be attributed to God.

Hence the minor is proved. If God could make something outside himself and could create nothing, he could produce something from a subject, which would be either God himself or something distinct from God. But neither can be said. Therefore, unless he could create, he could make nothing.

This minor is proved as to the first part. If God produced something outside himself from himself as from a subject, God's simplicity and immutability would be destroyed, and we would fall into all the absurdities of pantheism.

The same minor is proved as to the second part. That subject distinct from God would be either something produced or something unproduced. If you say the first, the same question always returns, by whom and in what way it was produced; and then either we finally arrive at some subject produced out of nothing, and we have what was assumed, or an infinite series would have to be admitted, which is openly repugnant. But if you say the second, then two unproduced beings, or beings from themselves, would have to be admitted; and this is shown impossible by many arguments in metaphysics. It will be enough for us, in the most eloquent words of Tertullian, Against Hermogenes, chapters 7-8, to bring forward one argument to prove that God could not have founded the world from an unproduced subject, from unbegotten matter: "How, then, can they dare so to subject matter to God: eternal to eternal, unborn to unborn, authoress to author, saying: I too am first, I too am before all things, and I too am that from which are all things; we were equal, we were together, both without beginning, without end; both without author, without God. What God subjects me to one contemporary and coeval with me? If indeed he is called God, I too have my own name. Either I am God, or he is matter, because we both are what the other of us is. Do you think, therefore, that he has not compared matter with God, since he subjects it to him? But he even sets it before God, and rather subjects God to matter, when he wills that God made all things from matter."

Third proof, from the argument of St. Thomas, Summa Theologiae I, q. 44, a. 1, and q. 45, a. 2. Whatever is by participation must be caused by that which is by essence; but God alone is by essence, and everything other than God is a being by participation. Therefore everything other than God is caused by God. But not everything other than God would be caused by him if God had made nothing out of nothing, since then he would have made all things from something presupposed which had not been caused by him. Therefore.

Explanation. In many senses God is said to be by essence, and things other than God are said to be beings by participation. Thus, for example, God is said to be being by essence insofar as being belongs to him essentially. But this is not the meaning assumed in this argument; for man too is animal by essence, insofar as animal belongs to him essentially, yet it does not follow from this that man is the efficient cause of all animals. So also, for example, whatever exists outside God is said to be being by participation insofar as it participates in being, receiving it from God. But neither is this the meaning assumed in the present argument; otherwise, as is clear, what is to be proved would be assumed as the principle of proof. Therefore, omitting the rest, we say here that God is being by essence insofar as he is the very fullness of being subsisting through itself; and that what is other than God is being by participation insofar as the predicate being belongs to it with limitation, and consequently whatever is outside God is finite. This being posited:

That major is proved. Everything finite is mutable, since it is capable of increase; everything mutable is contingent; everything contingent does not have in itself the reason of being, but ultimately has it in necessary being. Therefore everything finite, or whatever is being by participation, must be caused by necessary being, or by that which is being by essence, namely by God.

Note I. From the proofs given, it easily becomes known that the dogma of creation out of nothing not only agrees most deeply with the prescription

of reason, but is the only mode of explaining the origin of things which corresponds to the principles of right reason. For, once the existence of contingent things is supposed, either we never arrive at any necessary being which produced them, by admitting an absurd infinite series, and atheism is had; or God is said to have produced them from himself, and pantheism is had; or he is said to have produced them from unbegotten matter, and dualism is had; or finally he is said to have produced them out of nothing, and the dogma of creation is had. Nothing else can be thought up. But atheism, pantheism, and dualism are repugnant to right reason. Therefore the dogma of creation is the only way of explaining the origin of things in a manner conformable to reason.

Note II. We abstain from multiplying arguments and from unfolding the given arguments more fully, because we presuppose these things from philosophy. Whoever desires more should consult St. Thomas, De potentia, q. 3, aa. 1 and 5; and Contra Gentiles II, chapters 15-16.

Article 4. Whether to Create is Proper to the Whole Trinity

LatineEnglish

Fourth Article. Whether To Create Is Proper To The Whole Trinity.

44. Doctrina Ecclesiæ, quoad præsentem quæstionem , declarata est in Conc. CPtano. V. c. 1., ubi dicitur : "Unus Pater, ex quo omnia, et unus Dominus Deus, per quem omnia, et unus Spiritus Sanctus, in

4 Disp. I. De Mundi Origine. 43 quo omnia. " Et in Conc. Later. IV. (n. 27.), ubi dicitur : "Simpliciter confitemur, quod unus solus est verus Deus Pater et Filius et Spiritus Sanctus .. unum universorum principium : creator omnium, etc." 44. The doctrine of the Church, with respect to the present question, was declared in the Fifth Council of Constantinople, chapter 1, where it is said: "One Father, from whom are all things, and one Lord God, through whom are all things, and one Holy Spirit, in whom are all things." And in the Fourth Lateran Council (n. 27), where it is said: "We simply confess that one alone is the true God, Father and Son and Holy Spirit ... one principle of all things: creator of all, etc."

45. Ad cujus doctrinæ intelligentiam, sciendum est neminem, ut videtur, unquam negavisse simpliciter creationem pertinere ad Deum, non solum ut est natura unus, sed etiam ut est Personis trinus. Sed 1. sectatores Raimundi Lulli, docentis mysterium Sanctissimæ Trinitatis posse per naturalem rationem certo et evidenter demonstrari, ut errorem sui magistri defenderent, commenti sunt in creaturis aliquid inveniri productum a solo Patre , aliquid a solo Filio, aliquid a solo Spiritu Sancto.- 2. Henricus Gandavensis asseruit creationem tribuendam quidem esse tribus Personis divinis ; at non per aliquid omnibus commune, puta per potentiam, et per essentialem notitiam et amorem, sed solum per Verbum et amorem productum.-3. Minus recte etiam locuti esse videntur Mastrofini (de Trin. 1. VI. c. 7.) et Staudenmaier (tom. II.) contendentes Personas divinas creare pro ratione characteris personalis. 45. For the understanding of this doctrine, it must be known that no one, as it seems, ever simply denied that creation belongs to God, not only as he is one in nature, but also as he is three in Persons. But 1. the followers of Raymond Lull, who taught that the mystery of the Most Holy Trinity could be certainly and evidently demonstrated by natural reason, in order to defend the error of their master, invented that in creatures something is found produced by the Father alone, something by the Son alone, and something by the Holy Spirit alone. 2. Henry of Ghent asserted that creation is indeed to be attributed to the three divine Persons, but not through something common to all, namely through power, and through essential knowledge and love, but only through the Word and produced love. 3. Mastrofini (On the Trinity, book VI, chapter 7) and Staudenmaier (vol. II) also seem to have spoken less correctly, contending that the divine Persons create according to the character

of the personal property.

46. Quare doctrina vera est 1. creationem ita pertinere ad tres Personas divinas, ut nulla sit creatura , et nihil sit in ulla creatura, quod non sit simul productum ab omnibus.-- 2 . Creationem tribuendam esse tribus Personis divinis per aliquid, quod est omnibus commune, ac propterea secundum eamdem causalitatem.-3. Quod consequens est, creationem pertinere ad tres Personas divinas, tamquam ad unum principium ut expresse dicitur in cit. c. Conc. Lat. Qua in re notandum est principium quod crea

44 De Deo Creatore. tionis esse tres Personas divinas ; principium quo esse voluntatem et intellectum cum potentia, si hæc ab intellectu et voluntate distinguatur. Unde absolute debet dici Personas divinas esse unum principium creationis, seu unum Creatorem. Concreta enim substantiva cum includant suppositum et formam, non multiplicantur nisi utroque multiplicato ; sed Creator est concretum substantivum, quod dicit tres Personas, sed unam formam, seu unum principium quo ; ergo. Vid. D. Th. 1. p. q . 39. a. 3 .; et q. 36. a. 4. 46. Therefore the true doctrine is: 1. creation so belongs to the three divine Persons that there is no creature, and nothing in any creature, which has not been produced simultaneously by all. 2. Creation is to be attributed to the three divine Persons through something which is common to all, and therefore according to the same causality. 3. What follows from this is that creation belongs to the three divine Persons as to one principle, as is expressly said in the cited chapter of the Lateran Council. In this matter it must be noted that the principle which of creation is the three divine Persons; the principle by which is the will and intellect together with power, if this is distinguished from intellect and will. Hence it must be said absolutely that the divine Persons are one principle of creation, or one Creator. For concrete substantives, since they include the supposit and the form, are not multiplied unless both are multiplied; but Creator is a concrete substantive which denotes three Persons, but one form, or one principle by which; therefore. See St. Thomas, Summa Theologiae I, q. 39, a. 3; and q. 36, a. 4.

47. Unum quæri hic potest : utrum dato quod tres divinæ Personæ creant per aliquid ipsis commune (quod nemo, ut vidimus, negare potest), creant etiam per aliquid ipsis proprium. Cui quæstioni occasionem dat D. Th. 1. p. q. 45. a. 6. dicens : "Sed tamen divinæ Personæ secundum rationem suæ processionis habent causalitatem respectu creationis rerum. " Et de Valentia tom. 1. Disp. 3. q. 2. p. 3. ait : "etiam fatendum est a Personis quoque secundum proprietates personales, creaturas procedere. " Eadem quæstio ab aliis sic proponitur : utrum ad causalitatem creationis requirantur processiones personales ; seu utrum Personæ Verbi et Spiritus Sancti postulentur ut Pater creet. Responderi breviter potest Personas procedentes necessarias esse ut Deus possit creare, quatenus necesse est ut sit Deus, cujus creare est proprium : Deus autem, ut fide constat, non est sine Trinitate Personarum. Pariter cum Deus creet per intellectum dirigentem, et voluntatem imperantem ; necesse est ut intellectus et voluntas sint quales debent esse in Deo, cujus est creare : intellectus autem et

Disp. I. De Mundi Origine. 45 voluntas, ut fides docet, habent in Deo essentialiter terminum immanentem. Vid. etiam Sylv. in cit. 1. D. Th. At vero non videntur Personæ procedentes postulari ut Deus creare possit, quatenus Personæ divinæ creent per aliquid proprium : Sic enim non viderentur amplius esse unum principium, unus Creator. Unde D. Th. eodem 1. ait : " processiones Personarum sunt rationes productionis creaturarum, in quantum includunt essentialia attributa, quæ sunt scientia et voluntas. " Asserenti ergo Personas divinas creare etiam per aliquid proprium, facile possent opponi fere omnes rationes, quibus ipse de Valentia 1. c. Henrici Gandavensis sententiam, quam dicit non esse tolerabilem, impugnat. 47. One thing can be asked here: whether, granted that the three divine Persons create through something common to themselves (which, as we have seen, no one can deny), they also create through something proper to themselves. St. Thomas gives occasion for this question, Summa Theologiae I, q. 45, a. 6, saying: "But nevertheless the divine Persons, according to the notion of their procession, have causality with respect to the creation of things." And de Valentia, vol. 1,

disp. 3, q. 2, p. 3, says: "it must also be confessed that creatures proceed from the Persons also according to the personal properties." The same question is proposed by others thus: whether personal processions are required for the causality of creation; or whether the Persons of the Word and of the Holy Spirit are demanded in order that the Father may create.

It can be answered briefly that the proceeding Persons are necessary in order that God may be able to create, insofar as it is necessary that he be God, whose proper act it is to create; but God, as is established by faith, is not without the Trinity of Persons. Likewise, since God creates through the intellect directing and the will commanding, it is necessary that the intellect and will be such as they must be in God, whose act it is to create; but intellect and will, as faith teaches, have in God an essentially immanent terminus. See also Sylvius on the cited place of St. Thomas. But in truth the proceeding Persons do not seem to be demanded so that God may be able to create insofar as the divine Persons create through something proper; for in this way they would no longer seem to be one principle, one Creator. Hence St. Thomas says in the same place: "the processions of the Persons are the reasons of the production of creatures, insofar as they include the essential attributes, which are knowledge and will." Therefore, to one asserting that the divine Persons create also through something proper, nearly all the arguments could easily be opposed by which de Valentia himself, in the cited place, attacks the opinion of Henry of Ghent, which he says is not tolerable.

48. Quamvis autem hæc certa sint, ad pleniorem tamen doctrinæ catholicæ intelligentiam et ad præcavendas difficultates, animadvertamus oportet opus creationis per appropriationem diverso modo tribui Personis divinis . 48. Although these things are certain, nevertheless for a fuller understanding of Catholic doctrine and for warding off difficulties, we must observe that the work of creation is attributed in diverse ways to the divine Persons through appropriation.

49. Norunt omnes in divinis valde differre propria unius Personæ ab appropriatis. Propria dicuntur ea, quæ ita competunt uni Personæ, ut non possint alteri competere. Sic ex. gr. Paternitas, intellectus notionalis Patris generans Verbum, ita competunt Personæ Patris ut non possint tribui neque Filio, neque Spiritui Sancto. Appropriata vero sunt ea, quæ etsi sint communia toti Trinitati, nec proinde magis conveniant uni Personæ, quam alteri (hoc enim æqualitati Personarum repugnat), ratione tamen majoris manifestationis attribuuntur uni certæ Personæ. Fundamentum appropriationis est, ut docet D. Th. de ver. q. 7. art. 3., major similitudo ad id, quod est

46 De Deo Creatore proprium unius Personæ, quam ad id, quod est proprium alterius. Sic ex. gr. sapientia est quidem communis tribus Personis, sed per appropriationem attribuitur Filio, ad cujus propria, ut mox explicabitur, habet majorem similitudinem. 49. Everyone knows that in divine things the proper things of one Person differ greatly from the appropriated things. Those things are called proper which so belong to one Person that they cannot belong to another. Thus, for example, Paternity, and the notional intellect of the Father generating the Word, so belong to the Person of the Father that they cannot be attributed either to the Son or to the Holy Spirit. But appropriated things are those which, although they are common to the whole Trinity, and consequently do not belong more to one Person than to another (for this is repugnant to the equality of the Persons), nevertheless by reason of greater manifestation are attributed to a certain Person. The foundation of appropriation is, as St. Thomas teaches, De veritate, q. 7, a. 3, a greater likeness to that which is proper to one Person than to that which is proper to another. Thus, for example, wisdom is indeed common to the three Persons, but by appropriation it is attributed to the Son, to whose proper things, as will soon be explained, it has a greater likeness.

50. Unde, ad rem nostram, sequitur a) posse attributa communia toti Trinitati appropriari uni certæ Personæ. Si consideremus ex. gr. virtutem Dei operativam ad extra, habemus omnipotentiam, sapientiam, bonitatem, quæ certe pertinent ad tres Personas

divinas. Attamen potentia per appropriationem tribuitur Patri ; potentia enim, in quantum hujusmodi, est quoddam principium, ideoque majorem habet similitudinem cum Patre cœlesti, qui est principium non tantum creaturarum, sed et aliarum Personarum divinarum. Sapientia per appropriationem tribuitur Filio: quia, cum pertineat ad intellectum, majorem habet similitudinem cum propriis Filii, qui procedit per intellectum, et est Verbum. Bonitas per appropriationem tribuitur Spiritui Sancto ; bonitas enim est objectum amoris, et Spiritus Sanctus per voluntatem est Amor. Sequitur b) quod si consideremus diversa opera Dei ad extra, prout ipsa habent majorem similitudinem cum propriis unius Personæ, per appropriationem ei tribuuntur. Sic ex. gr. si in uno opere magis reluceat omnipotentia, in alio sapientia, in alio bonitas ; primum tribuitur Patri, alterum Filio, tertium Spiritui Sancto. "Licet," inquit D. Th. 1. c. ad 3., quilibet effectus Dei procedat ex quolibet attributorum, tamen reducitur unusquisque effectus ad illud attributum cum quo habet convenientiam secundum

Disp. I. De Mundi Origine. 47 propriam rationem ; sicut ordinatio rerum ad sapientiam ; et justificatio impii, ad misericordiam et bonitatem se superabundanter diffundentem. Creatio vero, quæ est productio ipsius substantiæ rei, reducitur ad potentiam. " Sequitur c) quod idem opus Dei ad extra, quamvis pertineat ad totam Trinitatem operantem per aliquid commune causalitate unica, possit tamen per appropriationem diverso modo tribui unicuique Personæ. Quare D. Th. 1. c. ad 2. ait : "Sicut natura divina, licet sit communis tribus Personis, ordine tamen quodam eis convenit, in quantum Filius accipit naturam divinam a Patre, et Spiritus Sanctus ab utroque ; ita etiam et virtus creandi, licet sit communis tribus Personis, ordine tamen quodam eis convenit. Nam Filius habet eam a Patre, et Spiritus Sanctus ab utroque. Unde Creatorem esse attribuitur Patri ut ei qui non habet virtutem creandi ab alio. De Filio autem dicitur Joan. 1. 3 : Per quem omnia facta sunt, in quantum habet eamdem virtutem , sed ab alio ; nam hæc præpositio, per, solet denotare causam mediam, sive principium de principio. Sed Spiritui Sancto, qui habet eamdem virtutem ab utroque , attribuitur quod dominando gubernet et vivificet quæ sunt creata a Patre per Filium . Potest enim hujus attributionis communis ratio accipi ex appropriatione essentialium attributorum. Nam, sicut supra dictum est, qu. 39, art. 8, ad 3 , Patri attribuitur et appropriatur potentia, quæ maxime manifestatur in creatione ; et ideo attribuitur Patri Creatorem esse, Filio autem appropriatur sapientia ; per quam agens per intellectum operatur, et ideo dicitur :

48 De Deo Creatore. de Filio : per quem omnia facta sunt. Spiritui Sancto autem appropriatur bonitas, ad quam pertinet gubernatio deducens res in debitos fines, et vivificatio ; nam vita in interiori quodam motu consistit ; primum autem movens est finis et bonitas ." 50. Hence, for our matter, it follows: a) that attributes common to the whole Trinity can be appropriated to one certain Person. If, for example, we consider God's operative virtue outside himself, we have omnipotence, wisdom, and goodness, which certainly belong to the three divine Persons. Yet power is attributed by appropriation to the Father; for power, insofar as it is such, is a certain principle, and therefore has a greater likeness to the heavenly Father, who is the principle not only of creatures, but also of the other divine Persons. Wisdom is attributed by appropriation to the Son, because, since it belongs to the intellect, it has a greater likeness to the proper things of the Son, who proceeds through intellect and is the Word. Goodness is attributed by appropriation to the Holy Spirit; for goodness is the object of love, and the Holy Spirit through the will is Love.

It follows: b) that if we consider the diverse works of God outside himself, according as they have a greater likeness to the proper things of one Person, they are attributed to that Person by appropriation. Thus, for example, if in one work omnipotence shines forth more, in another wisdom, in another goodness, the first is attributed to the Father, the second to the Son, the third to the Holy Spirit. "Although," says St. Thomas in the cited place, reply to objection 3, "every effect of God proceeds from each of the attributes, nevertheless each effect is reduced to that attribute with which it has fittingness according to its proper notion; as the ordering of things is reduced to wisdom, and the justification of the impious to mercy and to goodness superabundantly diffusing itself. But creation, which is the production of the very substance of a thing, is reduced to power."

It follows: c) that the same work of God outside himself, although it belongs to the whole Trinity operating through something common by a single causality, can nevertheless by appropriation be attributed in a diverse way to each Person. Wherefore St. Thomas says in the cited place,

reply to objection 2: "Just as the divine nature, although it is common to the three Persons, nevertheless belongs to them in a certain order, insofar as the Son receives the divine nature from the Father, and the Holy Spirit from both, so also the virtue of creating, although it is common to the three Persons, nevertheless belongs to them in a certain order. For the Son has it from the Father, and the Holy Spirit from both. Hence to be Creator is attributed to the Father, as to him who does not have the virtue of creating from another. But of the Son it is said, John 1:3: Through whom all things were made, insofar as he has the same virtue, but from another; for this preposition, through, is accustomed to denote a middle cause, or a principle from a principle. But to the Holy Spirit, who has the same virtue from both, it is attributed that by ruling he governs and vivifies the things which have been created by the Father through the Son. For the common reason of this attribution can be taken from the appropriation of the essential attributes. For, as was said above, q. 39, a. 8, reply to objection 3, power is attributed and appropriated to the Father, which is especially manifested in creation; and therefore to be Creator is attributed to the Father. Wisdom is appropriated to the Son, through which one acting through intellect operates, and therefore it is said of the Son: through whom all things were made. But goodness is appropriated to the Holy Spirit, to which belongs governance leading things to their due ends, and vivification; for life consists in a certain interior motion, and the first mover is end and goodness."

51. His bene constitutis, dicimus : PROP. V. Causa mundi efficiens sunt tres divinæ Personæ, quæ singulari communique actione omnia, quæcumque sunt, ex nihilo produxere. Prob . I. ex Scriptura. Etenim in Scripturis creatio tribuitur Patri, Filio, et Spiritui Sancto ; atqui ita tribuitur, ut eis competat per singularem communemque efficientiam. Ergo . Prob. maj . Creatio in Scripturis a) tribuitur Patri : sic Luc. 10. 21. legitur : "Confiteor tibi Pater Domine cæli et terræ ;" et Act. 4. 24. seq. " Domine tu es, qui fecisti cælum et terram, mare et omnia quæ in eis sunt : qui Spiritu Sancto per os patris nostri David pueri tui dixisti ... convenerunt enim vere adversum sanctum puerum tuum Jesum." -b) tribuitur Filio : sic Jo. 1.1-3. “In principio erat Verbum ... omnia per ipsum facta sunt et sine ipso factum est nihil quod factum est."-Colos. 1. 15. seq. "Qui est imago Dei invisibilis primogenitus omnis creaturæ ; quoniam in ipso condita sunt universa in cœlis et in terra .. omnia per ipsum ... et in ipso creata sunt, et ipse est ante omnes, et omnia in ipso constant. "-c) tribuitur Spiritui Sancto : sic Ps. 32. 6. "Verbo Domini cæli firmati sunt, et. Spiritu oris ejus omnis virtus eorum. " Ps. 103. 30. "Emittes Spiritum tuum et creabuntur : et renovabis faciem terræ. "-De tribus Personis simul potest intel-

Disp. I. De Mundi Origine. 49 ligi illud ad Rom. 11. 36. “ Ex ipso, et per ipsum, et in ipso sunt omnia: ipsi gloria in sæcula." Prob. min. Causalitas respectu Patris communiter exprimitur per particulam ex, respectu Filii per particulam per, respectu Spiritus Sancti per particulam in. Jamvero hæ diversæ particulæ vel exprimunt eamdem causalitatem respectu trium Personarum, quatenus omnes creant per aliquid ipsis commune, quod potest diverso modo unicuique tribui solum per appropriationem ; vel exprimunt veluti diversam causalitatem, quatenus unaquæque creat per aliquid proprium. Atqui hoc ultimum dici nequit. Ergo. Prob. hæc min. Quod est proprium unius Personæ nequit de aliis prædicari ; ergo si illæ diversæ particulæ aliquid proprium exprimerent, quæ pro una Persona adhibetur, non posset adhiberi pro altera : si ex. gr. particula ex adhiberetur pro Patre, non posset adhiberi pro aliis Personis ; et ita de cæteris. Atqui particulæ illæ promiscue adhibentur pro omnibus Personis. Ergo. Prob. hæc ult. min. Particula per adhibetur etiam pro Patre : sic 1. Cor. 1. 9. "Fidelis Deus, per quem vocati estis in societatem Filii ejus Jesu Christi. " Particula in adhibetur etiam pro Filio, uti patet ex testimonio Colos. 1. 15. seq. superius recitato ; et item particula ex, uti Eph . 4. 15. "Crescamus in illo per omnia qui est caput Christus , ex quo totum corpus compactum et connexum, etc."-De Spiritu Sancto usurpatur particula per 1. Cor. 12. 8. "alii quidem per Spiritum datur sermo sapientiæ"; atque particula ex Jo. 3. 6. "Quod natum est ex Spiritu spiritus est." Vid. S. Bas. de Spir. San. c. 5.

50 De Deo Creatore. Prob . II . Ex Patribus. S. Dionysius, de divinis nominibus cap. 2. dixit : "Communia totius Trinitatis esse omnia creabilia."-S. Athanasius serm. 3 . n. 5. " Pater per Filium in Spiritu Sancto creat omnia. " S. Basilius de Sp. San. c. 16. "In rerum creatione cogita Patrem ut primam creaturarum

causam, Filium ut causam creantem, Spiritum Sanctum ut causam omnia perficientem . "-Similia habent S. Greg. Naz . Or. 38. n. 9.-S. Ambrosius Hexæm. 1 . 2. c. 5. n. 18.-S. Augustinus 1. 11. de Civ. Dei c. 32 . Quare omnia testimonia ex dictis de appropriatione, et de argumento ex Scripturis facile intelliguntur. Prob . III . Est Theologicum axioma testimoniis etiam Patrum confirmatum (Vid. Valentia tom. 1. disp. 2. q. 10. p. 2.) "In divinis omnia sunt unum, ubi non obviat relationis oppositio." Atqui in creatione, quæ est opus Dei ad extra, nulla, uti patet, obviat relationis oppositio. Ergo . 51. These things having been well established, we say:

Proposition V. The efficient cause of the world is the three divine Persons, who by a singular and common action produced out of nothing all things whatsoever are.

First proof, from Scripture. For in the Scriptures creation is attributed to the Father, to the Son, and to the Holy Spirit; but it is attributed in such a way that it belongs to them through a singular and common efficiency. Therefore.

The major is proved. Creation in the Scriptures a) is attributed to the Father: thus Luke 10:21 reads: "I confess to you, Father, Lord of heaven and earth"; and Acts 4:24 ff.: "Lord, you are he who made heaven and earth, the sea and all things that are in them: who by the Holy Spirit, through the mouth of our father David your servant, said ... for they have truly assembled against your holy servant Jesus." b) It is attributed to the Son: thus John 1:1-3: "In the beginning was the Word ... all things were made through him, and without him was made nothing that was made." Colossians 1:15 ff.: "Who is the image of the invisible God, the firstborn of every creature; for in him all things were created in heaven and on earth ... all things were created through him and in him, and he is before all, and all things consist in him." c) It is attributed to the Holy Spirit: thus Psalm 32:6: "By the Word of the Lord the heavens were established, and by the Spirit of his mouth all their power." Psalm 103:30: "You will send forth your Spirit and they will be created, and you will renew the face of the earth." Of the three Persons together can be understood that text of Romans 11:36: "From him, and through him, and in him are all things: to him be glory forever."

The minor is proved. Causality with respect to the Father is commonly expressed by the particle from, with respect to the Son by the particle through, and with respect to the Holy Spirit by the particle in. Now these diverse particles either express the same causality with respect to the three Persons, insofar as all create through something common to themselves, which can be attributed in a diverse way to each one only by appropriation; or they express, as it were, a diverse causality, insofar as each one creates through something proper. But this last cannot be said. Therefore.

This minor is proved. What is proper to one Person cannot be predicated of the others; therefore if those diverse particles expressed something proper, the particle which is applied for one Person could not be applied for another: if, for example, the particle from were applied for the Father, it could not be applied for the other Persons; and so concerning the rest. But those particles are applied promiscuously for all the Persons. Therefore.

This last minor is proved. The particle through is also applied for the Father: thus 1 Corinthians 1:9: "God is faithful, through whom you have been called into the fellowship of his Son Jesus Christ." The particle in is also applied for the Son, as is clear from the testimony of Colossians 1:15 ff. recited above; and likewise the particle from, as in Ephesians 4:15: "Let us grow in him through all things, who is the head, Christ, from whom the whole body, compacted and connected, etc." Concerning the Holy Spirit the particle through is used in 1 Corinthians 12:8: "to one indeed through the Spirit is given the word of wisdom"; and the particle from in John 3:6: "That which is born from the Spirit is spirit." See St. Basil, On the Holy Spirit, chapter 5.

Second proof, from the Fathers. St. Dionysius, On the Divine Names, chapter 2, said: "All creatable things are common to the whole Trinity." St. Athanasius, sermon 3, n. 5: "The Father through the Son in the Holy Spirit creates all things." St. Basil, On the Holy Spirit, chapter 16: "In the creation of things, think of the Father as the first cause of creatures, the Son as the creating cause, the Holy Spirit as the cause perfecting all things." Similar things are found in St. Gregory Nazianzen, Oration 38, n. 9; St. Ambrose, Hexaemeron, book 2, chapter 5, n. 18; St. Augustine, book 11 of The City of God, chapter 32. Therefore all the testimonies are easily understood from what has been said concerning appropriation, and concerning the argument from the Scriptures.

Third proof. It is a theological

axiom confirmed also by testimonies of the Fathers (see Valentia, vol. 1, disp. 2, q. 10, p. 2): "In divine things all things are one, where the opposition of relation does not stand in the way." But in creation, which is a work of God outside himself, no opposition of relation, as is clear, stands in the way. Therefore.

Article 5. Whether the Power of Creating is Communicable to Any Creature

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Fifth Article. Whether The Virtue Of Creating Is Communicable To Any Creature.

52. Ex iis, quæ disputavimus, satis superque constat Deum unum et Trinum per unam efficientiam esse causam mundi effectricem. Quod nunc quærimus est, utrum creare ita sit proprium Dei, ut nulli creaturæ possit competere. Hæc quæstio non levis momenti est, præsertim quoad doctrinam de miraculis, ubi statuitur aliqua esse miracula, quæ neque quoad veritatem operis possunt ab ulla creatura patrari : claritatis gratia distinctis paragraphis illam pertractabimus .

Disp. I. De Mundi Origine. 51 § I. Status quæstionis. 52. From the things which we have discussed, it is sufficiently and more than sufficiently established that God, one and triune, through one efficiency, is the efficient cause of the world. What we now ask is whether to create is so proper to God that it cannot belong to any creature. This question is of no slight importance, especially with respect to the doctrine concerning miracles, where it is established that there are some miracles which, even with respect to the reality of the work, cannot be performed by any creature. For the sake of clarity we shall treat this question in distinct paragraphs.

Section I. State Of The Question.

53. Non agitur hic de facto : Deus enim solus, ut demonstravimus (n. 26. seqq.) est rerum omnium Creator, ac proinde nulla creatura aliquid unquam creavit. Ex hoc autem facile deducitur nullam creaturam habere potestatem creandi de lege ordinaria, seu ut nunc res sunt a Deo constitutæ. Quod enim de facto numquam est, de potentia ordinaria non potest esse ; sed nulla unquam creatura aliquid creavit ; ergo . Maj . patet ; siquidem ad Dei providentiam spectat, ut sinat creaturas proprias actiones operari , ne frustra sit ulla potentia in agentibus naturalibus. 53. The question here is not about the fact. For God alone, as we have demonstrated (n. 26 ff.), is the Creator of all things, and consequently no creature has ever created anything. From this it is easily deduced that no creature has the power of creating according to the ordinary law, or as things are now constituted by God. For what never exists in fact cannot exist by ordinary power; but no creature has ever created anything; therefore. The major is clear, since it belongs to God's providence that he permit creatures to perform their own proper actions, lest any potency in natural agents be in vain.

54. Agitur ergo de possibilitate et de Dei potentia absoluta ; et quæritur utrum ita creaturæ repugnet potestas creandi, ut Deus, nec agendo præter ordinem jam constitutum, possit vel ulli creaturæ existenti, vel alii creaturæ creabili illam communicare. Hæc autem quæstio agitari potest de creatura ut causa principali, et ut causa instrumentali. 54. Therefore the question concerns possibility and the absolute power of God; and it is asked whether the power of creating is so repugnant to a creature that God, even by acting beyond the order already constituted, cannot communicate it either to any existing creature or to some other creatable creature. This question, however, can be treated concerning a creature as a principal cause and as an instrumental cause.

55. Si consideretur creatura ut causa creans principalis , duo iterum certa sunt. Primo, virtus creandi secundum omnimodam independentiam, qua est in Deo, non est communicabilis creaturæ ; hæc enim quemadmodum essentialiter dependet a Deo in essendo ita et in operando-secundo, virtus creandi adæquata objecto creabili, seu quæ se porrigit ad omnia creabilia, neque potest ulli creaturæ communicari. Nam a) "talis potentia," inquit Suarez Met. disp. 20.

52 De Deo Creatore. sec. 2. n. 4. "habet objectum infinite perfectum syncategorematice : nam in illa latitudine objecti, nullum potest assignari tantæ perfectionis, quin aliud majoris perfectionis creari possit, et ita in infinitum : ergo in potentia, quæ sua virtute continet totum illud objectum requireretur virtus, et perfectio simpliciter infinita : quia neque actu finita sufficere potest , alias posset æquari et superari ab aliqua parte objecti sui, neque potest virtus illa esse infinita syncategorematice, quia simul et actu habet existentem totam suam virtutem et perfectionem. "-2. "Secunda ratio, " ait idem auctor l. c., "adhiberi potest, quia impossibile est potentiam aliquam productivam se ipsam claudere sub objecto suo adæquato : quia impossibile est aliquid posse creare se ipsum : sed omnis creatura continetur sub ente creabili, ut per se notum est : ergo non potest habere pro objecto adæquato suæ potentiæ ens creabile ut sic : alias se ipsam clauderet sub objecto suo ."- Omnis creatura est finita, ac proinde potest alia dari ea perfectior ; ergo si illa haberet vim creandi adæquatam objecto creabili, posset ut causa principalis producere aliam creaturam se præstantiorem ; atqui hoc repugnat, siquidem non datur effectus major sua causa. Ergo . 55. If the creature is considered as a principal creating cause, two things again are certain. First, the virtue of creating according to the independence in every respect by which it exists in God is not communicable to a creature; for just as a creature depends essentially on God in being, so also in operating. Second, the virtue of creating adequate to the creatable object, or which extends itself to all creatable things, also cannot be communicated to any creature. For a) "such a potency," says Suarez, Metaphysical Disputations, disp. 20, sect. 2, n. 4, "has an object infinitely perfect syncategorematically; for in that breadth of object, nothing of such perfection can be assigned that another of greater perfection cannot be created, and so on to infinity. Therefore in a potency which by its own virtue contains that whole object, virtue and perfection simply infinite would be required; because neither can one actually finite suffice, otherwise it could be equaled and surpassed by some part of its own object; nor can that virtue be infinite syncategorematically, because it has its whole virtue and perfection existing simultaneously and actually." 2. "A second reason," says the same author in the cited place, "can be applied, because it is impossible for any productive potency to enclose itself under its own adequate object; because it is impossible for something to be able to create itself. But every creature is contained under creatable being, as is self-evident. Therefore it cannot have creatable being as such for the adequate object of its potency; otherwise it would enclose itself under its own object." Every creature is finite, and consequently another more perfect than it can be given; therefore, if that creature had a force of creating adequate to the creatable object, it could, as a principal cause, produce another creature more excellent than itself. But this is repugnant, since an effect is not given greater than its cause. Therefore.

56. Quæstio ergo potest solum procedere de virtute creandi in creatura, per modum causæ secundæ principalis dependentis in agendo a prima causa, et limitatæ ad certum ordinem vel speciem rerum creabilium. En, quomodo totam rem explicat de Valentia (tom. 1. disp. 3. q. 2. p. 4) : "Sciendum est , principalem causam eam dici quæ secundum virtutem, in ipsa existentem, potest effectum attingere, sive

Disp. I. De Mundi Origine. 53 illa virtus in illa existens sit supra naturam, sive præter naturam ejus, sive naturalis et naturæ ejus proportionata. Nam et contingit esse quasdam causas principales secundas per virtutem supernaturalem . Ut cum homo per habitus supernaturales producit actus supernaturales in intellectu et voluntate. Itaque quæstio est, utrum per potentiam Dei absolutam queat aliqua creatura quidpiam creare per virtutem suam ad id sufficientem : sive ea virtus ei, supra vel præter naturam ipsius, a Deo communicetur, sive sit ei naturalis : ut si Deus præter creaturas omnes , quæ jam sunt, conderet aliquam creaturam præstantissimam quæ esset tali virtute naturaliter

prædita." 56. Therefore the question can proceed only concerning the virtue of creating in a creature by way of a secondary principal cause dependent in acting on the first cause, and limited to a certain order or species of creatable things. Behold how de Valentia explains the whole matter (vol. 1, disp. 3, q. 2, p. 4): "It must be known that a principal cause is called that which according to a virtue existing in it can reach the effect, whether that virtue existing in it is above its nature, or beyond its nature, or natural and proportioned to its nature. For it also happens that there are certain secondary principal causes through supernatural virtue. As when man through supernatural habits produces supernatural acts in the intellect and will. And so the question is whether, by the absolute power of God, some creature can create anything through its own virtue sufficient for this: whether that virtue is communicated to it by God above or beyond its own nature, or whether it is natural to it; as if God, besides all the creatures which now exist, were to found some most excellent creature which would be naturally endowed with such a virtue."

57. His positis, expenditur imprimis quæstio § II. Utrum virtus creandi communicabilis sit creaturæ ut causæ principali. PROP. VI. Virtus creativa, etiam dependens a causa prima et ad certum creaturarum ordinem limitata , non est ulli creaturæ, nec de potentia Dei absoluta, communicabilis. Prob. I. ex Patribus. S. Athanasius (serm. 3. con. Arianos), inquit : "Administrare creaturarum et servorum est. Condere autem et creare solius Dei ejusque Verbi et Sapientiæ. "- S. Basilius (con. Eunom. 1. 4. c. 3.), ait : "Si Filius creatura Dei est, omnis autem creatura est Creatoris serva ; Angelus Dei servus est non Filius . Potestas eadem non communis .. est facturæ cum factore ; nihil ergo commune Patri

54 De Deo Creatore. cum Filio, ne creatio quidem, etc. " Idem asserit Cyrillus Alex. (de Trinitate Dial. 6.), et (con . Jul. 1. 2.) inquit : "Repugnat maxime divinæ gloriæ putare quod aliis insint facultates procreandi, et in lucem edendi quæ non erant. Neque enim fas est dicere quæ singularia et propria sunt divinæ et ineffabilis naturæ (scribit contra Platonem dicentem res inferiores et sublunares creari per deos inferiores) ea posse naturaliter quibusdam inesse rebus a se conditis, etc." -Damascenus (1. 2. c. 3.) " Quicumque dicunt Angelos conditores esse qualiscumque substantiæ, ipsi os diaboli sunt, qui est eorum pater. Creaturæ enim cum sint, non sunt conditores. "-S. Aug. (de Gen. ad litt. c. 9. n. 15.) "Angeli nullam omnino possunt creare creaturam, solus enim unus cujuslibet naturæ seu minimæ Creator est Deus ... Creare naturam tam nullus Angelus potest, quam nec seipsum. Voluntas vero Angelica obedienter Deo subjecta ... de rebus subjectis tamquam materiam ministrare ... ut aliquid in tempore creetur, more agricolandi vel medendi potest." Eadem habet (de Civ. Dei 1. 12. c. 24.)-Theodoretus (hæret. fabul. 1. 5. c. 5.) "Est autem hoc quoque humanarum actionum imbecillitatis argumentum : quoniam enim ars omnis apud homines subjecta materia indiget existimarunt stolidi • Deum quoque sine materia creare non posse ; nec intellexerunt quantum Dei et hominum sit discrimen, et quod fieri non possit ut omnia habeat imago quæ archetypus habet, et quod homo quidem velut imago ex iis quæ extant fabricatur , Deus autem ex iis quæ non sunt." Similia habent S. Irenæus (1. 2 . c. 2. n. 5.) ; S. Ambrosius (Hex. 1. 3. ■. 7.).

1 Disp. I. De Mundi Origine. 55 Unde : agunt Patres de virtute creativa 1. dependente a causa prima-2. limitata ad certum creaturarum ordinem ; et hanc negant esse creaturæ communicabilem-3 . etiam de potentia Dei absoluta. Ergo. Prob. antec. quoad 1. Dum PP. negant posse creaturas creare, simul dicunt posse alia facere, uti administrare materiam, etc.; sed hæc possunt facere uti causæ secundæ a prima dependentes. Ergo. Prob. quoad 2. Negant PP. posse creaturam aliquid vel minimum creare asserunt nihil posse creare -impugnant eos qui docebant Angelos vel deos minores posse res solum sublunares creare-opponunt potentiam creatam potentiæ divinæ non in eo quod illa possit aliqua creare, hæc omnia ; sed in eo quod illa exigat subjectum ut aliquid faciat, hæc possit sine subjecto agere. Ergo . Prob . quoad 3. Negant PP. virtutem creandi in creatura, quia est creatura, quia est imago non archetypus, quia non potest creatura creare seipsam : hæ vero rationes attingunt quamcumque creaturam possibilem, et potentiam Dei etiam absolutam. Negant iterum PP. eamdem virtutem Angelis, quos sæpe exhibent uti supremum genus creaturarum etiam creabilium : iidem vero negant non quia optime perspectum habebant gradum perfectionis supremi inter Angelos, sed quia, utut perfecti,

Angeli sunt creaturæ. -Agentes contra Arianos, PP. dicunt : Filius Dei creavit cum Patre, ergo est Deus. Ariani autem concedebant Verbum esse nobilissimam omnium creaturarum etiam possibilium. Ergo . Prob . II. Ex communi Doctorum sensu. Etenim si Gabrielem et Durandum excipias, cæteri omnes do-

56 De Deo Creatore cuerunt impossibilitatem virtutis creandi in creatura. Vid Suarez et Valentia ll. cc. Prob . III. Argumento D. Th. 1. p. q. 45. a. 5., quod sic ex Suaresio exponi potest : illius tantum potest esse actio et potentia, cujus potest esse effectus ; atqui effectus actionis et potentiæ creativæ potest esse solius Dei. Ergo. Prob . min. Effectus universalissimus non potest nisi causæ universalissimæ, quæ est solus Deus, convenire ; sicut enim universaliores effectus ad universaliores causas revocantur, ita universalissimus ad universalissimam. Atqui effectus creationis est universalissimus : nam per creationem non ita proprie producitur aliquid in quantum est hoc vel tale esse, sed in quantum est absolute ens ; ens autem secundum absolutam suam rationem est universalissimus effectus. Ergo . Decl. Tota vis hujus argumenti nititur eo principio "producere esse absolute, non in quantum est hoc vel tale, pertinet ad rationem creationis." Hoc autem potest triplicem sensum habere. Primus est quod solus Deus potest efficere ipsum esse in qualibet creatura, quasi causæ secundæ nullo modo concurrere possint active ad efficiendum esse existentiæ : hic sensus est falsus, et non est intentus a D. Th.- Secundus est quod solus Deus facere potest esse ex omnino non esse, seu facere in qualibet re omnia, quæ ad illius esse requiruntur : hic sensus est verus, non tamen eum intendit D. Th. in præfato argumento ; secus enim, uti patet, incideret in petitionem principii. Tertius est quod solus Deus respicit totum esse factibile, seu sola divina potentia adæquat totum

Disp. I. De Mundi Origine. 57 esse creabile: hic est verus sensus, quem intendit D. Th. At vero hoc posito, contra datum argumentum Dices : si ens dicitur effectus universalissimus , ac proinde solius Dei proprius, solum quatenus comprehendit totum creabile ; ex hoc sequitur quidem non posse communicari creaturæ virtutem creandi adæquatam objecto creabili, sed non sequitur non posse eidem communicari virtutem creandi limitatam ad certum ordinem creabilium : atqui nostra propositio negat in creatura possibilitatem virtutis creativæ ad certum creabilium ordinem limitatæ ; ergo hoc argumentum non probat thesim nostram.- Revera etsi ens absolute sumptum sit proprius effectus potentiæ creativæ ut sic, seu quæ se extendit ad omnia creabilia ; effectus tamen virtutis creativæ ad certum creabilium ordinem limitatæ videtur esse ens hoc vel tale, nempe esse creaturæ quæ continetur in eo ordine . Ergo. Resp. Si daretur in creatura virtus creandi ad certum ordinem creaturarum limitata, deberet in ea posse etiam dari virtus creandi adæquata toti latitudini entis participabilis ; ergo si illa virtus limitata admitteretur in creatura, deberet posse in ea admitti etiam potentia creandi habens pro objecto ens absolute ut ens. Aliis verbis, qui potest unum creare, potest omnia. Prob. antec. a) Omnis potentia complectitur omnia, quæ sub suo formali et adæquato objecto comprehenduntur : intellectus, ex. gr., cujus formale objectum est verum, complectitur omnia quæ participant rationem veritatis ; voluntas, cujus formale objectum est bonum, complectitur omnia, in quibus invenitur ratio bonitatis. Atqui objectum formale et

58 De Deo Creatore. adæquatum virtutis creativæ, quæcumque ea sit, est ens absolute ut ens (objectum virtutis creandi adæquatæ toti entis participabilis latitudini). Ergo si virtus creativa etiam limitata ad certum ordinem creabilium admitteretur in creatura , deberet in ea admitti etiam virtus creativa adæquata toti latitudini entis participabilis. Prob . hæc min. Certum est quod prima ratio, secundum quam virtus creativa, etiam limitata, attingit suum effectum est ratio entis. "Nam, " inquit Suarez, 1. c. n. 28., " effectus dicitur fieri per se primo secundum eam rationem quæ non præcessit ex parte effectus: nam si præcessit, jam non per se, sed per accidens fieri dicetur, nam cum ignis generatur ex aere, non fit per se corpus, neque elementum, fit autem per se ignis. Sic igitur in omni creatione fit per se ens seu esse, non solum ut tale, sed simpliciter ut esse : quia nulla ratio entis aut esse supponitur ad creationem, cum fit ex nihilo." -Certum est quod id quod distinguit creationem ab omni alia productionis specie, est quod res fiat ex nihilo, seu ex non ente ; ac proinde id quod per creationem primo fit est ipsum esse. (Vid. n . 8.) . Unde : id quod primo attingit aliqua potentia , et ratione cujus attingit quodcumque aliud, et quod eam distinguit a quacumque alia potentia, est ejus formale objectum ; atqui quod primo attingit potentia creativa, etiam limitata ad certum ordinem, et ratione cujus attingit quemcumque effectum, et quod eam distinguit a quacumque alia potentia productiva , est ens ut ens . Ergo . Prob. idem antec. b) Si ex una parte supponatur in

creatura potentia creativa, et ex alia dicatur limitata ad certum ordinem creabilium ; hæc limitatio vel

Disp. I. De Mundi Origine. 59 peteretur ex ipsa potentia, vel ex ejus objecto, vel ex modo illud attingendi. Atqui non potest peti ex ipso objecto ; quia in objecto nihil aliud requiritur, nisi possibilitas, et hæc invenitur in omnibus creabilibus : non ex parte modi attingendi illud ; quia modus est producere ex nihilo, et hæc difficultas jam superata est ab eo, qui supponitur posse vel unum creare : non ex ipsa potentia ; quia cum creatio nullum præsupponat subjectum, potentia creandi in creatura videtur esse ipsa ejus voluntas, cui communicata esset efficacia divina "dixit, et facta sunt ; mandavit, et creata sunt ; " voluntas autem potest velle sicut unum, ita omnia creabilia. Ergo.-Dices : limitatio illa peteretur ex ipso subjecto, in quo esset potentia creandi; creatura enim est finita.-Resp . Sed si aliqua potentia inspecta in se ipsa, in suo objecto, in modo illud attingendi, nullam patitur limitationem ; nequit dici quod limitetur a subjecto limitato, in quo est ; sed potius quod cum sit infinita, nequit in limitato subjecto reperiri. Prob . IV. Argumento, quod indicat D. Th. 1. c. a 5. ad 2. Ita exponitur a Suaresio 1. c. nn. 36.38. "Potentia creandi esse debet necessario infinita : ergo non potest esse creata : et eodem modo inferri potest necessario extendi ad omne creabile, nam potentia simpliciter infinita, est etiam universalissima et objectum ejus esse debet infinitum quantum esse potest in ratione objecti factibilis . Antecedens probatur a D. Thoma, quia virtus potentiæ non tantum attenditur ex re facta, sed etiam ex modo ; sed modus producendi ex nihilo indicat infinitam vim in agendo ; nam ad producendum aliquid ex potentia

60 De Deo. Creatore. remota , requiritur magna virtus, et ex remotiori major : ergo ad producendum ex nulla potentia, seu ex nihilo requiritur infinita virtus. "-"Communiter fundant illam consecutionem in maxima improportione, quæ est inter ens et nihil. Nam ad agendum ex potentia magis elongata ab actu, requiritur major virtus : ergo qua proportione effectus fiet ex remotiore potentia, eadem requiretur major virtus : ergo ubi elongatio actus a potentia est sine ulla proportione ibi major sine ulla proportione virtus requiretur, hæc autem non est nisi infinita : nam omnis virtus finita servat aliquam proportionem ad alteram finitam. Qui argumentandi modus frequens est apud Aristotelem ut constat ex 4. et 8. Phys . Ex quo simili proportione argumentatur Cajetanus , nam si ad producendum aliquid ex nihilo sufficeret virtus finita, sequeretur, æqualem virtutem requiri ad producendum aliquid ex aliqua materia, et ex nihilo : sit enim virtus creatrix finita ut quatuor : virtus autem producens ex materia remota sit ut duo : ergo virtus necessaria ad producendum ex materia duplo remotiori, erit saltem ut tria : ergo ad producendum ex ulteriori materia duplo etiam remotiori , erit necessaria virtus ut quatuor : ergo tanta virtus requiretur ad producendum aliquid ex aliqua materia, quanta ad creandum. " 57. These things having been posited, the question is first weighed:

Proposition VI. Creative virtue, even dependent on the first cause and limited to a certain order of creatures, is not communicable to any creature, not even by the absolute power of God.

First proof, from the Fathers. St. Athanasius (Sermon 3 Against the Arians) says: "To administer belongs to creatures and servants. But to found and create belongs to God alone and to his Word and Wisdom." St. Basil (Against Eunomius, book 4, chapter 3) says: "If the Son is a creature of God, and every creature is the servant of the Creator, an angel is the servant of God, not the Son. The same power is not common to the thing made and to the maker; therefore nothing is common to the Father with the Son, not even creation, etc." Cyril of Alexandria asserts the same (On the Trinity, Dialogue 6), and (Against Julian, book 2) says: "It is maximally repugnant to the divine glory to think that faculties of producing and bringing into light things which were not are present in others. For it is not right to say that the things which are singular and proper to the divine and ineffable nature (he writes against Plato, who says that inferior and sublunary things are created through inferior gods) can naturally be present in certain things founded by him, etc." Damascene (book 2, chapter 3): "Whoever say that angels are founders of any substance whatsoever are themselves the mouth of the devil, who is their father. For since they are creatures, they are not founders." St. Augustine (On Genesis Literally, chapter 9, n. 15): "Angels can create no creature at all; for the one sole Creator of any nature whatever, even the least, is God ... No angel can create a nature any more than he can create himself. But the angelic will, obediently subject to God ... can minister from subject things as from

matter ... so that something may be created in time, in the manner of farming or of healing." He has the same things in The City of God, book 12, chapter 24. Theodoret (Heretical Fables, book 5, chapter 5): "This also is an argument of the weakness of human actions: for since every art among men needs underlying matter, foolish men thought that God also could not create without matter; nor did they understand how great is the difference between God and men, and that it cannot happen that the image have all the things which the archetype has, and that man indeed, as an image, fashions from things which exist, but God from things which are not." Similar things are found in St. Irenaeus (book 2, chapter 2, n. 5) and St. Ambrose (Hexaemeron, book 3, chapter 7).

Hence: the Fathers treat of creative virtue 1. dependent on the first cause; 2. limited to a certain order of creatures, and they deny that this is communicable to a creature; 3. even by the absolute power of God. Therefore.

The antecedent is proved as to 1. While the Fathers deny that creatures can create, they at the same time say that they can do other things, such as administer matter, etc.; but they can do these things as secondary causes dependent on the first. Therefore.

It is proved as to 2. The Fathers deny that a creature can create anything, even the least thing; they assert that it can create nothing; they attack those who taught that angels or lesser gods can create only sublunary things; they oppose created potency to divine potency, not in this respect, that the former can create some things while the latter can create all things, but in this, that the former requires a subject in order to make something, while the latter can act without a subject. Therefore.

It is proved as to 3. The Fathers deny the virtue of creating in a creature because it is a creature, because it is an image and not the archetype, because a creature cannot create itself; but these reasons touch any possible creature whatsoever, and even the absolute power of God. Again, the Fathers deny the same virtue to angels, whom they often present as the supreme genus of creatures, even of creatable creatures; and they deny this not because they had a perfectly surveyed knowledge of the grade of perfection of the highest among the angels, but because, however perfect, angels are creatures. Acting against the Arians, the Fathers say: the Son of God created with the Father; therefore he is God. But the Arians conceded that the Word is the noblest of all creatures, even possible creatures. Therefore.

Second proof. From the common judgment of the Doctors. For if you except Gabriel and Durandus, all the rest taught the impossibility of the virtue of creating in a creature. See Suarez and Valentia in the cited places.

Third proof. From the argument of St. Thomas, Summa Theologiae I, q. 45, a. 5, which can be explained from Suarez in this way: action and potency can belong only to him to whom the effect can belong; but the effect of creative action and potency can belong to God alone. Therefore.

The minor is proved. The most universal effect cannot belong except to the most universal cause, which is God alone; for just as more universal effects are referred back to more universal causes, so the most universal effect is referred back to the most universal cause. But the effect of creation is the most universal; for through creation something is not so properly produced insofar as it is this or such a being, but insofar as it is absolutely being; and being according to its absolute notion is the most universal effect. Therefore.

Explanation. The whole force of this argument rests on the principle: "to produce being absolutely, not insofar as it is this or such a being, belongs to the notion of creation." But this can have a threefold sense. The first is that God alone can effect being itself in any creature, as though secondary causes could in no way actively concur in effecting the being of existence; this sense is false, and is not intended by St. Thomas. The second is that God alone can make being from altogether non-being, or make in any thing all the things which are required for its being; this sense is true, yet St. Thomas does not intend it in the aforesaid argument; otherwise, as is clear, he would fall into begging the principle. The third is that God alone regards the whole of makeable being, or that the divine power alone is adequate to the whole of creatable being; this is the true sense which St. Thomas intends.

But, this being posited, against the given argument you will say: if being is called the most universal effect, and consequently proper to God alone, only insofar as it comprehends the whole of the creatable, from this it indeed follows that the virtue of creating adequate to the creatable object cannot be communicated to a creature; but it does not follow that there cannot be communicated to the same creature a virtue of creating limited to a certain order of creatable things. But our proposition denies in a creature the

possibility of creative virtue limited to a certain order of creatable things; therefore this argument does not prove our thesis. In reality, although being taken absolutely is the proper effect of creative potency as such, or as it extends itself to all creatable things, nevertheless the effect of creative virtue limited to a certain order of creatable things seems to be this or such a being, namely the being of the creature which is contained in that order. Therefore.

Response. If there were given in a creature a virtue of creating limited to a certain order of creatures, there ought also to be able to be given in it a virtue of creating adequate to the whole breadth of participable being; therefore, if that limited virtue were admitted in a creature, there ought also to be able to be admitted in it a potency of creating having being absolutely as being for its object. In other words, he who can create one thing can create all things.

The antecedent is proved: a) Every potency embraces all things which are comprehended under its formal and adequate object: the intellect, for example, whose formal object is the true, embraces all things which participate in the notion of truth; the will, whose formal object is the good, embraces all things in which the notion of goodness is found. But the formal and adequate object of creative virtue, whatever it may be, is being absolutely as being (the object of the virtue of creating adequate to the whole breadth of participable being). Therefore, if creative virtue, even limited to a certain order of creatable things, were admitted in a creature, there ought also to be admitted in it a creative virtue adequate to the whole breadth of participable being. This minor is proved. It is certain that the first notion according to which creative virtue, even limited creative virtue, reaches its effect is the notion of being. "For," says Suarez, in the cited place, n. 28, "an effect is said to be made per se first according to that notion which did not precede on the part of the effect; for if it did precede, it will now be said to be made not per se, but per accidens. For when fire is generated from air, body is not made per se, nor element, but fire is made per se. Thus, therefore, in every creation being or to-be is made per se, not only as such, but simply as to-be, because no notion of being or to-be is presupposed for creation, since it is made out of nothing." It is certain that what distinguishes creation from every other species of production is that a thing is made out of nothing, or out of non-being; and consequently what is first made through creation is being itself (see n. 8). Hence: that which some potency first reaches, and by reason of which it reaches anything else whatever, and which distinguishes it from any other potency, is its formal object; but what creative potency first reaches, even when limited to a certain order, and by reason of which it reaches any effect whatever, and which distinguishes it from any other productive potency, is being as being. Therefore.

The same antecedent is proved: b) If on the one hand creative potency is supposed in a creature, and on the other it is said to be limited to a certain order of creatable things, this limitation would be sought either from the potency itself, or from its object, or from the mode of reaching that object. But it cannot be sought from the object itself, because nothing else is required in the object except possibility, and this is found in all creatable things; not from the mode of reaching it, because the mode is to produce out of nothing, and this difficulty has already been overcome by him who is supposed to be able to create even one thing; not from the potency itself, because since creation presupposes no subject, the potency of creating in a creature seems to be its very will, to which the divine efficacy would have been communicated: "he spoke, and they were made; he commanded, and they were created"; but the will can will all creatable things just as it can will one. Therefore. You will say: that limitation would be sought from the subject itself in which the potency of creating would be, for the creature is finite. Response. But if some potency, considered in itself, in its object, and in the mode of reaching that object, suffers no limitation, it cannot be said that it is limited by the limited subject in which it is; but rather that, since it is infinite, it cannot be found in a limited subject.

Fourth proof. From the argument which St. Thomas indicates in the cited place, article 5, reply to objection 2. It is explained by Suarez in the cited place, nn. 36-38: "The potency of creating must necessarily be infinite; therefore it cannot be created. And in the same way it can be inferred that it necessarily extends to every creatable thing, for a potency simply infinite is also most universal, and its object must be infinite as much as it can be in the notion of a makeable object. The antecedent is proved by St. Thomas, because the virtue of a potency is considered not only from the thing made, but also from the mode; but the mode of producing out of nothing indicates an infinite force in acting. For to produce

something from remote potency, great virtue is required, and from a more remote potency a greater one; therefore to produce from no potency, or out of nothing, infinite virtue is required." "They commonly found that consequence on the greatest disproportion which exists between being and nothing. For to act from a potency more distant from act, a greater virtue is required; therefore in the proportion in which the effect will be made from a more remote potency, in the same proportion a greater virtue will be required. Therefore where the distance of act from potency is without any proportion, there a greater virtue without any proportion will be required; but this is nothing other than infinite, for every finite virtue preserves some proportion to another finite virtue. This mode of arguing is frequent in Aristotle, as is clear from books 4 and 8 of the Physics. From this Cajetan argues by a similar proportion: for if finite virtue sufficed to produce something out of nothing, it would follow that equal virtue is required to produce something from some matter and out of nothing. For let the creative virtue be finite as four; but let the virtue producing a thing from remote matter be as two; therefore the virtue necessary for producing from matter twice as remote will be at least as three; therefore for producing from further matter, also twice as remote, virtue as four will be necessary; therefore as much virtue will be required to produce something from some matter as to create."

Section III. Whether A Creature Can Be An Instrumental Cause Of Creation.

58. Ad quæstionis intelligentiam pauca prænotabimus de natura causæ instrumentalis. Dividitur hæc contra causam principalem ; ac plures habet acceptiones. Sic, ex. gr. , si nomine causæ principalis veniat ea, quæ a nulla pendet, et a qua pendent cæteræ ; quibus proinde veluti instrumentis utitur ; tunc omnes causæ secundæ dicuntur causæ instrumentales, et nonnisi causæ primæ nomen causæ principalis relinquitur. Quo sensu locutus est D. Th. de pot. q. 3. a. 7. , dicens : "Deus est causa omnis actionis, prout quodlibet agens est instrumentum divinæ virtutis operantis . " Sed hac aliisque minus propriis acceptionibus omissis, in præsenti quæstione sermo tantum est de causa instrumentali proprie dicta. 58. For understanding the question, we shall pre-note a few things concerning the nature of an instrumental cause. This is divided in contrast to a principal cause, and it has several acceptions. Thus, for example, if by the name principal cause there comes that which depends on none, and on which the rest depend, and which consequently uses them as instruments, then all secondary causes are called instrumental causes, and the name principal cause is left only to the first cause. In this sense St. Thomas spoke in De potentia, q. 3, a. 7, saying: "God is the cause of every action, insofar as every agent is an instrument of the divine virtue operating." But these and other less proper acceptions being omitted, in the present question the discussion is only about an instrumental cause properly so called.

59. De hac certum est 1. quod debeat virtute sua influere aliquo modo in productionem effectus ; et 2 . quod non possit sola sine juvamine causæ principalis totum effectum attingere. 59. Concerning this it is certain: 1. that by its own virtue it must in some way flow into the production of the effect; and 2. that by itself, without the aid of the principal cause, it cannot reach the whole effect.

60. Quoad 1um, debet imprimis aliquo modo concurrere ad productionem effectus ; nam causa instrumentalis est vera causa, quæ ad genus causæ efficientis reducitur ; debet ergo in ea reperiri quidquid causam efficientem constituit : hæc autem, ut omnes norunt, natura sua postulat ut actione sua influat in effectum. 60. As to the first, it must first in some way concur in the production of the effect; for an instrumental cause is a true cause, which is reduced to the genus of efficient cause. Therefore there must be found in it whatever constitutes an efficient cause; but this, as all know, by its nature

requires that by its action it flow into the effect.

61. Debet insuper causa instrumentalis concurrere ad productionem effectus virtute sua propria.

62 De Deo Creatore. Quod expresse docet D. Th. c. g. 1. 2. c. 21. , dicens : "Omne agens instrumentale exequitur actionem principalis agentis per aliquam actionem propriam et connaturalem sibi ; sicut calor naturalis generat carnem dissolvendo et digerendo, et serra operatur ad perfectionem scamni secando." Revera si instrumentum aliquod nihil ex virtute sua ageret, esset solum medium veluti deferens virtutem principalis agentis ; quod autem solum defert virtutem alterius, et nihil ex virtute sua agit, habet quidem rationem medii, at non veræ causæ . 61. Moreover, an instrumental cause must concur in the production of the effect by its own proper virtue. St. Thomas expressly teaches this in Contra Gentiles II, chapter 21, saying: "Every instrumental agent executes the action of the principal agent through some action proper and connatural to itself; as natural heat generates flesh by dissolving and digesting, and a saw operates toward the perfection of a bench by cutting." In reality, if some instrument acted nothing from its own virtue, it would be only a medium as it were carrying the virtue of the principal agent; but what only carries the virtue of another, and acts nothing from its own virtue, has indeed the notion of a medium, but not of a true cause.

62. Debet denique causa instrumentalis, concurrere ad productionem effectus, nempe effectus causæ principalis, cujus est instrumentum. Distinguit D. Th. 3. p. q. 62. a. 1. ad 2. duplicem actionem in instrumento "unam instrumentalem, secundum quam operatur non in virtute propria, sed virtute principalis agentis ; aliam autem habet actionem propriam, quæ competit sibi secundum propriam formam ; sicut securi competit scindere ratione suæ acuitatis, facere autem lectum, in quantum est instrumentum artis : non autem perficit instrumentalem actionem, nisi exercendo actionem propriam, scindendo enim facit lectum." At quamvis distinguantur hæ duæ actiones, et possint consequenter distingui duo termini , quorum unus sit proprius actionis causæ instrumentalis, alter causæ principalis ; certum est tamen quod debet instrumentum concurrere etiam ad productionem effectus causæ principalis : secus enim non posset dici hujus effectus vera causa in suo ordine. Unde idem S. Doctor, 3. p. q. 79. a. 2. ad 3., ait : "Nihil prohibet causam instrumentalem producere

Disp. I. De Mundi Origine. 63 potiorem effectum. " Et 1. p. q. 115. a. 1. ad 5. ait : " Corpus agit et ad formam accidentalem, et ad formam substantialem. Qualitas enim activa, ut calor, etsi sit accidens, agit tamen in virtute formæ substantialis sicut ejus instrumentum ; et ideo potest agere ad formam substantialem, sicut et calor naturalis, in quantum est instrumentum animæ agit ad generationem carnis. " Recte tamen notat Sylvius quod licet actio propria instrumenti sit formaliter diversa ab actione propria principalis agentis ; non est tamen necessarium ut assignentur duæ actiones secundum rem differentes, quarum una sit solius instrumenti, et altera agentis principalis. Unde D. Th. 1. p. q. 23. a. 5. c. dicit, "non esse distinctum id, quod est ex causa secunda, et ex causa prima. "-Et q. 105. dicit nihil prohibere " quin una et eadem actio procedat a primo et secundo agente. "-Et c. g. 1. 2. c. 70. docet unum eumdemque effectum totum tribui instrumento, et totum agenti principali. 62. Finally, an instrumental cause must concur in the production of the effect, namely the effect of the principal cause of which it is the instrument. St. Thomas distinguishes a twofold action in an instrument, Summa Theologiae III, q. 62, a. 1, reply to objection 2: "one instrumental, according to which it operates not in its own virtue, but in the virtue of the principal agent; but it has another proper action, which belongs to it according to its own proper form; as it belongs to an axe to cut by reason of its sharpness, but to make a bed insofar as it is an instrument of art; nor does it perfect the instrumental action except by exercising the proper action, for by cutting it makes the bed." But although these two actions are distinguished, and consequently two termini can be distinguished, of which one is proper to the action of the instrumental cause, the other to the principal cause, nevertheless it is certain that the instrument must also concur in the production of the effect of the principal cause; otherwise it could not be called a true cause of this effect in its own

order.

Hence the same holy Doctor says, Summa Theologiae III, q. 79, a. 2, reply to objection 3: "Nothing prevents an instrumental cause from producing a more excellent effect." And in I, q. 115, a. 1, reply to objection 5, he says: "A body acts both toward an accidental form and toward a substantial form. For an active quality, such as heat, although it is an accident, nevertheless acts in the virtue of the substantial form as its instrument; and therefore it can act toward a substantial form, just as natural heat, insofar as it is an instrument of the soul, acts toward the generation of flesh."

Yet Sylvius rightly notes that although the proper action of the instrument is formally diverse from the proper action of the principal agent, nevertheless it is not necessary that two actions differing according to reality be assigned, one of which belongs to the instrument alone and the other to the principal agent. Hence St. Thomas says in I, q. 23, a. 5, corpus, that "what is from the second cause and from the first cause is not distinct." And in q. 105 he says that nothing prevents "one and the same action from proceeding from the first and second agent." And in Contra Gentiles II, chapter 70, he teaches that one and the same whole effect is attributed wholly to the instrument and wholly to the principal agent.

63. Tribus autem modis intelligi potest instrumentum concurrere ad effectum principalis agentis , scilicet vel tantum remote, attingendo scilicet aliquid prævium ; vel tantum proxime nempe attingendo formam intentam a principali agente ; vel simul utroque modo. "Serra," ex. gr. , inquit Suarez, "est instrumentum ad tale artificium, quod instrumentum proxime solum efficit incisionem, impellendo et loco movendo partes intermedias ; inde vero resultat forma artificialis, ad quam comparatur ut instrumentalis causa, quia illam non attingit immediate propria actione , sed solum resultat ex priori effectu. " Et e

64 De Deo Creatore contra sunt alia instrumenta quæ immediate attingunt ipsam formam intentam a principali agente : sicut, ex. gr. Sacramenta ad efficiendam gratiam , ipsam in se attingendo. Quare ratio instrumenti exigit ut uno ex tribus prædictis modis concurrat ad effectum principalis agentis ; sed non ita limitatur ad primum modum, nempe ad influxum remotum, ut non possit ullo in casu proximum influxum exercere . 63. Now an instrument can be understood to concur in the effect of the principal agent in three ways: namely, either only remotely, by reaching something prior; or only proximately, namely by reaching the form intended by the principal agent; or by both ways at once. "A saw," for example, says Suarez, "is an instrument for such an artifact, which instrument proximately effects only the incision, by driving and locally moving the intermediate parts; from this, however, the artificial form results, to which it is compared as an instrumental cause, because it does not immediately reach that form by its own proper action, but that form only results from the prior effect." And on the contrary there are other instruments which immediately reach the very form intended by the principal agent: as, for example, the Sacraments for effecting grace, by reaching grace itself in itself. Therefore the notion of instrument requires that it concur in the effect of the principal agent in one of the three aforesaid ways; but it is not so limited to the first way, namely to remote influx, that it cannot in any case exercise proximate influx.

64. Quoad 2um vero, evidens est quod causa instrumentalis non potest effectum causæ principalis sola totum attingere sine juvamine hujus causæ. Causa enim principalis, proprie loquendo, ea est, quæ per virtutem suam vel nobiliorem, vel saltem æque nobilem cum effectu, influit in actionem, per quam talis effectus producitur ; ergo si eadem esset virtus instrumenti, hoc non instrumentalis, sed principalis esset causa. 64. As to the second, however, it is evident that an instrumental cause cannot by itself reach the whole effect of the principal cause without the aid of that cause. For a principal cause, properly speaking, is that which by its virtue, either more noble than the effect or at least equally noble with it, flows into the action through which such an effect is produced. Therefore if the virtue of the instrument were the same, it would not be an instrumental cause, but a principal cause.

65. Ex his colligitur a) vera notio causæ instrumentalis : ea est, quæ producit effectum se nobiliorem, vel saltem ad quem activitas ejus proportionata non est. nisi a superiore agente moveatur speciali concursu. Dicimus speciali concursu, ut distinguatur a concursu illo generali causæ primæ, qui requiritur in omnibus causis secundis . In artificialibus, ex. gr., forma intenta ab artifice non attingitur ab instrumento, nisi quatenus ab arte dirigitur et movetur. Intelligitur b) quo sensu dicitur causa instrumentalis agere in virtute principalis agentis. " Dicitur," inquit Suarez, Met. disp. 17. sect. 2. n. 19 , " operari in virtute principalis agentis, non quia non indigeat aliqua virtute intrinseca, id est in ea existente, ad suam actionem instrumentalem , sive illa virtus sit

Disp. I. De Mundi Origine. 65 innata, sive superaddita rei, et sive sit permanens et durabilis cessante actione, sive sit fluens (ut aiunt) et in motu consistens : in variis enim instrumentis vario modo reperiri potest, aliqua tamen vis instrumentaria necessaria est, alias non posset a tali re ulla actio prodire . Dicuntur ergo hæc instrumenta operari in virtute principalis agentis, quia illa vis quæ in eis est, improportionata est et insufficiens, et solum habet vim operandi juxta mensuram virtutis et elevationis principalis agentis." Patet c) quid significet illud D. Thomæ " instrumentum per aliquid sibi proprium dispositive operatur ad effectum principalis agentis." Sensus certe non est quodlibet instrumentum semper operari aliquem effectum sibi proprium, qui re antecedat effectum principalis agentis, sitque prævia dispositio ad illum. Diximus enim instrumentum effectum ultimo intentum aliquando immediate attingere ; quo in casu nihil ipsum facit, quod simul et totum non faciat principalis agens. Sed sensus est quod cum causa instrumentalis sit ea, qua veluti mediante, causa principalis attingit suum effectum cumque effectus proprius causæ principalis, qui ultimus est, non possit tribui soli causæ instrumentali, quæ tamen sua virtute aliquid vere agit ; hujus actio et effectus proprius saltem natura antecedit effectum causæ principalis , ac proinde dispositive se habet. Qui plura cupit de natura causæ instrumentalis, consulat Suarez 1. c. 65. From these things is gathered: a) the true notion of an instrumental cause. It is that which produces an effect more noble than itself, or at least an effect to which its activity is not proportioned, unless it is moved by a superior agent through a special concurrence. We say through a special concurrence, so that it may be distinguished from that general concurrence of the first cause which is required in all secondary causes. In artificial things, for example, the form intended by the craftsman is not reached by the instrument except insofar as it is directed and moved by the art.

b) It is understood in what sense an instrumental cause is said to act in the virtue of the principal agent. "It is said," says Suarez, Metaphysical Disputations, disp. 17, sect. 2, n. 19, "to operate in the virtue of the principal agent, not because it does not need some intrinsic virtue, that is, one existing in it, for its instrumental action, whether that virtue is innate or superadded to the thing, and whether it is permanent and durable when the action ceases, or is flowing, as they say, and consists in motion. For in various instruments it can be found in various ways; nevertheless some instrumental force is necessary, otherwise no action could proceed from such a thing. Therefore these instruments are said to operate in the virtue of the principal agent because that force which is in them is disproportionate and insufficient, and only has the force of operating according to the measure of the virtue and elevation of the principal agent."

c) It is clear what that saying of St. Thomas signifies: "the instrument through something proper to itself operates dispositively toward the effect of the principal agent." The sense certainly is not that any instrument whatever always operates some effect proper to itself, which precedes in reality the effect of the principal agent and is a prior disposition to it. For we have said that the instrument sometimes immediately reaches the effect ultimately intended; in that case it does nothing which the principal agent does not simultaneously and wholly do. But the sense is that, since the instrumental cause is that by which, as though by a medium, the principal cause reaches its effect, and since the proper effect of the principal cause, which is ultimate, cannot be attributed to the instrumental cause alone, which nevertheless by its own virtue truly does something, the action and proper effect of the latter at least by nature precedes the effect of the principal cause, and consequently has itself dispositively. Whoever desires more concerning the nature of instrumental cause should consult Suarez in the cited place.

66. Nunc, causa alia est physica, alia moralis : prima est quæ physice et realiter influit in effectum ; altera, quæ solum moraliter, ex. gr., consulendo, ro

66 De Deo Creatore. gando, imperando, etc. in effectum influit. Præsens quæstio procedit de causa instrumentali physica. 66. Now, one cause is physical, another moral. The first is that which physically and really flows into the effect; the other is that which flows into the effect only morally, for example by advising, asking, commanding, etc. The present question proceeds concerning a physical instrumental cause.

67. Dividitur etiam causa instrumentalis in naturalem et supernaturalem ; illa est, quæ habet instrumentariam ad effectum potentiam naturæ suæ proportionatam et debitam ; secunda vero, cujus potentia est ex dono superaddito naturæ. 67. An instrumental cause is also divided into natural and supernatural. The former is that which has an instrumental potency toward the effect proportioned and due to its own nature; but the latter is that whose potency is from a gift superadded to nature.

68. Concedunt omnes nullam creaturam posse esse causam instrumentalem naturalem creationis : quæstio fit solum de supernaturali. Suarez Met. disp. 2a. sect . 4. affirmat : sententia tamen negans est D. Thomæ, eamque communem et verissimam vocat de Valentia 1. c. Dicimus itaque : PROP. VII. Non potest ulla creatura, nec de potentia Dei absoluta, esse causa instrumentalis physica creationis . Prob . Quod absolute repugnat nec de potentia Dei absoluta fieri potest ; atqui natura tum creationis tum causæ instrumentalis inspecta, absolute repugnat ut detur aliqua causa instrumentalis physica in creatione. Ergo. Prob . min. argumento maxima perspicuitate proposito a D. Th. c. g. 1. 2. c. 21., quod est hujusmodi : " Omne agens instrumentale exsequitur actionem principalis agentis per aliquam actionem propriam et connaturalem sibi ; sicut calor naturalis generat carnem dissolvendo et digerendo, et serra operatur ad perfectionem scamni secando. Si igitur aliqua creatura sit quæ operetur ad creationem sicut instrumentum primi creantis, oportet quod hoc operetur per aliquam actionem debitam et propriam suæ naturæ. Effectus autem respondens actioni propriæ instru

Disp. I. De Mundi Origine. 67 menti, est prior in via generationis quam effectus respondens principali agenti ; ex quo provenit quod primo agenti finis ultimus respondet : prius enim est sectio ligni quam forma scamni, et digestio cibi quam generatio carnis. Oportebit igitur aliquid esse effectum per propriam operationem instrumentalis creantis , quod sit prius in via generationis, quam esse quod est effectus respondens actioni primi creantis. Hoc autem est impossibile ; nam quanto aliquid est communius, tanto est prius in via generationis , sicut prius est animal quam homo in generatione hominis, sicut Philosopus dicit (de Generatione Animalium) . Impossibile est ergo quod aliqua creatura creet sicut principale agens aut instrumentale." NOTA. Ad solutionem difficultatum, duo præ oculis habere sufficit .-1 . Ratio, propter quam repugnare dicitur causa instrumentalis in creatione est, quia nullus effectus potest concipi re aut natura prior effectu creationis. Cum autem hæc ratio non vigeat nisi in hac actione, nulla comparatione ducta ex quacumque alia productione, sive naturali sive supernaturali, infirmari potest thesis -2 Quæstio , ut diximus, est de causalitate physica : concedi autem potest Sacramenta habere causalitatem moralem. Vid. Sylv. in 1 . p. q. 45. a. 5. 68. All concede that no creature can be a natural instrumental cause of creation; the question is only about a supernatural one. Suarez, Metaphysical Disputations, disp. 20, sect. 4, affirms it; nevertheless the denying opinion is that of St. Thomas, and de Valentia calls it common and most true in the cited place. Therefore we say:

Proposition VII. No creature can, not even by the absolute power of God, be a physical instrumental cause of creation.

Proof. What is absolutely repugnant cannot be done even by the absolute power of God; but, once the nature both of creation and of instrumental cause has been inspected, it is absolutely repugnant that there be any physical instrumental cause in creation. Therefore.

The minor is proved by an argument proposed with the greatest clarity by St. Thomas,

Contra Gentiles II, chapter 21, which is of this kind: "Every instrumental agent executes the action of the principal agent through some action proper and connatural to itself; as natural heat generates flesh by dissolving and digesting, and a saw operates toward the perfection of a bench by cutting. Therefore if there is some creature which operates toward creation as an instrument of the first creator, it must operate through some action due and proper to its own nature. But the effect corresponding to the proper action of the instrument is prior in the way of generation to the effect corresponding to the principal agent; from this it comes that the ultimate end corresponds to the first agent. For the cutting of wood is prior to the form of the bench, and the digestion of food is prior to the generation of flesh. Therefore there will have to be some effect through the proper operation of the instrumental creator which is prior in the way of generation to being, which is the effect corresponding to the action of the first creator. But this is impossible; for the more common something is, the more prior it is in the way of generation, just as animal is prior to man in the generation of man, as the Philosopher says (On the Generation of Animals). Therefore it is impossible that any creature create either as a principal agent or as an instrumental agent."

Note. For the solution of difficulties, it is enough to keep two things before the eyes. 1. The reason on account of which an instrumental cause is said to be repugnant in creation is that no effect can be conceived, either in reality or by nature, prior to the effect of creation. But since this reason has force only in this action, the thesis cannot be weakened by any comparison drawn from any other production whatsoever, whether natural or supernatural. 2. The question, as we said, concerns physical causality; but it can be conceded that the Sacraments have moral causality. See Sylvius on Summa Theologiae I, q. 45, a. 5.

Article 6. Whether God is the Exemplary Cause of the World

LatineEnglish

Sixth Article. Whether God Is The Exemplar Cause Of The World.

69. Deus, uti patet ex superius disputatis, ita est causa mundi efficiens per creationem, ut non modo

68 De Deo Creatore. ipse omnia creaverit, sed nullum præter ipsum sit ens, cui virtus creandi competere possit. Agendum modo est de aliis causalitatis speciebus : cumque causalitas formalis et materialis Dei simplicitati et perfectioni repugnet, superest ut agamus de causalitate exemplari et finali. A prima incipimus. § I. Germana divinarum idearum notio. 69. God, as is clear from the things disputed above, is the efficient cause of the world through creation in such a way that not only did he himself create all things, but no being besides him exists to which the virtue of creating can belong. We must now treat the other species of causality; and since formal and material causality are repugnant to God's simplicity and perfection, it remains that we treat exemplar and final causality. We begin from the first.

Section I. The Genuine Notion Of The Divine Ideas.

70. Duo hic breviter exponenda suscipimus : 1 . quid sit idea generatim.-2. quid sit idea in Deo : ita quidem Dei causalitas exemplaris respectu mundi perspicua fiet. 70. We undertake here briefly to explain two things: 1. what an idea is generally; 2. what an idea is in God. Thus indeed God's exemplar causality with respect to the world will become clear.

71. Et quoad 1um, uti notavit D. Th. 1. p. q. 15. a. 1. , quod græce idea, latine dicitur forma. "Forma autem alicujus rei præter ipsam existens ad duo esse

potest, vel ut sit exemplar ejus cujus dicitur forma, vel ut sit principium cognitionis ipsius, secundum quod formæ cognoscibilium dicuntur esse in cognoscente ." 71. And as to the first, as St. Thomas noted in Summa Theologiae I, q. 15, a. 1, what in Greek is called idea is in Latin called form. "But the form of some thing existing apart from the thing itself can be for two things: either so that it is the exemplar of that of which it is called the form, or so that it is the principle of cognition of that thing, according as the forms of knowable things are said to be in the knower."

72. Quæ duplex ideæ acceptio facilius intelligetur, si animadvertamus discrimen inter scientiam speculativam et practicam ; ad utramque enim idea refertur. Discrimen illud ita exponitur a D. Th. 1. p. q. 14. a. 16.: "Scientia potest dici speculativa tripliciter : primo , ex parte rerum scitarum, quæ non sunt operabiles a sciente , sicut est scientia hominis de rebus naturalibus, vel divinis ; secundo, quantum ad modum sciendi, ut puta, si ædificator consideret domum, definiendo et dividendo, et considerando

Disp. I. De Mundi Origine. 69 universalia prædicata ipsius ; hoc siquidem est operabilia modo speculativo considerare , et non secundum quod operabilia sunt ; operabile enim est aliquid per applicationem formæ ad materiam, non per resolutionem compositi in principia universalia formalia ; tertio, quantum ad finem : nam intellectus practicus differt fine a speculativo . sicut dicitur in 3 de Anima, text. 49. Intellectus enim practicus ordinatur ad finem operationis ; finis autem intellectus speculativi est consideratio veritatis. Unde si quis ædificator consideret qualiter posset fieri aliqua domus, non ordinans ad finem operationis , sed ad cognoscendum tantum, erit quantum ad finem speculativa consideratio, tamen de re operabili. Scientia igitur quæ est speculativa ratione ipsius rei scitæ, est speculativa tantum. Quæ vero speculativa est, vel secundum modum, vel secundum finem, est secundum quid speculativa, et secundum quid practica. Cum vero ordinatur ad finem operationis, est simpliciter practica." 72. This twofold acceptation of idea will be more easily understood if we observe the distinction between speculative and practical knowledge; for idea is referred to each. This distinction is explained thus by St. Thomas, Summa Theologiae I, q. 14, a. 16: "Knowledge can be called speculative in three ways: first, on the part of the things known, which are not operable by the knower, as is man's knowledge of natural or divine things; second, as to the mode of knowing, as, for example, if a builder considers a house by defining and dividing and considering its universal predicates. For this is to consider operable things in a speculative mode, and not according as they are operable; for something is operable by application of form to matter, not by resolution of the composite into universal formal principles. Third, as to the end; for the practical intellect differs in end from the speculative, as is said in book 3 of On the Soul, text 49. For the practical intellect is ordered to the end of operation; but the end of the speculative intellect is the consideration of truth. Hence, if some builder considers how some house could be made, not ordering this to the end of operation, but only to knowing, the consideration will be speculative as to the end, though concerning an operable thing. Therefore knowledge which is speculative by reason of the thing known itself is speculative simply. But knowledge which is speculative either according to mode or according to end is speculative in a certain respect and practical in a certain respect. But when it is ordered to the end of operation, it is practical simply."

73. Quamvis idea ad scientiam tum speculativam tum practicam referatur, non tamen ad utramque refertur eadem proprietate, eodemque sensu. Etenim, ut docet idem S. Doctor Qq. de Ideis, 3. "Forma semper notat habitudinem causæ . Est enim forma quodammodo causa ejus, quod secundum ipsam formatur : sive formatio fiat per modum inhærentiæ , sicut in formis intrinsecis, sive per modum imitationis, ut in formis exemplaribus ... Si ergo loquamur de idea secundum propriam nominis rationem, sic non extendit se nisi ad illam scientiam, secundum quam aliquid formari potest : et hæc est cognitio actu practica vel virtute tantum Sed tamen si ideam com- ...

70 De Deo Creatore muniter appellemus similitudinem vel rationem, sic idea etiam ad speculativam

cognitionem pure pertinere potest. Vel magis proprie dicamus quod idea respicit cognitionem practicam actu vel virtute, similitudo autem et ratio tam speculativam quam practicam." 73. Although idea is referred both to speculative and to practical knowledge, nevertheless it is not referred to each with the same property and in the same sense. For, as the same holy Doctor teaches in the Questions on Ideas, 3: "Form always marks a relation of cause. For form is in a certain way the cause of that which is formed according to it: whether formation occurs by way of inherence, as in intrinsic forms, or by way of imitation, as in exemplar forms ... Therefore if we speak of idea according to the proper notion of the name, then it extends only to that knowledge according to which something can be formed; and this is knowledge actually practical, or only virtually practical. But nevertheless, if we commonly call a likeness or notion an idea, then idea can also pertain to purely speculative cognition. Or let us say more properly that idea regards cognition practical actually or virtually, but likeness and notion regard both speculative and practical cognition."

74. In præsenti quæstione consideramus ideam solum prout pertinet ad scientiam practicam, ac proinde possumus illam definire cum D. Th. 1. mox cit. a. 1. "Hæc videtur esse ratio ideæ, quod idea sit forma quam aliquid imitatur ex intentione agentis, qui determinat sibi finem." 74. In the present question we consider idea only insofar as it belongs to practical knowledge, and consequently we can define it with St. Thomas, in the place just cited, article 1: "This seems to be the notion of idea: that an idea is a form which something imitates from the intention of an agent who determines an end for himself."

75. Ex hac ideæ descriptione deducitur quatuor conditiones requiri ad ideam constituendam. Prima est ut sit forma existens extra rem, cujus est forma, et a qua necessario distinguitur. Etenim, uti observat D. Th. c. g. de Ideis a. 1. "Forma alicujus rei potest dici tripliciter. Uno modo a qua formatur res, sicut a forma agentis procedit effectus formatio . Sed quia non est de necessitate actionis ut effectus pertingant ad completam rationem formæ agentis , cum frequenter deficiant, maxime in causis æquivocis ; ideo forma a qua formatur aliquid, non dicitur esse idea vel forma. Alio modo dicitur forma alicujus secundum quam aliquid formatur ; sicut anima est forma hominis, et figura statuæ est forma cupri ; et quamvis forma, quæ est pars compositi, vere dicatur esse illius forma, non tamen consuevit dici ejus idea ; quia videtur hoc nomen idea significare formam separatam ab eo cujus est forma. Tertio modo dicitur forma alicujus illud ad quod aliquid formatur ; et hæc est forma exemplaris, ad cujus similitudinem aliquid

Disp. I. De Mundi Origine. 71 constituitur ; et in hac significatione consuetum est nomen ideæ accipi, ut idem sit idea quod forma quam aliquid imitatur. " Secunda est ut aliquid fiat ad similitudinem et imitationem ideæ ; hic enim est modus proprius causandi ideæ, quod sit regula, ad cujus imitationem fit effectus : unde non quævis forma extra rem existens dicitur idea aut exemplar. Tertia, ut quod fit ad similitudinem ideæ per se ita fiat. "Aliquid," inquit D. Th. 1. mox c. , "potest imitari formam aliquam dupliciter. Uno modo ex intentione agentis ; sicut pictura ad hoc fit a pictore ut imitetur aliquem cujus figura depingitur : aliquando autem est prædicta imitatio per accidens, præter intentionem, et a casu : sicut frequenter pictores faciunt imaginem alicujus, de quo non intendunt. Quod autem imitatur aliquam formam a casu, non dicitur ad illam formari, quia ly ad videtur importare ordinem ad finem ; unde, cum forma exemplaris, vel idea, sit ad quam formatur aliquid ; oportet quod formam exemplarem vel ideam aliquid imitetur per se , non per accidens." Quarta, ut agens tale sit per intellectum, ac proinde determinet sibi finem. "Si ergo," prosequitur idem S. Doctor, "aliquid fiat ad imitationem alterius per agens quod non determinat sibi finem, non ex hoc forma imitata habebit rationem exemplaris vel ideæ ; non enim dicimus quod forma hominis generantis sit idea vel exemplar hominis generati ; sed solum hoc dicimus quando agens propter finem determinat sibi finem ; sive illa forma sit in agente, sive extra agentem ; dicimus enim formam artis in

72 De Deo Creatore. artifice esse exemplar artificiati ; et simpliciter etiam formam quæ est extra artificem, ad cujus imitationem artifex aliquid facit." 75. From this description of idea four conditions are deduced as

required for constituting an idea.

The first is that it be a form existing outside the thing of which it is the form, and from which it is necessarily distinguished. For, as St. Thomas observes in Contra Gentiles, On Ideas, article 1: "The form of some thing can be said in three ways. In one way, that from which the thing is formed, as from the form of the agent the formation of the effect proceeds. But because it is not of the necessity of action that effects attain to the complete notion of the form of the agent, since they often fall short, especially in equivocal causes, therefore the form from which something is formed is not said to be an idea or form. In another way, the form of something is said to be that according to which something is formed; as the soul is the form of man, and the figure of the statue is the form of bronze. And although the form which is part of the composite is truly said to be its form, nevertheless it is not customarily called its idea; because this name idea seems to signify a form separated from that of which it is the form. In a third way, the form of something is said to be that to which something is formed; and this is the exemplar form, to whose likeness something is constituted; and in this signification the name idea is customarily taken, so that idea is the same as the form which something imitates."

The second is that something be made according to the likeness and imitation of the idea; for this is the proper mode of causing of an idea, that it be the rule to whose imitation the effect is made. Hence not any form whatever existing outside the thing is called an idea or exemplar.

The third is that what is made according to the likeness of the idea be made according to it per se. "Something," says St. Thomas in the place just cited, "can imitate some form in two ways. In one way, from the intention of the agent; as a painting is made by a painter for this, that it imitate someone whose figure is depicted. But sometimes the aforesaid imitation is per accidens, beyond intention, and by chance; as painters frequently make an image of someone whom they do not intend. But what imitates some form by chance is not said to be formed to that form, because the expression to seems to import an order to an end. Hence, since an exemplar form, or idea, is that to which something is formed, it is necessary that something imitate an exemplar form or idea per se, not per accidens."

The fourth is that such an agent act through intellect, and consequently determine an end for himself. "Therefore," the same holy Doctor continues, "if something is made in imitation of another through an agent which does not determine an end for itself, the imitated form will not from this have the notion of exemplar or idea. For we do not say that the form of the man generating is the idea or exemplar of the man generated; but we say this only when the agent, for the sake of an end, determines an end for itself, whether that form is in the agent or outside the agent. For we say that the form of art in the artisan is the exemplar of the thing made by art; and simply also the form which is outside the artisan, to whose imitation the artisan makes something."

Section I Continued. What An Idea Is In God.

76. Quoad 2um vero, si ex generali theoria de ideis deveniamus ad investigandum quid sit in concreto idea in Deo, dicendum videtur quod divina essentia, ut cognita ab intellectu divino communicabilis extra se, habet rationem ideæ. " Quod, " inquit D. Th. 1. p. 15. a. 2. c., "hoc modo potest videri : ipse enim essentiam suam perfecte cognoscit ; unde cognoscit eam secundum omnem modum quo cognoscibilis est. Potest autem cognosci non solum secundum quod in se est, sed secundum quod est participabilis secundum aliquem modum similitudinis a creaturis. Unaquæque autem creatura habet propriam speciem secundum quod aliquo modo participat divinæ essentiæ similitudinem. Sic igitur in quantum Deus cognoscit suam essentiam ut sic imitabilem a tali creatura, cognoscit eam ut propriam rationem et ideam hujus creaturæ ; et similiter de aliis. Et sic patet quod Deus intelligit plures rationes proprias plurium rerum , quæ sunt plures ideæ . " 76. As to the second, however, if from the general theory of ideas we come to investigating what an idea is concretely in God, it seems that it must be said that the divine essence, as known by the divine intellect as communicable outside itself, has the notion of an idea. "This," says St. Thomas, Summa Theologiae I, q. 15, a. 2, corpus, "can be seen in this way: for he perfectly

knows his own essence; hence he knows it according to every mode in which it is knowable. But it can be known not only according as it is in itself, but according as it is participable according to some mode of likeness by creatures. Now each creature has its proper species according as in some way it participates in the likeness of the divine essence. Thus, therefore, insofar as God knows his own essence as thus imitable by such a creature, he knows it as the proper notion and idea of this creature; and similarly concerning others. And thus it is clear that God understands several proper notions of several things, which are several ideas."

77. Ut magis determinemus ideas divinas in concreto, possumus tria distinguere. 1. ipsam divinam essentiam, quæ est realiter una, sed virtualiter multiplex, quatenus cum sit ipsa essendi plenitudo continet in se quemcumque essendi gradum.-2. Essentiam divinam prout actu cognoscitur a divino intellectu, ut imitabilis ad extra : seu varios gradus essendi, secundum quos divina essentia est imitabilis, actu terminantes cognitionem divinam.-3 . Cognitionem quamdam reflexam (nostro concipiendi modo), qua

Disp. I.-De Mundi Origine. 73 Deus cognoscit cognitionem habitam imitabilitatis suæ essentiæ. Jamvero ipsa essentia divina in se considerata antecedenter ad actum intellectus, quo illam contemplatur ut imitabilem, potest dici fundamentaliter idea sed non formaliter ; nondum enim dicit relationem ad id, cujus est exemplar, nec ad intellectum seu ad agens intellectuale, quod per ideam operatur : quæ tamen necessaria sunt, ut vidimus, ad rationem ideæ constituendam.-Varii gradus essendi, secundum quos essentia divina est imitabilis, prout actu terminant cognitionem divinam, formaliter constituunt ideas divinas ; ut enim patet, in iis verificantur omnia, quæ requiri diximus ad rationem ideæ.-Cognitio autem illa reflexa non dicitur constituere formaliter ideas divinas, siquidem illas supponit. Unde scite animadvertit Toledo in h. 1.: "Aliud est ideam fieri, aliud cognosci in se. Fit idea, quum essentia in ordine ad aliud intelligitur : cognoscitur autem, quum actu reflexo essentia habens ordinem cognoscitur. Ista distinguimus secundum nostrum modum intelligendi ; in Deo autem non est multitudo actuum, sed unus , qui ipsemet est." 77. In order that we may determine the divine ideas more concretely, we can distinguish three things. 1. The divine essence itself, which is really one, but virtually multiple, insofar as, since it is the very fullness of being, it contains in itself every grade of being. 2. The divine essence as actually known by the divine intellect as imitable outside itself; or the various grades of being, according to which the divine essence is imitable, actually terminating divine cognition. 3. A certain reflex cognition (according to our mode of conceiving), by which God knows the cognition he has of the imitability of his essence.

Now the divine essence itself, considered in itself antecedently to the act of intellect by which he contemplates it as imitable, can be called fundamentally an idea, but not formally; for it does not yet express a relation to that of which it is the exemplar, nor to the intellect or to the intellectual agent which operates through an idea. Yet these things, as we have seen, are necessary for constituting the notion of idea. The various grades of being according to which the divine essence is imitable, as they actually terminate divine cognition, formally constitute the divine ideas; for, as is clear, in them are verified all the things which we said are required for the notion of idea. But that reflex cognition is not said formally to constitute the divine ideas, since it supposes them. Hence Toledo acutely observes in this place: "It is one thing for an idea to be made, another for it to be known in itself. An idea is made when the essence is understood in order to another; but it is known when, by a reflex act, the essence having an order is known. We distinguish these things according to our mode of understanding; but in God there is not a multitude of acts, but one act, which is himself."

78. Ex dictis sequitur a) quod verissime S. Aug. (apud D. Th. q. 15. a. 2.) ideas divinas ita definierit : " Ideæ sunt principales quædam formæ, vel rationes rerum stabiles atque incommutabiles, quia ipsæ formatæ non sunt ; ac per hoc æternæ, ac semper eodem modo se habentes , quæ divina intelligentia continentur. Sed cum ipsæ neque oriantur, neque intereant, secundum eas tamen formari dicitur omne quod oriri et interire potest, et omne quod oritur et

interit."

74 De Deo Creatore. Sequitur b) quod idea in Deo potest dici una et multiplex. Una, quatenus una est divina essentia, et una realiter est divina cognitio ; multiplex vero, quatenus "idea," ut inquit D. Th. q. 15, a. 2. ad 1. , "non nominat divinam essentiam, in quantum est essentia, sed in quantum est similitudo, vel ratio hujus vel illius -rei. Unde secundum quod sunt plures rationes intellectæ ex una essentia, secundum hoc dicuntur plures ideæ." Sequitur c) quod hæc multiplicitas idearum nullo modo repugnat infinitæ Dei simplicitati. Etenim si ideæ considerentur in suo veluti fundamento, sunt ipsa divina essentia, quæ est realiter una, et solum virtualiter multiplex : virtualis autem distinctio non facit compositionem. Si ideæ formaliter considerentur, sunt termini divini intellectus contemplantis divinam essentiam uti imitabilem ad extra : intellectus autem unico actu attingens multiplex objectum non obstat simplicitati. Si denique ideæ considerentur uti principium cognitionis ; certe in Deo non sunt tamquam principium subjectivum, quo Deus intelligit ; Deus enim non indiget speciebus intelligibilibus, sed ipsa sua essentia determinatur ad cognoscendum : quidquid cognoscibile est. Sunt ergo ad summum principium objectivum in quo Deus cognoscit omnia possibilia, quemadmodum in sigillo possumus nos cognoscere varias impressiones quæ ex eo in aliqua materia fieri possunt. Sequitur d) quod omnes naturæ quatenus sunt termini imitantes divinam essentiam, respondentes ideis divinis, in quibus et cognoscuntur ; participant aliquo pacto de vita Dei, "Quidquid est in Deo," ait D. Th.

Disp. I. De Mundi Origine. 75 1. p. q. 19. a. 4., "ut intellectum, est ipsum vivere vel vita ejus. Unde cum omnia, quæ facta sunt a Deo, sint in ipso ut intellecta, sequitur quod omnia in ipso sunt ipsa vita divina." Quod pulcherrime expressit S. Augustinus (in Jo. tract. 1. n. 17.) dicens : "Faber facit arcam. Primo in arte habet arcam ; si enim in arte arcam non haberet, unde illam fabricando proferret ? Sed arca sic est in arte, ut non ipsa arca sit quæ videtur oculis. In arte invisibiliter est, in opere visibiliter erit. Ecce facta est in opere : numquid destitit esse in arte ? Et illa in opere facta est, et illa manet quæ in arte est : nam potest illa arca putrescere, et iterum ex illa quæ in arte est, alia fabricari. Attendite ergo arcam in arte, et arcam in opere. Arca in opere non est vita, arca in arte vita est, quia vivit anima artificis, ubi sunt ista omnia antequam proferantur. Si ergo, fratres carissimi, quia sapientia Dei, per quem facta sunt omnia, secundum artem continet omnia, antequam fabricet omnia ; hinc quæ fiunt per ipsam artem, non continuo vita sunt, sed quidquid factum est, vita in illo est. Terram vides, est in arte terra ; cælum vides, est in arte cœlum; solem et lunam vides, sunt et ista in arte ; sed foris corpora sunt, in arte vita sunt." (Vid. præter D. Th. et Toledo in ll. cc. , Liberatore, Della Conoscenza intellettuale, parte seconda, cap. 1. a. 1., et cap. 8. a. 2.). 78. From what has been said it follows: a) that St. Augustine very truly defined the divine ideas thus (as cited by St. Thomas, q. 15, a. 2): "Ideas are certain principal forms, or stable and incommutable notions of things, because they themselves have not been formed; and through this they are eternal, and always having themselves in the same way, which are contained in the divine intelligence. But although they themselves neither arise nor perish, nevertheless according to them everything is said to be formed which can arise and perish, and everything which arises and perishes."

It follows: b) that idea in God can be called one and multiple. One, insofar as the divine essence is one, and divine cognition is really one; but multiple, insofar as "idea," as St. Thomas says, q. 15, a. 2, reply to objection 1, "does not name the divine essence insofar as it is essence, but insofar as it is the likeness or notion of this or that thing. Hence according as there are several notions understood from one essence, according to this they are called several ideas."

It follows: c) that this multiplicity of ideas in no way conflicts with the infinite simplicity of God. For if the ideas are considered in their, as it were, foundation, they are the divine essence itself, which is really one and only virtually multiple; but a virtual distinction does not make composition. If the ideas are considered formally, they are the termini of the divine intellect contemplating the divine essence as imitable outside itself; but an intellect reaching a multiple object by one act does not stand in the way of simplicity. Finally, if the ideas are considered as a principle of cognition, certainly in God they are not as a subjective principle by which God understands; for God does not need intelligible species, but is determined by his own essence itself to knowing whatever is knowable. Therefore they are at most an objective principle in which God knows all possible things, just as in a seal we can know the various impressions which can be made from it in some

matter.

It follows: d) that all natures, insofar as they are termini imitating the divine essence and corresponding to the divine ideas in which they are also known, participate in some manner in the life of God. "Whatever is in God," says St. Thomas, Summa Theologiae I, q. 19, a. 4, "as understood, is his very living or life. Hence, since all things which have been made by God are in him as understood, it follows that all things in him are the divine life itself." St. Augustine expressed this most beautifully (On John, tractate 1, n. 17), saying: "A craftsman makes a chest. First he has the chest in his art; for if he did not have the chest in his art, from where would he bring it forth by making it? But the chest is in the art in such a way that it is not the chest itself which is seen by the eyes. It is invisibly in the art; it will be visibly in the work. Behold, it has been made in the work: did it cease to be in the art? Both the one was made in the work, and the one which is in the art remains; for that chest can rot, and again another can be made from that which is in the art. Therefore attend to the chest in the art and the chest in the work. The chest in the work is not life; the chest in the art is life, because the soul of the artisan lives, where all those things are before they are brought forth. Therefore, most beloved brothers, because the wisdom of God, through whom all things were made, contains all things according to art before it makes all things, hence the things which are made through that art are not immediately life, but whatever has been made is life in him. You see the earth; earth is in the art. You see the heaven; heaven is in the art. You see the sun and moon; these too are in the art. But outwardly they are bodies; in the art they are life." See, besides St. Thomas and Toledo in the cited places, Liberatore, Della Conoscenza intellettuale, part 2, chapter 1, article 1, and chapter 8, article 2.

Section II. The Proposed Question Is Solved.

79. His rite intellectis

76 De Deo Creatore. § II. Solvitur proposita quæstio. PROP. VIII. Deus est prima causa exemplaris mundi. Prob. I. ex Scriptura. Legitur Ps. 135. 5. "Qui facit cælos in intellectu. "-Jer. 1. 12. " Qui facit terram in fortitudine sua, præparat in sapientia sua, et potentia sua extendit cœlos.".-Prov. 3. 19. “Dominus sapientia fundavit terram, stabilivit cœlos prudentia. "-Sap. 9. 21. "Omnium enim artifex docuit me sapientia. "-Prov. 8, 22-30. inducitur sapientia sic loquens : "Dominus possedit me in initio viarum suarum , antequam quidquam faceret a principio. Ab æterno ordinata sum, et ex antiquis antequam terra fieret. Nondum erant abyssi, et ego jam concepta eram : necdum fontes aquarum eruperant : necdum montes gravi mole constiterant : ante colles ego parturiebar : adhuc terram non fecerat, et flumina, et cardines orbis terræ . Quando præparabat cælos, aderam : quando certa lege, et gyro vallabat abyssos : quando æthera firmabat sursum, et librabat fontes aquarum : quando circumdabat mari terminum suum, et legem ponebat aquis, ne transirent fines suos : quando appendebat fundamenta terræ. Cum eo eram cuncta componens : et delectabar per singulos dies, ludens coram eo omni tempore." Unde : ex datis testimoniis Deus mundum, seu res omnes extra ipsum existentes, condidit juxta ideas præconceptas-quas non ab aliquo objecto extra se

Disp. I. De Mundi Origine. 77 posito accepit. Ergo Deus est prima causa exemplaris mundi. Prob. antec. quoad 1am partem. Dicitur Deus omnia creasse in intellectu : intellectus autem non aliter concurrit ad opus externum, quam exhibendo formam rei faciendæ-Dicitur Deus omnia fecisse in sapientia ; in sapientia autem non potest aliquid moliri qui non habet ideam finis eorumque quæ ad finem ordinantur. "Si ordo universi," inquit D. Th. sæpe cit. q. 15. a. 2., "est per se creatus ab eo, et intentus ab ipso , necesse est quod habeat ideam ordinis universi. Ratio autem alicujus totius haberi non potest, nisi habeantur propriæ rationes eorum ex quibus totum constituitur ; sicut ædificator speciem domus concipere non posset, nisi apud ipsum esset propria ratio cujuslibet partium ejus. Sic igitur oportet quod in mente divina sint propriæ rationes omnium rerum." -Sapientia divina, per quam mundus conditus est, dicitur omnium artifex : artifex autem operatur juxta præconceptam ideam. Prob. antec. quoad 2am partem. Dicitur Deus cælos et terram , omnia, seu universitatem creaturarum in sapientia fecisse ; ergo non potuit ab aliquo objecto extra se posito ideas accipere ; secus enim non fecisset illud Deus in Sapientia.-Dicitur sapientia divina existere ab æterno , præexistere omnibus creaturis, præparasse seu

direxisse omnia opera Dei ad extra ; ergo non potuit Deus ab aliquo objecto extra se posito rerum creandarum ideas accipere. Prob. II. ex Patribus. Origenes (in Jo. ad ea verba "In principio erat Verbum.") : "Opinor, sicut domus et navis fabricatur, vel ædificatur juxta figuras

78 De Deo Creatore. et formas mentibus eorum, qui structuræ præsident, conceptas, domo navique principium sumentibus ab his figuris et rationibus, quæ sunt in artifice ; sic universa facta fuisse juxta rerum futurarum rationes jam antea a Deo manifestatas in sapientia : omnia enim in sapientia fecit."--S. Augustinus (lib. 83. qq. q. 46.) : " Quis audeat dicere, Deum irrationabiliter omnia condidisse ? quod si recte dici et credi non potest, restat ut omnia ratione sint condita, nec eadem ratione homo , qua equus ; hoc enim absurdum est existimare. Singula igitur propriis sunt creata rationibus . Has autem rationes ubi arbitrandum est esse, nisi in ipsa mente Creatoris ? Non enim extra se quidquam positum intuetur, ut secundum id constitueret quod constituebat ; nam hoc opinari sacrilegum est. Quod si hæ rerum creandarum, creatarumve rationes in divina mente continentur, neque in divina mente quidquam nisi æternum atque incommutabile potest esse, non solum sunt ideæ, sed ipsæ veræ sunt, quia æternæ sunt, et ejusmodi, atque incommutabiles manent, quarum participatione fit, ut sit, quidquid est, quoquo modo est. "-S. Maximus (apud Euthymium P. 1. Panop. Tit. 3.) : "Rationes omnium in Deo fixæ sunt, secundum quas ex non exstantibus illa produxit, ac secundum rationes easdem cognoscit omnia antequam fiant. Has porro rationes Areopagita Dionysius prædestinationes vocat, divinasque voluntates."-S. Anselmus (mon. c. 9.) : "Priusquam fierent universa, erat in ratione summæ naturæ, quid aut quale aut quomodo futura essent. Quare cum ea, quæ facta sunt, clarum sit nihil fuisse antequam fierent, quantum ad hoc quia non erant

Disp. I. De Mundi Origine. 79 quod nunc sunt, neque erat ex quo fierent : non tamen nihil erant, quantum ad rationem facientis, per quam et secundum quam fierent. "-Ideas Platonicas extra Deum existentes impugnant S. Justinus Martyr (Cohort. ad Gentes) Tertullianus (de anima)-Nazianzenus (orat. 33.), etc., etc.-Quæ omnia testimonia tam aperta sunt, ut nulla expositione indigeant. Prob. III. argumento D. Th. 1. p. q. 44 a. 3. , quod sic proponi potest : qui habet omnium rerum exemplaria quæ non sunt aliud a sua essentia, est prima causa exemplaris omnium ; atqui Deus habet rerum omnium exemplaria, seu ideas, quæ "non sunt realiter aliud a divina essentia, prout ejus similitudo a diversis participari potest diversimode ;" ergo . Prob. min. quoad 1am partem, nempe Deus habet rerum omnium ideas. Deus enim creando mundum non ex necessitate sed ex libera sua voluntate egit, ut inferius probabitur ; qui autem ita agit, agit intellectu dirigente ; ergo Deus , qui certe sapientissime operatus est, prout ejus natura exigit, debuit creationis finem præstituere, singulas creaturas ad finem ordinare, eas cognoscere etc. Sed hoc importat Deum habuisse ideas rerum omnium, quæ factæ sunt ; ergo. Confirmatur hoc a posteriori, siquidem constat esse ordinem in mundo, eumque in divinam sapientiam tamquam in primum principium reduci : "ordo autem in rerum distinctione consistit. Et ideo oportet dicere, quod in divina sapientia sint rationes omnium rerum, quas supra diximus ideas, id est formas exemplares in mente divina existentes. " "In omnibus" enim inquit idem S. Doctor q. 15. a. 1., quæ non a casu generantur, necesse est formam esse

■■ De Deo Creatore. finem generationis cujuscumque. Agens autem non agit propter formam, nisi in quantum similitudo formæ est in ipso. Quod quidem contingit dupliciter : in quibusdam enim agentibus præexistit forma rei faciendæ secundum esse naturale, sicut in his quæ agunt per naturam ; sicut homo generat hominem, et ignis ignem. In quibusdam vero secundum esse intelligibile, ut in his quæ agunt per intellectum ; sicut similitudo domus præexistit in mente ædificatoris ; et hæc potest dici idea domus, quia artifex intendit domum assimilare formæ quam mente concepit. Quia igitur mundus non est casu factus, sed est factus a Deo per intellectum agente, ut infra patebit q. 46. a. 6, necesse est quod in mente divina sit forma ad similitudinem cujus mundus est factus. Et in hoc consistit ratio ideæ." Prob. min. quoad 2am partem, nempe ideas divinas non esse aliud re a divina essentia. Nam Deus est causa omnino independens : sed talis non esset, si non a seipso, seu a sua essentia, sed ab aliquo alio exemplari a se distincto debuisset illas accipere ; ergo. Præterea cum nihil sit extra Deum, quod ab eo factum non sit ; nihil est extra Deum, a quo possit Deus rerum faciendarum ideas accipere. NOTA. Nonnulli recentiores timent ne ex statuta doctrina de ideis divinis, Pantheismus inducatur. Etenim , aiunt, juxta expositam doctrinam, ideæ divinæ realiter non distinguuntur a Deo, et Deus dici debet prototypus mundi ; jamvero cum artifex aliquid exterius molitur,

manifestat suam ideam ; mundus ergo non esset nisi exterior Dei manifestatio. Unde, addunt, dicendum potius est quod in Deo est idea

4 Disp. I. De Mundi Origine. 81 mundi, sed non quod Deus est idea mundi : quam formam loquendi et plurium Theologorum exempla confirmant (Staudenmayr apud Knoll, par. 2. c. 1 . a. 1.) At vero si tradita doctrina de ideis divinis bene intelligatur, evidens est nullum esse pantheismi periculum. Creaturæ enim, sive in statu existentiæ, sive in statu possibilitatis spectentur, non sunt ipsæ ideæ Dei ; sed eæ sunt quæ ideas Dei imitantur, seu quæ ad idearum divinarum similitudinem fiunt aut fieri possunt. Quare Deus creando manifestat quidem suas ideas, seu manifestat seipsum , sed non ponendo extra se suas ipsas ideas, sed earumdem terminos imitativos : ita ut ex creaturis possimus ideas divinas cognoscere , non quatenus has in se ipsis intuemur, sed quatenus ex earum similitudine in creaturis manifestata ad idearum notitiam assurgimus.- Non est autem recedendum ab illo modo loquendi "Deus est idea mundi ; " tum quia, ut vidimus, est communis apud Patres et D. Th.; tum quia, ex dictis est veritati conformis. Cæterum fere nullum est discrimen inter hæc duo "Deus est idea mundi ;" et "in Deo sunt ideæ mundi :" quidquid enim in Deo est, Deus est. Unde iidem Theologi ab adversariis citati, qui utuntur altera formula "in Deo sunt ideæ mundi" promiscue adhibent etiam primam, quod et videre est apud D. Thomam. Piget dicere præfatum Theologum vere erroneo fundamento niti, et discrimen esse non in modo loquendi, sed in doctrina. Nam distinguit in Deo duplex, ut ait, Logon : Increatum, quod est Verbum, Filius Dei ; et creatum, quod, juxta ipsum, est cogi

82 De Deo Creatore. tatio de mundo, quam habet Pater : hoc alterum vero ponit in Deo ut realiter distinctum ab intellectu et essentia divina. Sed hic talis est error, ut vix refutatione indigeat. Etenim præterquam quod sic tribueretur creatio solum Patri ; aliquid reale poneretur in Deo a Deo ipso realiter distinctum. Quod si dicitur infinitum, habemus duo infinita, vel quartam Personam in Deo ; si finitum, actum est de divina simplicitate, etc. Hæc attigisse sufficiat de re sat evidenti. 79. With these things rightly understood:

Proposition VIII. God is the first exemplar cause of the world.

First proof, from Scripture. Psalm 135:5 reads: "Who makes the heavens in understanding." Jeremiah 1:12: "Who makes the earth in his strength, prepares it in his wisdom, and stretches out the heavens by his power." Proverbs 3:19: "The Lord by wisdom founded the earth, established the heavens by prudence." Wisdom 9:21: "For wisdom, the artisan of all things, taught me." In Proverbs 8:22-30 wisdom is introduced speaking thus: "The Lord possessed me in the beginning of his ways, before he made anything from the beginning. From eternity I was ordained, and from ancient times before the earth was made. The abysses were not yet, and I was already conceived; the fountains of waters had not yet burst forth; the mountains had not yet stood with heavy mass; before the hills I was brought forth; he had not yet made the earth and the rivers and the hinges of the world of the earth. When he prepared the heavens, I was present; when by a fixed law and circle he enclosed the abysses; when he established the ether above and balanced the fountains of waters; when he set its boundary around the sea, and placed a law for the waters, lest they pass beyond their limits; when he suspended the foundations of the earth. I was with him composing all things; and I was delighted through each day, playing before him at all times."

Hence: from the given testimonies, God founded the world, or all things existing outside himself, according to preconceived ideas, which he did not receive from any object posited outside himself. Therefore God is the first exemplar cause of the world.

The antecedent is proved as to the first part. God is said to have created all things in understanding; but the intellect does not concur otherwise toward an external work than by exhibiting the form of the thing to be made. God is said to have made all things in wisdom; but one who does not have an idea of the end and of the things ordered to the end cannot attempt something in wisdom. "If the order of the universe," says St. Thomas in the often-cited q. 15, a. 2, "is created by him per se, and intended by him, it is necessary that he have an idea of the order of the universe. But the notion of some whole cannot be had unless the proper notions are had of the things from which the whole is constituted; just as a builder could not conceive the species of a house unless there were with him the proper notion of each of its parts. Thus, therefore, it is necessary that in the divine mind there be the proper notions of all things." Divine wisdom, through which the world was founded, is called the artisan of all things; but an artisan operates

according to a preconceived idea.

The antecedent is proved as to the second part. God is said to have made heaven and earth, all things, or the universality of creatures, in wisdom; therefore he could not have received the ideas from any object posited outside himself; for otherwise God would not have made that in Wisdom. Divine wisdom is said to exist from eternity, to preexist all creatures, and to have prepared or directed all the works of God outside himself; therefore God could not have received the ideas of things to be created from any object posited outside himself.

Second proof, from the Fathers. Origen (on John, at the words "In the beginning was the Word"): "I think that, just as a house and ship are fashioned or built according to the figures and forms conceived in the minds of those who preside over the construction, with the house and ship taking their principle from those figures and notions which are in the artisan, so all things were made according to the notions of future things already manifested beforehand by God in wisdom; for he made all things in wisdom." St. Augustine (Eighty-Three Questions, q. 46): "Who would dare to say that God founded all things irrationally? But if this cannot rightly be said and believed, it remains that all things were founded according to reason, and not man according to the same reason as horse; for to think this is absurd. Therefore individual things were created according to their proper reasons. But where should those reasons be thought to be, except in the very mind of the Creator? For he does not look at anything posited outside himself, so that according to it he would constitute what he was constituting; for to think this is sacrilegious. But if these reasons of things to be created or already created are contained in the divine mind, and nothing can be in the divine mind except what is eternal and incommutable, not only are they ideas, but they are themselves true, because they are eternal and of this sort, and remain incommutable; by participation in them it comes about that whatever is, in whatever way it is, is." St. Maximus (as cited by Euthymius, Panoplia, part 1, title 3): "The reasons of all things are fixed in God, according to which he produced those things out of non-existing things, and according to the same reasons he knows all things before they come to be. Moreover Dionysius the Areopagite calls these reasons predestinations and divine wills." St. Anselm (Monologion, chapter 9): "Before all things came to be, there was in the reason of the supreme nature what or what sort or in what way they were going to be. Wherefore, since it is clear that the things which have been made were nothing before they came to be, as to this, that they were not what they now are, nor was there anything from which they might be made, nevertheless they were not nothing as to the reason of the maker, through which and according to which they were to be made." St. Justin Martyr (Exhortation to the Greeks), Tertullian (On the Soul), Nazianzen (Oration 33), etc., attack Platonic ideas existing outside God. All these testimonies are so open that they need no exposition.

Third proof, from the argument of St. Thomas, Summa Theologiae I, q. 44, a. 3, which can be proposed thus: he who has the exemplars of all things, which are not other than his essence, is the first exemplar cause of all things; but God has the exemplars of all things, or ideas, which "are not really other than the divine essence, according as its likeness can be participated in diverse ways by diverse things"; therefore.

The minor is proved as to the first part, namely that God has the ideas of all things. For in creating the world God acted not from necessity but from his free will, as will be proved below; but he who acts in this way acts with intellect directing. Therefore God, who certainly operated most wisely, as his nature requires, had to pre-establish the end of creation, order the individual creatures to the end, know them, etc. But this imports that God had the ideas of all the things which were made; therefore. This is confirmed a posteriori, since it is established that there is order in the world, and that it is reduced to divine wisdom as to its first principle: "but order consists in the distinction of things. And therefore it is necessary to say that in divine wisdom there are the notions of all things, which above we called ideas, that is, exemplar forms existing in the divine mind." For "in all things," says the same holy Doctor, q. 15, a. 1, "which are not generated by chance, it is necessary that form be the end of any generation whatever. But an agent does not act for the sake of a form except insofar as the likeness of the form is in it. This indeed happens in two ways: for in some agents the form of the thing to be made preexists according to natural being, as in those which act through nature, as man generates man and fire generates fire. But in some it preexists according to intelligible being, as in those things which act through intellect, as the likeness of a

house preexists in the mind of the builder; and this can be called the idea of the house, because the artisan intends to assimilate the house to the form which he conceived in his mind. Therefore, because the world was not made by chance, but was made by God acting through intellect, as will be clear below, q. 46, a. 6, it is necessary that in the divine mind there be the form to whose likeness the world was made. And in this consists the notion of idea."

The minor is proved as to the second part, namely that the divine ideas are not something really other than the divine essence. For God is an altogether independent cause; but he would not be such if he had to receive those ideas not from himself, or from his essence, but from some other exemplar distinct from himself; therefore. Moreover, since there is nothing outside God which has not been made by him, there is nothing outside God from which God could receive the ideas of things to be made.

Note. Some more recent authors fear lest pantheism be introduced from the established doctrine concerning the divine ideas. For, they say, according to the doctrine set forth, the divine ideas are not really distinguished from God, and God must be called the prototype of the world. Now when an artisan fashions something external, he manifests his idea; therefore the world would be nothing but an exterior manifestation of God. Hence, they add, it should rather be said that in God there is the idea of the world, but not that God is the idea of the world; and examples from several theologians confirm this form of speaking (Staudenmayr, as cited by Knoll, part 2, chapter 1, article 1).

But in truth, if the handed-down doctrine concerning the divine ideas is well understood, it is evident that there is no danger of pantheism. For creatures, whether they are considered in the state of existence or in the state of possibility, are not themselves the ideas of God; but they are those things which imitate the ideas of God, or which are made or can be made according to the likeness of the divine ideas. Therefore God in creating indeed manifests his ideas, or manifests himself, but not by positing outside himself his very ideas, but their imitative termini; so that from creatures we can know the divine ideas, not insofar as we intuit these in themselves, but insofar as from their likeness manifested in creatures we rise to knowledge of the ideas.

Nor should there be any departure from that mode of speaking, "God is the idea of the world"; both because, as we have seen, it is common among the Fathers and St. Thomas, and because, from what has been said, it is conformable to truth. Besides, there is almost no difference between these two: "God is the idea of the world" and "in God are the ideas of the world"; for whatever is in God, God is. Hence the same theologians cited by the adversaries, who use the other formula, "in God are the ideas of the world," also promiscuously employ the first, as can also be seen in St. Thomas.

It is irksome to say that the aforementioned theologian rests on a truly erroneous foundation, and that the difference is not in the mode of speaking, but in the doctrine. For he distinguishes in God a twofold Logos, as he says: an uncreated Logos, which is the Word, the Son of God; and a created Logos, which, according to him, is the thought concerning the world which the Father has. He places this latter in God as really distinct from the divine intellect and essence. But this is such an error that it scarcely needs refutation. For besides the fact that in this way creation would be attributed to the Father alone, something real would be posited in God really distinct from God himself. If this is said to be infinite, we have two infinites, or a fourth Person in God; if finite, it is over with divine simplicity, etc. It is enough to have touched upon these things concerning a matter sufficiently evident.

Article 7. Whether There is Some Representation of God in the World

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Seventh Article. Whether There Is Some Representation Of God In The World.

80. Cum quælibet causa effectum aliquo modo sibi similem faciat, ex eo quod Deus est causa mundi, uti ostensum est, facile deducitur mundum præseferre aliquam similitudinem ad Deum. Hæc autem aliqualis similitudo præsertim eruitur ex Dei causalitate

exemplari ; ac proinde postquam de hac egimus, statim exponendam aggredimur Dei repræsentationem in mundo. § I. Status quæstionis. 80. Since any cause whatever makes its effect in some way like itself, from the fact that God is the cause of the world, as has been shown, it is easily deduced that the world displays some likeness to God. But this likeness, such as it is, is especially elicited from God's exemplar causality; and consequently, after we have treated this, we immediately undertake to explain God's representation in the world.

Section I. State Of The Question.

81. Proposita quæstio de Dei repræsentatione in mundo potest duplicem sensum habere : 1. utrum sit aliqua repræsentatio Dei ut est unus essentia-2. utrum sit aliqua repræsentatio Dei prout est trinus

Disp. I. De Mundi Origine. 83 Personis . Et quidem si omnis causæ est sibi aliquo modo effectum assimilare ; cum tres Personæ divinæ, ut diximus, sint causa mundi, videtur aliqua repræsentatio etiam Trinitatis debere in mundo inveniri. 81. The proposed question concerning God's representation in the world can have a twofold sense: 1. whether there is some representation of God as he is one in essence; 2. whether there is some representation of God insofar as he is three in Persons. And indeed, if it belongs to every cause in some way to assimilate an effect to itself, since the three divine Persons, as we have said, are the cause of the world, it seems that some representation even of the Trinity ought to be found in the world.

82. Verum quidem est effectum assimilari causæ potius secundum principium quo producitur (secundum illud enim participat de perfectione causæ), quam secundum principium quod illum producit. Nihilominus cum Personæ divinæ cum divina essentia identificentur ; cumque inter se distinguantur secundum originem , quæ in unaquaque re est secundum convenientiam suæ naturæ : necesse est ut ubi est repræsentatio Dei secundum id quod est in eo absolutum, et commune tribus Personis, sit etiam Personarum repræsentatio. "Distinctio, " inquit D. Th. 1. p. q. 93. a. 5. c., “divinarum Personarum non est nisi secundum originem, vel potius secundum relationes originis. Non autem est idem modus originis in omnibus ; sed modus originis uniuscujusque est secundum convenientiam suæ naturæ. Aliter enim producuntur animata, aliter inanimata, aliter animalia, atque aliter plantæ. Unde manifestum est quod distinctio divinarum Personarum est secundum quod divinæ naturæ convenit. Unde esse ad imaginem Dei secundum imitationem divinæ naturæ non excludit hoc quod est esse ad imaginem Dei secundum repræsentationem trium Personarum, sed magis unum ad alterum sequitur." 82. It is indeed true that an effect is assimilated to the cause rather according to the principle by which it is produced (for according to that it participates in the perfection of the cause) than according to the principle which produces it. Nevertheless, since the divine Persons are identified with the divine essence, and since they are distinguished among themselves according to origin, which in each thing is according to the fittingness of its own nature, it is necessary that where there is a representation of God according to that which is absolute in him and common to the three Persons, there also be a representation of the Persons. "The distinction," says St. Thomas, Summa Theologiae I, q. 93, a. 5, corpus, "of the divine Persons is only according to origin, or rather according to relations of origin. But the mode of origin is not the same in all things; rather, the mode of origin of each thing is according to the fittingness of its own nature. For animate things are produced in one way, inanimate things in another, animals in another, and plants in another. Hence it is manifest that the distinction of the divine Persons is according as it befits the divine nature. Hence to be to the image of God according to imitation of the divine nature does not exclude being to the image of God according to representation of the three Persons, but rather one follows upon the other."

83. Dei autem unius et trini repræsentatio in creaturis potest inveniri vel per modum vestigii, vel per modum imaginis. Repræsentatio per modum vestigii

habetur, cum 1. p. q. 45. a. 7. "aliquis effectus

84 De Deo Creatore. repræsentat solam causalitatem causæ, non autem formam ejus ;" seu, ut docet idem S. Doctor, q. 93. a. 6. c. , " vestigium autem repræsentat per modum effectus, qui sic repræsentat suam causam, quod tamen ad speciei similitudinem non pertingat. Impressionem enim quæ ex motu animalium relinquuntur, dicuntur vestigia : et similiter cinis dicitur vestigium ignis, et desolatio terræ vestigium hostilis exercitus ." 83. Now the representation of God one and triune in creatures can be found either by way of vestige or by way of image. Representation by way of vestige is had when, as Summa Theologiae I, q. 45, a. 7 says, "some effect represents only the causality of the cause, but not its form"; or, as the same holy Doctor teaches, q. 93, a. 6, corpus, "a vestige represents by way of an effect, which so represents its cause that nevertheless it does not attain to likeness of species. For impressions which are left from the motion of animals are called vestiges; and similarly ash is called the vestige of fire, and the desolation of land the vestige of a hostile army."

84. Unde sequitur quod per vestigium proprie investigari possumus existentiam causæ, et ad summum ejus naturam quoad aliqua communia, non vero quoad propriam ejus formam. Notandum tamen est cum de Valentia Tom. 1. Disp. 3. q. 2. p. 3. " cum dicimus ex sententia D. Thomæ, de ratione vestigii esse , ut non perfecte per id veniamus in rei cognitionem ; intelligendum hoc esse ex vi vestigii. Nam accedente nostro discursu, ex vestigio quoque aliquando venimus in cognitionem causæ, secundum proprium ejus esse ; ut ex hominis vestigio intelligimus hominem ibi fuisse secundum propriam formam. Hoc tamen non cognoscimus, quia vestigium perfecte hominem repræsentet . "-Imo, magis ad rem nostram , advertendum est supposita fide Trinitatis nos aliqua ejus vestigia posse invenire ; at si nullam habeamus de hoc mysterio notitiam, nec possumus ullum ejus vestigium agnoscere, ac per consequens nec Trinitatis notitiam consequi. Sicut si nihil sciremus de leone, quamvis ejus vestigium videremus, non possemus dicere illud esse vestigium leonis, nec per illud ad propriam leonis formæ notitiam assurgere. 84. Hence it follows that through a vestige we can properly investigate the existence of the cause, and at most its nature with respect to certain common things, but not with respect to its proper form. Yet it must be noted with de Valentia, vol. 1, disp. 3, q. 2, p. 3: "When we say, according to the opinion of St. Thomas, that it belongs to the notion of a vestige that through it we do not come perfectly into knowledge of the thing, this must be understood from the force of the vestige. For when our discourse is added, from a vestige also we sometimes come into knowledge of the cause according to its proper being; as from the vestige of a man we understand that a man was there according to his proper form. Yet we do not know this because the vestige perfectly represents the man." Indeed, more to our matter, it must be observed that, once faith in the Trinity is supposed, we can find some of its vestiges; but if we have no knowledge of this mystery, we cannot recognize any vestige of it, and consequently cannot obtain knowledge of the Trinity. Just as, if we knew nothing about a lion, although we saw its footprint, we could not say that it was the vestige of a lion, nor through it rise to knowledge of the lion's proper form.

85. Repræsentatio autem per modum imaginis non modo requirit ut ex vi productionis aliquid sit

Disp. I. De Mundi Origine. 85 alteri simile, sed præsertim ut ei sit simile in natura specifica, vel in signo speciei, ut in figura. "Requiritur autem, " ait D. Th. 1. p . q. 93. a. 2. c. "ad rationem imaginis quod sit similitudo secundum speciem, sicut imago regis est in filio suo ; vel ad minus secundum aliquod accidens proprium speciei, et præcipue secundum figuram, sicut hominis imago dicitur esse in cupro. Unde signanter Hilarius dicit, in lib . de Synod., can. 1. quod imago est species indifferens." 85. But representation by way of image requires not only that by force of production something be like another, but especially that it be like it in specific nature, or in a sign of species, as in figure. "It is required," says St. Thomas, Summa Theologiae I, q. 93, a. 2, corpus, "for the notion of image that there be likeness according to species, as the image of the king is in his son; or at least according to some accident proper to

the species, and especially according to figure, as the image of a man is said to be in bronze. Hence Hilary says pointedly, in On the Synods, canon 1, that image is an undiffering species."

86. Cum vero in Deo nullum sit accidens, ejus repræsentatio in creaturis per modum imaginis nequit haberi, nisi secundum similitudinem speciei. Unde idem S. Doctor mox cit. 1. subdit : " Manifestum est autem quod similitudo speciei attenditur secundum ultimam differentiam. Assimilantur autem aliqua Deo, primo quidem, et maxime communiter, in quantum sunt ; secundo , in quantum vivunt ; tertio vero, in quantum sapiunt vel intelligunt ; quæ, ut Augustinus dicit in lib. 83 QQ., quæst. 51 , in med., ita sunt Deo similitudine proxima ut in creaturis nihil sit propinquius. Sic ergo patet quod solæ intellectuales creaturæ, proprie loquendo, sunt ad imaginem Dei." 86. But since there is no accident in God, his representation in creatures by way of image cannot be had except according to likeness of species. Hence the same holy Doctor, in the place just cited, immediately adds: "It is manifest that likeness of species is considered according to the ultimate difference. But some things are assimilated to God, first indeed, and most commonly, insofar as they are; second, insofar as they live; third, insofar as they know or understand. These, as Augustine says in the book Eighty-Three Questions, q. 51, middle, are so near to God in likeness that in creatures there is nothing nearer. Thus, therefore, it is clear that intellectual creatures alone, properly speaking, are to the image of God."

87. Ne tamen hac in re ullus sit errori locus, animadvertamus oportet cum eodem D. Th. 1. p. q. 4. a. 3. c. , " quod cum ' similitudo attendatur secundum convenientiam, vel communicationem in forma, multiplex est similitudo secundum multos modos communicandi in forma. Quædam enim dicuntur similia, quæ communicant in eadem forma secundum eamdem rationem, et secundum eumdem modum ; et hæc non solum dicuntur similia, sed æqualia in sua

86 De Deo Creatore. similitudine ; sicut duo æqualiter alba dicuntur similia in albedine ; et hæc est perfectissima similitudo . Alio modo dicuntur similia, quæ communicant in forma secundum eamdem rationem, et non secundum eumdem modum, sed secundum magis et minus ; ut minus album dicitur simile magis albo ; et hæc est similitudo imperfecta. Tertio modo dicuntur aliqua similia, quæ communicant in eadem forma, sed non secundum eamdem rationem, ut patet in agentibus non univocis ... Si ergo agens sit contentum in eadem specie cum suo effectu, erit similitudo inter faciens, et factum in forma, secundum eamdem rationem speciei, sicut homo generat hominem. Si autem agens non sit contentum in eadem specie, erit similitudo , sed non secundum eamdem rationem speciei ... sed secundum similitudinem generis. Si igitur sit aliquod agens quod non in genere contineatur, effectus ejus adhuc magis remote accedet ad similitudinem formæ agentis, non tamen ita quod participet similitudinem formæ agentis secundum eamdem rationem speciei, aut generis, sed secundum aliqualem analogiam, sicut ipsum esse est commune omnibus. Et hoc modo illa quæ sunt a Deo, assimilantur ei, in quantum sunt entia, ut primo et universali principio totius esse." 87. Nevertheless, lest there be any place for error in this matter, we must observe with the same St. Thomas, Summa Theologiae I, q. 4, a. 3, corpus, "that since likeness is considered according to agreement or communication in form, likeness is multiple according to many modes of communicating in form. For some things are called similar which communicate in the same form according to the same notion and according to the same mode; and these are not only called similar, but equal in their likeness, as two equally white things are called similar in whiteness; and this is the most perfect likeness. In another way, things are called similar which communicate in form according to the same notion, and not according to the same mode, but according to more and less; as the less white is called similar to the more white; and this is imperfect likeness. In a third way, some things are called similar which communicate in the same form, but not according to the same notion, as is clear in non-univocal agents ... Therefore if the agent is contained in the same species with its effect, there will be likeness between the maker and the thing made in form, according to the same notion of species, as man generates man. But if the agent is not contained in the same species,

there will be likeness, but not according to the same notion of species ... but according to likeness of genus. Therefore if there is some agent which is not contained in a genus, its effect will still more remotely approach likeness of the form of the agent; yet not so that it participates in the likeness of the form of the agent according to the same notion of species or genus, but according to some analogy, just as being itself is common to all things. And in this way the things which are from God are assimilated to him, insofar as they are beings, as to the first and universal principle of the whole of being."

88. Ex his omnibus sequitur a) quod etsi, juxta Patres quos videre est apud Petavium (de Op. sex dier. 1. 2. cc. 2-4.) multiplex sit in homine similitudo ad Deum ; repræsentatio tamen per modum imaginis ei competit solum in quantum mentem habet : si qua alia sit repræsentatio etiam secundum corpus, ea non erit, nisi per modum vestigii. “Quam

Disp. I.-De Mundi Origine. 87 vis, " inquit D. Th. q. 93. a. 6. ad 3., "imago Dei in homine non accipiatur secundum figuram corpoream ; tamen quia corpus hominis solum inter terrenorum animalium corpora non pronum in alvum prostratum est, sed tale est ut ad contemplandum cælum sit aptius, magis hoc ad imaginem et similitudinem Dei, quam cætera corpora animalium factum jure videri potest, ut Augustinus dicit in lib. 82 QQ., qu. 51. Quod tamen non est sic intelligendum, quasi in corpore hominis sit imago Dei ; sed quia ipsa figura humani corporis repræsentat imaginem Dei in anima per modum vestigii. " Sequitur b) quod repræsentatio Dei in homine etiam per modum imaginis est valde imperfecta, siquidem cum Deus sit supra omne genus et supra omnem speciem, nihil potest ei secundum similitudinem speciei convenire ; seu qualibet repræsentatio Dei in creatura est analogica, non univoca. Unde D. Th. q. 93. a. 1. ad 3. dicit : " Cum unum sit ens indivisum , eo modo dicitur species indifferens, quo una. Unum autem dicitur aliquid, non solum numero, aut specie, aut genere, sed etiam secundum analogiam vel proportionem quamdam ; et sic est unitas, vel convenientia creaturæ ad Deum. " Sequitur c) quod imago Dei perfecta non sit, nec possit esse nisi una. "Primogenitus," inquit idem S. Doctor 1. mox cit. ad 2., "omnis creaturæ est imago Dei perfecta, perfecte implens illud cujus imago est. Et ideo dicitur imago, et nunquam ad imaginem. Homo vero et propter similitudinem dicitur imago, et propter imperfectionem similitudinis dicitur ad imaginem. Et quia similitudo perfecta Dei non potest

88 De Deo Creatore. esse nisi identitate naturæ, imago Dei est in Filio suo primogenito , sicut imago regis in filio sibi connaturali ; in homine autem sicut in aliena natura, sicut imago regis in nummo argenteo, ut patet per Augustinum in lib . de decem Chordis, (cap. 8. circ. med.) " Sequitur d) quod hæc licet repræsentatio per modum imaginis valde perfectior sit repræsentatione per modum vestigii ; quoad notitiam tamen Trinitatis Personarum in Deo, quod de hac diximus, et de illa dicendum est. Etenim repræsentatio Trinitatis habetur tum per attributa, quæ, ut diximus , appropriantur Personis, tum præsertim in homine per ea attributa et per illas operationes, per quas processiones Personarum locum habent in Deo ; sed neque sciremus attributa illa appropriari Personis divinis, aut operationes, quæ homini competunt ut ratione est præditus, imaginem esse Trinitatis, nisi antea revelatione edoceremur esse Trinitatem Personarum in Deo. Sic , ex. gr., ex intellectione et amore, quem in nobis experimur, colligeremus ad summum esse intellectionem et amorem in Deo ; sed absque revelatione numquam possemus cognoscere Verbum et amorem in Deo esse duas subsistentias. Unde D. Th. cum sibi objecisset q. 93. a. 5.: "Si igitur in homine est imago Dei secundum Trinitatem Personarum , cum homo per naturalem rationem seipsum cognoscere possit, sequeretur quod per naturalem cognitionem posset homo cognoscere Trinitatem divinarum Personarum ; quod est falsum, ut supra ostensum est, (quæst. 32, art. 1.) ; " respondet : "Ratio illa procederet, si imago Dei esset in homine perfecte repræsentans Deum. Sed, sicut Augustinus dicit, 15 de

Disp. I. De Mundi Origine. 89 Trin. , cap. 6. versus fin., maxima est differentia trinitatis quæ est in nobis, ad Trinitatem divinam. Et ideo, ut ipse ibidem dicit, trinitatem, quæ in nobis est, videmus potius quam credimus ; Deum vero esse Trinitatem credimus potius quam videmus ." Quare ea quæ partim diximus, partim dicturi sumus de imagine Trinitatis in homine, plane conveniunt cum can. 1. in cap. IV. Const. Dei Filius Conc. Vat.: "Si quis dixerit, in revelatione divina nulla et proprie dicta mysteria contineri, sed universa fidei dogmata posse per rationem rite excultam e naturalibus principiis intelligi et demonstrari ; anathema sit." <div

class="pl-en">88. From all these things it follows: a) that although, according to the Fathers whom one may see in Petavius (On the Work of the Six Days, book 2, chapters 2-4), there is in man a manifold likeness to God, nevertheless representation by way of image belongs to him only insofar as he has a mind. If there is any other representation even according to the body, it will be only by way of vestige. "Although," says St. Thomas, q. 93, a. 6, reply to objection 3, "the image of God in man is not taken according to bodily figure; nevertheless, because the body of man alone among the bodies of earthly animals is not prone, prostrate toward the belly, but is such that it is more apt for contemplating heaven, this can rightly seem to have been made more to the image and likeness of God than the other bodies of animals, as Augustine says in the book Eighty-Three Questions, q. 51. Yet this is not to be understood as though the image of God were in the body of man, but because the very figure of the human body represents the image of God in the soul by way of vestige."

It follows: b) that the representation of God in man, even by way of image, is very imperfect, since, because God is above every genus and above every species, nothing can agree with him according to likeness of species; or, every representation of God in a creature is analogical, not univocal. Hence St. Thomas, q. 93, a. 1, reply to objection 3, says: "Since one is undivided being, species is called undiffering in the way in which it is one. But something is called one not only in number, or species, or genus, but also according to analogy or a certain proportion; and thus there is unity or agreement of the creature with God."

It follows: c) that the perfect image of God is not, nor can be, except one. "The Firstborn," says the same holy Doctor in the place just cited, reply to objection 2, "of every creature is the perfect image of God, perfectly fulfilling that of which he is the image. And therefore he is called image, and never to the image. But man, both on account of likeness, is called image, and on account of the imperfection of likeness, is called to the image. And because the perfect likeness of God cannot exist except by identity of nature, the image of God is in his Firstborn Son, as the image of a king is in a son connatural to himself; but in man as in an alien nature, as the image of a king is in a silver coin, as is clear through Augustine in the book On the Ten Strings, chapter 8, around the middle."

It follows: d) that although this representation by way of image is much more perfect than representation by way of vestige, nevertheless, with respect to knowledge of the Trinity of Persons in God, what we have said concerning the latter must also be said concerning the former. For representation of the Trinity is had both through the attributes which, as we have said, are appropriated to the Persons, and especially in man through those attributes and through those operations through which the processions of the Persons have place in God. But we would not know that those attributes are appropriated to the divine Persons, or that the operations which belong to man insofar as he is endowed with reason are an image of the Trinity, unless we were first taught by revelation that there is a Trinity of Persons in God. Thus, for example, from intellection and love, which we experience in ourselves, we would gather at most that there is intellection and love in God; but without revelation we could never know that Word and Love in God are two subsistences. Hence when St. Thomas had objected to himself, q. 93, a. 5: "Therefore if in man there is the image of God according to the Trinity of Persons, since man can know himself through natural reason, it would follow that through natural knowledge man could know the Trinity of divine Persons; which is false, as was shown above (q. 32, a. 1)," he replies: "That argument would proceed if the image of God in man perfectly represented God. But, as Augustine says, book 15 On the Trinity, chapter 6, toward the end, there is the greatest difference between the trinity which is in us and the divine Trinity. And therefore, as he says in the same place, we see rather than believe the trinity which is in us; but that God is Trinity we believe rather than see."

Wherefore those things which we have partly said, and partly are going to say, concerning the image of the Trinity in man plainly agree with canon 1 in chapter IV of the constitution Dei Filius of the Vatican Council: "If anyone shall say that in divine revelation no mysteries truly and properly so called are contained, but that all the dogmas of faith can be understood and demonstrated by reason duly cultivated from natural principles, let him be anathema."

Section II. Whether And How In Creatures Lacking Intelligence There Is A Vestige Of God One And Triune.

89. PROP. IX. In creaturis omnibus intelligentia et ratione destitutis invenitur Dei 1. unius-2. et trini repræsentatio per modum vestigii. Patet ex superius dictis hujusmodi creaturas non posse Deum repræsentare per modum imaginis : ac proinde, si probetur aliquam eas præseferre similitudinem cum Deo, eo ipso constabit Deum in ipsis repræsentari per modum vestigii. Unde Prob. I. 1ma pars. "Quidquid, " inquit D. Th. 1. p. q. 4. a. 2. c. , "perfectionis est in effectu, oportet inveniri in causa effectiva vel secundum eamdem rationem, si sit agens univocum, ut homo generat hominem ; vel eminentiori modo, si sit agens æquivocum ; " atqui Deus est causa efficiens omnium creaturarum,

90 De Deo Creatore. ut probavimus ; ergo. Idem fere argumentum aliter proponi potest ex eodem S. Doctore, c. g. 1. 1. c. 40. : " quod per participationem dicitur aliquale non dicitur tale, nisi in quantum habet quamdam similitudinem ejus, quod per essentiam dicitur ;" atqui Deus dicitur ens per essentiam, et creaturæ omnes entia per participationem ; ergo. Unde creaturæ omnes repræsentant Deum summum et primum ens. Prob. II. Creaturæ omnes debent assimilari ideis quas de iisdem ab æterno habuit Deus, qui est earum causa exemplaris ; sed, si hoc, assimilantur ipsi Deo, uti patet ex dictis de natura divinarum idearum ; ergo. Unde creaturæ repræsentant Deum summum et primum verum. "Res naturales, " inquit D. Th. 1. p. q. 16. a. 1., "dicuntur esse veræ, secundum quod assequuntur similitudinem specierum, quæ sunt in mente divina."-Et q. 17. a. 6.: "Si loquamur de veritate, secundum quod est in rebus ; sic omnes sunt veræ una prima veritate, cui unumquodque assimilatur secundum suam entitatem. Et sic licet plures sint essentiæ vel formæ rerum, tamen una est veritas divini intellectus, secundum quam omnes res denominantur veræ." Prob. III. "Omne ens," inquit D. Th. 1. p. q. 5. a. 3. , "in quantum est ens, est in actu, et quodammodo perfectum ; quia omnis actus perfectio quædam est ; perfectum vero habet rationem appetibilis, et boni, ut ex dictis patet art. 1 hujus quæst .; unde sequitur, omne ens, in quantum hujusmodi, bonum esse ; " atqui creaturæ omnes assimilantur Deo secundum esse, quod ab eo participant ; ergo. Unde creaturæ omnes repræsentant Deum summum et

Disp. I. De Mundi Origine. 91 primum bonum . Quod D. Th. 1. p. q. 6. a. 4. c. insuper explicat etiam de quadam bonitate extrinseca. "Unumquodque dicitur bonum bonitate divina, sicut primo principio exemplari, effectivo, et finali totius bonitatis. Nihilominus tamen unumquodque dicitur bonum similitudine divinæ bonitatis sibi inhærente, quæ est formaliter sua bonitas, denominans ipsum. Et sic est bonitas una omnium, et etiam multæ bonitates." Prob. IV. Si creaturas omnes simul consideremus , videmus in earum multiplicitate, varietate et ordine relucere varias perfectiones divinas, quæ sunt unus Deus ; ergo. Hinc D. Th. 1. p. q. 47. a. 1. c. ait : "Unde dicendum est quod distinctio rerum et multitudo est ex intentione primi agentis, quod est Deus. Produxit enim res in esse propter suam bonitatem communicandam creaturis , et per eas repræsentandam ; et quia per unam creaturam sufficienter repræsentari non potest, produxit multas creaturas, et diversas ; ut quod deest uni ad repræsentandam divinam bonitatem, suppleatur ex alia. Nam bonitas, quæ in Deo est simpliciter et uniformiter, in creaturis est multipliciter et divisim ; unde perfectius participat divinam bonitatem, et repræsentat eam totum universum, quam alia quæcumque creatura. "- Et q. 47. a. 3. ad 1.: "Propter quod Aristoteles in Metaph ., text. 52, ex unitate ordinis in rebus existentis concludit unitatem Dei gubernantis ; et Plato, in Timeo, aliq. a princ., ex unitate exemplaris probat unitatem mundi, quasi exemplati." Vid. etiam c. g. l. 1. c. 42. arg. 6.

92 De Deo Creatore. Prob. 2da pars . In omnibus creaturis est aliquid unum, quod simul dici potest trinum ; et quod trinum est debet per appropriationis legem in divinas Personas reduci tamquam in causam. Ergo. Decl . et prob. antec. ex D. Th. 1. p. q. 45. a. 7.: "In qualibet creatura inveniuntur aliqua quæ necesse est reducere in divinas Personas sicut in causam. Quælibet enim creatura subsistit in suo esse, et habet formam, per quam determinatur ad speciem, et habet ordinem ad aliquid aliud. Secundum igitur quod est quædam substantia creata, repræsentat causam et principium ; et sic demonstrat Personam Patris, qui est principium non de principio. Secundum autem quod habet quamdam formam et speciem, repræsentat Verbum, secundum quod forma artificiati est ex conceptione artificis. Secundum autem quod habet ordinem, repræsentat Spiritum

Sanctum, in quantum est amor ; quia ordo effectus ad aliquid alterum est ex voluntate creantis. Et ideo dicit Augustinus, in 6 lib. de Trin., cap. 10, circa fin., quod vestigium Trinitatis invenitur in unaquaque creatura, secundum quod unum aliquid est ; et secundum quod aliqua specie formatur ; et secundum quod quemdam ordinem tenet. Et ad hæc etiam reducuntur illa tria, numerus , pondus, et mensura, quæ ponuntur Sap. 11. Nam mensura refertur ad substantiam rei limitatam suis principiis , numerus ad speciem, pondus ad ordiEt ad hæc tria reducuntur alia tria quæ ponit nem . Augustinus, in lib. de Natura boni, cap. 3 : Modus , species et ordo ; et ea quæ ponit in lib. 83 QQ. quæst . 18, in princ. , quo constat, quo discernitur, quo congruit. Constat enim aliquid per suam substantiam, discernitur

Disp. I.- De Mundi Origine. 93 per formam, congruit per ordinem. Et in idem de facili reduci possunt quæcumque sic dicuntur." Vid. S. Augustinum 1. 6. de Trinit. cap. ult.-toto l. 11. et lib. 14. cap. 8. 89. Proposition IX. In all creatures destitute of intelligence and reason there is found a representation by way of vestige of God, 1. one, 2. and triune.

It is clear from what was said above that creatures of this kind cannot represent God by way of image; and consequently, if it is proved that they display some likeness with God, by that very fact it will be established that God is represented in them by way of vestige. Hence:

First proof, first part. "Whatever of perfection," says St. Thomas, Summa Theologiae I, q. 4, a. 2, corpus, "is in the effect, must be found in the effective cause, either according to the same notion, if it is a univocal agent, as man generates man; or in a more eminent mode, if it is an equivocal agent." But God is the efficient cause of all creatures, as we have proved; therefore. Almost the same argument can be proposed otherwise from the same holy Doctor, Contra Gentiles I, chapter 40: "What is called such by participation is not called such except insofar as it has some likeness of that which is called such by essence." But God is called being by essence, and all creatures beings by participation; therefore. Hence all creatures represent God as the highest and first being.

Second proof. All creatures must be assimilated to the ideas which God, who is their exemplar cause, had concerning them from eternity; but if this is so, they are assimilated to God himself, as is clear from what has been said concerning the nature of the divine ideas; therefore. Hence creatures represent God as the highest and first true. "Natural things," says St. Thomas, Summa Theologiae I, q. 16, a. 1, "are said to be true according as they attain the likeness of the species which are in the divine mind." And q. 17, a. 6: "If we speak of truth according as it is in things, then all are true by one first truth, to which each thing is assimilated according to its own entity. And thus, although there are several essences or forms of things, nevertheless there is one truth of the divine intellect, according to which all things are denominated true."

Third proof. "Every being," says St. Thomas, Summa Theologiae I, q. 5, a. 3, "insofar as it is being, is in act and in some way perfect, because every act is a certain perfection; but the perfect has the notion of the appetible and of the good, as is clear from what was said in article 1 of this question; hence it follows that every being, insofar as it is such, is good." But all creatures are assimilated to God according to being, which they participate from him; therefore. Hence all creatures represent God as the highest and first good. St. Thomas, Summa Theologiae I, q. 6, a. 4, corpus, further explains this also concerning a certain extrinsic goodness: "Each thing is called good by divine goodness as by the first exemplary, effective, and final principle of all goodness. Nevertheless each thing is called good by a likeness of divine goodness inhering in it, which is formally its own goodness, denominating it. And thus there is one goodness of all things, and also many goodnesses."

Fourth proof. If we consider all creatures together, we see in their multiplicity, variety, and order various divine perfections shining forth, which are one God; therefore. Hence St. Thomas, Summa Theologiae I, q. 47, a. 1, corpus, says: "Hence it must be said that the distinction and multitude of things is from the intention of the first agent, which is God. For he produced things into being for the sake of communicating his goodness to creatures, and representing it through them; and because it cannot be sufficiently represented through one creature, he produced many and diverse creatures, so that what is lacking to one for representing the divine goodness might be supplied from another. For the goodness which is in God simply and uniformly is in creatures manifoldly and dividedly; hence the whole universe participates in and represents divine

goodness more perfectly than any other creature whatever." And q. 47, a. 3, reply to objection 1: "On account of this Aristotle, in the Metaphysics, text 52, from the unity of order existing in things concludes the unity of God governing; and Plato, in the Timaeus, somewhat from the beginning, from the unity of the exemplar proves the unity of the world, as of the thing exemplated." See also Contra Gentiles I, chapter 42, argument 6.

Proof of the second part. In all creatures there is something one which at the same time can be called threefold; and what is threefold must, by the law of appropriation, be reduced into the divine Persons as into a cause. Therefore. The antecedent is explained and proved from St. Thomas, Summa Theologiae I, q. 45, a. 7: "In any creature there are found certain things which it is necessary to reduce into the divine Persons as into a cause. For any creature subsists in its own being, and has a form by which it is determined to a species, and has an order to something else. Therefore, according as it is a certain created substance, it represents cause and principle; and thus it manifests the Person of the Father, who is principle not from a principle. But according as it has a certain form and species, it represents the Word, according as the form of the thing made by art is from the conception of the artisan. But according as it has order, it represents the Holy Spirit, insofar as he is Love; because the order of the effect to something else is from the will of the creator. And therefore Augustine says, in book 6 On the Trinity, chapter 10, around the end, that the vestige of the Trinity is found in each creature, according as it is some one thing, and according as it is formed by some species, and according as it holds a certain order. And to these are also reduced those three: number, weight, and measure, which are posited in Wisdom 11. For measure is referred to the substance of the thing limited by its principles, number to species, weight to order. And to these three are reduced the other three which Augustine posits in the book On the Nature of the Good, chapter 3: mode, species, and order; and those which he posits in the book Eighty-Three Questions, q. 18, at the beginning: that by which it is established, that by which it is discerned, that by which it agrees. For something is established by its substance, discerned by its form, and agrees by its order. And to the same can easily be reduced whatever things are so called." See St. Augustine, book 6 On the Trinity, final chapter; the whole of book 11 and book 14, chapter 8.

Section III. Whether And How In Man There Is The Image Of God One And Triune.

90. PROP. X. Est in homine repræsentatio per modum imaginis Dei 1. unius-2. et Trini. Prob. 1a pars. I. Ex Scriptura. Gen. 1. 27.: " Creavit Deus hominem ad imaginem suam : ad imaginem Dei creavit illum : masculum et feminam creavit eos. "-Sap. 2. 23.: "Deus creavit hominem inexterminabilem, et ad imaginem similitudinis suæ fecit illum. " Eccli. 17. 1.: "Deus creavit de terra hominem, et secundum imaginem suam fecit illum."- 1 Cor. 11. 7.: "Vir quidem non debet velare caput suum : quoniam imago et gloria Dei est." Vid. h. textum 1. p. q. 93. a. 4. ad 1., et lect. 2. in istud caput. Prob. II. Ex dictis tum de idearum natura, tum de Dei repræsentatione in creaturis per modum imaginis, tria ad hanc requiruntur et sufficiunt : ut ex vi productionis sit similis alteri-ut sit similis secundum gradum naturæ intellectualis-ut sit ex alio expressa, seu producta ad similitudinem alterius. Atqui primum et tertium constant ex argumentis adductis in thesi præcedente ; secundum vero ex ipsa hominis natura. Ergo . Prob. 2da pars. I. Gen. 1. 26. legitur : "Faciamus hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem

94 De Deo Creatore. nostram." Et S. Aug. 1. 12. de Trinit. cap. 6. ait ; "Dixit Deus, Faciamus hominem ad imaginem nostram. Paulo post autem dictum est, et fecit Deus hominem ad imaginem Dei. Nostram certe, quia pluralis est numerus , non recte diceretur, si homo ad unius Personæ imaginem fieret sive Patris, sive Filii, sive Spiritus Sancti. Sed quia fiebat ad imaginem Trinitatis, propterea dictum est, ad imaginem nostram. Rursus autem, ne in Trinitate credendos arbitraremur tres deos, cum sit eadem Trinitas unus Deus ; et fecit, inquit, Deus hominem ad imaginem Dei, pro eo ac si diceret ad imaginem suam. "-Ibidem autem refutat S. Doctor errorem eorum, qui dicebant hominem factum ad imaginem solius Filii. Cap. seq etiam refutat eos qui asserebant imaginem Trinitatis non esse in uno homine, sed tribus, nempe viro, uxore, et filio. Reliqua SS.

PP. testimonia videri possunt apud Petavium 1. c. in § præc. Prob. II. Probavimus esse in homine Dei secundum essentiam repræsentatio per modum imaginis ; ergo debet etiam homo repræsentare per modum imaginis Deum secundum Trinitatem Personarum ; tum quia Personæ divinæ sunt idem cum divina essentia, tum quia distinctio Personarum in Deo non est nisi secundum relationes originis, et modus originis uniuscujusque, est secundum convenientiam suæ naturæ, ut audivimus a D. Thoma. Prob. III. In divinis est Pater generans Verbum per intellectum, Pater et Filius spirantes Spiritum Sanctum per voluntatem ; Pater autem, Verbum, et Spiritus Sanctus sunt unum natura... Atqui in homine, prout ratione est præditus, datur processio Verbi

Disp. I. De Mundi Origine. 95 per intellectum ; siquidem inquit S. Aug. de Trin. l. 11. c. 7. n. 10. "cogitamus enim omne quod dicimus, etiam illo interiore verbo, quod ad nullius gentis pertinet linguam. " Ergo-"Cum increata Trinitas, " ait D. Th. 1. p. q. 93. a. 6. c. "distinguatur secundum processionem Verbi a dicente, et amoris ab utroque, ut supra habitum est, qu. 45, art. 7, in creatura rationali, in qua invenitur processio verbi secundum intellectum, et processio amoris secundum voluntatem , potest dici imago Trinitatis increatæ per quamdam repræsentationem speciei."-et 1. p. q. 37. a. 1.: "Sicut ex hoc quod aliquis rem aliquam intelligit provenit quædam intellectualis conceptio rei intellectæ in intelligente, quæ dicitur verbum ; ita ex hoc quod aliquis rem aliquam amat, provenit quædam impressio (ut ita loquar) rei amatæ in affectu amantis, secundum quam amatum dicitur esse in amante, sicut et intellectum in intelligente ; ita quod cum aliquis seipsum intelligit et amat, est in se ipso, non solum per identitatem rei, sed etiam ut intellectum in intelligente, et amatum in amante." Quod jam expresserat S. Aug. de Trin. l. 9. c. 11. n. 18., dicens : "Est quædam imago Trinitatis ipsa mens et notitia ejus, quod est proles ejus ac de se ipsa verbum ejus, et amor tertius : et hæc tria unum sunt atque una substantia. " Quod argumentum confirmans et explicans D. Thomas docet 1. quod licet imago Trinitatis sit in anima nostra secundum potentias ; distinctior tamen est, cum actu cogitamus et amamus. "Ad rationem," inquit q. 93. a. 7., "imaginis pertinet aliqualis repræsentatio speciei. Si ergo imago Trinitatis divinæ

96 De Deo Creatore. debet accipi in anima, oportet quod secundum illud principaliter attendatur quod maxime accedit (prout possibile est) ad repræsentandum speciem divinarum Personarum. Divinæ autem Personæ distinguuntur secundum processionem verbi a dicente, et amoris connectentis utrumque . Verbum autem in anima nostra sine actuali cognitione esse non potest, ut Augustinus dicit, 14 de Trin., cap. 7, a med. Et ideo primo et principaliter attenditur imago Trinitatis in mente secundum actus, prout scilicet ex notitia quam habemus, cogitando, interius verbum formamus, et ex hoc in amorem prorumpimus. Sed quia principia actuum sunt habitus et potentiæ, unumquodque autem virtualiter est in suo principio ; secundario et quasi ex consequenti imago Trinitatis potest attendi in anima secundum potentias, et præcipue secundum habitus , prout in eis scilicet actus virtualiter existunt." Docet 2. quod etsi imago quædam Trinitatis sit in homine actu intelligente et volente quodcumque objectum ; adhuc tamen perfectior est imago quando cogitamus et amamus nos ipsos ; tunc enim homo " est in seipso non solum per identitatem rei, sed etiam ut intellectum in intelligente , et amatum in amante. " Docet 3. quod adhuc perfectior est imago Trinitatis in homine, quando homo seipsum intelligit et amat in ordine ad Deum. " Verbum Dei," inquit q. 93. a. 8. , "nascitur de Deo secundum notitiam sui ipsius, et amor procedit a Deo, secundum quod seipsum amat. Manifestum est autem quod diversitas objectorum diversificat speciem verbi et amoris. Non enim idem est specie in corde hominis verbum conceptum de lapide et equo ; nec idem specie amor.

Disp. I-. De Mundi Origine. 97 Attenditur igitur divina imago in homine secundum verbum conceptum de Dei notitia, et amorem exinde derivatum ; Et sic imago Dei attenditur in anima, secundum quod fertur vel nata est ferri in Deum." Docet 4. quod tripliciter considerari potest imago Trinitatis in homine prout ipsa Dei cognitio et amor spectari potest in triplici ordine , naturali, supernaturali in via, et supernaturali in patria, q. 93. a. 4. Cum cognitio Dei per fidem et amor charitatis perfectior sit cognitione et amore Dei naturali, perfectiorem etiam in nobis exprimunt imaginem Trinitatis. Sed cum fides locum cedit visioni, et Deus amatur charitate tali visioni respondente, sicut fit in cœlis , tunc perfectissima, quoad possibile nobis est, erit in nobis imago Dei. Unde de hoc statu dicitur, 1. Jo. 3. 2. " scimus quoniam cum apparuerit, similes ei erimus, quoniam videbimus eum sicuti est." 90. Proposition X. In man there is a representation by way

of image of God, 1. one, 2. and triune.

Proof of the first part. I. From Scripture. Genesis 1:27: "God created man to his image: to the image of God he created him; male and female he created them." Wisdom 2:23: "God created man inexterminable, and made him to the image of his likeness." Ecclesiasticus 17:1: "God created man from the earth, and made him according to his image." 1 Corinthians 11:7: "A man indeed ought not to veil his head, because he is the image and glory of God." See this text in Summa Theologiae I, q. 93, a. 4, reply to objection 1, and lecture 2 on that chapter.

Proof II. From what has been said both concerning the nature of ideas and concerning the representation of God in creatures by way of image, three things are required and suffice for this representation: that, by the force of production, it be like another; that it be like according to the grade of intellectual nature; and that it be expressed from another, or produced according to the likeness of another. But the first and third are established from the arguments adduced in the preceding thesis; the second from the very nature of man. Therefore.

Proof of the second part. I. Genesis 1:26 reads: "Let us make man to our image and likeness." And St. Augustine, book 12 On the Trinity, chapter 6, says: "God said, Let us make man to our image. But a little later it was said: and God made man to the image of God. Certainly our, because it is plural in number, would not rightly be said if man were made to the image of one Person, whether of the Father, or of the Son, or of the Holy Spirit. But because he was made to the image of the Trinity, therefore it was said, to our image. Again, however, lest we think that in the Trinity three gods must be believed, since the same Trinity is one God, it says, And God made man to the image of God, as if it said, to his own image." In the same place the holy Doctor refutes the error of those who said that man was made to the image of the Son alone. In the following chapter he also refutes those who asserted that the image of the Trinity is not in one man, but in three, namely husband, wife, and son. The remaining testimonies of the holy Fathers can be seen in Petavius in the cited place in the preceding section.

Proof II. We have proved that in man there is a representation of God according to essence by way of image; therefore man must also represent by way of image God according to the Trinity of Persons: both because the divine Persons are the same as the divine essence, and because the distinction of Persons in God is only according to relations of origin, and the mode of origin of each is according to the fittingness of its nature, as we have heard from St. Thomas.

Proof III. In divine things there is the Father generating the Word through intellect, the Father and the Son spirating the Holy Spirit through will; but the Father, the Word, and the Holy Spirit are one in nature. But in man, insofar as he is endowed with reason, there is a procession of word through intellect; for St. Augustine says, On the Trinity, book 11, chapter 7, n. 10: "we think everything that we say, even by that interior word which pertains to the language of no nation." Therefore. "Since the uncreated Trinity," says St. Thomas, Summa Theologiae I, q. 93, a. 6, corpus, "is distinguished according to the procession of the Word from the Speaker, and of Love from both, as was held above, q. 45, a. 7, in the rational creature, in which there is found procession of word according to intellect and procession of love according to will, there can be said to be an image of the uncreated Trinity by a certain representation of species." And in I, q. 37, a. 1: "Just as from the fact that someone understands some thing there comes forth a certain intellectual conception of the thing understood in the one understanding, which is called word, so from the fact that someone loves some thing there comes forth a certain impression, so to speak, of the thing loved in the affection of the lover, according to which the loved is said to be in the lover, just as the understood is in the one understanding; so that when someone understands and loves himself, he is in himself, not only by identity of thing, but also as understood in the one understanding and loved in the lover." St. Augustine had already expressed this, On the Trinity, book 9, chapter 11, n. 18, saying: "There is a certain image of the Trinity: the mind itself and its knowledge, which is its offspring and its word concerning itself, and love as the third; and these three are one and one substance."

Confirming and explaining this argument, St. Thomas teaches: 1. that although the image of the Trinity is in our soul according to powers, nevertheless it is more distinct when we actually think and love. "To the notion," he says, q. 93, a. 7, "of image belongs some representation of species. Therefore if the image of the divine Trinity ought to be taken in the soul, it must be considered principally

according to that which most closely approaches, so far as is possible, to representing the species of the divine Persons. But the divine Persons are distinguished according to the procession of word from the speaker, and of love connecting both. Now word cannot exist in our soul without actual cognition, as Augustine says, book 14 On the Trinity, chapter 7, from the middle. And therefore first and principally the image of the Trinity is considered in the mind according to acts, namely insofar as from the knowledge which we have, by thinking, we form an interior word, and from this we burst forth into love. But because the principles of acts are habits and powers, and each thing is virtually in its own principle, secondarily and as if consequently the image of the Trinity can be considered in the soul according to powers, and especially according to habits, insofar as acts exist virtually in them."

He teaches: 2. that although some image of the Trinity is in man when actually understanding and willing any object whatever, nevertheless the image is still more perfect when we think and love ourselves; for then man "is in himself not only by identity of thing, but also as understood in the one understanding and loved in the lover."

He teaches: 3. that the image of the Trinity in man is still more perfect when man understands and loves himself in order to God. "The Word of God," he says, q. 93, a. 8, "is born from God according to knowledge of himself, and Love proceeds from God according as he loves himself. But it is manifest that diversity of objects diversifies the species of word and love. For a word conceived in the heart of man concerning stone and horse is not the same in species; nor is the love the same in species. Therefore the divine image in man is considered according to the word conceived from the knowledge of God, and the love derived from it. And thus the image of God is considered in the soul according as it is borne, or is by nature able to be borne, into God."

He teaches: 4. that the image of the Trinity in man can be considered in three ways, according as the very knowledge and love of God can be regarded in a threefold order: natural, supernatural on the way, and supernatural in the homeland, q. 93, a. 4. Since knowledge of God through faith and the love of charity is more perfect than natural knowledge and love of God, they also express in us a more perfect image of the Trinity. But when faith gives place to vision, and God is loved by charity corresponding to such vision, as happens in heaven, then the image of God in us will be most perfect, so far as is possible for us. Hence of this state it is said, 1 John 3:2: "we know that when he shall appear, we shall be like him, because we shall see him as he is."

Article 8. Whether God is the Final Cause of the World

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Eighth Article. Whether God Is The Final Cause Of The World.
Section I. Certain Things Are Set Forth Beforehand.

91. Concilium Vaticanum in cap. 1. Const. Dei Filius (n. 27) declaravit Deum mundum creavisse "non ad augendam suam beatitudinem, nec ad acquirendam, sed ad manifestandam perfectionem suam per bona, quæ creaturis impertitur." Et can. 5. in

98 De Deo Creatore. h. cap. definivit : "Si quis mundum ad Dei gloriam conditum esse negaverit ; anathema sit." 91. The Vatican Council, in chapter 1 of the constitution Dei Filius (n. 27), declared that God created the world "not for increasing his own beatitude, nor for acquiring it, but for manifesting his perfection through the goods which he imparts to creatures." And in canon 5 of the same chapter it defined: "If anyone shall deny that the world was founded for the glory of God, let him be anathema."

92. Ad hujus catholicæ doctrinæ intelligentiam et defensionem, necesse est ut aliqua in antecessum statuamus. Ac imprimis probe distinguendum est inter quæstionem de fine creationis ex parte actus, seu volitionis divinæ, qua Deus mundum voluit; et aliam de fine creationis ex parte voliti, seu mundi. Si quæratur de fine creationis ex parte volitionis divinæ, sensus quæstionis est : quid est quod movit voluntatem divinam ad creandum mundum ?-Si autem idem finis

inspiciatur ex parte voliti, sensus quæstionis est : supposito quod Deus ex ratione etiam nobis ignota mundum voluerit, ad quem finem illum ordinavit, quem finem mundo præstituit ? 92. For the understanding and defense of this Catholic doctrine, it is necessary that we establish some things beforehand. And first, one must carefully distinguish between the question concerning the end of creation on the part of the act, or of the divine volition by which God willed the world, and the other question concerning the end of creation on the part of the thing willed, or of the world. If one asks about the end of creation on the part of the divine volition, the sense of the question is: what is it that moved the divine will to creating the world? But if the same end is considered on the part of the thing willed, the sense of the question is: supposing that God, for a reason even unknown to us, willed the world, to what end did he order it, what end did he assign to the world?

93. Distinguendum insuper est inter finem proprie dictum, seu causam finalem, et rationem volendi. Nam causa finalis tria, quoad rem præsentem, sibi necessario vindicat : ut realiter distinguatur a suo effectu- ut sit magis amabilis, quam ea quæ ad ipsam ordinantur ; siquidem finis diligitur propter se, media autem propter finem-ut consequenter ejus effectus ab eadem dependeat. At contra, ut aliquid sit solum ratio volendi et non causa, sufficit distinctio rationis inter ipsam et rationatum. Quæ distinctio inter causam et rationem communiter admittitur a Theologis quando tradunt unum attributum divinum esse rationem alterius, ex. gr. immutabilitatem æternitatis ; cum certum sit nullum attributum esse causam alterius attributi. Eamdem distinctionem sæpe docuit D. Thomas, sed præsertim 1. p. q. 19. a. 5. ■. ubi concludens ait : "vult ergo hoc esse propter hoc, sed non propter hoc vult hoc ."

Disp. I. De Mundi Origine. 99 93. Moreover, one must distinguish between an end properly so called, or a final cause, and a reason for willing. For a final cause, as to the present matter, necessarily claims three things for itself: that it be really distinguished from its effect; that it be more lovable than the things which are ordered to it, since the end is loved for its own sake, but means for the sake of the end; and that consequently its effect depend on it. On the contrary, for something to be only a reason for willing and not a cause, a distinction of reason between it and the thing reasoned is sufficient. This distinction between cause and reason is commonly admitted by theologians when they hand down that one divine attribute is the reason for another, for example immutability the reason for eternity; since it is certain that no attribute is the cause of another attribute. St. Thomas often taught the same distinction, but especially in Summa Theologiae I, q. 19, a. 5, corpus, where in concluding he says: "therefore he wills this to be for the sake of this, but he does not will this on account of this."

94. His positis, statuendum est imprimis : nulla est causa finalis creationis ex parte ipsius volitionis divinæ. Nam hujusmodi causa vel esset ipsa divina bonitas, vel aliqua alia bonitas extra Deum ; finis enim est bonum. Atqui neutrum dici potest.-Non 1um , nam divina volitio est idem cum divina bonitate ; ergo si divina bonitas esset causa divinæ volitionis esset causa sui ipsius ; esset magis amabilis se ipsa : penderet a se ipsa : quæ omnia sunt absurda-Non 2um, quia Deus penderet ab alio, sicut effectus a causa : quod iterum absurdissimum est. Has ipsas rationes jam indicaverat S. Augustinus (de Genes. cont. Manichæos l. 2.) eas simul sua auctoritate confirmans . " Si ergo," inquit, "isti dixerint, quid placuit Deo facere cœlum et terram ? respondendum est eis ut prius discant vim voluntatis humanæ qui voluntatem Dei nosse desiderant. "Causas voluntatis scire quærunt, cum voluntas Dei omnium quæ sunt , ipsa sit causa. Si enim habet causam voluntas Dei, est aliquid quod antecedat voluntatem Dei ; quod nefas est credere. Qui ergo dicit : quare fecit Deus cælum et terram, respondendum est ei, quia voluit. Voluntas enim Dei causa est cæli et terræ, et ideo major est voluntas Dei quam cælum et terra. Qui autem dicit, quare voluit facere cœlum et terram ; majus aliquid quærit, quam est voluntas Dei ; nihil autem majus inveniri potest." Et D. Thomas sæpe tradit eamdem veritatem ; ex. gr. l. mox c. ad 1. inquit ; "voluntas Dei rationabilis est, non quod aliquid sit Deo causa volendi, sed in quantum vult unum esse propter aliud." 94. These things having been

posited, it must first be established: there is no final cause of creation on the part of the divine volition itself. For a cause of this kind would be either divine goodness itself, or some other goodness outside God; for the end is a good. But neither can be said. Not the first, for the divine volition is the same as divine goodness; therefore if divine goodness were the cause of the divine volition, it would be the cause of itself, it would be more lovable than itself, and it would depend on itself, all of which are absurd. Not the second, because God would depend on another, as an effect on a cause, which again is most absurd. St. Augustine had already indicated these very reasons (On Genesis Against the Manichaeans, book 2), at the same time confirming them by his authority. "Therefore," he says, "if they say, What pleased God to make heaven and earth? they must be answered that they should first learn the force of human will, who desire to know the will of God. They seek to know the causes of the will, when the will of God is itself the cause of all things that are. For if the will of God has a cause, there is something that precedes the will of God, which it is impious to believe. Therefore to one who says: why did God make heaven and earth? one must answer: because he willed. For the will of God is the cause of heaven and earth, and therefore the will of God is greater than heaven and earth. But one who says, why did he will to make heaven and earth, seeks something greater than the will of God; but nothing greater can be found." And St. Thomas often hands down the same truth; for example, in the place just cited, reply to objection 1, he says: "the will of God is reasonable, not because something is for God the cause of willing, but insofar as he wills one thing to be for the sake of another."

95. Si vero agatur de ratione et non de causa divinæ voluntatis creandi mundum, dicendum est 1.

100 De Deo Creatore. quod ratio adæquata cur Deus voluerit mundum creare, seu cur ejus volitio terminetur ad mundum ut creandum, debet necessario complecti ipsam liberam determinationem divinæ voluntatis . Cum enim creatio in Deo sit libera, si præscindamus a libera determinatione voluntatis divinæ, habemus rationem cur Deus possit creare mundum, sed non cur creet. Unde S. Aug. dixit Deum creavisse mundum quia voluit.- Dicendum est 2. quod etiam divina bonitas est ratio, cur Deus voluerit creare mundum. Etenim velle creare est amare creaturas, quibus tribuitur existentia ; non possunt amari creaturæ nisi sint bonæ : non possunt esse bonæ, nisi per participationem divinæ bonitatis ; si ergo Deus non amaret suam bonitatem, nec amare posset creaturas, ac proinde nec illas creare. Unde S. Aug. l. 11. de Civ. Dei c. 24. ait : " sola bonitate et liberrima voluntate fecit Deus quidquid fecit". 95. But if the question concerns the reason and not the cause of the divine will to create the world, it must be said: 1. that the adequate reason why God willed to create the world, or why his volition is terminated at the world as to be created, must necessarily include the free determination itself of the divine will. For since creation in God is free, if we prescind from the free determination of the divine will, we have the reason why God can create the world, but not why he creates. Hence St. Augustine said that God created the world because he willed. 2. It must be said that divine goodness also is the reason why God willed to create the world. For to will to create is to love creatures, to which existence is attributed; creatures cannot be loved unless they are good; they cannot be good except by participation in divine goodness. Therefore if God did not love his own goodness, he also could not love creatures, and consequently could not create them. Hence St. Augustine, book 11 The City of God, chapter 24, says: "by goodness alone and most free will God made whatever he made."

96. Quoad 2am autem quæstionem, certum est Deum aliquem finem mundo præstituisse ; sapientis est enim aliquem finem operi suo præstituere. Doctrina etiam communis est divinam bonitatem esse ultimum creationis finem. Sed ut hoc bene intelligatur notandum est finem agentis dupliciter dici : uno modo, quem agens sibi suique gratia intendit ; alio modo, quem alteri proponit et præscribit ut ipse eum assequatur. Si ex. gr. dominus aliquid operetur in gratiam famuli, absque dubio agit propter finem , non tamen ob finem sui, quem ipse sibi intendit consequi, sed ob finem alterius. Juxta priorem modum divina bonitas nequit dici finis, ob quem Deus mundum creavit : juxta alterum vero

modum divina bonitas dici

Disp. I-. De Mundi Origine. 101 tur finis creationis, quatenus est finis ad cujus participationem vult creaturas perducere, quemque illis præscribit ut in eum tendant. Unde D. Th. 1. p. q. 44. a. 4. c. ait ; " primo agenti, qui est agens tantum, non convenit agere propter acquisitionem alicujus finis, sed intendit solum communicare suam perfectionem, quæ est ejus bonitas : et unaquæque creatura intendit consequi suam perfectionem, quæ est similitudo perfectionis, et bonitatis divinæ. Sic ergo divina bonitas erit finis rerum omnium."-Vid. Sylv. in h. l. 96. As to the second question, however, it is certain that God assigned some end to the world; for it belongs to one who is wise to assign some end to his work. The common doctrine also is that divine goodness is the ultimate end of creation. But in order that this be well understood, it must be noted that the end of an agent is said in two ways: in one way, the end which the agent intends for himself and for his own sake; in another way, the end which he proposes and prescribes to another so that the other may attain it. If, for example, a master does something for the sake of a servant, without doubt he acts for the sake of an end, yet not on account of an end of himself which he intends to attain for himself, but on account of the end of another. According to the former mode, divine goodness cannot be called the end on account of which God created the world; but according to the latter mode, divine goodness is called the end of creation, insofar as it is the end to whose participation he wills to lead creatures, and which he prescribes to them so that they may tend into it. Hence St. Thomas, Summa Theologiae I, q. 44, a. 4, corpus, says: "it does not belong to the first agent, who is agent only, to act for the acquisition of some end, but he intends only to communicate his perfection, which is his goodness; and each creature intends to attain its perfection, which is a likeness of divine perfection and goodness. Thus, therefore, divine goodness will be the end of all things." See Sylvius in this place.

97. Ex quibus patet apertissime Deum non creavisse mundum ad aliquod bonum sibi acquirendum "non ad augendam suam beatitudinem, nec ad acquirendam. " Hoc 1. sæpe docent scripturæ. Sic ex. gr. Ps. 15. 1. legitur : Dixi Domino : Deus meus es tu, quoniam bonorum meorum non eges "-Job 22. 3.: "quid prodest Deo, si justus fueris, aut quid ei confers, si immaculata fuerit vita tua ? "-Hoc 2. constanter tradunt Patres. Athenagoras (de Resurrect. mortuorum, n. 12.), scribit : " Deus nec frustra hominem fecit, est enim sapiens, nullum autem sapientiæ opus inutile ; nec ad proprium suum usum, nulla enim re indiget ; qui autem nulla omnino re indiget, sua ei opera nihil ad proprium usum attulerint. Sed nec ob aliquam rerum a se creatarum hominem condidit ... Quapropter si nec sine causa, nec frustra creatus est homo, nec ad ipsius Creatoris usum, ... nec ad alterius cujuspiam rei ab ipso conditæ ; liquet Deum," etc.-S. Jo. Chrys. (hom. 3. in Epist. Philem.): "Nulla re indigens Deus quæ in nostra sit potestate, nos condidit. Nullius autem ipsum eguisse monstravit in eo quod postea fecit. Nam si opus

1 102 De Deo Creatore. habuisset , olim condidisset . Quod si sine nobis erat ille, nos autem posterioribus temporibus facti sumus, non utique fecit nos indigens nostri. "-S. Hilarius (in Ps. 2um) : "Nullum a nobis nisi innocentiæ et religionis et fidei obsequium Deus postulat. Amari se a nobis exigit, non utique amoris in se nostri fructum aliquem seu causam ipse percipiens, sed amore ipso nobis potius, qui eum amabimus, profuturo ." S. Aug. (de Doct. Christ. l. 1. c. 31.) : “Diligit nos Deus , quomodo ergo diligit ? ut nobis utatur, an ut fruatur ? Sed si fruitur, eget bono nostro, quod nemo sanus dixerit, omne enim bonum nostrum vel ipse vel ab ipso est. Cui autem obscurum est non egere lucem rerum harum nitore quas ipsa illustraverit ; Dicit etiam apertissime propheta : Dixi Domino : Deus meus es tu quia bonorum meorum non eges. Non ergo fruitur nobis, sed utitur. Nam si neque fruitur neque utitur, non invenio quemadmodum diligat. Sed neque sic utitur ut nos : nam nos quibus utimur, ad id referimus, ut Dei bonitate fruamur : Deus vero ad suam bonitatem usum nostrum refert. Quia enim bonus est sumus, et in quantum sumus boni sumus ... Ille igitur usus qui dicitur Dei, quo nobis utitur non ad ejus sed ad nostram utilitatem refertur ; ad ejus autem tantummodo bonitatem." Unde D. Th. l. 2. c. g. c. 35. scribit : "Finis autem divinæ voluntatis non potest esse nisi ejus bonitas. Non autem agit propter hunc finem producendum in esse, sicut artifex agit propter constitutionem artificiati, cum bonitas ejus sit æterna et immutabilis, itaque ei nihil accrescere potest.

Nec etiam potest dici, quod propter ejus meliorationem

Disp. I. De Mundi Origine. 103 Deus agat, nec etiam agit propter hunc finem acquirendum sibi, sicut rex pugnat, ut acquirat civitatem. Ipse enim est sua bonitas. Restat igitur quod agat propter finem, in quantum effectum producit ad participationem finis ." 97. From these things it is most openly clear that God did not create the world in order to acquire some good for himself, "not for increasing his own beatitude, nor for acquiring it." This, 1. the Scriptures often teach. Thus, for example, Psalm 15:1 reads: "I said to the Lord: you are my God, since you do not need my goods." Job 22:3: "What does it profit God if you have been just, or what do you confer on him if your life has been immaculate?" This, 2. the Fathers constantly hand down. Athenagoras (On the Resurrection of the Dead, n. 12) writes: "God did not make man in vain, for he is wise, and no work of wisdom is useless; nor for his own use, for he needs nothing, and to one who needs absolutely nothing, his works would bring nothing for his own use. But neither did he found man on account of any of the things created by him ... Wherefore, if man was created neither without cause, nor in vain, nor for the use of the Creator himself ... nor for the use of any other thing founded by him, it is clear that God," etc. St. John Chrysostom (homily 3 on the Epistle to Philemon): "God, needing nothing which is in our power, founded us. But that he needed nothing he showed in that which he did later. For if he had needed the work, he would have founded it long ago. But if he existed without us, and we were made in later times, he certainly did not make us because he needed us." St. Hilary (on Psalm 2): "God asks from us no service except that of innocence and religion and faith. He demands that he be loved by us, not indeed as himself receiving some fruit or cause of our love in himself, but rather because the love itself will profit us, who shall love him." St. Augustine (On Christian Doctrine, book 1, chapter 31): "God loves us; how therefore does he love? So that he may use us, or so that he may enjoy us? But if he enjoys us, he needs our good, which no sane person would say; for all our good either is he himself or is from him. But to whom is it obscure that the light does not need the brightness of those things which it has itself illumined? The prophet also says most openly: I said to the Lord: you are my God, because you do not need my goods. Therefore he does not enjoy us, but uses us. For if he neither enjoys nor uses us, I do not find how he loves. But neither does he use us as we do; for we refer the things which we use to this, that we may enjoy the goodness of God; but God refers our use to his own goodness. For because he is good, we are, and insofar as we are, we are good ... Therefore that use which is called God's, by which he uses us, is referred not to his utility but to ours; but to his goodness alone." Hence St. Thomas, Contra Gentiles II, chapter 35, writes: "But the end of the divine will can be nothing except his goodness. Yet he does not act for this end as something to be produced into being, as an artisan acts for the constitution of the thing made, since his goodness is eternal and immutable, and so nothing can accrue to it. Nor can it be said that God acts for the sake of improving it, nor again does he act for the sake of acquiring this end for himself, as a king fights to acquire a city. For he himself is his goodness. It remains, therefore, that he acts for the sake of an end insofar as he produces an effect for participation in the end."

Section II. Whether And How The Ultimate End Of The World Is The Extrinsic Glory Of God. The Question Is Proposed.

98. Cum sit communis apud Theologos doctrina, mundum creatum esse propter gloriam Dei extrinsecam ; necesse est ostendere quomodo hæc doctrina cum iis, quæ paulo ante diximus, cohæreat, et quodnam fundamentum habeat. Nonnulla prænotamus ad declarandum statum quæstionis. 98. Since it is a common doctrine among theologians that the world was created for the sake of the extrinsic glory of God, it is necessary to show how this doctrine coheres with those things which we said a little before, and what foundation it has. We pre-note a few things for declaring the state of the question.

99. Quando finis divisiones traduntur, non semper iisdem vocibus idem sensus ab omnibus tribuitur ; ne ergo vocum æquivocatio perspicuitati noceat, ea de hac re attingemus, quæ ad præsentem quæstionem sunt necessaria . 99. When divisions of end are handed down, the same sense is not always attributed by all to the same words. Therefore, lest an equivocation of terms harm clarity, we shall touch on those things concerning this matter which are necessary for the present question.

100. Itaque finis communiter definitur : id cujus gratia aliquid fit. Illud cujus gratia idem sonat ac propter quod. Unde distinguere solent inter finem quia, et finem propter quem : ille proprie non est causa finalis, sed ratio, de qua superius locuti sumus ; hic vero est proprie causa finalis, præcognitus ab agente ut in se bonus, et bonitate sua movet agens ad operandum, ipsum alliciendo, ac velut invitando. Finis propter quem dividitur in finem qui (ab aliis dicitur cujus), et est ipsum bonum quod intenditur ab agente ; et finem cui. Et est persona vel subjectum, cui procuratur finis qui, tamquam bonum ejus. Dum ægro, ex. gr. , sanitatem procuras, sanitas est finis qui, æger est finis cui.-Uterque dividitur in finem ultimum et proximum : primus est, in quo ultimo sistit intentio agentis : alter, propter quem ponitur aliquod medium, sic tamen ut ad ulteriorem finem agens progrediatur. Si simul comparentur finis qui et finis cui, patet quod ille ad hunc ordinatur : bonum quod intenditur, intenditur alicui subjecto. Cæteras divisiones finis omittimus, quia ad præsentem quæstionem non sunt necessaria. 100. And so an end is commonly defined: that for the sake of which something is done. That for the sake of which sounds the same as on account of which. Hence they are accustomed to distinguish between the end because of which, and the end for the sake of which: the former is not properly a final cause, but the reason about which we spoke above; the latter is properly a final cause, foreknown by the agent as good in itself, and by its own goodness it moves the agent to operating, alluring him and, as it were, inviting him. The end for the sake of which is divided into the end which (called by others the end whose), and this is the good itself which is intended by the agent; and the end for whom, and this is the person or subject for whom the end which is procured as his good. When, for example, you procure health for a sick man, health is the end which, the sick man is the end for whom. Each is divided into ultimate and proximate end: the first is that in which the intention of the agent ultimately rests; the other is that for the sake of which some means is posited, yet in such a way that the agent proceeds toward a further end. If the end which and the end for whom are compared together, it is clear that the former is ordered to the latter: the good which is intended is intended for some subject. We omit the other divisions of end, because they are not necessary for the present question.

101. His positis, juxta doctrinam inter Theologos communem quoad rem, finis qui proximus creationis est communicatio divinæ bonitatis. Quæ communicatio fit eo ipso quod effectus producuntur a Deo , siquidem debent de ejus bonitate, ut vidimus, participare, eique aliquo pacto similes fieri. Et si consideremus omnia opera Dei ad extra, eadem communicatio fit speciali modo cognoscentibus et amantibus Deum, potissimum si cognitio sit intuitiva, et amor huic cognitioni respondeat; tunc enim vere Deus possidetur a creatura. Cum autem nostra felicitas consistat in cognitione et amore Dei; dici potest eamdem esse finem qui creationis.-Finis qui ultimus creationis est manifestatio divinæ bonitatis et perfectionis, seu divina gloria.-Item finis cui proximus seu secundarius creationis (quoad rem præsentem) est creatura intelligentia prædita, cui Deus vult felicitatem, ei communicando suam bonitatem.-Finis cui ultimus seu primarius est ipse Deus ; sibi enim Deus vult gloriam , ad quam ordinat ipsam nostram felicitatem. "Bonum

Disp. I. De Mundi Origine. 105 rerum creatarum, " inquit Lessius (de div. Perf. 1. 14. c. 3. n. 58.) "dupliciter posse considerari. Primo , Ut rem creatam perficit. Secundo , Ut ad Dei gloriam pertinet, et divinas perfectiones repræsentat : et hoc secundo modo consideratum longe pluris æstimandum, et a Deo semper intendi. Tertio, Sicut impossibile est esse aliquam rem creatam, quæ non dependeat ab influxu Dei ut primæ causæ efficientis : ita etiam impossibile est esse aliquam rem creatam quæ non dependeat ab intentione gloriæ Dei, et ad eam tamquam ultimum finem non

ordinetur." 101. These things having been posited, according to the doctrine common among theologians as to the matter, the proximate end which of creation is the communication of divine goodness. This communication occurs by the very fact that effects are produced by God, since, as we have seen, they must participate in his goodness and in some way become like him. And if we consider all the works of God outside himself, the same communication occurs in a special way for those knowing and loving God, especially if the cognition is intuitive and the love corresponds to this cognition; for then God is truly possessed by the creature. But since our happiness consists in the cognition and love of God, the same can be said to be the end which of creation. The ultimate end which of creation is the manifestation of divine goodness and perfection, or divine glory. Likewise the proximate or secondary end for whom of creation (as to the present matter) is the creature endowed with intelligence, to whom God wills happiness by communicating his goodness to it. The ultimate or primary end for whom is God himself; for God wills glory for himself, to which he orders our very happiness. "The good of created things," says Lessius (On the Divine Perfections, book 14, chapter 3, n. 58), "can be considered in two ways. First, as it perfects the created thing. Second, as it pertains to the glory of God and represents the divine perfections; and considered in this second way, it is to be esteemed far more, and is always intended by God. Third, just as it is impossible that there be some created thing which does not depend on the influx of God as first efficient cause, so it is also impossible that there be some created thing which does not depend on the intention of God's glory and is not ordered to it as ultimate end."

102. Contra hanc communem Theologorum doctrinam quæ nunc catholica est, insurrexerunt plures ex Reformatis ; Moshemius (Elem. theol. dog. p. 1. sect. 2. c. 1.) , Wegscheider (Inst. theol. § 96.), Kant (In critica rationis practicæ), etc.-Inter ipsos Catholicos, Cartesius (Medit. 4.) irridet doctrinam eorum, qui statuunt Deum mundum condidisse ad nominis sui gloriam-Hermes (In introduct. Phil. q. 2. § 71.), etc. Hi omnes assignant felicitatem hominum vel tamquam finem unicum, vel primarium creationis universi ; ac proinde vel penitus excludunt divinam gloriam, vel eam hominum felicitati subordinant. 102. Against this common doctrine of theologians, which is now Catholic, several from the Reformed have risen up: Mosheim (Elements of Dogmatic Theology, part 1, section 2, chapter 1), Wegscheider (Institutions of Theology, § 96), Kant (In the Critique of Practical Reason), etc. Among Catholics themselves, Descartes (Meditation 4) ridicules the doctrine of those who establish that God founded the world for the glory of his name; Hermes (Introduction to Philosophy, q. 2, § 71), etc. All these assign the happiness of human beings either as the sole end, or as the primary end, of the universe's creation; and consequently they either entirely exclude divine glory, or subordinate it to human happiness.

103. Antequam doctrinam catholicam statuamus, adhuc notandum est cum Lessio (l. c. c. 1. n. 7.) 1. "gloriam dupliciter accipi. Primo, pro quavis excellentia interna vel externa, ratione cujus dignus est quis cognosci, laudari, æstimari, honorari, amari. Secundo, pro ipso cognosci, amari, laudari, esse in admiratione, veneratione, etc. Hoc enim proprie et formaliter gloria dicitur, quæ definiri solet clara cum laude notitia : notitia inquam, quæ habetur de excellentia alicujus. Itaque duplex est Dei gloria, interna et externa. Interna iterum duplex est, objectiva et formalis . Objectiva gloria Deo intrinseca est ipsa Divinitas, seu splendor et excellentia Divinitatis, et Personarum divinarum : ob hanc enim dignissimus est qui ab omnibus cognoscatur, ametur, laudetur, etc. Sic passim in Scripturis excellentia Divinitatis, et omnia hujus excellentiæ signa dicuntur gloria Dei. Formalis gloria Deo intrinseca est cognitio, amor et gaudium Dei de seipso : sive quod ipse a seipso infinite et adæquate cognoscatur, ametur et cum infinito gaudio ac suavitate gustetur ... Gloria extrinseca duplex est. Altera enim est objectiva, et consistit in excellentia et pulchritudine rerum creatarum ; sed maxime filiorum Dei, ut sunt omnes Beati. Sicut enim gloria Principis sæcularis dicitur consistere potissimum in splendore et multitudine aulicorum : ita externa gloria Dei objectiva consistit potissimum in splendore et multitudine aulicorum cælestium, secundario in aliis

rebus creatis. Altera est gloria formalis, quæ sita est in Dei visione, amore, gaudio, et actibus hinc sequentibus : nimirum quatenus ipse a Beatis cognoscitur, amatur, gustatur, laudatur et benedicitur in omnem æternitatem. In hac re completur tota gloria Dei externa, et ad illam tota rerum creatarum species et pulchritudo ordinatur." Notandum est 2. cum eodem Lessio (l. c. cap. 4. 1.), quod "cum natura ratione carens, non sit capax talium actuum (quibus Deo tribuitur gloria extrinseca), videndum qua ratione ad gloriam Dei ordinetur , illique serviat. Quod ut intelligatur, notandum est, Deum ita esse finem ultimum naturæ rationalis, ut

6 Disp. I. De Mundi Origine. 107 etiam sit ejus finis proximus ; cum non sit aliquid infra Deum ad cujus gloriam vel commodum ipsa possit ordinari. Unde solus Deus est finis immediatus ad cujus solius gloriam ipsa est condita. Verum naturæ irrationalis Deus ita est finis ultimus, ut ipsa etiam alium finem habeat ad quem proxime natura sua destinetur, nempe naturam humanam, ad cujus obsequium mundus iste corporeus cum omnibus rebus corporalibus quæ ipso continentur, conditus est. " Ibidem autem imprimis probat ex Scripturis et ex Patribus , creaturas inferiores factas esse immediate propter homines ; et deinde ostendit quomodo ex eis possit et debeat homo Deum glorificare . Notandum 3. quomodo finis qui proximus et secundarius apprime cohæreat cum fine qui ultimo. "Summa, " inquit idem Auctor (l. c. cap. 3. n. 62.) "ejus (Dei) gloria externa est ipsum a nobis perfecte cognosci, amari et gustari ... Summum bonum nostrum, et formalis beatitas est Deum videre, amare, gustare. Itaque in summa Dei gloria formaliter et intrinsece includitur summum bonum nostrum, ita ut sine illo concipi nequeat : et hoc ipso quod Deus illam gloriam intendit et quærit, intendit et quærit summum bonum et commodum nostrum. Unde non minus Deo gratias agere debemus quod quærat gloriam suam, quam quod quærat salutem nostram ; quia gloria ejus est salus nostra. Hoc in Hymno Angelico Ecclesia insinuat cum ait : Gratias agimus tibi propter magnam gloriam tuam : beneficia enim ipsius in nos, sunt gloria ejus." 103. Before we establish the Catholic doctrine, it must still be noted with Lessius (cited place, chapter 1, n. 7): 1. "that glory is taken in two ways. First, for any internal or external excellence, by reason of which someone is worthy to be known, praised, esteemed, honored, loved. Second, for the very being known, loved, praised, being in admiration, veneration, etc. For this is properly and formally called glory, which is customarily defined as clear knowledge with praise: knowledge, I say, which is had concerning someone's excellence. And so God's glory is twofold, internal and external. Internal glory is again twofold, objective and formal. Objective glory intrinsic to God is the Divinity itself, or the splendor and excellence of the Divinity and of the divine Persons; for on account of this he is most worthy to be known, loved, praised, etc., by all. Thus throughout the Scriptures the excellence of the Divinity, and all the signs of this excellence, are called the glory of God. Formal glory intrinsic to God is God's cognition, love, and joy concerning himself: namely, that he is known, loved, and tasted by himself infinitely and adequately, and with infinite joy and sweetness ... Extrinsic glory is twofold. One is objective, and consists in the excellence and beauty of created things, but especially of the children of God, as all the Blessed are. For just as the glory of a secular prince is said to consist especially in the splendor and multitude of courtiers, so the objective external glory of God consists especially in the splendor and multitude of heavenly courtiers, secondarily in other created things. The other is formal glory, which is situated in the vision, love, joy of God, and the acts following from these: namely, insofar as he is known, loved, tasted, praised, and blessed by the Blessed for all eternity. In this matter the whole external glory of God is completed, and to it the whole beauty and species of created things is ordered."

It must be noted: 2. with the same Lessius (cited place, chapter 4, n. 1), that "since nature lacking reason is not capable of such acts (by which extrinsic glory is attributed to God), it must be seen in what way it is ordered to the glory of God and serves it. For this to be understood, it must be noted that God is the ultimate end of rational nature in such a way that he is also its proximate end, since there is nothing below God to whose glory or advantage it can be ordered. Hence God alone is the immediate end, for whose glory alone it has been founded. But of irrational nature God is the ultimate end in such a way that it also has another end to which it is proximately destined by its nature, namely human nature, for whose service this corporeal world with all corporeal things which are contained in it has been founded." In the same place he first proves from the Scriptures and from the Fathers that inferior

creatures were made immediately for human beings; and then he shows how from them man can and ought to glorify God.

It must be noted: 3. how the proximate and secondary end which coheres especially well with the ultimate end which. "The sum," says the same author (cited place, chapter 3, n. 62), "of his (God's) external glory is that he be perfectly known, loved, and tasted by us ... Our highest good and formal beatitude is to see, love, and taste God. And so in the sum of God's glory our highest good is formally and intrinsically included, so that without it that glory cannot be conceived; and by the very fact that God intends and seeks that glory, he intends and seeks our highest good and advantage. Hence we ought to give thanks to God no less because he seeks his own glory than because he seeks our salvation; because his glory is our salvation. The Church intimates this in the Angelic Hymn when it says: We give thanks to you for your great glory; for his benefits toward us are his glory."

104. His rite constitutis

PROP. XI. Supremus creationis finis, cui etiam felicitas intelligentis creaturae est obnoxia, alius non est ab extrinseca Dei gloria.

Prob. I. ex Scriptura, Prov. 16. 4. dicitur: "Universa propter semetipsum operatus est Dominus; impium quoque ad diem malum." - Is. 43. 7.: "Omnem qui invocat nomen meum, in gloriam meam creavi eum, formavi eum, et feci eum." - Deut. 26. 19. sermo est de "cunctis gentibus, quas creavit in laudem, et nomen, et gloriam suam." Ps. 18. 1.: "Caeli enarrant gloriam Dei, et opera manuum ejus annuntiat firmamentum." - Is. 6. 3.: "Plena est omnis terra gloria ejus." - Rom. 1. 20.: "Invisibilia enim ipsius, a creatura mundi, per ea quae facta sunt, intellecta, conspiciuntur: sempiterna quoque ejus virtus, et divinitas: ita ut sint inexcusabiles. Quia cum cognovissent Deum, non sicut Deum glorificaverunt." - Apoc. 1. 8.: "Ego sum Alpha et Omega, principium et finis." Unde:

In recitatis testimoniis asseritur creaturas omnes factas esse ad gloriam Dei manifestandam - hominem creatum fuisse propter Deum - propter gloriam Dei: quae omnia ostendunt finem creationis. Atqui haec omnia intelligenda sunt de supremo creationis fine. Ergo.

Prob. min. gloria Dei designatur non modo ut finis, sed ut supremus creationis finis, si ei subordinatur

ipsa felicitas creaturarum intelligentium; atqui ita est; dicitur enim "impium quoque ad diem malum;" ergo. Si gloria Dei non esset supremus finis, subordinaretur, ut adversarii contendunt, felicitati intelligentis creaturae; atqui hoc dici nequit, siquidem, ut patebit ex argumento tertio loco afferendo, hoc esset contra rectum rerum ordinem; ergo si gloria Dei designatur in Scriptura ut creationis finis, designatur ut supremus finis.

Prob. II. ex Patribus. Athenagoras (De resurrectione mortuorum, n. 12.) "Manifestum est, Deum, si prima et maxime universalis ratio spectetur, propter seipsum et propter suam bonitatem et sapientiam ex omnibus operibus suis resplendentem, impulsum fuisse, ut hominem crearet." - Tertullianus (Apol. c. 17.) "De nihilo (mundum) expressit in ornamentum majestatis suae." - Theophilus Antiochenus (l. 1. ad Autol. 4.) "Deus omnia fecit, quae antea non extiterunt, ut ex operibus magnitudo ipsius cognosceretur et intelligeretur." - Lactantius (Lib. 7. instit. c. 6.) "Idcirco mundus factus est, ut nascamur; ideo nascimur, ut agnoscamus factorem mundi, ac nostri, Deum; ideo agnoscimus, ut colamus: ideo colimus, ut immortalitatem pro laborum mercede capiamus, quoniam maximis laboribus cultus Dei constat; ideo praemio immortalitatis afficimur, ut similes Angelis effecti, summo Patri ac Domino in perpetuum serviamus, et simus aeternum Dei regnum." - S. Hieronymus (In Eph. 1. 14.) "Non quod Deus laude alicujus indigeat, sed quod laus Dei laudatoribus prosit, et dum per singula opera majestatem ipsius magnitudinemque cognoscunt, ad laudandum eum miraculo

stuporis erumpant." - S. Augustinus (Lib. 3. de lib. arbitr. c. 11. n. 32.) "Naturas igitur omnes Deus fecit non solum in virtute et justitia mansuras, sed etiam peccaturas, non ut peccarent, sed ut essent ornaturae universum, sive peccare, sive non peccare voluissent." S. Chrysostomus (Hom. II. n. 2.) propugnat contra Manichaeos Deum fecisse mundum pulchrum et corruptibilem "per pulchritudinem in conditoris admirationem, per infirmitatem vero a colenda nos abducens creatura."

Prob. III. ex ratione. Deus ex infinita perfectione suae naturae non potest res nisi ordinatissimo amore prosequi; atqui non ita Deus res creando amaret, nisi omnia, etiam felicitatem nostram, ad seipsum ultimo dirigeret; ergo debet omnia ad seipsum ultimo ordinare. Cum autem, ex dictis, non possit omnia ad se ordinare, nisi quatenus

omnia dirigit ad gloriam suam extrinsecam (nihil aliud possunt creaturae Deo tribuere); sequitur omnia, etiam felicitatem nostram, ad hanc suam gloriam ordinasse.

Prob. min. Quodcumque, vel minimum bonum Dei, majus est quocumque creaturarum bono; atqui rectus ordo postulat ut bona inferiora praestantioribus subordinentur; ergo.

Prob. IV. ex ratione iterum. Finem ultimum creationis Deus absolute vult, ac proinde infallibiliter attingit: sed si finis ultimus esset hominis felicitas, Deus illum non semper attingeret, nisi velimus dicere neminem periisse, aut damnatorum poenas non esse aeternas; si vero est gloria Dei extrinseca, eam semper obtinet Deus, siquidem ipsa poena reprobis inflicta justitiam Dei manifestat. Pulchrum enim et

recto ordini conveniens est, ut qui injuriam Deo irrogaverunt, ei patiendo satisfaciant "experturi," inquit S. Aug. (De spir. et litt. c. 33.) "in suppliciis potestatem ejus, cujus in donis misericordiam contempserunt."

Quare Conc. Vat. cit. cap. dicit Deum mundum condidisse "ad manifestandam perfectionem suam per bona, quae creaturis impertitur:" maximum autem bonum nobis communicatum, est aeterna felicitas; haec ipsa ergo ordinatur ad gloriam Dei. Et can. cit. definiens finem creationis commemorat solum "Dei gloriam"; soli enim ultimo fini simpliciter competit ratio finis.

NOTA. Ex dictis facile est solvere difficultates, quae contra thesim afferi solent. Duae sunt praecipuae. Prima est: asserere Deum creavisse mundum ultimo propter gloriam suam, est ambitionis vitium ei tribuere, ac proinde ei injuriam irrogare. Resp. Quaerere gloriam et honorem non est per se malum; unde ipse homo potest aliquando eam quaerere. Ita, ex. gr., potest superior debitam reverentiam exigere non modo quia hoc postulat subditorum bonum, sed etiam quia ordini naturae et morali legi conveniens est ut honor praestetur ei, qui talem obtinet dignitatem a Deo collatam, cui reverentia et honor debetur. Potest tamen homo facile peccare dum suam gloriam quaerit, sive quia quaerit indebitam, sive quia unice quaerit, ex. gr., ob delectationem in ea sistendo. At in Deo hi aut similes defectus non sunt possibiles; et aliunde est omnino rerum ordini conforme ut omnia externa sua opera ad gloriam sui, qui infinite perfectionis est, referat. Unde tantum abest ut hoc pos-

sit ei vitio verti, ut si contra ageret, esset in eo vitiosum.

Altera difficultas est: Si Deus omnia creavisset propter gloriam suam, non amaret creaturas suas propter seipsas, seu amore benevolentiae, sed amore concupiscentiae: ita quidem demitur grato animi sensui, quem nos habere debemus erga Deum. - Resp. Hic confunduntur duae quaestiones valde inter se distinctae: 1ma, cur Deus diligit creaturas? - 2da, cur eas refert ad gloriam suam? - Ratio cur Deus diligit creaturas est quia diligens bonitatem suam, diligit quidquid de ea participat; in creaturis autem Deus non praesupponit participationem suae bonitatis, sed amando illas ponit in ipsis sui rationem amoris, bonitatem suam illis communicando, citra suam utilitatem: qui sic diligit, amore benevolentiae diligit. - Refert Deus omnes creaturas ultimo ad gloriam suam, non quia iis indiget, vel quia ei sunt quoquomodo utiles; sed quia hoc exigit rectus ordo et Dei sanctitas: hoc vero nullo pacto impedit quominus amor Dei erga nos sit vere amor benevolentiae. An quando amicum diligimus ob bonum ejus et non ob commodum nostrum, amor noster desinit esse benevolentiae eo quod amicum diligimus, uti fieri debet, in ordine ad Deum? Quare merito D. Th. c. g. l. 1. c. 93., scribit: "Finis ultimus, propter quem vult Deus omnia, nullo modo dependet ab his quae sunt ad finem, nec quantum ad esse, nec quantum ad perfectionem aliquam; unde non vult alicui suam bonitatem communicare, ad hoc ut sibi exinde aliquid accrescat, sed quia ipsum communicare est sibi conveniens sicut fonti bonitatis. Dare autem, non propter aliquod commo-

dum ex datione expectatum, sed propter ipsam bonitatem et convenientiam dationis; est actus liberalitatis ... Hanc autem ejus liberalitatem Scriptura ostendit dicens: Aperiente te manum tuam, omnia implebuntur bonitate (Ps. 103. 29.)" - Et Rogaccius (Unum necessarium, p. 1. c. 25.) ait: "Sane, ullane liberalior esse potest ac beneficentior voluntas, seu lucis erga hominem caecum, quam si illum spectatorem suae pulchritudinis cupiat; seu fontis erga siti confectum, quam si ad gustandos suos latices eum provocet?" 104. These things having been duly established:

PROP. XI. The supreme end of creation, to which even the happiness of the intelligent creature is subject, is no other than the extrinsic glory of God.

Proof I, from Scripture. In Proverbs 16:4 it is said: "The Lord has made all things for himself; the wicked also for the evil day." Isaiah 43:7: "Everyone who invokes my name, I have created him for my glory, I have formed him, and I have made him." In Deuteronomy 26:19 the discourse

concerns "all the nations, which he created for his praise, and name, and glory." Psalm 18:1: "The heavens declare the glory of God, and the firmament announces the works of his hands." Isaiah 6:3: "The whole earth is full of his glory." Romans 1:20: "For the invisible things of him, from the creation of the world, being understood through those things which have been made, are seen: his everlasting power also, and divinity: so that they are inexcusable. Because when they had known God, they did not glorify him as God." Apocalypse 1:8: "I am Alpha and Omega, the beginning and the end." Hence:

In the testimonies recited it is asserted that all creatures were made for manifesting the glory of God; that man was created on account of God; on account of the glory of God. All these things show the end of creation. But all these things must be understood concerning the supreme end of creation. Therefore.

The minor is proved. The glory of God is designated not only as the end, but as the supreme end of creation, if the happiness itself of intelligent creatures is subordinated to it. But so it is; for it is said, "the wicked also for the evil day." Therefore. If the glory of God were not the supreme end, it would be subordinated, as the adversaries contend, to the happiness of the intelligent creature. But this cannot be said, since, as will be clear from the argument to be brought forward in the third place, this would be against the right order of things. Therefore, if the glory of God is designated in Scripture as the end of creation, it is designated as the supreme end.

Proof II, from the Fathers. Athenagoras (On the Resurrection of the Dead, n. 12): "It is manifest that God, if the first and maximally universal reason is considered, was moved to create man on account of himself and on account of his goodness and wisdom shining forth from all his works." Tertullian (Apology, c. 17): "From nothing he brought forth (the world) for the ornament of his majesty." Theophilus of Antioch (To Autolycus, book 1, 4): "God made all things which had not existed before, so that from his works his greatness might be known and understood." Lactantius (Institutes, book 7, c. 6): "For this reason the world was made, that we might be born; for this reason we are born, that we might acknowledge the maker of the world, and our maker, God; for this reason we acknowledge him, that we might worship him; for this reason we worship him, that we might receive immortality as the reward for labors, since the worship of God consists in very great labors; for this reason we are affected with the reward of immortality, that, having been made like the Angels, we may serve forever the highest Father and Lord, and may be the eternal kingdom of God." St. Jerome (On Ephesians 1:14): "Not that God needs anyone's praise, but because the praise of God benefits those who praise, and while through individual works they know his majesty and greatness, they burst forth to praising him by the wonder of astonishment." St. Augustine (On Free Choice of the Will, book 3, c. 11, n. 32): "Therefore God made all natures not only those that would remain in virtue and justice, but also those that would sin; not so that they should sin, but so that they would adorn the universe, whether they had willed to sin or not to sin." St. Chrysostom (Homily II, n. 2) maintains against the Manichaeans that God made the world beautiful and corruptible, "by beauty [leading us] into admiration of the Creator, but by weakness drawing us away from worshiping the creature."

Proof III, from reason. God, from the infinite perfection of his nature, cannot pursue things except with a most ordered love. But God would not love things in this way by creating them unless he ultimately directed all things, even our happiness, to himself. Therefore he must ultimately order all things to himself. But since, from the things said, he cannot order all things to himself except insofar as he directs all things to his extrinsic glory (creatures can attribute nothing else to God), it follows that he has ordered all things, even our happiness, to this his glory.

The minor is proved. Whatever good of God, even the least, is greater than any good whatsoever of creatures. But right order demands that lower goods be subordinated to more excellent goods. Therefore.

Proof IV, from reason again. God wills the ultimate end of creation absolutely, and therefore infallibly attains it. But if the ultimate end were man's happiness, God would not always attain it, unless we wished to say that no one has perished, or that the punishments of the damned are not eternal. But if it is the extrinsic glory of God, God always obtains it, since the very punishment inflicted on the reprobate manifests the justice of God. For it is beautiful and suitable to right order that those who have inflicted injury on God should satisfy him by suffering, "being about to

experience," says St. Augustine (On the Spirit and the Letter, c. 33), "in punishments the power of him whose mercy in gifts they despised."

Wherefore the cited chapter of the Vatican Council says that God founded the world "for manifesting his perfection through the goods which he imparts to creatures." But the greatest good communicated to us is eternal happiness; therefore this very happiness is ordered to the glory of God. And the cited canon, when defining the end of creation, commemorates only "the glory of God"; for the ratio of end belongs simply to the ultimate end alone.

NOTE. From the things said, it is easy to solve the difficulties which are usually brought against the thesis. There are two principal ones. The first is: to assert that God created the world ultimately on account of his own glory is to attribute to him the vice of ambition, and therefore to inflict injury on him. I reply. To seek glory and honor is not evil in itself; hence man himself can sometimes seek it. Thus, for example, a superior can demand due reverence not only because the good of subjects demands this, but also because it is suitable to the order of nature and to the moral law that honor be rendered to him who obtains such dignity conferred by God, to whom reverence and honor are due. Yet a man can easily sin while he seeks his own glory, either because he seeks one not due, or because he seeks it alone, for example, by stopping in delight in it. But in God these or similar defects are not possible; and besides, it is entirely conformed to the order of things that he refer all his external works to the glory of himself, who is of infinite perfection. Hence so far is this from being able to be turned into a vice in him, that if he acted otherwise, it would be vicious in him.

The other difficulty is: If God had created all things on account of his own glory, he would not love his creatures on account of themselves, or by a love of benevolence, but by a love of concupiscence; and so indeed there is taken away the grateful feeling of mind which we ought to have toward God. I reply. Here two questions very distinct from each other are confused: first, why does God love creatures? second, why does he refer them to his own glory? The reason why God loves creatures is that, loving his own goodness, he loves whatever participates in it. But in creatures God does not presuppose a participation of his goodness; rather, by loving them he places in them the reason of his love, by communicating his goodness to them, apart from his own utility. He who loves thus loves with a love of benevolence. God refers all creatures ultimately to his own glory, not because he needs them, or because they are useful to him in any way whatever, but because right order and the holiness of God demand this. But this in no way prevents the love of God toward us from being truly a love of benevolence. When we love a friend on account of his good and not on account of our advantage, does our love cease to be one of benevolence because we love the friend, as ought to happen, in order to God? Wherefore St. Thomas rightly writes, Contra Gentiles, book 1, c. 93: "The ultimate end, for the sake of which God wills all things, in no way depends on those things which are for the end, neither as to being, nor as to any perfection; hence he does not will to communicate his goodness to someone in order that something might accrue to himself from it, but because communicating itself is suitable to him as to the fountain of goodness. But to give, not on account of some advantage expected from the giving, but on account of the very goodness and suitability of the giving, is an act of liberality ... Scripture shows this liberality of his when it says: When you open your hand, all things will be filled with goodness (Ps. 103:29)." And Rogaccius (The One Thing Necessary, part 1, c. 25) says: "Indeed, can there be any will more liberal and beneficent, either of light toward a blind man, than if it desires him as a spectator of its beauty; or of a fountain toward one exhausted by thirst, than if it summons him to taste its streams?"

Article 9. Whether God Freely Created the World

LatineEnglish

Utrum Deus libere mundum creaverit.

105. Haec quaestio tradi solet in philosophia; paucis ergo ea solum attingemus, quae ad rerum intelligentiam necessaria hic sunt. Mundum a Deo non libere, sed necessario creatum esse docuerunt non modo fatalistae omnes et athei, sed et pantheistae. Hi revera negant veram creationem, quod plene concordat cum eorum principiis; sed creationis nomine saepe abutentes, creationem quamdam suo modo agnoscunt, quam dicunt necessariam. Sic Spinoza, ex. gr., (Ethic. p. 2. prop. 48.) ait: "Liberum Dei decretum fictitium esse demonstramus." - Non defuerunt ultimis his temporibus philosophi, qui licet catholico nomine gloriarentur, errorem tamen de necessitate creationis, antiquas objectiones centies refutatas repetentes, docuerunt. Inter quos Cousin, dum errorem suum retractare affirmabat, sophismatum repetitione confirmabat. 105. This question is usually handed down in philosophy; therefore we shall touch briefly only on those things which are necessary here for the understanding of the matters. That the world was created by God not freely, but necessarily, was taught not only by all fatalists and atheists, but also by pantheists. These in reality deny true creation, which fully agrees with their principles; but often abusing the name of creation, they acknowledge in their own way a certain creation, which they say is necessary. Thus Spinoza, for example (Ethics, part 2, prop. 48), says: "We demonstrate that the free decree of God is fictitious." In these last times there have not been lacking philosophers who, although they gloried in the Catholic name, nevertheless taught the error concerning the necessity of creation, repeating ancient objections refuted a hundred times. Among these was Cousin, who, while he affirmed that he was retracting his error, confirmed it by the repetition of sophisms.

106. Doctrina catholica quoad hanc rem sufficienter tradita fuit ab Eugenio IV. in Decreto pro Jacobitis, approbante Concilio Florentino. Ibi dicitur: "Firmissime credit, profitetur et praedicat (Romana Ecclesia), unum verum Deum ... esse omnium ... Creatorem, qui quando voluit, bonitate sua universas tam spirituales quam corporales condidit creaturas." - Docetur etiam in Catechismo Romano, ubi legitur: Deus non ex materia aliqua mundum fabricatus est, sed ex nihilo creavit: idque nulla vi aut necessitate coactus, sed sua sponte et voluntate instituit. Denique clarissime definita fuit in Concilio Vaticano, cap. cit. (n. 27.), ubi dicitur Deus mundum creavisse liberrimo consilio. - Et can. 5. in idem cap.: "Si quis ... Deum dixerit non voluntate ab omni necessitate libera, sed tam necessario creasse, quam necessario amat seipsum ... anathema sit." 106. The Catholic doctrine concerning this matter was sufficiently handed down by Eugene IV in the Decree for the Jacobites, with the approval of the Council of Florence. There it is said: "The Roman Church most firmly believes, professes, and preaches that the one true God ... is the Creator of all things ... who, when he willed, by his goodness founded all creatures, both spiritual and corporeal." It is also taught in the Roman Catechism, where it is read: God did not fashion the world from some matter, but created it from nothing; and he established this, compelled by no force or necessity, but of his own accord and will. Finally, it was most clearly defined in the cited chapter of the Vatican Council (n. 27), where it is said that God created the world by a most free counsel. And canon 5 in the same chapter: "If anyone ... shall say that God created not by a will free from all necessity, but as necessarily as he necessarily loves himself ... let him be anathema."

107. Ad difficultates praecavendas in mentem revocandum est quod omnes divinae perfectiones sunt quid unum in Deo. Attamen quae secundum rem unum sunt, secundum rationem distinguuntur, quatenus diversae perfectiones diversum habent formalem conceptum: Sic, ex. gr., distinguimus divinam voluntatem a divina essentia. Haec autem distinctio quamvis non sit realis, non est tamen purum figmentum rationis nostrae, siquidem habet fundamentum in re; idque est ipsa divina perfectio, quae, cum infinita sit, debet cuicumque perfectioni aequivalere. Sub hac distinctione patet non valere argumentum a natura divina ad voluntatem respectu illorum, quae sunt a voluntate non ut natura est, sed ut voluntas. Sic dum natura Dei est et concipitur ut aliquid omnino

absolutum; voluntas dicit habitudinem ad aliquem terminum, quem amat. Duplex autem est terminus divinae voluntatis:

Deus ipse, seu divina bonitas, et quidquid est aliud a Deo. Seipsum Deus necessario vult, hoc enim postulat ipsa infinita Dei Bonitas; caetera vero libere vult. Nam, ut docet D. Th. 1. p. q. 19. a. 3. c.: "Alia autem a se Deus vult, in quantum ordinantur ad suam bonitatem ut in finem. Ea autem quae sunt ad finem, non ex necessitate volumus volentes finem, nisi sint talia sine quibus finis esse non potest; sicut volumus cibum, volentes conservationem vitae; et navem volentes transfretare. Non sic autem ex necessitate volumus ea sine quibus esse potest, sicut equum ad ambulandum quia sine hoc possumus ire; et eadem ratio est in aliis. Unde cum bonitas Dei sit perfecta, et esse possit sine aliis, cum nihil ei perfectionis ex aliis accrescat, sequitur quod alia a se eum velle non sit necessarium absolute." Cum tandem voluntas in Deo non sit per modum potentiae prodeuntis in actum, sed per modum actus qui terminatur ad aliquid; si quid Deus libere vult, ac proinde ita vult ut potuerit non velle, tota contingentia se habet ex parte termini, qui potest esse et non esse, non vero ex parte actus divini, qui idem semper manet sive terminetur ad creaturas, sive non. Haec innuisse sufficiat, cum vera notio divinae libertatis tradita fuerit anno elapso in tract. de Deo. Vid. si lubet cit. qs. 19. a. 3. et 10. 107. To forestall difficulties, it must be recalled to mind that all the divine perfections are one thing in God. Nevertheless, those things which are one according to reality are distinguished according to reason, insofar as diverse perfections have a diverse formal concept. Thus, for example, we distinguish the divine will from the divine essence. But this distinction, although it is not real, is nevertheless not a pure fiction of our reason, since it has a foundation in reality; and that foundation is the divine perfection itself, which, since it is infinite, must be equivalent to every perfection. Under this distinction it is clear that an argument from the divine nature to the will does not hold with respect to those things which are from the will not as it is nature, but as it is will. Thus, while the nature of God is and is conceived as something altogether absolute, will says a relation to some term which it loves. But the term of the divine will is twofold: God himself, or the divine goodness, and whatever is other than God. God necessarily wills himself, for the infinite Goodness of God itself demands this; but other things he freely wills. For, as St. Thomas teaches, Summa Theologiae I, q. 19, a. 3, corpus: "God wills things other than himself insofar as they are ordered to his goodness as to an end. But those things which are for the end we do not will from necessity while willing the end, unless they are such that without them the end cannot be; just as we will food, while willing the preservation of life; and a ship, while willing to cross the sea. But we do not in this way from necessity will those things without which the end can be, as a horse for walking, because without this we can go; and the same reasoning holds in other cases. Hence, since the goodness of God is perfect, and can be without other things, since nothing of perfection accrues to him from other things, it follows that for him to will things other than himself is not absolutely necessary." Finally, since will in God is not by way of a potency going forth into act, but by way of an act which is terminated at something; if God freely wills something, and therefore wills it in such a way that he could have not willed it, the whole contingency is on the part of the term, which can be and not be, but not on the part of the divine act, which always remains the same whether it is terminated at creatures or not. It suffices to have indicated these things, since the true notion of divine freedom was handed down last year in the treatise On God. See, if you please, the cited q. 19, a. 3 and 10.

108. His praenotatis, dicimus:

PROP. XII. Deus voluntate ab omni necessitate libera creavit mundum, qui proinde liberrimus Deo existimari debet.

Prob. I. ex Scriptura. Ps. 134. 6. dicitur: "Omnia quaecumque voluit, Deus fecit, in caelo, et in terra, in mari, et in omnibus abyssis." - Ps. 113. 3.: "Deus autem noster in caelo: omnia, quaecumque voluit, fecit." - Eph. 1. 11.: "In quo (Christo) etiam, et nos sorte vocati sumus praedestinati secundum propositum ejus, qui operatur omnia secundum consilium voluntatis suae." - Apoc. 4. 11.: "Dignus es, Domine Deus noster, accipere gloriam, et honorem, et virtutem: quia tu creasti omnia, et propter voluntatem tuam erant, et creata sunt."

Unde: Qui dicitur operari quaecumque vult, creare per voluntatem, operari omnia secundum consilium voluntatis suae; dicitur ita operari, ut habeat dominium actuum suorum. Atqui qui ita agit ut habeat suorum actuum dominium, libere

agit. Ergo.

Prob. II. ex Patribus. S. Irenaeus (L. 2. c. 1. n. 1.) ait: "Neque ab aliquo motus, sed sua sententia et libertate fecit omnia." - Et (L. 2. adv. haer. c. 30.): "Ipse a semetipso fecit libere et ex sua potestate, et disposuit et perfecit omnia, et est substantia omnium voluntas ejus." - S. Chrysostomus (In Gen. 1. 1. Hom. 2.): "Deus est qui omnia fecit et praeparat, et juxta voluntatem suam omnia apte disponit." - S. Aug. (L. 11. de civ. Dei c. 24.): "In eo vero, quod dicitur: vidit Deus, quia bonum est, satis significatur, Deum nulla necessitate, nulla sua cujusque utilitatis indigentia, sed sola bonitate fecisse, quod factum est, id est quia bonum." - Et (De Gen. ad litt. l. 6. c. 15.): "Manifestum est etiam, sic non factum esse hominem contra quam erat in illa prima conditione causarum; quia ibi erat etiam sic fieri necesse esse: hoc enim

non erat in conditione creaturae, sed in placito Creatoris, cujus voluntas rerum necessitas est."

Prob. III. ex ratione. Si Deus mundum necessario creavisset, haec necessitas repetenda esset vel ex parte mundi vel ex parte Dei; atqui neutrum dici potest. - Non 1um; quia tunc mundus esset necessarius; atqui ipsa experientia constat ejus contingentia - hinc limitatio, etc.; ergo. - Non 2um; quia quocumque modo explicetur hujusmodi necessitas in Deo, semper importat aliquam in eo indigentiam mundi, quo veluti perficeretur; atqui hoc est absurdum; ergo. "Si enim," inquit D. Th. c. g. l. 2. c. 31., "universitatem creaturarum vel quamcumque unam creaturam necesse est esse, oportet quod necessitatem istam habeat ex se vel ex alio. Ex se quidem eam habere non potest. Ostensum est enim supra c. 15 quod omne ens oportet esse a primo ente. Quod autem non habet esse a se, impossibile est quod necessitatem essendi a se habeat; quia quod necesse est esse, impossibile est non esse; et sic quod de se habet quod sit necesse esse, de se habet quod non possit esse non-ens, et per consequens quod non sit non-ens, et ita quod sit ens. Si autem haec necessitas creaturae est ab alio, oportet quod sit ab aliqua causa quae sit extrinseca: quia, quidquid accipiatur intrinsecum creaturae, habet esse ab alio. Causa autem extrinseca est vel efficiens vel finis. Ex efficiente vero sequitur quod effectum necesse sit esse, per hoc quod agentem necesse est agere; per actionem enim agentis effectus a causa efficiente dependet. Si igitur agentem non necesse sit agere ad productionem effectus, nec effectum necesse est esse abso-

lute. Deus autem non agit ex aliqua necessitate ad creaturarum productionem, ut supra c. 23 ostensum est. Non est igitur absolute necesse creaturam esse, necessitate dependente a causa efficiente. Similiter, nec necessitate dependente a causa finali. Ea enim quae sunt ad finem, necessitatem a fine non recipiunt, nisi secundum quod finis sine eis vel non potest esse, sicut conservatio vitae sine cibo, vel non ita bene esse, sicut iter sine equo. Finis autem divinae voluntatis, ex qua res in esse processerunt, non potest aliud esse quam sua bonitas, ut ostensum est l. 1. c. 75.; quae quidem a creaturis non dependet nec quantum ad esse, quum sit per se necesse esse, nec quantum ad bene esse, quum sit secundum se perfecta simpliciter; quae omnia supra c. 13 et 28 ostensa sunt. Non est igitur creaturam esse absolute necessarium." Vid. alias rationes l. 1. c. g. c. 81.

NOTA. Omnes objectiones, quae contra hanc thesim urgeri solent, petuntur vel ex falsa ratione libertatis divinae; vel, quod fere idem est, ex comparatione inter libertatem divinam et humanam; hujus enim defectus illi etiam tribuendos falso putant. Non oportet ergo eas hic singillatim referre et refutare: videri possunt in q. 3. de pot. art. 15. Cousinius ipse nullam difficultatem a D. Thoma non solutam proposuit, ut videre est apud Gatti, Instit. Apologetico Polemicae, Vol. 1. Disp. 1. cap. 3. 108. These things having been pre-noted, we say:

PROP. XII. God created the world by a will free from every necessity, and therefore the world must be considered most free to God.

Proof I, from Scripture. Psalm 134:6 says: "All things whatsoever God willed, he did, in heaven and on earth, in the sea, and in all the depths." Psalm 113:3: "But our God is in heaven: all things whatsoever he willed, he did." Ephesians 1:11: "In whom (Christ) we also have been called by lot, predestined according to his purpose, who works all things according to the counsel of his will." Apocalypse 4:11: "You are worthy, O Lord our God, to receive glory, and honor, and power: because you created all things, and on account of your will they were, and were created."

Hence: He who is said to operate whatever he wills, to create through will, to operate all things according to the counsel of his will, is said to operate in such a way that he has dominion over his acts. But he who acts in such a way that he has dominion over his acts acts freely.

Therefore.

Proof II, from the Fathers. St. Irenaeus (book 2, c. 1, n. 1) says: "Not moved by anyone, but by his own judgment and freedom, he made all things." And (book 2, Against Heresies, c. 30): "He himself from himself made all things freely and from his own power, and disposed and perfected all things, and his will is the substance of all things." St. Chrysostom (On Genesis 1:1, Homily 2): "God is he who made and prepares all things, and suitably disposes all things according to his will." St. Augustine (City of God, book 11, c. 24): "But in this, that it is said, God saw that it was good, it is sufficiently signified that God made what was made by no necessity, by no indigence of any utility of his own, but by goodness alone, that is, because it was good." And (On Genesis Literally, book 6, c. 15): "It is manifest also that man was not made in a way contrary to that which was in that first condition of causes; because there also it was necessary that he be made in this way: for this was not in the condition of the creature, but in the good pleasure of the Creator, whose will is the necessity of things."

Proof III, from reason. If God had created the world necessarily, this necessity would have to be derived either on the part of the world or on the part of God. But neither can be said. Not the first, because then the world would be necessary; but from experience itself its contingency is evident, hence limitation, etc.; therefore. Not the second, because in whatever way a necessity of this kind in God is explained, it always imports in him some need of the world, by which he would, as it were, be perfected; but this is absurd. Therefore. "For if," says St. Thomas, Contra Gentiles, book 2, c. 31, "the universality of creatures or any one creature whatever must necessarily be, it is necessary that it have this necessity from itself or from another. It cannot have it from itself. For it was shown above, c. 15, that every being must be from the first being. But what does not have being from itself cannot possibly have necessity of being from itself; because what must necessarily be, cannot not be; and so what has of itself that it must necessarily be has of itself that it cannot be non-being, and consequently that it is not non-being, and thus that it is being. But if this necessity of the creature is from another, it must be from some cause which is extrinsic, because whatever is taken as intrinsic to the creature has being from another. But an extrinsic cause is either efficient or final. From the efficient cause, however, it follows that the effect must necessarily be through the fact that the agent must necessarily act; for through the action of the agent the effect depends on the efficient cause. Therefore, if the agent need not necessarily act for the production of the effect, neither must the effect necessarily be absolutely. But God does not act from any necessity for the production of creatures, as was shown above, c. 23. Therefore it is not absolutely necessary that the creature be, by a necessity depending on the efficient cause. Similarly, neither by a necessity depending on the final cause. For those things which are for the end do not receive necessity from the end except insofar as without them the end either cannot be, as the preservation of life without food, or cannot be so well, as a journey without a horse. But the end of the divine will, from which things have proceeded into being, cannot be anything other than his goodness, as was shown, book 1, c. 75; and this goodness does not depend on creatures either as to being, since it is necessary being through itself, or as to well-being, since it is according to itself perfect simply; all these things were shown above, c. 13 and 28. Therefore it is not absolutely necessary that the creature be." See other reasons in book 1, Contra Gentiles, c. 81.

NOTE. All the objections which are usually urged against this thesis are sought either from a false account of divine freedom, or, what is almost the same thing, from a comparison between divine and human freedom; for they falsely think that the defects of the latter must also be attributed to the former. Therefore it is not necessary to report and refute them individually here. They can be seen in De potentia, q. 3, a. 15. Cousin himself proposed no difficulty not solved by St. Thomas, as may be seen in Gatti, Institutions Apologetico-Polemical, vol. 1, disputation 1, chapter 3.

Article 10. Whether the World is from Eternity

LatineEnglish

Utrum mundus sit ab aeterno.

109. Distinguenda hic est quaestio possibilitatis a quaestione facti. Si enim de possibilitate aeternae creationis agatur, Theologi et Philosophi in varias abeunt sententias, quas omnes ad quatuor revocat Valentia, tom. 1. disp. 3. q. 3. p. 2. Plures cum D. Thoma 1. p. q. 46. a. 2., censent saltem non posse evidenter probari ex sola ratione repugnantiam aeternae creationis. Sed quidquid sit de possibilitatis quaestione, quam nos philosophis relinquimus, hic solum agitur de quaestione facti. 109. Here the question of possibility must be distinguished from the question of fact. For if the matter concerns the possibility of eternal creation, theologians and philosophers go off into various opinions, all of which Valentia reduces to four, tome 1, disputation 3, question 3, point 2. Many, with St. Thomas, Summa Theologiae I, q. 46, a. 2, judge that at least the repugnance of eternal creation cannot be evidently proved from reason alone. But whatever may be true concerning the question of possibility, which we leave to the philosophers, here the matter concerns only the question of fact.

110. Jamvero est veritas catholica mundum non fuisse creatum ab aeterno, sed in tempore, seu cum tempore. Etenim Joannes XXII. sequentes Ekkardi propositiones haereseos stigmate notavit: "Quam cito Deus fuit, tam cito mundum creavit." - 2. "Concedi posse, quod mundus ab aeterno fuerit." - 3. "Quod simul et semel, quando Deus fuit, quando Filium sibi coaeternum per omnia coaequalem Deum genuit, etiam mundum creavit." - In Conc. autem Lat. IV. cap. Firmiter, dicitur: "credimus ... Deum esse Creatorem omnium ... qui sua omnipotente virtute simul ab initio temporis utramque de nihilo condidit creaturam etc." - Eamdem formulam confirmavit Conc. Vat. saepe cit. cap. 1. Const. Dei Filius. 110. Now it is a Catholic truth that the world was not created from eternity, but in time, or with time. For John XXII marked the following propositions of Eckhart with the stigma of heresy: "As soon as God was, so soon he created the world." 2. "That it can be conceded that the world was from eternity." 3. "That together and at once, when God was, when he begot the Son, God co-eternal with himself and in all things co-equal, he also created the world." But in the Fourth Lateran Council, chapter Firmiter, it is said: "we believe ... that God is the Creator of all things ... who by his omnipotent power at once from the beginning of time founded each creature, spiritual and corporeal, from nothing, etc." The same formula was confirmed by the Vatican Council, in the often cited chapter 1 of the constitution Dei Filius.

111. Cum tempus non distinguatur realiter ab ipsa successione rerum, quae mundum constituunt, nequit admitti temporariam durationem fuisse ante cre-

ationem. Unde melius dicitur mundus creatus cum tempore, quam in tempore; semper autem intelligitur non ab aeterno. Quod jam notaverunt S. Ambrosius et S. Augustinus. Primus enim (In Hexaem. l. 1. c. 6.) ait: "In principio temporis Deus caelum et terram fecit. Tempus enim ab hoc mundo, non ante mundum." Alter (Lib. 11. de civ. Dei c. 5.) inquit: "Procul dubio non est factus mundus in tempore, sed cum tempore."

PROP. XIII. Non aeternam, sed temporariam mundo tribuendam esse existentiam, certis argumentis demonstratur.

Prob. I. Ex Scriptura. Legitur 1. Gen.: "In principio creavit Deus caelum et terram."

Ut probetur thesis ex hoc testimonio, notandum est cum D. Th. 1. p. q. 46. a. 3. c., illud "in principio" tripliciter exponi. Exponitur enim 1. ad significandum initium temporis, ante quod mundus non erat - 2. ad significandum Deum omnia fecisse in Filio, seu per Filium, de quo similiter ad Coloss. 1. dicitur: "In quo condita sunt universa;" et Jo. 8.: "Principium, qui et loquor vobis." - 3. ad significandum ante omnia, seu priusquam Deus alia faceret, creavit caelum et terram. Vid. Petavium, de Op. sex dier. l. 1. c. 1. a n. 11. Ex his autem tribus expositionibus, prima, uti patet, facit ad usum praesentis quaestionis.

Unde: Ex cit. testimonio constat mundum habuisse initium et non semper fuisse; ergo.

Prob. antec. Hoc constat, si constat illud "in principio" praeferre sensum "in initio temporis, antequam mundus esset;" atqui hoc constat; ergo.

Prob. min. Quamvis dentur tres diversi sensus,

ut vidimus, illius "in principio," non tamen pugnant inter se, et possunt esse omnes simul veri, uti docet S. Aug. l. 12. Conf. 32. Jamvero primum etiam sensum, qui thesim probat, esse retinendum, constat a) auctoritate Patrum. Nam plures exhibent expresse hunc sensum: et qui alterum aut tertium tradunt, non excludunt primum, sed imo explicite etiam illum docent, ut videre est apud Valentia tom. 1. disp. 3. q. 3. p. 1.: ergo habetur consensus SS. Patrum - b) ex aliis Sac. Script. locis. Ps. 89. 2.: "Priusquam montes fierent, aut formaretur terra et orbis: a saeculo usque in saeculum tu es Deus." - Jo. 17. 5.: "Clarifica me tu, Pater, apud temetipsum, claritate, quam habui, prius quam mundus esset, apud te." V. 24. "Dilexisti me ante constitutionem mundi." - Eph. 1. 4.: "Elegit nos in ipso ante mundi constitutionem." Vid. etiam Prov. 8. In quibus omnibus aeternitas soli Deo tribuitur, ita ut ipse semper fuerit, mundus vero non item. c) ex superius cit. cap. Conc. Later. et Conc. Vat.

Prob. II. Ex Patribus. Patres propugnantes divinitatem Verbi contra Arianos, frequenter ex eo probabant, quod ei tribueretur aeternitas. Unde in Conc. Nicaeno, haec prolata fuit sententia: "Quicumque dicit Filium creaturam, dicit eum coepisse." Eadem argumentatione usus est Sanctus Athanasius ad probandam divinitatem Spiritus Sancti (Ep. ad Serap.), dicens: "Quemadmodum Filius quia semper est, non est creatura, ita quoniam semper est Trinitas, nulla est in ea creatura, quapropter non est creatura Spiritus." - S. Basilius

(In Hexaem. Hom. 1. n. 6.) "Quoniam multi opinabantur, mundum Deo esse coaeternum ... ad istorum hominum errorem tollendum consulto haec verba elegit, et dixit: In principio temporis." - S. Ambrosius (In Hexaem. Praef. con. Perip.): "Quid tam inconveniens, ut aeternitatem operis cum Dei omnipotentis aeternitate conjungerent?" - S. Fulgentius (de Fid. ad Pet. c. 3.): "Deus, qui sine initio semper est, quia summe est, dedit rebus a se creatis, ut sint; non tamen sine initio, quia nulla creatura ejusdem naturae est, cujus est Trinitas." - Idem docent S. Chrys. (Hom. 1. in Joan.); et saepissime S. Augustinus.

NOTA. I. Cum nos abstineamus a quaestione de possibilitate vel repugnantia creationis ab aeterno, nullum possumus afferre argumentum a priori ex ratione ut ostendamus mundum non fuisse creatum ab aeterno. Solent tamen plures, etiam praetermissa illa quaestione, aliquibus argumentis ex ratione uti, quibus nisi demonstretur, saltem suadeatur creatio in tempore facta: urgent praecipue argumentum ex omnium populorum traditione desumptum - Praeterea adduci solent quaedam rationes convenientiae. Ita D. Th. 1. p. q. 46. a. 1. ad 6., inquit: "Dedit (Deus) effectui suo tempus, quantum et quando voluit, et secundum quod conveniens fuit ad suam potentiam demonstrandam. Manifestius enim mundus ducit in cognitionem divinae potentiae creantis, si mundus non semper fuit, quam si semper fuisset; omne enim quod non semper fuit, manifestum est habere causam; sed non ita manifestum est de eo quod semper fuit." - Et c. g. l. 1. c. 13.: "Via efficacissima ad probandum Deum esse, est ex suppositione novitatis mundi, non

autem sic, ex suppositione aeternitatis mundi; qua posita, minus videtur esse manifestum, quod Deus sit. Nam si mundus et motus de novo incepit, planum est quod oportet poni aliquam causam, quae de novo producat mundum et motum; quia omne, quod de novo fit, ab aliquo innovatore oportet sumere originem, quum nihil educat se de potentia in actum vel de non-esse in esse." - Et l. 2. c. 38.: "Ex hoc enim quia res non semper fuerunt, ostenditur etiam quod Deus non agit per necessitatem naturae; et quod virtus sua est infinita in agendo."

NOTA. II. Multae objectiones fieri solent contra hanc thesim, quae videri possunt praesertim apud D. Th. 1. p. q. 46. a. 1. et 3.: duas solum, quae specialem difficultatem praeferre videntur, breviter proponam. Prima est: Si mundus creatus fuisset in tempore, Deus esset in tempore et non ab aeterno Creator; hoc autem videtur absurdum, quia Deus videretur mutari. - Resp. Inter nomina, quae de Deo dicuntur, cum relatione ad creaturas, alia consequuntur actionem Dei immanentem, et non praesupponunt existentiam creaturae: alia vero consequuntur actionem Dei transeuntem in exteriorem effectum, et praesupponunt existentiam rei creatae. Prima dicuntur de Deo ab aeterno, et sic, ex. gr., Deus dicitur ab aeterno cognoscere creaturas. Quoad alia vero, notandum est quod ea nomina dici possunt de Deo vel secundum potestatem, vel secundum actum: secundum potestatem etiam dicuntur de Deo ab aeterno, quia potestas ab aeterno est in Deo. Imo, secundum hunc respectum, non praesupponunt existentiam creaturae, ideoque possunt ad prima nomina revocari. Secun-

dum actum vero, dicuntur de Deo in tempore. Sic, ex. gr., Deus dicitur Dominus et Creator, secundum potestatem, ab aeterno, ex data ratione; dicitur vero Dominus, secundum actum in tempore: Dominus enim et Creator, secundum

actum, dicitur ille qui servum habet, in quem actu dominetur: creaturae autem in quas Deus dominatur, sunt in tempore. Ex hoc autem nulla sequitur mutatio in Deo; siquidem nec Deus tunc agit cum creaturae incipiunt esse, nec aliquid novi acquirit ex creaturarum reali existentia. Vid. 1. p. q. 13. a. 7. et Sylv. in h. l.

Altera difficultas est: posita causa sufficiente creationis in actu, debet statim poni effectus in actu; sed Deus est causa sufficiens creationis ab aeterno in actu; ergo - Praeclarissime hanc difficultatem solvit D. Th. c. g. l. 2. c. 35., dicens: "Nec tamen oportet quod, si primi agentis actio sit aeterna, ejus effectus sit aeternus. Ostensum est enim supra (c. 23) quod Deus agit voluntarie in rerum productione, non autem ita quod sit aliqua actio ipsius media, sicut in nobis actio virtutis motivae est media inter actum voluntatis et effectum, ut in precedentibus ostensum est; sed oportet quod suum intelligere et velle sit suum facere; effectus autem ab intellectu et voluntate sequitur, secundum determinationem intellectus et imperium voluntatis. Sicut autem per intellectum determinatur rei factio et quaecumque alia conditio, ita et praescribitur ei tempus; non enim solum ars determinat ut hoc tale sit, sed ut tunc sit, sicut medicus ut tunc detur potus; unde, si ejus velle per se esset efficax ad effectum producendum, sequeretur de novo effectus ab antiqua voluntate, nulla actione

de novo existente. Nihil igitur prohibet dicere actionem Dei ab aeterno fuisse, effectum autem ejus non ab aeterno, sed tunc quum ab aeterno disposuit. Ex quo etiam patet quod, etsi Deus sit sufficiens causa productionis rerum in esse, non tamen oportet quod ejus effectus aeternus ponatur, eo existente aeterno. Posita enim causa sufficiente, ponitur ejus effectus, non autem effectus extraneus a causa: hoc enim esset ex insufficientia causae, ac si calidum non calefaceret. Proprius autem effectus voluntatis est ut sit hoc quod voluntas vult; si autem aliquid aliud esset quam voluntas velit, non poneretur effectus proprius causae, sed alienus ab ea; voluntas autem, sicut dictum est, sicut vult hoc esse tale, ita vult hoc esse tunc; unde oportet, ad hoc quod voluntas sit sufficiens causa, quod effectus sit quando voluntas est ut sit et quando effectum esse disposuit. In his autem quae a causa naturaliter agente procedunt, secus est, quia actio naturae est secundum quod ipsa est; unde ad esse causae sequi oportet effectum. Voluntas autem agit non secundum modum sui esse, sed secundum modum sui propositi; et ideo, sicut effectus naturalis agentis sequitur esse agentis, si sit sufficiens, ita effectus agentis per voluntatem sequitur modum propositi." 111. Since time is not really distinguished from the very succession of things which constitute the world, it cannot be admitted that there was a temporal duration before creation. Hence it is better said that the world was created with time than in time; however, it is always understood that it was not from eternity. This had already been noted by St. Ambrose and St. Augustine. The first says (Hexaemeron, book 1, c. 6): "In the beginning of time God made heaven and earth. For time is from this world, not before the world." The other says (City of God, book 11, c. 5): "Without doubt the world was not made in time, but with time."

PROP. XIII. It is demonstrated by certain arguments that not eternal but temporal existence must be attributed to the world.

Proof I, from Scripture. It is read in Genesis 1: "In the beginning God created heaven and earth."

In order that the thesis may be proved from this testimony, it must be noted with St. Thomas, Summa Theologiae I, q. 46, a. 3, corpus, that the phrase "in the beginning" is explained in three ways. For it is explained: first, to signify the beginning of time, before which the world was not; second, to signify that God made all things in the Son, or through the Son, concerning whom similarly it is said at Colossians 1: "In whom all things were founded"; and John 8: "The beginning, who also speak to you"; third, to signify before all things, or that before God made other things, he created heaven and earth. See Petavius, On the Work of the Six Days, book 1, c. 1, from n. 11. But of these three explanations, the first, as is clear, serves the use of the present question.

Hence: From the cited testimony it is evident that the world had a beginning and did not always exist. Therefore.

The antecedent is proved. This is evident if it is evident that the phrase "in the beginning" presents the sense "in the beginning of time, before the world existed." But this is evident. Therefore.

The minor is proved. Although there are, as we have seen, three diverse senses of that phrase "in the beginning," nevertheless they are not in conflict with each other, and all can be true at the same time, as St. Augustine teaches, Confessions, book 12, c. 32. Now that the first sense also, which

proves the thesis, must be retained, is evident: a) from the authority of the Fathers. For many expressly exhibit this sense; and those who hand down the second or third do not exclude the first, but indeed explicitly also teach it, as may be seen in Valentia, tome 1, disputation 3, question 3, point 1. Therefore there is a consensus of the holy Fathers. b) From other places of Sacred Scripture. Psalm 89:2: "Before the mountains were made, or the earth and the world was formed: from age to age you are God." John 17:5: "Glorify me, Father, with yourself, with the glory which I had with you before the world was." Verse 24: "You loved me before the foundation of the world." Ephesians 1:4: "He chose us in him before the foundation of the world." See also Proverbs 8. In all these eternity is attributed to God alone, so that he himself always was, but the world was not likewise. c) From the above cited chapter of the Lateran Council and the Vatican Council.

Proof II, from the Fathers. The Fathers, defending the divinity of the Word against the Arians, frequently proved it from the fact that eternity was attributed to him. Hence in the Nicene Council this judgment was uttered: "Whoever says the Son is a creature says that he began." St. Athanasius used the same argumentation to prove the divinity of the Holy Spirit (Letter to Serapion), saying: "Just as the Son, because he always is, is not a creature, so, since the Trinity always is, there is no creature in it; wherefore the Spirit is not a creature." St. Basil (Hexaemeron, Homily 1, n. 6): "Since many were thinking that the world is co-eternal with God ... to remove the error of those men he deliberately chose these words, and said: In the beginning of time." St. Ambrose (Hexaemeron, Preface against the Peripatetics): "What is so unfitting as that they should join the eternity of the work with the eternity of almighty God?" St. Fulgentius (On Faith to Peter, c. 3): "God, who is always without beginning, because he supremely is, gave to things created by him that they should be; yet not without beginning, because no creature is of the same nature as the Trinity is." St. Chrysostom teaches the same (Homily 1 on John), and St. Augustine very often.

NOTE I. Since we abstain from the question concerning the possibility or repugnance of creation from eternity, we can bring forward no a priori argument from reason to show that the world was not created from eternity. Yet many, even while passing over that question, are accustomed to use certain arguments from reason, by which, if creation in time is not demonstrated, it is at least made persuasive. They especially press the argument taken from the tradition of all peoples. Besides, certain reasons of fittingness are usually adduced. Thus St. Thomas, Summa Theologiae I, q. 46, a. 1, ad 6, says: "God gave to his effect time, as much and when he willed, and according as it was fitting for demonstrating his power. For the world more manifestly leads into knowledge of the divine creating power if the world did not always exist than if it had always existed; for everything which did not always exist is manifestly seen to have a cause, but it is not so manifest concerning that which always existed." And Contra Gentiles, book 1, c. 13: "The most efficacious way for proving that God exists is from the supposition of the newness of the world, but not in the same way from the supposition of the eternity of the world; once that is posited, it seems less manifest that God exists. For if the world and motion began anew, it is plain that some cause must be posited which newly produces the world and motion; because everything which newly comes to be must take its origin from some innovator, since nothing brings itself from potency into act or from non-being into being." And book 2, c. 38: "For from this, that things did not always exist, it is also shown that God does not act through necessity of nature, and that his power is infinite in acting."

NOTE II. Many objections are usually made against this thesis, which can be seen especially in St. Thomas, Summa Theologiae I, q. 46, a. 1 and 3. I shall briefly propose only two which seem to present a special difficulty. The first is: If the world had been created in time, God would be in time and not Creator from eternity; but this seems absurd, because God would seem to be changed. I reply. Among the names which are said of God with relation to creatures, some follow the immanent action of God, and do not presuppose the existence of the creature; others, however, follow the action of God passing over into an exterior effect, and presuppose the existence of the created thing. The first are said of God from eternity, and thus, for example, God is said from eternity to know creatures. But regarding the others, it must be noted that these names can be said of God either according to power or

according to act. According to power they are also said of God from eternity, because power is in God from eternity. Indeed, according to this respect, they do not presuppose the existence of the creature, and therefore can be brought back to the first names. But according to act, they are said of God in time. Thus, for example, God is called Lord and Creator, according to power, from eternity, for the reason given; but he is called Lord according to act in time. For he is called Lord and Creator according to act who has a servant over whom he actually has dominion; but the creatures over whom God has dominion are in time. From this, however, no change in God follows, since God neither then acts when creatures begin to be, nor does he acquire anything new from the real existence of creatures. See Summa Theologiae I, q. 13, a. 7, and Sylvius on this place.

The other difficulty is: once the sufficient cause of creation is posited in act, the effect must immediately be posited in act; but God is the sufficient cause of creation from eternity in act; therefore. St. Thomas solves this difficulty most splendidly, Contra Gentiles, book 2, c. 35, saying: "Nor, however, is it necessary that, if the action of the first agent is eternal, its effect be eternal. For it was shown above (c. 23) that God acts voluntarily in the production of things; not, however, in such a way that there is some action of his as a middle, as in us the action of the moving power is a middle between the act of the will and the effect, as was shown in the preceding things; but his understanding and willing must be his making. But the effect follows from intellect and will according to the determination of the intellect and the command of the will. But just as through intellect the making of the thing and any other condition whatsoever is determined, so also time is prescribed to it; for art determines not only that this be such, but that it be then, as the physician determines that the drink be given then. Hence, if his willing were efficacious of itself for producing the effect, a new effect would follow from an ancient will, with no new action existing. Therefore nothing prevents saying that the action of God was from eternity, but that his effect was not from eternity, but then when he disposed from eternity. From this it is also clear that, although God is the sufficient cause of the production of things in being, nevertheless it is not necessary that his effect be posited as eternal, though he exists eternally. For when a sufficient cause is posited, its effect is posited, but not an effect foreign to the cause; for this would be from the insufficiency of the cause, as if something hot did not heat. But the proper effect of will is that there be what the will wills. But if there were something other than the will wills, the proper effect of the cause would not be posited, but one alien from it. Now will, as has been said, just as it wills this to be such, so it wills this to be then. Hence, in order that will be a sufficient cause, the effect must be when the will is that it be, and when it has disposed that the effect be. But in those things which proceed from a cause acting naturally, the matter is otherwise, because the action of nature is according as it itself is; hence the effect must follow upon the being of the cause. But will acts not according to the mode of its own being, but according to the mode of its purpose; and therefore, just as the effect of a natural agent follows the being of the agent, if it is sufficient, so the effect of an agent through will follows the mode of the purpose."

Article 11. On Mosaic Cosmogony

LatineEnglish

De Mosaica cosmogonia.

112. Solebant veteres Theologi hoc loco exponere historiam creationis, prout a Moyse refertur in

Genesi, singulos creationis dies, et omnia uniuscujusque diei opera expendentes. Nunc tamen mos invaluit ut specialis de hac re tractatio habeatur, quae communiter Sacrae Scripturae interpreti relinquitur. Excipitur tamen de diebus creationis generalis quaestio, de qua communius recentiores Theologi hoc loco agunt. Hanc methodum imitabimur. 112. The older theologians were accustomed in this place to expound the history of creation, as it is reported by Moses in Genesis, weighing the individual days of creation and all the works of each single day. Now, however, the custom has prevailed that a special

treatment of this matter be had, which is commonly left to the interpreter of Sacred Scripture. Yet the general question concerning the days of creation is excepted, concerning which more commonly recent theologians treat in this place. We shall imitate this method.

§ I. Quaedam praenotantur, et praecipuae sententiae referuntur. Section I. Certain Things Are Pre-Noted, And The Principal Opinions Are Reported.

113. Neminem latet Moysem conscribere Israelitis historiam generis sui, et Legem a Deo datam. Ut fundamentum praestituat, in Gen. cap. 1. primam rerum originem describit, tria praesertim prae oculis habens: 1. ut asserat unum Deum esse rerum omnium auctorem, ut sic doctrinam monotheismi, et verum cujuscumque religionis fundamentum ponat - 2. ut consequenter populum avertat a cultu astrorum, animalium ac plantarum, docens ea omnia condita esse propter hominem: "Et ait: Faciamus hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem nostram: et praesit piscibus maris, et volatilibus caeli, et bestiis, universaeque terrae, omnique reptili quod movetur in terra, etc.," Gen. 1. 26. seqq. - 3. ut legem sabbati exemplo Dei quasi confirmet: Unde legitur Exod. 20. 9-11.: "Sex diebus operaberis, et facies omnia opera tua. Septimo autem die sabbatum Domini Dei tui est: non facies omne opus in eo, tu, et filius tuus et filia tua, et servus tuus et ancilla tua, jumentum tuum, et advena qui est intra portas tuas. Sex enim

diebus fecit Dominus caelum et terram, et mare, et omnia quae in eis sunt, et requievit in die septimo, idcirco benedixit Dominus diei sabbati, et sanctificavit eum." Cf. etiam Ex. 31. 15-17. 113. No one is unaware that Moses writes for the Israelites the history of their race, and the Law given by God. In order to set down the foundation beforehand, in Genesis chapter 1 he describes the first origin of things, having especially three things before his eyes: 1. that he may assert that one God is the author of all things, and so establish the doctrine of monotheism, and the true foundation of any religion whatsoever; 2. that, consequently, he may turn the people away from the worship of stars, animals, and plants, teaching that all these things were founded on account of man: "And he said: Let us make man to our image and likeness: and let him preside over the fishes of the sea, and the birds of heaven, and the beasts, and the whole earth, and every creeping thing which moves on the earth, etc.," Genesis 1:26 and following; 3. that he may, as it were, confirm the law of the Sabbath by the example of God. Hence it is read in Exodus 20:9-11: "Six days you shall work, and shall do all your works. But on the seventh day is the Sabbath of the Lord your God: you shall do no work in it, you, and your son and your daughter, and your manservant and your maidservant, your beast, and the stranger who is within your gates. For in six days the Lord made heaven and earth, and the sea, and all things which are in them, and rested on the seventh day; therefore the Lord blessed the day of the Sabbath, and sanctified it." Compare also Exodus 31:15-17.

114. Quamvis autem Moyses rerum omnium originem describat, proprie tamen vult historiam telluris exhibere, sive quia hanc inhabitat homo, in cujus utilitatem caeterae omnes inferiores creaturae conditae sunt, sive etiam ex aliis rationibus, quas hic non vacat prosequi. Propterea mirum non est si exhibeat solem, lunam et sidera terrae commodis inservientia; de caelestibus enim corporibus tantum et eatenus agit, quantum et quatenus ad illam referuntur. 114. Although Moses describes the origin of all things, nevertheless he properly wishes to exhibit the history of the earth, either because man inhabits it, for whose utility all the other inferior creatures were founded, or also for other reasons which there is no leisure to pursue here. For this reason it is not strange if he presents the sun, moon, and stars as serving the advantages of the earth; for he treats of heavenly bodies only so much and insofar as they are referred to it.

115. Occasione rerum originis ad praedictos fines describendae, multa alia dicit Moyses, quae non directe intendit. Ex quo intelligi quidem potest cur ea

sint aliquatenus obscure prolata (licet omnimodam Scripturarum perspicuitatem solum propugnant haeretici, qui infallibile Ecclesiae magisterium inficiantur); sed nullo pacto sequitur eadem posse pro lubito negari. Cum enim constet, quod, "veteris et novi Testamenti libri integri cum omnibus suis partibus, prout in ejusdem Concilii (Tridentini) decreto recensentur, et in veteri vulgata latina editione habentur, pro sacris et canonicis suscipiendi sunt;" si constet simul aliquid dictum esse a Moyse in Gen.; uti divinitus inspiratum est habendum. Unde rejicienda est mythica 1. Gen. expositio pluribus Protestantibus nunc communis, juxta quam, Moysis narrationi unica de Deo universi Auctore subest veritas; reliqua vero ornatus et vestitus causa essent excogitata. Vid. Schwetz. Theol. Dog. Cath. Vol. 1., part. 2., sect. 1. §. 75. 115. On the occasion of describing the origin of things for the aforesaid ends, Moses says many other things which he does not directly intend. From this, indeed, one can understand why those things are set forth somewhat obscurely (although only heretics, who deny the infallible magisterium of the Church, defend the complete perspicuity of the Scriptures); but it in no way follows that the same things can be denied at pleasure. For since it is established that "the whole books of the Old and New Testament with all their parts, as they are listed in the decree of the same Council [of Trent], and are contained in the old Latin Vulgate edition, are to be received as sacred and canonical," if at the same time it is established that something was said by Moses in Genesis, it must be held as divinely inspired. Hence the mythical exposition of Genesis 1, now common among many Protestants, must be rejected, according to which a single truth underlies the Mosaic narrative, namely concerning God the Author of the universe, while the rest would have been devised for the sake of ornament and clothing. See Schwetz, Catholic Dogmatic Theology, vol. 1, part 2, section 1, § 75.

116. His in tuto positis, diversae, quae inter catholicos libere adhuc proferuntur, interpretationes de diebus Mosaicis in Gen. descriptis, ad tres praecipuas reduci possunt: ad allegoricam vel mysticam - literalem obviam et communem - literalem recentiorem. 116. With these things placed in safety, the diverse interpretations concerning the Mosaic days described in Genesis, which are still freely brought forward among Catholics, can be reduced to three principal ones: the allegorical or mystical; the obvious and common literal; and the more recent literal.

117. Interpretatio allegorica memoratu digna, ea est quae proponitur a S. Augustino pluribus in locis, et praesertim de Civ. Dei l. 11. c. 6. seqq.; de Gen. ad litt. l. 4. c. 24. seqq. Fatetur imprimis S. Doctor rei difficultatem: "qui dies," inquit, "cujusmodi sint, aut perdifficile nobis, aut etiam impossibile est cogitare, quanto magis dicere." Proponit tamen sententiam, juxta quam Deus non sex veris successivis diebus condidisset mundum, sed uno instanti, omnia simul. Si vero quaeratur ab eo cur, quae uno instanti facta sunt, sex dierum spatio narrantur facta; duplicem praesertim reddit rationem. Prima est: "commodissime in illo libro quasi morarum per intervalla, factorem a Deo rerum digesta narratio est, ut ipsa dispositio, quae ab infirmioribus animis contemplatione stabili videri non poterat, per hujusmodi ordinem sermonis exposita, quasi istis oculis cerneretur." (De Gen. ad litt. op. imp. c. 7.) Altera vero, quod licet nulla sit dierum distinctio quatenus aliqua opera facta sint uno die, alia alio: est tamen quaedam mystica, sed vera significatio, juxta quam et dies in creatione, et vesperum et mane in qualibet die distinguuntur.

Hujusmodi autem distinctionem fieri putat juxta rationem, qua Angeli in creaturarum cognitionem venerunt. Notat enim (l. 4. de Gen. ad litt. c. 22.): "Lux, quae primitus facta est, non corporalis, sed

spiritualis est;" et hanc lucem spiritualem declarat (c. 32.), dicens: "Deus dixit: Fiat lux, et secuta est ipsa lux, qua angelica mens formata est, atque in sua natura facta est. adhaesitque creanti luci lux creata, videns illam, et se in illa, idest rationem, qua facta est." Quemadmodum vero lucem interpretatur Angelorum exercitum, ita distinctionem vespere et mane sexies repetitam petit ex Angelorum cognitione. Nam duplex est admittenda in Angelis creaturarum cognitio; una, quam habent contemplando res in seipsis, harum tamen pulchritudini non inhaerentes, sed ad Dei gloriam referentes; alia, qua res cognoscunt in Verbo, in quo sunt rerum omnium creandarum rationes: primam, uti minus perfectam vocat vespertinam;

alteram perfectiorem vocat matutinam. "Itaque," inquit (c. 26.), "dies ille, quem fecit Deus per opera ejus, ipse repetitur non circuitu corporali, sed cognitione spirituali, cum beata illa societas Angelorum et primitus contemplatur in Verbo Dei, quod dixit Deus: fiat, atque ideo prius in ejus cognitione fit, cum dicitur: et sic factum est: et postea rem ipsam factam in eaipsa cognoscit, quod significatur facta vespere; et eam deinde cognitionem rei factae ad illius veritatis laudem refert, ubi rationem viderat faciendae, quod significatur: facto mane. Ac sic per omnes illos dies unus est dies, non istorum dierum consuetudine intelligendus, quos videmus solis circuitu determinari, atque numerari, sed alio quodam modo, a quo et illi tres dies, qui ante conditionem istorum luminarium commemorati sunt, alieni esse non possunt."

Tandem, quia in Angelorum mente vespertinae cognitioni sine ignorantia et errorum tenebris statim matutina cognitio succedit, ideo nulla, juxta S. Doctorem fit mentio de nocte. "Quia," ait (c. 30.), "non ibi abscessu lucis superioris, sed inferioris cognitionis distinctione fit vespera: nec mane tanquam nocti ignorantiae scientia matutina succedat, sed quod vespertinam etiam cognitionem in gloriam conditoris attollat. Denique et David, nocte non nominata, vespere, inquit, et mane et meridie narrabo, et annuntiabo, et exaudiet vocem meam: hic fortasse per temporum vices, sed tamen, quantum puto, significans quid sine temporum vicibus perageretur in patria, cui ejus peregrinatio suspirabat." 117. The allegorical interpretation worthy of mention is that which is proposed by St. Augustine in several places, and especially in City of God, book 11, c. 6 and following; and On Genesis Literally, book 4, c. 24 and following. The holy Doctor first admits the difficulty of the matter: "What sort of days those were," he says, "is either very difficult for us, or even impossible, to think, how much more to say." Nevertheless he proposes an opinion according to which God did not found the world in six true successive days, but in one instant, all things simultaneously. But if he is asked why things which were made in one instant are narrated as made over the space of six days, he especially gives a twofold reason. The first is: "Most suitably in that book, as though through intervals of delays, the ordered narration of things made by God is arranged, so that the very disposition, which could not be seen by weaker minds in stable contemplation, might, when set forth through this kind of order of speech, be discerned as though by those eyes." (On Genesis Literally, Unfinished Work, c. 7.) The other reason is that, although there is no distinction of days insofar as some works were made on one day, and others on another, nevertheless there is a certain mystical but true signification, according to which both the day in creation, and evening and morning in any given day, are distinguished.

He thinks that a distinction of this kind is made according to the account by which the Angels came into knowledge of creatures. For he notes (On Genesis Literally, book 4, c. 22): "The light which was first made is not corporeal, but spiritual"; and he explains this spiritual light (c. 32), saying: "God said: Let light be made, and that light itself followed, by which the angelic mind was formed, and was made in its own nature, and the created light adhered to the creating light, seeing that light, and itself in that light, that is, the ratio by which it was made." But just as he interprets light as the host of Angels, so he seeks the distinction of evening and morning repeated six times from the cognition of the Angels. For a twofold cognition of creatures must be admitted in the Angels: one which they have by contemplating things in themselves, yet not clinging to the beauty of these things, but referring them to the glory of God; the other by which they know things in the Word, in whom are the rationes of all things to be created. The first, as less perfect, he calls evening cognition; the other, more perfect, he calls morning cognition. "And so," he says (c. 26), "that day which God made through his works is itself repeated not by a bodily circuit, but by spiritual cognition, when that blessed society of Angels first contemplates in the Word of God what God said: let it be made, and therefore first it is made in his cognition, when it is said: and so it was made; and afterward it knows the thing itself made in itself, which is signified by evening having been made; and then it refers that cognition of the thing made to the praise of that truth, where it had seen the ratio of its being made, which is signified by morning having been made. And thus through all those days there is one day, not to be understood according to the custom of these days, which we see determined and numbered by the circuit of the sun, but in another certain way, from which also those three days, which are commemorated before the founding of those luminaries, cannot be

alien."

Finally, because in the mind of the Angels morning cognition immediately succeeds evening cognition without ignorance and the darkness of errors, therefore, according to the holy Doctor, no mention is made of night. "Because," he says (c. 30), "evening is made there not by the withdrawal of the higher light, but by the distinction of lower cognition; nor does morning occur as though morning knowledge succeeds a night of ignorance, but because it lifts up even evening cognition to the glory of the Founder. Finally David also, with night not named, says: Evening and morning and midday I will narrate and announce, and he will hear my voice: here perhaps through changes of times, but nevertheless, as I think, signifying what would be accomplished without changes of times in the homeland for which his pilgrimage sighed."

118. Istam S. Augustini sententiam, quoad creationem uno instanti absolutam, tradiderunt etiam Clemens Alex. (l. 6. Strom.); Origenes (l. 6. c. Celsum); S. Athanasius (Or. 3. c. Arianos); Isidorus Hisp. (l. 1. de summo bono); Cassiodorus (l. 1. div. inst. c. 22.) - Inter Theologos vero, alii, uti Molina, Cornelius a Lapide, Arriaga, etc., eamdem interpretationem quasi erroneam rejecerunt; alii, uti Estius, Natalis Alex. etc., tamquam minus probabilem suo auctori reliquerunt; alii, uti Xistus Senensis, Albertus Magnus, Card. Norisius, Berti, etc., amplexi sunt et defenderunt. S. Th. (2. sent. dist. 12. q. 1. a. 2.), dicit: "opinio Augustini plus mihi placet"; et (1. p. q. 74. a. 2.) interpretatione S. Aug. et alia literali obvia relata, inquit: "ut igitur neutri sententiae praejudicetur, utriusque rationibus respondendum est." 118. This opinion of St. Augustine, as to creation completed in one instant, was also handed down by Clement of Alexandria (Stromata, book 6); Origen (Against Celsus, book 6); St. Athanasius (Oration 3 against the Arians); Isidore of Seville (On the Highest Good, book 1); Cassiodorus (Divine Institutions, book 1, c. 22). Among theologians, however, some, such as Molina, Cornelius a Lapide, Arriaga, etc., rejected the same interpretation as quasi-erroneous; others, such as Estius, Natalis Alexander, etc., left it to its author as less probable; others, such as Sixtus of Siena, Albert the Great, Cardinal Noris, Berti, etc., embraced and defended it. St. Thomas (Sentences II, dist. 12, q. 1, a. 2) says: "the opinion of Augustine pleases me more"; and in Summa Theologiae I, q. 74, a. 2, after reporting the interpretation of St. Augustine and the other obvious literal one, he says: "therefore, so that prejudice be done to neither opinion, the arguments of each must be answered."

119. Interpretatio literalis communis expositione non indiget. Qui eam tenent, dierum nomine intel-

ligunt temporis spatia nostris diebus similia; a quarto die solis ortu et occasu fuerunt determinata; praecedentium vero dierum spatia habuerunt etiam vicissitudinem lucis et tenebrarum, sed ex alia causa, ut dicemus. Haec sententia communior fuit apud Patres; eam enim docuerunt Theophilus Antioch., S. Ambrosius, S. Basilius, S. Greg. Nyss., S. Joan. Chrysostomus, Theodoretus, S. Gregorius M., S. Hieronymus, etc. Vid. Petav. de Op. sex dier. l. 1. c. 5. - Communissima fuit apud Theologos scholasticos, et etiam nunc temporis a non paucis propugnatur. 119. The common literal interpretation does not need exposition. Those who hold it understand by the name of days spaces of time similar to our days; from the fourth day they were determined by the rising and setting of the sun; but the spaces of the preceding days also had a vicissitude of light and darkness, but from another cause, as we shall say. This opinion was more common among the Fathers; for Theophilus of Antioch, St. Ambrose, St. Basil, St. Gregory of Nyssa, St. John Chrysostom, Theodoret, St. Gregory the Great, St. Jerome, etc., taught it. See Petavius, On the Work of the Six Days, book 1, c. 5. It was most common among the scholastic theologians, and even now is defended by not a few.

120. Quoad interpretationem literalem recentiorem notandum est quod increduli elapsi saeculi, duce praesertim Voltaire, nihil intentatum reliquerunt, ut ostenderent narrationem Mosaicam a veritate aberrare. Summa eorum argumentorum, quoad

rem praesentem, eo redit, ut adstruant ex scientiis physicis, praesertim geologia, plura centena millia annorum necessaria fuisse, ut terrestris globus ad eum statum adduceretur, in quo erat, quando homo creatus fuit. Argumenta hujusmodi magnam vim habere visa sunt non paucis auctoribus Catholicis; qui proinde in eo conveniunt, ut veritatem Mosaicae cosmogoniae defendant, concedendo longam saeculorum seriem ad formationem terrae. Discrepant vero, quod alii hanc longam annorum periodum collocant ante dies a Moyse descriptos; alii ipsos dies longas annorum periodos esse censent. 120. Regarding the more recent literal interpretation, it must be noted that the unbelievers of the last century, under the leadership especially of Voltaire, left nothing untried in order to show that the Mosaic narrative deviated from truth. The sum of their arguments, as to the present matter, comes back to this: that they maintain from the physical sciences, especially geology, that many hundreds of thousands of years were necessary for the terrestrial globe to be brought to that state in which it was when man was created. Arguments of this kind seemed to have great force to not a few Catholic authors, who therefore agree in this, that they defend the truth of Mosaic cosmogony by conceding a long series of ages for the formation of the earth. But they differ because some place this long period of years before the days described by Moses, while others judge that the days themselves are long periods of years.

121. Primi itaque statuunt in 1. v. Gen. "In principio creavit Deus caelum et terram" tradi originem totius universi; in secundo v. "Terra autem erat inanis et vacua" indicari ruinam nostrae terrae, in

seqq. vers. describi autumant non proprie creationem, sed restaurationem terrae. Unde primam a secunda creatione ita distinguunt, ut illa exhibeat veram creationem totius universi, 1. v.: haec vero restaurationem, prout legitur in v. 3. seqq. Inter utramque ponunt amplissimum temporis intervallum, in quo multa plantarum et animalium genera vixere - quae ex variis terrae revolutionibus, ut aiunt, fortasse pluries, interierunt - dum eodem tempore successiva terrae formatio, quam geologia adstruit, accidisse putant. Tandem cum universali, et praegrandi catastrophe terra inhabitabilis facta fuerit et penitus collapsa, quod indigitari dicunt in 2. v.; divina omnipotentia restituta fuit, et hanc restitutionem describit Moyses factam sex dierum spatio. Quod Moyses solis stellarumque productionem quarto diei adscribat, explicant dicendo solem et stellas productas fuisse in prima creatione: et Moysem, dum secundam describit, docere solum astrorum praesentem relationem et influxum quoad terram, quarto die fuisse divina omnipotentia constitutam. Hanc sententiam, quam claritatis gratia recentiorem minus communem vocabimus, plures cum Buckland, Card. Wiseman, etc., amplexi olim sunt; nunc tamen sententia statim exponenda praevalere videtur. 121. Therefore the first group establish that in the first verse of Genesis, "In the beginning God created heaven and earth," the origin of the whole universe is handed down; in the second verse, "But the earth was empty and void," the ruin of our earth is indicated; and in the following verses they think that what is described is not properly creation, but restoration of the earth. Hence they distinguish the first creation from the second in such a way that the former exhibits the true creation of the whole universe, verse 1, while the latter exhibits restoration, as is read in verse 3 and following. Between the two they place a very wide interval of time, in which many genera of plants and animals lived - which, from various revolutions of the earth, as they say, perhaps perished several times - while at the same time they think that the successive formation of the earth, which geology maintains, occurred. Finally, when by a universal and very great catastrophe the earth had been made uninhabitable and utterly collapsed, which they say is indicated in verse 2, it was restored by divine omnipotence; and Moses describes this restoration as made in the space of six days. That Moses ascribes the production of the sun and stars to the fourth day, they explain by saying that the sun and stars were produced in the first creation; and that Moses, while describing the second, teaches only that the present relation and influence of the stars with respect to the earth was constituted by divine omnipotence on the fourth day. This opinion, which for the sake of clarity we shall call the more recent less common one, many once embraced with Buckland, Cardinal Wiseman, etc.; now, however, the opinion immediately to be set forth seems to prevail.

122. Alia recentioris interpretationis expositio est, quod ipsi dies in Gen. commemorati non sunt dies vulgares, sed diuturnae temporis periodi. Exceptis ergo quibusdam creaturis, uti sunt, ex. gr., animantia ac praesertim homo, in quarum formatione immediata divinae actionis interventio agnoscenda est; Deum dicunt materiam ab initio creasse, eamdem

que ipsimet permisisse, ut naturali suarum virium evolutione, juxta primam Sapientissimi Opificis dispositionem, paulatim terram formaret. Hanc sententiam quae recentior communior dici potest, nunc plures Doctores Catholici tuentur, eaque utuntur ad Moysis narrationem ab impiorum sophismatibus vindicandam. 122. Another exposition of the more recent interpretation is that the days themselves commemorated in Genesis are not ordinary days, but long periods of time. Therefore, except for certain creatures, such as, for example, living things and especially man, in whose formation the immediate intervention of divine action must be acknowledged, they say that God created matter from the beginning and permitted it itself, by the natural evolution of its powers, according to the first disposition of the most wise Artisan, gradually to form the earth. This opinion, which can be called the more recent more common one, is now maintained by several Catholic Doctors, and they use it to vindicate the narrative of Moses from the sophisms of the impious.

§ II. Expenduntur interpretatio allegorica et recentior minus communis. Section II. The Allegorical Interpretation And The More Recent Less Common Interpretation Are Examined.

123. Expositioni allegoricae, quam numquam improbavit Ecclesia, nulla quidem, uti patet ex recitatis auctoritatibus, nota inuri potest: videntur tamen merito Auctores communissime ab ea recedere. 123. Upon the allegorical exposition, which the Church has never disapproved, no mark indeed can be inflicted, as is clear from the authorities recited; nevertheless authors very commonly seem rightly to recede from it.

124. Prob. I. Nullum videtur habere fundamentum in Scriptura. Nam duplex assignari solet: 1. Illud Eccli. 18. 1. "Qui vivit in aeternum creavit omnia simul;" ubi illud simul significare dicunt eodem tempore, quod enim nihil sit extra Deum, quod ab eo creatum non fuerit, satis exprimitur per illud omnia. - 2. Illud Gen. 2. 4. "Istae sunt generationes caeli et terrae, quando creata sunt, in die quo fecit Dominus Deus caelum et terram: et omne virgultum agri antequam oriretur in terra, omnemque herbam regionis priusquam germinaret;" ergo, aiunt, omnes productiones a Moyse enarratae spectant ad unum eumdemque diem, quin ullum sit temporis intervallum inter creationem caeli et terrae, et diem tertiam, in qua fuerunt producta germina et ligna.

Atqui neutrum valet. Non 1um; nam, juxta textum graecum, illud simul significat ad unum omnia, sine exceptione (Vid. Schwetz, l. c.). Nec obstat quod hoc sufficienter exprimitur per vocem omnia; siquidem frequenter in Sacra Scriptura eadem res aequivalentibus terminis confirmatur. Sic, ex. gr., Ps. 13. 3. dicitur: "Omnes declinaverunt, simul inutiles facti sunt;" et propius ad rem nostram, Jo. 1. legitur: "Omnia per ipsum facta sunt, et sine ipso factum est nihil." - Non 2um, quia illud in die significat in tempore antea a Moyse designato, seu in diebus, singularis enim pro plurali saepe usurpatur in Sacra Scriptura. (Vid. Petav. l. 1. c. 5.)

Prob. II. Communissima SS. Patrum et Doctorum sententia sensui proprio et litterali adhaeret. Huic autem consensui obstare non videtur auctoritas S. Augustini. Nam a) S. Doctor dubitando proponit interpretationem allegoricam. "Quisque," ait (de Gen. ad litt. l. 4. c. 28.) "non eam, quam pro nostro modulo vel indagare vel putare potuimus, sed aliam requirat in illorum dierum enumeratione sententiam, quae non in prophetia figurate, sed in hac creaturarum conditione proprie meliusque possit intelligi, quaerat, et divinitus adjutus inveniat. Fieri enim potest, ut et ego aliam his divinae Scripturae verbis congruentiorem fortassis inveniam. Neque enim ita hanc confirmo, ut illam quae praeponenda sit inveniri non posse contendam." - b) Ipse S. Doctor (de Catechizandis rudibus,

c. 17. n. 28.), communem literalem interpretationem admittere

videtur; inquit enim: "De qua requie significat Scriptura et non tacet, quod ab initio mundi, ex quo fecit Deus caelum et terram et omnia quae in eis sunt, sex diebus operatus est, et septimo die requievit. Poterat enim omnipotens et uno momento temporis omnia facere. Non autem laboraverat, ut requiesceret, quando dixit et facta sunt, mandavit et creata sunt: sed ut significaret quia post sex aetates mundi hujus, septima aetate tamquam septimo die requieturus est in Sanctis suis." - c) Loquens de XII. lib. de Gen. ad litt. (Retract. c. 24.), ait: "In quo opere plura quaesita quam inventa sunt, pauciora firmata: caetera vero ita posita, velut adhuc requirenda sint."

Prob. III. Est regula hermeneutica ab ipso S. Augustino tradita, quod non sit discedendum a sensu literali et proprio Sacrae Scripturae absque cogente ratione; atqui in casu nulla est cogens ratio; ergo.

Prob. min. Nam a) nulla absurditas sequitur ex sensu literali, ac proinde nulla datur incredulis ansa calumniandi Mosaicam narrationem, quod tantopere timebat S. Augustinus: quod inde patet, quod nunc scandalum potius paterentur, si creatio simultanea, et non successiva, adstrueretur.

b) Scriptura ipsa non docet sensum literalem esse relinquendum, uti probavimus expendendo loca, quae ab ipsis Auctoribus interpretationis allegoricae afferri solent. Imo contrarium videtur suadere; nam 1. alia, quae ibi narrantur, sensu proprio accipienda esse, conveniunt omnes. Creationem ipsam mulieris, quidquid Cajetanus dixerit, sensu proprio accipiendam esse, docet Apostolus 1. Cor. 11. 9., dicens: "Non

enim vir ex muliere, sed mulier ex viro;" cur ergo non sumetur sensu proprio ipsa distinctio dierum? - 2. Moyses, ut omnes fatentur, est scriptor historicus; in decursu Genesis simplici calamo facta enarrat; initio Genesis fundamenta legis, ut vidimus, ponit: haec autem omnia excludere videntur difficiles allegorias a narratione creationis universi.

c) Traditionem tandem nullo pacto favere interpretationi allegoricae, jam superius demonstratum est. 124. Proof I. It seems to have no foundation in Scripture. For a twofold foundation is usually assigned. 1. That text of Ecclesiasticus 18:1, "He who lives forever created all things together"; where they say that "together" signifies at the same time, since the fact that there is nothing outside God which was not created by him is sufficiently expressed by that word "all things." 2. That text of Genesis 2:4, "These are the generations of heaven and earth, when they were created, in the day in which the Lord God made heaven and earth: and every shrub of the field before it arose on the earth, and every herb of the region before it sprouted"; therefore, they say, all the productions narrated by Moses pertain to one and the same day, without there being any interval of time between the creation of heaven and earth and the third day, on which shoots and trees were produced.

But neither is valid. Not the first; for, according to the Greek text, that word "together" signifies all things as one, without exception (see Schwetz, cited place). Nor does it obstruct this that the same thing is sufficiently expressed by the word "all things"; since frequently in Sacred Scripture the same thing is confirmed by equivalent terms. Thus, for example, Psalm 13:3 says: "All have turned aside, together they have become useless"; and nearer to our matter, John 1 reads: "All things were made through him, and without him nothing was made." Not the second, because that phrase "in the day" signifies in the time previously designated by Moses, or in the days, for the singular is often used for the plural in Sacred Scripture. See Petavius, book 1, c. 5.

Proof II. The very common opinion of the holy Fathers and Doctors adheres to the proper and literal sense. But the authority of St. Augustine does not seem to obstruct this consensus. For a) the holy Doctor proposes the allegorical interpretation while doubting. "Let anyone," he says (On Genesis Literally, book 4, c. 28), "seek in the enumeration of those days, not that opinion which according to our measure we have been able either to investigate or to suppose, but another, which may be understood better and properly, not figuratively in prophecy, but in this condition of creatures; let him seek, and, helped by God, let him find. For it can happen that I also perhaps may find another more congruent with these words of divine Scripture. Nor do I confirm this one in such a way that I would contend that one which should be preferred cannot be found." b) The holy Doctor himself (On Catechizing the Uninstructed, c. 17, n. 28) seems to admit the common literal interpretation; for he says: "Concerning this rest Scripture signifies and does not keep silent, that from the beginning of the world, from the time when God made heaven and earth and all things which are in them, he worked for six days, and on the seventh day he rested. For the omnipotent one could have made all things

also in one moment of time. But he had not labored so that he should rest, when he spoke and they were made, he commanded and they were created; but so that he might signify that after the six ages of this world, in the seventh age, as on the seventh day, he would rest in his Saints." c) Speaking of the twelve books of On Genesis Literally (Retractations, c. 24), he says: "In this work more things were asked than found, fewer things were established; but the rest were posited in such a way as though they were still to be sought."

Proof III. It is a hermeneutic rule handed down by St. Augustine himself that one must not depart from the literal and proper sense of Sacred Scripture without a compelling reason. But in this case there is no compelling reason. Therefore.

The minor is proved. For a) no absurdity follows from the literal sense, and therefore no handle is given to unbelievers for calumniating the Mosaic narrative, which St. Augustine feared so greatly. This is clear from the fact that now they would rather suffer scandal if simultaneous creation, and not successive creation, were maintained.

b) Scripture itself does not teach that the literal sense must be abandoned, as we have proved by examining the places which are usually brought forward by the authors themselves of the allegorical interpretation. Indeed, it seems to suggest the contrary. For 1. all agree that the other things which are narrated there must be received in the proper sense. Whatever Cajetan may have said, the Apostle teaches that the creation itself of woman must be received in the proper sense, saying in 1 Corinthians 11:9: "For man is not from woman, but woman from man"; why, therefore, will the distinction itself of the days not be taken in the proper sense? 2. Moses, as all admit, is a historical writer; in the course of Genesis he narrates facts with a simple pen; at the beginning of Genesis he lays down the foundations of the law, as we have seen. But all these things seem to exclude difficult allegories from the narrative of the creation of the universe.

c) Finally, that tradition in no way favors the allegorical interpretation has already been demonstrated above.

125. Non videtur adhaerendum esse sententiae recentiori minus communi, quae tamen adhuc libera est inter Catholicos. Etenim a) Juxta constantem traditionem SS. Patrum et Theologorum, Mosaica narratio non de restauratione, sed de creatione et formatione terrae, quae prius non exstiterat, intelligenda est.

b) Creatio caeli et terrae videtur immediate conjungi cum productione herbarum in Gen. 2. 4. superius recitato.

c) Referam animadversiones P. Pianciani (In historiam creationis Mosaicam commentatio, pag. 14.) "In hac sententia," inquit, "quae ab Ecclesia toleratur, illud est incommodi, quod nimis separatur versus secundus a primo. Creavit ... terram. Terra autem inanis ... Videntur hic res sibi proxime succedentes et prima terrae facies describi, non vero status ad quem post multa saecula et plurimas vicissitudines terra reciderit. Duriusculum autem mihi est ponere, lucem fuisse ante Dei vocem: Sit lux; stirpes et animalia, antequam Deus diceret: germinet terra herbam ... scateant aquae reptilibus ... volet volatile super terram, etc. Praeterea minus verisimile videtur, Deum tellurem creatam, et ita ornatam vitaque plenam destruxisse, licet mediantibus causis secundis, antequam hominem faceret qui eum cognoscere ejus-

que opera contemplari posset. Nec apparet, si dies mosaicos faciunt 24 horarum, cur Deus mundum illum antiquum qui ante hominem deletus est, tam diuturna molitione et legibus naturae operantibus perfecerit; hunc vero quem nobis concessit, tam cito atque una sua omnipotenti virtute refecerit." Vid. etiam Miller, Testimony, p. 133.; et Brownson's Quarterly Review, 1863. p. 207. 125. It does not seem that one must adhere to the more recent less common opinion, which nevertheless is still free among Catholics. For a) according to the constant tradition of the holy Fathers and theologians, the Mosaic narrative is to be understood not of the restoration, but of the creation and formation of the earth, which previously had not existed.

b) The creation of heaven and earth seems to be joined immediately with the production of herbs in Genesis 2:4, recited above.

c) I shall report the observations of Fr. Pianciani (Commentary on the History of Mosaic Creation, p. 14). "In this opinion," he says, "which is tolerated by the Church, this is the inconvenience, that the second verse is separated too much from the first. He created ... the earth. But the earth was empty ... Here things seem to succeed one another immediately and the first face of the earth seems

to be described, not the state into which, after many ages and very many vicissitudes, the earth had fallen back. Moreover it is rather hard for me to posit that light existed before the voice of God: Let light be made; plants and animals before God said: let the earth bring forth the herb ... let the waters swarm with creeping things ... let the winged thing fly over the earth, etc. Besides, it seems less likely that God destroyed the earth, created and so adorned and full of life, even by means of secondary causes, before he made man who could know him and contemplate his works. Nor does it appear, if they make the Mosaic days to be of 24 hours, why God perfected that ancient world which was destroyed before man by such prolonged fashioning and by the laws of nature operating, but refashioned this one which he granted to us so quickly and by his one omnipotent power." See also Miller, Testimony, p. 133; and Brownson's Quarterly Review, 1863, p. 207.

§ III. Interpretatio recentior communior, et interpretatio literalis communis theologice spectatae. Section III. The More Recent More Common Interpretation, And The Common Literal Interpretation Considered Theologically.

126. Auctores vero interpretationis literalis communis, quamvis fateantur libere defendi posse a Catholicis praecedentem interpretationem; huic tamen illam praeferendam esse contendunt, propter sequentes rationes.

a) Quidquid erudite disseratur de variis significationibus vocis diei, certum est quod sensus ejus proprius et non derivatus vel translatus, est vel tempus lucis prout nocti ejusdem diei opponitur, vel dies civilis 24 horarum. Atque idem dicendum est de voce hebraica iom, et arabica jaumun: quod expresse tandem fatentur ipsi auctores recentioris interpretationis (1).

b) Voces etiam hereb, et boker vespere et mane, juxta etymologiam significare quidem possunt confusionem et dispositionem seu ordinem: certum est tamen in usu biblico idem significare ac apud nos. Hoc etiam iidem auctores fatentur (2).

Unde dicunt: Potest sensus derivatus vel translatus verborum etiam admitti, si opus sit, sed retento imprimis sensu proprio et sensu determinato ex usu bi-

blico, nisi cogens aliqua ratio hunc relinquendum esse suadeat; atqui sensus proprius diei non est tempus indeterminatum, sed vel tempus lucis in die, vel dies civilis; sensus vero determinatus ex usu biblico vocum vespere et mane est idem ac apud nos; ergo si nulla sit cogens ratio, alteruter sensus diei est retinendus. Atqui, in casu, non potest retineri primus sensus proprius, siquidem Moyses ait: "Factum est vespere et mane dies unus ... secundus, etc.;" ergo alter retineri debet, nempe sumi debet dies pro die civili. Utrum autem aliqua sit ratio relinquendi sensum proprium, patebit ex seq. §.

c) Constat ex usu biblico vocem dies sumi pro die civili semper ac plures dies distincte numerantur. Sic, ex. gr., nemo dubitat de hac significatione in lib. Num. cap. 7., ubi legitur: "Primo die obtulit oblationem suam Nahasson;" 18. "Secundo die obtulit Nathanael;" 24. "Tertio die princeps filiorum Zabulon, Eliab filius Helon;" 30. "Die quarto princeps filiorum Ruben, Elisur filius Sedeur;" 36. "Die quinto princeps filiorum Simeon, Salamiel filius Surisaddai." Et ita porro usque ad diem duodecimum. - Similiter cap. 29. dicitur: "Prima dies venerabilis et sancta erit vobis, etc.;" v. 17. "In die altero offeretis vitulos de armento duodecim, etc.;" v. 20. "Die tertio offeretis vitulos undecim, etc.;" v. 23. "Die quarto offeretis vitulos decem, etc.;" et ita usque ad octavum diem. Atqui eadem distincta enumeratio dierum habetur in 1. Genes.; ergo.

d) Nec obstat quod Gen. 2. 4-5. dicitur: "Istae sunt generationes caeli et terrae, quando creata sunt, in die quo fecit Dominus Deus caelum et terram: et

omne virgultum agri, etc." - Nam ex usu biblico, aiunt, quando vox illa in die refertur ad tempus antea determinatum, ab eo accipit determinationem, quam per se forte non haberet. Sic, ex. gr., in cit. cap. 7. libri Num. v. 84. legitur: "Haec in dedicatione altaris oblata sunt a principibus Israel in die qua consecratum est;" ubi illud in die evidenter refertur ad tempus duodecim dierum antea determinatum, quod proinde exprimit. Atqui similiter illud in die Gen. 2. 4. refertur ad dies jam enumeratos in cap. 1.; ergo. Sane, inquiunt, si quae est obscuritas in illo in die cap. 2., et in illis "dies unus," "dies secundus," "dies tertius," etc. cap. 1.; videtur explicatio illius in die petenda ex cap. 1., et non viceversa; siquidem cum in die praeferat aliquam indeterminationem per se, vox dies in cit. vv. cap. 1. satis determinata

est per propriam significationem vocis, per additionem vespere et mane, et per distinctam enumerationem.

e) Legitur 1. Gen. vv. 14-19.: "Dixit autem Deus: Fiant luminaria in firmamento caeli, et dividant diem ac noctem, et sint in signa et tempora, et dies et annos: ut luceant in firmamento caeli, et illuminent terram. Et factum est ita. Fecitque Deus duo luminaria magna: luminare majus, ut praeesset diei, et luminare minus, ut praeesset nocti: et stellas. Et posuit eas in firmamento caeli, ut lucerent super terram, et praeessent diei ac nocti, et dividerent lucem ac tenebras. Et vidit Deus quod esset bonum. Et factum est vespere et mane, dies quartus." Unde, aiunt: cum eodem modo dicatur "factus est dies unus ... secundus, etc.," ac dicitur "factus est dies quar-

tus," si quae est difficultas in determinando vero sensu vocis dies quando Moyses enumerat sex creationis tempora, ea explananda est ex textibus magis perspicuis; sed nulla potest magis perspicua descriptio diei desiderari ea quam ipse Moyses tradit loquens de quarto die; ergo. Atqui cum dicitur "et factum est vespere et mane dies quartus" vox dies significat diem civilem; tanta enim distinctione et perspicuitate describitur dies civilis, ut nulla major desiderari posse videatur. Ergo etiam caeteri creationis dies civiles habendi sunt. - Nec obstat, inquiunt, quod in praecedentibus diebus sol nondum erat; nam Deus fecit duo luminaria ut "praeessent diei ac nocti, et dividerent lucem ac tenebras;" vicissitudinem autem lucis ac tenebrarum poterat Deus aliter obtinere ante creationem solis per aliud medium (quod clarius intelligitur ex recentioribus theoriis de natura lucis), ita ut maneat analogia et eadem duratio omnium dierum. Nec ullam Moyses dedisset occasionem errori: duratio enim omnium dierum esset eadem; eam vero primis tribus diebus a sole nullo pacto pendere sufficienter dixisset, ponendo expresse solis creationem in die quarto. 126. But the authors of the common literal interpretation, although they admit that the preceding interpretation can be freely defended by Catholics, nevertheless contend that this one must be preferred to it, for the following reasons.

a) Whatever may be learnedly discussed concerning the various significations of the word "day," it is certain that its proper and not derived or transferred sense is either the time of light insofar as it is opposed to the night of the same day, or a civil day of 24 hours. And the same thing must be said of the Hebrew word iom and the Arabic jaumun, which at last the authors themselves of the more recent interpretation expressly admit (1).

b) The words also hereb and boker, evening and morning, according to etymology can indeed signify confusion and disposition or order; nevertheless it is certain that in biblical usage they signify the same thing as among us. The same authors also admit this (2).

Hence they say: a derived or transferred sense of words can also be admitted, if there is need, but with the proper sense and the sense determined from biblical usage being retained first, unless some compelling reason persuades that this must be abandoned. But the proper sense of "day" is not an indeterminate time, but either the time of light in the day, or a civil day; and the sense determined from biblical usage of the words evening and morning is the same as among us. Therefore, if there is no compelling reason, one or the other sense of "day" must be retained. But in this case the first proper sense cannot be retained, since Moses says: "Evening and morning were made, one day ... second, etc." Therefore the other must be retained, namely, "day" must be taken for a civil day. But whether there is some reason for abandoning the proper sense will be clear from the following section.

c) It is established from biblical usage that the word "day" is taken for a civil day whenever several days are distinctly numbered. Thus, for example, no one doubts this signification in the book of Numbers, chapter 7, where it is read: "On the first day Nahasson offered his oblation"; verse 18: "On the second day Nathanael offered"; verse 24: "On the third day the prince of the sons of Zabulon, Eliab the son of Helon"; verse 30: "On the fourth day the prince of the sons of Ruben, Elisur the son of Sedeur"; verse 36: "On the fifth day the prince of the sons of Simeon, Salamiel the son of Surisaddai." And so onward up to the twelfth day. Similarly, chapter 29 says: "The first day shall be venerable and holy to you, etc."; verse 17: "On the second day you shall offer twelve calves from the herd, etc."; verse 20: "On the third day you shall offer eleven calves, etc."; verse 23: "On the fourth day you shall offer ten calves, etc."; and so up to the eighth day. But the same distinct enumeration of days is had in Genesis 1. Therefore.

d) Nor does it obstruct this that Genesis 2:4-5 says: "These are the generations of heaven and earth, when they were

created, in the day in which the Lord God made heaven and earth: and every shrub of the field, etc." For from biblical usage, they say, when that word "in the day" is referred to a time previously determined, it receives from that time the determination which perhaps it would not have of itself. Thus, for example, in the cited chapter 7 of the book of Numbers, verse 84, it is read: "These things were offered by the princes of Israel in the dedication of the altar on the day on which it was consecrated"; where that phrase "on the day" evidently refers to the time of twelve days previously determined, and therefore expresses that. But similarly that phrase "in the day" in Genesis 2:4 refers to the days already enumerated in chapter 1. Therefore. Indeed, they say, if there is any obscurity in that phrase "in the day" in chapter 2, and in those phrases "one day," "second day," "third day," etc. in chapter 1, the explanation of that phrase "in the day" seems to be sought from chapter 1, and not conversely; since, while "in the day" presents some indetermination of itself, the word "day" in the cited verses of chapter 1 is sufficiently determined by the proper signification of the word, by the addition of evening and morning, and by the distinct enumeration.

e) It is read in Genesis 1:14-19: "And God said: Let luminaries be made in the firmament of heaven, and let them divide day and night, and let them be for signs and seasons, and days and years: that they may shine in the firmament of heaven, and illumine the earth. And it was made so. And God made two great luminaries: the greater luminary, that it might preside over the day, and the lesser luminary, that it might preside over the night: and the stars. And he placed them in the firmament of heaven, that they might shine over the earth, and preside over day and night, and divide light and darkness. And God saw that it was good. And evening and morning were made, the fourth day." Hence, they say: since it is said in the same way "one day was made ... second, etc." as it is said "the fourth day was made," if there is any difficulty in determining the true sense of the word "day" when Moses enumerates the six times of creation, it must be explained from clearer texts; but no description of a day can be desired more clear than that which Moses himself hands down while speaking of the fourth day. Therefore. But when it is said "and evening and morning were made, the fourth day," the word "day" signifies a civil day; for the civil day is described with such distinction and clarity that no greater seems able to be desired. Therefore the other days of creation also must be held to be civil days. Nor does it obstruct, they say, that in the preceding days the sun did not yet exist; for God made the two luminaries so that they might "preside over day and night, and divide light and darkness." But God could have obtained the vicissitude of light and darkness otherwise before the creation of the sun, through another medium (which is understood more clearly from the more recent theories concerning the nature of light), so that the analogy and the same duration of all the days would remain. Nor would Moses have given any occasion for error: for the duration of all the days would be the same; and he would have said sufficiently that in the first three days it in no way depended on the sun, by expressly placing the creation of the sun on the fourth day.

127. Haec sunt praecipua argumenta biblica, quibus interpretatio litteralis communis defendi solet: superest solum inquirendum utrum ex ea sequatur aliquid absurdi. 127. These are the principal biblical arguments by which the common literal interpretation is usually defended. It remains only to inquire whether anything absurd follows from it.

§ IV. Interpretatio literalis communis et recentior philosophice spectatae. Section IV. The Common Literal Interpretation And The More Recent Interpretation Considered Philosophically.

129. Non est nostri instituti omnia singillatim expendere, quae ex scientiis naturalibus afferuntur ad confirmandam recentiorem interpretationem; praecipua referre satis nobis erit; ex iis enim unusquisque facile intelliget quaenam sit omnium argumentorum vis; singulis autem adjiciemus animadversiones contrariae sententiae, quibusdam generalibus animadversionibus praemissis, quae omnibus fere argumentis aptari possunt. Omnes autem animadversiones non eo tendunt, ut falsa, sed ut incerta demonstrent recentioris interpretationis fundamenta.

Prima generalis

animadversio. Assumunt Geologi tamquam principium, ab initio Deum non creavisse nisi materiam mundi cum suis viribus, ex quarum naturali evolutione (praescindimus nunc ab homine et animantibus) terra formata est. Sed potuitne Deus ab initio producere aridam et aquam, illam ab hac ipse dividere, ipse producere quosdam montes primitivos, metalla, marmora, silices Lydios, etc., sicut produxit hominem ab initio in statu perfecto? Hoc Deum potuisse inficiabitur nemo. At itane fecit? Videri hoc potest conformius narrationi Mosaicae 1. Gen., praesertim 6-7., et 9-10. Negant tamen recentioris interpretationis auctores; quia talis modus productionis esset miraculosus, et miracula non sunt admittenda quamdiu non probantur - Atqui in casu

non fuisset verum miraculum; miraculum enim est quod fit praeter consuetum naturae ordinem; Deus autem creando constituebat ipsum ordinem. Unde D. Th. 1. p. q. 105. a. 7. ad 1. dicit: "creatio et justificatio impii, etsi a solo Deo fiant, non tamen, proprie loquendo, miracula dicuntur; quia non contingunt praeter ordinem naturae, cum haec ad ordinem naturae non pertineant." - Et ad 2.: "Similiter etiam insolitum dicitur (miraculum), non quia frequenter non eveniat, sed quia est praeter naturalem consuetudinem." Quare principium assumptum incertum omnino est, nec proinde ex eo certae deduci possunt consequentiae: quod et non pauci inter naturalium scientiarum cultores fatentur. (3)

Secunda animadversio generalis. Aliud principium assumunt geologi, quo statuunt omnia, quae pertinent ad formationem terrae aliaque phenomena in ea existentia, explicanda esse ex viribus naturalibus regulari et ordinario modo, qui nunc obtinet, operantibus. - Sed 1. sunt quaedam agentia in natura non communia, seu, quae non frequenter inveniuntur; sunt quaedam circumstantiae in quibus vires naturales extraordinario quodam modo exercentur: ita, ex. gr., nunc omnes norunt petrificationes vegetalium et animalium aliquando fieri brevi temporis intervallo. - 2. Praeter actionem regularem et ordinariam virium naturalium admittendae sunt quaedam magnae terrae perturbationes, seu, ut aiunt, revolutiones: ita praeter diluvium Noeticum, agnoscunt communiter magnas revolutiones (Wiseman Conf. VI.) sive ante sive post diluvium, partiales quidem, sed quae ad plura centena milliaria se extendebant. Multi ergo effectus, ut

formatio quorumdam montium, vallium, arida a mare occupata, etc., brevi intervallo fuerunt producti, cum aliter longam annorum periodum postulassent. Quod, et alia ratione, plures jam fatentur: inter alios Hopkins, C. E., F. G. S. (4)

Tertia animadversio generalis. Quae ex scientiis naturalibus, praesertim ex geologia, desumuntur ad mundi antiquitatem probandam, valde incerta sunt ob magnam harum scientiarum imperfectionem. (5) Quae quidem imperfectio maxime apparet ex duplici capite: primum est, quod observationes hactenus habitae non sufficiunt ad universalem conclusionem fundandam (6); alterum quod in conclusionibus, sicut in factis asserendis, magna est inter illarum scientiarum cultores discrepantia. - Primum illustrat Reusch (op. et ed. cit., lez. IV.) plurium testimoniis, uti Huxley, Humboldt, Lyell, Deutinger, Bischof, etc.; quorum alii simpliciter affirmant defectum sufficientis observationis; alii affirmant, in statu praesenti geologiae, errorem fere necessarium; alii denique, ut Bischof, tenent geologiam in suis essentialibus futuram esse semper hypotheticam. - Neque putandum est praefatam discrepantiam vigere solum quoad facta quaedam, et conclusiones minus principales; fatentur enim aliqui unum tantum esse certum, quod nempe aliquando terra fuerit a mare occupata (7) - Quodsi communiter convenire videntur quoad mundi antiquitatem asserendam; nullum tamen est hujus assertionis fundamentum, etiam facti, quod ipsi non evertant, uti paulo inferius patebit. Assertio ergo illa, quamvis communis, incerta manet, sicut ejus fundamentum.

Argum. 1um. Ipsa telluris formatio postulat longam annorum seriem ante creationem hominis. Etenim tota massa materiae creata primitus fuit in statu liquido juxta Neptunianos et Plutonistas; immo huic praecessisse statum fluidum aeriformem non pauci tenent, juxta hypothesim, quam vocant nebularem. - Fuisse in statu liquido probant ex figura sphaeroidea terrae, ita ut sit elevatior in parte aequatoriali et depressior in polis; scilicet supposito motu revolutionis circa suum axem, terra eam praecise habet figuram, quam, juxta leges mechanicae corpus liquidum debet acquirere. Pro hypothesi Plutonistarum adducitur tamquam probatio praesertim ignis, qui adhuc est in centro terrae, uti constat ex vulcanis, aquis thermalibus, et calore proportionaliter crescente cum in ima descenditur. Vid., inter caeteros, Figuier, "The World before the Deluge".

Animadv. a) Quod terra primitus fuerit in statu fluido aeriformi major pars geologorum negat. (8) - b) Non pauci geologi rejiciunt hypothesim ignis centralis (9) - c) Etiamsi

ostenderetur ignis centralis, ex eo non argueretur cum certitudine ad statum igneum totius massae materiae ab initio, uti patet per se, et admittitur ab auctoribus sententiae recentioris. Vid. Reusch (La Bibbia e la Natura, lez. XV.) - d) Probatio ex figura terrae infirmatur ex prima animadversione generali, et auctoritate adversariorum. (10)

Argum. 2um. In cortice terrae hactenus experimentis subjecto inveniuntur strata, quae crassitie, duritie, natura substantiarum differunt; ex iis aliqua sunt horizontalia, alia obliqua, alia verticalia; verticalia

vel obliqua priora sunt horizontalibus; atque haec ab illis nonnisi in aliqua terrae commotione penetrari potuere; quae terrae commotio debuit esse universalis, siquidem eadem strata in eadem dispositione ubique inveniuntur. Vid. Figuier op. c.

Animadv. a) Totum hoc argumentum infirmari potest ex animadversione generali prima et secunda. - b) Hinc strata verticalia quae penetrantur et superimponuntur horizontalibus, possent etiam explicari ex terrae revolutionibus ab omnibus admissis. c) Uniformis dispositio stratorum ab aliquibus refertur non ut factum, sed ut factum accommodatum theoriis jam praeconceptis. (11) - d) Irregularitas stratorum non in eo solum consistit, quod non ubique omnia diversa strata inveniuntur, ut fatentur omnes; sed etiam in eo, quod ea quae inveniuntur non servant eamdem inter se dispositionem. (12) - e) Praescindendo a fossilibus, de quibus dicetur infra, nihil strata probare non pauci autumant. (13)

Argum. 3um. Sunt terrena carbonifica, quae longum tempus exigunt, sive quia vegetationem jam adultam produnt, sive quia non poterant aliter in tanta quantitate ad eum statum adduci. Item de crystallizationibus. - Praesertim longa epocha est asserenda pro terrenis, quae, ut patet ex iis quae in ipsis inveniuntur, pluries fuere a mare occupata.

Animadv. a) Adulta vegetatio eatenus requirit longam annorum seriem, quatenus supponuntur vegetalia non immediate a Deo creata in statu perfecto. Recole primam animadversionem generalem - b) Potest, et fortasse debet supponi celerior vegetatio in quibusdam locis, ex particularibus circumstantiis

praesertim in primis temporibus, uti observat ipse Reusch (op. et edit. cit. pag. 302, Vol. 1.) - c) Brevi tempore posse aliquando obtineri conversionem vegetalium in carbones, nonnulli experientia ostendunt. (14) - d) Idem dicendum est de crystallizatione. (15) - Repetita terrae a mare occupatio non videtur firmum argumentum, sive quia ex exuviis non sat probatur; (16) sive quia non tantum temporis lapsum exigit; (17) sive tandem quia diluvium Noeticum, aliaeque partiales terrae revolutiones ante et post diluvium illud explicare possunt; eo vel magis quod minima pars terrae, ut vidimus, explorata est.

Argum. 4um ex fossilibus. (The name of fossils, from fossilis, dug up, is given to all organized bodies, animal or vegetable, buried naturally in the terrestrial strata, and more or less petrified, that is, turned to stone. Figuier, "The World before the Deluge", edited and revised by H. W. Bristow, F. R. S., F. G. S.). Unde: In terrenis fossiliferis vegetalia et animalia in magna quantitate ita ordinata inveniuntur, ut in posterioribus stratis nullum inveniatur vestigium eorum, quae in prioribus inveniuntur. Jam ut uniuscujusque generis vel speciei individua ita multiplicarentur et deinde reducerentur ad statum, in quo nunc sunt, longa annorum series requirebatur. Non inveniuntur, aiebant, fossilia humana. Ergo.

Animadv. a) Saepe videre est apud geologos, quod relativam antiquitatem stratorum ex fossilibus judicant; et haec vicissim ex stratis - b) Ordo, quo fossilia disposita dicuntur, non videtur esse certum factum. (18) c) Supposita etiam absentia quorumdam fos-

silium, potest aliter explicari, uti concedunt auctores recentioris interpretationis. (19) - d) Quantitas fossilium - supposito quod minima pars terrae est explorata; quod fuerint ante et post diluvium plures revolutiones; quod distributio fossilium non in omnibus casibus est eadem - potest etiam explicari per hypothesim translationis, quam ipsi geologi in pluribus casibus admittunt. (20) - e) Quoad humana fossilia, nunc res est extra controversiam posita. Vid., inter caetera, "Annales de Philosophie chretienne", n. 47., Nov. 1863, in artic. "Paleontologie humaine."

Argum. 5um. Omissis difficultatibus astronomicis, quae jam ab ipsis Astronomis refutantur (Vid. Perrone), dicunt solum: multa millia annorum requiruntur, ut lux stellarum fixarum ad nos perveniat; ergo. Hoc argumentum fusius proponit P. Pianciani op. cit., n. 14.

Animadv. Sufficit referre quae habet Schwetz op. cit., pag. 371, licet recentiorem interpretationem sequatur. "Putamus," inquit, "calculos illos de lucis stellarum propagatione institutos haud solidis niti rationibus. Etenim primo non evictum est, lucem omnis generis et per omnia loca, sive sint vacua sive quacumque demum materia pellucida repleta, eadem celeritate, ut hic sumitur, propagari. Deinde ipsa natura lucis non constat. Nam

hypothesis, qua statuitur, lucem esse materiam e corporibus lucentibus emanantem, a plurimis physicis merito est derelicta, sed et altera hypothesi, vibrationis dicta, non omnia lucis phaenomena explicari possunt, ita ut illorum sententia fors praeferenda sit, qui lucem simplicem vim vel substantiam habent, cujus propagandi celeritas a sola

densitate corporum pellucidorum, per quae propagatur, pendeat. Quod si verum esset, stellae omnes eodem fere temporis momento a nobis conspicerentur, et de tot myriadibus annorum, quibus opus est juxta sententiam adversariorum, ut lux viam a stellis fixis usque ad terram absolvat, cogitandum haud esset." 129. It is not part of our plan to weigh one by one all the things which are brought forward from the natural sciences to confirm the more recent interpretation; it will be enough for us to report the principal things. For from these anyone will easily understand what the force of all the arguments is; and to each we shall add observations of the contrary opinion, after certain general observations have been set down first, which can be fitted to almost all the arguments. But all the observations do not tend to demonstrate that the foundations of the more recent interpretation are false, but that they are uncertain.

First general observation. Geologists assume as a principle that from the beginning God created nothing except the matter of the world with its powers, from the natural evolution of which (we now prescind from man and living things) the earth was formed. But could God from the beginning produce dry land and water, himself divide the former from the latter, himself produce certain primitive mountains, metals, marbles, Lydian stones, etc., just as he produced man from the beginning in a perfect state? No one will deny that God could do this. But did he do so? This can seem more conformable to the Mosaic narrative in Genesis 1, especially verses 6-7 and 9-10. Nevertheless the authors of the more recent interpretation deny it, because such a mode of production would be miraculous, and miracles are not to be admitted as long as they are not proved. But in this case it would not have been a true miracle; for a miracle is what occurs outside the accustomed order of nature; but God by creating was establishing the order itself. Hence St. Thomas, Summa Theologiae I, q. 105, a. 7, ad 1, says: "creation and the justification of the ungodly, although they are done by God alone, nevertheless, properly speaking, are not called miracles; because they do not occur outside the order of nature, since these things do not belong to the order of nature." And ad 2: "Similarly, a miracle is also called unusual, not because it does not happen frequently, but because it is outside natural custom." Therefore the assumed principle is altogether uncertain, and consequently no certain consequences can be deduced from it. Not a few among the cultivators of the natural sciences also admit this. (3)

Second general observation. Geologists assume another principle, by which they establish that all things which pertain to the formation of the earth and other phenomena existing in it must be explained from natural powers operating in the regular and ordinary mode which now obtains. But 1. there are certain agents in nature which are not common, or which are not frequently found; there are certain circumstances in which natural powers are exercised in a certain extraordinary mode. Thus, for example, everyone now knows that petrifications of plants and animals are sometimes made within a short interval of time. 2. Besides the regular and ordinary action of natural powers, certain great disturbances of the earth must be admitted, or, as they say, revolutions. Thus, besides the Noachic flood, they commonly acknowledge great revolutions (Wiseman, Conference VI), whether before or after the flood, partial indeed, but extending to several hundreds of miles. Therefore many effects, such as the formation of certain mountains, valleys, dry land occupied by the sea, etc., were produced within a brief interval, although otherwise they would have demanded a long period of years. This, and for another reason, many now admit: among others Hopkins, C. E., F. G. S. (4)

Third general observation. The things which are taken from the natural sciences, especially from geology, to prove the antiquity of the world are very uncertain because of the great imperfection of these sciences. (5) This imperfection appears especially under a twofold head: the first is that observations held thus far do not suffice for founding a universal conclusion (6); the other, that in conclusions, as in asserting facts, there is great disagreement among the cultivators of those sciences. Reusch illustrates the first point (cited work and edition, lecture IV) by the testimonies of several, such as Huxley, Humboldt, Lyell, Deutinger, Bischof, etc.; of whom some simply

affirm the lack of sufficient observation; others affirm that, in the present state of geology, error is almost necessary; and finally others, such as Bischof, hold that geology in its essentials will always be hypothetical. Nor should it be thought that the aforesaid disagreement flourishes only as to certain facts and less principal conclusions; for some admit that only one thing is certain, namely that at some time the earth was occupied by the sea. (7) But if they seem commonly to agree as to asserting the antiquity of the world, nevertheless there is no foundation for this assertion, even a factual one, which they themselves do not overturn, as will be clear a little below. Therefore that assertion, although common, remains uncertain, just like its foundation.

Argument 1. The formation itself of the earth demands a long series of years before the creation of man. For the whole mass of created matter was originally in a liquid state according to the Neptunians and Plutonists; indeed not a few hold that an aeriform fluid state preceded this, according to the hypothesis which they call nebular. That it was in a liquid state they prove from the spheroidal figure of the earth, so that it is higher in the equatorial part and lower at the poles; namely, once the motion of revolution around its own axis is supposed, the earth has precisely that figure which, according to the laws of mechanics, a liquid body ought to acquire. For the hypothesis of the Plutonists, fire, which still exists in the center of the earth, is brought forward especially as proof, as is evident from volcanoes, thermal waters, and heat increasing proportionally as one descends into the depths. See, among others, Figuier, The World before the Deluge.

Observation. a) The greater part of geologists deny that the earth originally was in an aeriform fluid state. (8) b) Not a few geologists reject the hypothesis of central fire. (9) c) Even if central fire were shown, from it one would not argue with certainty to the fiery state of the whole mass of matter from the beginning, as is clear in itself and is admitted by the authors of the more recent opinion. See Reusch, La Bibbia e la Natura, lecture XV. d) The proof from the figure of the earth is weakened by the first general observation and by the authority of the adversaries. (10)

Argument 2. In the crust of the earth thus far subjected to experiments, strata are found which differ in thickness, hardness, and nature of substances; of these some are horizontal, others oblique, others vertical. The vertical or oblique strata are prior to the horizontal; and the latter could not have been penetrated by the former except in some commotion of the earth; and this commotion of the earth must have been universal, since the same strata are found everywhere in the same disposition. See Figuier, cited work.

Observation. a) This whole argument can be weakened from the first and second general observation. b) Hence vertical strata which penetrate and are superimposed on horizontal strata could also be explained from revolutions of the earth admitted by all. c) The uniform disposition of strata is reported by some not as a fact, but as a fact accommodated to theories already preconceived. (11) d) The irregularity of strata consists not only in this, that not all the diverse strata are found everywhere, as all admit, but also in this, that those which are found do not preserve the same disposition among themselves. (12) e) Prescinding from fossils, concerning which something will be said below, not a few think that strata prove nothing. (13)

Argument 3. There are carboniferous lands which demand a long time, either because they betray already mature vegetation, or because otherwise they could not be brought in such quantity to that state. Likewise concerning crystallizations. Especially a long epoch must be asserted for the lands which, as is clear from those things which are found in them, were occupied by the sea several times.

Observation. a) Mature vegetation requires a long series of years only insofar as plants are supposed not to have been immediately created by God in a perfect state. Recall the first general observation. b) A more rapid vegetation can, and perhaps must, be supposed in certain places, from particular circumstances, especially in the first times, as Reusch himself observes (cited work and edition, p. 302, vol. 1). c) Some show by experience that the conversion of plants into coal can sometimes be obtained in a short time. (14) d) The same must be said of crystallization. (15) The repeated occupation of the earth by the sea does not seem a firm argument, whether because it is not sufficiently proved from remains (16), or because it does not require so great a lapse of time (17), or finally because the Noachic flood and other partial revolutions of the earth before and after that flood can explain it, all the more because the smallest part of the earth, as we have seen, has been explored.

Argument 4, from fossils. (The name of fossils, from

fossilis, dug up, is given to all organized bodies, animal or vegetable, buried naturally in the terrestrial strata, and more or less petrified, that is, turned to stone. Figuier, The World before the Deluge, edited and revised by H. W. Bristow, F. R. S., F. G. S.). Hence: In fossil-bearing lands plants and animals are found in great quantity so ordered that in the later strata no trace is found of those things which are found in the earlier strata. Now, in order that the individuals of each genus or species should be multiplied in this way and then be reduced to the state in which they now are, a long series of years was required. Human fossils, they used to say, are not found. Therefore.

Observation. a) It is often seen among geologists that they judge the relative antiquity of strata from fossils, and these in turn from strata. b) The order in which fossils are said to be disposed does not seem to be a certain fact. (18) c) Even supposing the absence of certain fossils, it can be explained otherwise, as the authors of the more recent interpretation concede. (19) d) The quantity of fossils - supposing that the smallest part of the earth has been explored, that before and after the flood there were several revolutions, and that the distribution of fossils is not the same in all cases - can also be explained through the hypothesis of translation, which geologists themselves admit in several cases. (20) e) As to human fossils, the matter is now placed beyond controversy. See, among other things, Annales de Philosophie chretienne, n. 47, November 1863, in the article "Paleontologie humaine."

Argument 5. Omitting astronomical difficulties, which are now refuted by the Astronomers themselves (see Perrone), they say only: many thousands of years are required for the light of the fixed stars to come to us. Therefore. Fr. Pianciani proposes this argument more fully in the cited work, n. 14.

Observation. It is enough to report what Schwetz has in the cited work, p. 371, although he follows the more recent interpretation. "We think," he says, "that those calculations set up concerning the propagation of the light of the stars rest on hardly solid reasons. For first, it has not been demonstrated that light of every kind and through all places, whether they are empty or finally filled with any transparent matter whatsoever, is propagated with the same speed as is assumed here. Next, the very nature of light is not established. For the hypothesis by which it is maintained that light is matter emanating from luminous bodies has rightly been abandoned by most physicists; but by the other hypothesis, called that of vibration, not all the phenomena of light can be explained, so that perhaps the opinion of those should be preferred who hold light to be a simple force or substance, whose speed of propagation depends only on the density of transparent bodies through which it is propagated. But if this were true, all the stars would be seen by us at almost the same moment of time, and there would be no need to think of so many myriads of years, which according to the opinion of the adversaries are required for light to complete the path from the fixed stars all the way to the earth."

Conclusio. Conclusion.

130. Ex dictis in hoc articulo sequitur I. interpretationem recentiorem esse 1. liberam inter Catholicos, ita ut sine ulla nota defendi possit - 2. probabilem, siquidem a non paucis viris bene de Ecclesia et de scientia meritis defenditur. - 3. Non tamen certam, ut aliqui contendunt; nam a) argumenta, quibus nititur, non sunt certa - b) plures adhuc defendunt interpretationem literalem obviam. - c) Non desunt inter auctores recentioris interpretationis qui illud fatentur. Et hoc videtur satis innuere, ex. gr., P. Pianciani, dum in op. cit., n. 12. dicit: "Sequamur ergo quam exposuimus, sententiam; cui si valedicere difficultas aliqua insolubilis sive theologica sive physica jusserit, integrum tunc nobis erit ex reliquis duabus unam aut alteram capessere." 130. From the things said in this article it follows, first, that the more recent interpretation is: 1. free among Catholics, so that it can be defended without any mark; 2. probable, since it is defended by not a few men well deserving of the Church and of science; 3. nevertheless not certain, as some contend. For a) the arguments on which it rests are not certain; b) many still defend the obvious literal interpretation; c) there are not lacking among the authors of the more recent interpretation those who admit this. And Fr. Pianciani seems sufficiently to intimate this, for example, when in the cited

work, n. 12, he says: "Let us follow, therefore, the opinion which we have explained; if some insoluble difficulty, whether theological or physical, should bid us farewell to it, it will then remain open to us to take one or the other of the remaining two."

131. Sequitur II. Interpretationem communem 1. manere probabilem, siquidem nullo certo argumento ex scientiis naturalibus ducto, infirmatur - 2. videri etiam theologice probabiliorem; nam non modo vere literalis et magis obvia est exegetice spectata, sed habet insuper majus auctoritatis pondus ex traditione. Eo vel magis quod pauci antiqui non proprie favent recentiori interpretationi, sed potius efficere videntur,

ut traditio ipsi non obstet: qui enim a communiori recedunt inter antiquos, non sex epochas, sed unum instans loco sex dierum civilium adstruunt. 131. It follows, second, that the common interpretation: 1. remains probable, since it is weakened by no certain argument drawn from the natural sciences; 2. seems also theologically more probable, for not only is it truly literal and more obvious when considered exegetically, but it also has greater weight of authority from tradition. All the more because the few ancients do not properly favor the more recent interpretation, but rather seem to bring it about that tradition does not obstruct it: for those among the ancients who recede from the more common interpretation maintain not six epochs, but one instant in place of six civil days.

132. Unde in hanc interpretationem literalem obviam inclinat Jungmann; eamdem sequuntur Knoll, Gatti, Bosizio, S. J., P. Laurentius Prov. Capuc. "Etudes geologiques, philosophiques et scripturales sur la cosmogonie de Moise, Paris 1863", Sorignet Geology, etc. Keil, Veith, etc. Cl. P. Perrone vero, recentiori interpretatione exposita, ait: "Hanc ... neque amplectimur neque respuimus ... Si evidentes observationes nos cogant a communi interpretatione recedere, nullum detrimentum patitur Mosaica cosmogonia." 132. Hence Jungmann inclines toward this obvious literal interpretation; Knoll, Gatti, Bosizio, S.J., Fr. Laurentius, Provincial of the Capuchins, Geological, Philosophical, and Scriptural Studies on the Cosmogony of Moses, Paris 1863, Sorignet, Geology, etc., Keil, Veith, etc., follow the same. But the distinguished Fr. Perrone, after the more recent interpretation has been set forth, says: "This ... we neither embrace nor reject ... If evident observations compel us to recede from the common interpretation, Mosaic cosmogony suffers no detriment."

133. Cum hujusmodi evidentes observationes, ex dictis, adhuc desiderentur, licebit communi, seu literali obviae interpretationi adhaerere. Simul tamen plenissime obtemperamus D. Thomae 1. p. q. 68. a. 1., monito, quod et alterius sententiae auctoribus commendatur: "Sicut Augustinus docet 1 super Genes. ad litt., cap. 18, prope fin., et lib. 12. Conf., c. 23 et 24, in princ., in hujusmodi quaestionibus duo sunt observanda. Primo quidem, ut veritas Scripturae inconcusse teneatur. Secundo, cum Scriptura divina multipliciter exponi possit, quod nulli expositioni aliquis ita praecise inhaereat, ut si certa ratione constiterit hoc esse falsum quod aliquis sensum Scripturae esse credebat, id nihilominus asserere praesumat; ne Scriptura ex hoc ab infidelibus derideatur, et ne eis via credendi praecludatur." 133. Since evident observations of this kind, from the things said, are still lacking, it will be lawful to adhere to the common, or obvious literal, interpretation. Yet at the same time we obey most fully the warning of St. Thomas, Summa Theologiae I, q. 68, a. 1, which is also commended to the authors of the other opinion: "As Augustine teaches in On Genesis Literally, book 1, chapter 18, near the end, and Confessions, book 12, chapters 23 and 24, at the beginning, in questions of this kind two things are to be observed. First, that the truth of Scripture be held unshakenly. Second, since divine Scripture can be explained in many ways, that no one adhere so precisely to any exposition that, if by certain reason it is established that what someone believed to be the sense of Scripture is false, he nevertheless presume to assert

it; lest Scripture be derided by unbelievers on this account, and lest the way of believing be closed off to them."

Disputation II — On the Origin and Nature of Man

Article 1. Whether Man is Immediately from God

LatineEnglish

DE HOMINIS ORIGINE ET NATURA. On The Origin And Nature Of Man.

134. Omissis, ut monuimus (n. 112.), quae pertinent ad singulos creationis dies, disputationem de hominis origine et natura statim aggredimur. Cum plura hac de re pertractari soleant in philosophia; ea solum hic attingimus, quae ad dogma catholicum explicandum et vindicandum proprius accedunt. 134. Omitting, as we warned (n. 112), the things which pertain to the individual days of creation, we at once enter upon the disputation concerning the origin and nature of man. Since many things concerning this matter are usually treated in philosophy, we touch here only those things which more properly approach the explaining and vindicating of Catholic dogma.

135. Hominem praestantissimum esse visibilis creationis opus, Scriptura saepe asserit, et Patres confirmant. Hi autem hominis praeeminentiam triplici praesertim ex capite deducunt. a) ex tempore, quo homo conditus fuit. "Consentaneum," ait S. Greg. Nyss. (de hom. opif. c. 2.) "non erat imperantem existere prius quam eos, quibus esset cum potestate praefuturus. Praeparato nimirum ante omnia imperio, tum deinde proximum erat regem designari. Idcirco universitatis hujus creator ei, qui imperaturus erat, quamdam sedem regiam praestruxit." Idem docet S. Greg. Nazi. (Orat. 43.); Zacharias Mityl. (de mundi opific.); Severianus Gabalitanus (Orat. 4.) etc. - b) ex modo, quo conditus est. "Quamvis," inquit S. Gregorius M. (Moral. l. 9. c. 27.) per coaeternum Patri Verbum cuncta creata sint, in ipsa tamen rela-

tione creationis ostenditur, quantum cunctis animalibus, quantum rebus vel caelestibus, sed tamen insensibilibus, homo praeferatur. Cuncta quidem dixit et facta sunt. Cum vero facere hominem decernit, hoc quod reverenter pensandum est praemittit dicens: Faciamus hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem nostram. Ut videlicet, quia rationalis creatura condebatur, quasi cum consilio facta videretur. Quasi per studium de terra plasmatur, et inspiratione Conditoris in virtute spiritus vitalis erigitur: ut scilicet non per jussionis vocem, sed per dignitatem operationis existeret, qui ad Conditoris imaginem fiebat." Idem habent S. Greg. Nyss. (de hom. opific. c. 3.); Tertullianus (de Resurr. carn. c. 5.) etc. c) ex hominis natura. "Fecit te (o homo)" ait S. Petrus Chrysol. (Serm. 148.) "esse terra, ut esses tu dominus terrenorum, et esses ipsis in ipsius substantiae communione communis, nec tamen terrestribus te sic aequavit, ut non etiam caelestibus animatum te caelitus exaequaret, et ut esset tibi cum Deo ratio communis, corpus commune cum jumentis, dedit tibi animam de caelo, dedit tibi corpus de terra, ut in te nexa caeli terraeque concordia servaretur." - Idem docent S. August., S. Joan. Chrysost., S. Gregor. Nazi., S. Greg. M., etc. 135. Scripture often asserts, and the Fathers confirm, that man is the most excellent work of visible creation. But they derive the preeminence of man especially under a threefold head. a) From the time at which man was founded. "It was not fitting," says St. Gregory of Nyssa (On the Making of Man, c. 2), "that the one who was to rule should exist before those over whom he was to preside with power. For after the kingdom had first been prepared, then next it was fitting that the king be designated. For this reason the creator of this universe first built a certain royal seat for him who was to rule." St. Gregory Nazianzen teaches the same (Oration 43); Zacharias of Mytilene (On the Making of the World); Severian of Gabala (Oration 4), etc. b) From the mode by which he was founded. "Although," says St. Gregory the Great (Moralia, book 9, c. 27), "all things were created through the Word co-eternal with the Father, nevertheless, in the very account of creation it is shown how much man is preferred to all animals, how much

even to heavenly things, though insensible. Indeed he spoke all things, and they were made. But when he decides to make man, he first sends forth this, which must be reverently weighed, saying: Let us make man to our image and likeness. Namely, because a rational creature was being founded, he seemed to be made, as it were, with counsel. As if by study he is formed from the earth, and by the inspiration of the Founder he is raised up in the power of a vital spirit: namely, so that he who was being made to the image of the Founder might exist not through the voice of command, but through the dignity of the operation." St. Gregory of Nyssa (On the Making of Man, c. 3), Tertullian (On the Resurrection of the Flesh, c. 5), etc., have the same. c) From the nature of man. "He made you (O man)," says St. Peter Chrysologus (Sermon 148), "to be earth, so that you might be lord of earthly things, and might be common with them in communion of the same substance; yet he did not so equal you to earthly things that he would not also, by animating you from heaven, make you equal to heavenly things; and so that reason might be common to you with God, and body common with beasts, he gave you a soul from heaven, he gave you a body from earth, so that in you the bound concord of heaven and earth might be preserved." St. Augustine, St. John Chrysostom, St. Gregory Nazianzen, St. Gregory the Great, etc., teach the same.

136. Simul tamen monet S. Joan. Chrys. (Hom. 2. in Gen.): "Formavit Deus hominem de limo terrae: ad hoc si attendere volumus, non parva nobis humilitatis offertur doctrina. Nam cum cogitaverimus unde constitutionis suae initium natura nostra susceperit, etiamsi sexcenties supercilia surrigamus, ea reprimemus et humiliabimur, et substantiae nostrae qualitatem perpendentes, modestiam discemus." 136. At the same time, however, St. John Chrysostom warns (Homily 2 on Genesis): "God formed man from the slime of the earth: if we are willing to attend to this, no small doctrine of humility is offered to us. For when we have considered from where our nature received the beginning of its constitution, even if we raise our brows six hundred times, we shall press them down and be humbled, and, weighing the quality of our substance, we shall learn modesty."

De hominis origine et natura. On The Origin And Nature Of Man.

137. Immediata hominis origo a Deo dupliciter impugnatur. Alii enim, ut rationalistae ac neoterici biblici, quae de ea enarrantur in Gen. non literaliter sed mythice sumenda esse contendunt - Alii argumentis ex scientiis naturalibus ductis, ostendere conantur communem esse homini cum bestiis originem (Vid. Perrone). Theologice, ergo, et philosophice quaestionem pertractabimus. 137. The immediate origin of man from God is attacked in two ways. For some, such as rationalists and biblical neoterics, contend that the things narrated concerning it in Genesis must be taken not literally but mythically. Others, by arguments drawn from the natural sciences, try to show that man has an origin common with the beasts (see Perrone). Therefore we shall treat the question theologically and philosophically.

§ I. Hominis origo ex fontibus theologicis - exponitur quaestio. Section I. The Origin Of Man From Theological Sources - The Question Is Set Forth.

138. Conc. Vaticanum (Con. Dei Filius, cap. 1.) docet quod "Deus ... utramque de nihilo condidit creaturam, spiritualem et corporalem, angelicam videlicet et mundanam, ac deinde humanam quasi communem ex spiritu et corpore constitutam". Eadem definierat Conc. Lat. (n. 27.). Ex quo deducunt Theologi esse veritatem fidei quod primi parentes immediate a Deo conditi sunt. (Vid. Perrone, Knoll, Jungmann etc.) Utriusque enim Concilii decretum simul et eodem modo loquitur de Angelis, de mundo et de homine: sed constat Angelos et mundum immediate a Deo conditos esse. Ergo. 138. The Vatican Council (Dei Filius, chapter 1) teaches that "God ... founded from nothing each creature, spiritual and

corporeal, namely the angelic and the worldly, and then the human as something common constituted from spirit and body." The Lateran Council had defined the same (n. 27). From this theologians deduce that it is a truth of faith that the first parents were immediately founded by God (see Perrone, Knoll, Jungmann, etc.). For the decree of each Council speaks at the same time and in the same way concerning Angels, the world, and man; but it is established that the Angels and the world were immediately founded by God. Therefore.

139. Ut intelligatur haec catholica doctrina notandum est a) quod agitur non solum de anima, sed

etiam de corpore; ita ut homo ipse immediate a Deo conditus sit.

b) Quod anima quidem est immediate a Deo creata; corpus vero, uti patet, ex narratione Mosaica, non immediate creatum, sed conditum de limo terrae fuit, ac nonnisi mediate creatum (n. 30.); ideoque dicuntur primi parentes conditi a Deo.

c) Quod dicuntur primi parentes immediate conditi a Deo ad excludendum errorem eorum, qui hominem prodiisse affirmant vel a terrae fecunditate, vel ab ovo etc. Unde etsi corpus non fuerit immediate creatum, cum tamen fuerit immediate a Deo conditum, asseritur specialis et immediata Dei actio, distincta ab illa qua terram creavit, qua res omnes conservat, et qua concurrit ad omnes creaturarum operationes.

d) Quod in cit. cap. Conc. Vat. et Lat. non attingitur quaestio, utrum Deus usus fuerit ministerio Angelorum in formatione Adae - Communius negant Patres hujusmodi Angelorum ministerium adhibitum fuisse; si tamen de possibilitate illud adhibendi agatur, "potuit" inquit D. Th. 1. p. q. 91. a. 2. ad 1., "fieri, ut aliquod ministerium in formatione corporis primi hominis exhiberent, sicut exhibebunt in ultima resurrectione, pulveres colligendo."

Hoc explicans Suarez de op. sex dier. l. 3. c. 1. n. 5., animadvertit: "Duo posse in formatione illius corporis considerari. Unum est localis congregatio terrae in locum aptum, et convenientem ad disponendum corpus illud; alterum est, organizatio, et dispositio illius materiae humanae conveniens. Primum istorum facile potuit Angelorum ministerio fieri. Et de illo praecipue loquitur D. Thom. dicto art. 2. ad 1. in ex-

emplum adducens ministerium, quod in ultima resurrectione Angeli exhibebunt, cineres humanos colligendo. Illud autem ministerium non sufficit, ut Angeli dicantur hominem creasse, vel corpus ejus formasse, sicut nec in resurrectione sufficeret, ut corpora resurgentium creasse, aut formasse Angeli dicantur, quia illud ministerium est valde remotum per solam applicationem materiae. Quod variis exemplis declarat Aug. lib. 9. Gen. ad liter. cap. 15."

Deinde, n. 6., addit: "Loquor de illo corpore, ut tunc factum est, et ad receptionem animae praeparatum, nam cum homo fit per naturalem generationem, illa organizatio, et dispositio corporis naturali virtute a generante fit; secluso tamen ordine naturalis propagationis non potest illud opus fieri ab ulla causa creata sive elementari, aut caelesti, sive ab omnibus simul, et multo minus ab Angelis, qui non possunt naturaliter materiam transmutare, aut corpora per se alterare; sed organizatio corporis primi hominis non fuit facta per viam naturalis generationis, ut per se notum est; ergo a solo Deo fieri potuit." - Vid. si lubet quae sequuntur.

e) Quod non modo Adam, sed etiam Eva, a qua etiam humana natura propagata est, quoad animam et corpus a Deo immediate condita est. Quod notamus, praecipue quia ex iis quae dicuntur de creatione mulieris peti solent difficultates ad excludendum sensum literalem.

Fuit revera opinio Cajetani narrationem de creatione mulieris esse allegorice intelligendam. "Dicit enim," inquit Suarez, l. c. cap. 2. n. 5., "per ablationem costae significatam esse diminutionem roboris ex

animo viri ob uxorem, et per costam significatam esse socialem vitam inter virum, et uxorem, et per costam quatenus una tantum nominatur significari debilitatem foeminae, et in eo, quod dicitur, replevisse Deum carnem pro ea, significatum esse, quod diminutio roboris in viro ob uxorem prolis fructu compensatur." Sed haec opinio merito ab omnibus temeritatis nota afficitur.

PROP. XIV. Primi parentes, prout ex divina revelatione constat, immediate a Deo conditi sunt.

Prob. I. ex Scriptura. Gen. 1., 26. seqq., legitur: "Et ait: Faciamus hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem nostram: et praesit piscibus maris, et volatilibus caeli, et bestiis, universaeque terrae, omnique reptili quod movetur in terra. Et creavit Deus hominem ad imaginem suam: ad imaginem Dei creavit illum: masculum et feminam creavit eos." - Et 2., 7. 18. 20.: "Formavit igitur Dominus

Deus hominem de limo terrae, et inspiravit in faciem ejus spiraculum vitae, et factus est homo in animam viventem ... Dixit quoque Dominus Deus: Non est bonum esse hominem solum; faciamus ei adjutorium simile sibi ... Immisit ergo Dominus Deus soporem in Adam, quumque obdormisset, tulit unam de costis ejus, et replevit carnem pro ea. Et aedificavit Dominus Deus costam, quam tulerat de Adam, in mulierem: et adduxit eam ad Adam."

Homines, quorum formatio describitur in primo et secundo capite Genesis sunt omnino iidem: discrimen in eo tantummodo est, quod productio Adami et Evae, quae summatim enarratur in primo cap., quin explicetur modus, uberius declaratur in secundo - Unde: si recitata verba Sacrae Scripturae sensu obvio et literali sumantur, absque dubio patefaciunt hominem immediate a Deo conditum esse; atqui sensu literali et obvio sumenda sunt. Ergo.

Decl. maj. Exhibetur Deus dicens, "Faciamus hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem nostram;" et additur, "et creavit eum, etc.;" nullius ergo agentis intermedii fit mentio, imo potius excluditur, ille enim creat, qui ad sui similitudinem creat. Si sermo sit de anima, haec nequit produci nisi per veri nominis creationem, quae solius Dei est; si de corpore hominis, illud dicitur Deus formavisse, finxisse de limo terrae, nempe limum, quem jam creaverat, disposuisse ut aptus esset et exigeret anima informari "spiravit in faciem ejus spiraculum vitae:" haec autem omnia sensu obvio accepta immediatam actionem Dei exhibent.

Prob. min. Omissis communibus argumentis, sufficit hic ostendere in Scripturis saepe ita allusionem fieri ad formationem hominis, ut secundum literam accipi debeat. Sic, ex. gr., Ps. CII. 14.: "Ipse (Deus) cognovit figmentum nostrum. Recordatus est, quoniam pulvis sumus;" Job 10. 8. 9.: "Manus tuae fecerunt me, et plasmaverunt me totum in circuitu: memento quaeso, quod sicut lutum feceris me, et in pulverem reduces me;" c. 33. v. 4.: "Spiritus Dei fecit me, et spiraculum Omnipotentis vivificavit me;" v. 6.: "Ecce et me, sicut et te fecit Deus, et de

eodem luto ego quoque formatus sum." Sap. 7. 1.: "Sum quidem et ego mortalis homo et ex genere terreni illius, qui prior factus est;" Eccli. 18. 1.: "Deus creavit de terra hominem, et secundum imaginem suam fecit illum."

Item quoad productionem mulieris de costa viri, sensum literalem a) exigit contextus, uti patet ex verbis Adami, qui expergefactus dixit: hoc nunc os ex ossibus meis, et caro de carne mea - b) natura libri Moysis, qui est historicus - c) exigunt alia, quae ibi narrantur, et quae, juxta omnes, literaliter sunt accipienda. - d) Parallelismus. Nam Math. 19. 4. seq.: "Non legistis, quia qui fecit hominem ab initio, masculum et feminam fecit eos? et dixit: Propter hoc dimittet homo patrem et matrem, et adhaerebit uxori suae, et erunt duo in carne una. Itaque jam non sunt duo, sed una caro. Quod ergo Deus conjunxit, homo non separet." Et 1. Tim. 2. 13.: "Adam enim primus formatus est, deinde Eva." Et 1. Cor. 11. 8-9.: "Non vir ex muliere est, sed mulier ex viro. Etenim non est creatus vir propter mulierem, sed mulier propter virum." Et 11. 12.: "Nam sicut mulier de viro, ita et vir per mulierem: omnia autem ex Deo."

His addit Suarez cit. cap. 2. n. 5. rationem. Relata enim expositione metaphorica Cajetani, quam superius dedimus, observat: "Verba scripturae, quae actionem Dei narrant, etiamsi vel in re facta, vel in modo actionis aliquam metaphoram habere dicantur, necessario actionem aliquam significare debent, ut vera in aliquo sensu sint. Illa autem verba, tulit,

replevit, aedificavit, actionem, imo actiones significant; ergo etiamsi metaphora in verbis permitteretur, ad veritatem semper est necessarium, saltem metaphorice aliquam Dei actionem significari. Nulla autem a Cajet. explicatur, nec facile excogitari potest, etiamsi fingendi detur licentia."

Prob. II. ex Patribus. Nam a) ita plures hominem immediate a Deo conditum asserunt, ut excludant etiam ministerium Angelorum. Ita S. Basilius (hom. 9. in Hexaem.); S. Ambrosius (Hexaem. l. 6. c. 7. n. 40.); S. Augustinus (de Gen. ad lit. l. 9. c. 15.); Theodoretus (in Gen. q. 19.)

b) Quae narrantur in Gen. de formatione viri et mulieris literaliter aperte accipiunt. Ita S. Basilius in cit. hom. 9., in cujus fine de creatione hominis sermonem habet, inquit: "Ego, cum faenum audio, faenum intelligo; et plantam, et piscem, et bestiam, et pecus, omnia uti dicta sunt, sic accipio; non enim erubesco Evangelium;" et paulo inferius illos reprehendit, qui, relicto sensu literali, solum allegorias quaerunt, et sua commenta pro eloquiis Spiritus Sancti venditant. S. Hieronymus (in Com. in Ep. ad Philem.): "Credit quispiam in conditorem Deum? non potest credere, nisi prius crediderit de Sanctis ejus, vera esse quae scripta sunt: Adam a Deo plasmatum, Evam ex costa illius et latere fabricatam, Enoch translatum, etc."

c) Ita admirantur formationem hominis, ut manifeste profiteantur specialem et immediatam divinam operationem.

Ita S. Jo. Chrys. (Hom. 15. in Gen.): "Acceptam costam aedificavit Dominus Deus in mulierem. Admirabile dictum, nostram rationem nimia excellentia vincens! Ejusmodi enim sunt omnia, quae fiunt a Domino. Istud enim non est minus, quam hominem e pulvere formari." - S. Cyrillus Hier.

(Catech. 12.), ex eo, quod ex luto corpus Adami, et ex ejus costa mulierem produxit, probat contra Judaeos, Deum etiam efficere potuisse, ut virgo filium pareret.

d) Etsi diversas expositiones allegoricas, variasque rationes tradant Patres de formatione mulieris ex costa Adae; omnes tamen supponunt veritatem historicam et sensum literalem facti. Sic, ex. gr., S. Augustinus (Tract. 9. in Joan. n. 10.), ait: "Dormit Adam, ut fiat Eva; moritur Christus, ut fiat Ecclesia. Dormiente Adam fit Eva de latere; Mortuo Christo lancea percutitur latus, ut profluant Sacramenta, quibus formetur Ecclesia." Quod et Conc. Vienn. Clement. 1. de Sum. Trin. docuit. Vide 1. p. q. 92. a. 2. 139. In order that this Catholic doctrine be understood, it must be noted: a) that the matter concerns not only the soul, but also the body, so that man himself was immediately founded by God.

b) That the soul indeed is immediately created by God; but the body, as is clear from the Mosaic narrative, was not immediately created, but was founded from the slime of the earth, and was created only mediately (n. 30); and therefore the first parents are said to have been founded by God.

c) That the first parents are said to have been immediately founded by God in order to exclude the error of those who affirm that man came forth either from the fecundity of the earth, or from an egg, etc. Hence, although the body was not immediately created, nevertheless, since it was immediately founded by God, there is asserted a special and immediate action of God, distinct from that by which he created the earth, by which he conserves all things, and by which he concurs with all the operations of creatures.

d) That in the cited chapter of the Vatican and Lateran Councils the question is not touched whether God used the ministry of Angels in the formation of Adam. More commonly the Fathers deny that a ministry of Angels of this kind was employed. Yet if the matter concerns the possibility of employing it, "it could have happened," says St. Thomas, Summa Theologiae I, q. 91, a. 2, ad 1, "that they displayed some ministry in the formation of the body of the first man, just as they will display it in the last resurrection by gathering the dust."

Explaining this, Suarez, On the Work of the Six Days, book 3, c. 1, n. 5, observes: "Two things can be considered in the formation of that body. One is the local gathering of earth into a place apt and suitable for disposing that body; the other is the organization and suitable disposition of that human matter. The first of these could easily have been done by the ministry of Angels. And St. Thomas speaks especially of that in the cited article 2, ad 1, bringing forward as an example the ministry which Angels will display in the last resurrection by gathering human ashes. But that ministry does not suffice for Angels to be said to have created man, or to have formed his body, just as neither in the resurrection would it suffice for Angels to be said to have created or formed the bodies of those rising again, because that ministry is very remote, through the mere application of matter. Augustine explains this by various examples, book 9 of On Genesis Literally, chapter 15."

Then, n. 6, he adds: "I am speaking of that body as it was then made and prepared for the reception of the soul; for when man comes to be through natural generation, that organization and disposition of the body is made by natural power from the generator. Yet, with the order of natural propagation set aside, that work cannot be done by any created cause, whether elemental or heavenly, whether by all together, and much less by Angels, who cannot naturally transmute matter or alter bodies through themselves; but the organization of the body of the first man was not made by way of natural generation, as is known through itself; therefore it could be made by God alone." See, if you please, the things which follow.

e) That not only Adam, but also Eve, from whom human nature also was propagated, was immediately founded by God as to soul and body. We note this especially because difficulties are usually sought from the things which are said concerning the creation of woman in order to exclude the literal sense.

There really was an opinion of Cajetan that the narrative concerning the creation of woman must be understood allegorically. "For he says," says Suarez, cited place, chapter 2, n. 5, "that by the removal of the rib was signified the diminution of strength from the mind of the man on account of his wife; and that by the rib was signified the social life between man and wife; and that by the rib, insofar

as only one is named, was signified the weakness of woman; and in that which is said, that God filled up flesh in place of it, was signified that the diminution of strength in the man on account of his wife is compensated by the fruit of offspring." But this opinion is rightly branded by all with the mark of temerity.

PROP. XIV. The first parents, as is established from divine revelation, were immediately founded by God.

Proof I, from Scripture. Genesis 1:26 and following reads: "And he said: Let us make man to our image and likeness: and let him preside over the fishes of the sea, and the birds of heaven, and the beasts, and the whole earth, and every creeping thing which moves on the earth. And God created man to his image: to the image of God he created him: male and female he created them." And Genesis 2:7, 18, 20: "Therefore the Lord God formed man from the slime of the earth, and breathed into his face the breath of life, and man became a living soul ... The Lord God also said: It is not good for man to be alone; let us make him a helper like himself ... Therefore the Lord God sent sleep into Adam, and when he had fallen asleep, he took one of his ribs, and filled up flesh in place of it. And the Lord God built the rib, which he had taken from Adam, into a woman: and he brought her to Adam."

The human beings whose formation is described in the first and second chapter of Genesis are altogether the same. The difference is only in this, that the production of Adam and Eve, which is narrated summarily in the first chapter, without the mode being explained, is declared more richly in the second. Hence, if the recited words of Sacred Scripture are taken in the obvious and literal sense, they without doubt disclose that man was immediately founded by God. But they must be taken in the literal and obvious sense. Therefore.

The major is explained. God is presented as saying, "Let us make man to our image and likeness"; and it is added, "and he created him, etc." Therefore no intermediate agent is mentioned; indeed rather such an agent is excluded, for he creates who creates to his own likeness. If the discourse is about the soul, this cannot be produced except through creation properly so called, which belongs to God alone. If it is about the body of man, God is said to have formed it, fashioned it from the slime of the earth, namely, to have disposed the slime which he had already created so that it would be apt and would demand to be informed by a soul: "he breathed into his face the breath of life." But all these things, taken in the obvious sense, exhibit the immediate action of God.

The minor is proved. Omitting the common arguments, it is enough here to show that in the Scriptures allusion is often made to the formation of man in such a way that it must be taken according to the letter. Thus, for example, Psalm 102:14: "He (God) knew our frame. He remembered that we are dust." Job 10:8-9: "Your hands made me, and fashioned me wholly round about: remember, I ask, that you made me as clay, and will bring me back into dust." Chapter 33, verse 4: "The Spirit of God made me, and the breath of the Almighty gave me life"; verse 6: "Behold, God made me just as he made you, and I too was formed from the same clay." Wisdom 7:1: "I too am indeed a mortal man and from the race of that earthly one who was made first." Ecclesiasticus 18:1: "God created man from the earth, and made him according to his own image."

Likewise, as to the production of woman from the rib of the man, the literal sense is required: a) by the context, as is clear from the words of Adam, who, having awakened, said: this now is bone from my bones, and flesh from my flesh; b) by the nature of the book of Moses, which is historical; c) by the other things which are narrated there, and which, according to all, must be taken literally; d) by parallelism. For Matthew 19:4 and following says: "Have you not read that he who made man from the beginning made them male and female? And he said: For this reason a man shall leave father and mother, and shall cling to his wife, and the two shall be in one flesh. Therefore now they are not two, but one flesh. What therefore God has joined, let man not separate." And 1 Timothy 2:13: "For Adam was formed first, then Eve." And 1 Corinthians 11:8-9: "For the man is not from the woman, but the woman from the man. For the man was not created on account of the woman, but the woman on account of the man." And 11:12: "For as the woman is from the man, so also the man is through the woman: but all things are from God."

To these Suarez adds a reason in the cited chapter 2, n. 5. For after reporting the metaphorical exposition of Cajetan which we gave above, he observes: "The words of Scripture which narrate the action of God, even if they are said to have some metaphor either in the thing done or in the mode of action, must necessarily signify some action, so that they may be true in some sense.

But those words, he took, he filled up, he built, signify action, indeed actions. Therefore, even if metaphor were permitted in the words, it is always necessary for the truth that at least metaphorically some action of God be signified. But none is explained by Cajetan, nor can one easily be thought out, even if license of inventing be granted."

Proof II, from the Fathers. For a) several so assert that man was immediately founded by God that they exclude even the ministry of Angels. Thus St. Basil (Homily 9 on the Hexaemeron); St. Ambrose (Hexaemeron, book 6, c. 7, n. 40); St. Augustine (On Genesis Literally, book 9, c. 15); Theodoret (on Genesis, q. 19).

b) They openly take literally the things narrated in Genesis concerning the formation of man and woman. Thus St. Basil in the cited homily 9, at the end of which he has a discourse concerning the creation of man, says: "When I hear grass, I understand grass; and plant, and fish, and beast, and cattle, all things as they have been said, so I receive them; for I am not ashamed of the Gospel." And a little below he rebukes those who, having left behind the literal sense, seek only allegories and sell their own inventions as utterances of the Holy Spirit. St. Jerome (Commentary on the Epistle to Philemon): "Does someone believe in God the Founder? He cannot believe unless he first believes that concerning his saints the things which have been written are true: that Adam was formed by God, Eve fashioned from his rib and side, Enoch translated, etc."

c) They so admire the formation of man that they manifestly profess a special and immediate divine operation. Thus St. John Chrysostom (Homily 15 on Genesis): "The Lord God built the rib he had received into a woman. An admirable saying, overcoming our reason by too great an excellence! For all things which are done by the Lord are of this sort. For this is no less than that man be formed from dust." St. Cyril of Jerusalem (Catechesis 12), from the fact that God produced the body of Adam from clay and woman from his rib, proves against the Jews that God also could have brought it about that a virgin should bear a son.

d) Although the Fathers hand down diverse allegorical expositions and various reasons concerning the formation of woman from the rib of Adam, nevertheless all suppose the historical truth and the literal sense of the fact. Thus, for example, St. Augustine (Tractate 9 on John, n. 10) says: "Adam sleeps, that Eve may be made; Christ dies, that the Church may be made. While Adam sleeps, Eve is made from his side; when Christ is dead, his side is struck by the lance, so that the Sacraments may flow forth, by which the Church is formed." This also the Council of Vienne taught, Clementine 1, On the Highest Trinity. See Summa Theologiae I, q. 92, a. 2.

§ II. Solvitur proposita quaestio. Section II. The Proposed Question Is Solved.

140. Cf. D. Th., 1. p. q. 91. et 92. - Suarez, de op. sex. dier., l. 3. c. 1. et 2.; ubi et objectiones videri possunt. 140. Compare St. Thomas, Summa Theologiae I, q. 91 and 92; Suarez, On the Work of the Six Days, book 3, c. 1 and 2, where the objections also can be seen.

§ III.
Hominis origo ex principiis rationis. - Expositio systematum. Section III.
The Origin Of Man From Principles Of Reason - Exposition Of The Systems.

141. Distinxerunt semper, et etiam nunc celebriores Naturalistae distinguunt inter species, varietates et stirpes, eamque legem, experientia docti, praesertim statuerunt, ut 1. ex individuis unius speciei possint produci et propagari individua diversae stirpis et varietatis, non autem diversae speciei; atque ut 2. conjunctio individuorum diversae speciei vel sit omnino sterilis, vel si aliqua fecunditate donetur, numquam talis sit ut individua hybrida possint tamquam

nova species propagari. Species ergo habent indefinitam fecunditatem, sed juxta

identitatem typi, ac proinde stabiles seu immutabiles dicuntur. 141. Naturalists have always distinguished, and even now the more celebrated Naturalists distinguish, among species, varieties, and stocks; and, taught by experience, they have especially established this law: 1. that from individuals of one species individuals of a different stock and variety can be produced and propagated, but not individuals of a different species; and 2. that the conjunction of individuals of different species either is altogether sterile, or, if it is endowed with some fecundity, is never such that hybrid individuals can be propagated as a new species. Therefore species have indefinite fecundity, but according to identity of type, and consequently they are called stable or immutable.

142. Hanc legem inficiantur qui Transformistae nunc audiunt, eorum enim principium est transformatio, conversio unius speciei in aliam, origo unius speciei ab alia: dicunt nempe, quod quemadmodum ex individuis unius speciei, sive vegetalis sive animalis, possunt oriri et propagari diversae varietates et stirpes in eadem specie, ita et diversae species. 142. Those who are now called Transformists deny this law. For their principle is transformation, the conversion of one species into another, the origin of one species from another. Namely, they say that just as from individuals of one species, whether vegetal or animal, different varieties and stocks can arise and be propagated within the same species, so also different species can arise and be propagated.

143. Si quaeratur medium quo diversae species in hoc systemate producuntur, duo praecipua assignari solent. Primum est, quod Darwin vocat natural selection; alterum vero, quod Lamark et alii constituunt in organorum exercitio, et conatu, ad quem instinctive incitatur subjectum ad aliquam indigentiam explendam. 143. If one asks by what means different species are produced in this system, two principal means are usually assigned. The first is what Darwin calls natural selection; the other is what Lamarck and others place in the exercise of the organs and in the effort to which the subject is instinctively incited for satisfying some need.

144. Quoad primum observat imprimis cit. auctor modum, quo ex humana industria varietates obtinentur sive in cultura plantarum sive in procreatione animalium: seliguntur nempe praestantiora individua, simul miscentur aut conjunguntur, atque ita incrementum et diversitas obtinetur. Sic, ex. gr., si in flore albi coloris rubra macula appareat, potest haec varietas propagari per semina illius floris, in quo est illa macula; flores enim qui inde nascuntur generatim eamdem maculam habent. Imo cum ea per successivas generationes crescere soleat, si eadem industria repetatur, post lapsum temporis, ex flore primitus albo, flos rubri coloris tandem germinabit. Sic etiam, ex. gr., si seligantur equi, qui ad propagationem speciei destinantur, poterit perfectio et incre-

mentum, et successu temporis etiam varietas obtineri. - Quod hac in re humanae industriae tribuitur, etiam natura suo modo facit: selectione naturae sensim sine sensu varietates utiles in eodem vivente cumulantur rejectis inutilibus aut minus perfectis. 144. As to the first, the cited author first observes the mode by which varieties are obtained by human industry, whether in the cultivation of plants or in the procreation of animals: namely, the more excellent individuals are selected, mixed together or joined, and thus increase and diversity are obtained. Thus, for example, if a red spot appears in a flower of white color, this variety can be propagated through the seeds of that flower in which that spot is present; for the flowers which are born from it generally have the same spot. Indeed, since that spot is accustomed to grow through successive generations, if the same industry is repeated, after a lapse of time, from a flower originally white, a flower of red color will at last germinate. So also, for example, if horses are selected which are destined for the propagation of the species, perfection and increase, and in the course of time also variety, can be obtained.

What in this matter is attributed to human industry, nature also does in its own way: by the selection of nature, gradually and imperceptibly useful varieties are accumulated in the same living being, while useless or less perfect ones are rejected.

145. Ad hanc naturalem selectionem explicandam invexit Darwin legem, quam vocat "struggle for existence". Supponit nempe omnem animantium speciem tendere ad se propagandum geometrica progressione; hinc tractu temporis individua mirabiliter multiplicantur. At desunt media omnibus sufficientia ad vitam; incipit ergo pugna inter ipsa, unumquodque enim vult suam vitam conservare. In hac pugna vero ea individua vincent, quae melius natura disposita, in melioribus versantur conditionibus; exitus ergo erit, quod a Darwin dicitur "survival of the fittest". Similis fere pugna cum eodem exitu habetur in regno vegetali. Jamvero perfectiora individua, quae supersunt, de lege ordinaria gignent perfectiorem prolem; quae cum deinde eamdem pugnam ineat cum eodem exitu, post longam generationum seriem, habebitur collectio individuorum in quibus qualitates perfectiores cumulantur, nempe, nova stirps. Cumque, aiunt, quod varietas vel stirps communiter dicitur nihil aliud revera sit, quam species incipiens; post longam generationum seriem, praedicto processu surget nova species. 145. To explain this natural selection Darwin introduced the law which he calls "struggle for existence." Namely, he supposes that every species of living things tends to propagate itself by geometrical progression; hence in the course of time individuals are wonderfully multiplied. But means sufficient for life are lacking for all; therefore a struggle begins among them, for each one wishes to preserve its own life. In this struggle, however, those individuals will conquer which, better disposed by nature, are situated in better conditions; therefore the outcome will be what Darwin calls "survival of the fittest." An almost similar struggle, with the same outcome, is found in the vegetable kingdom. Now the more perfect individuals which survive will, by the ordinary law, beget a more perfect offspring; and when that offspring then enters the same struggle with the same outcome, after a long series of generations there will be had a collection of individuals in which the more perfect qualities are accumulated, namely, a new stock. And since, they say, what is commonly called a variety or stock is in reality nothing other than an incipient species, after a long series of generations, by the aforesaid process, a new species will arise.

146. Ex hoc duo viderentur sequi: 1. quod datur transformatio specierum in indefinitum - 2. quod hujusmodi transformatio fit constanti progressu ex bono in melius. Attamen primae sequelae obstat, juxta Darwin, lex, quam vocat permanentiae: in eo consistit haec lex ut transformatio fiat quamdiu in individuis

habetur forma incerta et vaga et peculiaris determinationis indiga; cum vero natura acquisiverit characteres omnino definitos, stabilitatem acquirit, et in alias converti nequit. - Alteram vero sequelam de constanti progressu admittit idem auctor: sed cum evidentia facti constanti illi progressui contradicat, non timet deinde eamdem sequelam negare. 146. From this two things would seem to follow: 1. that there is a transformation of species indefinitely; 2. that a transformation of this sort takes place by constant progress from good to better. Nevertheless, according to Darwin, the law which he calls the law of permanence stands against the first consequence. This law consists in this, that transformation takes place as long as there is in the individuals an uncertain and vague form, needing a particular determination; but when nature has acquired entirely definite characters, it acquires stability and cannot be converted into others. The same author admits the other consequence, concerning constant progress; but since the evidence of fact contradicts that constant progress, he afterwards does not fear to deny the same consequence.

147. Quoad secundum medium transformationis specierum, nititur Lamark facto physiologico, quod usus et exercitium perficit organa. Hinc si animalia versentur in novis conditionibus, quibus ad majores frequentioresque conatus excitentur, temporis intervallo, nova organa formantur. Et e contra, si ex novis conditionibus aliquae corporis partes non exerceantur, eo ipso

poterunt paulatim amitti. Novis autem organis acquisitis, nova animalium species exurgit. Sic, ex. gr., si avis non potest alibi quam in mare sibi cibum procurare, necessitate coacta, aiunt, extendet digitos supra superficiem aquae; hujusmodi conatibus saepius repetitis, pellis, quae digitos in radice conjungit, paulatim evadit membrum ad natandum utile. Ad recreandum animum juverit legere quomodo, juxta Darwin, homo acquisivit eam corporis formam, quam nunc habet. "The Descent of Man," Vol. 1. "Manner of Development," ex. gr., pag. 145 seqq., Appleton, 1871. 147. As to the second means of the transformation of species, Lamarck relies upon the physiological fact that use and exercise perfect the organs. Hence, if animals are situated in new conditions by which they are excited to greater and more frequent efforts, over an interval of time new organs are formed. And conversely, if, from new conditions, some parts of the body are not exercised, by that very fact they can gradually be lost. But when new organs have been acquired, a new species of animals arises. Thus, for example, if a bird cannot procure food for itself anywhere except in the sea, compelled by necessity, they say, it will extend its toes over the surface of the water; by efforts of this sort more frequently repeated, the skin which joins the toes at the base gradually becomes a member useful for swimming. To refresh the mind, it will be pleasant to read how, according to Darwin, man acquired that form of body which he now has: The Descent of Man, vol. 1, "Manner of Development," for example, p. 145 and following, Appleton, 1871.

148. Theoria haec generalis estne applicanda ipsi homini? Haeserunt hac in re ab initio ancipites auctores systematis; sed nunc et ipsi aperte profitentur quod eorum discipuli statim agnoverunt, hominem nempe nihil aliud esse nisi inferius quoddam animal transformatum. Si quis autem proximum humani

generis stipitem quaerat, alii assignant simiam trogloditem, alii vero aliquam simiarum speciem extinctam. Notat enim Darwin quod simiae nunc existentes habent characteres omnino determinatos; ideoque vetat lex permanentiae quominus in aliam speciem convertantur. At vero cum magna similitudo vigeat inter hominem et simias praesertim anthropomorphas (Chimpanse, Gorilla, Ourang-outang), pronum est inferre tum hominem tum simias ab eodem parente originem ducere. Si quaeratur insuper de primis progenitoribus hominis, Lamark assignat duas formas primitivas, organica entia valde imperfecta, quae proto organismos nominat. Darwin vero admittit quatuor vel quinque formas primitivas, quas vocat prototypa, quamvis simul innuat spem fore ut tempore et studio omnes ad unam revocentur. Si tandem quaeratur origo ipsarum formarum primitivarum, Lamark eas e materia rudi et inorganica per generationem spontaneam eductas asserit; Darwin vero (Athenaeum, Ap. 25, 1863, p. 554) fatetur se primam originem vitae penitus ignorare. 148. Is this general theory to be applied to man himself? At the beginning, the authors of the system hesitated in this matter, uncertain; but now they themselves openly profess what their disciples immediately recognized, namely, that man is nothing other than a certain lower animal transformed. But if someone asks for the proximate stock of the human race, some assign the troglodyte ape, while others assign some extinct species of apes. For Darwin notes that the apes now existing have entirely determined characters; and therefore the law of permanence forbids that they be converted into another species. But since a great similarity prevails between man and the apes, especially the anthropomorphic ones (chimpanzee, gorilla, orangutan), it is easy to infer that both man and the apes derive their origin from the same parent. If one asks further about the first progenitors of man, Lamarck assigns two primitive forms, very imperfect organic beings, which he names proto-organisms. Darwin, however, admits four or five primitive forms, which he calls prototypes, although at the same time he intimates the hope that with time and study all will be brought back to one. Finally, if one asks the origin of the primitive forms themselves, Lamarck asserts that they were brought forth from rude and inorganic matter through spontaneous generation; Darwin, however (Athenaeum, Apr. 25, 1863, p. 554), confesses that he is wholly ignorant of the first origin of life.

149. Totum hoc systema de transformatione specierum opponitur certe dogmati de hominis origine immediate a Deo; opponitur etiam diversitati specierum immediate a Deo, quae videtur tradi in Gen. (de qua quaestione non est nobis nunc agendum: Vid. Suarez, de op. sex. dier. capp. 7. et 10); sed, uti patet, per se non excludit dogma de Deo Creatore, si quidem saltem creavisset Deus materiam e qua plantae, animalia, homo primitus eductus fuisset. Quod dogma licet Darwin expresse videatur profiteri, plures tamen ex ejus discipulis, praesertim in Germa-

nia, inficiati sunt; ita ut Hoffmann et Pfaff rapidam systematis transformationis propagationem, possibilitati eo excludendi Deum Creatorem tribuant. Vid. Reusch, la Bibbia e la Natura, ed. cit. lez. 27. 149. This whole system concerning the transformation of species is certainly opposed to the dogma concerning the origin of man immediately from God. It is also opposed to the diversity of species immediately from God, which seems to be handed down in Genesis (concerning which question we do not now have to treat; see Suarez, On the Work of the Six Days, chapters 7 and 10). But, as is clear, of itself it does not exclude the dogma concerning God the Creator, provided at least that God had created the matter from which plants, animals, and man were first brought forth. Although Darwin expressly seems to profess this dogma, nevertheless many of his disciples, especially in Germany, have denied it; so that Hoffmann and Pfaff attribute the rapid propagation of the system of transformation to the possibility of excluding God the Creator by it. See Reusch, la Bibbia e la Natura, cited edition, lecture 27.

150. Liceat in fine hujus brevis expositionis animadvertere transformistas licet progressum praedicent, eum tamen nullo modo promovere. Si enim consideremus eorum errorem, novus non est; nam Aristoteles, de Generat. ani. l. 3., ait: "quare et de hominum ac quadrupedum ortu non absurde quis conjiciat, si olim ex terra editi sunt, id duorum modorum altero evenisse, aut ut ex verme primum existerent, aut ex ovis ederentur;" expositis autem his modis, inquit: "quare si quid initium existendi animantibus fuit, id altero de duobus istis modis contigisse manifestum est." Et Empedocles, teste Lucretio, l. 5., finxit terram humani corporis membra separatim protulisse, quae postea casu concreverint, hominemque formaverint. Ipsa lex "survival of the fittest" est antiquus error, quem refert Aristoteles Phys. 2. 8. - Talem vero, suo systemate, humanae naturae ideam ingerunt, ut vere dici possit: "Homo, cum in honore esset, non intellexit: comparatus est jumentis insipientibus, et similis factus est illis." Ps. 48. 12. 150. At the end of this brief exposition, let it be permitted to observe that, although the Transformists preach progress, they in no way promote it. For if we consider their error, it is not new; for Aristotle, On the Generation of Animals, book 3, says: "and therefore concerning the origin of men and quadrupeds one might not absurdly conjecture, if they were once brought forth from the earth, that this happened in one of two ways: either that they first existed as from a worm, or that they were produced from eggs." But after these modes have been set forth, he says: "therefore, if there was any beginning of existing for living things, it is manifest that it happened in one of these two modes." And Empedocles, as Lucretius witnesses, book 5, imagined that the earth brought forth separately the members of the human body, which afterwards came together by chance and formed man. The very law "survival of the fittest" is an ancient error, which Aristotle reports in Physics 2.8. But by their system they instill such an idea of human nature that it can truly be said: "Man, when he was in honor, did not understand; he was compared to foolish beasts, and became like them." Psalm 48:12.

§ IV.
Hominis origo ex principiis rationis. Quaedam praestituuntur. Section IV.
The Origin Of Man From Principles Of Reason. Certain Things Are Set Down Beforehand.

151. Ex dictis in praecedente §, quatuor in praesente quaestione distingui debent: 1. negatio dogmatis creationis - 2. affirmatio generationis spontaneae

- 3. transformatio plantarum et animalium ex una specie in aliam - 4. applicatio hujus systematis origini hominis explicandae. 151. From the things said in the preceding section, four things must be distinguished in the present question: 1. the denial of the dogma of creation; 2. the affirmation of spontaneous generation; 3. the transformation of plants and animals from one species into another; 4. the application of this system to explaining the origin of man.

152. Contra negationem dogmatis creationis nihil nunc dicendum est: sive quia negatio illa, ut vidimus, non est consequentia necessaria systematis transformistarum; sive quia dogma creationis sufficienter in praecedente disputatione asseruimus et defendimus. 152. Against the denial of the dogma of creation nothing must now be said: both because that denial, as we have seen, is not a necessary consequence of the system of the Transformists, and because we sufficiently asserted and defended the dogma of creation in the preceding disputation.

153. Neque necesse est ad praesentem quaestionem directe de generatione spontanea agere. Quamvis enim daretur generatio spontanea quarumdam formarum primitivarum, non posset ex ea hominis origo explicari, nisi admittendo transformationem specierum etiam in animantibus perfectis, et extendendo hanc transformationem ad ipsum hominem. At vero cum hac occasione nonnulli D. Thomae et scholasticorum doctrinam calumnientur, pauca breviter adnotabimus. 153. Nor is it necessary for the present question to treat directly of spontaneous generation. For even if spontaneous generation of certain primitive forms were granted, the origin of man could not be explained from it unless one admitted the transformation of species even in perfect living things, and extended this transformation to man himself. But since on this occasion some calumniate the doctrine of St. Thomas and the scholastics, we shall briefly note a few things.

154. a) Quid nunc temporis sentiant naturalistae de generatione spontanea videri potest apud Reusch (La Bibbia e la Natura, lez. 26., ediz. cit.). Quidquid autem sit de quaestione, utrum scholastici docuerint generationem spontaneam eodem omnino sensu ac Lamark; certum est unanimiter et constanter docuisse omnium animalium species non posse, juxta rerum ordinem, neque immediate, neque mediate repeti ex generatione spontanea. "Avicenna posuit," inquit D. Th. 1. p. q. 71. a. un. ad 1., "omnia animalia posse generari ex aliquali elementorum commixtione absque semine, etiam per viam naturae. Sed hoc videtur inconveniens; quia natura determinatis mediis

procedit ad suos effectus. Unde illa quae naturaliter generantur ex semine, non possunt naturaliter sine semine generari. Et ideo dicendum est aliter quod in naturali generatione animalium principium activum est virtus formativa, quae est in semine, in iis quae ex semine generantur .... In prima autem rerum institutione principium activum fuit verbum Dei, quod de materia elementari produxit animalia." - Et Suarez, de op. sex. dier. l. 2. cap. 10. n. 2., agens de prima formatione animalium perfectorum, ait: "Tota species non potest incipere per naturalem generationem, quia unumquodque individuum ab alio simili procreatur: et ideo necessario sistendum est in aliquo primo individuo ab alio simili non genito. Neque illud primum ex solo semine generari potuit, quia neque illud semen naturaliter fieri potest, nisi ab animali decisum, neque etiam conservari potest, vel ad faetum formandum perduci, nisi in utero alicujus animalis generantis. Neque etiam talium animantium species, seu prima earum individua per solas causas universales, solem nimirum, et astra introduci in orbem potuerunt, ut etiam ex Philosophia contra Avicennam, et alios antiquos Philosophos demonstratur. Ergo necessarium fuit, prima individua horum animantium immediate ab auctore naturae fieri."

b) Hinc patet nihil commune habere doctrinam scholasticorum cum

systemate transformationis specierum, quod nunc Darwin cum aliis tenet. Imo, ad illud evertendum, eodem argumento directo utebantur scholastici, ac nunc illud impugnatur. Experientia nempe constat animalia perfecta non oriri nisi per

generationem ab individuis ejusdem speciei; natura autem habet determinatum modum agendi; ergo, juxta ordinem naturae, non possunt animalia perfecta alio modo oriri, etc. Quod principium saepissime repetit D. Th. Vid., ex. gr., praeter locum mox cit., 1. p. q. 92. a. 1. ad 2., a. 4. c., etc.

c) Neque ex eo quod scholastici docent formas omnes inferiores, non exclusa anima brutorum, educi de potentia materiae, sequitur ullo pacto quod naturaliter possit ex animante unius speciei produci alterius speciei animal. Nec enim ex quacumque materia utcumque disposita potest, juxta scholasticos, naturaliter qualiscumque forma educi: "natura ... ex determinata materia producit aliquid in determinata specie;" neque quaecumque virtus activa creata potest quamcumque formam ex materia educere, quod solius Dei esse, Angelis ipsis exclusis, saepe docet D. Th. Unde ut animae brutorum educantur de potentia materiae modo naturali, requiritur praeter determinatam materiam virtus activa generantis ejusdem speciei; animae autem primorum brutorum licet non dicantur creatae, sed eductae de potentia materiae; non fuerunt tamen eductae virtute alicujus agentis creati, sed speciali actione divina. "Quamvis productio," inquit Suarez, cit. cap. 10., n. 3., "istorum animalium, interdum creatio dicatur, nihilominus non fuit ex nihilo, sed ex praejacente materia, modo tamen proprio auctoris naturae ... Creatio appellatur lato modo, ut et ab ordinaria generatione distinguatur, et ut denotetur fuisse quemdam modum productionis auctoris naturae proprium." Et D. Th. 1. p. q. 91, cum sibi objecisset quod id quod existit in cor-

porali creatura secundum causales rationes, potest per aliquam virtutem creatam produci; respondet: "Secundum rationes causales in creaturis dicitur aliquid praeexistere dupliciter: uno modo secundum potentiam activam et passivam: ut non solum ex materia praeexistenti fieri possit, sed etiam ut aliqua praeexistens creatura hoc facere possit. Alio modo secundum potentiam passivam tantum, ut scilicet de materia praeexistenti fieri possit a Deo."

d) Quod autem animae brutorum non creentur, sed educantur de potentia materiae 1. est doctrina D. Thomae, et communis, ut omnes norunt, apud scholasticos - 2. quae probatur philosophice optimis rationibus, quarum praecipua est, quod unumquodque sic se habet ad fieri, sicut se habet ad esse; sed animae brutorum sunt dependentes a materia, et in hoc essentialiter differunt ab anima humana; ergo debent et fieri dependenter a materia, ac proinde proprie non creantur. (n. 9.) - 3. sententia contraria, juxta quam animae brutorum non possunt produci nisi per creationem a Deo, saepe asseritur sine ulla omnino probatione; et quando probare illam nituntur, nullum afferunt argumentum, quod non fuerit praevisum a scholasticis, et cui illi non responderint: in hoc casu ergo non valet frequens illa excusatio discedendi a communi scholasticorum sententia, quod nempe novum factum, nova experientia, etc., illis ignota, nunc cogit illos relinquere. - Quare si difficile est intelligere aliquos adhuc tenere animas brutorum non produci, nisi per creationem; mirum omnino est hanc sententiam ab ipsis dici philosophice certam.

e) Magis adhuc mirum est quod velint ex Scriptura eamdem sententiam confirmare, eo nixi argumento, quod Gen. 1. 21. adhibeatur verbum barah, quod, dicunt, vi sua significat creare. Nam 1. probatissimi Theologi hoc negant (n. 32.). Gesenius ad verb. barah ostendit illud nativa sua vi non significare creationem ex nihilo - in forma kal usurpari in Scripturis quando agitur de actione divina - exempla affert ex Scriptura, in quibus illa actio divina expressa per dictum verbum in dicta forma certe non est creatio ex nihilo - Prima animarum brutorum productio licet non sit creatio ex nihilo, exigit tamen, ut diximus actionem propriam Dei. Ergo admittendo quod animae brutorum fuerunt primitus eductae de potentia materiae per actionem divinam, jam servatur vis barah in kal juxta usum biblicum. 2. in iis, quae in Gen. referuntur ad productionem animalium, indifferenter adhibetur verbum creare, formare, etc.; et praesertim cap. 2. v. 19. dicitur: "Formatis igitur, Dominus Deus, de humo cunctis animantibus terrae, etc." - 3. Imo merito notat Suarez, cit. cap. 10. n. 4.: "Recte hinc colligi potest omnes formas, seu animas istorum animantium quantumvis perfectorum citra hominem ex potentia materiae eductas esse, id enim significant illa verba, producat terra animam viventem, quae statim distribuuntur ad omnes species per illa verba, jumenta, reptilia et bestias terrae, quod recte notavit Cajet. et Perrer. consentit." - 4. Etsi animae brutorum dicantur primitus concreatae a Deo (creatum enim diceretur totum compositum), non inde sequeretur quod quando deinde animalia producerentur per viam naturalem

generationis, eorum animae creentur, et non educantur de potentia materiae.

f) Quod si aliquos deterreat periculum ne hac scholasticorum doctrina abutantur transformistae; duo respondebimus. 1. Vanus est timor; siquidem non debemus timere, nisi legitimas absurdas illationes alicujus doctrinae: illatio autem transformistarum nec esset legitima, uti ostendimus, nec a Doctoribus admittitur. 2. Caveant potius, ne eorum sententia aliquod incredulis periculum praebeat; possent enim hi suo modo (jure vel injuria non dicimus) ita ratiocinari: juxta Doctores Catholicos ratio, propter quam anima humana nequit produci nisi per creationem, est quia neque in agendo neque in essendo pendet a materia; sed, juxta vos, idem productionis modus est necessarius pro anima brutorum. Ergo. 154. a) What naturalists think at the present time concerning spontaneous generation can be seen in Reusch (La Bibbia e la Natura, lecture 26, cited edition). But whatever may be the case concerning the question whether the scholastics taught spontaneous generation in entirely the same sense as Lamarck, it is certain that they unanimously and constantly taught that the species of all animals cannot, according to the order of things, be traced back either immediately or mediately to spontaneous generation. "Avicenna held," says St. Thomas, Summa Theologiae I, q. 71, single article, ad 1, "that all animals can be generated from some mixture of the elements without seed, even by way of nature. But this seems unfitting, because nature proceeds to its effects by determinate means. Hence those things which are naturally generated from seed cannot naturally be generated without seed. And therefore it must be said otherwise, that in the natural generation of animals the active principle is the formative power which is in the seed, in those things which are generated from seed.... But in the first institution of things the active principle was the Word of God, which produced the animals from elemental matter." And Suarez, On the Work of the Six Days, book 2, chapter 10, n. 2, treating of the first formation of perfect animals, says: "A whole species cannot begin through natural generation, because each individual is procreated by another like itself; and therefore one must necessarily stop at some first individual not generated by another like itself. Nor could that first one have been generated from seed alone, because neither can that seed naturally come to be unless it is separated from an animal, nor can it be conserved or brought through to the forming of a fetus except in the womb of some generating animal. Nor also could the species of such living things, or their first individuals, have been introduced into the world through universal causes alone, namely the sun and the stars, as is also demonstrated from Philosophy against Avicenna and other ancient Philosophers. Therefore it was necessary that the first individuals of these living things be made immediately by the author of nature."

b) Hence it is clear that the doctrine of the scholastics has nothing in common with the system of the transformation of species which Darwin now holds with others. Indeed, to overturn it, the scholastics used the same direct argument by which it is now attacked. Namely, it is established by experience that perfect animals arise only through generation from individuals of the same species; but nature has a determinate mode of acting; therefore, according to the order of nature, perfect animals cannot arise in another way, etc. St. Thomas repeats this principle very often. See, for example, besides the place just cited, Summa Theologiae I, q. 92, a. 1, ad 2; a. 4, corpus, etc.

c) Nor from the fact that the scholastics teach that all inferior forms, not excluding the soul of brutes, are educed from the potency of matter, does it follow in any way that naturally from a living thing of one species an animal of another species can be produced. For according to the scholastics, not from any matter disposed in any manner whatever can any form whatever naturally be educed: "nature ... from determinate matter produces something in a determinate species"; nor can any created active power whatever educe any form whatever from matter, which St. Thomas often teaches belongs to God alone, even with the Angels excluded. Hence, in order that the souls of brutes be educed from the potency of matter in a natural mode, there is required, besides determinate matter, the active power of a generator of the same species. But the souls of the first brutes, although they are not said to have been created but educed from the potency of matter, nevertheless were not educed by the power of any created agent, but by a special divine action. "Although the production," says Suarez, cited chapter 10, n. 3, "of those animals is sometimes called creation, nevertheless it was not from nothing, but from preexisting matter, yet in a mode proper to the author of

nature.... It is called creation in a broad mode, both so that it may be distinguished from ordinary generation, and so that it may be denoted that there was a certain mode of production proper to the author of nature." And St. Thomas, Summa Theologiae I, q. 91, when he had objected to himself that that which exists in a corporeal creature according to causal reasons can be produced by some created power, replies: "A thing is said to preexist according to causal reasons in creatures in two ways: in one way according to active and passive potency, so that it can not only come to be from preexisting matter, but also so that some preexisting creature can do this. In another way according to passive potency only, namely so that it can come to be from preexisting matter by God."

d) But that the souls of brutes are not created, but are educed from the potency of matter: 1. is the doctrine of St. Thomas, and common, as all know, among the scholastics; 2. is proved philosophically by the best reasons, the principal one of which is that each thing is related to coming-to-be as it is related to being; but the souls of brutes are dependent upon matter, and in this they differ essentially from the human soul; therefore they also ought to come to be dependently upon matter, and consequently they are not properly created (n. 9); 3. the contrary opinion, according to which the souls of brutes cannot be produced except through creation by God, is often asserted without any proof whatever; and when they attempt to prove it, they bring forward no argument which was not foreseen by the scholastics and to which they did not reply. Therefore in this case that frequent excuse for departing from the common opinion of the scholastics does not avail, namely, that some new fact, new experience, etc., unknown to them, now compels one to abandon them. Therefore, if it is difficult to understand that some still hold that the souls of brutes are not produced except through creation, it is altogether astonishing that this opinion is called by them philosophically certain.

e) It is still more astonishing that they wish to confirm the same opinion from Scripture, relying on this argument, that in Genesis 1:21 the word barah is employed, which, they say, by its own force signifies to create. For 1. the most approved Theologians deny this (n. 32). Gesenius, at the word barah, shows that by its native force it does not signify creation from nothing; that in the kal form it is used in the Scriptures when divine action is concerned; and he brings examples from Scripture in which that divine action expressed by the said word in the said form is certainly not creation from nothing. The first production of the souls of brutes, although it is not creation from nothing, nevertheless requires, as we said, an action proper to God. Therefore, by admitting that the souls of brutes were first educed from the potency of matter through divine action, the force of barah in kal is now preserved according to biblical usage. 2. In those things which are referred in Genesis to the production of animals, the word create, form, etc., is employed indifferently; and especially chapter 2, verse 19 says: "Therefore, the Lord God having formed from the ground all the living things of the earth, etc." 3. Indeed Suarez rightly notes, cited chapter 10, n. 4: "From this it can rightly be gathered that all the forms, or souls, of those living things, however perfect short of man, were educed from the potency of matter; for that is what those words signify, let the earth produce a living soul, which are immediately distributed to all species by those words, cattle, creeping things, and beasts of the earth, which Cajetan rightly noted, and Perrer. agrees." 4. Even if the souls of brutes are said to have been first con-created by God (for the whole composite would be said to have been created), it would not follow from this that when animals would thereafter be produced by way of natural generation, their souls are created and are not educed from the potency of matter.

f) But if the danger should frighten some that the Transformists may abuse this doctrine of the scholastics, we shall answer two things. 1. The fear is empty, since we ought not to fear anything except legitimate absurd inferences from some doctrine; but the inference of the Transformists would neither be legitimate, as we have shown, nor is it admitted by the Doctors. 2. Rather let them beware lest their own opinion offer some danger to unbelievers. For these could reason in their own way (whether rightly or wrongly we do not say) as follows: according to Catholic Doctors, the reason why the human soul cannot be produced except through creation is that neither in acting nor in being does it depend upon matter; but, according to you, the same mode of production is necessary for the soul of brutes. Therefore.

155. Quoad transformationem specierum dicendum est imprimis, quod cum agitur de hominis origine explicanda, possemus, absolute loquendo, ab hac generali quaestione pertractanda abstinere. Etenim quidquid sit de systemate transformistarum quoad plantas et animantia, certum est, inspecta natura animae humanae, illud non posse ad hominem transferri. Hoc autem facile ostenditur ex iis, quae in philosophia statuuntur de essentiali discrimine inter sensum et rationem, de spiritualitate animae humanae, de ejus necessaria origine per creationem a Deo. Videri possunt inter caetera, quae de hoc argumento habent Liberatore (Del Composto umano, cap. 4. art. 8.); Hettinger (Apologie du Christianisme, vol. 1. cap. 7.); Dublin Review (July, 1871., Evolution and Faith, a pag. 24.), etc. 155. As to the transformation of species, it must first be said that when the matter concerns explaining the origin of man, we could, absolutely speaking, abstain from treating this general question. For whatever may be the case concerning the system of the Transformists as regards plants and living things, it is certain, once the nature of the human soul has been considered, that it cannot be transferred to man. But this is easily shown from those things which are established in philosophy concerning the essential distinction between sense and reason, concerning the spirituality of the human soul, and concerning its necessary origin through creation by God. Among other things which treat this argument, Liberatore (Del Composto umano, chapter 4, article 8), Hettinger (Apologie du Christianisme, vol. 1, chapter 7), Dublin Review (July 1871, Evolution and Faith, from p. 24), etc., can be seen.

156. Attamen transformistae, qui certe confundunt etiam sensum cum ratione (Darwin, Descent of

Man, vol. 2., pag. 390.) non tanti faciunt hoc argumentum, quanti illud desumptum ex similitudine corporis hominis cum corporibus animantium: ideoque opere pretium est saltem breviter indicare quomodo iisdem armis impugnari possint. 156. Nevertheless the Transformists, who certainly confuse even sense with reason (Darwin, Descent of Man, vol. 2, p. 390), do not make as much of this argument as of that one taken from the similarity of the body of man with the bodies of living things; and therefore it is worth the effort at least briefly to indicate how they can be attacked by the same weapons.

§ V.
Hominis origo ex principiis rationis. - Refutatur systema transformistarum. Section V.
The Origin Of Man From Principles Of Reason - The System Of The Transformists Is Refuted.

157. PROP. XV. 1. Principium, quod transformistae assumunt repugnat experientiae, et est omnino arbitrarium - 2. media, quae assignant ad transformationem efficiendam sunt insufficientia - 3. probationes, quas adducunt, nihil evincunt.

Prob. 1ma. pars. Principium, quod transformistae assumunt, est omnia animalia originem ducere a quibusdam prototypis, et unius speciei animalia oriri ex individuis alterius speciei, sicut diversae varietates et stirpes habentur in eadem specie. Atqui hoc principium repugnat experientiae. Ergo.

Prob. min. Constanti experientia edocemur a piscibus pisces, ab avibus aves, ab equo equum exoriri, nempe generatim animalia non aliter nisi ex individuis ejusdem speciei propagari; hoc tandem fatetur ipse Darwin (Animals and Plants under Domestication, Vol. 1. 2., c. 16.) Ergo.

Dices cum Darwin. 1. Ex speciebus nunc existentibus non oriuntur nisi individua ejusdem speciei, quia animantia haec jam acquisiverunt characteres omnino determinatos; ac proinde lex permanentiae vetat, etc.

- 2. Transmutationes non fiunt nisi per longam annorum seriem, ideoque modo non sensibili. Ergo argumentum praesentis experientiae non probat.

Resp. 1. Lex illa permanentiae videtur

tandem concedere quod nos tuemur, stabilitatem specierum. - 2. Si ex animalibus habentibus vagas et incertas formas, per longam annorum periodum ortum ducerent species existentes, et praesertim homo; deberemus hujusmodi formas intermedias invenire; atqui non inveniuntur, imo habemus ex experientia contrarium. Revera a) historice constat animalia eamdem formam, eosdemque mores retinuisse; uti patet ex sculpturis antiquissimis Aegyptiorum, ex iis quae in Scriptoribus Sacris occurrunt de quibusdam animalibus, ex historia animalium Aristotelis, ex similitudinibus Homeri, etc. b) In stratis telluris multae reliquiae plantarum et animalium inveniuntur, quin tamen ullum sit vestigium sive formarum primitivarum, sive transitionum intermediarum a formis minus perfectis ad perfectiores; imo fossilia definitos characteres exhibent. c) Hinc ipsi transformistae concedunt hominis progenitores esse adhuc ignotos (Darwin, Origin of Species, c. 9.). Adeo verum est, quod continuo praedicant transformistae, scilicet suum systema factis niti!

Ex his satis constat principium transformistarum esse arbitrarium. Sed fingamus nos oculis nostris conspicere transmutationem animalium ex una specie in aliam; sequereturne inde, omnes animantium species ex una vel pluribus formis primitivis imperfectissimis provenire? Nonne saltem potuisset Deus ipse ab initio varias species constituere? Nonne prae-

sertim potuisset ipse hominem in statu perfecto condere? Quod et factum esse universalis omnium populorum traditio fert. Quaquaversus igitur transformistarum principium consideretur, arbitrarium dicendum est.

Prob. 2da. pars. Media, quae assignant reducuntur ad conatum et exercitium organorum ex novis necessitatibus et desideriis animantis, ad influxum adjunctorum, in quibus versatur animal, ad naturalem selectionem. Atqui haec media sunt insufficientia. Ergo.

Prob. minor quoad 1um. Desideria conatus respondere necessario debent ipsi principio, a quo procedunt et determinantur, seu ipsi naturae et facultatibus animantium: hoc non modo recta ratio, sed experientia ostendit: ergo nequeunt desideria, conatus, exercitium membrorum novam naturam producere. Quoad 2. influxus adjunctorum externorum determinatur ab ipso subjecto, quod illum recipit: unde fit ut plantae, animalia in iisdem adjunctis modificentur diverso modo, unumquodque modo conformi suae naturae: ergo. Cur, naturae legibus iisdem manentibus, non fiunt nunc eaedem transformationes? Quoad 3. ipse Darwin, qui antea fere omnia naturali selectioni tribuebat, asseruit deinde eam tantum primas habere partes in transformatione; ac tandem, experientia ejus assertioni renitente, fassus est causas transformationis esse ignotas. En iterum quomodo semper theoria transformistarum nititur factis! Sed de hac re consule praesertim Mivart (Genesis of Species, Introductory).

Prob. 3. pars. Omnia transformistarum argumenta, utut multis illustrentur, ad summum reduci possunt ad tria. Primum est: Corpus animalium, praesertim simiarum anthropomorpharum, physiologice, anatomice, pathologice, inspectum magnam praesefert similitudinem cum corpore humano; ergo communem habent originem. - Alterum est: Ova et embryones omnium animantium, praesertim vertebratorum, similia sunt, et hanc similitudinem diu retinent donec explicent propriam formam; ergo eamdem habent originem. Tertium est: sunt in humano corpore partes aliquae imperfectae, quae nullius utilitatis sunt, et quarum existentia bene explicatur ponendo eas esse rudera organorum perfectorum et utilium in proavis existentium, quae facta deinde ex novis circumstantiis, ex naturali selectione, etc. inutilia, sensim sine sensu amissa sunt: sic ex. gr. coccyx in homine est vestigium caudae; pili, quibus hac illac tegitur humanum corpus, est vestigium vestis pilosae in toto corpore proavorum etc. Ergo homo originem habet ab iis animantibus, in quibus partes illae erant perfectae.

Atqui, dicimus, nullum ex his argumentis probat; ergo.

Prob. min. quoad 1um. Nam a) similitudo inter structuram humani corporis et corporis brutorum, ostendit quidem nos cum iis convenire in vita sensitiva, seu in genere; at nullo modo probat nos convenire cum eis etiam in specie, siquidem specifica differentia est ratio, qua destituuntur bruta: aliis verbis, corpus, materia convenit, sed anima, forma discrepat: forma autem dat esse specificum. - b) Si ex sola simi-

litudine inter corpus brutorum et corpus hominum potest argui identitas originis et speciei; ex dissimilitudine possumus arguere diversitatem originis et speciei. c) Imo a fortiori; dissimilitudines enim majores sunt, et tales ut praeseferant diversum omnino typum, uti bene ostendit inter alios De Quatrefages (Rapport sur les progres de l'anthropologie, 2me partie, ch. 8. § 1. "origine de l'homme -

l'homme descend-il du singe?"). - d) Magnam hanc dissimilitudinem concedunt et ostendunt ipsi transformistae, uti Huxley, Buchner, Moleschott, et ipse Darwin (Descent of Man, c. n.) - e) Neque vim hujus confessionis infirmare possunt dicentes majorem adhuc esse dissimilitudinem inter ipsas simias. Contrarium enim docent celebriores Naturalistae, ut Aeby, Bischoff, etc. - Contrarium docent ipsi transformistae, qui dum majorem dissimilitudinem praedicant inter simias et simias, unum membrum vel organum solum considerant; cum dissimilitudo inter homines et simias appareat in omnibus organis. - Contrarium tandem docent ipsi transformistae, cum, ratione etiam dissimilitudinis, negant hominem oriri ex speciebus existentibus simiarum, cum omnium experientia homines ex hominibus nascantur.

Prob. min. quoad 2um. Nam a) Differentia inter ova et embryones omnium vertebratorum non apparet per aliquod tempus; at nequit exinde deduci quod non sit. - b) Revera, si non different inter se cur et quomodo fieret ut ova et embryones unius speciei, semper evolvantur in animalia ejusdem speciei, quamvis reperiantur in iisdem externis adjunctis, ac ova et embryones alterius speciei? - c) Ipsi transformistae, tandem, de more sibi contradicentes, conce-

dunt ova et embryones diversorum animalium debere inter se differre. Ita ex. gr. Buchner, Haeckel, etc.

Prob. min. quoad 3um. Nam a) Dato quod transformistae ignorent usum aliquorum humani corporis partium, quod nec videant aliquid eas facere ad ornatum etc.; non recte arguitur esse inutiles. Unde sapienter animadvertit S. Augustinus (in l. sup. Gen. con. Manichaeos, c. 16.): "si in alicujus opificis officinam imperitus intraverit, videt ibi multa instrumenta, quorum causas ignorat; et si multum est insipiens, superflua putat. Jam vero si in fornacem incautus ceciderit, aut ferramento aliquo acuto se vulneraverit, noxia existimat ibi esse multa; quorum usum quia novit artifex, insipientiam ejus irridet. Sic in hoc mundo quidam audent multa reprehendere quorum causas non vident. Multa enim etsi domui nostrae non sunt necessaria, in eis tamen completur universitatis integritas." - b) Cum juxta transformistas homo originem habeat ex quibusdam prototypis, non modo explicandum esset quomodo nunc non habeat caudam, quam parentes suos dicunt habuisse; sed etiam quomodo parentes acquisiverint, cum eorum praedecessores nondum illam haberent. Dicit Darwin progenitores acquisivisse caudam, ex necessitate se defendendi contra insecta; sed cum, juxta ipsum, insensibili et tardo progressu acquisierint, destituti hoc medio fuissent per plura fortasse centena annorum millia! c) Rudera vocant quasdam humani corporis partes, quatenus jam supponunt id quod esset probandum, nempe hominem ex animali alterius speciei, caudam ex. gr. habentis, originem ducere: hoc autem dicitur in Logica petitio principii. 157. PROP. XV. 1. The principle which the Transformists assume is repugnant to experience and is altogether arbitrary; 2. the means which they assign for effecting transformation are insufficient; 3. the proofs which they adduce prove nothing.

Proof of the first part. The principle which the Transformists assume is that all animals derive their origin from certain prototypes, and that animals of one species arise from individuals of another species, just as different varieties and stocks are had in the same species. But this principle is repugnant to experience. Therefore.

Proof of the minor. By constant experience we are taught that fish arise from fish, birds from birds, a horse from a horse; namely, generally animals are propagated in no other way except from individuals of the same species. Darwin himself finally admits this (Animals and Plants under Domestication, vol. 1. 2., c. 16). Therefore.

You will say with Darwin. 1. From the species now existing there arise only individuals of the same species, because these living things have now acquired entirely determinate characters; and consequently the law of permanence forbids it, etc. 2. Transmutations do not take place except through a long series of years, and therefore in a non-sensible mode. Therefore the argument from present experience does not prove.

I reply. 1. That law of permanence seems at last to concede what we defend, the stability of species. 2. If existing species, and especially man, took their origin through a long period of years from animals having vague and uncertain forms, we would have to find intermediate forms of this sort. But they are not found; indeed we have the contrary from experience. In fact, a) historically it is established that animals have retained the same form and the same habits, as is clear from the most ancient sculptures of the Egyptians, from those things which occur in the

Sacred Writers concerning certain animals, from Aristotle's history of animals, from the comparisons of Homer, etc. b) In the strata of the earth many remains of plants and animals are found, but there is no trace either of primitive forms or of intermediate transitions from less perfect forms to more perfect ones; indeed fossils exhibit definite characters. c) Hence the Transformists themselves concede that man's progenitors are still unknown (Darwin, Origin of Species, c. 9). So true is what the Transformists continually proclaim, namely, that their system rests on facts!

From these things it is sufficiently established that the principle of the Transformists is arbitrary. But let us imagine that we behold with our own eyes the transmutation of animals from one species into another. Would it follow from this that all species of living things come from one or several most imperfect primitive forms? Could not God himself at least have constituted various species from the beginning? Could not he especially have founded man himself in a perfect state? And universal tradition of all peoples reports that this was done. Therefore, from whatever side the principle of the Transformists is considered, it must be called arbitrary.

Proof of the second part. The means which they assign are reduced to the effort and exercise of organs from the new necessities and desires of the living thing, to the influence of the surroundings in which the animal is situated, and to natural selection. But these means are insufficient. Therefore.

Proof of the minor as to the first. Desires and efforts must necessarily correspond to the very principle from which they proceed and by which they are determined, that is, to the very nature and faculties of living things. Not only right reason but experience shows this. Therefore desires, efforts, and the exercise of members cannot produce a new nature. As to the second: the influence of external surroundings is determined by the very subject which receives it; whence it happens that plants and animals in the same surroundings are modified in a different mode, each in a mode conformable to its own nature. Therefore. Why, while the laws of nature remain the same, do the same transformations not now take place? As to the third: Darwin himself, who previously attributed almost everything to natural selection, afterwards asserted that it has only the principal parts in transformation; and finally, when experience resisted his assertion, he confessed that the causes of transformation are unknown. Behold again how the theory of the Transformists always rests on facts! But concerning this matter consult especially Mivart (Genesis of Species, introductory material).

Proof of the third part. All the arguments of the Transformists, although illustrated by many things, can at most be reduced to three. The first is: the body of animals, especially of anthropomorphic apes, considered physiologically, anatomically, and pathologically, presents a great similarity with the human body; therefore they have a common origin. The second is: the eggs and embryos of all living things, especially vertebrates, are similar, and they retain this similarity for a long time until they unfold their proper form; therefore they have the same origin. The third is: there are in the human body some imperfect parts which are of no utility, and whose existence is well explained by positing that they are remnants of organs perfect and useful in the ancestors, which afterwards, made useless from new circumstances, from natural selection, etc., were gradually and imperceptibly lost. Thus, for example, the coccyx in man is a vestige of a tail; the hairs by which the human body is covered here and there are a vestige of a hairy covering over the whole body of the ancestors, etc. Therefore man has his origin from those living things in which those parts were perfect.

But, we say, none of these arguments proves. Therefore.

Proof of the minor as to the first. For a) the similarity between the structure of the human body and the body of brutes indeed shows that we agree with them in sensitive life, or in genus; but in no way does it prove that we agree with them also in species, since the specific difference is reason, of which brutes are deprived. In other words, the body, the matter, agrees; but the soul, the form, differs. But the form gives specific being. b) If from the sole similarity between the body of brutes and the body of men identity of origin and species can be argued, from dissimilarity we can argue diversity of origin and species. c) Indeed, a fortiori; for the dissimilarities are greater, and are such that they present an entirely different type, as De Quatrefages among others well shows (Rapport sur les progres de l'anthropologie, 2nd part, ch. 8, § 1, "origine de l'homme - l'homme descend-il du singe?"). d) The Transformists themselves concede and show this great dissimilarity, such as Huxley, Buchner, Moleschott,

and Darwin himself (Descent of Man, c. n.). e) Nor can they weaken the force of this confession by saying that there is a still greater dissimilarity among the apes themselves. For the more celebrated Naturalists teach the contrary, such as Aeby, Bischoff, etc. The Transformists themselves teach the contrary, who, when they proclaim a greater dissimilarity between apes and apes, consider only one member or organ; whereas the dissimilarity between men and apes appears in all organs. Finally the Transformists themselves teach the contrary, when, on the basis even of dissimilarity, they deny that man arises from existing species of apes, while by the experience of all, men are born from men.

Proof of the minor as to the second. For a) the difference among the eggs and embryos of all vertebrates does not appear for some time; but from this it cannot be deduced that it does not exist. b) In reality, if they did not differ among themselves, why and how would it happen that the eggs and embryos of one species always develop into animals of the same species, although they are found in the same external surroundings as the eggs and embryos of another species? c) The Transformists themselves, finally, contradicting themselves according to custom, concede that the eggs and embryos of different animals must differ among themselves. Thus, for example, Buchner, Haeckel, etc.

Proof of the minor as to the third. For a) granted that the Transformists are ignorant of the use of some parts of the human body, and that they do not see that they contribute anything to adornment, etc., it is not rightly argued that they are useless. Hence St. Augustine wisely observes (On Genesis against the Manichaeans, book 1, c. 16): "if an unskilled man has entered the workshop of some craftsman, he sees there many instruments whose causes he does not know; and if he is very foolish, he thinks them superfluous. But if, incautious, he falls into the furnace, or wounds himself with some sharp tool, he thinks many things there are harmful; but because the craftsman knows their use, he laughs at his foolishness. So in this world some dare to rebuke many things whose causes they do not see. For many things, even if they are not necessary for our house, nevertheless in them the integrity of the universe is completed." b) Since, according to the Transformists, man has his origin from certain prototypes, it would have to be explained not only how he now does not have a tail, which they say his parents had, but also how his parents acquired it, since their predecessors did not yet have it. Darwin says that the progenitors acquired a tail from the necessity of defending themselves against insects; but since, according to him, they acquired it by an insensible and slow progress, they would have been deprived of this means for perhaps several hundreds of thousands of years! c) They call certain parts of the human body remnants insofar as they already suppose that which had to be proved, namely, that man derives his origin from an animal of another species, for example one having a tail. But this is called in Logic a begging of the question.

158. Quare si agatur non de iis, quae Deus sua omnipotenti virtute operari absolute potest in creaturis, sed de iis quae juxta naturalem cursum, quem solum adversarii considerant, accidere debent, concludamus cum D. Augustino, cujus auctoritate nonnulli abutuntur: "Omnis iste," inquit (De Gen. ad litt. l. 9. c. 32.), "naturae usitatissimus cursus habet quasdam naturales leges suas, secundum quas et spiritus vitae, qui creatura est, habet quosdam appetitus suos determinatos quodammodo, quos etiam mala voluntas non possit excedere. Et elementa mundi hujus corporei habent definitam vim qualitatemque suam, quid unumquodque valeat vel non valeat, quid de quo fieri possit vel non possit. Ex his velut primordiis rerum, omnia quae gignuntur, suo quoque tempore exortus processusque sumunt, finesque et decessiones sui cujusque generis. Unde fit ut de grano tritici non nascatur faba, vel de faba triticum, vel de pecore homo, vel de homine pecus. Alius ergo est rerum modus ... quo illa herba sic germinat, illa sic; illa aetas parit, illa non parit; homo loqui potest, pecus non potest. Horum et talium modorum rationes non tantum in Deo sunt, sed ab etiam rebus creatis inditae atque concreatae. Ut autem lignum de terra excisum, aridum, perpolitum, sine radice ulla, sine terra et aqua repente floreat, et fructum gignat, ut per juventam sterilis femina in senecta pariat, ut asina loquatur, et si quid ejusmodi est, alio modo dedit, ut non ... haec haberent in motu naturali, sed in eo quo ita creata essent, ut eorum natura voluntati potentiori amplius subjaceret."

Vide Civilta Cattolica, serie VIII. vol. 4. pag.

293 et 530; vol. 5. pag. 36, 400, 688; vol. 6. pag. 270; vol. 7. pag. 272, 525; ubi quae nos paucis perstrinximus, fusius evoluta, atque naturalistarum auctoritate, et transformistarum sibimetipsis minime cohaerentium confessionibus confirmata invenies: Cf. etiam Reusch, la Bibbia e la Natura, lez. 27 et 28; ubi etiam invenies longum catalogum celebriorum Naturalistarum, qui defendunt adhuc immutabilitatem specierum. Mivart, Genesis of Species; Etudes Religieuses, Mars. 1872, "Darwinisme et Logique." 158. Therefore, if the question concerns not those things which God by his omnipotent power can absolutely work in creatures, but those things which according to the natural course, which alone the adversaries consider, ought to happen, let us conclude with St. Augustine, whose authority some abuse: "This whole most customary course of nature," he says (On Genesis Literally, book 9, c. 32), "has certain natural laws of its own, according to which even the spirit of life, which is a creature, has certain appetites of its own, determined in a certain way, which even an evil will cannot exceed. And the elements of this corporeal world have their definite force and quality, what each thing is able or not able to do, what can or cannot be made from what. From these, as from the first beginnings of things, all things which are generated receive in their own time the beginnings and developments, and the ends and departures, of each one's own kind. Hence it happens that from a grain of wheat a bean is not born, nor wheat from a bean, nor man from cattle, nor cattle from man. Therefore there is one mode of things ... by which that herb germinates thus, that one thus; that age bears, that one does not bear; man can speak, cattle cannot. The reasons of these and similar modes are not only in God, but are also implanted and con-created in created things themselves. But that wood cut from the earth, dry, polished, without any root, without earth and water, should suddenly flower and bear fruit; that a sterile woman should bear in old age after youth; that an ass should speak; and if there is anything of this sort, he gave in another mode, so that ... they would not have these things in natural motion, but in that by which they were so created that their nature would be more fully subject to a more powerful will."

See Civilta Cattolica, series VIII, vol. 4, pp. 293 and 530; vol. 5, pp. 36, 400, 688; vol. 6, p. 270; vol. 7, pp. 272, 525; where you will find the things which we have touched upon in few words more fully developed and confirmed by the authority of naturalists and by the confessions of Transformists who are by no means consistent with themselves. Cf. also Reusch, la Bibbia e la Natura, lectures 27 and 28; where you will also find a long catalogue of the more celebrated Naturalists who still defend the immutability of species. Mivart, Genesis of Species; Etudes Religieuses, March 1872, "Darwinisme et Logique."

Article 2. Whether the Whole Human Race was Propagated from Adam, the First Parent of All

LatineEnglish

Utrum ab Adam omnium protoparente universum genus humanum propagatum sit. Whether The Whole Human Race Was Propagated From Adam, The Protoparent Of All.

159. Statuimus in praecedente articulo hominis originem immediatam a Deo; agendum nunc est de humani generis propagatione. Quae de hac re revelatio docet diversis argumentis impugnant Praeadamitae et Coadamitae: contra eos igitur distinctis paragraphis agemus. 159. In the preceding article we established the immediate origin of man from God; now we must treat of the propagation of the human race. What revelation teaches concerning this matter, the Praeadamites and Coadamites attack with diverse arguments; therefore we shall proceed against them in distinct sections.

§ I.
Praeadamitarum error exponitur et refellitur. Section I.
The

Error Of The Praeadamites Is Set Forth And Refuted.

160. Doctrina de totius humani generis propagatione ab uno omnium parente, Adamo, intimam habet connexionem cum dogmate de humanae naturae elevatione, lapsu, reparatione per Christum. Unde

Conc. Trid. sess. 5., decr. de pecc. orig., illam veluti necessarium fundamentum supponens, Adam vocat primum hominem et totum humanum genus ejus propaginem, juxta verba Apostoli, quae citat. 160. The doctrine concerning the propagation of the whole human race from one parent of all, Adam, has an intimate connection with the dogma concerning the elevation, fall, and reparation through Christ of human nature. Hence the Council of Trent, session 5, decree on original sin, supposing it as a necessary foundation, calls Adam the first man and the whole human race his offspring, according to the words of the Apostle which it cites.

161. Praetermissis quibusdam antiquis haereticis, ut Sabaei, Julianus Apostata, etc., doctrinam hanc propugnavit saeculo XVII Isaacus Pereyrus, natione Gallus, e Calvinistarum secta. Duos libros edidit: unum cui titulus: Praeadamitae, seu exercitatio super versus 12, 13, 14. cap. 5. Epistolae ad Rom.; alium, quem inscripsit: Systema Theologicum ex praeadamitarum hypothesi. In his docuit hominem, cujus formatio narratur 1. Gen. non fuisse Adamum, cujus formatio legitur, aiebat, 2. Gen. a ver. 7.; sed alium hominem, ante Adamum creatum; hunc fuisse parentem Gentilium, illum vero Judaeorum; Adami et non alterius hominis progeniem describi a Moyse, quia ejus scopus erat originem et propaginem describere gentis Judaeorum. A multis statim et solide confutatus fuit Pereyrus, qui tandem divina gratia excitatus et adjutus Romam petiit, ibique sub Alex. VII. errorem suum, et sectam Calvinisticam abjuravit. Sacrae Scripturae auctoritatem agnoscebat, imo ea abutebatur ad errorem suum confirmandum: ideo ex Scriptura praesertim refutandus est Praeadamitarum error. 161. Passing over certain ancient heretics, such as the Sabaeans, Julian the Apostate, etc., Isaac Pereyrus, a Frenchman by nation, of the sect of the Calvinists, defended this doctrine in the seventeenth century. He published two books: one whose title is Praeadamitae, or an Exercise on Verses 12, 13, 14 of Chapter 5 of the Epistle to the Romans; another, which he inscribed Theological System from the Hypothesis of the Praeadamites. In these he taught that the man whose formation is narrated in Genesis 1 was not Adam, whose formation, he said, is read in Genesis 2 from verse 7, but another man, created before Adam; that this man was the parent of the Gentiles, but Adam of the Jews; that the progeny of Adam and not of the other man is described by Moses, because his scope was to describe the origin and offspring of the Jewish people. Pereyrus was at once solidly refuted by many; and at last, stirred up and helped by divine grace, he sought Rome, and there under Alexander VII abjured his error and the Calvinistic sect. He acknowledged the authority of Sacred Scripture; indeed he abused it to confirm his error. Therefore the error of the Praeadamites must be refuted especially from Scripture.

162. Dicimus itaque:

PROP. XVI. Divina revelatione edocemur universum genus humanum ab Adamo omnium protoparente propagatum esse.

Prob. I. ex Scriptura. Facta descriptione creationis caeli et terrae, eorumque omnium, quae sive in

caelo, sive in aquis, sive in terra sunt, dicitur 1. Gen. 27. "et creavit Deus hominem ad imaginem suam;" hic ergo est, Praeadamitis etiam fatentibus, primus homo a Deo conditus. Atqui non alterius, sed ejusdem hominis enucleatius describitur formatio in 2. Gen. a ver. 7., et hic dicitur Adam; ergo ante Adamum nullus exstitit homo. Ab homine autem de quo agitur in utroque loco, Scriptura teste et Praeadamitis fatentibus, tum gentes tum Judaei, seu universum humanum genus propagatum est. Ergo.

Prob. min. a) Gen. 2.5. dicitur: "Et homo non erat, qui operaretur terram;" et deinde vers. 7. Adami ex limo terrestri fabricatio refertur. Gen. 2.18. dicitur: "Non est bonum esse hominem solum: faciamus ei adjutorium simile sibi:" postea autem vers. 21. 22. refertur Evae

formatio ex Adami costa. Unde: si homo, cujus formatio traditur in 1. Gen. esset alter ab Adamo et Eva, de quibus agitur in 2. Gen., jam ante creationem Adae fuisset homo, qui operaretur terram, et fuisset adjutorium simile Adamo; atqui contrarium docet Scriptura. Ergo.

b) Gen. 3.20. legitur: "Et vocavit Adam nomen uxoris suae Evam, eo quod mater esset cunctorum viventium;" atqui si homines alii creati fuissent antea, a quibus gentes propagatae essent, jam Eva non esset mater cunctorum viventium. Ergo.

c) Gen. 5.1. seq. dicitur: "Hic est liber generationis Adam. In die qua creavit Deus hominem, ad similitudinem Dei fecit illum. Masculum et foeminam creavit eos, et benedixit illis: et vocavit nomen eorum Adam, in die, qua creati sunt." Unde: dum dicitur Deus creasse Adam, dicitur creasse hominem per

excellentiam (l'uomo, l'homme, man); atqui hoc dici non posset, si alii ante Adamum exstitissent homines. Ergo.

d) Eodem cap. 5. Gen. originem Noe ab Adamo deducit Moyses; 10.32. dicitur: "Ab his (familiis Noe) diversae sunt gentes in terra post diluvium;" ergo omnes gentes ab Adamo descendunt.

e) Sap. 10.1.: "Haec (sapientia) illum, qui primus formatus est a Deo, Pater orbis terrarum, cum solus esset creatus, custodivit." Ergo.

f) Math. 19.4.: "Non legistis, quia qui fecit hominem ab initio, masculum et foeminam fecit eos?" unde redit idem argumentum ac sub lit. (c).

g) Hanc veritatem supponit Apostolus Rom. 5.12., ubi de peccato originali in omnes homines transfuso agit; et 1. Cor. 15.22. 45. seqq., ubi de universali hominum morte et resurrectione disputat; sed et, Act. 17.26., stans in medio Areopagi, Deumque supremum annuntians "qui fecit mundum et omnia, quae in eo sunt" diserte dicit: "Fecitque (Deus) ex uno genus hominum inhabitare super universam faciem terrae, definiens statuta tempora, et terminos habitationis eorum."

Prob. II. ex Patribus. Lactantius (lib. 6. Inst. c. 10.): "Si ab uno homine, quem Deus finxit, omnes orimur, certe consanguinei sumus, et ideo maximum scelus putandum est, odisse hominem vel nocentem." - S. Augustinus (Tract. 9. in Jo.): "In ipso exordio Adam et Eva parentes omnium gentium erant, non tantummodo Judaeorum." - S. Laurentius Justinianus (lib. de charit. c. 15.): "Propterea Deus voluit unicum hominem primo formare, ex quo omnes procederent,

ut tamquam fratres omnes se amarent: non sic legitur factum esse in angelis, vel in brutis." - S. Ambrosius, (de parad. Jo. n. 48.): "Nec illud otiosum, quod non de eadem terra de qua plasmatus est Adam, sed de ipsius costa facta sit mulier, ut sciremus, unam in viro et muliere corporis esse naturam, unum fontem generis humani. Ideo non duo a principio facti, vir, et mulier, neque duo viri neque duae mulieres, sed primum vir, deinde ex eo mulier. Unam enim naturam volens hominum constituere Deus, ab uno principio creaturae hujus incipiens, multarum et disparium naturarum eripuit facultatem. Faciamus, inquit, ei adjutorium simile sibi, ad generationem generis humani intelligimus." - Idem docent S. J. Chrys. (Hom. de char.) - S. Hieronymus (l. 16. in Isa.) - Theodoretus (l. 3. Therap.) - Caeterum ipse Pereyrus agnovit contra se Patrum habere auctoritatem; in Epist. enim ad Philotimum scribit: "Fateor me non latuisse hypothesin, quae mihi venit in mentem de primis hominibus ante Adamum conditis, diversam penitus abiisse ab opinione SS. Patrum, nec non aberravisse a toto orthodoxorum Conciliorum canone; totamque doctrinae fabricam de homine lapso et redempto fundatam fuisse a Patribus et Conciliis super hypothesi de Adamo, primo omnium hominum formato."

NOTA. Ad solutionem difficultatum sufficit pauca adnotare.

1. Quamvis filii Adae expresse nominentur soli tres Cain, Abel et Seth; alios tamen filios, certe habuit Adam, cum Gen. 5.4. de eo dicatur quod genuit filios et filias et vixit annos nongentos et

triginta. Unde S. Aug. l. 15. de Civit. Dei, c. 8., ait: "Parum considerant non omnes homines, qui tunc esse potuerunt, scriptorem sacrae hujus historiae necesse habuisse nominare, sed eos solos, quos operis suscepti ratio postulabat. Propositum quippe scriptoris illius fuit, per quem Spiritus Sanctus id agebat, per successiones certarum generationum ex uno homine propagatarum pervenire ad Abraham, ac deinde ex ejus semine ad populum Dei: ita ut nec de altera societate hominum taceretur, quam terrenam dicimus Civitatem, quantum ei commemorandae satis esset, ut Civitas Dei etiam suae adversariae comparatione claresceret."

2. Humani generis initio, ad ejus propagationem licebat sororem uxorem ducere. Unde S. Aug. l. c. cap. 16. inquit: "Cum igitur genus humanum post primam copulam viri facti ex pulvere, et conjugis ejus ex viri latere, marium, foeminarumque conjunctione opus haberet, ut gignendo multiplicaretur; nec essent ulli homines, nisi qui ex illis duobus nati fuissent, viri sorores suas

conjuges acceperunt: quod profecto quanto est antiquius compellente necessitate, tanto postea factum est damnabilius Religione prohibente."

3. Spatio annorum 225, quo filii Israel manserunt in Aegypto, scimus ex Ex. 12.37., illos ad sexcenta et amplius animarum millia excrevisse, cum nonnisi 70 animae essent, quando Jacob cum tota sua domo illuc ingressus est. "Proinde," notat S. Augustinus, l. 1. quaest. in Gen. 9. 1., "cum multo pluribus illi vixerint annis, quam Israelitae in Aegypto fuerunt, quis non videat, quam multi homines nasci potuerunt, unde illa civitas impleretur; si Hebraei multo minori tempore ita multiplicari potuerunt?"

4. Henochia a Cain non fuit ante quingentesimum mundi annum aedificata, nec requirebat artium perfectionem, quae ad nostras civitates requiritur: idem dicendum de instrumentis ad colendam terram.

5. Illud 4. Gen. 7., "statim in foribus peccatum aderit" certe non indicat judices commentitios judicantes in portis; sed significat peccato praesto futuram poenam: cujus dicendi modi etiam apud profanos scriptores extant exempla. - Vid. praeter Perrone, Gotti tract. 10. q. 1. dub. 9. 162. Therefore we say:

PROP. XVI. We are taught by divine revelation that the whole human race was propagated from Adam, the protoparent of all.

Proof I, from Scripture. After the description of the creation of heaven and earth, and of all things which are either in heaven, or in the waters, or on the earth, Genesis 1:27 says: "and God created man to his own image." Therefore this man, even by the confession of the Praeadamites, is the first man founded by God. But the formation not of another man, but of the same man, is described more fully in Genesis 2 from verse 7, and this man is called Adam; therefore before Adam no man existed. But from the man concerning whom both places treat, with Scripture as witness and with the Praeadamites confessing it, both the Gentiles and the Jews, or the whole human race, were propagated. Therefore.

Proof of the minor. a) Genesis 2:5 says: "And there was not a man to work the earth"; and then, verse 7, the fashioning of Adam from the earthly slime is reported. Genesis 2:18 says: "It is not good for man to be alone: let us make him a helper like himself"; but afterwards, verses 21 and 22, the formation of Eve from Adam's rib is reported. Hence: if the man whose formation is handed down in Genesis 1 were another than Adam and Eve, who are treated in Genesis 2, already before the creation of Adam there would have been a man who would work the earth, and there would have been a helper like Adam. But Scripture teaches the contrary. Therefore.

b) Genesis 3:20 reads: "And Adam called the name of his wife Eve, because she was the mother of all the living." But if other men had been created before, from whom the nations had been propagated, Eve would not now be the mother of all the living. Therefore.

c) Genesis 5:1 and following says: "This is the book of the generation of Adam. In the day on which God created man, he made him to the likeness of God. Male and female he created them, and blessed them; and he called their name Adam, in the day on which they were created." Hence, when God is said to have created Adam, he is said to have created man par excellence (l'uomo, l'homme, man). But this could not be said if other men had existed before Adam. Therefore.

d) In the same chapter, Genesis 5, Moses deduces the origin of Noah from Adam; Genesis 10:32 says: "From these (the families of Noah) the nations were divided on the earth after the flood." Therefore all nations descend from Adam.

e) Wisdom 10:1: "She (wisdom) preserved him who was first formed by God, the father of the world, when he had been created alone." Therefore.

f) Matthew 19:4: "Have you not read that he who made man from the beginning made them male and female?" Hence the same argument returns as under letter (c).

g) The Apostle supposes this truth in Romans 5:12, where he treats of original sin poured forth into all men; and in 1 Corinthians 15:22, 45 and following, where he discusses the universal death and resurrection of men. But also, in Acts 17:26, standing in the middle of the Areopagus and announcing the supreme God "who made the world and all things that are in it," he says expressly: "And (God) made from one the race of men to inhabit the whole face of the earth, determining appointed times and the boundaries of their habitation."

Proof II, from the Fathers. Lactantius (Institutes, book 6, c. 10): "If we all arise from one man, whom God fashioned, certainly we are of one blood; and therefore it must be thought the greatest crime to hate a man, even one who is guilty." St. Augustine

(Tractate 9 on John): "At the very beginning Adam and Eve were the parents of all nations, not only of the Jews." St. Laurence Justinian (On Charity, c. 15): "For this reason God willed first to form one single man, from whom all would proceed, so that all might love one another as brothers: it is not read that this was done in Angels or in brutes." St. Ambrose (On Paradise, n. 48): "Nor is that idle, that the woman was made not from the same earth from which Adam was formed, but from his very rib, so that we might know that there is one nature of body in man and woman, one source of the human race. Therefore not two were made at the beginning, man and woman, nor two men nor two women, but first man, then from him woman. For God, wishing to constitute one nature of men, beginning from one principle of this creature, took away the possibility of many and disparate natures. Let us make, he says, for him a helper like himself: we understand this for the generation of the human race." St. John Chrysostom (Homily on Charity), St. Jerome (book 16 on Isaiah), and Theodoret (book 3 of Therapeutics) teach the same. Moreover Pereyrus himself acknowledged that he had the authority of the Fathers against him; for in his letter to Philotimus he writes: "I confess that it did not escape me that the hypothesis which came into my mind concerning the first men founded before Adam departed utterly from the opinion of the holy Fathers, and also wandered from the whole canon of orthodox Councils; and that the whole fabric of doctrine concerning man fallen and redeemed had been founded by the Fathers and Councils upon the hypothesis concerning Adam, formed first of all men."

NOTE. For the solution of difficulties it is enough to note a few things.

1. Although only three sons of Adam are expressly named, Cain, Abel, and Seth, nevertheless Adam certainly had other sons, since Genesis 5:4 says of him that he begot sons and daughters and lived nine hundred and thirty years. Hence St. Augustine, book 15 of The City of God, c. 8, says: "They little consider that the writer of this sacred history did not have to name all the men who could then have existed, but only those whom the plan of the work undertaken demanded. For the purpose of that writer, through whom the Holy Spirit was doing this, was to arrive, through the successions of certain generations propagated from one man, at Abraham, and then from his seed at the people of God; so that neither would there be silence concerning the other society of men, which we call the earthly City, as much as was enough for commemorating it, so that the City of God might also be made clear by comparison with its adversary."

2. At the beginning of the human race, for its propagation it was permitted to take one's sister as wife. Hence St. Augustine, cited place, chapter 16, says: "Therefore, since the human race after the first union of the man made from dust and of his spouse from the man's side had need of the conjunction of males and females, so that it might be multiplied by begetting; and since there were no men except those who had been born from those two, men took their sisters as wives: and this indeed, the more ancient it is by compelling necessity, the more damnable it afterwards became when religion forbade it."

3. In the space of 225 years during which the sons of Israel remained in Egypt, we know from Exodus 12:37 that they had grown to six hundred thousand and more souls, although there were only 70 souls when Jacob entered there with his whole house. "Therefore," St. Augustine notes, book 1, Questions on Genesis, 9.1, "since they lived many more years than the Israelites were in Egypt, who does not see how many men could have been born, by whom that city would be filled, if the Hebrews could be multiplied so in a much shorter time?"

4. The city of Henoch, built by Cain, was not built before the five-hundredth year of the world, nor did it require the perfection of arts which is required for our cities; the same must be said concerning instruments for cultivating the earth.

5. That text of Genesis 4:7, "sin will immediately be at the doors," certainly does not indicate imaginary judges judging in the gates, but signifies punishment soon to be ready for sin; examples of this way of speaking also exist among profane writers. See, besides Perrone, Gotti, tract 10, q. 1, dub. 9.

§ II.
Rejicitur error Coadamitarum. Section II.
The Error Of The Coadamites Is Rejected.

163. Coadamitas hic vocamus eos omnes generatim, qui alios homines, praeter Adamum et Evam, agnoscunt primos humani generis parentes. Distinguere eos possumus in antiquos et recentiores. Antiqui Coadamitae sunt illi omnes, qui admittunt aborigines; seu qui commenti sunt in variis latissimi orbis regionibus exstitisse (dicamus "creatos fuisse" si enim creationem negarent, jam refutati essent in articulo praecedente) homines primordiales, ex quibus diversae hominum gentes prodierint, adeoque rejiciendum esse dogma de omnium hominum ortu a primo illo pari, Adamo et Eva. Uti patet, nullo modo impugnamus eos, qui aborigenes admittunt eo tantum sensu, quod populos esse dicant, quorum immediata origo ex historicis documentis cognosci nequit. 163. Here we call Coadamites, in general, all those who acknowledge other men, besides Adam and Eve, as first parents of the human race. We can distinguish them into ancient and more recent. The ancient Coadamites are all those who admit aborigines; or who have imagined that in various regions of the very broad world there existed (let us say "were created," for if they denied creation, they would already have been refuted in the preceding article) primordial men, from whom the diverse nations of men came forth, and therefore that the dogma concerning the origin of all men from that first pair, Adam and Eve, must be rejected. As is clear, we in no way attack those who admit aborigines only in this sense, that they say there are peoples whose immediate origin cannot be known from historical documents.

164. Alia ratione propagationem totius humani

generis per Adamum et Evam impugnarunt quidam recentiores. Hi, ex perpensis differentiis inter diversarum regionum homines existentibus quoad corpus praesertim (anima et ratio enim ipsis nihil aut fere nihil videtur esse), deduxere admittendas esse non modo diversas stirpes, quod omnes norunt, sed etiam diversas species humanas. Quoad numerum autem specierum non conveniunt: nam alii, uti Virey, duas tantum admittunt; alii, uti Bory Saint-Vincent, quindecim; alii, uti Desmoulins, sexdecim; alii, uti Knox caput scholae Americanae, tot fere distinctas hominum species admittunt, quot sunt nationes. Ita quidem dum transformistae tantam similitudinem vident inter homines et simias, ut unam illis originem tribuant; alii, polygenistae, tantam inter ipsos homines dissimilitudinem inveniunt, ut eos a diversis omnino parentibus procreatos dicant. Vere "evanuerunt in cogitationibus suis"! 164. Certain more recent authors have attacked the propagation of the whole human race through Adam and Eve in another way. From considering the differences existing among men of diverse regions, especially as to the body (for soul and reason seem to them to be nothing, or almost nothing), they deduced that there must be admitted not only diverse stocks, which all know, but also diverse human species. But as to the number of species they do not agree: for some, such as Virey, admit only two; others, such as Bory Saint-Vincent, fifteen; others, such as Desmoulins, sixteen; others, such as Knox, the head of the American school, admit almost as many distinct species of men as there are nations. Thus indeed, while the Transformists see so great a similarity between men and apes that they attribute one origin to them, others, the polygenists, find so great a dissimilarity among men themselves that they say they were procreated from altogether diverse parents. Truly "they became vain in their thoughts"!

165. Ad intelligentiam quaestionis, et probationum, quae afferendae sunt, juverit paucis tradere notiones veras speciei et stirpis. Species, quoad praesentem quaestionem, definiri potest: collectio individuorum similium ab uno communi stipite descendentium per successionem non interruptam familiarum. - Jamvero inter individua cujuscumque speciei, sive plantarum, sive animalium, sive etiam speciei humanae, datur quaedam diversitas: si haec diversitas sit notabilis, constans, transmissa per generationem; habetur id quod dicitur stirps. - Idea speciei, uti patet, duo complectitur elementa, similitudinem, et filiationem; quorum licet unum includat aliud, et vicissim, praecipuum tamen est filiatio; haec enim magis determinat ipsam similitudinem necessariam inter indivi-

dua ejusdem speciei. Quare praecipue ex charactere filiationis dijudicantur et distinguuntur species. 165. For understanding the

question, and the proofs which must be brought forward, it will be useful to hand down in a few words the true notions of species and stock. Species, as regards the present question, can be defined: a collection of similar individuals descending from one common stock through an uninterrupted succession of families. Now among the individuals of any species whatever, whether of plants, or of animals, or even of the human species, there is a certain diversity. If this diversity is notable, constant, and transmitted through generation, there is had that which is called a stock. The idea of species, as is clear, includes two elements, similarity and filiation; and although one includes the other, and conversely, nevertheless the principal one is filiation, for this more determines the very similarity necessary among individuals of the same species. Therefore species are judged and distinguished chiefly from the character of filiation.

166. Jamvero experientia compertum est conjunctiones inter individua ejusdem speciei sed diversae stirpis esse tam fecundas, quam conjunctiones inter individua ejusdem stirpis, imo iisdem quandoque fecundiores. E contra vero conjunctiones inter individua diversae animalium speciei difficile obtinentur, et si obtineantur, vel sunt omnino steriles, vel steriles fiunt post unam aut alteram generationem, vel tandem reproducunt omnes characteres unius ex speciebus, a quibus individua hybrida (sic vocatur proles ex individuis diversae speciei) ortum duxere. 166. Now it is found by experience that unions among individuals of the same species but of diverse stock are as fecund as unions among individuals of the same stock, indeed sometimes more fecund than these. On the contrary, however, unions among individuals of a diverse species of animals are obtained with difficulty, and if they are obtained, they are either altogether sterile, or become sterile after one or another generation, or finally reproduce all the characters of one of the species from which the hybrid individuals (so the offspring from individuals of diverse species is called) took their origin.

167. Exposita idea speciei ejusque fecunditatis experientia nititur. Unde 1. inter veteres, Aristoteles docuit: "omne simile generat sibi simile;" et generatio, quae est actio viventium tendens ad conservationem et propagationem speciei, definita fuit: "origo viventis a vivente principio conjuncto in similitudinem naturae." 2. Celebriores Naturalistae recentiores eamdem tradiderunt notionem speciei, eamdemque legem propagationis statuerunt, uti videre est apud de Quatrefages (Rapport, etc. 2me partie, ch. 2.). Darwin etiam (Plants and Animals under Domestication, Vol. 2. ch. 16.) testatur praedictam difficultatem et sterilitatem conjunctionum inter individua diversae speciei. - 3. In 1. Gen., ubi agitur de prima productione plantarum et animalium, adhibetur vox min, quae de se involvit conceptum similitudinis et filiationis; ideo a latino interprete quater vertitur species, et sexies genus: species, ab aspiciendo, denotat similitudinem viventium, quae oculis conspicitur;

genus a generando, innuit originem viventium a stipite ejusdem collectionis (gruppo). "Omnis caro ad similem sibi conjungetur." Eccli. 13.20. 167. The idea of species just set forth, and of its fecundity, rests on experience. Hence 1. among the ancients, Aristotle taught: "every like generates something like itself"; and generation, which is an action of living things tending to the conservation and propagation of the species, was defined: "the origin of a living thing from a conjoined living principle unto the likeness of nature." 2. The more celebrated recent Naturalists handed down the same notion of species and established the same law of propagation, as can be seen in de Quatrefages (Rapport, etc., 2nd part, ch. 2). Darwin also (Plants and Animals under Domestication, vol. 2, ch. 16) bears witness to the aforesaid difficulty and sterility of unions among individuals of diverse species. 3. In Genesis 1, where the first production of plants and animals is treated, the word min is employed, which of itself involves the concept of similarity and filiation; therefore by the Latin interpreter it is rendered four times as species and six times as genus. Species, from looking upon, denotes the similarity of living things which is perceived by the eyes; genus, from generating, suggests the origin of living things from a stock of the same collection (gruppo). "All flesh will be joined to its like." Ecclesiasticus

13:20.

168. His positis, dicimus:

PROP. XVII. Nihil ex humanis scientiis adduci potest, quo pluralitas humanae originis et speciei adstruatur; imo multa sunt, quae universos homines ita existere suadent, ut tum origine, tum specifica naturae unitate, omnes ad eamdem familiam eamdemque humanitatem revocentur.

Prob. I. Abstractione facta a divina Scripturarum auctoritate, sola arte critica duce ostenditur Pent. Moysis vetustissimum esse historicum documentum, atque nullum aliud ipsi praeferri aut comparari posse integritate et authenticitate. Collatis vero diversis locis hujus libri, constat, ut vidimus, omnes homines ab uno progenitore usque ad Noe propagatos esse, et ita deinde omnes a Noe et filiis ejus. Unde: sana ratio docet non esse recedendum a testimonio hujus libri, saltem non esse recedendum sine aliqua evidente ratione contraria: secus enim nulla fides historica remaneret. Atqui liber ille docet unitatem originis, et consequenter speciei humanae, quin ulla evidens ratio detur cur hoc denegetur, ut patebit ex mox dicendis. Ergo.

Confirm. Omnes antiquae anthropogoniae, quas nobis poetae et historici servarunt, nec non traditiones omnium populorum, sive antiquiorum sive recentiorum, anthropogoniam Mosaicam prorsus referunt, uti ostendit Huetius (Demonstr. evang. prop. 4. c. 5. seqq.). - Historiae omnes, quae coloniarum transmigrationes ex Asia, Chaldaea, Phoenicia, Aegypto, Graecia,

etc., narrant, testes saltem sunt populos omnes, ex tenui principio exortos, paulatim excrevisse, et originem communem habuisse. Cui universali traditioni non obstat, quod aliqui populi dicti sint aborigenes: sive a) quia constat hanc fabulam ortam esse ex quadam gloriolae cupidine, qua ducti decertare inter se de antiquitate coeperunt; sive b) quia cum hac fabula simul retinebant iidem populi signa et traditiones quasdam de communi omnium origine (Perrone in not.). Ergo, si veritas de unitate originis et speciei omnium hominum negari posset, omnes traditiones, utut universales, et omnia historica documenta rejicienda essent.

Prob. II. Ex studio comparativo linguarum constat linguas omnes facile revocari ad duas primitivas, semiticam et japheticam, et has ab una profectas esse. Hoc ostendunt philologi ex identitate, vel similitudine et analogia vocum, radicum, formarum, systematis grammaticalis, etc. Cons. Auctores, quos citat P. Perrone in not. - Saepe etiam experientia constat majorem esse affinitatem inter linguas populorum inter se valde dissitorum, quam propinquiorum. - Jamvero haec communis omnium linguarum analogia et affinitas facile ostendit unam fuisse omnium hominum originem, secus nullam causam haberet.

Prob. III. Jam diximus, experientia constare et testimonio naturalistarum uniones inter animalia diversae speciei vel esse omnino steriles, vel saltem generationes non perpetuari, nisi per reditum descendentium ad typum perfectum speciei unius ex progenitoribus. - Constat etiam notas characteristicas unius speciei non inveniri in individuis alterius speciei; cum e con-

tra characteres unius stirpis inveniantur in individuis alterius stirpis (Vid. de Quatrefages, Rapport etc. pag. 112.). - Atqui uniones inter homines cujuscumque regionis, cujuscumque stirpis (cujuscumque speciei juxta adversarios), habent omnimodam fecunditatem, uti pluribus ostendit de Quatrefages op. cit. pag. 115.; nec ullum ex factis allegatis in contrarium quidquam probat, uti ostendit idem Auctor pag. 439. Characteres autem unius stirpis humanae (juxta adversarios speciei), quos adversarii ipsi assignant [color; color et natura capillorum; calvae atque anguli imprimis oris humani dispar structura etc.] inveniuntur in individuis alterius stirpis, uti ostendit inter alios idem de Quatrefages op. cit. pag. 112. Ergo.

Prob. IV. Praecipuum fundamentum eorum, qui adstruere conantur pluralitatem humanarum specierum, est magnum discrimen inter homines diversarum stirpium. Atqui hoc fundamentum labile omnino est. Nam a) diversitates illae magnae apparent, si comparentur individua diversae stirpis, quorum unumquodque habet notas suae stirpis in summo gradu (summam nigredinem ex. gr. et summam albedinem); at minimae sunt, si comparentur simul, individua, quorum unumquodque suae stirpis notas habet in inferiori gradu. Quae animadversio confirmatur ex eo, quod, uti bene probat de Quatrefages op. cit. pag. 111.: "La meme, ou les extremes sont le plus distincts, comme en Afrique, la difficulte n'est pas de trouver des ressemblances; elle consiste a preciser les differences." - b) Inter

quaedam animalia diversae stirpis majores sunt dissimilitudines, quam inter homines, et tamen confessione omnium naturalistarum animalia

illa non pertinent ad diversas species. - c) Qualescumque sint differentiae inter homines diversae stirpis, bene ostenditur illas explicari posse ex climate, victu, vitae ratione, etc., quin admittatur diversitas originis. Vid. de Quatrefages, op. cit. 2me partie, ch. 3. d) Idem Auctor 3me partie accurate expendit characteres physicos - anatomicos - physiologicos - pathologicos - intellectuales - morales hominum diversarum stirpium; et ex his omnibus deducit potius unitatem humanae speciei: quam conclusionem, quemadmodum et praemissas celebriorum naturalistarum testimoniis confirmat.

Prob. V. Idem de Quatrefages ad evertendum aliud argumentum, quo praesertim Agassiz nititur ostendere omnes homines non habere eamdem originem, statuit hanc thesim: "Que l'on soit monogeniste ou polygeniste, on ne saurait attribuer a l'homme des origines geographiques multiples sans faire de lui une exception unique parmi tous les etres organises." Op. cit. pag. 165. Hanc autem thesim pluribus confirmat.

Caeterum modus ipse agendi adversariorum satis probat nihili facienda esse eorum argumenta, quibus principia et logica desunt. Etenim Knox et Gliddon inutile et ridiculum putant speciem definire, cum tamen adstruant pluralitatem humanarum specierum; idem Gliddon et Nott, contra experientiam et auctoritatem, diversas species dijudicare volunt solum ex dissimilitudinibus, cum tamen hoc argumentum, uti vidimus, nihil probet, imo contra ipsos probet: Agassiz et aliquot alii docent fecunditatem continuam et fecunditatem limitatam aut sterilitatem nullius esse

momenti ad species determinandas; quod iterum est contra factum, et auctoritatem celebriorum Naturalistarum, tum veterum tum recentiorum. Vid. de Quatrefages, op. cit. pag. 118.

Quare hos omnes ita breviter perstringere possumus: Si speciem non definitis; ex eo quod sint, ut dicitis, diversae humanae species, minime probare potestis repugnare ut omnes habeant communem originem. Si speciem definitis solum ex similitudine; ostensum est similitudines existentes inter homines diversarum regionum non impedire, quominus omnes potuerint procedere a communi stipite. Si tandem admittitis, quod verum est, speciem determinari praecipue ex fecunditate continua; ostensum est hanc dari inter homines diversarum regionum, quaecumque sint dissimilitudines inter illos. Ergo nullo pacto ostenditis totum humanum genus non potuisse ab Adamo et Eva propagari. Hoc autem, quod fieri poterat, revera factum esse demonstrant revelatio, universalis hominum traditio, etc.

Vid. objectiones apud Perrone. 168. With these things posited, we say:

PROP. XVII. Nothing can be adduced from the human sciences by which plurality of human origin and species may be established; indeed there are many things which suggest that all men exist in such a way that, both by origin and by the specific unity of nature, all are brought back to the same family and the same humanity.

Proof I. With abstraction made from the divine authority of the Scriptures, and with the art of criticism alone as guide, it is shown that the Pentateuch of Moses is the most ancient historical document, and that no other can be preferred to it or compared with it in integrity and authenticity. But when the diverse places of this book are compared, it is established, as we have seen, that all men were propagated from one progenitor down to Noah, and then all from Noah and his sons. Hence sound reason teaches that one must not depart from the testimony of this book, or at least that one must not depart without some evident contrary reason; otherwise no historical faith would remain. But that book teaches the unity of origin, and consequently of the human species, while no evident reason is given why this should be denied, as will be clear from the things soon to be said. Therefore.

Confirmation. All the ancient anthropogonies which poets and historians have preserved for us, and also the traditions of all peoples, whether more ancient or more recent, entirely reproduce the Mosaic anthropogony, as Huet shows (Demonstratio evangelica, prop. 4, c. 5 and following). All the histories which narrate transmigrations of colonies from Asia, Chaldaea, Phoenicia, Egypt, Greece, etc., are at least witnesses that all peoples, having arisen from a small beginning, gradually increased and had a common origin. Nor is it opposed to this universal tradition that some peoples have been called aborigines: both a) because it is established that this fable arose from a certain desire for a little glory, by which they were led to contend among themselves about antiquity; and b) because, together

with this fable, the same peoples at the same time retained certain signs and traditions concerning the common origin of all (Perrone in the note). Therefore, if the truth concerning the unity of origin and species of all men could be denied, all traditions, however universal, and all historical documents would have to be rejected.

Proof II. From the comparative study of languages it is established that all languages are easily brought back to two primitive ones, the Semitic and the Japhetic, and that these proceeded from one. Philologists show this from the identity, or similarity and analogy, of words, roots, forms, the grammatical system, etc. Consult the authors whom Fr. Perrone cites in the note. Experience also often establishes that there is a greater affinity among the languages of peoples very far apart from one another than among those nearer to one another. Now this common analogy and affinity of all languages easily shows that there was one origin of all men; otherwise it would have no cause.

Proof III. We have already said that it is established by experience and by the testimony of naturalists that unions among animals of diverse species either are altogether sterile, or at least that generations are not perpetuated except through the return of the descendants to the perfect type of one species of the progenitors. It is also established that the characteristic marks of one species are not found in the individuals of another species; while, on the contrary, the characters of one stock are found in the individuals of another stock (see de Quatrefages, Rapport, etc., p. 112). But unions among men of whatever region, of whatever stock (of whatever species according to the adversaries), have complete fecundity, as de Quatrefages shows at length in the cited work, p. 115; nor does any of the facts alleged to the contrary prove anything, as the same Author shows on p. 439. But the characters of one human stock (according to the adversaries, species), which the adversaries themselves assign [color; the color and nature of the hair; the different structure especially of the skull and facial angle of the human mouth, etc.] are found in individuals of another stock, as the same de Quatrefages among others shows in the cited work, p. 112. Therefore.

Proof IV. The chief foundation of those who try to establish the plurality of human species is the great difference among men of diverse stocks. But this foundation is altogether unstable. For a) those diversities appear great if individuals of diverse stock are compared, each of whom has the marks of his own stock in the highest degree (the greatest blackness, for example, and the greatest whiteness); but they are very small if individuals are compared together each of whom has the marks of his own stock in a lower degree. This observation is confirmed from the fact that, as de Quatrefages well proves in the cited work, p. 111: "Even where the extremes are most distinct, as in Africa, the difficulty is not to find resemblances; it consists in specifying the differences." b) Among certain animals of diverse stock there are greater dissimilarities than among men, and yet by the confession of all naturalists those animals do not belong to diverse species. c) Whatever the differences may be among men of diverse stock, it is well shown that they can be explained from climate, food, manner of life, etc., without admitting diversity of origin. See de Quatrefages, cited work, 2nd part, ch. 3. d) The same Author, in the 3rd part, carefully weighs the physical, anatomical, physiological, pathological, intellectual, and moral characters of men of diverse stocks; and from all these he rather deduces the unity of the human species, a conclusion which, like the premises, he confirms by the testimonies of the more celebrated naturalists.

Proof V. The same de Quatrefages, to overturn another argument by which especially Agassiz strives to show that all men do not have the same origin, establishes this thesis: "Whether one is monogenist or polygenist, one could not attribute multiple geographical origins to man without making him a unique exception among all organized beings." Cited work, p. 165. He confirms this thesis at length.

Moreover, the very mode of acting of the adversaries sufficiently proves that their arguments, which lack principles and logic, must be considered of no account. For Knox and Gliddon think it useless and ridiculous to define species, although they establish a plurality of human species. The same Gliddon and Nott, against experience and authority, wish to judge diverse species solely from dissimilarities, although this argument, as we have seen, proves nothing, indeed proves against them. Agassiz and some others teach that continuous fecundity and limited fecundity or sterility are of no moment for determining species; which again is against fact and the authority of the more celebrated Naturalists, both ancient and

recent. See de Quatrefages, cited work, p. 118.

Therefore we can briefly press all these men in this way: if you do not define species, from the fact that there are, as you say, diverse human species, you can by no means prove that it is repugnant for all to have a common origin. If you define species only from similarity, it has been shown that the similarities existing among men of diverse regions do not prevent all from having been able to proceed from a common stock. Finally, if you admit, what is true, that species is determined chiefly from continuous fecundity, it has been shown that this is found among men of diverse regions, whatever the dissimilarities among them may be. Therefore in no way do you show that the whole human race could not have been propagated from Adam and Eve. But that this, which could have happened, in fact happened, is demonstrated by revelation, the universal tradition of men, etc.

See the objections in Perrone.

Article 3. What is the Origin of the Human Soul

LatineEnglish

Quaenam sit animae humanae origo.

169. Non hic solum inquirimus originem animae primi hominis, sed originem animae in unoquoque homine. Licet haec quaestio pertractari soleat in philosophia, attamen pertinet etiam multiplici ex capite ad doctrinam revelatam, ideoque non possumus illam penitus omittere. Breviter de ea agemus, falsas sententias refutando veram statuendo

- ejusque gradum certitudinis theologice determinando. 169. Here we inquire not only into the origin of the soul of the first man, but into the origin of the soul in each man. Although this question is usually treated in philosophy, nevertheless it also pertains under many heads to revealed doctrine, and therefore we cannot omit it entirely. We shall treat it briefly, refuting the false opinions, establishing the true one, and determining theologically its degree of certitude.

§ I.
Diversae sententiae referuntur, et falsae eliminantur. Section I.
Diverse Opinions Are Reported, And The False Ones Are Eliminated.

170. Diversae sententiae de origine animae humanae ad tres classes facile omnes revocantur; vel enim dicitur producta de substantia Dei (melius diceretur improducta), et habemus sententias pantheisticas - vel dicitur producta de substantia parentum; et habemus Traducianismum - vel dicitur producta ex nihilo; et habemus Creatianismum. 170. The diverse opinions concerning the origin of the human soul are all easily brought back to three classes. For either it is said to be produced from the substance of God (it would be better said to be unproduced), and we have pantheistic opinions; or it is said to be produced from the substance of the parents, and we have Traducianism; or it is said to be produced from nothing, and we have Creationism.

171. Sententiae pantheisticae, uti patet ex ipsa essentia hujus absurdi systematis, omnes conveniunt in eo, quod animae humanae sint eductae ex Dei substantia; at cum idem systema sub diversis formis proponatur, diversus etiam statuitur modus, quo anima ex Dei substantia producitur. Qui enim Deum, primum rerum principium, uti ens corporeum adstruunt, animam dicunt esse partem ipsius Dei; qui Deum agnoscunt esse ens spirituale, animam esse statuunt veluti effluxum Dei; qui tandem tenent Deum esse ens quoddam indeterminatum, animam humanam considerant uti determinationem aliquam, phenomenon divinitatis. 171. The pantheistic opinions, as is clear from the very essence of this

absurd system, all agree in this, that human souls are educed from the substance of God. But since the same system is proposed under diverse forms, there is also established a diverse mode by which the soul is produced from the substance of God. For those who establish God, the first principle of things, as a corporeal being say that the soul is a part of God himself; those who acknowledge God to be a spiritual being hold that the soul is, as it were, an efflux of God; and finally those who hold that God is a certain indeterminate being consider the human soul as some determination, a phenomenon of divinity.

172. Non oportet hic diutius immorari in his absurdis pantheisticis sententiis refutandis, cum facile refutentur ex iis, quibus suo loco refutatur pantheismus. Sufficit aliqua afferre ex D. Thoma, quibus evidenter ostenditur non posse animam humanam ex

Dei substantia produci, quicumque tandem emanationis modus assignetur. "Omne illud," inquit S. Doctor, c. g. l. 2. c. 85., "ex quo fit aliquid, est in potentia ad illud quod fit ex eo. Substantia autem Dei non est in potentia ad aliquid, cum sit purus actus. Impossibile est igitur quod ex substantia Dei fiat anima, vel quodcumque aliud. Adhuc, illud, ex quo fit aliud, aliquo modo mutatur. Deus autem est omnino immutabilis. Impossibile est igitur ut ex eo aliquid fieri possit. Amplius, in anima manifeste apparet variatio secundum scientiam et virtutem et eorum opposita. Deus autem est omnino invariabilis et per se et per accidens. Non igitur anima potest esse de divina substantia." Quod ultimum argumentum perbelle etiam proponit S. Augustinus, Ep. 166. § 3., dicens: "Non est pars Dei anima ... Quod si esset, nec deficeret in deterius, nec proficeret in melius; nec aliquid in semetipsa inciperet habere quod non habebat, vel desineret habere quod habebat, quantum ad ejus ipsius affectiones pertinet. Quam vero aliter se habeat, non est opus extrinseco testimonio: quisquis semetipsum advertit, cognoscit." 172. There is no need here to linger longer in refuting these absurd pantheistic opinions, since they are easily refuted from those things by which pantheism is refuted in its proper place. It is enough to bring forward some things from St. Thomas, by which it is evidently shown that the human soul cannot be produced from the substance of God, whatever mode of emanation may finally be assigned. "Everything," says the holy Doctor, Contra Gentiles, book 2, c. 85, "from which something is made is in potency to that which is made from it. But the substance of God is not in potency to anything, since it is pure act. Therefore it is impossible that from the substance of God a soul, or anything else, should be made. Again, that from which another thing is made is changed in some way. But God is altogether immutable. Therefore it is impossible that something should be made from him. Moreover, in the soul there manifestly appears variation according to knowledge and virtue and their opposites. But God is altogether invariable both per se and per accidens. Therefore the soul cannot be of the divine substance." St. Augustine also very beautifully proposes this last argument, Epistle 166, § 3, saying: "The soul is not a part of God.... For if it were, it would neither decline into worse nor advance into better; nor would it begin to have in itself anything which it did not have, or cease to have what it did have, so far as concerns its own affections. But how differently it stands, there is no need of external testimony: whoever attends to himself knows it."

173. Traducianismus duplex distinguitur. Nonnulli enim dicebant ex semine corporali parentum generari non modo corpus, sed etiam animam; alii vero non a corpore, sed ab anima parentum, filiorum animas generari autumant, ipsi animae quoddam spirituale semen tribuentes. Hunc traducianismum spiritualem aliqui vocant generatianismum, ut illum distinguant a materiali, cui nomen traducianismi relinquunt. 173. Traducianism is distinguished as twofold. For some said that not only the body but also the soul is generated from the corporeal seed of the parents; others, however, think that the souls of children are generated not from the body, but from the soul of the parents, attributing to the soul itself a certain spiritual seed. Some call this spiritual traducianism generatianism, in order to distinguish it from the material one, to which they leave the name traducianism.

174. Traducianismum, quem olim docuisse videtur Tertullianus, reprobarunt Patres. Ita S. Augustinus, Epist. 190 ad Opt. c. 4., ait: "Illi, qui animas ex una propagari asserunt, quam Deus primo homini dedit, atque ita eas ex parentibus trahi dicunt, si Tertulliani opinionem sequuntur, profecto eas non spiritus, sed corpora esse contendunt, et corpulentis seminibus exoriri; quo perversius quid dici potest? Neque hoc Tertullianum somniasse mirandum est, qui etiam ipsum Creatorem Deum non esse nisi corpus opinatur." S. Hieronymus (In Eccli. 12.7.): "Ex quo satis ridendi sunt, qui putant, animas cum corporibus seri, et non a Deo, sed a corporum parentibus generari." Ceterum hic error facile refutari potest iis omnibus argumentis, quibus in philosophia animae humanae simplicitas et spiritualitas vindicatur. 174. The Fathers rejected traducianism, which Tertullian once seems to have taught. Thus St. Augustine, Epistle 190 to Optatus, c. 4, says: "Those who assert that souls are propagated from the one which God gave to the first man, and thus say that they are drawn from parents, if they follow the opinion of Tertullian, certainly contend that they are not spirits, but bodies, and that they arise from corporeal seeds; what more perverse can be said? Nor is it to be wondered that Tertullian dreamed this, who also opines that God the Creator himself is nothing but a body." St. Jerome (On Ecclesiastes 12:7): "From this those are sufficiently to be laughed at who think that souls are sown with bodies and are generated not by God, but by the parents of bodies." Moreover, this error can easily be refuted by all those arguments by which the simplicity and spirituality of the human soul are vindicated in philosophy.

175. Generatianismum ultimis his temporibus renovavit Klee, quem pauci alii sequuti sunt. Cum argumenta afferenda ad veram sententiam comprobandam aeque excludant generatianismum, satis erit hic referre quae Bellarminus habet contra illum. "Si animae hominum," inquit (de Amiss. grat. et statu pecc. l. 4. c. 11.), "a parentibus trahuntur, vel trahuntur ex corpore vel ex anima parentum ... Si ex anima, vel ex tota, vel ex parte; si ex tota, igitur vel parens caret deinceps anima, quippe qui totam transfudit in filium; vel tota manet in patre et in filio. Utrumque est evidenter falsum; nam experientia testatur, parentem per generationem anima non destitui; et non esse unam atque eandem animam patris et filii; ut omittam singulare, ac proprium esse

divinae naturae ob ejus infinitatem, ut una numero sit in pluribus personis. Sin autem non ex tota, sed ex parte animae patris existit anima filii, igitur anima partibilis est, ac per hoc corporalis et mortalis. Ita semper reditur ad articulum de animae immortalitate." Quae ultima pars argumenti valet si supponatur semen quoddam spirituale veluti decidi ex anima parentum, et constituere veluti partem animae prolis: quod utrumque implicat generatianismus. Paulo inferius vero addit idem Bellarminus: "Si anima humana traducitur, non secus atque animae bestiarum, et generabitur ex materia, et a materia separata deficiet ac peribit. Sic igitur demonstratum sit, animas humanas non fieri ex propagine, sed creari." Sed juverit legere integrum cit. caput, ubi plene tractat totam quaestionem de origine animae humanae. 175. In these last times Klee renewed generatianism, whom a few others followed. Since the arguments to be brought forward for proving the true opinion equally exclude generatianism, it will be enough here to report what Bellarmine has against it. "If the souls of men," he says (On the Loss of Grace and the State of Sin, book 4, c. 11), "are drawn from the parents, they are drawn either from the body or from the soul of the parents.... If from the soul, either from the whole or from a part; if from the whole, then either the parent thereafter lacks the soul, since he has poured the whole into the son, or the whole remains in the father and in the son. Each is evidently false; for experience testifies that the parent is not deprived of soul through generation, and that there is not one and the same soul of father and son; to omit that it is singular and proper to the divine nature, on account of its infinity, that one in number should be in several persons. But if the soul of the son exists not from the whole, but from a part of the soul of the father, then the soul is divisible, and by this very fact corporeal and mortal. Thus one always returns to the article concerning the immortality of the soul." This last part of the argument is valid if it is supposed that some spiritual seed is, as it were, cut off from the soul of the parents and constitutes, as it were, a part of the

soul of the offspring; and generatianism implies both. A little below the same Bellarmine adds: "If the human soul is traduced, no otherwise than the souls of beasts, it will both be generated from matter and, separated from matter, will fail and perish. Thus, therefore, let it be demonstrated that human souls are not made from propagation, but are created." But it will be useful to read the whole cited chapter, where he treats fully the whole question concerning the origin of the human soul.

176. Qui creatianismum defendunt conveniunt in eo, quod anima humana producitur ex nihilo. Sed aliquot recentiores, uti Froschammer, docent parentes ipsos ex nihilo producere animas filiorum, in libro, quem edidit anno 1854. Sac. Cong. Indicis damnavit hunc librum, et summus Pont. Pius IX. iterum auctorem reprobavit in Brevi ad Archiep. Monac. et Fring. Gravissimas inter acerbitates, 11 Dec. 1862. Hic error refutatur ex dictis (n. 26. seqq., et n. 53. seqq.) Vide La Civilta Cattolica, serie 5. vol. 10., pag. 141. 176. Those who defend creationism agree in this, that the human soul is produced from nothing. But some more recent authors, such as Froschammer, teach that the parents themselves produce the souls of their children from nothing, in the book which he published in the year 1854. The Sacred Congregation of the Index condemned this book, and the Supreme Pontiff Pius IX again reproved the author in the Brief to the Archbishop of Munich and Freising, Gravissimas inter acerbitates, December 11, 1862. This error is refuted from the things said (n. 26 and following, and n. 53 and following). See La Civilta Cattolica, series 5, vol. 10, p. 141.

177. Alii fatentur quidem animas humanas non existere nisi per creationem a Deo, sed simul tenent omnes ab initio mundi creatas fuisse, ac aliquando vitam sine corpore egisse; at cum in eo statu in peccata inciderint, in poenam peccati fuisse in corpora

tamquam in carcerem detrusas. Hunc errorem non pauci docuerunt inter Judaeos, uti Philo cum secta Essenorum; aliqui etiam inter Christianos, uti Priscillianistae, Origenes, etc.; et ultimis his temporibus renovavit Kant. Ratio, qua hi omnes nitebantur, petebatur ex inclinatione ad malum, miseriis etc., quae juxta eos, non possunt aliter explicari, quam per inordinatam actionem, quam anima commisit ante hanc vitam terrestrem. 177. Others indeed confess that human souls do not exist except through creation by God, but at the same time they hold that all were created from the beginning of the world and at some time lived life without a body; but since in that state they fell into sins, they were thrust down into bodies as into a prison, as punishment for sin. Not a few among the Jews taught this error, such as Philo with the sect of the Essenes; also some among Christians, such as the Priscillianists, Origen, etc.; and in these last times Kant renewed it. The reason on which all these relied was sought from the inclination to evil, miseries, etc., which according to them cannot be explained otherwise than through the disordered action which the soul committed before this earthly life.

178. Haec vero sententia est manifesta haeresis. Quod patet 1. Ex Scriptura. Nam Rom. 5.14. Legitur: "Regnavit mors ab Adam usque ad Moysen, etiam in eos, qui non peccaverunt in similitudinem praevaricationis Adae." Atqui dici nequit quod non peccaverunt, quatenus non contraxerunt peccatum originale; ergo non peccaverunt, committendo peccatum actuale; uti sunt ex. gr. infantes, qui tamen moriuntur. Rom. 9.11. dicitur: "cum nondum nati fuissent, aut aliquid boni egissent aut mali, etc." Et S. Augustinus (De pecc. orig. c. Pelag. et Coelest. c. 31.), ait: "Neque enim sicut nonnulli secundum Platonicos opinantur, hoc uniuscuiusque infantis animae redditur, quod ante istam vitam sua voluntate commisit, cum haberet ante hoc corpus vel bene, vel male liberum vivendi arbitrium: cum Paulus Apostolus apertissime dicat, nondum natos nihil egisse boni vel mali."

Patet 2. ex Patribus. S. Gregorius Nazianzenus (or. 37. c. 15.), inquit: "Timeo, ne quis stultam sententiam amplectatur, quasi anima prius jam quodam in loco vixerit, et postea in corpus tanquam in carcerem conjecta fuerit ... haec sententia vesana est, et

ecclesiasticae traditioni repugnat." - S. Hieronymus (l. 2. c. 2.) acri stylo insectatur Rufinum, eo quod defenderet Origenem dicentem, quod "animae ante corpora fuerint et egerint

aliquid, propter quod sint crassis corporibus alligatae, quasi in morem glirium torpentes, consopitaeque dormierint." - Theodoretus (haeret. fab. comp. l. 5. c. 9. de homine), ait: "Nos autem profitemur ... quod anima ante corpus non existat." - S. Leo (Epist. 93. c. 10.): "Catholica fides constanter praedicat, atque veraciter, quod animae hominum, priusquam suis inspirarentur corporibus, non fuere." Idem docent Clemens Alex. - Tertullianus. - Lactantius. - Petrus Alex. - S. Cyrillus Alex. - Et Conc. CPtanum V. capitula novem edidit, quibus proscripsit Origenis errores, inter quos recensetur ille de praeexistentia animarum (Act. Conc. ed. Harduin. p. 283.)

Patet 3. ex ratione. Nam a) anima cujus essentia per unionem cum corpore non mutatur, vitae anteactae, et suarum culparum aliquam memoriam retinere deberet. - b) Eo vel magis, quod, juxta adversariorum sententiam, memoria et conscientia praeteritorum delictorum necessaria esset, ut homines possent ab illis purgari, et pro illis satisfacere. c) Deus creavit creaturam spiritualem, corporalem, et hominem de utraque participantem ad ordinem universi. d) Inclinatio ad malum, miseriae, etc., in statu praesente repetuntur ex peccato originali, etc. Vid. Bellarm. l. superius cit. 178. This opinion, however, is manifest heresy. This is clear 1. from Scripture. For Romans 5:14 reads: "Death reigned from Adam unto Moses, even over those who did not sin in the likeness of the prevarication of Adam." But it cannot be said that they did not sin insofar as they did not contract original sin; therefore they did not sin by committing actual sin, as, for example, infants, who nevertheless die. Romans 9:11 says: "when they had not yet been born, or had done anything good or evil, etc." And St. Augustine (On Original Sin against Pelagius and Coelestius, c. 31) says: "For it is not, as some according to the Platonists opine, that this is rendered to the soul of each infant because it committed it by its own will before this life, when it had before this body a free choice of living either well or badly; since the Apostle Paul says most openly that those not yet born had done nothing good or evil."

It is clear 2. from the Fathers. St. Gregory Nazianzen (Oration 37, c. 15) says: "I fear lest someone embrace the foolish opinion, as if the soul had already lived previously in some place, and afterwards had been cast into the body as into a prison.... This opinion is insane and is repugnant to ecclesiastical tradition." St. Jerome (book 2, c. 2) attacks Rufinus with a sharp style because he defended Origen saying that "souls existed before bodies and did something because of which they were bound to gross bodies, as if after the manner of dormice they had grown torpid and had fallen asleep." Theodoret (Compendium of Heretical Fables, book 5, c. 9, on man) says: "But we profess ... that the soul does not exist before the body." St. Leo (Epistle 93, c. 10): "The Catholic faith constantly and truly proclaims that the souls of men did not exist before they were breathed into their bodies." Clement of Alexandria, Tertullian, Lactantius, Peter of Alexandria, and St. Cyril of Alexandria teach the same. And the Fifth Council of Constantinople issued nine chapters by which it proscribed the errors of Origen, among which is listed that concerning the preexistence of souls (Acta Conciliorum, ed. Harduin, p. 283).

It is clear 3. from reason. For a) a soul whose essence is not changed through union with the body ought to retain some memory of its previous life and of its own faults. b) All the more because, according to the opinion of the adversaries, memory and consciousness of past offenses would be necessary so that men could be purified from them and make satisfaction for them. c) God created a spiritual creature, a corporeal creature, and man participating in both, for the order of the universe. d) The inclination to evil, miseries, etc., in the present state are traced back to original sin, etc. See Bellarmine, the book cited above.

179. Neque audiendi sunt, qui asserunt omnes humanas animas creatas fuisse ab initio mundi, quin tamen addant alium errorem de culpis, ad quarum

expiationem conjunctae deinde fuerunt cum corporibus. Nam a) ut audivimus a S. Leone (quod et alii Patres docent) est constans fides animas non extitisse prius quam suis inspirarentur corporibus. - b) "Si enim," inquit D. Thomas, 1. p. q. 118. a. 3., "animae naturale est corpori uniri, esse sine corpore est sibi contra naturam, et sine corpore existens non habet suae naturae perfectionem. Non fuit autem conveniens ut Deus ab imperfectis suum opus inchoaret, et ab his quae sunt praeter naturam; non enim fecit hominem sine manu, aut sine pede, quae sunt partes naturales hominis; multo igitur minus fecit animam sine corpore.

Si vero aliquis dicat, quod non est naturale animae corpori uniri, oportet inquirere causam quare sit corpori unita. Oportet autem dicere quod aut hoc sit factum ex ejus voluntate, aut ex alia causa. Si ejus voluntate, videtur hoc esse inconveniens. Primo quidem quia haec voluntas irrationabilis esset, si non indigeret corpore, et vellet ei uniri; si enim eo indigeret, naturale esset ei quod corpori uniretur, quia natura non deficit in necessariis. Secundo quia nulla ratio esset quare animae a principio mundi creatae post tot tempora voluntas accesserit ut nunc corpori uniatur: est enim substantia spiritualis supra tempus, utpote revolutiones coeli excedens. Tertio quia videretur a casu esse quod haec anima huic corpori uniretur; cum ad hoc requiratur concursus duarum voluntatum, scilicet animae advenientis et hominis generantis. Si autem praeter voluntatem ipsius corpori unitur, et praeter ejus naturam oportet quod hoc sit ex causa violentiam inferente: et sic erit poenale et triste: quod est

secundum errorem Origenis, qui posuit, ut refert Epiphanius, lib. 2 cont. haeres., haer. 64, animas incorporari propter poenam peccati." 179. Nor must those be heard who assert that all human souls were created from the beginning of the world, yet without adding the other error concerning faults for the expiation of which they were afterwards joined with bodies. For a) as we heard from St. Leo (which other Fathers also teach), it is a constant faith that souls did not exist before they were breathed into their bodies. b) "For if," says St. Thomas, Summa Theologiae I, q. 118, a. 3, "it is natural for the soul to be united to the body, to be without the body is contrary to nature for it, and existing without the body it does not have the perfection of its nature. But it was not fitting that God should begin his work from imperfect things, and from those things which are outside nature; for he did not make man without a hand or without a foot, which are natural parts of man; much less, therefore, did he make the soul without the body. But if someone says that it is not natural for the soul to be united to the body, it is necessary to inquire into the cause why it is united to the body. But one must say that either this was done by its will, or by another cause. If by its will, this seems unfitting. First, indeed, because this will would be irrational, if it did not need the body and wished to be united to it; for if it needed it, it would be natural to it to be united to the body, because nature does not fail in necessary things. Second, because there would be no reason why a will should have come to souls created at the beginning of the world, after so many times, that now they should be united to bodies; for spiritual substance is above time, as exceeding the revolutions of heaven. Third, because it would seem to be by chance that this soul would be united to this body, since for this there would be required the concurrence of two wills, namely of the soul arriving and of the man generating. But if it is united to the body apart from its own will and apart from its nature, it must be that this is from a cause inflicting violence; and thus it will be penal and sorrowful, which is according to the error of Origen, who held, as Epiphanius reports, book 2 against heresies, heresy 64, that souls are incorporated on account of the punishment of sin."

§ II.
Statuitur vera sententia. Section II.
The True Opinion Is Established.

180. Duo hic praestare debemus: statuenda est imprimis origo animae humanae per creationem a Deo - deinde determinanda est theologice qualificatio hujus veritatis. Quoad primum, animadvertimus sufficere ut probemus animam humanam non posse aliter produci quam per creationem proprie dictam; cum enim jam probatum sit creationem non competere nisi Deo, hoc ipso ostenditur eam esse immediate a Deo. 180. We must accomplish two things here: first, the origin of the human soul through creation by God must be established; then the theological qualification of this truth must be determined. As to the first, we note that it is enough for us to prove that the human soul cannot be produced otherwise than through creation properly so called; for since it has already been proved that creation belongs to God alone, by this very fact it is shown that the soul is immediately from God.

181. Quoad alterum vero duo notanda sunt. 1. Ut aliqua veritas dicatur pertinere ad fidem catholicam, requiritur Ecclesiae propositio; sed Ecclesia potest dupliciter proponere credenda quae divinitus revelata sunt, nempe "sive solemni judicio, sive ordinario et universali magisterio," ut definivit Conc. Vat. Const. Dei Filius, cap. 3. - 2. Notum est post Apostolorum tempora nullam admittendam esse novam catholicam revelationem; sed hoc non impedit quominus aliquae veritates a Deo revelatae et ab Apostolis traditae per aliquod temporis intervallum non fuerint ita notae ut omnes tenerentur iis explicite praebere divinae fidei assensum: unde per idem tempus potuit esse de iisdem veritatibus aliqua dissensio inter Catholicos non quidem defectu revela-

tionis, sed defectu sufficientis cognitionis. Postea vero, novis subortis erroribus, novis studiis adhibitis in verbo Dei investigando, Spiritu Sancto Ecclesiam assistente, possunt dictae veritates ita manifestari ut divinitus revelatae, ut nemini liceat sine naufragio in fide easdem negare. Hujus rei plura sunt exempla. Vide quae diximus in tract. de Virt. Theol. a pag. 209. 181. As to the second, however, two things must be noted. 1. In order that some truth be said to pertain to Catholic faith, the proposition of the Church is required; but the Church can propose in two ways those things to be believed which have been divinely revealed, namely "either by solemn judgment, or by the ordinary and universal magisterium," as the Vatican Council defined, Constitution Dei Filius, chapter 3. 2. It is known that after the times of the Apostles no new Catholic revelation is to be admitted; but this does not prevent some truths revealed by God and handed down by the Apostles from not having been, for some interval of time, so known that all were bound explicitly to offer to them the assent of divine faith. Hence during the same time there could be some disagreement about the same truths among Catholics, not indeed from a defect of revelation, but from a defect of sufficient knowledge. Afterwards, however, when new errors have arisen, when new studies have been applied to investigating the word of God, and when the Holy Spirit assists the Church, those truths can be so manifested as divinely revealed that it is permitted to no one to deny them without shipwreck in faith. There are many examples of this matter. See what we said in the treatise On the Theological Virtues, from p. 209.

182. Nulla fortasse adduci potest expressa et solemnis Ecclesiae definitio de origine animae humanae per creationem; sed tuemur Ecclesiam hanc veritatem sufficienter proposuisse jugi et universali suo magisterio. Fatemur per aliquod tempus dubium aliquod, intra limites Ecclesiae, de hac re extitisse, ut patebit ex inferius dicendis de mente S. Augustini; sed simul asserimus posterioribus temporibus veritatem de creatione animae humanae fuisse plene manifestatam uti pertinentem ad depositum fidei. 182. Perhaps no express and solemn definition of the Church can be adduced concerning the origin of the human soul through creation; but we maintain that the Church has sufficiently proposed this truth by its constant and universal magisterium. We confess that for some time some doubt existed within the limits of the Church concerning this matter, as will be clear from the things to be said below concerning the mind of St. Augustine; but at the same time we assert that in later times the truth concerning the creation of the human soul was fully manifested as pertaining to the deposit of faith.

183. Cum, eisdem argumentis theologicis probetur veritas et qualificatio propositionis statuendae, afferemus imprimis argumenta rationis ad veritatem comprobandam. 183. Since the truth and the qualification of the proposition to be established are proved by the same theological arguments, we shall first bring forward arguments of reason for proving the truth.

184. His explicatis, dicimus:

PROP. XVIII. Animam humanam a Deo creari 1. veritas est, quae 2.

ad fidem catholicam pertinere censenda est.

PROB. 1ma pars. I. Anima humana operationes habet vitae intellectivae, quae sunt independentes a materia, seu spirituales; ergo et esse habet spirituale seu independens a materia, siquidem operatio est effectus ipsius esse, ac proinde nequit suam causam superare. Atqui quod est omnino a materia independens in esse, debet necessario esse independens in fieri; siquidem

fieri seu effectio est ipsum esse rei in suo fieri; ergo anima humana debet esse a materia omnino independens dum fit. Atqui non esset a materia omnino independens dum fit, si fieret ex aliquo; siquidem hoc aliquid vel necessario requiritur, ut anima fiat, seu sit dum fit, et jam anima ab eo pendet in essendo; vel non necessario requiritur, et frustra admittitur. Ergo anima debet fieri ex nihilo, quod est creari.

Decl. breviter. "Anima humana, uti ex ipsa entis intelligentis natura demonstratur, non solum est simplex, h. e. partibus extra se positis non constans, sed etiam spiritualis, substantia scilicet a materia ita independens, ut sine ea et esse et operari possit; atque hac maxime immaterialitate, essentialis ejus ab anima bruti differentia ostenditur." (Ord. pro trien. phil. stud. 1858, pag. 14.) - Jamvero, uti saepissime docet D. Th. "cum fieri sit via ad esse, hoc modo alicui competit fieri, sicut ei competit esse." Quod principium non modo habet auctoritatem omnium Scholasticorum DD., sed nititur insuper evidente ratione. - Nam effectio, fieri, actio transiens, qua aliquid fit, entitative non distinguitur ab ipsa re, quae fit (n. 15. 17., et 22.); seu ens de quo modo dicitur fit, modo factum est, est unum idemque: atqui unius entis unus est essendi modus; ergo si independens est a materia quando factum est, independens etiam sit oportet quando fit. - Quod autem fit independenter a materia, seu a quocumque subjecto, fit ex nihilo, seu creatur. Ergo.

Prob. II. "Omne quod in esse producitur," inquit D. Th., c. g. l. 2. c. 87., "vel generatur per se,

aut per accidens, vel creatur." Atqui anima humana producitur in esse, siquidem nec est a se nec semper fuit; et non generatur neque per se neque per accidens; ergo creatur.

Decl. et prob. maj. "Nomine generationis," docet D. Th. 1. p. q. 27. a. 2., "dupliciter utimur. Uno modo communiter ad omnia generabilia et corruptibilia; et sic generatio nihil aliud est quam mutatio de non esse ad esse. Alio modo proprie in viventibus; et sic generatio significat originem alicujus viventis a principio vivente conjuncto; et haec proprie dicitur nativitas." Hic vero sumitur generatio primo sensu minus proprio, ac proinde patet partitionem esse completam. Nam propositio illa major aequivalet huic: quidquid producitur, vel producitur ex nihilo vel ex aliquo; si ex aliquo, vel generatur per se, quod verum est de subsistentibus; vel generatur per accidens, quod verum est de iis quae per se non subsistunt. Atqui praeter hos productionis modos, nullus alius assignari potest. Ergo.

Decl. et prob. min. Produci per accidens non significat aliquid produci veluti casu, sed importat fieri cum relatione ad aliud et dependentia ab illo, ita ut id quod proprie (per se) producitur, seu generatur sit compositum ex utroque. Producitur autem cum dependentia ab alio id, quod ab eo pendet in essendo, unumquodque enim, uti saepe diximus, sicut se habet ad esse, sic se habet ad fieri. Jamvero accidentia et formae inferiores anima humana pendent ab alio in essendo; accidentia enim, ut sint, naturaliter indigent subjecto; formae inferiores pendent a materia in essendo, sicut materia pendet ab illis, et sic sunt sibi mutuo causa essendi. Unde accidentia et for-

mae inferiores non sunt proprie id quod est, sed id quo aliquid est; seu per se non subsistunt. Id quod proprie est, ex. gr., non est albedo, sed corpus album; non est rotunditas, sed corpus rotundum; quemadmodum id quod proprie est, non est principium vegetativum, sed planta - non est principium sensitivum, sed animal. Quod probatur ex operationibus, quae sunt totius compositi.

Haec, quae generantur per accidens, dicuntur educi de potentia materiae, quatenus dum virtute activa generantis producuntur in materia, haec fit quod capax est ut fiat: est, ex. gr., capax vivendi vita vegetativa, et dum principium hujus vitae in ea producitur, fit ipsa vivens hac vita. - Hoc vero nullo modo implicat quod principium vitae sensitivae aut vegetativae non sit simplex; nam uti bene, juxta communem scholasticorum doctrinam, dicit Valentia [Vol. 1. Disp. 3. q. 2. p. 4.] istae formae fiunt ex subjecto, non ex quo componantur, sed ex cujus potentia educantur.

Unde facile prob. min. quoad utramque partem. 1. Id dicitur generari per accidens, quod non est per se subsistens, seu quod ab alio pendet in essendo; atqui anima humana est independens a subjecto, quia non est accidens, et a materia, quia est spiritualis. Ergo. Id quod per se generatur est compositum: unum enim ex elementis supponitur, aliud fit per

accidens, et compositum ex utroque dicitur generari per se; atqui anima humana non est composita. Ergo. Haec et alia argumenta ex ratione invenies apud D. Thomam, 1. p. q. 118. Quaest. 3. de Pot. a. 9. c. g. l. 2. cap. 85-89.

Prob. 2da pars. a) Etsi S. Augustinus (de cujus mente paulo inferius dicemus) dubitaverit utrum anima humana creetur a Deo, et ex ejus auctoritate alii pauci inter Patres, uti S. Gregorius M. (L. 7., Epist. 53. ad Secundinum), S. Isidorus (L. 2. de offic. eccl. c. 23.) etc.; certum est tamen sententiam affirmantem creationem animarum tum communiorem fuisse ante et post S. Augustini tempora, tum a quibusdam Patribus expresse tradi uti sententiam catholicam. Plura SS. PP. testimonia videri possunt apud Bellarminum, l. c., et Scheeben. Sufficit hic recolere quae ex S. Leone citavimus (in Ep. ad Turibium), et ea, quae scribit S. Hieronymus, ad Pammach.: "Omne humanum genus quibus animarum censetur exordiis? Utrum ex traduce, juxta bruta animalia, aut quomodo corpus ex corpore, sic anima generatur ex anima? an certe, quod ecclesiasticum est, juxta eloquia Salvatoris: Pater meus usque modo operatur et ego operor, et illud Zachariae: qui format spiritum hominis in ipso; et in Psalmis: Qui fingit per singulos corda eorum, quotidie Deus fabricetur animas, cujus velle fecisse est, et conditor esse non cessat?"

b) Successu temporis communiter tradita est sententia de creatione animae humanae uti catholica. Sufficit praecipuos citare, ut facile unusquisque intelligat hunc unanimem consensum. Petrus Lombardus [sent. l. 2. dist. 18.] ait: "Catholica Ecclesia nec simul nec ex traduce factas esse animas docet, sed corporibus per coitum seminatis atque formatis infundi et infundendo creari."

D. Thomas [Qq. Disp. 9. q. 3. de Pot. Dei art. 9.], inquit: "Circa hanc quaestionem antiquitus diversa

dicebantur a diversis. Quidam nempe dicebant, animam filii ex parentis anima propagari, sicut et corpus propagatur ex corpore. Alii vero dicebant, omnes animas seorsum creari; sed ponebant a principio eas extra corpora fuisse creatas simul, et postmodum corporibus seminatis conjungebantur, vel proprio motu voluntatis, secundum quosdam, vel Deo mandante et faciente, secundum alios. Alii vero dicebant, animas, simul cum creantur, corporibus infundi. Quae quidem opiniones, quamvis aliquo tempore sustinerentur et quae earum esset vera in dubium verteretur (ut patet ex Augustino in decimo super Genesim ad litteram, et in libris quos scripsit de origine animae); tamen primae duae postmodum judicio Ecclesiae sunt damnatae, et tertia approbata. Unde dicitur in libro De Ecclesiasticis Dogmatibus: Animas hominum non esse ab initio inter caeteras intellectuales naturas nec simul creatas credimus, sicut Origenes fingit, neque cum corporibus per coitum seminantur, sicut Luciferiani et Cyrillus et aliqui latinorum praesumptores affirmant. Sed dicimus, corpus tantum per conjugii copulam seminari, ac formato jam corpore, animam creari et infundi."

S. Bonaventura [L. 2. Dist. 18. q. 2.]: "Est et alius modus dicendi, quod animarum productio est per traductionem, ut anima traducatur ex anima, sicut caro ex carne: et sicut ab una candela accenduntur multae; sic ab una anima per sui multiplicationem absque diminutione vivificentur multa corpora; et de hoc aliquando dubitaverunt catholici tractatores, et Augustinus maxime. Tertius est modus dicendi catholicus et verus, quod animae non seminantur, sed

formatis corporibus a Deo creantur et creando infunduntur."

Canus [De Locis Theol. l. 12. cap. ult.]: "Fidei quaestionem duobus modis interpretari possumus: et ex natura sua, et quoad nos. Ex natura sua illa Fidei quaestio est, quae est a Deo Ecclesiae revelata, quamvis a plerisque ignoretur. Ut Spiritum a Patre Filioque procedere ipse Spiritus Apostolis revelavit; item animas Sanctorum statim, ut a corpore exierint, videre Deum. De quibus licuit olim varie sentire et sine Fidei discrimine aut affirmare aut negare, cum neutra res scilicet erat plene ab Ecclesia definita. Ita quoad nos non semper Fidei quaestiones illae sunt habitae, sed salva Fide viri quidam docti contrariam veritati sententiam tenuerunt. Quomodo asseruit Augustinus, non esse Fidei quaestionem, num anima rationalis ex traduce sit. Nunc autem, cum post ea tempora Theologorum fideliumque omnium consensu firmatum sit, animam non per generationem sed per creationem existere, sine dubio ad Fidem illa quaestio pertinet."

c) In Conc. Later. V. habetur de anima humana: "Pro corporum, quibus infunditur, multitudine singulariter multiplicabilis, et multiplicata et multiplicanda sit." Licet his verbis Concilium ex proposito non definierit sententiam de animarum creatione, illam tamen suam fecit. Etenim tempore Concilii sicut animarum generatio dicebatur traductio, ita communiter in scholis animarum creatio dicebatur infusio.

Benedictus XII., inter errores quos rejiciendos praescripsit Armenis, numerat

generatianismum. - "Item quod quidam Magister Armenorum Mechitaris,

qui interpretatur Paraclitus, de novo introduxit et docuit, quod anima humana filii propagetur ab anima patris sui, sicut corpus a corpore et Angelus etiam unus ab alio; quia cum anima humana rationalis existens et Angelus existens intellectualis naturae sint quaedam lumina spiritualia, ex se ipsis propagant alia lumina spiritualia." - Et in Episcop. respons. legitur: "Hic error, quod anima hominis propagetur ab anima patris sui sicut corpus a corpore ... semper fuit excommunicatus in Ecclesia Armenorum et maledictus sit." [Raynaldi, Ann. Eccl. an. 1341. nn. 46. 49.]

d) Addit Bellarminus l. c.: "Est ita insitum in mentibus fidelium animas a Deo recens creari cum foetus in uteris matrum animantur, ut etiam agricolae, fabri, sutores, mulierculae, pueri hoc sciant; et si quis contrarium publice doceret, pessime omnino apud catholicum populum audiret."

e) Unde idem declarat: "Ratio, cur sententiam hanc amplectendam esse judicemus duplex est. Primum enim habemus hoc tempore praeter testimonia Patrum, qui Sancti Augustini tempora praecesserunt, rescriptum Sancti Leonis primi, supra citatum ad Turibium, decretum Leonis decimi in Concilio Lateranensi, consensum Theologorum omnium, qui his quingentis annis floruerunt; denique rationes egregias a Theologis excogitatas; quibus argumentis Sanctus Augustinus caruit."

NOTA. S. Augustinus numquam docuit aliquam sententiam de animae origine contrariam nostrae, sed dubius haesit inter illam et generatianismum; reliquas vero sententias improbavit et refutavit. Unica

ratio, propter quam creationem animae non omnino admittebat, erat difficultas, quae inde oriebatur quoad propagationem peccati originalis. Unde scribebat ad Opt.: "Fateor, non inveni quemadmodum anima peccatum ex Adam trahat ... et ipsa ex Adam non trahatur;" et in Ep. 166. ad Hier. dicit: "Illa de animarum novarum creatione sententia, si hanc fidem fundatissimam non oppugnat, sit et mea; si oppugnat, non sit et tua." - Inclinabat tamen in sententiam nostram, siquidem Ep. 28. dicit: "Licet nemo faciat optando ut verum sit quod verum non est; tamen, si fieri posset, optarem ut haec sententia vera esset; sicut opto ut, si vera est, abs te liquidissime et invictissime defendatur." Et de orig. anim. l. 1. c. 19., inquit: "Nihil ergo istorum quatuor dicentes, quoniam quodlibet eorum falsum atque impium est, hanc sententiam suam non solum me non vetante, sed etiam favente et gratias agente defendant." Imo vult ut etiamsi illius difficultatis solutio non inveniatur, non ideo rejiciatur sententia de creatione animae. In cit. enim Ep. ad Opt., postquam illum hortatus sit ad quaerendum "quomodo animae, si novae a Deo creentur in peccato nasci queant," addit: "Et si inveneris, quod ipse adhuc non inveni, defende quantum potes atque assere animarum infantium ejusmodi esse novitatem, ut nulla propagatione ducantur ... Si autem non inveneris nec sic jam temere in aliam sententiam tua deflectatur assensio, ut eas ex illa una credas propagando traduci, ne forte alius invenire possit, quod ipse non possis." Jamvero praefata difficultas soluta est, ut suo loco patebit.

Vid. de tota hac quaestione La Civilta Cattolica, Serie V., Vol. 9. pag. 407. et 677.; Vol. 10., pag. 141. - Kleutgen, La Filosofia antica esposta, etc., Vol. 5. Tract. 8. cap. 4. 184. With these things explained, we say:

PROP. XVIII. That the human soul is created by God is 1. a truth, which 2. must be judged to pertain to Catholic faith.

Proof of the first part. I. The human soul has operations of intellective life which are independent of matter, or spiritual; therefore it also has a spiritual being, or one independent of matter, since operation is the effect of being itself, and consequently cannot surpass its cause. But that which is altogether independent of matter in being must necessarily be independent in coming-to-be, since coming-to-be or effecting is the very being of the thing in its coming-to-be. Therefore the human soul must be altogether independent of matter while it comes to be. But it would not be altogether independent of matter while it comes to be if it came to be from something; since this something is either required necessarily for the soul to come to be, or to be while it comes to be, and then the soul already depends upon it in being; or it is not required necessarily, and is admitted in vain. Therefore the soul must come to be from nothing, which is to be created.

Brief explanation. "The human soul, as is demonstrated from the very nature of an intelligent being, not only is simple, that is, not consisting of parts placed outside one another, but is also spiritual, namely a substance so independent of matter that it can both be and operate without it;

and by this immateriality especially its essential difference from the soul of a brute is shown" (Ord. pro trien. phil. stud. 1858, p. 14). Now, as St. Thomas very often teaches, "since coming-to-be is the way to being, coming-to-be belongs to something in the same mode as being belongs to it." This principle not only has the authority of all the scholastic Doctors, but also rests upon evident reason. For effecting, coming-to-be, the transient action by which something comes to be, is not entitatively distinguished from the thing itself which comes to be (n. 15, 17, and 22); or the being of which it is now said, it comes to be, and now, it has been made, is one and the same. But there is one mode of being for one being; therefore if it is independent of matter when it has been made, it must also be independent when it comes to be. But that which comes to be independently of matter, or of any subject whatever, comes to be from nothing, or is created. Therefore.

Proof II. "Everything which is produced into being," says St. Thomas, Contra Gentiles, book 2, c. 87, "is either generated per se, or per accidens, or is created." But the human soul is produced into being, since it neither is from itself nor has always been; and it is generated neither per se nor per accidens. Therefore it is created.

Explanation and proof of the major. "We use the name of generation," teaches St. Thomas, Summa Theologiae I, q. 27, a. 2, "in two ways. In one way commonly for all generable and corruptible things; and thus generation is nothing other than a change from non-being to being. In another way properly in living things; and thus generation signifies the origin of some living thing from a conjoined living principle; and this is properly called nativity." Here, however, generation is taken in the first, less proper sense; and consequently it is clear that the division is complete. For that major proposition is equivalent to this: whatever is produced is produced either from nothing or from something; if from something, it is either generated per se, which is true of subsisting things, or it is generated per accidens, which is true of those things which do not subsist per se. But besides these modes of production, no other can be assigned. Therefore.

Explanation and proof of the minor. To be produced per accidens does not signify that something is produced as if by chance, but imports coming-to-be with relation to another and dependence upon it, so that that which is properly produced, or generated per se, is the composite from both. But that is produced with dependence upon another which depends upon it in being; for each thing, as we have often said, is related to being as it is related to coming-to-be. Now accidents and forms inferior to the human soul depend upon another in being; for accidents, in order that they be, naturally need a subject; inferior forms depend upon matter in being, just as matter depends upon them, and thus they are mutually the cause of being for each other. Hence accidents and inferior forms are not properly that which is, but that by which something is; or they do not subsist per se. That which properly is, for example, is not whiteness, but a white body; it is not roundness, but a round body; just as that which properly is, is not the vegetative principle, but a plant; it is not the sensitive principle, but an animal. This is proved from the operations, which belong to the whole composite.

These things, which are generated per accidens, are said to be educed from the potency of matter, insofar as, while they are produced in matter by the active power of the generator, this matter becomes that which it is capable of becoming: it is, for example, capable of living with vegetative life, and when the principle of this life is produced in it, it itself becomes living with this life. But this in no way implies that the principle of sensitive or vegetative life is not simple; for, as Valencia says well according to the common doctrine of the scholastics [vol. 1, disp. 3, q. 2, p. 4], those forms come to be from the subject, not from that of which they are composed, but from that from whose potency they are educed.

Hence the minor is easily proved as to each part. 1. That is said to be generated per accidens which is not subsisting per se, or which depends upon another in being; but the human soul is independent of a subject, because it is not an accident, and of matter, because it is spiritual. Therefore. That which is generated per se is a composite: for one of the elements is presupposed, another comes to be per accidens, and the composite from both is said to be generated per se. But the human soul is not composite. Therefore. These and other arguments from reason you will find in St. Thomas, Summa Theologiae I, q. 118; Quaestiones disputatae de potentia, q. 3, a. 9; Contra Gentiles, book 2, chapters 85-89.

Proof of the second part. a) Although

St. Augustine (concerning whose mind we shall speak a little below) doubted whether the human soul is created by God, and from his authority a few others among the Fathers, such as St. Gregory the Great (book 7, Epistle 53 to Secundinus), St. Isidore (book 2, On Ecclesiastical Offices, c. 23), etc.; nevertheless it is certain that the opinion affirming the creation of souls was both the more common before and after the times of St. Augustine, and handed down expressly by certain Fathers as the Catholic opinion. More testimonies of the holy Fathers can be seen in Bellarmine, cited place, and Scheeben. It is enough here to recall the things which we cited from St. Leo (in the Epistle to Turibius), and those things which St. Jerome writes to Pammachius: "By what beginnings of souls is the whole human race reckoned? Whether from propagation, according to brute animals, or, as body is generated from body, so soul is generated from soul? Or indeed, what is ecclesiastical, according to the sayings of the Savior: My Father works even until now and I work; and that of Zechariah: who forms the spirit of man in him; and in the Psalms: who fashions their hearts one by one, God daily fabricates souls, whose willing is to have done, and who does not cease to be Founder?"

b) In the course of time the opinion concerning the creation of the human soul was commonly handed down as Catholic. It is enough to cite the principal authors, so that anyone may easily understand this unanimous consent. Peter Lombard [Sentences, book 2, dist. 18] says: "The Catholic Church teaches that souls were made neither together nor from propagation, but that they are infused into bodies sown and formed through intercourse, and are created by being infused."

St. Thomas [Disputed Questions, q. 3, On the Power of God, a. 9] says: "Concerning this question, diverse things were said by diverse authors in antiquity. For some said that the soul of the son is propagated from the soul of the parent, just as the body is propagated from the body. Others said that all souls are created separately; but they held that from the beginning they had all been created outside bodies, and afterwards were joined to sown bodies, either by the proper motion of the will, according to some, or by God commanding and doing it, according to others. Others said that souls, at the same time as they are created, are infused into bodies. These opinions, although they were sustained for some time and it was turned into doubt which of them was true (as is clear from Augustine in the tenth book of On Genesis Literally, and in the books which he wrote on the origin of the soul), nevertheless the first two were afterwards condemned by the judgment of the Church, and the third approved. Hence it is said in the book On Ecclesiastical Dogmas: We believe that the souls of men were not from the beginning among the other intellectual natures, nor created together, as Origen invents; nor are they sown with bodies through intercourse, as the Luciferians and Cyril and some presumptuous Latins affirm. But we say that only the body is sown through the conjugal union, and that when the body has already been formed, the soul is created and infused."

St. Bonaventure [book 2, dist. 18, q. 2]: "There is also another mode of speaking, that the production of souls is through traduction, so that soul is traduced from soul, as flesh from flesh; and just as from one candle many are lit, so from one soul, by its multiplication without diminution, many bodies are vivified; and about this Catholic treatise-writers sometimes doubted, and Augustine most of all. The third mode of speaking is Catholic and true, that souls are not sown, but once bodies have been formed they are created by God and infused by being created."

Cano [On Theological Places, book 12, last chapter]: "We can interpret a question of faith in two ways: both from its own nature and as regards us. From its own nature that is a question of Faith which has been revealed by God to the Church, even though it is unknown by many. Thus the Spirit himself revealed to the Apostles that the Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son; likewise that the souls of the Saints see God immediately when they have departed from the body. Concerning these it was once permitted to think variously and, without danger to Faith, either to affirm or deny, since neither matter was then fully defined by the Church. Thus as regards us those questions were not always regarded as questions of Faith, but with Faith preserved certain learned men held an opinion contrary to the truth. In this way Augustine asserted that it was not a question of Faith whether the rational soul is from propagation. But now, since after those times it has been established by the consensus of all Theologians and faithful that the soul exists not through generation but through creation, without doubt that question pertains to Faith."

c) In the Fifth Lateran Council it is had

concerning the human soul: "According to the multitude of bodies into which it is infused, it is singularly multipliable, and multiplied, and to be multiplied." Although by these words the Council did not expressly define the opinion concerning the creation of souls, nevertheless it made it its own. For in the time of the Council, just as the generation of souls was called traduction, so commonly in the schools the creation of souls was called infusion.

Benedict XII, among the errors which he prescribed to be rejected by the Armenians, numbers generatianism: "Likewise, that a certain Teacher of the Armenians, Mekhitar, which is interpreted Paraclete, newly introduced and taught that the human soul of the son is propagated from the soul of his father, just as body from body and even one Angel from another; because, since the rational human soul and an Angel existing of intellectual nature are certain spiritual lights, they propagate other spiritual lights from themselves." And in the response of the Bishops it is read: "This error, that the soul of man is propagated from the soul of his father as body from body ... was always excommunicated in the Armenian Church, and let it be accursed" [Raynaldus, Annales Ecclesiastici, year 1341, nn. 46, 49].

d) Bellarmine adds in the cited place: "It is so implanted in the minds of the faithful that souls are newly created by God when fetuses are animated in the wombs of their mothers, that even farmers, craftsmen, shoemakers, little women, and children know this; and if anyone publicly taught the contrary, he would be heard altogether very badly among the Catholic people."

e) Hence the same author declares: "The reason why we judge that this opinion must be embraced is twofold. For first, at this time we have, besides the testimonies of the Fathers who preceded the times of St. Augustine, the rescript of St. Leo I, cited above to Turibius, the decree of Leo X in the Lateran Council, the consensus of all Theologians who have flourished in these five hundred years, and finally the excellent reasons worked out by Theologians; St. Augustine lacked these arguments."

NOTE. St. Augustine never taught any opinion concerning the origin of the soul contrary to ours, but remained doubtful between it and generatianism; the other opinions, however, he disapproved and refuted. The only reason on account of which he did not wholly admit the creation of the soul was the difficulty which arose from it concerning the propagation of original sin. Hence he wrote to Optatus: "I confess, I have not found how the soul draws sin from Adam ... and itself is not drawn from Adam"; and in Epistle 166 to Jerome he says: "That opinion concerning the creation of new souls, if it does not oppose this most firmly founded faith, let it also be mine; if it opposes it, let it not be yours either." Yet he inclined toward our opinion, since in Epistle 28 he says: "Although no one by wishing makes it true that what is not true should be true, nevertheless, if it could be done, I would wish that this opinion were true; just as I wish that, if it is true, it may be defended by you most clearly and most invincibly." And in On the Origin of the Soul, book 1, c. 19, he says: "Saying none of those four things, since any one of them is false and impious, let them defend this opinion of theirs, not only with me not forbidding it, but even favoring and giving thanks." Indeed he wills that even if the solution of that difficulty should not be found, the opinion concerning the creation of the soul should not for that reason be rejected. For in the cited Epistle to Optatus, after he had exhorted him to seek "how souls, if they are newly created by God, can be born in sin," he adds: "And if you find what I myself have not yet found, defend as much as you can and assert that the newness of infant souls is of such a kind that they are drawn by no propagation.... But if you do not find it, even so let your assent not now be rashly turned aside into another opinion, so that you believe them to be traduced by propagation from that one soul, lest perhaps another be able to find what you yourself cannot." But the aforesaid difficulty has now been solved, as will be clear in its own place.

See concerning this whole question La Civilta Cattolica, Series V, vol. 9, pp. 407 and 677; vol. 10, p. 141. Kleutgen, La Filosofia antica esposta, etc., vol. 5, tract 8, chapter 4.

Article 4. Whether There is Only One Soul in Man

LatineEnglish

Corrected Latin Text
Utrum una tantum in homine sit anima.

185. Post ea quae diximus de humani generis origine et propagatione, disserendum est de hominis natura. Hanc pulchre describit S. Augustinus (Serm. 43. de verbis Isaiae 7. c. 2. 3.): "A Deo habemus esse quod sumus. Quia quod non nihil sumus, nisi a Deo, a quo habemus? - sed sunt et ligna, sunt et lapides, a quo nisi a Deo? nos ergo quid plus? non vivunt ligna (caesa et exsiccata), et lapides: nos autem vivimus. Sed adhuc nobis idipsum vivere cum arboribus fructetisque commune est. Dicuntur enim et vites vivere. Nam si non viverent, non scriptum esset: Occidit in grandine vineas eorum: vivit cum viret, arescit, cum moritur. Sed vita ista non habet sensum. Quid nos amplius? - Sentimus. Quinquepartitus notus est sensus: videmus, audimus, olfacimus, gustamus, tactu etiam per totum corpus nostrum mollia dijudicamus, et dura, aspera et lenia, calida et frigida. Est ergo in nobis sensus quinquepartitus. Sed hunc habent et bestiae. Habemus ergo aliquid amplius nos? - Et iste tamen, quae enumeravimus, fratres mei, si consideremus in nobis, quantam de his gratiarum actionem, quantam Creatori laudem debemus? Sed tamen amplius quid habemus? Mentem, rationem, consilium, quod non habent bestiae, non habent volucres, non habent pisces; in eo facti sumus ad imaginem Dei." 185. After the things which we have said concerning the origin and propagation of the human race, the nature of man must be discussed. St. Augustine beautifully describes it (Sermon 43, On the Words of Isaiah 7, c. 2, 3): "From God we have the being that we are. For that we are not nothing, unless from God, from whom do we have it? But there are also trees, there are also stones; from whom, unless from God? What more, then, have we? Trees, when cut and dried, and stones do not live; but we live. Yet this very living is still common to us with trees and shrubs. For vines also are said to live. For if they did not live, it would not have been written: He killed their vines with hail. It lives when it is green; it dries up when it dies. But that life does not have sense. What more do we have? We sense. The fivefold sense is known: we see, hear, smell, taste; also by touch through our whole body we discern soft and hard things, rough and smooth, hot and cold. Therefore there is in us a fivefold sense. But beasts also have this. Therefore do we have something more? And yet these things which we have enumerated, my brothers, if we consider them in ourselves, how great thanksgiving, how great praise to the Creator we owe for them. But nevertheless what more do we have? Mind, reason, counsel, which beasts do not have, birds do not have, fish do not have; in this we have been made to the image of God."

186. At si triplex est vita in homine, estne multiplex anima, anima enim est primum vitae principium in iis, quae vivunt? Teste S. Irenaeo (l. 1. adv. haereses c. 5.) Gnostici hominem ex tribus partibus compositum dicebant. - Manichaei, teste S. Augustino (l. 1. Retract. c. 15.), praeter corpus, duas animas, unam bonam, alteram malam homini tribuebant. - Apollinaris negans in Christo esse animam rationalem, huic errori Platonicam sententiam substruebat de reali discrimine inter animam hominis sensitivam et rationalem; et illam quidem, hanc vero minime Verbum assumpsisse affirmabat. "Apollinaris," inquit Theodoretus (Haerit. fabul. l. 4. c. 8.), "Incarnatum Deum Verbum dixit corpore assumpto et anima, non rationali, sed experte rationis, quam φυτικην aut ζωτικην quidam vocant. Mentem aliud esse statuens ac animam, minime assumptam fuisse ait, sed divinam suffecisse naturam ad usum mentis explendum." - Errorem de alia anima praeter rationalem in homine renovarunt Gunther et Baltzer, quorum opera damnata fuerunt a S. P. Pio IX. - Haereticorum commentum trichotomia dictum est, eo quod hominem in triplicem veluti substantiam dividat. 186. But if there is a threefold life in man, is there a manifold soul, since the soul is the first principle of life in those things which live? According to the testimony of St. Irenaeus (book 1, Against Heresies, c. 5), the Gnostics used to say that man is composed of three parts. The Manichaeans, according to the testimony of St. Augustine (book 1, Retractations, c. 15), attributed to man, besides the body, two souls, one good and the other evil. Apollinaris, denying that there is a rational soul in Christ, underlaid this error with the Platonic opinion concerning a real distinction

between the sensitive and rational soul of man; and he affirmed that the Word assumed the former indeed, but by no means the latter. "Apollinaris," says Theodoret (Heretical Fables, book 4, c. 8), "said that God the Word was incarnate by assuming a body and a soul, not a rational one, but one lacking reason, which some call vegetative or vital. Holding that mind is something other than soul, he says that it was by no means assumed, but that the divine nature sufficed to fulfill the use of mind." Gunther and Baltzer renewed the error concerning another soul besides the rational soul in man; their works were condemned by the Supreme Pontiff Pius IX. The invention of the heretics was called trichotomy, because it divides man into, as it were, a threefold substance.

187. Catholica autem doctrina, quae praeter animam rationalem et corpus nullam aliam animam agnoscit in homine, et quae propterea dichotomia dicitur, definita fuit in Conc. CPno. IV. a. 869, quod statuit: "Veteri et Novo Testamento unam animam rationalem et intellectualem habere (vel potius ut Raderus vertit, unicam homini, eamque ratione et intelligentia pollentem esse animam), et omnibus deiloquis patribus et magistris Ecclesiae eandem opinionem asseverantibus, in tantum impietatis quidam, malorum inventionibus dantes operam, devenerunt, ut duas eum habere animas impudenter dogmatizare, et quibusdam irrationalibus conatibus per sapientiam, quae stulta facta est, propriam haeresim confirmare pertentent (vitiosis ratiunculis suam haeresim stabiliant.) Itaque sancta haec et universalis Synodus, veluti quoddam pessimum zizanium, nunc germinantem nequam opinionem evellere festinans, - talis impietatis inventores et patratores, et his similia sentientes, magna voce anathematizat, et definit, atque promulgat, neminem prorsus habere vel servare (debere) quoquomodo statuta hujus impietatis auctorum. Si quis autem contraria gerere praesumpserit huic sanctae et magnae Synodo, anathema sit, et a fide atque cultura Christianorum alienus." Sunt et aliae Ecclesiae de hac re definitiones, quas in sequentibus articulis dabimus. 187. The Catholic doctrine, however, which acknowledges in man no soul other than the rational soul and the body, and which for that reason is called dichotomy, was defined in the Fourth Council of Constantinople in 869, which decreed: "Although the Old and New Testament have one rational and intellectual soul (or rather, as Rader translates, that man has one only soul, and that it is endowed with reason and intelligence), and although all the God-speaking Fathers and teachers of the Church assert the same opinion, certain men, giving themselves to inventions of evils, have come to such a degree of impiety that they shamelessly dogmatize that he has two souls, and by certain irrational attempts, through wisdom which has been made foolish, they strive to confirm their own heresy (they establish their heresy by faulty little reasonings). Therefore this holy and universal Synod, hastening to pull up the wicked opinion now springing up, as though it were a certain very evil tare, anathematizes with a loud voice the inventors and perpetrators of such impiety, and those who think things similar to them, and defines and promulgates that absolutely no one is to hold or preserve in any way the statutes of the authors of this impiety. But if anyone presumes to do things contrary to this holy and great Synod, let him be anathema and alien from the faith and worship of Christians." There are also other definitions of the Church concerning this matter, which we shall give in the following articles.

188. Antequam hanc doctrinam catholicam probemus, ad praecavendas aliquas difficultates, quae tum ex Scriptura tum ex Patribus peti solent, aliqua praenotemus oportet. Ac 1. Anima humana prout vita intellectiva a materia independente gaudet dicitur spiritus; prout vero est vitae vegetativae et sensitivae principium in corpore dicitur anima. Etenim, ut docet Nyssenus (de anima et resurrectione), Damascenus [l. 2. c. 12.], omnes Scholastici DD. post Aristotelem: "anima est substantia vivificans, corpori organico conferens vitam et sensum per seipsam." Ita etiam Gennadius (de eccle. dog.). Quando ergo sive in Scriptura sive apud Patres, spiritus et anima ponitur in homine, non duae res distinctae assignantur, sed una eademque res, quae duplicem habet essendi gradum.

2. Aliquando in Scriptura et apud Patres distinguitur spiritus ab anima in homine, sed nomine spiritus veniunt dona supernaturalia, quae sunt vitae supernaturalis principium; nomine autem animae significatur homo interior naturalis.

3. Aliquando Patres videntur tria ponere in homine,

spiritum vel mentem, animam, et corpus. Sed nomine spiritus intelligunt vel facultatem animae, quae est mens, vel donum infusum Spiritus Sancti, ut diximus etiam in praecedente animadversione.

4. Generatim ergo loquendo, nomine spiritus in Scriptura modo significatur quod pertinet ad hominem ut animans est, uti Gen. 7. 15. - modo id, quod est in homine intelligens, uti Eccl. 12. 7. - modo dona supernaturalia, vel Deus Spiritus Sanctus eorum Dator, uti Matth. 1. 18.; 1. Cor. 3. 4.; Thess. 5. 19. - Nomine autem animae exprimitur tum principium vitale, uti Exod. 4. 19., tum principium intelligens, uti Sap. 1. 4.; Matth. 10. 28.

Sic etiam quoad Patres. 5. a) iidem qui videntur distinguere inter spiritum vel mentem, et animam, explicite, ut Nyssenus, vel implicite, ut Origenes et Ephrem, tradunt dichotomiam. - b) S. Epiphanius testatur nullum Ecclesiae filium asseruisse mentem esse substantiam distinctam et non facultatem unius animae in homine. c) Unde Auctor orationis in verba Pauli "non quod volo facio, etc." [inter opp. Chrys.] contra Apollinaristas ita concludit: "Verum haec ad haereticos qui animam et corpus et spiritum memorant, et vim inferunt apostolico verbo dicenti: Deus custodiat corpus vestrum, et animam, et spiritum. Spiritum putant esse mentem. Cur ergo Apostolus dixit: psallam spiritu, psallam et mente? Mos est Scripturae spiritum vocare gratiam spiritus." Cf. etiam D. Thomam [in Ep. 1. ad Thess. c. 5. lect. 2.] 188. Before we prove this Catholic doctrine, it is necessary that we make some preliminary notes, in order to forestall certain difficulties which are commonly sought both from Scripture and from the Fathers. And 1. The human soul, insofar as it enjoys intellective life independent of matter, is called spirit; but insofar as it is the principle of vegetative and sensitive life in the body, it is called soul. For, as Nyssen teaches (On the Soul and Resurrection), Damascene [book 2, c. 12], and all the scholastic Doctors after Aristotle: "the soul is a vivifying substance, conferring life and sense upon an organic body through itself." Thus also Gennadius (On Ecclesiastical Dogmas). Therefore, when either in Scripture or among the Fathers spirit and soul are posited in man, two distinct things are not assigned, but one and the same thing, which has a twofold grade of being.

2. Sometimes in Scripture and among the Fathers spirit is distinguished from soul in man; but under the name of spirit come the supernatural gifts, which are the principle of supernatural life, while by the name of soul the natural interior man is signified.

3. Sometimes the Fathers seem to posit three things in man: spirit or mind, soul, and body. But by the name of spirit they understand either the faculty of the soul which is mind, or the infused gift of the Holy Spirit, as we said also in the preceding observation.

4. Generally speaking, therefore, by the name spirit in Scripture sometimes there is signified what pertains to man as he is a living being, as in Gen. 7:15; sometimes that which is intelligent in man, as in Eccles. 12:7; sometimes supernatural gifts, or God the Holy Spirit, the Giver of them, as in Matt. 1:18; 1 Cor. 3:4; 1 Thess. 5:19. But by the name soul there is expressed both the vital principle, as in Exod. 4:19, and the intelligent principle, as in Wis. 1:4; Matt. 10:28.

So also with regard to the Fathers. 5. a) The same Fathers who seem to distinguish between spirit or mind and soul hand down dichotomy, either explicitly, as Nyssen, or implicitly, as Origen and Ephrem. b) St. Epiphanius testifies that no son of the Church asserted that the mind is a distinct substance and not the faculty of one soul in man. c) Hence the author of the oration on the words of Paul, "I do not do what I will," etc. [among the works of Chrysostom], concludes against the Apollinarists in this way: "But these things are against the heretics who mention soul and body and spirit, and do violence to the apostolic word saying: May God keep your body, and soul, and spirit. They think spirit to be mind. Why then did the Apostle say: I will sing with the spirit, and I will sing also with the mind? It is the custom of Scripture to call the grace of the spirit, spirit." Cf. also St. Thomas [on 1 Thess. c. 5, lect. 2].

189. His positis dicimus:

PROP. XIX. Unica est anima in homine, eaque rationalis; ac proinde distributio hominis in spiritum, animam et corpus, ac ejusdem partitio in spiritum et corpus informatum anima rejicienda est.

Prob. I. ex Scriptura. a) Gen. 2. 7. legitur: "Formavit igitur Deus hominem de limo terrae, et inspiravit in faciem ejus spiraculum vitae, et factus est homo in animam

viventem." Unde: describitur hic formatio hominis, et duo solum traduntur elementa, corpus et anima, qua vivificatur; ergo duobus solum elementis constat humana natura. - Revera, spiraculum vitae, de quo hic agitur, est certe anima hominis siquidem per illud factus est homo in animam viventem; atqui illud idem spiraculum vitae est spiritus. Nam hoc fert communis SS. Patrum interpretatio: nullo alio elemento commemorato, dicitur in Gen. 1. homo factus ad imaginem et similitudinem Dei, et ut praesit animantibus ac dominetur illis: - Statim post recitata verba ex cap. 2. dicitur Deus praeceptum homini dedisse - adjungitur hominem imposuisse nomina caeteris animalibus: haec autem omnia non possunt ipsi competere, nisi prout est mente praeditus. Ergo. Vid. Suarez de anim. l. 1. cap. 12. nn. 4. 5.

b) Eccl. 12., 1. 7.: "Memento Creatoris tui in diebus juventutis tuae, antequam veniat tempus afflictionis, et veniant anni de quibus dicas: Non mihi placent: antequam ... revertatur pulvis in terram suam unde erat, et spiritus redeat ad Deum, qui dedit illum." In quo loco duplex solum humanae naturae elementum commemoratur, pulvis - de limo terrae - et spiritus - spiraculum vitae; spiritus autem, qui ad Deum redit, est immortalis, ac proinde intelligentia praeditus.

c) Matth. 10. 28.: "Nolite timere eos, qui occidunt corpus, animam autem non possunt occidere: sed potius timete eum, qui potest et animam et corpus perdere in gehennam." - 27. 50.: "Jesus autem iterum clamans voce magna emisit spiritum." - Luc. 8. 55. de filia Jairi a Domino in vitam revocata dicitur: "Reversus est spiritus ejus, et surrexit continuo." In quibus omnibus duo solum ponuntur, corpus et anima, quam homines non possunt occidere, seu immortalis, vel spiritus: si autem principium vivificans corpus est anima immortalis, spiritus: nulla alia praeter illam, anima agnoscitur in homine.

Prob. II. ex Patribus. a) Multi ante exortam haeresim Apollinaris hanc doctrinam tradiderunt. Ita Athenagoras [de Resur. c. 15.], ait: "Hominis natura ex anima immortali constat et corpore, quod cum anima in creatione conjunctum fuit; unum ex utroque est animal quod patitur quaecumque anima patitur et corpus." Exinde demonstrat convenientiam resurrectionis. Clemens Alex. (Strom. l. 5.) enarrans verba Moyses, Gen 2. 7.: "Merito," ait, "ex terra corpus dicit formari Moyses, animam autem ratione praeditam desuper inspiratam fuisse in faciem. Hic enim dicunt collocatam principalem animae facultatem, ingressum animae in protoplastum per accessionem sensuum interpretantes, et ideo factum esse hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem Dei." Ita etiam Tertullianus [de Poen. c. 3.] - S. Irenaeus [l. 5. c. 8.] - Methodius [ex lib. de resurr. apud Photium cod. 234.] - Origenes [in Matth. tom. 13. n. 18., et Periar. l. 1. c. 7.] etc.

b) Ab exorta vero Apollinaris haeresi, perspicua omnino dichotomia in eorum scriptis invenitur. S. Athanasius [l. 2. con. Apollin. n. 14.], inquit: "Qui de hominis inobedientia quaestionem habuit, judicium dedit quo duplicem poenae sententiam protulit: terreno corpori dicens: Terra es et in terram reverteris; atque ita, Domino sententiam ferente, corruptio corpus excipit; animae autem: morte morieris; et sic in duas dividitur partes homo, damnatus ad duo secedere loca ... quod si mihi alium damnationis locum, praeter hos duos indicare valetis, merito dixeritis in tres partes dividi hominem et ex duobus quidem locis revocationem factam esse: in tertio vero tertiam partem manere vinculis colligatam. Si vero nullum alium locum ostendere potestis praeter sepulcrum et infernum, ex quibus homo perfecte ereptus sit [Esto per suam perfectam et verissimam formam nos liberante], cur adhuc talia profertis, quasi Deus humano generi nondum reconciliatus sit?" S. Ephrem [de Inspirat.]: "Anima ita est in corpore, ut physicum vinculum solutu difficile. In omnibus operatur, velut dominatrix in corpore. Ita vitam in carne operatur ut naturali vinculo detenta. Non est alia anima in sensibilibus agens, alia in intelligibilibus, cum corpore condita est, sed propriam habet substantiam." - S. Leo [Ep. ad Flav.]: "Verbum caro factum est, et habitavit in nobis, hoc est, in ea carne quam assumpsit ex homine, et quam spiritu vitae rationalis animavit." (de Eccles. dog. c. 15.): "Neque duas animas credimus esse in uno homine, unam animalem, qua animatur corpus et quae immixta sit sanguini, et alteram spiritualem; sed dicimus, unam eandemque esse animam in homine, quae et corpus sua societate vivificat, et semetipsam sua ratione disponit." S. Augustinus (Serm. 150. de verb. Apost.): "Nihil est in homine, quod ad ejus substantiam pertineat et naturam, praeter corpus et animam."

NOTA. Ex dicendis in articulis sequentibus haec thesis confirmabitur, ideoque abstinemus ab aliis probationibus adducendis. - Objectiones ex auctoritate facile solvuntur ex animadversionibus praemissis. - Ex ratione autem praecipue objiciunt: unum idemque

principium nequit habere oppositas tendentias; sed caro concupiscit adversus spiritum. Ergo.

Resp. 1. Hoc argumentum nimis probat. Nam quandoque oritur pugna etiam inter desideria pertinentia ad vitam rationalem, ut ipsa experientia constat; ergo si quid probaret haec pugna, probaret etiam admittendas esse in nobis duas animas rationales. - D. Thomas (Quodl. 11. q. 5. a. 5.) jam responderat huic difficultati, dicens: "Non est inconveniens aliquid idem existens secundum diversas vires vel partes moveri ad opposita; et ideo, licet substantia sit eadem sensitivae et intellectivae, tamen potest secundum diversas partes et vires moveri ad opposita, ut scilicet sensus moveatur ad ea, quae sunt sibi propria, et ratio ad ea, ad quae ordinatur." Quam responsionem perspicue evolvit Maurus (Quaest. phil. Vol. 4. ad 2.), "Sicut," inquit, "quum quis trahitur a duobus in partes oppositas, experitur in suo corpore pugnam contrariarum tractionum, sic cum animus a bonis oppositis trahitur ad contrarias inclinationes, e. g., a bono virtutis trahitur ad electionem honesti, et a bono voluntatis trahitur ad electionem jucundi contrarii honesto, experitur in se pugnam contrariarum inclinationum ... Si quis urgeat: non possunt in unica anima dari simul inclinationes et actus contrarii; distinguo: efficaces, concedo; inefficaces, nego. Sicut idem corpus non potest efficaciter trahi simul ad dexteram et sinistram, ita ut moveatur simul in utramque partem, potest tamen inefficaciter trahi, ita ut ad neutram moveatur, vel efficaciter ad unam, inefficaciter ad alteram, ita ut ad unam moveatur, ad alteram non: sic una anima potest inefficaciter trahi ad electiones contrarias honesti et jucundi, e. g., ita ut neutrum, aut alterum tantum eligat, sed non potest efficaciter trahi simul ad electionem contrariorum, ita ut eligat simul contraria." Vid. Liberatore, Del Composto um. cap. 6. 189. With these things laid down, we say:

PROP. XIX. There is one soul in man, and it is rational; and consequently the distribution of man into spirit, soul, and body, and likewise his partition into spirit and body informed by soul, must be rejected.

Proof I, from Scripture. a) In Gen. 2:7 it is read: "Therefore God formed man from the slime of the earth, and breathed into his face the breath of life, and man became a living soul." Hence: the formation of man is described here, and only two elements are handed down, body and soul, by which he is vivified; therefore human nature consists of only two elements. In truth, the breath of life, of which there is question here, is certainly the soul of man, since through it man became a living soul; but that same breath of life is spirit. For this is what the common interpretation of the holy Fathers bears: with no other element mentioned, man is said in Gen. 1 to have been made to the image and likeness of God, and to preside over living things and have dominion over them. Immediately after the words recited from chapter 2, God is said to have given a command to man; it is added that man imposed names upon the other animals. But all these things cannot belong to him except insofar as he is endowed with mind. Therefore. See Suarez, On the Soul, book 1, c. 12, nn. 4, 5.

b) Eccles. 12:1, 7: "Remember thy Creator in the days of thy youth, before the time of affliction comes, and the years come of which thou shalt say: They please me not: before ... the dust returns to its earth from which it was, and the spirit returns to God, who gave it." In this passage only a twofold element of human nature is commemorated: dust - from the slime of the earth - and spirit - the breath of life; but the spirit which returns to God is immortal, and consequently endowed with intelligence.

c) Matt. 10:28: "Fear not those who kill the body, but cannot kill the soul; rather fear him who can destroy both soul and body in hell." Matt. 27:50: "But Jesus, again crying with a loud voice, gave up the spirit." Luke 8:55 says of the daughter of Jairus, recalled by the Lord to life: "Her spirit returned, and she rose immediately." In all these places only two things are posited: body and soul, which men cannot kill, or the immortal soul, that is, spirit. But if the principle vivifying the body is the immortal soul, spirit, then no other soul besides that one is acknowledged in man.

Proof II, from the Fathers. a) Many before the rise of the heresy of Apollinaris handed down this doctrine. Thus Athenagoras [On the Resurrection, c. 15] says: "The nature of man consists of an immortal soul and a body, which was joined with the soul in creation; from both there is one animal which suffers whatever the soul and the body suffer." From this he demonstrates the fittingness of the resurrection. Clement of Alexandria (Stromata, book 5), explaining the words of Moses, Gen. 2:7, says: "Deservedly Moses says that the body was formed from the earth, but that the soul

endowed with reason was breathed from above into the face. For they say that the principal faculty of the soul was placed here, interpreting the entrance of the soul into the first-formed man through the accession of the senses; and therefore man was made to the image and likeness of God." Thus also Tertullian [On Penance, c. 3], St. Irenaeus [book 5, c. 8], Methodius [from the book On the Resurrection, apud Photius, cod. 234], Origen [on Matthew, tom. 13, n. 18, and Peri Archon, book 1, c. 7], etc.

b) But after the heresy of Apollinaris had arisen, an altogether clear dichotomy is found in their writings. St. Athanasius [book 2, against Apollinaris, n. 14] says: "He who had the question concerning man's disobedience gave a judgment by which he brought forth a twofold sentence of punishment: saying to the earthly body, Earth thou art and unto earth thou shalt return; and thus, when the Lord pronounces the sentence, corruption receives the body; but to the soul, Thou shalt die the death; and thus man is divided into two parts, condemned to depart to two places. But if you are able to indicate to me another place of condemnation besides these two, you will deservedly have said that man is divided into three parts and that a recall has been made from two places, but that in the third place the third part remains bound in chains. But if you cannot show any other place besides the sepulcher and hell, from which man has been perfectly rescued [with his perfect and most true form liberating us], why do you still bring forward such things, as if God has not yet been reconciled to the human race?" St. Ephrem [On Inspiration]: "The soul is in the body as a physical bond difficult to loose. It operates in all things, as a mistress in the body. It operates life in the flesh as held by a natural bond. There is not one soul acting in sensibles and another in intelligibles; it was established with the body, but it has its own substance." St. Leo [Epistle to Flavian]: "The Word was made flesh and dwelt among us, that is, in that flesh which he assumed from man, and which he animated by the spirit of rational life." (On Ecclesiastical Dogmas, c. 15): "Nor do we believe that there are two souls in one man, one animal soul by which the body is animated and which is mixed with the blood, and another spiritual soul; but we say that there is one and the same soul in man, which both vivifies the body by its association and disposes itself by its reason." St. Augustine (Sermon 150, On the Words of the Apostle): "There is nothing in man which pertains to his substance and nature except body and soul."

NOTE. This thesis will be confirmed from the things to be said in the following articles; and therefore we abstain from bringing forward other proofs. Objections from authority are easily solved from the preliminary observations already set down. But from reason they especially object: one and the same principle cannot have opposite tendencies; but the flesh lusts against the spirit. Therefore.

Reply 1. This argument proves too much. For sometimes a conflict also arises between desires pertaining to rational life, as experience itself establishes; therefore if this conflict proved anything, it would also prove that two rational souls must be admitted in us. St. Thomas (Quodlibet 11, q. 5, a. 5) had already answered this difficulty, saying: "It is not unsuitable that something existing as one and the same thing should, according to diverse powers or parts, be moved toward opposites; and therefore, although the substance of the sensitive and intellective [soul] is the same, nevertheless according to diverse parts and powers it can be moved toward opposites, namely so that sense is moved toward those things which are proper to it, and reason toward those things to which it is ordered." Maurus (Philosophical Questions, vol. 4, ad 2) clearly unfolds this response: "Just as," he says, "when someone is drawn by two men in opposite directions, he experiences in his body the conflict of contrary pullings, so when the mind is drawn by opposed goods toward contrary inclinations, for example, by the good of virtue it is drawn toward the choice of the honorable, and by the good of the will it is drawn toward the choice of the pleasant contrary to the honorable, it experiences in itself the conflict of contrary inclinations. ... If someone urges: contrary inclinations and acts cannot be given simultaneously in one soul, I distinguish: efficacious ones, I concede; inefficacious ones, I deny. Just as the same body cannot be efficaciously drawn at the same time to the right and to the left, so that it is moved at the same time in both directions, yet it can be inefficaciously drawn, so that it is moved toward neither, or efficaciously toward one, inefficaciously toward the other, so that it is moved toward one and not toward the other; so one soul can be inefficaciously drawn toward contrary choices of the honorable and the pleasant, for example, so that it

chooses neither, or only one of the two, but it cannot be efficaciously drawn at the same time toward the choice of contraries, so that it chooses contraries at the same time." See Liberatore, Del Composto um., c. 6.

Article 5. Whether Man is Substantially One

LatineEnglish

Corrected Latin Text
Utrum homo sit substantialiter unus.

190. Ex dictis in articulo praecedente constat totam humanam naturam anima rationali et corpore absolvi; cum autem hae veluti partes inter se distinctae concurrant ad efformandum unum hominem, investiganda est natura hujus unitatis. 190. From the things said in the preceding article it is established that the whole human nature is completed by the rational soul and the body. But since these, as parts distinct from one another, concur in forming one man, the nature of this unity must be investigated.

191. Quod ut intelligatur, notandum est imprimis cum Bellarmino (de Incarn. l. 3. c. 8.) "tribus modis posse aliqua uniri. Primo essentialiter, cum videlicet ex pluribus fit una essentia: quomodo uniuntur materia et forma, genus et differentia. Et hoc modo non est facta unio incarnationis, ut patet, tum quia una esset in Christo natura, et illa nec esset divina, nec humana, sed tertia quaedam; tum etiam quia unio essentialis numquam fit, nisi ex imperfectis naturis, vel, si ex perfectis, per corruptionem, aut conversionem aliquam; in Christo autem sunt naturae perfectae et integrae. Secundo modo accidentaliter, ut cum accidentia subjecto adjunguntur, vel cum substantia substantiae copulatur, sed ex copula non exsurgit, nisi forma accidentalis, ut cum ex lapidibus vel lignis fit domus; et hoc modo non est facta unio hypostatica, quia Deus, ut notum est, nec potest esse accidens, nec accidentium subjectum. Tertio modo substantialiter, ut cum substantia, quae alioqui per se existeret, trahitur ad esse alterius suppositi, et ab illo pendet tamquam pars ipsius, et hoc modo facta est incarnatio. Et licet nullum sit exemplum omnino simile; tamen aliqua dantur a doctoribus, quae utcumque rem explicant." 191. In order that this may be understood, it must first be noted with Bellarmine (On the Incarnation, book 3, c. 8) that "some things can be united in three ways. First, essentially, namely when from several things there comes to be one essence, in the way in which matter and form, genus and difference are united. And the union of the Incarnation was not made in this way, as is clear, both because there would be one nature in Christ, and that nature would be neither divine nor human, but a certain third nature; and also because essential union never occurs except from imperfect natures, or, if from perfect natures, through some corruption or conversion; but in Christ there are perfect and integral natures. In a second way, accidentally, as when accidents are joined to a subject, or when substance is coupled with substance, but from the coupling there arises only an accidental form, as when a house is made from stones or wood; and the hypostatic union was not made in this way, because God, as is known, can neither be an accident nor the subject of accidents. In a third way, substantially, as when a substance which would otherwise exist per se is drawn to the being of another supposit, and depends upon it as a part of it; and in this way the Incarnation was made. And although there is no example altogether similar, still some examples are given by the doctors which explain the matter in some way."

192. Jamvero quemadmodum fatentur omnes hominem non esse unum per accidens, ac proinde unionem animae et corporis non esse accidentalem; ita communiter dicunt hominem esse unum substantialiter, ac proinde unionem animae cum corpore esse substantialem. Sed observandum est cum D. Th. 3. p. q. 2. a. 6. ad 3., quod "Substantia dupliciter dicitur: uno modo pro essentia, sive natura; alio modo pro supposito, sive hypostasi." Utroque sensu dicitur unio animae

cum corpore in homine substantialis, videlicet ex unione animae cum corpore fit una persona et una essentia. "Ex anima et corpore," inquit D. Thomas, 3. p. q. 2. a. 1. ad 2., "constituitur in unoquoque nostrum duplex unitas: naturae et personae." 192. Now just as all confess that man is not one per accidens, and consequently that the union of soul and body is not accidental, so they commonly say that man is one substantially, and consequently that the union of soul with body is substantial. But it must be observed with St. Thomas, III, q. 2, a. 6, ad 3, that "substance is said in two ways: in one way for essence, or nature; in another way for supposit, or hypostasis." In both senses the union of soul with body in man is called substantial, namely because from the union of soul with body there comes to be one person and one essence. "From soul and body," says St. Thomas, III, q. 2, a. 1, ad 2, "there is constituted in each of us a twofold unity: of nature and of person."

193. Notandum insuper est quod sicut substantia aliquando dicitur pro essentia, ita essentia dicitur pro natura. "Nomen naturae," inquit D. Thomas, 1. p. q. 29. a. 1. ad 4., "primo impositum est ad significandam generationem viventium, quae dicitur nativitas. Et quia hujusmodi generatio est a principio intrinseco, extensum est hoc nomen ad significandum principium intrinsecum cujuscumque motus. Et sic definitur natura in 2 Phys., text. 3. Et quia hujusmodi principium est formale vel materiale, communiter tam materia quam forma dicitur natura. Et quia per formam completur essentia uniuscujusque rei, communiter essentia uniuscujusque rei, quam significat ejus definitio, vocatur natura. Et sic accipitur hic natura. Unde Boetius in eodem lib. de duab. Naturis a princ., dicit quod natura est unumquodque informans specifica differentia. Specifica enim differentia est quae complet distinctionem, et sumitur a propria forma rei." 193. It must further be noted that just as substance is sometimes said for essence, so essence is said for nature. "The name nature," says St. Thomas, I, q. 29, a. 1, ad 4, "was first imposed to signify the generation of living things, which is called nativity. And because generation of this kind is from an intrinsic principle, this name was extended to signify the intrinsic principle of any motion whatsoever. And in this way nature is defined in Physics II, text 3. And because a principle of this kind is formal or material, commonly both matter and form are called nature. And because through form the essence of each thing is completed, commonly the essence of each thing, which its definition signifies, is called nature. And nature is taken here in this way. Hence Boethius in the same book On the Two Natures, at the beginning, says that nature is that which informs each thing by its specific difference. For the specific difference is that which completes the distinction and is taken from the proper form of the thing."

194. Ex his omnibus, quae communiter a Theologis traduntur, sequitur 1. quod substantia, essentia, natura habent diversos conceptus formales. Etenim essentia, juxta communem doctrinam, dicitur, "id, quo aliquid est id, quod est;" seu, "id, quo aliquid constituitur in propria natura;" seu id, quo respondetur quaestioni quid est, unde vocari etiam solet quidditas. Substantia vero dicitur "ens per se stans;" seu id, quod non indiget alia re, cui tamquam subjecto inhaereat. - Natura dicitur "primum principium (quo) operationis."

Sequitur 2. quod notio essentiae latius patet, quam notio substantiae; substantia enim dividitur contra accidens: essentia autem competit tum substantiae, tum accidenti. Unde D. Thomas (Opusc. de Ente et Essentia, cap. 1.), ait: "ens per se dicitur dupliciter: uno modo, quod dividitur per decem genera ... sumitur essentia ab ente primo modo dicto. Et quia, ut dictum est, ens hoc modo dictum dividitur per decem genera, oportet quod essentia significet aliquid commune omnibus naturis, per quas diversa entia, in diversis generibus collocantur." Et postquam ostenderit quomodo essentia sit in substantia, sive simplici sive composita; deinde, cap. 7., explicat quomodo sit in accidentibus.

Sequitur 3. quod in ente, quod est substantia et non accidens, substantia, essentia, natura sint unum idemque secundum rem. Hinc factum est, ut cum una sit essentia et natura hominis composita ex anima et corpore, una sit etiam substantia. S. Irenaeus (l. 5. c. 8.) inquit: "Substantia nostra, idest animae et carnis adunatio." - S. Augustinus (Serm. 150. de verb. Apost.) ait: "Nihil est in homine, quod ad ejus substantiam pertineat et naturam, praeter corpus et animam." - Vinc. Lirin. (cap. 19.): "In Deo una

substantia, sed tres Personae; in Christo duae substantiae, sed una Persona." - Et ex eadem ratione in Conc. Lat. IV. dicitur quod in Deo sunt tres Personae, "sed una essentia, substantia, seu natura." Unde merito Theologi, cum de unitate humanae naturae adstruenda agitur, promiscue usurpant nomen substantiae, essentiae, naturae. Vid., ex. gr., Suarez de anim. l. 1. c. 1. n. 9. 194. From all these things, which are commonly handed down by the theologians, it follows, 1. that substance, essence, and nature have diverse formal concepts. For essence, according to the common doctrine, is called "that by which something is that which it is"; or, "that by which something is constituted in its proper nature"; or that by which the question what is it is answered, whence it is also commonly called quiddity. But substance is called "a being standing per se," or that which does not need another thing in which it inheres as in a subject. Nature is called "the first principle by which there is operation."

It follows, 2. that the notion of essence extends more broadly than the notion of substance; for substance is divided against accident, but essence belongs both to substance and to accident. Hence St. Thomas (On Being and Essence, c. 1) says: "Being per se is said in two ways: in one way, that which is divided through the ten genera ... essence is taken from being said in the first way. And because, as was said, being said in this way is divided through the ten genera, it is necessary that essence signify something common to all natures through which diverse beings are located in diverse genera." And after he has shown how essence is in substance, whether simple or composite, he then explains, in chapter 7, how it is in accidents.

It follows, 3. that in a being which is substance and not accident, substance, essence, and nature are one and the same according to the thing. Hence it has come about that, since the essence and nature of man composed from soul and body is one, the substance also is one. St. Irenaeus (book 5, c. 8) says: "Our substance, that is, the union of soul and flesh." St. Augustine (Sermon 150, On the Words of the Apostle) says: "There is nothing in man which pertains to his substance and nature except body and soul." Vincent of Lerins (c. 19): "In God there is one substance, but three Persons; in Christ two substances, but one Person." And from the same reason it is said in the Fourth Lateran Council that in God there are three Persons, "but one essence, substance, or nature." Hence theologians rightly, when the unity of human nature is to be established, use the names substance, essence, and nature promiscuously. See, for example, Suarez, On the Soul, book 1, c. 1, n. 9.

195. His itaque expositis, dicimus:

PROP. XX. Anima rationalis et corpus ita inter se uniuntur in homine, ut ex iis 1. una resultet persona - 2. et una natura.

Prob. 1ma pars. Ex anima et corpore una resultat persona, si uni eidemque subjecto tribuuntur tum quae ad animam, tum quae ad corpus pertinent; primum enim subjectum attributionis est suppositum. Atqui ita est. Ergo.

Prob. min. Sive ex Scriptura, sive ex communi loquendi usu, unus idemque est ille, qui dicitur nasci, nutriri, mori, resurgere, videre, etc.; et dicitur intelligere, eligere, credere, colere Deum, etc.; atqui prima ei competunt secundum corpus, altera secundum animam rationalem. Ergo.

Confirmari potest hoc argumentum ex eo, quod eodem modo probatur unitas Personae in Christo; uni enim eidemque tribuuntur quae pertinent tum ad divinam tum ad humanam naturam: ex hoc autem Patres et Theologi concludunt unam esse in Christo Personam.

Nec obstat 1. quod aliquando adhibentur tales dicendi modi, qui videntur indicare solam animam constituere humanam personam. Illi enim non secundum proprietatem verborum, sed secundum quamdam accommodationem intelligendi sunt. "Illud potissime," inquit D. Thomas 1. p. q. 75. a. 4. ad 1., "videtur esse unumquodque quod est principale in ipso; sicut quod facit rector civitatis, dicitur civitas facere. Et hoc modo aliquando quod est principale in homine, dicitur homo."

Nec obstat 2. quod saepe dicatur corpus instrumentum animae; est enim instrumentum ei substantialiter, et non accidentaliter unitum. Unde fit quod uni homini tribui potest quidquid pertinet ad corpus, et non solum quod ad ipsum pertinet secundum actionem instrumentalem; cum hoc solum possit causae principali tribui, quando instrumentum ei solum accidentaliter unitur. Sic, ex. gr., possum dicere ego sentio et corpus sentit, sicut dicere possum calamus scribit et ego scribo; sed dum possum dicere ego cado si corpus cadit, non possum

dicere me cadere si calamus cadat. "Non omne quod assumitur," ait D. Thomas, 3. p. q. 2. a. 6. ad 4., "ut instrumentum, pertinet ad hypostasim assumentis, sicut patet de securi et gladio; nihil tamen prohibet illud quod assumitur ad unitatem hypostasis, se habere ut instrumentum, sicut corpus hominis vel membra ejus."

Prob. 2da pars. I. Ex Patribus. Nam a) communis est apud Patres hominis definitio "animal rationale." Ita, ex. gr., illum definiunt Cyrillus (In Jo. l. 1. c. 1. v. 13.) - S. Augustinus (De Quantitate animae, c. 25.) - Pseudo Athanasius (De communi essentia, n. 53.) etc.

b) Expresse asserunt unam esse in homine naturam. Ita, ex. gr., S. Augustinus (De civ. Dei l. 10. c. 29.) ait: "corpus animae cohaerere, ut homo totus et plenus sit, natura nostra ipsa teste agnoscimus." - Nemesius (De Natura hominis cap. 3.) improbat sententiam Platonis "qui non vult animal constare ex anima et corpore, sed ipsum esse animam, quae corpore utatur, et velut corpore vestita sit ... Quomodo enim unum esse potest cum vestitu anima? non enim unum est tunica cum eo, quod tunica indutum est." - Cyrillus Alex. [Dial. Quod unus sit Christus]: "Nonne unum dicimus hominem, atque unam ipsius naturam, etsi uniformis et simplex non sit?" - S. Athanasius [adv. Apollin. l. 2. c. 1.]: "Forma servi humanae substantiae intelligens natura, cum organica compositione agnoscitur." Cf. etiam quaedam SS. PP. testimonia in praeced. artic. recitata.

c) Cum Patres unitatem Personae in Christo tuentur, saepe ad mysterium hoc aliquo modo illustrandum, utuntur similitudine ex unitate hominis substantiali ducta; simul tamen in hac comparatione, sive Patres ipsi, sive communiter Theologi notant discrimen, quod in eo reponunt, quod dum in Christo habetur una Persona, in qua subsistunt duae naturae, divina et humana; in homine ex anima et corpore fit etiam una natura. Unde S. Athanasius, ex. gr., qui ad ostendendum unitatem personae in Christo, dicit in symb. "Sicut anima rationalis, et caro unus est homo, ita Deus et homo unus est Christus;" ut explicet differentiam inter utramque unionem, ait: "Hic (Christus) enim non ex rebus imperfectis habet, ut sit (sicut homo), sed perfectarum naturarum concursum ostendit in seipso: atque illic quidem partes hominis sunt anima et corpus."

d) Unde Conc. Later. IV. et Conc. Vat. in decretis saepe citatis docent Deum condidisse creaturam, seu naturam spiritualem et corporalem "ac deinde humanam, quasi communem ex spiritu et corpore constitutam."

Prob. II. Ibi est una natura, ubi est unum primum operationis principium; atqui in homine, si inspiciamus operationes vitae sensitivae, unum est operationis principium, constans corpore et anima (rationali uti patet ex art. praec.); ergo ex corpore et anima rationali fit in homine una natura. "Impossibile est," inquit D. Th. (c. g. l. 2. c. 57.), "quod eorum quae sunt diversa secundum esse, sit operatio una. Dico autem operationem unam, non ex parte ejus in quod terminatur actio, sed secundum quod egreditur ab agente. Multi enim trahentes navim, unam actionem faciunt ex parte operati, quod est unum, sed tamen ex parte trahentium sunt multae actiones, quia sunt diversi impulsus ad trahendum. Cum enim actio consequatur formam, et virtutem, oportet quod quorum sunt diversae formae, et virtutes, esse et actiones diversas. Quamvis autem animae sit aliqua operatio propria, in qua non communicat corpus, sicut intelligere; sunt tamen aliquae operationes communes sibi et corpori, ut timere, irasci, et sentire, et hujusmodi. Haec enim accidunt secundum aliquam transmutationem alicujus determinatae partis corporis. Ex quo patet quod simul sunt animae et corporis operationes. Oportet igitur ex anima et corpore unum fieri, et quod non sint secundum esse diversa."

Decl. breviter. Ratione et experientia constat operationes omnes vitae sensitivae non exerceri sine concursu corporis, ac proinde animam ab eodem pendere quoad illas operationes. At vero, qualis est hic concursus corporis ad operationes vitae sensitivae?

Si dicitur esse solum extrinsecus, concomitans, sicut concursus phantasiae ad operationes vitae intellectivae; sequitur nullum esse essentiale discrimen inter utriusque vitae operationes: quemadmodum ergo intelligere dicitur independens a corpore non obstante concomitanti actione phantasiae; ita etiam videre, audire, etc., essent actiones a corpore independentes. Sed independentia operationis dicit independentiam principii, a quo illa procedit; principium agens et subsistens independenter a materia, dicitur spirituale; spiritualitas est fundamentum immortalitatis: ergo si actiones vitae sensitivae solum praedicto modo penderent a corpore, sicut anima rationalis est vere et intrinsece independens a materia, spiritualis, immortalis; ita etiam anima brutorum. - Sin vero concursus corporis ad operationes vitae sensitivae est intrinsecus, quatenus organum est principium partiale earum operationum; tum quidem, anima sensitiva est

intrinsece dependens quoad suas operationes a corpore; intrinsece dependens quoad esse, ac proinde nec erit spiritualis, nec immortalis.

Quapropter non valeo intelligere quomodo aliqui philosophi dicant - 1. sensitivae vitae operationes esse solius animae et non totius compositi - vel 2. easdem operationes esse quidem a materia dependentes, at vero animam ipsam, a qua illae procedunt in brutis, a corpore non pendere quoad ipsum esse. Juxta primum destruitur essentiale discrimen inter animam humanam et animas brutorum; juxta alterum destruitur unicum principium, quo, ex ratione, animae humanae spiritualitatem ostendere possumus. Mirum vero est, quod addant animam brutorum esse subsistentem, quatenus a corpore non pendet ut sit; non esse vero subsistentem quatenus est pars. - At etiam anima humana est pars humanae naturae; videndum potius est qualis sit pars. Si enim anima bruti talis est pars animalis, ut sine materia possit operari, vel, ut illi philosophi volunt, esse et subsistere; tollitur, ut diximus essentiale discrimen inter illam et animam humanam.

His ergo positis, facile intelligitur vis propositi argumenti: datur in homine operatio vitae sensitivae; cum sensatio sit una debet a potentia procedere, quae sit una; potentia una, nequit esse nisi unius naturae; natura ergo, a qua sensatio procedit debet esse una. Sed sensatio procedit ab anima et corpore, et in homine nulla alia anima est praeter rationalem; ergo ex corpore et anima rationali una fit in homine natura. Cf. Liberatore (Del Composto umano, cap. 4. art. 5. 6.) pro hoc argumento - pro tota vero thesi (cap. 1. art. 1. 4.) 195. With these things set forth, therefore, we say:

PROP. XX. The rational soul and the body are so united with one another in man that from them there results 1. one person, and 2. one nature.

Proof of the first part. From soul and body there results one person if the things which pertain both to the soul and to the body are attributed to one and the same subject; for the first subject of attribution is the supposit. But so it is. Therefore.

Proof of the minor. Whether from Scripture or from common usage of speech, he who is said to be born, nourished, to die, rise again, see, etc., and who is said to understand, choose, believe, worship God, etc., is one and the same. But the former things belong to him according to the body, the latter according to the rational soul. Therefore.

This argument can be confirmed from the fact that the unity of Person in Christ is proved in the same way. For the things which pertain both to the divine nature and to the human nature are attributed to one and the same; and from this the Fathers and theologians conclude that there is one Person in Christ.

Nor is it an obstacle, 1. that sometimes such modes of speaking are employed as seem to indicate that the soul alone constitutes the human person. For those modes are to be understood not according to the propriety of the words, but according to a certain accommodation of understanding. "That especially," says St. Thomas, I, q. 75, a. 4, ad 1, "seems to be each thing which is principal in it; just as what the ruler of a city does is said to be done by the city. And in this way sometimes that which is principal in man is called man."

Nor is it an obstacle, 2. that the body is often said to be the instrument of the soul; for it is an instrument united to it substantially, and not accidentally. Hence it happens that whatever pertains to the body can be attributed to one man, and not only what pertains to it according to instrumental action; since only this latter can be attributed to the principal cause when the instrument is united to it only accidentally. Thus, for example, I can say, I sense, and the body senses, just as I can say, the pen writes, and I write; but while I can say, I fall if the body falls, I cannot say that I fall if the pen falls. "Not everything that is assumed," says St. Thomas, III, q. 2, a. 6, ad 4, "as an instrument pertains to the hypostasis of the one assuming, as is clear concerning an axe and a sword; nevertheless nothing prevents that which is assumed to the unity of hypostasis from having itself as an instrument, as the body of man or his members."

Proof of the second part. I. From the Fathers. For a) among the Fathers the common definition of man is "a rational animal." Thus, for example, Cyril defines him in this way (on John, book 1, c. 1, v. 13), St. Augustine (On the Quantity of the Soul, c. 25), Pseudo-Athanasius (On the Common Essence, n. 53), etc.

b) They expressly assert that there is one nature in man. Thus, for example, St. Augustine (City of God, book 10, c. 29) says: "We acknowledge, with our very nature as witness, that the body coheres with the soul so that man may be whole and complete." Nemesius (On the Nature of Man, c. 3) criticizes the opinion of Plato,

"who does not want the animal to consist of soul and body, but wants it itself to be the soul which uses the body and is, as it were, clothed with the body. ... For how can the soul be one with clothing? For a tunic is not one with him who is clothed with the tunic." Cyril of Alexandria [Dialogue That Christ Is One]: "Do we not say that man is one, and that his nature is one, even if it is not uniform and simple?" St. Athanasius [against Apollinaris, book 2, c. 1]: "The form of a servant is acknowledged as the intelligent nature of human substance, with organic composition." Cf. also certain testimonies of the holy Fathers recited in the preceding article.

c) When the Fathers defend the unity of Person in Christ, they often use, in order to illustrate this mystery in some way, a likeness drawn from the substantial unity of man. At the same time, however, in this comparison, either the Fathers themselves or theologians commonly note the difference, which they place in this: that while in Christ there is one Person in whom two natures subsist, the divine and the human, in man from soul and body there also comes to be one nature. Hence St. Athanasius, for example, who, to show the unity of person in Christ, says in the Creed, "As the rational soul and flesh is one man, so God and man is one Christ," says, in order to explain the difference between the two unions: "For this one (Christ) does not have it from imperfect things that he is (as man does), but shows in himself the concurrence of perfect natures; and there indeed the parts of man are soul and body."

d) Hence the Fourth Lateran Council and the Vatican Council, in the decrees often cited, teach that God founded the spiritual and corporeal creature, or nature, "and then the human, as if common, constituted from spirit and body."

Proof II. There is one nature where there is one first principle of operation. But in man, if we inspect the operations of sensitive life, there is one principle of operation, consisting of body and soul (the rational soul, as is clear from the preceding article). Therefore from body and rational soul there comes to be one nature in man. "It is impossible," says St. Thomas (Contra Gentiles, book 2, c. 57), "that there be one operation of those things which are diverse according to being. But I call an operation one, not on the part of that in which the action is terminated, but according as it goes forth from the agent. For many men drawing a ship perform one action on the part of the thing worked, which is one; nevertheless on the part of those drawing there are many actions, because there are diverse impulses toward drawing. For since action follows form and power, it is necessary that things whose forms and powers are diverse have diverse beings and actions. But although there is some operation proper to the soul, in which the body does not communicate, such as to understand, nevertheless there are some operations common to it and the body, such as to fear, to be angry, to sense, and things of this kind. For these occur according to some transmutation of some determinate part of the body. From this it is clear that they are at the same time operations of soul and body. Therefore it is necessary that from soul and body one thing come to be, and that they not be diverse according to being."

Brief explanation. By reason and experience it is established that all operations of sensitive life are not exercised without the concurrence of the body, and consequently that the soul depends upon the same body with respect to those operations. But what kind of concurrence of the body is this in relation to the operations of sensitive life?

If it is said to be only extrinsic and concomitant, like the concurrence of phantasy in the operations of intellective life, it follows that there is no essential distinction between the operations of either life. Therefore, just as understanding is called independent of the body notwithstanding the concomitant action of phantasy, so also seeing, hearing, etc., would be actions independent of the body. But the independence of an operation bespeaks the independence of the principle from which it proceeds; an acting and subsisting principle independent of matter is called spiritual; spirituality is the foundation of immortality. Therefore, if the actions of sensitive life depended upon the body only in the aforesaid way, then just as the rational soul is truly and intrinsically independent of matter, spiritual, and immortal, so also would be the soul of brutes. But if the concurrence of the body in the operations of sensitive life is intrinsic, insofar as the organ is a partial principle of those operations, then indeed the sensitive soul is intrinsically dependent upon the body with respect to its operations; it is intrinsically dependent with respect to being, and consequently will be neither spiritual nor immortal.

Therefore I cannot understand how some philosophers say, 1. that the operations of

sensitive life belong to the soul alone and not to the whole composite; or 2. that these same operations are indeed dependent upon matter, but that the soul itself, from which they proceed in brutes, does not depend upon the body with respect to being itself. According to the first, the essential distinction between the human soul and the souls of brutes is destroyed; according to the second, the one principle by which we can show from reason the spirituality of the human soul is destroyed. But it is strange that they add that the soul of brutes is subsistent insofar as it does not depend upon the body in order to be, but is not subsistent insofar as it is a part. Yet even the human soul is a part of human nature; one must rather see what kind of part it is. For if the soul of a brute is such a part of the animal that it can operate without matter, or, as those philosophers wish, be and subsist without matter, then, as we have said, the essential distinction between it and the human soul is removed.

With these things laid down, therefore, the force of the proposed argument is easily understood: there is in man an operation of sensitive life; since sensation is one, it must proceed from a power which is one; one power cannot belong except to one nature; therefore the nature from which sensation proceeds must be one. But sensation proceeds from soul and body, and in man there is no other soul besides the rational soul; therefore from body and rational soul one nature comes to be in man. Cf. Liberatore (Del Composto umano, c. 4, art. 5, 6) for this argument, and for the whole thesis (c. 1, art. 1, 4).

Article 6. How the Soul is United to the Body For Forming Man Substantially One

LatineEnglish

Corrected Latin Text
Quomodo uniatur anima corpori ad efformandum hominem substantialiter unum. In What Way The Soul Is United To The Body For Forming A Man Substantially One.

196. Cum jam constet hominem esse natura et persona unum, agitur nunc de hac unitate explicanda; explicatio vero pendet a modo, quo anima et corpus uniuntur. Cum autem hac in re quaedam sint certa apud omnes Ecclesiae filios, alia inter eos adhuc libere disputentur, illa ab his secernere curabimus. 196. Since it is now established that man is one in nature and person, the explanation of this unity is now at issue; but the explanation depends upon the mode by which soul and body are united. Since, however, in this matter some things are certain among all sons of the Church, while others are still freely disputed among them, we shall take care to separate the former from the latter.

§ I.
Documenta Ecclesiae proferuntur, et breviter adnotantur. Section I.
The Documents Of The Church Are Brought Forward And Briefly Annotated.

197. Concilium Viennense sub Clemente V. haec habet: "Fidei catholicae fundamento, praeter quod, teste Apostolo, nemo potest aliud ponere, firmiter inhaerentes, aperte cum sancta matre Ecclesia confitemur, unigenitum Dei Filium in iis omnibus, in quibus Deus Pater existit, una cum Patre aeternaliter subsistentem, partes nostrae naturae simul unitas, ex quibus in se verus Deus existens fieret verus homo, humanum videlicet corpus passibile et animam intellectivam, seu rationalem, ipsum corpus vere per se essentialiter informantem, assumpsisse ex tempore in virginali thalamo ad unitatem suae hypostasis et personae ... Porro doctrinam omnem, seu positionem temere asserentem, aut vertentem in dubium, quod substantia animae rationalis, seu intellectivae, vere ac per se humani corporis non

sit forma, velut erroneam ac veritati catholicae inimicam fidei, praedicto sacro approbante concilio reprobamus: definientes, ut cunctis nota sit fidei sincerae veritas ac praecludatur universis erroribus aditus, ne subintrent, quod quisquis deinceps asserere, defendere, seu tenere pertinaciter praesumpserit, quod anima rationalis seu intellectiva non sit forma corporis humani per se et essentialiter, tamquam haereticus sit censendus."

Conc. Lat. V. sub Leone X. statuit: "Hoc sacro approbante concilio damnamus et reprobamus omnes asserentes animam intellectivam mortalem esse, aut unicam in cunctis hominibus, et haec in dubium vertentes: cum illa non solum vere, per se et essentialiter humani corporis forma existat, sicut in canone fel. rec. Clementis Papae V., praedecessoris nostri, in generali Viennensi Concilio edito continetur, verum et immortalis et pro corporum, quibus infunditur, multitudine singulariter multiplicabilis et multiplicata et multiplicanda sit."

S. P. IX., in Litt. Apost. ad Card. Geissel, Archiep. Colonien. 1857, damnans errores Gunther, ait: "Noscimus iisdem libris (operibus scilicet hujus scriptoris) laedi catholicam sententiam ac doctrinam de homine, qui corpore et anima ita absolvatur, ut anima, eaque rationalis, sit vera, per se, atque immediata corporis forma."

Idem S. P., in Litt. Apost. ad Epis. Wratislaviensem, 30 Apr. 1860, damnans errores Baltzer, inquit: "Notatum praeterea est, Baltzerum in illo suo libello cum omnem controversiam ad hoc revocasset, sitne corpori vitae principium proprium, ab anima rationali reipsa discretum, eo temeritatis progressum esse, ut oppositam sententiam et appellaret haereticam et pro tali habendam esse multis verbis argueret. Quod quidem non possumus non vehementer improbare, considerantes hanc sententiam, quae unum in homine ponit vitae principium, animam scilicet rationalem, a qua corpus quoque et motum et vitam omnem et sensum accipiat, in Dei Ecclesia esse communissimam, atque Doctoribus plerisque, et probatissimis quidem maxime, cum Ecclesiae dogmate ita videri conjunctam, ut hujus sit legitima solaque vera interpretatio, nec proinde sine errore in fide possit negari." 197. The Council of Vienne under Clement V has this: "Firmly adhering to the foundation of Catholic faith, besides which, according to the Apostle's testimony, no one can lay another, we openly confess with holy mother Church that the only-begotten Son of God, eternally subsisting together with the Father in all those things in which God the Father exists, assumed in time in the virginal chamber, unto the unity of his hypostasis and person, the parts of our nature united together, from which, existing in himself as true God, he would become true man, namely a passible human body and an intellective or rational soul, truly, per se, and essentially informing that body. ... Furthermore, with the aforesaid sacred council approving, we reprove every doctrine or position rashly asserting or calling into doubt that the substance of the rational or intellective soul is not truly and per se the form of the human body, as erroneous and hostile to the truth of Catholic faith; defining, so that the sincere truth of faith may be known to all and the entrance to all errors be closed off lest they creep in, that whoever henceforth shall presume pertinaciously to assert, defend, or hold that the rational or intellective soul is not the form of the human body per se and essentially, is to be judged as a heretic."

The Fifth Lateran Council under Leo X decreed: "With this sacred council approving, we condemn and reprove all who assert that the intellective soul is mortal, or one only in all men, and those who call these things into doubt: since it not only truly, per se, and essentially exists as the form of the human body, as is contained in the canon of Clement V, our predecessor of happy memory, issued in the General Council of Vienne, but also is immortal and, according to the multitude of bodies into which it is infused, singularly multipliable, multiplied, and to be multiplied."

The Supreme Pontiff Pius IX, in the Apostolic Letter to Cardinal Geissel, Archbishop of Cologne, in 1857, condemning the errors of Gunther, says: "We know that in those same books, that is, in the works of this writer, the Catholic opinion and doctrine concerning man is harmed, according to which man is completed by body and soul in such a way that the soul, and indeed the rational soul, is the true, per se, and immediate form of the body."

The same Supreme Pontiff, in the Apostolic Letter to the Bishop of Breslau, April 30, 1860, condemning the errors of Baltzer, says: "It has furthermore been noted that Baltzer, in that little book of his, after he had reduced the whole controversy to this: whether there is for the body a proper principle of life really distinct from the rational soul, advanced to such rashness that he both called the opposite opinion heretical and argued with many words that it must be held as such. This

indeed we cannot but vehemently disapprove, considering that this opinion, which posits one principle of life in man, namely the rational soul, from which the body also receives motion and all life and sense, is very common in the Church of God, and seems so joined with the dogma of the Church to most Doctors, and indeed especially to the most approved, that it is the legitimate and only true interpretation of it, and consequently cannot be denied without error in faith."

198. Ut vera harum definitionum vis innotescat, quaedam breviter adnotanda sunt. Ac 1. observant nonnulli recentiores verba Concilii Vien. posse dupliciter exponi: a) anima, quae est forma corporis, est anima rationalis - vel b) anima, quae est rationalis, est forma corporis. Juxta primam expositionem, aiunt, intentio Conc. directe fertur in definitionem de unitate animae in homine, et solum supponit quod anima sit forma corporis; juxta alteram vero, definitio directe cadit in illa "est forma corporis", et solum indirecte adstruitur unitas animae in homine. Primam autem expositionem praeferendam esse dicunt; quia Concilium praefatam definitionem edidit contra Olivam, qui errorem de pluralitate animarum in homine renovasse videtur.

At vero a) si verba Concilii sumantur uti sonant, videntur directe statuere animam esse formam corporis eo vel magis quod ipsam rationem formae distincte determinant addendo "vere, per se, essentialiter." - b) Si Concilium volens definire unicam animam, eamque intellectivam, esse in homine, usum est hac formula, "anima rationalis seu intellectiva est forma corporis humani per se et essentialiter;" signum est quod veritas formae ita intime connectitur cum unitate animae humanae, ut unum sine alio stare non possit. c) Concedunt tandem quod Concilium saltem indirecte statuit animam esse formam corporis: hoc autem sufficit, ut haec doctrina sit ab omnibus tenenda. - d) Historice non bene constat, ut fatentur omnes, quinam fuerint errores Olivae; sed optime constare videtur Ecclesiae definitionem non coarctari sola damnatione horum errorum. Etenim, cum Concilium expresse dicat se definire animam esse per se et essentialiter formam corporis "ut cunctis nota sit fidei sincera veritas ac praecludatur universis erroribus aditus ne subintrent;" patet quod errores Olivae fuerunt occasio definitionis, vel eorum damnatio fuit scopus concilii partialis; sed integrum definitionis scopum aperte comprehendere "ut praecludatur universis erroribus aditus, ne subintrent."

II. Quando Concil. Vien., cujus decretum confirmarunt posteriores Ecclesiae definitiones, docet animam esse vere, per se, essentialiter corporis formam; vox illa forma sumenda est sensu proprio et determinato. Nam a) Concilium dicit animam vere esse formam; sed quando Conc. Trid. sess. 6. can. 22 damnat eos, qui dicunt "justificatum non vere mereri augmentum gratiae," omnes Theologi ex illo vere colligunt agi de merito proprie dicto, seu de condigno; ergo a pari quando Conc. Vien. dicit animam esse vere formam corporis, vox illa forma proprio sensu sumenda est. - b) Scopus definitionis, quem ipsum Conc. expressit, erat "ut cunctis nota sit fidei sincera veritas ac praecludatur universis erroribus aditus, ne subintrent;" atqui hunc scopum non potuisset attingere Concilium, nisi sensu determinato adhibuisset vocem illam forma; ergo. c) Unde merito a Porrecta [appendix in art. 1. q. 76. 1. p.] ait: "Intellige Clementem loqui formaliter; quoniam si philosophorum verba formaliter sumenda sunt, multo magis utique Sacrorum Conciliorum dogmata formaliter intelligere quisque tenetur, et hoc pro universali regula tenendum est. Hoc autem eo verius est in proposito, quanto explicatius Papam loquutum videmus, et vere (inquit) et perfecte et per se et essentialiter est humani corporis forma anima rationalis seu intellectiva. Quis nisi haereticus dicat tot tantisque gravissimis verbis hic non importari sermonem formalem?"

III. Quare videndum est quid tempore definitionis praedictae intelligebatur in scholis catholicis nomine formae; si enim aliqua sunt quae communiter docebant, ea saltem sunt omnino retinenda, uti a Conc. declarata.

Jamvero forma generatim dividebatur contra materiam; et cum materia diceretur potentia, forma dicebatur actus, D. Th. opusc. 21.: dicebatur autem actus, quia rem constituit, determinat ad certum essendi modum. - Distinguebant communiter formam in subsistentem et informantem: Forma subsistens est illa, quae per se subsistit, quin sit in aliquo subjecto: ita Angeli dicuntur formae subsistentes; formae quidem, quia determinantur ad certum essendi modum; subsistentes vero, quia non recipiuntur in aliqua materia. Forma autem informans est illa, quae in aliquo subjecto recipitur.

Anima humana est certe forma informans. Nam a) Conc. Vien. in eodem decr. loquens

de veritate et integritate humanae naturae in Christo, dicit eum habere animam informantem. - b) Dicitur anima non solum forma, sed forma corporis, a qua corpus vitam etc. accipit. c) Unde merito notat Suarez de anim. l. 1. c. 1. n. 12.: "Indubitatum est apud christianos philosophos omnem animam vivificantem corruptibile corpus esse veram formam informantem. Hoc ostendemus infra esse de fide de anima rationali, et ratione etiam probabitur."

IV. At vero forma proprie dicta, seu forma informans dividebatur communiter in accidentalem et substantialem. Substantialis est illa, quae dat esse simpliciter, idest primum esse, quod nullum aliud supponit; accidentalis vero, quae supervenit rei jam in suo esse substantiali constitutae, eique tribuit aliquod esse secundum quid, ex. gr., velocitatem equo. Anima humana estne forma corporis substantialis an accidentalis?

Ut huic quaestioni satisfaciamus tradenda est 1. enucleatior notitia de forma substantiali juxta ea, quae communiter admittebantur in scholis catholicis tempore Conc. Vienn. - et 2. verba quaedam ejusdem Concil. perpendenda sunt.

Quoad 1um, forma substantialis definitur a Suarez (Met. disp. 15. sect. 5. n. 1., et cum eo omnes conveniunt quoad rem): "substantia simplex, et incompleta, quae ut actus constituit essentiam substantiae corporeae." Dicitur substantia, idest realis, ac proinde rejiciuntur accidentia et modi substantiales. Additur simplex, ut excludantur substantiae compositae. - Incompleta, ut excludantur completae substantiae, ex. gr., Angeli - ut actus, ut distinguatur forma a materia, quae per modum potentiae constituit compositum substantiale. - Fortasse illud incompleta nondum est sat clarum. Illud autem declarat Suarez tum Metaph. disp. 33., sect. 1., n. 15., tum de anim. l. 1. c. 12. n. 17. In hoc loco inquit: "Distinguenda est enim duplex substantia spiritualis, una est omnino completa, et absoluta in propria essentia, et ratione subsistendi, et haec non potest esse forma corporis, nec cum alia substantia ad unam completam essentiam substantialem componendam uniri; quia quod in genere substantiae completum est, non potest amplius compleri. Alia vero esse potest substantia spiritualis incompleta in genere substantiae, et non omnino absoluta transcendentaliter, sed includens in sua essentia transcendentalem habitudinem ad corpus; quia in hoc nulla cogitari potest repugnantia, et talis actus spiritualis, potest esse vera corporis forma." Vid. etiam D. Th. 1. p. q. 75. a. 7. c. et ad 3.

Ex hac definitione formae substantialis sequitur quod tria praesertim juxta omnes sunt de ratione formae substantialis. 1. Quemadmodum cujuscumque formae est, ut sit principium communicativum esse, ita proprium est formae substantialis ut sit principium communicativum esse substantialis. "Ad hoc enim," inquit D. Thomas, c. g. l. 2. cap. 68., "quod aliquid sit forma substantialis alterius, duo requiruntur. Quorum unum est ut forma sit principium essendi substantialiter ei cujus est forma; principium autem dico non effectivum sed formale, quo aliquid est et denominatur ens. Unde sequitur aliud, scilicet quod forma et materia conveniant in uno esse; quod non contingit de principio effectivo cum eo cui dat esse; et hoc esse est in quo subsistit substantia composita, quae est una secundum esse ex materia et forma constans." Quod saepissime repetit S. Doctor. Etiam Scotus, 4. Sent. Distinct. 11. q. 3., fatetur quod forma substantialis dat esse simpliciter; et addit: "Nulla est causa, quare ista dat esse simpliciter et illa secundum quid, nisi quia haec est forma substantialis et illa accidentalis."

2. Cum ens et unum convertantur, id quod est principium esse, est etiam principium unitatis; et si sit forma substantialis, principium esse substantialis, per se, simpliciter; faciet etiam unum simpliciter, per se. "Ab eodem," inquit D. Thomas, c. g. l. 2. cap. 58., "aliquid habet esse, et unitatem. Unum enim consequitur ad ens. Cum igitur a forma unaquaeque res habeat esse, a forma etiam habebit unitatem. Si igitur ponantur in homine plures animae sicut diversae formae, homo non erit unum ens, sed plura: nec ad unitatem hominis ordo formarum sufficiet, quia esse unum secundum ordinem, non est esse unum simpliciter, cum unitas ordinis sit minima unitatum." Et cap. 69.: "Non enim corpus et anima sunt duae substantiae actu existentes, sed ex eis duobus fit una substantia actu existens."

Si quis autem quaerat quid significat hic unum per se, optime illud explicat D. Thomas, c. g. l. 2. cap. 56., dicens: "Unum autem simpliciter, tripliciter dicitur, vel sicut indivisibile, vel sicut continuum, vel sicut quod est ratione unum. Ex substantia autem intellectuali, et corpore non potest fieri unum quod sit indivisibile. Oportet enim illud esse compositum ex duobus. Nec iterum quod sit continuum, quia partes continui quantae sunt. Relinquitur igitur inquirendum, utrum ex substantia intellectuali et corpore possit fieri unum, sicut quod est ratione unum. Ex duobus autem permanentibus non fit aliquod ratione unum, nisi sicut ex forma substantiali,

et materia. Ex substantia enim, et accidente non fit ratione unum: non enim est eadem ratio hominis et albi."

3. Cum substantia re idem sit ac natura, et natura significet primum operationis principium; id quod est principium esse substantialis, est etiam principium operationis. Unde D. Th. 1. p. q. 76. ait: "Illud quo primo aliquid operatur, est forma ejus ... Manifestum est autem quod primum, quo corpus vivit, est anima. Anima enim est primum quo nutrimur, et sentimus, et movemur secundum locum, et similiter quo primo intelligimus. Hoc ergo principium quo primo intelligimus, sive dicatur intellectus, sive anima intellectiva, est forma corporis."

Quoad 2um vero breviter notandum est 1. quod ab Ecclesia dicitur anima forma corporis per se. Quod significare potest a) animam non per accidens, sed natura sua esse formam corporis: et hic sensus est certe verus, in hoc enim anima nostra, substantia spiritualis, forma informans, distinguitur a substantia Angelica - b) animam esse formam corporis per se, quatenus non necessario semper actu informat corpus, sed exigit corpus informare; et hic sensus est etiam verus, siquidem anima a corpore separata, non desinit esse forma, quamvis non actu informat. - c) animam esse formam per se, nempe per suam essentiam, et non per aliud: et hic sensus est etiam verus, et continetur in verbis sequentibus Concilii.

2. Dicitur anima forma corporis essentialiter. Quod duo significare potest: vel quod essentiale est animae ut sit forma, ut diximus - vel quod per ipsam suam essentiam et non per aliud informet.

3. Dicitur anima immediata forma corporis. Quod significat quod non mediante alia anima - non mediante aliqua sua potentia - non mediante aliqua sua actione - sed immediate, id est per se ipsam, per suam substantiam corpus informat. Unde Conc. Vienn. dixit quod substantia animae rationalis est forma corporis. "Anima," inquit D. Th., c. g. l. 2. cap. 71., "immediate corpori unitur; nec oportet ponere aliquod medium quasi animam corpori uniens: vel phantasmata, sicut dicit Averrhoes; vel potentias ipsius, sicut quidam dicunt; vel etiam spiritum corporalem, sicut alii dixerunt. Ostensum est enim quod anima unitur corpori ut forma ejus; forma autem unitur materiae absque omni medio; per se enim competit formae quod sit actus corporis, et non per aliquid aliud." - Et Qq. de anima, a. 9. c.: "Inter omnia, esse est illud, quod immediatius et intimius convenit rebus ... unde oportet cum materia habeat esse actu per formam, quod forma dans esse materiae, immediatius caeteris sibi insit. Est autem hoc proprium formae substantialis quod det materiae esse simpliciter ... Si qua ergo forma est quae non det materiae esse simpliciter, sed adveniat materiae jam existenti in actu per aliquam formam, non erit forma substantialis ... Sola prima forma, quae faceret esse substantiam actu esset substantialis, aliae vero omnes accidentales." Cf. integrum art. - Vid. etiam 1. p. q. 76. a. 7.

Jam, ex his facile responderi potest propositae quaestioni; et dicimus animam humanam esse formam corporis substantialem et non accidentalem. Nam a) forma, quae est substantia et seipsa unitur, nequit communicare, nisi esse substantiale; atqui anima humana est substantia, et seipsa unitur corpori; ergo communicat esse substantiale. Atqui principium communicativum esse substantialis dicitur forma substantialis; ergo anima humana est forma substantialis. - b) Quod anima sit forma substantialis conceditur etiam a Scoto expressis verbis, ut vidimus; utrum autem deinde sibi cohaereat, videbitur inferius; sed assumere hic possumus uti sententiam communem in scholis catholicis, animam esse formam substantialem, et hoc sufficit rei praesenti.

V. Ex dictis colligere possumus, juxta doctrinam Ecclesiae, animam esse veram formam corporis - formam informantem - principium communicativum esse - communicativum esse substantialis ideoque facere unum per se simul cum corpore - atque tandem esse principium primum operationis in homine.

Jamvero, quaeritur quodnam esse communicet anima corpori. Ac certum est 1. quod "licet anima," uti inquit D. Th. Qq. disp. Quaestio de anima, a. 10. ad 2., "sit forma corporis secundum essentiam animae intellectualis, non tamen secundum operationem intellectualem." Anima enim communicat materiae esse, quo haec capax est; sed materia non est capax gradus essendi intellectivi. Unde, c. g. l. 2. cap. 69., docet D. Thomas: "Quamvis autem sit unum esse formae et materiae, non tamen oportet quod materia semper adaequet esse formae; imo quanto forma est nobilior, tanto in suo esse superexcedit materiam." - Cf. integrum caput, et Qq. disp., q. de anima, a. 10.

2. Certum est animam humanam communicare corpori vitam sensitivam et omnem vitam, quae in eo est. Quod patet a) ex eo, quod expresse dicat S. P. Pius IX. in praef. Litt. animam rationalem esse unicum vitae principium in homine "a qua corpus quoque et motum et vitam omnem et sensum accipiat." - b)

ex dictis in articulo praecedente de unitate animae in homine.

3. Quamvis S. P. non definiat dari, praeter vitam sensitivam aliam vitam nempe vegetativam in homine; est tamen omnino conforme praefatis S. P. verbis et hanc admittere; si enim praeter sensum, nulla alia esset vita in homine, non apparet significatio illorum verborum "motum et vitam omnem." - Caeterum, quidquid aliqui recentiores dicant, a philosophis bene probatur admittendam esse vitam vegetativam: nobis satis erit referre quae habet Suarez de anim. l. 1. cap. 4. n. 11.: "Et in Theologia certum," inquit, "et in Philosophia evidens est, et plantas vivere, et formam vegetativam esse veram animam. Eamque ob rem in hac veritate asserenda omnes Philosophi et Theologi conveniunt. Et in primis habet fundamentum in Scriptura, dicit enim Paulus 1. Cor. 15.: Tu quod seminas, non vivificatur, nisi prius moriatur. Ubi productionem plantae vivificationem appellat; ergo quod sic producitur vivit, utique vita vegetativa. Ut ponderavit Aug. lib. 1. de civit. cap. 20. dicens: 'Hoc genus rerum, id est, plantarum, quamvis non sentiat, vivit, ac per hoc potest mori, et occidi:' et adjungit illud Psalm 77.: 'et occidit in grandine vineas eorum.' Unde Dionys. cap. 6. de divin. nom. prope initium, quasi respondens tertiae rationi a nobis factae, inquit: 'ex ipsa, utique vita Dei, et animantes omnes, et plantae juxta extremam vitae harmoniam, ut vivant acceperunt.' Et iterum in fine, 'ex ipsa,' inquit, 'vivificantur, et confoventur, et animantes, cunctae atque arbores, et sive spiritualem dixeris, sive rationalem, sive sensitivam, sive nutritivam, sive vegetativam, ex ipsa vivit, etc.' Hinc Aug. lib. de vera relig. cap. 55.: 'Non sit,' ait, 'vobis religio illius vitae, qua dicuntur arbores vivere, quoniam nullus sensus in illa est.' Et divisionem trium animarum tradit lib. 8. de civit. cap. 8. Idem Aristot. in citato loco, et certius in lib. 2. de Anima, cap. 1. et 2. et saepe aliis in locis, quae infra notabimus. Et D. Thom. 1. p. q. 18. a. 1. et 2. ut omittam alios Philosophos, et Theologos, qui eos sine contradictione secuti sunt."

4. Certum consequenter est animam humanam esse principium cujuscumque operationis vitalis in homine. - Imo videtur magis consonum praecitatis verbis S. P. dicere quod anima sit principium cujuscumque operationis etiam non vitalis in corpore. Licet enim illud "a qua corpus motum ... accipit" velint aliqui explicare de vita progressiva, seu de motu spontaneo, qui est perfectior gradus intra limites vitae sensitivae; melius tamen videtur explicari de motu non vitali; nam sic servatur gradatio in verbis S. P. dicentis "a qua corpus quoque et motum (non vitalem) et vitam omnem (vegetativam) et sensum (vitam sensitivam) accipiat." Verum consentiunt omnes Catholici in asserendo animam rationalem unicum vitae cujuscumque, et operationis vitalis principium in homine; utrum vero eadem sit principium motus, seu operationis non vitalis in corpore, pendet ex quaestione sequente. 198. In order that the true force of these definitions may become known, some things must be briefly noted. And 1. some more recent authors observe that the words of the Council of Vienne can be explained in two ways: a) the soul which is the form of the body is the rational soul; or b) the soul which is rational is the form of the body. According to the first exposition, they say, the intention of the Council is borne directly toward the definition concerning the unity of the soul in man, and only supposes that the soul is the form of the body; but according to the other, the definition falls directly upon the phrase "is the form of the body," and the unity of the soul in man is established only indirectly. They say that the first exposition is to be preferred, because the Council issued the aforesaid definition against Olivi, who seems to have renewed the error concerning plurality of souls in man.

But, on the contrary, a) if the words of the Council are taken as they sound, they seem directly to establish that the soul is the form of the body, all the more because they distinctly determine the very notion of form by adding "truly, per se, essentially." b) If the Council, wishing to define that there is one soul in man, and that it is intellective, used this formula, "the rational or intellective soul is the form of the human body per se and essentially," this is a sign that the truth of form is so intimately connected with the unity of the human soul that one cannot stand without the other. c) Finally they concede that the Council at least indirectly established that the soul is the form of the body; but this suffices for this doctrine to be held by all. d) Historically it is not well established, as all confess, what the errors of Olivi were; but it seems very well established that the definition of the Church is not restricted to the condemnation of these errors alone. For since the Council expressly says that it defines the soul to be per se and essentially the form of the body "so that the sincere truth of faith may be known to all and the entrance to all errors be closed off lest they

creep in," it is clear that the errors of Olivi were the occasion of the definition, or that their condemnation was a partial purpose of the council; but that the whole purpose of the definition is openly comprehended in this: "that the entrance to all errors be closed off, lest they creep in."

II. When the Council of Vienne, whose decree later definitions of the Church confirmed, teaches that the soul is truly, per se, essentially the form of the body, that word form must be taken in a proper and determinate sense. For a) the Council says that the soul is truly form; but when the Council of Trent, session 6, canon 22, condemns those who say that "the justified man does not truly merit an increase of grace," all theologians gather from that truly that it is treating of merit properly so called, or merit de condigno. Therefore, by parity, when the Council of Vienne says that the soul is truly the form of the body, that word form must be taken in its proper sense. b) The purpose of the definition, which the Council itself expressed, was "so that the sincere truth of faith may be known to all and the entrance to all errors be closed off, lest they creep in"; but the Council could not have attained this purpose unless it had used that word form in a determinate sense. Therefore. c) Hence a Porrecta rightly says [appendix on article 1 of q. 76, I]: "Understand Clement to speak formally; for if the words of philosophers must be taken formally, much more certainly is each one bound to understand the dogmas of sacred Councils formally, and this is to be held as a universal rule. But this is all the truer in the present matter, insofar as we see the Pope speaking more explicitly: and truly, he says, and perfectly and per se and essentially the rational or intellective soul is the form of the human body. Who except a heretic would say that by so many and such weighty words formal speech is not implied here?"

III. Therefore one must see what, at the time of the aforesaid definition, was understood in the Catholic schools by the name form; for if there are some things which they commonly taught, those at least must be wholly retained as declared by the Council.

Now form generally was divided against matter; and since matter was called potency, form was called act, St. Thomas, opusculum 21. It was called act, however, because it constitutes the thing and determines it to a certain mode of being. They commonly distinguished form into subsisting and informing. A subsisting form is one which subsists per se, without being in some subject: thus angels are called subsisting forms; forms indeed, because they are determined to a certain mode of being; subsisting, however, because they are not received in any matter. But an informing form is one which is received in some subject.

The human soul is certainly an informing form. For a) the Council of Vienne in the same decree, speaking of the truth and integrity of the human nature in Christ, says that he has an informing soul. b) The soul is called not only form, but form of the body, from which the body receives life, etc. c) Hence Suarez rightly notes, On the Soul, book 1, c. 1, n. 12: "It is indubitable among Christian philosophers that every soul vivifying a corruptible body is a true informing form. We shall show below that this is of faith concerning the rational soul, and it will also be proved by reason."

IV. But form properly so called, or informing form, was commonly divided into accidental and substantial. A substantial form is one which gives being simply, that is, first being, which supposes no other; but an accidental form is one which supervenes upon a thing already constituted in its substantial being and gives it some being in a qualified respect, for example, speed to a horse. Is the human soul the substantial or accidental form of the body?

In order to satisfy this question, there must be handed down, 1. a more fully unfolded account of substantial form according to those things which were commonly admitted in the Catholic schools at the time of the Council of Vienne; and 2. certain words of the same Council must be weighed.

As to the first, substantial form is defined by Suarez (Metaphysical Disputations, disp. 15, sect. 5, n. 1, and all agree with him as to the matter): "a simple and incomplete substance, which as act constitutes the essence of a corporeal substance." It is called substance, that is, real, and consequently accidents and substantial modes are rejected. Simple is added in order to exclude composite substances. Incomplete, in order to exclude complete substances, for example, angels. As act, in order to distinguish form from matter, which constitutes the substantial composite in the mode of potency. Perhaps that word incomplete is not yet sufficiently clear. Suarez explains it, however, both in Metaphysical Disputations, disp. 33, sect. 1, n. 15, and in On the Soul, book 1, c. 12, n. 17. In this latter place he says: "For a twofold spiritual substance must be distinguished. One is

altogether complete and absolute in its proper essence and in the manner of subsisting; and this cannot be the form of a body, nor be united with another substance for composing one complete substantial essence, because what is complete in the genus of substance cannot be further completed. But another can be a spiritual substance incomplete in the genus of substance and not altogether absolute transcendentally, but including in its essence a transcendental relation to body; because no repugnance can be conceived in this, and such a spiritual act can be the true form of a body." See also St. Thomas, I, q. 75, a. 7, corpus and ad 3.

From this definition of substantial form it follows that, according to all, three things especially belong to the nature of substantial form. 1. Just as it belongs to any form whatever to be a principle communicative of being, so it is proper to substantial form to be a principle communicative of substantial being. "For in order," says St. Thomas, Contra Gentiles, book 2, c. 68, "that something be the substantial form of another, two things are required. One of these is that the form be the principle of being substantially for that of which it is the form; but I call it a principle not effective but formal, by which something is and is denominated a being. Hence the other follows, namely that form and matter come together in one being; this does not happen with the effective principle and that to which it gives being. And this being is that in which the composite substance subsists, which is one according to being, consisting of matter and form." The holy Doctor repeats this very often. Scotus also, 4 Sentences, dist. 11, q. 3, confesses that substantial form gives being simply; and adds: "There is no cause why this one gives being simply and that one in a qualified respect, except because this one is a substantial form and that one accidental."

2. Since being and one are convertible, that which is the principle of being is also the principle of unity; and if it is substantial form, the principle of substantial being, per se, simply, it will also make one simply, per se. "From the same thing," says St. Thomas, Contra Gentiles, book 2, c. 58, "something has being and unity. For one follows upon being. Therefore, since each thing has being from form, it will also have unity from form. If, therefore, several souls are posited in man as diverse forms, man will not be one being, but several; nor will the order of forms suffice for the unity of man, because to be one according to order is not to be one simply, since unity of order is the least of unities." And chapter 69: "For body and soul are not two substances existing in act, but from these two there comes to be one substance existing in act."

But if someone asks what one per se signifies here, St. Thomas explains it very well, Contra Gentiles, book 2, c. 56, saying: "One simply is said in three ways: either as the indivisible, or as the continuous, or as that which is one in account. But from an intellectual substance and a body there cannot come to be one thing which is indivisible. For that must be composed from two. Nor again can there be one thing which is continuous, because the parts of a continuum are quantified. Therefore it remains to be inquired whether from an intellectual substance and a body there can come to be one thing as that which is one in account. But from two things remaining, nothing one in account comes to be except as from substantial form and matter. For from substance and accident there does not come to be one in account; for the account of man and of white is not the same."

3. Since substance is really the same as nature, and nature signifies the first principle of operation, that which is the principle of substantial being is also the principle of operation. Hence St. Thomas, I, q. 76, says: "That by which something first operates is its form. ... But it is manifest that the first thing by which the body lives is the soul. For the soul is the first thing by which we are nourished and sense and are moved according to place, and likewise the first thing by which we understand. Therefore this principle by which we first understand, whether it is called intellect or intellective soul, is the form of the body."

As to the second, however, it must be briefly noted, 1. that the soul is called by the Church the form of the body per se. This can signify: a) that the soul is the form of the body not per accidens but by its nature; and this sense is certainly true, for in this our soul, a spiritual substance and informing form, is distinguished from an angelic substance; b) that the soul is the form of the body per se insofar as it does not necessarily always actually inform the body, but demands to inform the body; and this sense is also true, since the soul separated from the body does not cease to be form, although it does not actually inform; c) that the soul is form per se, namely through its own essence and not through another; and this sense is also true and is contained in the following words of the Council.

2. The

soul is called the form of the body essentially. This can signify two things: either that it is essential to the soul that it be form, as we said; or that it informs through its very essence and not through something else.

3. The soul is called the immediate form of the body. This signifies that it informs the body not by means of another soul, not by means of some power of its own, not by means of some action of its own, but immediately, that is, through itself, through its substance. Hence the Council of Vienne said that the substance of the rational soul is the form of the body. "The soul," says St. Thomas, Contra Gentiles, book 2, c. 71, "is immediately united to the body; nor is it necessary to posit some medium as uniting the soul to the body: either phantasms, as Averroes says, or the powers of the soul, as some say, or even corporeal spirit, as others said. For it has been shown that the soul is united to the body as its form; but form is united to matter without any medium; for it belongs to form per se to be the act of the body, and not through something else." And in the Questions on the Soul, a. 9, corpus: "Among all things, being is that which belongs to things most immediately and intimately ... hence, since matter has actual being through form, it is necessary that the form giving being to matter inhere in it more immediately than the others. But it is proper to substantial form that it give matter being simply. ... Therefore, if there is some form which does not give matter being simply, but comes to matter already existing in act through some form, it will not be a substantial form. ... Only the first form, which would make substance exist in act, would be substantial; but all the others accidental." Cf. the whole article. See also I, q. 76, a. 7.

Now, from these things the proposed question can easily be answered; and we say that the human soul is the substantial form of the body and not an accidental form. For a) a form which is a substance and is united through itself cannot communicate anything except substantial being; but the human soul is a substance and is united through itself to the body; therefore it communicates substantial being. But the principle communicative of substantial being is called substantial form; therefore the human soul is substantial form. b) That the soul is substantial form is conceded even by Scotus in express words, as we have seen; whether afterwards he is consistent with himself will be seen below; but here we can assume as the common opinion in the Catholic schools that the soul is substantial form, and this suffices for the present matter.

V. From the things said we can gather that, according to the doctrine of the Church, the soul is the true form of the body, an informing form, a principle communicative of being, communicative of substantial being and therefore making one per se together with the body, and finally the first principle of operation in man.

Now it is asked what being the soul communicates to the body. And it is certain, 1. that "although the soul," as St. Thomas says in the disputed questions, Question on the Soul, a. 10, ad 2, "is the form of the body according to the essence of the intellectual soul, nevertheless not according to intellectual operation." For the soul communicates to matter the being of which matter is capable; but matter is not capable of the grade of intellective being. Hence, Contra Gentiles, book 2, c. 69, St. Thomas teaches: "Although there is one being of form and matter, nevertheless it is not necessary that matter always equal the being of the form; indeed, the nobler the form is, the more it exceeds matter in its being." Cf. the whole chapter, and the disputed questions, question On the Soul, a. 10.

2. It is certain that the human soul communicates to the body sensitive life and every life which is in it. This is clear a) from the fact that the Supreme Pontiff Pius IX expressly says in the aforesaid letter that the rational soul is the one principle of life in man, "from which the body also receives motion and all life and sense"; b) from the things said in the preceding article concerning the unity of the soul in man.

3. Although the Supreme Pontiff does not define that there is in man, besides sensitive life, another life, namely vegetative life, nevertheless it is altogether conformable to the aforesaid words of the Supreme Pontiff to admit this too. For if, besides sense, there were no other life in man, the meaning of those words "motion and all life" would not appear. Moreover, whatever some more recent authors may say, it is well proved by philosophers that vegetative life must be admitted. It will be enough for us to report what Suarez has in On the Soul, book 1, c. 4, n. 11: "Both in theology it is certain," he says, "and in philosophy it is evident, that plants live and that the vegetative form is a true soul. And for this reason all philosophers and theologians agree in asserting this truth. And first it has a foundation in Scripture, for Paul says in 1 Cor. 15: What thou

sowest is not quickened unless it first die. There he calls the production of a plant a vivification; therefore what is produced in this way lives, certainly by vegetative life. As Augustine weighed it in book 1 of City of God, c. 20, saying: 'This kind of things, that is, of plants, although it does not sense, lives, and on this account can die and be killed'; and he adds that passage of Psalm 77: 'and he killed their vines with hail.' Hence Dionysius, c. 6 of On the Divine Names, near the beginning, as though responding to the third reason made by us, says: 'from it, that is, the life of God, all living things and plants have received to live according to the lowest harmony of life.' And again at the end, 'from it,' he says, 'are vivified and cherished both living beings and all trees; and whether you call it spiritual, or rational, or sensitive, or nutritive, or vegetative, it lives from it, etc.' Hence Augustine, book On True Religion, c. 55: 'Let not that life be your religion,' he says, 'by which trees are said to live, since there is no sense in it.' And he hands down the division of three souls in book 8 of City of God, c. 8. The same is in Aristotle in the cited place, and more certainly in book 2 of On the Soul, chapters 1 and 2, and often in other places which we shall note below. And St. Thomas, I, q. 18, a. 1 and 2, to omit other philosophers and theologians, who followed them without contradiction."

4. Consequently it is certain that the human soul is the principle of every vital operation whatsoever in man. Indeed, it seems more consonant with the previously cited words of the Supreme Pontiff to say that the soul is the principle of every operation, even non-vital, in the body. For although some wish to explain the phrase "from which the body receives motion ..." as concerning progressive life, or spontaneous motion, which is a more perfect grade within the limits of sensitive life, nevertheless it seems better to explain it of non-vital motion; for in this way the gradation is preserved in the words of the Supreme Pontiff, saying, "from which the body also receives motion (non-vital), and all life (vegetative), and sense (sensitive life)." But all Catholics agree in asserting that the rational soul is the one principle of every kind of life and of vital operation in man; whether the same soul is also the principle of motion, or of non-vital operation, in the body depends upon the following question.

Corrected Latin Text
§ II.
Utrum anima humana ita sit forma corporis, ut ipsi det non modo esse viventis, sed ipsum esse corporis. Proponitur quaestio. Section II.
Whether The Human Soul Is The Form Of The Body In Such A Way That It Gives To It Not Only The Being Of A Living Thing, But The Very Being Of A Body. The Question Is Proposed.

199. Doctrina catholica, juxta quam anima est forma corporis quatenus illi dat esse viventis, ita intime connexa visa est D. Thomae cum doctrina, juxta quam anima est forma corporis quatenus illi dat ipsum esse corporis, ut iisdem utramque probaret argumentis - ut unam pro alia indiscriminatim probaret - ut defenderet animam non esse formam veram et substantialem corporis, nisi ipsi esse etiam corporis communicaret. Unde constanter docuit anima rationali corpus nostrum constitui non modo in esse viventis, sed etiam in esse corporis. Ita, ex. gr., (de spirit. creat. a. 3.), ait: "Sic ergo dicimus, quod in hoc homine non est alia forma substantialis, quam anima, et quod per eam non solum est homo, sed animal, et vivum, et corpus, et ens." Et (de anim. a. 9.): "Cum anima sit forma substantialis, quia constituit hominem in determinata specie substantiae, non est aliqua alia forma substantialis media inter animam et primam materiam; sed homo ea ipsa anima rationali perficitur secundum diversos gradus perfectionum, ut sit scilicet corpus, et animatum corpus, et animal rationale." Ita etiam, ut caetera in re manifesta omittam, docet in ultimo suo opere, 1. p. q. 76. a. 5. 199. The Catholic doctrine according to which the soul is the form of the body insofar as it gives to it the being of a living thing seemed so intimately connected to St. Thomas with the doctrine according to which the soul is the form of the body insofar as it gives to it the very being of a body, that he proved both by the same arguments, proved one for the other indiscriminately, and defended that the soul is not the true and substantial form of the body unless it also communicates to it the being of

body. Hence he constantly taught that by the rational soul our body is constituted not only in the being of a living thing, but also in the being of body. Thus, for example, in On Spiritual Creatures, a. 3, he says: "Therefore we say that in this man there is no other substantial form than the soul, and that through it he is not only man, but animal, and living, and body, and being." And in On the Soul, a. 9: "Since the soul is substantial form, because it constitutes man in a determinate species of substance, there is no other substantial form mediating between the soul and first matter; but man is perfected by that same rational soul according to diverse grades of perfections, so that he is body, animated body, and rational animal." Thus also, to omit the rest in a manifest matter, he teaches in his last work, I, q. 76, a. 5.

200. Contra hanc doctrinam insurrexerunt Scotus et aliquot recentiores, quamvis diversa ratione. Scotus praeter animam rationalem posuit in homine formam, quam appellat corporeitatis, cujus munus est constituere corpus organicum independenter ab anima, ordinatum tamen ad illam ut proprium illius subjectum, quod fit per illam vivens. Inde juxta D. Thomam subjectum immediate informatum ab anima est materia prima ab ea accipiens ipsum esse corporis: juxta Scotum vero subjectum immediate ab anima informatum est corpus organicum, ab ea accipiens esse viventis.

Admittebat tamen Scotus systema Scholasticum de materia et forma - communem et ab omnibus receptam notionem formae - communem, ut vidimus, notionem formae substantialis - communem de ente simpliciter et de ente secundum quid notionem; unde in 4. sent. Dist. 11. q. 3., ait: "quemadmodum substantia est ens simpliciter et accidens ens secundum quid; ita esse simpliciter est esse substantiam, et esse secundum quid est esse secundum accidens."

Ut vero, positis his ab omnibus receptis notionibus, conciliaret suam formam corporeitatis cum doctrina de anima, forma substantiali corporis; censuit corpus cum illa forma corporeitatis manere indeterminatum quoad genus, quoad speciem, quoad individuum. "Per istam formam," inquit l. c., "est in actu partiali, et est proximum receptivum animae intellectivae, licet non sit per illam in genere corporis, ut corpus est genus." et "Per hoc non est individuum nec species in genere corporis nec in genere substantiae." Cum ergo corpus, non obstante forma corporeitatis, maneret sic indeterminatum, etiam in genere substantiae (difficile quidem intellectu), anima illud informans, et sic determinans illud, esset forma ejus substantialis. 200. Scotus and some more recent authors rose up against this doctrine, although by a different reasoning. Scotus, besides the rational soul, posited in man a form which he calls the form of corporeity, whose office is to constitute the organic body independently of the soul, yet ordered to it as its proper subject, which becomes living through it. Hence, according to St. Thomas, the subject immediately informed by the soul is first matter, receiving from it the very being of body; but according to Scotus, the subject immediately informed by the soul is the organic body, receiving from it the being of a living thing.

Nevertheless Scotus admitted the scholastic system of matter and form, the common notion of form received by all, the common notion, as we have seen, of substantial form, and the common notion concerning being simply and being in a qualified respect. Hence in 4 Sentences, dist. 11, q. 3, he says: "just as substance is being simply and accident is being in a qualified respect, so being simply is to be substance, and being in a qualified respect is to be according to accident."

But in order, with these notions received by all having been posited, to reconcile his form of corporeity with the doctrine concerning the soul as the substantial form of the body, he judged that the body with that form of corporeity remains indeterminate as to genus, as to species, and as to individual. "Through that form," he says in the cited place, "it is in partial act, and is the proximate receptive subject of the intellective soul, although through it it is not in the genus of body, as body is a genus." And: "Through this it is not an individual nor a species in the genus of body nor in the genus of substance." Therefore, since the body, notwithstanding the form of corporeity, would thus remain indeterminate, even in the genus of substance (a thing indeed difficult to understand), the soul informing it, and thus determining it, would be its substantial form.

201. Alia autem ratione procedunt quidam recentiores. Negantes enim systema Scholasticum de materia et forma, statuunt: 1. Corpus humanum constare atomis substantiarum elementarium certo quodam modo compositis, et actu permanentibus. - 2. Corpus humanum, attenta sola ratione corporis, esse substantiam completam, imo aggregatum substantiarum. - 3. Corpus humanum esse corpus non per aliquam formam, sed vi cohaesionis, qua atomi conjunguntur; et corpus tale effici per vires mechanicas et chemicas sub organismi conditionibus, et sub animae influxu operantes. - 4. Subjectum, quod anima informat, non esse materiam primam, sed corpus organicum, seu potius nerveum systema, ac fluidum maxime nerveum. - 5. Corpus informari ab anima nihil aliud significare, nisi quod anima corpus pervadit, et vim suam vi corporis propriae associat, admiscet. - 6. Ac tandem animam esse formam substantialem compositi, seu hominis; non vero partis, seu corporis, cui communicat solum esse accidentale. 201. Certain more recent authors, however, proceed by another reasoning. For, denying the scholastic system of matter and form, they state: 1. that the human body consists of atoms of elementary substances composed in some definite way and remaining in act; 2. that the human body, considered under the aspect of body alone, is a complete substance, indeed an aggregate of substances; 3. that the human body is a body not through some form, but by the force of cohesion by which atoms are joined, and that such a body is effected through mechanical and chemical forces operating under the conditions of the organism and under the influence of the soul; 4. that the subject which the soul informs is not first matter, but an organic body, or rather the nervous system and especially the nervous fluid; 5. that for the body to be informed by the soul signifies nothing other than that the soul pervades the body and associates and commingles its own power with the proper power of the body; 6. and finally, that the soul is the substantial form of the composite, or man, but not of the part, or body, to which it communicates only accidental being.

202. Antequam aperiamus quid nobis videtur tenendum in hac re, pauca claritatis gratia praenotabimus. Ac 1. contendunt nonnulli hanc quaestionem esse mere philosophicam, et nullo pacto theologicam. At hoc est falsum. Nam veritas theologica censenda est non modo illa, quae est formaliter revelata, et fide divina credenda; sed etiam illa quae talem connexionem habet cum revelatis veritatibus, ut hae sine illa defendi nequeant. Vid. Franzelin, de Tradit. et Script. pag. 111. seq. Jamvero a) non dicimus esse de fide definitum quod anima det ipsum esse corporis: quamvis id de fide non esse, minime probet quod non pauci Doctores ante Conc. Vienn. illud negaverint: plures inter catholicos, scientia et dignitate conspicui docuerunt errores Gallicanismi et Liberalismi; ex hoc non sequitur hos errores non esse nunc ab Ecclesia damnatos.

b) Certum tamen est praesentem quaestionem saltem connexionem habere cum veritatibus fidei. Cum enim sit definitum animam esse formam corporis per se, essentialiter, vere, immediate; quod pertinet ad intelligentiam et definitionem hujus veritatis, connexionem habet cum veritate fidei, et est hoc saltem sensu theologicum. Praeterea, qui impugnant sententiam D. Thomae utuntur argumentis theologicis, ductis ex mysteriis Incarnationis et Eucharistiae, ut videbimus: ergo vel veritas, de qua hic est quaestio, habet connexionem cum illis mysteriis; et jam est veritas theologica; vel nullam habet cum ipsis connexionem, et non potest ex illis impugnari.

c) Theologi Catholici munus est non modo defendere quod sine nota haeresis, erroris, temeritatis, etc. asseri nequit; verum etiam quidquid conformius videtur Ecclesiae menti et definitionibus; major enim conformitas cum mente Ecclesiae potior nobis est quolibet argumento, proprio ingenio sive a principiis rationis sive a fontibus revelationis derivato. Unde omnes theologi instituunt similes quaestiones, cum, ex. gr., agitur de contritione et attritione, vel de mercede immediate sequente opera remissiora habitibus praeexistentibus, etc. In his omnibus quaeritur major conformitas cum definitionibus Conc. Trid., quin ulla nota inuratur sententiis contrariis. 202. Before we disclose what seems to us must be held in this matter, we shall make a few preliminary notes for the sake of clarity. And 1. some contend that this question is merely philosophical and in no way theological. But this is false. For a truth must be judged theological not only when it is formally revealed and to be believed with divine faith, but also when it

has such a connection with revealed truths that these cannot be defended without it. See Franzelin, On Tradition and Scripture, p. 111 ff. Now a) we do not say that it is defined as of faith that the soul gives the very being of body; although the fact that this is not of faith is by no means proved by the fact that not a few Doctors before the Council of Vienne denied it. Many among Catholics, distinguished in knowledge and dignity, taught the errors of Gallicanism and Liberalism; from this it does not follow that these errors are not now condemned by the Church.

b) Nevertheless it is certain that the present question has at least a connection with truths of faith. For since it has been defined that the soul is the form of the body per se, essentially, truly, immediately, whatever pertains to the understanding and definition of this truth has a connection with the truth of faith, and is theological at least in this sense. Besides, those who attack the opinion of St. Thomas use theological arguments drawn from the mysteries of the Incarnation and the Eucharist, as we shall see. Therefore either the truth about which there is question here has a connection with those mysteries, and then it is a theological truth; or it has no connection with them, and cannot be attacked from them.

c) It is the office of a Catholic theologian not only to defend what cannot be asserted without the note of heresy, error, rashness, etc., but also whatever seems more conformable to the mind and definitions of the Church; for greater conformity with the mind of the Church is of more weight for us than any argument derived by our own ingenuity either from principles of reason or from the sources of revelation. Hence all theologians institute similar questions, as, for example, when there is question of contrition and attrition, or of the reward immediately following works weaker than preexisting habits, etc. In all these matters greater conformity with the definitions of the Council of Trent is sought, although no note is branded upon contrary opinions.

203. Notandum est 2. quod vix intelligimus cur sententia D. Thomae in hac re continuo traducatur uti sententia Thomistarum. Verum est quod, cum sit aperta S. Doctoris doctrina, asseritur ab omnibus Theologis illius scholae; sed non est ejusdem veluti propria, uti sententia, ex. gr., de praedeterminatione physica. Imo, fatentibus adversariis, post Conc. Vienn., sententia D. Thomae facta est communissima in scholis catholicis; eamque docent Suarez, de Lugo, Toletus, Vasquez, Valentia, Conimbricenses, Hurtado, Arriaga, Tellez, Oviedo, Soares, Lossada, etc., omnes Theologi et Philosophi Societatis nostrae praecipui. 203. It must be noted, 2. that we scarcely understand why the opinion of St. Thomas in this matter is continually passed off as the opinion of Thomists. It is true that, since it is the open doctrine of the holy Doctor, it is asserted by all the theologians of that school; but it is not, as it were, proper to that school in the way, for example, that the opinion concerning physical predetermination is. Indeed, with the adversaries admitting it, after the Council of Vienne the opinion of St. Thomas became very common in the Catholic schools; and Suarez, de Lugo, Toletus, Vasquez, Valencia, the Conimbricenses, Hurtado, Arriaga, Tellez, Oviedo, Soares, Lossada, etc., all the principal theologians and philosophers of our Society, teach it.

204. Notandum est 3. quod, ne in longum abeamus, simul asserimus sententiam D. Th. et utramque contrariam impugnamus, afferentes argumenta, quorum aliqua Scoti, alia recentiorum sententiam magis directe impetunt. Neutri tamen ex his oppositis sententiis ullam notam inurimus. Quamvis enim non intelligamus quomodo praesertim cum recentiore opinione stet veritas quod anima humana est vera et substantialis forma (quae veritas ex dictis est omnino tenenda); cum tamen auctores quidam catholici sententiam illam tueantur, Ecclesia tacente, tacemus. - Eodem ferme pacto, ac non intelligentes quomodo cum physica praedeterminatione salva consistat humana libertas, illam non damnamus, sed suis auctoribus relinquimus. 204. It must be noted, 3. that, lest we go on at length, we at the same time assert the opinion of St. Thomas and attack both contrary opinions, bringing forward arguments, some of which strike more directly at Scotus's opinion, others at the more recent opinion. Nevertheless we brand neither of these opposed opinions with any note. For although we do not understand how, especially with the

more recent opinion, the truth that the human soul is a true and substantial form can stand (a truth which, from the things said, is altogether to be held), nevertheless, since certain Catholic authors defend that opinion while the Church is silent, we are silent. In almost the same way, although we do not understand how human liberty can stand safe with physical predetermination, we do not condemn it, but leave it to its authors.

205. His praestitutis. 205. With these things having been set down.

Corrected Latin Text
§ III.
Solvitur proposita quaestio. Section III.
The Proposed Question Is Solved.

206. Prob. I. Est de ratione formae substantialis ut sit principium communicativum esse substantialis; atqui neque in sententia Scoti, neque in recentiorum opinione, anima humana esset principium esse substantialis communicativum. Ergo.

Major patet ex dictis in § praecedente. Antequam vero probetur minor, tria praenotamus ut vis argumenti innotescat.

1. Sensus quo anima humana est forma corporis debet desumi ex iis, saltem quae, tempore Concilii Viennensis, communiter de hac re tradebantur in scholis catholicis. Nequit enim dici quod Concilium ediderit definitionem, quae nonnisi post quinque aut sex saecula intelligeretur in Ecclesia. - Eo vel magis, quod si vox forma non adhiberetur sensu tunc temporis determinato, Concilium non potuisset assequi suum finem "ut praecludatur universis erroribus aditus, ne subintrent."

2. Etsi forma dicatur et sit causa compositi, hoc tamen non excludit, imo necessario includit, ut sit causa subjecti quod informat. Unde, cum anima intellectiva sit forma nostra, debet esse causa formalis non modo hominis, sed etiam subjecti (materiae vel corporis), quod informat. Revera si anima humana est forma corporis saltem quoad esse viventis (quod ab omnibus debet admitti), hoc est non modo quia facit hominem viventem, sed etiam quia facit vivens ipsum corpus. Unde a) in superius recitatis definitionibus dicitur corpus accipere ab anima vitam, motum, sensum - b) definitur anima a Patribus et communiter a DD. (n. 188.) substantia conferens vitam corpori per seipsam - c) Gennadius (de Eccl. dogm. c. 15.) docet "unam esse eamdemque animam in homine, quae et corpus sua societate vivificet" - d) corpus ipsum dicitur vivificatum; imo si quando a quibusdam ex Patribus dicitur in Christo caro deificata, notant ipsi Patres et Theologi discrimen: caro Christi dicitur deificata solum quia est caro Verbi; corpus nostrum dicitur vivificatum proprio sensu, quatenus nempe in ipsum anima transfundit vitam - e) Unde non modo homo, sed ipsum etiam corpus dicitur vivere, crescere, nutriri, sentire; et consequenter ipsum corpus dicitur mori: "non est anima," inquit S. Athanasius (orat. c. idola), "quae moritur, sed ob ejus discessum corpus moritur." - f) Hinc in omnium sententia subjectum quod informatur, supponitur esse in potentia ad aliquid, quod recipit a forma, a qua proinde dicitur secundum illud fieri in actu. Eo ergo modo, quo anima nostra est forma, debet aliquid causare non solum in composito, sed in ipso subjecto, quod immediate informat, seu debet illi aliquod esse communicare.

3. Anima dicitur forma substantialis non modo quia facit compositum substantiale, sed etiam quia communicat subjecto, quod informat esse substantiale, et non accidentale. - Nam a) anima non unitur corpori per aliquod accidens, sed per suam essentiam, per se ipsam; ipsa substantia animae unitur corpori ut forma, uti patet ex dictis in § praecedente: ergo si esse communicat ipsi subjecto, quod informat, nequit nisi suum esse, quod substantiale est, communicare. - b) Atque hic erat communis in scholis catholicis sensus tempore Conc. Vienn. De D. Thoma nullum est dubium; Scotus autem ideo, ut vidimus, dicebat corpus cum forma corporeitatis manere indeterminatum et incompletum etiam in genere substantiae, ut posset deinde asserere illud ab anima recipere esse substantiale. Quibus positis, facile propositi argumenti.

Prob. min. Contra Scotum. Esse substantiale est primum esse; nam "est impossibile," inquit D. Th. 1. p. q. 76. a. 4. ad 4., "aliquid esse medium inter substantiam et accidens;" accidens autem supponit substantiam cui inhaereat.

Atqui si esset in corpore humano forma corporeitatis, anima intellectiva ei adveniens non daret illi primum esse; hoc enim haberet corpus a forma praecedente. Ergo si daretur illa forma corporeitatis in homine, anima intellectiva non daret esse substantiale corpori, ac proinde non esset forma substantialis. "Ad cujus evidentiam," inquit D. Thomas ultimo cit. in corp., "considerandum est quod forma substantialis in hoc a forma accidentali differt, quia forma accidentalis non dat esse simpliciter, sed esse tale; sicut calor facit suum subjectum non simpliciter esse, sed esse calidum. Et ideo cum advenit forma accidentalis, non dicitur aliquid fieri, vel generari simpliciter, sed fieri tale, aut aliquo modo se habens; et similiter cum recedit forma accidentalis, non dicitur aliquid corrumpi simpliciter, sed secundum quid. Forma autem substantialis dat esse simpliciter; et ideo per ejus adventum dicitur aliquid simpliciter generari; et per ejus recessum simpliciter corrumpi. Et propter hoc antiqui naturales, qui posuerunt materiam primam esse aliquod ens actu, puta ignem, aut aerem, aut aliquid hujusmodi, dixerunt quod nihil generatur aut corrumpitur simpliciter; sed omne fieri statuerunt alterari, ut dicitur in 1. Phys., text 33. Si igitur ita esset quod praeter animam intellectivam praeexisteret quaecumque alia forma substantialis in materia, per quam subjectum animae esset ens actu; sequeretur quod anima non daret esse simpliciter, et per consequens quod non esset forma substantialis, et quod per adventum animae non esset generatio simpliciter, neque per ejus recessum corruptio simpliciter, sed solum secundum quid; quae sunt manifeste falsa."

Nec prodest dicere quod, juxta Scotum, corpus cum sola forma corporeitatis manet incompletum quoad speciem, quoad individuum, in genere substantiae. Nam a) Scotus admittebat theoriam de compositione substantiali ex materia et forma: juxta hanc autem theoriam ex materia et forma habetur ens completum - b) Juxta Scotum corpus cum sola corporeitatis forma existit, subsistit, distinguitur a quolibet alio; siquidem post separationem ab anima intellectiva, corpus remaneret cum sola corporeitatis forma, quam Scotus admittebat praecise ad vitandum novae formae productionem in morte. Atqui quod existit, subsistit, distinguitur a quolibet alio, et operatur, certe est completum in ratione substantiae. Ergo.

Prob. min. contra opinionem recentiorum. a) "Quidquid," ait D. Thomas, c. g. l. 2. c. 58., "post primam formam substantialem advenit rei, accidentaliter adveniet;" seu quidquid advenit rei jam completae in ratione substantiae, accidens est; atqui in sententia recentiore, corpus est jam completum in ratione substantiae, quando ei advenit anima intellectiva; ergo haec non posset nisi esse accidentale illi communicare. - b) Caeterum ipsi auctores hujus sententiae expresse fatentur animam esse principium essentiale compositi, seu hominis; non vero corporis, quod informat. c) Nec juvat dicere quod corpus independenter ab anima intellectiva est completum in ratione corporis, non vero in ratione corporis humani. Nam vel illud esse humani est re idem cum esse corporis, vel ab eo re distinguitur: si primum, anima dans esse humani hoc ipso dat esse corporis; sin vero alterum, cum esse humani adveniat esse corporis, jam anima non communicat corpori esse substantiale, quod est primum esse. "Esse substantiale cujuslibet rei," inquit D. Th. 1. p. q. 76. a. 4. ad 4., "in indivisibili consistit; et omnis additio et subtractio variat speciem, sicut in numeris. Unde impossibile est quod forma substantialis quaecumque recipiat magis et minus." d) Si anima non communicaret corpori esse substantiale, seu primum esse, in sententia recentiorum nullum esse illi communicaret, ac proinde nullo pacto esset ejus forma. Revera ipsi negant accidens habere aliquam realem entitatem realiter distinctam a substantia, cui inhaeret; inter accidens vero et substantiam non datur medium; ergo si anima non communicaret corpori esse substantiale, nullum reale esse communicaret.

Prob. II. Concedunt adversarii, et concedendum est ex definitionibus Ecclesiae, animam communicare corpori esse viventis; atqui nequit ei esse viventis communicare, quin communicet ipsum primum esse, ac proinde ipsum esse corporis. Ergo.

Decl. et prob. min. Supponimus ex superius demonstratis non modo hominem vivere, sed ipsum corpus in homine vita donari. - Jamvero quid est vita? "Vita," inquit D. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 3. a. 2. ad 1., "dicitur dupliciter: uno modo ipsum esse viventis ... alio modo ipsa operatio viventis, secundum quam principium vitae in actum reducitur." - Et 1. p. q. 18. a. 1.: "Propria ratio vitae est ex hoc, quod aliquid est natum movere seipsum ... Ea enim sine vita esse dicimus, quae ab exteriori tantum principio moveri possunt." Si ergo corpus vivit, dicendum est quod vivere est ipsum esse ejus, et quod corpus movet seipsum. Sed quid significat vivere esse ipsum esse corporis et corpus movere seipsum? Quando dicitur

homo vivere, fatentibus ipsis adversariis, hoc significat animam, principium vitae, esse homini intrinsece unitam; et dicitur intrinsece ei unita, quia est pars essentiae hominis. Ergo si corpus vere vivit, et sic vivere est esse ejus, hoc significat quod principium vitae (anima) est intrinsece ipsi unitum, et pertinet ad ejus essentiam. Ergo si corpus vitam accipit ab anima, ab ea constituitur in sua essentia: essentia est quod primum concipitur in ente; ergo corpus ab anima accipit primum esse: sed si independenter ab anima haberet esse corporis, hoc ipso ab ea non acciperet primum esse. Ergo si anima non communicaret corpori esse corporis, nec illi vere communicaret esse viventis.

Confir. Quod anima uniatur corpori immediate et intrinsece fatentur omnes, et ipsi adversarii. Si vero uniri immediate et intrinsece non significat quod anima constituit corpus in suo esse, quaerimus quid significare potest. Num a) quod anima est intime praesens corpori? Sed etiam Deus est intime illi praesens; etiam Angelus potest fieri intime illi praesens: nec tamen dicitur Deus, aut diceretur Angelus vivificare corpus quemadmodum dicitur de anima. - Num b) quod anima movet corpus? Sed si corpus movetur ab anima, quin haec pertineat ad esse ejus, jam corpus non movet seipsum, et sic non erit vere vivens - jam anima non erit forma, sed motor corporis ut voluit Plato. Vid. D. Th. c. g. l. 2. cap. 57. - Num c) quod anima producit in corpore aliquem modum, qui est vita corporis? Sed, ergo modus ille, et non anima erit intrinsecus corpori; per illum modum, et non per animam formaliter et immediate, vivet corpus - vita accidentalis et non substantialis erit corpori, ac proinde anima non erit ejus forma substantialis - imo nullo modo esset vera forma, siquidem modus ille, aiunt, non distinguitur realiter a subjecto; et anima non est, addunt, causa formalis realitatis subjecti, seu corporis: nihil ergo reale corpori anima communicaret. Et haec quidem, silentio praetereuntes quod arbitrarium et inauditum est in hac explicatione vitae corporis per modum aliquem ei inhaerentem, cujus anima dicitur esse ratio!

Prob. III. magis directe contra opinionem recentiorem. Informatio corporis per animam intellectivam, seu ratio formae informantis, juxta recentiores, constituitur in eo, quod anima pervadat corpus jam completum in esse corporis, et vires suas viribus ejus admisceat. Atqui nequit in hoc constitui ratio formae informantis. Ergo.

Prob. min. a) Nequit ratio formae informantis in eo constitui, quod in nulla schola catholica tradebatur tempore, quo definitum fuit animam esse vere, per se, et essentialiter formam corporis: neque autem in schola D. Thomae, neque in schola Scoti, ut vidimus, ratio informationis constituebatur in eo, in quo recentiores illam constituunt. - b) Quid significat pervadere? num quod anima est praesens corpori, ita ut nulla sit atomus cui non sit praesens anima? num quod anima aut tangit, aut movet corpus? sed haec jam explosa sunt in praecedente argumento; et insuper non faciunt ut ex anima et corpore resultet una substantia. - c) Quid significat miscere vires et associare? Imprimis, si per mixtionem virium uniuntur anima et corpus, anima non immediate per suam essentiam, sed mediantibus viribus suis informaret corpus: non ipsa substantia animae esset immediata corporis forma. - Deinde videretur etiam corpus esse forma animae, siquidem et corpus misceret suas vires viribus animae. - d) Praeterea vires animae et corporis, dum in unione miscentur, manentne eaedem, vel ex mixtione earum surgunt novae vires? Si surgunt novae vires diversae a viribus componentium, debet admitti quod ex unione animae et corporis exsurgit novum esse; operatio enim sequitur esse. Hoc novum esse estne accidentale an substantiale? Si accidentale, anima et corpus in homine non faciunt unam substantiam: si substantiale, quomodo exsurgit? Vires enim supponunt, non constituunt esse, a quo procedunt. Sin vero vires animae et corporis manent eaedem in mixtione; ex unione animae et corporis non fit novum esse, nam operatio sequitur esse.

e) Ad rem explanandam recurrunt nonnulli ad chimicas combinationes, prout ab ipsis intelliguntur: dicunt, ex. gr., proprietates chloruri aurei differre a proprietatibus chlorii et auri; atque ita vires, proprietates hominis differre a propriis tum corporis tum animae. Sed, iterum, si proprietates differunt, prout accidentaliter vel substantialiter differunt, debet agnosci esse accidentaliter aut substantialiter diversum; si accidentaliter diversum, ex unione animae et corporis non exsurgit nova substantia; si vero substantialiter diversum, quomodo fit ut maneant, in eorum sententia, substantiae componentes secundum proprium esse in mixto? Recolatur hic argumentum, quo communiter Theologi post D. Thomam, 3. p. q. 2. a. 1., ostendunt unionem Verbi non esse factam in natura: ab eo argumento abstinemus, quia in alia schola hoc eodem anno exponendum est.

Dicit aliquis: ex unione animae cum corpore fit nova natura, seu novum

intrinsecum operationis principium; non vero nova substantia. Sed quid censendum sit de hac peregrina inventione patet cum ex iis quae diximus (n. 194. sequitur 3.), tum ex saepe repetito ab omnibus admittendo principio "operatio sequitur esse."

Prob. IV. magis directe contra Scotum. Est principium, quo frequenter utitur Scotus "non sunt multiplicanda entia sine necessitate." Unde: non debet admitti forma corporeitatis, si nulla est necessitas eam admittendi; atqui nulla est hujusmodi necessitas. Ergo.

Prob. min. Nulla est necessitas admittendi formam corporeitatis, si 1. anima intellectiva potest praestare quod illa praestaret et 2. nulla est ratio cur id non praestet; atqui ita est. Ergo.

Prob. haec min. quoad 2am partem ex solutione objectionum; quoad 1am vero: potest anima intellectiva praestare in homine quod anima sensitiva praestat in brutis, et vegetativa in plantis; siquidem in homine unica est anima, eaque intellectiva, a qua corpus sensum et vitam omnem accipit: ergo poterit praestare etiam, quod praestat forma in corporibus inorganicis. "Perfectior forma," inquit D. Th. Qq. Disp. Quarto de anima, a. 11., "facit per unum omnia, quae inferiores faciunt per diversa, et adhuc amplius; puta, si forma corporis inanimati dat materiae esse et esse corpus, et forma plantae dabit ei et hoc et insuper vivere. Anima vero sensitiva et hoc et insuper sensibile esse. Sic enim inveniuntur differre formae rerum naturalium secundum perfectum et magis perfectum, ut patet intuenti. Propter quod species comparatur numeris, quorum species per additionem et subtractionem unitatis variantur." 206. Proof I. It belongs to the nature of substantial form that it be a principle communicative of substantial being; but neither in the opinion of Scotus nor in the opinion of the more recent authors would the human soul be a principle communicative of substantial being. Therefore.

The major is clear from the things said in the preceding section. But before the minor is proved, we make three preliminary notes so that the force of the argument may become known.

1. The sense in which the human soul is the form of the body must be taken at least from those things which, at the time of the Council of Vienne, were commonly handed down concerning this matter in the Catholic schools. For it cannot be said that the Council issued a definition which would be understood in the Church only after five or six centuries. This is all the more so because, if the word form were not used in the sense determined at that time, the Council could not have attained its end, "that the entrance to all errors be closed off, lest they creep in."

2. Although form is said to be and is the cause of the composite, this nevertheless does not exclude, indeed it necessarily includes, that it be the cause of the subject which it informs. Hence, since the intellective soul is our form, it must be the formal cause not only of man, but also of the subject, whether matter or body, which it informs. In reality, if the human soul is the form of the body at least with respect to the being of a living thing, which must be admitted by all, this is not only because it makes man living, but also because it makes the body itself living. Hence a) in the definitions cited above the body is said to receive life, motion, and sense from the soul; b) the soul is defined by the Fathers and commonly by the Doctors (n. 188) as a substance conferring life upon the body through itself; c) Gennadius (On Ecclesiastical Dogmas, c. 15) teaches that "there is one and the same soul in man, which also vivifies the body by its association"; d) the body itself is called vivified. Indeed, if at times by certain Fathers the flesh in Christ is said to be deified, the Fathers and theologians themselves note the distinction: the flesh of Christ is called deified only because it is the flesh of the Word; our body is called vivified in the proper sense, namely insofar as the soul pours life into it; e) hence not only man, but even the body itself, is said to live, grow, be nourished, and sense; and consequently the body itself is said to die: "it is not the soul," says St. Athanasius (oration against idols), "which dies, but the body dies because of its departure"; f) hence, in the opinion of all, the subject which is informed is supposed to be in potency to something which it receives from the form, and from which it is consequently said to become in act according to that thing. Therefore, in the mode in which our soul is form, it must cause something not only in the composite, but in the subject itself which it immediately informs, or it must communicate some being to it.

3. The soul is called substantial form not only because it makes the substantial composite, but also because it communicates to the subject which it informs substantial being, and not accidental being. For a) the soul is not united to the body through some accident, but through its essence, through itself; the very

substance of the soul is united to the body as form, as is clear from the things said in the preceding section. Therefore, if it communicates being to the subject which it informs, it can communicate nothing except its own being, which is substantial. b) And this was the common sense in the Catholic schools at the time of the Council of Vienne. Concerning St. Thomas there is no doubt; but Scotus, as we have seen, said that the body with the form of corporeity remains indeterminate and incomplete even in the genus of substance, precisely so that he could then assert that it receives substantial being from the soul. With these things posited, the force of the proposed argument is easy.

Proof of the minor against Scotus. Substantial being is first being; for "it is impossible," says St. Thomas, I, q. 76, a. 4, ad 4, "that there be something intermediate between substance and accident"; but accident supposes a substance in which it inheres. But if there were in the human body a form of corporeity, the intellective soul, coming to it, would not give it first being; for the body would have this from the preceding form. Therefore, if that form of corporeity were given in man, the intellective soul would not give substantial being to the body, and consequently would not be substantial form. "For the evidence of this," says St. Thomas in the place last cited, in the body, "it must be considered that substantial form differs from accidental form in this: that accidental form does not give being simply, but being of such a kind; as heat makes its subject not simply to be, but to be hot. And therefore, when accidental form comes, something is not said to come to be or to be generated simply, but to become such, or to have itself in some way; and likewise when accidental form departs, something is not said to be corrupted simply, but in a qualified respect. But substantial form gives being simply; and therefore by its coming something is said to be generated simply, and by its departure to be corrupted simply. And on account of this the ancient natural philosophers, who posited that first matter is some being in act, for example fire or air or something of this sort, said that nothing is generated or corrupted simply, but held that every coming-to-be is alteration, as is said in Physics I, text 33. If therefore it were the case that besides the intellective soul some other substantial form preexisted in matter, through which the subject of the soul were a being in act, it would follow that the soul would not give being simply, and consequently that it would not be substantial form, and that by the coming of the soul there would not be generation simply, nor by its departure corruption simply, but only in a qualified respect; and these things are manifestly false."

Nor does it help to say that, according to Scotus, the body with the form of corporeity alone remains incomplete as to species, as to individual, in the genus of substance. For a) Scotus admitted the theory of substantial composition from matter and form; but according to this theory from matter and form there is had a complete being. b) According to Scotus, the body with the form of corporeity alone exists, subsists, and is distinguished from every other thing; indeed, after separation from the intellective soul, the body would remain with the form of corporeity alone, which Scotus admitted precisely to avoid the production of a new form in death. But that which exists, subsists, is distinguished from every other thing, and operates, is certainly complete in the account of substance. Therefore.

Proof of the minor against the opinion of the more recent authors. a) "Whatever," says St. Thomas, Contra Gentiles, book 2, c. 58, "comes to a thing after the first substantial form will come accidentally"; or, whatever comes to a thing already complete in the account of substance is an accident. But in the more recent opinion, the body is already complete in the account of substance when the intellective soul comes to it. Therefore the soul could communicate to it only accidental being. b) Moreover the authors of this opinion themselves expressly confess that the soul is the essential principle of the composite, or man, but not of the body which it informs. c) Nor does it help to say that the body independently of the intellective soul is complete in the account of body, but not in the account of human body. For either that human being is really the same as bodily being, or it is really distinguished from it. If the first, then the soul, in giving human being, by this very fact gives bodily being; but if the other, since human being comes to bodily being, the soul no longer communicates substantial being to the body, which is first being. "The substantial being of any thing," says St. Thomas, I, q. 76, a. 4, ad 4, "consists in an indivisible; and every addition and subtraction varies the species, as in numbers. Hence it is impossible that any substantial form receive more and less." d) If the soul did not communicate substantial being, or first

being, to the body, then in the opinion of the more recent authors it would communicate no being to it, and consequently in no way would be its form. In reality they themselves deny that an accident has any real entity really distinct from the substance in which it inheres; but between accident and substance no middle is given. Therefore if the soul did not communicate substantial being to the body, it would communicate no real being.

Proof II. The adversaries concede, and it must be conceded from the definitions of the Church, that the soul communicates to the body the being of a living thing; but it cannot communicate to it the being of a living thing without communicating the very first being, and consequently the very being of body. Therefore.

Explanation and proof of the minor. We suppose from the things demonstrated above not only that man lives, but that the body itself in man is given life. Now, what is life? "Life," says St. Thomas, I-II, q. 3, a. 2, ad 1, "is said in two ways: in one way, the very being of a living thing ... in another way, the very operation of a living thing, according to which the principle of life is reduced to act." And I, q. 18, a. 1: "The proper account of life is from this, that something is naturally apt to move itself ... For we say that those things are without life which can be moved only by an exterior principle." If therefore the body lives, it must be said that to live is its very being, and that the body moves itself. But what does it signify that living is the very being of the body and that the body moves itself? When man is said to live, by the confession of the adversaries themselves, this signifies that the soul, the principle of life, is intrinsically united to man; and it is said to be intrinsically united to him because it is part of the essence of man. Therefore if the body truly lives, and if thus living is its being, this signifies that the principle of life, the soul, is intrinsically united to it and pertains to its essence. Therefore if the body receives life from the soul, it is constituted by it in its essence. Essence is what is first conceived in a being; therefore the body receives first being from the soul. But if it had bodily being independently of the soul, by this very fact it would not receive first being from it. Therefore if the soul did not communicate bodily being to the body, neither would it truly communicate to it the being of a living thing.

Confirmation. All, even the adversaries themselves, confess that the soul is united to the body immediately and intrinsically. But if to be united immediately and intrinsically does not signify that the soul constitutes the body in its being, we ask what it can signify. Does it mean a) that the soul is intimately present to the body? But God also is intimately present to it; an angel too can become intimately present to it; and yet God is not said, nor would an angel be said, to vivify the body in the way that is said of the soul. Does it mean b) that the soul moves the body? But if the body is moved by the soul without the soul pertaining to its being, then the body does not move itself, and so will not be truly living; now the soul will not be form, but mover of the body, as Plato wished. See St. Thomas, Contra Gentiles, book 2, c. 57. Does it mean c) that the soul produces in the body some mode which is the life of the body? But then that mode, and not the soul, will be intrinsic to the body; through that mode, and not through the soul formally and immediately, the body will live; accidental life and not substantial life will belong to the body; and consequently the soul will not be its substantial form. Indeed it would in no way be a true form, since that mode, they say, is not really distinguished from the subject; and the soul, they add, is not the formal cause of the reality of the subject, or body. Therefore the soul would communicate nothing real to the body. And these things we say while passing over in silence what is arbitrary and unheard-of in this explanation of the life of the body through some mode inhering in it, of which the soul is said to be the reason.

Proof III, more directly against the more recent opinion. The information of the body by the intellective soul, or the account of informing form, according to the more recent authors, is constituted in this: that the soul pervades the body already complete in the being of body and mingles its powers with the powers of the body. But the account of informing form cannot be constituted in this. Therefore.

Proof of the minor. a) The account of informing form cannot be constituted in that which was handed down in no Catholic school at the time when it was defined that the soul is truly, per se, and essentially the form of the body. But neither in the school of St. Thomas nor in the school of Scotus, as we have seen, was the account of information constituted in that in which the more recent authors constitute it. b) What does pervade signify? That the soul is present to the body, so that there is

no atom to which the soul is not present? That the soul either touches or moves the body? But these things have already been exploded in the preceding argument; and besides, they do not make it so that from soul and body there results one substance. c) What does it signify to mingle and associate powers? First, if soul and body are united through the mixture of powers, the soul would inform the body not immediately through its essence, but by means of its powers; the very substance of the soul would not be the immediate form of the body. Next, the body would also seem to be the form of the soul, since the body too would mingle its powers with the powers of the soul. d) Moreover, while the powers of soul and body are mingled in the union, do they remain the same, or do new powers arise from their mixture? If new powers arise, diverse from the powers of the components, it must be admitted that from the union of soul and body there arises a new being; for operation follows being. Is this new being accidental or substantial? If accidental, soul and body in man do not make one substance. If substantial, how does it arise? For powers suppose being, they do not constitute the being from which they proceed. But if the powers of soul and body remain the same in the mixture, from the union of soul and body no new being comes to be, for operation follows being.

e) To explain the matter, some have recourse to chemical combinations, as they themselves understand them. They say, for example, that the properties of gold chloride differ from the properties of chlorine and gold; and thus that the powers and properties of man differ from the proper powers and properties both of the body and of the soul. But again, if the properties differ, insofar as they differ accidentally or substantially, a being accidentally or substantially diverse must be acknowledged. If accidentally diverse, from the union of soul and body no new substance arises. But if substantially diverse, how does it happen, on their opinion, that the component substances remain in the mixture according to their proper being? Here let the argument be recalled by which theologians commonly, after St. Thomas, III, q. 2, a. 1, show that the union of the Word was not made in nature. We abstain from that argument, because it is to be expounded in another school this same year.

Someone says: from the union of the soul with the body there comes to be a new nature, or a new intrinsic principle of operation, but not a new substance. But what must be judged concerning this strange invention is clear both from the things which we said (n. 194, consequence 3), and from the principle often repeated and admitted by all: "operation follows being."

Proof IV, more directly against Scotus. It is a principle which Scotus frequently uses: "entities are not to be multiplied without necessity." Hence: the form of corporeity ought not to be admitted if there is no necessity for admitting it; but there is no necessity of this kind. Therefore.

Proof of the minor. There is no necessity of admitting the form of corporeity if 1. the intellective soul can provide what that form would provide, and 2. there is no reason why it should not provide it. But so it is. Therefore.

Proof of this minor. As to the second part, from the solution of the objections; but as to the first: the intellective soul can provide in man what the sensitive soul provides in brutes and the vegetative soul in plants, since in man there is one soul, and it is intellective, from which the body receives sense and all life. Therefore it will be able to provide also what form provides in inorganic bodies. "The more perfect form," says St. Thomas, disputed questions, fourth On the Soul, a. 11, "does through one thing all that lower forms do through diverse things, and still more; for example, if the form of an inanimate body gives to matter being and being a body, the form of a plant will give it both this and, in addition, to live. But the sensitive soul gives both this and, in addition, to be sensible. For thus the forms of natural things are found to differ according to the perfect and the more perfect, as is clear to one considering. On account of this, species are compared to numbers, whose species are varied by the addition and subtraction of unity."

207. Ex iis, quae delibavimus de sententia Scoti et recentiorum, facile patet quod Scotus admittens generalem theoriam de substantiali compositione ex materia et forma, retinet veram et communem notionem formae substantialis; dum vero admittit formam corporeitatis in homine distinctam ab anima, parum sibi cohaeret. - E contra recentiores repudiantes illam theoriam, non retinent veram notionem formae substantialis; dum ergo suo modo explicant unionem animae

cum corpore cohaerent suis principiis; sed quomodo salva maneat veritas quod anima est vera, per se, essentialiter, immediate forma corporis, profecto non intelligimus.

Non enim est quaestio utrum anima sit forma corporis; hoc docent omnes, et fatentur omnes esse saltem indirecte definitum. Quaestio est, de sensu quo anima dicenda est forma: recentiores quidem novae cuidam adhaerent significationi; nos vero expendentes verba Ecclesiae vere, per se, essentialiter, immediate, vocem illam forma intelligimus sensu communiter recepto tempore definitionis. Cui sensui adhuc strictius, si fieri potest, adhaerendum esse censemus, eo quod iisdem verbis jam antea usus fuerat D. Thomas; qui, ex. gr., in Quaest. unic. de anima art. 9. ad 12., dixit animam esse formam corporis secundum essentiam animae intellectualis et ibid. ad. 18., "uniri per se et immediate." 207. From the things which we have touched upon concerning the opinion of Scotus and of the more recent authors, it is easily clear that Scotus, admitting the general theory of substantial composition from matter and form, retains the true and common notion of substantial form; but while he admits in man a form of corporeity distinct from the soul, he is hardly consistent with himself. On the contrary, the more recent authors, rejecting that theory, do not retain the true notion of substantial form. Therefore, while they explain in their own way the union of the soul with the body, they are consistent with their principles; but how the truth remains safe that the soul is truly, per se, essentially, and immediately the form of the body, we certainly do not understand.

For the question is not whether the soul is the form of the body; all teach this, and all confess that it has at least indirectly been defined. The question is concerning the sense in which the soul must be called form. The more recent authors indeed adhere to a certain new signification; but we, weighing the words of the Church truly, per se, essentially, immediately, understand that word form in the sense commonly received at the time of the definition. We judge that one must adhere to this sense still more strictly, if possible, because St. Thomas had already used the same words beforehand; for example, in the single question On the Soul, a. 9, ad 12, he said that the soul is the form of the body according to the essence of the intellectual soul, and in the same place, ad 18, that it is "united per se and immediately."

Corrected Latin Text
§ IV.
Quibusdam difficultatibus satisfit. Section IV.
Certain Difficulties Are Answered.

208. Non est nobis mens omnes difficultates, quae fieri solent contra statutam doctrinam, referre et solvere; afferemus praecipuas, quae adversariorum judicio majorem vim habere videntur. Eisdem breviter respondebimus, quia aliquae in aliis Theologiae tractatibus fusius enodantur, alias ex philosophia solutas supponimus.

Obj. I. Si praeter animam non esset in humano corpore forma corporeitatis, corpus Christi separatum ab anima in triduo mortis, non mansisset idem corpus; atqui hoc dici nequit; ergo. - Haec est una ex praecipuis rationibus Scoti, ut ipse fatetur.

Resp. 1. Suarez qui non est Thomista, proposita sibi hac difficultate, in 3 p. Disp. 38. sect. 3. n. 3., ait: "Sed haec sententia (de forma corporeitatis) supponit duo principia philosophica falsa. Unum est, formam corporeitatis esse re distinctam ab anima. Alterum est, posse manere substantiale individuum corporis, in nulla tamen specie corporis constitutum. De quibus non est hic disputandi locus; satis sit dicere, veram theologicam doctrinam non posse ex his falsis principiis pendere, ut statim explicabimus." -

Resp. 2. Quid mirum, si in triduo mortis Christus nec proprie fuit homo, 3. p. q. 50. a. 4. Unde D. Thomas, l. c. a. 5. ad 2. inquit: "Quia idem numero dicitur aliquid secundum suppositum, idem autem specie est idem secundum formam ubicumque suppositum subsistit in una sola natura, oportet quod sublata unitate speciei, auferatur unitas numeralis. Sed hypostasis Verbi Dei subsistit in duabus naturis; et ideo quamvis in Christo non remaneat corpus idem secundum speciem humanae naturae, remanet tamen idem numero secundum suppositum Verbi Dei."

Inst. Si ita esset, corpus Christi fuisset obnoxium corruptioni, facta enim

in eo fuisset mutatio substantialis; sed hoc dici nequit. Ergo.

Resp. ex Damasc. apud D. Th. l. c.: "Corruptionis nomen duo significat: uno modo separationem animae a corpore, et alia hujusmodi; alio modo perfectam dissolutionem in elementa. Ergo incorruptibile dicere corpus Domini, secundum Julianum et Gaianum, secundum primum corruptionis modum ante resurrectionem, est impium: et quia corpus Christi non esset consubstantiale nobis, nec in veritate mortuum esset, nec secundum veritatem salvati essemus. Secundo autem modo corpus Christi fuit incorruptum."

Inst. Si ita esset, admitti deberet in corpore Christi forma cadaverica in triduo mortis: quod dici nequit.

Resp. 1. Non est absolute necessarium admittere in corpore Christi formam cadavericam; aliqui enim aliter explicant quomodo corpus Christi post mortem manserit verum corpus: Vid. Toletum in cit. loc. D. Th. - Resp. 2. Nullum est inconveniens admittere formam illam cadavericam.

Inst. Atqui est inconveniens. Nam est axioma "quod Verbum semel assumpsit numquam dimisit"; atqui assumpsisset formam illam cadavericam, quam tamen certe in resurrectione dimisisset. Ergo.

Resp. 1. Axioma illud citari solet ex Damasc., sed non habetur nisi apud ejus Scholiasten. Vim ergo suam totam habet ex auctoritate Theologorum, qui communi consensu illud usurpant; ac proinde nequit extendi ultra id, ad quod extenditur communis ille consensus. Atqui non obstante hoc principio, quod admittunt, quamplures DD., ut vidimus, rejiciunt illam formam corporeitatis. Ergo. - Resp. 2. Notat Toletus l. c. juxta sententiam eorum, qui admittunt formam cadavericam: "Intellige talem formam non esse unitam Verbo, sed solam materiam; sed advenisse materiae unitae, sicut calor adveniebat Christo: non tamen uniebatur immediate." - Resp. 3. Axioma illud debet intelligi de natura assumpta, deque partibus, quae pertinent ad ejus veritatem, et integritatem. Quid mirum autem si Christus, factus in omnibus similis nobis absque peccato, in resurrectione sua dimiserit formam cadavericam, cum nec homines in resurrectione illam retineant? Vid. in c. l. D. Th., et in 3. p. q. 5. a. 2.

Obj. II. Docet Conc. Trid. (sess. 13. c. 3.) post consecrationem verum corpus et Sanguinem D. N. Jesu Christi esse sub speciebus panis et vini una cum ipsius anima et Divinitate; ita tamen, ut vi verborum corpus sit sub specie panis, et sanguis sub specie vini; ipsum autem corpus sub specie vini, et sanguinem sub specie panis, animamque sub utraque vi naturalis illius connexionis et concomitantiae, qua partes Christi Domini inter se copulantur. Atqui si anima daret corpori ipsum esse corporis, non vi concomitantiae sed vi verborum ea esset sub specie panis, siquidem esset pars essentialis ipsius corporis. Ergo.

Resp. 1. Hanc difficultatem sibi jam proposuerat Card. de Lugo (non est Thomista) in tract. de Sacr. Euch. disp. 8. sect. 4., et relata sententia eorum, qui eidem respondebant admittendo corpus jam constitutum in esse corporis independenter ab anima, inquit n. 62.: "Haec tamen sententia supponit rem in Philosophia minus veram; quod scilicet in homine datur simul alia forma substantialis corporeitatis cum anima rationali in eadem materia; quod impugnavi in 1. Phys. Disp. 3., et breviter rejicitur, quia, etc."

Resp. 2. Idem Emmus. Auctor sapienter animadvertit n. 78.: "Ex communi modo loquendi ... corpus non significat totum compositum, sed partem illius distinctam ab anima; nam licet aliquando apud Philosophos corpus accipiatur pro toto composito substantiali, et praedicetur in recto de homine: caeterum in modo communi loquendi vix accipitur corpus in hac significatione, sed pro una parte compositi humani, prout condistinguitur ab anima; et ideo dicimus hominem habere corpus, constare et corpore, et anima: Verbum assumpsisse humanitatem constantem ex corpore, et anima; et in eodem sensu dicitur in Symbolo Athanasii, quod anima rationalis, et caro unus est homo; et denique in hoc sensu loquitur Tridentinum ubi supra de corpore Christi, quod ponitur in Eucharistia ex vi verborum, ut de parte condistincta ab anima; dicit enim, corpus poni una cum anima, et corpus poni ex vi verborum, animam vero per concomitantiam partium inter se: quibus satis indicat, loqui de corpore, et anima, ut sunt duae partes hominis condistinctae realiter inter se." -

Resp. 3. Ut ergo innotescat quid veniat nomine corporis, quod vi verborum ponitur sub specie panis, videndum est quid nomine corporis intelligebatur; et in cit. sect. referuntur diversae sententiae probabiles, quae omnes fundantur in doctrina tempore Concilii Trid., ex confessione ipsa adversariorum, communissima, quod anima dat corpori ipsum esse corporis. Vid. etiam Liberatore (Del

Composto Umano, cap. 10. art. 2.)

Obj. III. Si anima daret corpori ipsum esse corporis, dicenda est pars ejus essentialis; atqui hoc est absurdum. Ergo.

Resp. neg. min. Nam a) cum anima, fatentibus omnibus, det corpori esse viventis, et cum vita ex dictis sit ipsum esse viventis, seu pertineat ad essentiam ejus; jam anima est pars essentiae corporis viventis. Sed in corpore vivente non sunt duae essentiae, una corporis, altera viventis, sed unum idemque est simul corpus vivens. Ergo anima est pars essentiae corporis. - b) Certe repugnantia quod anima sit pars essentiae corporis non ostenditur ex animae simplicitate, nisi ostendatur elementum aliquod simplex non posse esse elementum corporis; nec ex animae humanae spiritualitate, nisi ostendatur quod anima, eo ipso quod fit pars essentialis corporis ut forma ejus, amittat suas operationes vitae intellectivae, et suum esse a materia independens. c) Certe qui tam facile dicunt ad min. neg. "hoc est absurdum" nullam probationem afferunt. Vid. Liberatore (Del Comp. Um. cap. 10. art. 4.)

Obj. IV. In cadavere manent eadem accidentia; ergo manet idem specie corpus; sed in eo non manet anima; ergo manet alia forma, forma corporeitatis.

Resp. Neg. 1um Cons. Nam ea accidentia competunt corpori ratione materiae et extensionis; sufficit ergo ut haec maneant eadem, ut maneant eadem accidentia. Revera numquam deest subjectum, cui accidentia illa inhaereant, nec, si lubet, prima radix a qua pullulent: ex una parte enim informatio, ut Scotus ipse fatetur, est instantanea, ac proinde simul discedit a corpore anima, et ei unitur alia forma; ex alia vero parte, cur nova forma inducta non potest esse radix illorum accidentium, quae antea pendebant ab anima juxta exigentiam subjecti?

Inst. Si ita esset, admitti deberet nova forma in cadavere; sed hoc videtur repugnare; quia nulla apparet causa, quae possit illam producere: si quis, ex. gr., transfigitur a sagitta et moritur, num sagitta est causa illius formae? - Haec est alia praecipua objectio Scoti.

Resp. Certe sunt multa agentia, quae possunt mortem causare, et quae illam causarent, nisi principium vitale ipsis resisteret. Ergo si aliquo modo, ex. gr., ex sagitta, producatur aliqua alteratio in organismo, ita ut principium vitale fiat ineptum ad exercendum suam efficaciam, illa eadem agentia, quae sunt causa mortis, poterunt etiam esse causa novae formae. Quod facilius debet admitti in sententia Scoti, qui et Scholasticum systema propugnat, et admittit principium "corruptio unius est generatio alterius." Nec debet quemquam deterrere nomen formae cadavericae; sive quia parvi refert de nomine quando res est retinenda; sive quia dicitur cadaverica a cadendo: "Cadunt," inquit S. Augustinus, De Civ. Dei, l. 20. c. 10., "corpora moriendo, nam et a cadendo cadavera nuncupantur." Cons. Liberatore (op. cit. cap. 10. art. 3. a n. 481) - Sanseverino (Elementa Philosophiae Christianae, Vol. 3., Anthropol. cap. 2. art. 7.)

Obj. V. Ideo praesertim impugnatur sententia Scoti et recentiorum, quia duae substantiae, quamvis dicantur incompletae, nequeunt uniri nisi accidentaliter inter se; et sic anima non communicaret primum esse, ac proinde non erit forma substantialis. Atqui idem inconveniens locum habet in sententia D. Thomae; siquidem materia et anima vocantur etiam in hac sententia substantiae incompletae. Ergo.

Resp. Trans. maj. Quoad min. vero, ne ingrediamur quaestiones, quae non sunt hujus loci, sufficit ad rem nostram haec adnotare.

In sententia D. Th. subjectum quod informatur ab anima (materia, pars determinabilis compositi) ita dicitur incompletum, ut sine forma nequeat, saltem naturaliter, existere et subsistere; anima vero dicitur substantia incompleta, quatenus licet possit existere et subsistere sine informatione actuali materiae, dicit tamen ordinem ad illam, ut forma quae debet illam actuare et determinare, suum ipsum esse illi communicando. - At vero in sententia Scoti, et recentiorum, ipsum subjectum determinabile (corpus) quamvis dicatur incompletum in ratione substantiae, tale tamen est, ut sine anima possit existere, subsistere, operari, uti de facto fiet, aiunt, post mortem, absque ulla novae formae introductione. - Jamvero impossibile est, uti ostendimus, ut duo componentia, quorum unumquodque independenter ab alio est et operatur, ita uniantur, ut unum eorum alteri communicet primum esse, et sic faciant unam substantiam: e contra facile intelligitur quomodo ex duobus componentibus, quorum unum nequit esse independenter ab alio, per unionem ab eo accipiat ipsum primum esse, et sic fiat ex ambobus una substantia. Ut res illustretur exemplo, si humana natura in Christo haberet propriam subsistentiam, sicut divina, non possent ita uniri, ut una esset Persona in Christo. Sed si humana natura non habet propriam subsistentiam, tunc Persona propria divinae naturae ad se

trahet naturam humanam, et sic habetur unitas personalis in Christo.

"Illud quod advenit," inquit D. Th. 3. p. q. 2. a. 6. ad 2., "post esse completum, accidentaliter advenit, nisi trahatur in communionem illius esse completi; sicut in resurrectione corpus advenit animae praeexistenti; non tamen accidentaliter, quia ad idem esse assumitur, ut scilicet corpus habeat esse vitale per animam; non est autem sic de albedine, quia aliud est esse albi, et aliud est esse hominis, cui advenit albedo. Verbum autem Dei ab aeterno esse completum habuit secundum hypostasim sive personam; ex tempore autem advenit ei natura humana, non quasi assumpta ad unum esse, prout est naturae; sicut corpus assumitur ad esse animae; sed ad unum esse, prout est hypostasis vel personae. Et ideo humana natura non unitur accidentaliter Filio Dei." 208. It is not our intention to report and solve all the difficulties which are usually made against the doctrine established; we shall bring forward the principal ones, which in the judgment of the adversaries seem to have greater force. We shall respond to them briefly, because some are more fully unraveled in other treatises of Theology, and others we suppose to have been solved from philosophy.

Objection I. If, besides the soul, there were not in the human body a form of corporeity, the body of Christ, separated from the soul in the three days of death, would not have remained the same body; but this cannot be said; therefore. This is one of the principal reasons of Scotus, as he himself confesses.

Reply 1. Suarez, who is not a Thomist, when this difficulty was proposed to him, says in III, disp. 38, sect. 3, n. 3: "But this opinion concerning the form of corporeity supposes two false philosophical principles. One is that the form of corporeity is really distinct from the soul. The other is that the substantial individual of the body can remain, yet constituted in no species of body. There is no place here for disputing about these things; let it be enough to say that true theological doctrine cannot depend upon these false principles, as we shall immediately explain."

Reply 2. What wonder is it if, in the three days of death, Christ was not properly man, III, q. 50, a. 4? Hence St. Thomas, in the cited place, a. 5, ad 2, says: "Because something is said to be numerically the same according to supposit, but specifically the same according to form, wherever the supposit subsists in one nature alone, it is necessary that when unity of species is removed, numerical unity be removed. But the hypostasis of the Word of God subsists in two natures; and therefore, although in Christ the same body does not remain according to the species of human nature, nevertheless it remains numerically the same according to the supposit of the Word of God."

Instance. If it were so, the body of Christ would have been subject to corruption, for a substantial change would have been made in it; but this cannot be said. Therefore.

Reply. From Damascene apud St. Thomas in the cited place: "The name corruption signifies two things: in one way, the separation of soul from body, and other things of this kind; in another way, perfect dissolution into the elements. Therefore, to say that the body of the Lord was incorruptible before the resurrection according to the first mode of corruption, according to Julian and Gaianus, is impious: both because the body of Christ would not be consubstantial with us, and because he would not truly have died, nor would we have been saved according to truth. But according to the second mode the body of Christ was incorrupt."

Instance. If it were so, a cadaveric form would have to be admitted in the body of Christ in the three days of death; but this cannot be said.

Reply 1. It is not absolutely necessary to admit a cadaveric form in the body of Christ; for some explain otherwise how the body of Christ after death remained a true body. See Toletus in the cited place of St. Thomas. Reply 2. There is no inconvenience in admitting that cadaveric form.

Instance. But it is inconvenient. For there is the axiom, "what the Word once assumed, he never dismissed"; but he would have assumed that cadaveric form, which nevertheless he certainly would have dismissed in the resurrection. Therefore.

Reply 1. That axiom is commonly cited from Damascene, but it is found only in his Scholiast. Therefore its whole force comes from the authority of the theologians who use it by common consent; and consequently it cannot be extended beyond that to which that common consent is extended. But notwithstanding this principle, which they admit, very many Doctors, as we have seen, reject that form of corporeity. Therefore.

Reply 2. Toletus notes in the cited place, according to the opinion of those who admit a cadaveric form: "Understand that such a form is not united to the Word, but only the matter; but that it came to the united matter, just as heat came to Christ; nevertheless it was not united immediately." Reply 3. That axiom must be understood of the nature assumed, and of the parts which pertain to its truth and integrity. But what wonder is it if Christ, made like us in all things apart from sin, dismissed the cadaveric form in his resurrection, since men also do not retain it in the resurrection? See in the cited chapter of St. Thomas, and in III, q. 5, a. 2.

Objection II. The Council of Trent teaches (session 13, c. 3) that after consecration the true body and Blood of Our Lord Jesus Christ are under the species of bread and wine together with his soul and Divinity; yet in such a way that by force of the words the body is under the species of bread, and the blood under the species of wine; but the body itself under the species of wine, and the blood under the species of bread, and the soul under both, by force of that natural connection and concomitance by which the parts of Christ the Lord are joined among themselves. But if the soul gave to the body the very being of body, it would be under the species of bread not by force of concomitance but by force of the words, since it would be an essential part of the body itself. Therefore.

Reply 1. Cardinal de Lugo, who is not a Thomist, had already proposed this difficulty to himself in the treatise On the Sacrament of the Eucharist, disp. 8, sect. 4; and after reporting the opinion of those who responded to it by admitting the body as already constituted in the being of body independently of the soul, he says in n. 62: "Yet this opinion supposes a thing less true in philosophy, namely that in man there is at the same time another substantial form of corporeity with the rational soul in the same matter; which I attacked in I Physics, disp. 3, and it is briefly rejected because, etc."

Reply 2. The same most eminent author wisely observes in n. 78: "From the common mode of speaking ... body does not signify the whole composite, but the part of it distinct from the soul. For although among philosophers body is sometimes taken for the whole substantial composite and is predicated directly of man, nevertheless in the common mode of speaking body is scarcely taken in this signification, but for one part of the human composite, as it is distinguished from the soul; and therefore we say that man has a body, consists of body and soul; that the Word assumed humanity consisting of body and soul; and in the same sense it is said in the Athanasian Creed that the rational soul and flesh is one man. Finally in this sense the Tridentine Council speaks where above concerning the body of Christ, which is placed in the Eucharist by force of the words, as concerning a part distinguished from the soul; for it says that the body is placed together with the soul, and the body is placed by force of the words, but the soul through the concomitance of the parts among themselves: by these things it sufficiently indicates that it speaks of body and soul as they are two parts of man really distinguished among themselves."

Reply 3. Therefore, in order that it may become known what comes under the name body, which by force of the words is placed under the species of bread, one must see what was understood by the name body; and in the cited section diverse probable opinions are reported, all of which are founded upon the doctrine, very common at the time of the Council of Trent, according to the very confession of the adversaries, that the soul gives to the body the very being of body. See also Liberatore, Del Composto Umano, c. 10, art. 2.

Objection III. If the soul gave to the body the very being of body, it would have to be called an essential part of it; but this is absurd. Therefore.

Reply: deny the minor. For a) since the soul, with all confessing it, gives to the body the being of a living thing, and since life, from the things said, is the very being of a living thing, or pertains to its essence, the soul is already part of the essence of the living body. But in a living body there are not two essences, one of body, the other of living thing, but one and the same thing is at once a living body. Therefore the soul is part of the essence of the body. b) Certainly the repugnance that the soul be part of the essence of the body is not shown from the soul's simplicity, unless it is shown that some simple element cannot be an element of a body; nor from the spirituality of the human soul, unless it is shown that the soul, by the very fact that it becomes an essential part of the body as its form, loses its operations of intellective life and its being independent of matter. c) Certainly those who so easily say, against the minor,

"this is absurd," bring forward no proof. See Liberatore, Del Comp. Um., c. 10, art. 4.

Objection IV. In a corpse the same accidents remain; therefore the body remains the same in species; but in it the soul does not remain; therefore another form remains, the form of corporeity.

Reply: deny the first consequence. For those accidents belong to the body by reason of matter and extension; therefore it is enough that these remain the same for the same accidents to remain. In reality, there is never lacking a subject in which those accidents inhere, nor, if you please, a first root from which they spring. For on the one hand, information, as Scotus himself confesses, is instantaneous, and consequently at the same time the soul departs from the body and another form is united to it; but on the other hand, why can the new form induced not be the root of those accidents which previously depended upon the soul according to the requirement of the subject?

Instance. If it were so, a new form would have to be admitted in the corpse; but this seems repugnant, because no cause appears which could produce it. If someone, for example, is pierced by an arrow and dies, is the arrow the cause of that form? This is another principal objection of Scotus.

Reply. Certainly there are many agents which can cause death, and which would cause it unless the vital principle resisted them. Therefore if in some way, for example from an arrow, some alteration is produced in the organism, so that the vital principle becomes unfit to exercise its efficacy, those same agents which are the cause of death will also be able to be the cause of the new form. This must more easily be admitted in the opinion of Scotus, who both defends the scholastic system and admits the principle "the corruption of one thing is the generation of another." Nor should the name cadaveric form deter anyone; either because the name matters little when the thing must be retained, or because it is called cadaveric from falling. "Bodies fall by dying," says St. Augustine, City of God, book 20, c. 10, "for corpses too are named from falling." Consult Liberatore, cited work, c. 10, art. 3, from n. 481, and Sanseverino, Elements of Christian Philosophy, vol. 3, Anthropology, c. 2, art. 7.

Objection V. The opinion of Scotus and of the more recent authors is especially attacked because two substances, although they are called incomplete, cannot be united with one another except accidentally; and thus the soul would not communicate first being, and consequently will not be substantial form. But the same inconvenience has place in the opinion of St. Thomas, since matter and soul are also called incomplete substances in this opinion. Therefore.

Reply: let the major pass. As to the minor, however, lest we enter questions which do not belong to this place, it is enough for our matter to note these things.

In the opinion of St. Thomas, the subject which is informed by the soul, matter, the determinable part of the composite, is called incomplete in such a way that without form it cannot, at least naturally, exist and subsist. But the soul is called an incomplete substance insofar as, although it can exist and subsist without actual information of matter, it nevertheless bespeaks an order to matter, as the form which must actuate and determine it by communicating its very being to it. But in the opinion of Scotus and of the more recent authors, the determinable subject itself, the body, although it is called incomplete in the account of substance, is nevertheless such that without the soul it can exist, subsist, and operate, as in fact it will, they say, after death, without any introduction of a new form. Now it is impossible, as we have shown, that two components, each of which is and operates independently of the other, be united in such a way that one of them communicates first being to the other, and thus they make one substance. On the contrary, it is easily understood how, from two components of which one cannot be independently of the other, through union it receives from the other the very first being, and thus from both there comes to be one substance. To illustrate the matter by example: if the human nature in Christ had its own subsistence, as the divine nature does, they could not be united in such a way that there would be one Person in Christ. But if the human nature does not have its own subsistence, then the Person proper to the divine nature will draw human nature to himself, and thus personal unity is had in Christ.

"That which comes," says St. Thomas, III, q. 2, a. 6, ad 2, "after completed being, comes accidentally, unless it is drawn into the communion of that completed being; as in the resurrection the body comes to the preexisting soul, yet not accidentally, because it is assumed to the same being, namely so that the body may have vital

being through the soul. But it is not so with whiteness, because the being of white and the being of man to whom whiteness comes are different. But the Word of God had completed being from eternity according to hypostasis or person; in time, however, human nature came to him, not as assumed to one being as it belongs to nature, as the body is assumed to the being of the soul, but to one being as it belongs to hypostasis or person. And therefore human nature is not united accidentally to the Son of God."

Disputation III — On Man's Elevation to the Supernatural State

Article 1. General Notion of the Diverse States of Human Nature

LatineEnglish

Corrected Latin Text
Disputatio III.
De Hominis Elevatione Ad Statum Supernaturalem. On Man's Elevation To The Supernatural State.

209. Considerantes in praecedente disputatione hominem secundum id, quod pertinet ad ejus naturam, vidimus eum ita supra caeteras visibiles creaturas extolli, ut merito de eo dicatur "minuisti enim paulo minus ab Angelis." Sed Deus, qui dives est in misericordia, supernaturalibus insuper donis eum cumulans, ad altissimam filiorum Dei dignitatem evexit. "Etsi," inquit S. Augustinus (Epist. 117. ad Innoc.) "quadam non improbanda ratione dicitur gratia Dei qua creati sumus, ut nonnihil essemus, nec ita essemus aliquid ut cadaver quod non vivit, aut arbor quae non sentit, aut pecus quod non intelligit, sed homines, qui et essemus, et viveremus, et sentiremus, et intelligeremus, et de hoc tanto beneficio Creatori nostro gratias agere valeamus; unde merito et ista gratia dici potest, quia non praecedentium aliquorum bonorum operum meritis, sed gratuita Dei bonitate donata est: alia est tamen qua praedestinati vocamur, justificamur, glorificamur." 209. Considering in the preceding disputation man according to that which pertains to his nature, we saw that he is so raised above the other visible creatures that it is deservedly said of him, "For thou hast made him a little less than the Angels." But God, who is rich in mercy, heaping him besides with supernatural gifts, raised him to the highest dignity of the sons of God. "Although," says St. Augustine (Epistle 117, to Innocent), "by a certain not disapproved reasoning that may be called the grace of God by which we were created, so that we should be something, and should not be something in such a way as a corpse which does not live, or a tree which does not sense, or a beast which does not understand, but men, who both should exist, and should live, and should sense, and should understand, and should be able to give thanks to our Creator for so great a benefit; whence this too can deservedly be called grace, because it was given, not by the merits of any preceding good works, but by the gratuitous goodness of God: nevertheless that grace is another by which, having been predestined, we are called, justified, glorified."

210. Duplex in hac disputatione adversariorum genus impetimus. Pelagiani, Sociniani, Arminiani, quibus subscribunt recentiores rationalistae negant protoparentes donis supernaturalibus fuisse exornatos: et cum nihil in homine nunc desideretur, quod ad naturam humanam constituendam requiritur, existimarunt hominem in ea conditione nunc nasci, in qua olim conditus fuit, nempe sine gratia, sine peccato. Ex quo falso principio inferunt nullum esse peccatum originale, nullam gratiae necessitatem, nullam proprie dictam reparationem per Christum. 210. In this disputation we attack two kinds of adversaries. The Pelagians, Socinians, Arminians, to whom the more recent rationalists subscribe, deny that the first parents were adorned with supernatural gifts; and since nothing is now lacking in man which is required for constituting human nature, they thought that man is now born in that condition in which he was formerly established, namely without grace, without sin. From this false principle they infer that there is no original sin, no necessity of grace, no restoration properly so called through Christ.

211. Lutherani, Calvinistae, Janseniani, Baius, Quesnellus, etc., e contra contendunt hominem non modo accepisse a Deo omnia dona, quae eum in statu justitiae originalis collocabant, sed etiam ipsius naturae esse debita. Hinc inferebant per peccatum hominem

intrinsece in sua natura corruptum fuisse; concupiscentiae, quam verum peccatum dicunt, subjici; libero arbitrio privari, etc. Vid. Bell. (De Grat. Primi hom. cap. 1.) 211. The Lutherans, Calvinists, Jansenists, Baius, Quesnell, etc., on the contrary contend that man not only received from God all the gifts which placed him in the state of original justice, but also that they were owed to nature itself. Hence they inferred that through sin man was intrinsically corrupted in his nature; that he was subjected to concupiscence, which they call true sin; that he was deprived of free will, etc. See Bellarmine, On the Grace of the First Man, chapter 1.

212. Doctrina Catholica vero veluti media incedit inter hos oppositos errores. Dum enim adstruit factum, nempe Deum instruxisse hominem gratia sanctificante, integritate, immortalitate, etc.; simul tenet omnia illa dona fuisse humanae naturae indebita. - Ut ergo integram catholicam veritatem in hac re tueamur, debemus imprimis existentiam, dein autem eorum donorum supernaturalitatem vindicare. Utrumque praestabimus, postquam generales quasdam notiones de diversis humanae naturae statibus - de justitia originali - de supernaturalitate donorum tradiderimus. 212. Catholic doctrine, however, proceeds as a sort of middle way between these opposed errors. For while it asserts the fact, namely that God furnished man with sanctifying grace, integrity, immortality, etc., at the same time it holds that all those gifts were not owed to human nature. Therefore, so that we may protect the whole Catholic truth in this matter, we must first vindicate the existence, and then the supernaturality, of those gifts. We shall accomplish both after we have handed down certain general notions concerning the diverse states of human nature, concerning original justice, and concerning the supernaturality of gifts.

Articulus Primus.
Generalis Notio De Diversis Humanae Naturae Statibus.

213. "Status," inquit D. Thomas, 2. 2. q. 185. a. 1. c., "proprie loquendo significat quamdam positionis differentiam, secundum quam aliquid disponitur, secundum modum suae naturae, quasi in quadam immobilitate." 213. "State," says St. Thomas, II-II, q. 185, a. 1, corpus, "properly speaking signifies a certain difference of position, according to which something is disposed, according to the mode of its nature, as though in a certain immobility."

214. Haec generica status acceptio non eodem modo applicatur in diversis scientiis. Ita in jure civili significabat certam personae conditionem, secundum quam sui, vel alieni juris est: serva, vel libera, unde status servitutis vel libertatis. - In jure Canonico, significat genus illud vivendi, cui immobiliter homo est alligatus, ut status Matrimonii, Religionis, Sacrorum Ordinum. - In Theologia Morali nomen status vel sumitur una ex praedictis significationibus, quas habet in jure Canonico; vel ad significandum uniuscujusque privatam conditionem, secundum quam homo dicitur esse in statu gratiae, vel peccati. 214. This generic acceptance of state is not applied in the same way in the diverse sciences. Thus in civil law it signified a definite condition of a person, according to which he is under his own right or another's right: slave or free; whence the state of servitude or liberty. - In canon law, it signifies that kind of life to which a man is immovably bound, as the state of Matrimony, Religion, or Sacred Orders. - In Moral Theology the name state is either taken in one of the aforesaid significations which it has in canon law, or for signifying each person's private condition, according to which a man is said to be in the state of grace or of sin.

215. Sed his omissis, in re praesenti nomine status intelligimus certam conditionem, seu certum modum se habendi totius humani generis in ordine ad ultimum finem, secundum divinae Providentiae legem. Comprehendit ergo et finem, et media, et obstacula,

et externam Dei Providentiam, etc. 215. But omitting these things, in the present matter by the name state we understand a definite condition, or a definite mode of comporting itself, of the whole human race in order to the last end, according to the law of divine Providence. Therefore it comprehends the end, the means, the obstacles, the external Providence of God, etc.

216. Duplici autem modo potest generatim se habere homo in ordine ad ultimum finem: vel eo jam acquisito fruitur, vel ad eumdem nondum acquisitum tendit. Hinc divisio status in statum termini, et statum viae. Primus potiori ratione dicitur status, siquidem habet omnimodam stabilitatem; sed de hoc nunc non agimus. 216. Now in general man can comport himself in two ways in order to the last end: either he enjoys it as already acquired, or he tends toward it as not yet acquired. Hence the division of state into the state of the term and the state of the way. The first is called state with greater reason, since it has stability in every respect; but we are not now treating of this.

217. Generatim apud antiquiores Theologos de duplici solum statu viae fieri solet mentio: de statu naturae integrae (ita vocabant statum, in quo Adam conditus a Deo fuit), et de statu naturae lapsae. Subortis vero haeresibus Novatorum, majori distinctione haec quaestio de statibus tractari caepit. Unde variae status viae divisiones inductae sunt, quarum praecipua est in status viae reales, et mere possibiles; prout consideratur status, in quo humana natura vere fuit, vel actu est; aut status, in quo numquam fuit, sed esse posset. 217. In general among the older theologians mention is usually made of only two states of the way: the state of integral nature (so they called the state in which Adam was established by God), and the state of fallen nature. But after the heresies of the Innovators arose, this question concerning states began to be treated with greater distinction. Hence various divisions of the state of the way were introduced, of which the chief is into real states of the way and merely possible states, according as one considers the state in which human nature truly was, or actually is, or a state in which it never was, but could be.

218. Status viae reales tres numerantur: status justitiae originalis, qui vocari etiam solet status naturae innocentis - status naturae lapsae - status naturae lapsae et reparatae.

Status justitiae originalis est ille, in quo Adam conditus fuit, et comprehendit ea omnia dona, quae declarabimus, cum de eo statu erit sermo. - Status naturae lapsae est ille, in quo sunt omnes posteri Adae ante Baptismum. - Status naturae lapsae et reparatae, est ille, in quo sunt omnes homines per merita Christi redempti. 218. Three real states of the way are counted: the state of original justice, which is also usually called the state of innocent nature; the state of fallen nature; and the state of fallen and repaired nature.

The state of original justice is that in which Adam was established, and it comprehends all those gifts which we shall declare when there is discussion of that state. - The state of fallen nature is that in which all the descendants of Adam are before Baptism. - The state of fallen and repaired nature is that in which all men redeemed through the merits of Christ are.

219. Inter status vero mere possibiles, specialem meretur attentionem status purae naturae. Hic status duo comprehendit, positivum unum, alterum negativum. Positivum est, ut habeat humana natura cum perfectione essentiali, naturales facultates, finem sibi convenientem, concursum et Providentiam sibi proportionatam, etc. Negativum autem, ut humana natura praeter id, quod ut diximus, ipsi competit, nihil aliud habeat sive boni sive mali. Hinc concipitur homo esse in statu purae naturae, quando concipitur esse sine peccato, et sine ullo dono indebito, seu superaddito naturae exigentiis. 219. But among the merely possible states, the state of pure nature merits special attention. This state comprehends two

things, one positive, the other negative. The positive is that human nature should have, together with essential perfection, natural faculties, an end suitable to itself, concurrence and Providence proportioned to itself, etc. The negative is that human nature, besides that which, as we have said, belongs to it, should have nothing else, whether good or evil. Hence man is conceived to be in the state of pure nature when he is conceived to be without sin and without any gift not owed, or superadded to the demands of nature.

220. Praeter statum purae naturae plures alii status viae possibiles distingui solent, quamvis in eorum numero designando non videantur convenire Theologi, quod mirum non est; siquidem, uti bene observat Suarez (de op. sex. dierum, lib. 3., cap. 20., n. 45.) cum agatur de statibus possibilibus, "isti multiplicari possunt, vel unum vel plures (status) dividendo, vel ex mixtione plurium alios conficiendo." Unde habetur:

Status naturae elevatae, in quo homo esset elevatus ad beatitudinem supernaturalem, ac consequenter haberet omnia illa dona, quae ad illam consequendam requiruntur: quod quidem commune esset huic statui cum statu justitiae originalis. Sed in statu naturae simpliciter elevatae, non haberet homo caetera dona propria justitiae originalis, uti est immortalitas, immunitas a concupiscentia, etc.

Status naturae integrae solet distingui a statu justitiae originalis. "Nam posset Deus," inquit Suarez, l. c. n. 46., "condere hominem perfectum intra ordinem naturalem, et sine fomite, vel rebellione inter carnem, et spiritum, absque aliis peculiaribus privilegiis datis Adae in primo statu; et ille status sic conceptus vocatur integritatis naturae qui separabilis est a statu gratiae, ut ex dictis constat, et praeterea distingueretur ab statu originalis justitiae, quia non haberet adjuncta privilegia, vel immortalitatis, vel indolentiae, aut praeservationis ab omni errore, vel defectu veniali."

Sic a multis distinguitur, ait idem Auctor n. 45. status justitiae originalis perficientis hominem intra ordinem et finem naturalem, a statu gratiae, seu statu justitiae ut includentis gratiam. In hoc statu concipitur homo instructus non modo dono immunitatis a concupiscentia, quod invenitur in statu naturae integrae, sed etiam aliis donis, quae plenam rectitudinem in naturali ordine, justitia originalis conferebat. Dicitur autem rectitudo in naturali ordine, non quia esset debita humanae naturae, dona enim illa essent praeternaturalia; sed quia per se perficiunt non in ordine ad finem supernaturalem, ut melius deinde patebit.

"Ad eundem modum," ait Suarez n. 47., "considerari potest alius status, in quo simul justitia originalis sine justitia gratiae, cum statu peccati conjungatur, nam hic status possibilis est quia inter illa duo non est formalis repugnantia.

Sic beatissima Virgo habuit quemdam peculiarem statum (pro humano genere solum possibilem) naturae lapsae, conjunctum cum statu gratiae, et perfectae innocentiae personalis, et cum carentia fomitis, quae ad naturae integritatem pertinet, et nihilominus statum justitiae originalis non habuit, ut explicavi in 2. t. 3. p. d. 4. sect. 6." 220. Besides the state of pure nature, several other possible states of the way are usually distinguished, although theologians do not seem to agree in designating their number. This is not wonderful, since, as Suarez well observes (On the Work of the Six Days, book 3, chapter 20, n. 45), since the matter concerns possible states, "these can be multiplied either by dividing one or several states, or by making others from the mixture of several." Hence there is:

The state of elevated nature, in which man would be elevated to supernatural beatitude, and consequently would have all those gifts which are required for attaining it; and this indeed would be common to this state with the state of original justice. But in the state of nature simply elevated, man would not have the other gifts proper to original justice, such as immortality, immunity from concupiscence, etc.

The state of integral nature is usually distinguished from the state of original justice. "For God could," says Suarez in the cited place, n. 46, "establish man perfect within the natural order, and without the tinder, or rebellion between flesh and spirit, apart from the other peculiar privileges given to Adam in the first state; and that state so conceived is called the state of integrity of nature, which is separable from the state of grace, as is clear from what has been said, and furthermore would be distinguished from the state of original justice, because it would not have the joined privileges either of immortality, or of freedom from suffering, or of preservation

from every error or venial defect."

Thus, the same author says in n. 45, by many the state of original justice perfecting man within the natural order and end is distinguished from the state of grace, or the state of justice as including grace. In this state man is conceived as furnished not only with the gift of immunity from concupiscence, which is found in the state of integral nature, but also with the other gifts which original justice conferred as full rectitude in the natural order. It is called rectitude in the natural order, not because it would be owed to human nature, for those gifts would be preternatural, but because of themselves they perfect not in order to a supernatural end, as will be clearer later.

"In the same way," says Suarez, n. 47, "another state can be considered, in which original justice without the justice of grace is joined together with the state of sin; for this state is possible because there is no formal repugnance between those two.

Thus the most blessed Virgin had a certain peculiar state (only possible for the human race) of fallen nature, joined with the state of grace and of perfect personal innocence, and with the lack of the tinder, which pertains to the integrity of nature, and nevertheless she did not have the state of original justice, as I explained in 2, t. 3, p., d. 4, sect. 6."

221. Nobis in hac disputatione agendum est imprimis de statu justitiae originalis, in quo Adam conditus fuit. - Cum autem dona hujus status sint, ut diximus, naturae indebita; ex hoc deducemus possibilitatem status purae naturae. - In disputatione vero sequente erit sermo de amissione justitiae, seu de statu naturae lapsae. - De natura lapsa et reparata agitur in aliis Theologiae Tractatibus. 221. In this disputation we must deal first with the state of original justice, in which Adam was established. But since the gifts of this state are, as we have said, not owed to nature, from this we shall deduce the possibility of the state of pure nature. In the following disputation there will be discussion of the loss of justice, or of the state of fallen nature. Fallen and repaired nature is treated in other treatises of Theology.

Article 2. General Idea of the State of Original Justice

LatineEnglish

Articulus Secundus.
Generalis Idea De Statu Justitiae Originalis.

222. Nomen justitiae non sumitur hic ad significandum unam ex virtutibus cardinalibus; sed prout significat rectum ordinem alicujus totius (hominis) et omnium ejus partium (anima, corpus - diversae facultates), quarum unaquaeque in suo ordine contineatur; ita ut recte se habeat tam in ordine ad alias partes, tam in ordine (si sermo sit de facultatibus) ad proprios actus. Dicitur autem originalis haec justitia, tum quia ab origine consequuti eam sunt primi Parentes, tum quia, si non peccassent, eam ad posteros transmisissent, non praecise vi generationis, sed Deo in singulorum ab Adamo per viam communem generationis descendentium illam infundente. 222. The name justice is not taken here to signify one of the cardinal virtues, but insofar as it signifies the right order of some whole (man) and of all its parts (soul, body, the diverse faculties), each of which is contained in its own order, so that it is rightly disposed both in order to the other parts and in order, if the discussion is about faculties, to its proper acts. But this justice is called original both because the first Parents obtained it from the beginning, and because, if they had not sinned, they would have transmitted it to their descendants, not precisely by force of generation, but with God infusing it into each of those descending from Adam by the common way of generation.

223. Justitia sic accepta potest esse naturalis, vel supernaturalis; prout illa recta totius hominis et omnium partium ejus dispositio est in ordine ad finem naturalem, vel supernaturalem. Hic agimus solum de illa justitia, in qua reapse conditi fuerunt primi Parentes, ideoque de justitia supernaturali. 223.

Justice accepted in this way can be natural or supernatural, according as that right disposition of the whole man and of all his parts is in order to a natural or supernatural end. Here we are treating only of that justice in which the first Parents were in fact established, and therefore of supernatural justice.

224. Haec supernaturalis justitia sumi potest adequate vel inadequate. Adequate sumpta importat complexum omnium donorum, quae Adae collata fuere, et quibus recte disponebatur in ordine ad Deum ultimum finem supernaturalem. Inadequate vero sumpta importat principalem formam, quae tamquam radix et fundamentum ad alias perfectiones justitiae originalis comparatur. 224. This supernatural justice can be taken adequately or inadequately. Taken adequately, it imports the complex of all the gifts which were conferred upon Adam, and by which he was rightly disposed in order to God, the last supernatural end. Taken inadequately, however, it imports the principal form which is related as root and foundation to the other perfections of original justice.

225. Justitia supernaturalis adequate sumpta dici etiam solet status innocentiae; non quatenus culpa careat, cum hoc pertineat etiam ad statum purae naturae; sed quatenus nullam compatiatur culpam, nullum ex his defectibus, qui nunc sunt poena peccati, et aptissimus sit ad conservandam innocentiam: status innocentiae antonomastice. 225. Supernatural justice taken adequately is also usually called the state of innocence: not insofar as it lacks fault, since this also pertains to the state of pure nature, but insofar as it is compatible with no fault, with none of those defects which are now the punishment of sin, and is most apt for preserving innocence: the state of innocence by antonomasia.

226. Tres, uti docet D. Th. 1. p. q. 95. a. 1., erant praecipuae veluti partes justitiae originalis adequatae, ad quas caeterae facile revocantur: "erat rectitudo secundum hoc, quod ratio subdebatur Deo, rationi vero inferiores vires, et animae corpus." Quod explicans Suarez (de op. sex dier. l. 3. c. 20. n. 10.), inquit: "Rectitudo illius justitiae in tribus praecipue consistebat, videlicet in debita subordinatione animae ad Deum, quae est per intellectum, et voluntatem, et consequenter per dona, vel habitus illas potentias recte disponentes in ordine ad Deum. Item in debita subordinatione inferioris partis, ad superiorem, id est, phantasiae ad intellectum, et appetitus sensitivi ad voluntatem, per quam fiebat, ut in his inferioribus potentiis nulla motio disconveniens homini esse posset, quamdiu ratio in perfecta subjectione ad Deum perseveraret. Item in debita subordinatione corporis ad animam quoad indolentiam, impassibilitatem, et immortalitatem." 226. As St. Thomas teaches, I, q. 95, a. 1, there were three principal, as it were, parts of adequate original justice, to which the others are easily reduced: "there was rectitude according to this, that reason was subjected to God, the lower powers to reason, and the body to the soul." Explaining this, Suarez (On the Work of the Six Days, book 3, chapter 20, n. 10) says: "The rectitude of that justice consisted chiefly in three things, namely in the due subordination of the soul to God, which is through the intellect and will, and consequently through the gifts or habits rightly disposing those powers in order to God. Likewise in the due subordination of the lower part to the higher, that is, of phantasy to intellect and of the sensitive appetite to the will, through which it came about that in these lower powers no motion unbecoming to man could exist, so long as reason persevered in perfect subjection to God. Likewise in the due subordination of the body to the soul with respect to freedom from suffering, impassibility, and immortality."

227. Justitia autem originalis inadequate sumpta consistit in gratia sanctificante. Quod, ut bene intelligatur, notandum est quod inter dona justitiae originalis adequatae alia sunt veluti intrinsece connexa cum gratia sanctificante, uti, ex. gr., habitus virtutum infusarum; alia vero cum ea connexa veluti per accidens, aut ex extrinseca Dei ordinatione, uti, ex. gr.,

donum immunitatis a concupiscentia. Relate ad prima, gratia sanctificans dicitur eorum radix et fundamentum, quatenus vel haec dona ab illa physice resultant, vel connaturaliter ei debentur, prout praecise gratia sanctificans est. Relate vero ad alia, gratia sanctificans dicitur esse eorum radix et fundamentum, non quatenus erant connaturaliter debita ei, prout praecise est gratia sanctificans; sed quatenus gratiae sanctificanti illius status innocentiae, ita ex divina ordinatione ordinabantur, ut ea stante, caetera dona permanerent, et ea amissa, amitterentur, uti melius infra patebit. 227. But original justice taken inadequately consists in sanctifying grace. In order that this may be rightly understood, it must be noted that among the gifts of adequate original justice some are as it were intrinsically connected with sanctifying grace, as, for example, the habits of the infused virtues; but others are connected with it as it were by accident, or from the extrinsic ordination of God, as, for example, the gift of immunity from concupiscence. With respect to the first, sanctifying grace is called their root and foundation insofar as these gifts either result physically from it, or are connaturally owed to it, precisely insofar as it is sanctifying grace. But with respect to the others, sanctifying grace is said to be their root and foundation, not insofar as they were connaturally owed to it, precisely insofar as it is sanctifying grace, but insofar as they were so ordered, by divine ordination, to the sanctifying grace of that state of innocence, that while it stood, the other gifts remained, and when it was lost, they were lost, as will be clearer below.

228. Quare intelligitur 1. quomodo gratia sanctificans, licet eadem specie in Adamo ante peccatum, et in nobis; in eo tunc radicabat aliqua dona, quae nec in Adamo post poenitentiam, nec in nobis radicat: quamvis enim cum gratia, quam recuperamus per Christum, obtineamus etiam infusionem donorum, quae connaturaliter illam consequuntur, non tamen recuperamus caetera, quae solum ex divina ordinatione cum gratia primi status connectebantur. Unde D. Th., in 2. distinct. 32. q. 1. a. 2. ad 1., ait: "Excludere hujusmodi poenalitates non est effectus justitiae, quantum justitia est; sed fuit effectus originalis justitiae ratione cujusdam accidentis sibi annexi, in quantum scilicet fuit continuata, et non intercisa in natura humana: decuit enim, ut sicut anima sine interruptione in Deum dirigebatur per justitiam: ita etiam corpus animae sine interruptione totaliter obediret: et ideo non oportet, quod ille effectus gratuitae justitiae conveniat, cum facta fuerit interruptio rectitudinis humanae naturae ad Deum." 228. Wherefore it is understood, first, how sanctifying grace, although the same in species in Adam before sin and in us, rooted in him certain gifts which it roots neither in Adam after penance nor in us. For although with the grace which we recover through Christ we also obtain the infusion of gifts which connaturally follow it, nevertheless we do not recover the other gifts which were connected with the grace of the first state only by divine ordination. Hence St. Thomas, in II, dist. 32, q. 1, a. 2, ad 1, says: "To exclude penalities of this kind is not the effect of justice insofar as it is justice; but it was an effect of original justice by reason of a certain accident annexed to it, namely insofar as it was continued and not interrupted in human nature. For it was fitting that, just as the soul without interruption was directed to God through justice, so also the body should without interruption obey the soul totally. And therefore it is not necessary that that effect of gratuitous justice be fitting when an interruption of the rectitude of human nature toward God has been made."

229. Intelligitur 2. quid respondendum sit quaestioni utrum gratia sanctificans in Adamo fuerit habitus distinctus a dono justitiae originalis. Omissis diversis opinionibus, quae de hac re hinc inde agitari olim solebant, dicere possumus 1. quod si justitia originalis sumitur vel prout praescindit a fine naturali vel supernaturali, aut prout dicit rectam dispositionem in ordine ad finem naturalem (ita tamen non fuit in Adamo); certe gratia sanctificans est donum omnino ab ea distinctum. - 2. quod si justitia originalis supernaturalis sumitur inadequate; idem est ac gratia sanctificans. - 3. Si tandem justitia originalis supernaturalis sumitur adequate; gratia sanctificans distinguitur ab ea sicut pars a toto. 229. It is understood, second, what should be answered to the question whether sanctifying grace in Adam was a habit distinct

from the gift of original justice. Passing over the diverse opinions which formerly were customarily agitated here and there concerning this matter, we can say: first, that if original justice is taken either insofar as it abstracts from a natural or supernatural end, or insofar as it bespeaks a right disposition in order to a natural end (though in this way it was not in Adam), certainly sanctifying grace is a gift altogether distinct from it; second, that if supernatural original justice is taken inadequately, it is the same as sanctifying grace; third, if finally supernatural original justice is taken adequately, sanctifying grace is distinguished from it as a part from a whole.

230. His itaque positis facile ostenditur:

Prop. XXII. Inter dona justitiae originalis, gratia sanctificans uti caeterorum radix et fundamentum habenda est.

Prob. I. Justitia originalis formaliter, et adequate erat quaedam collectio plurium perfectionum data a Deo ad constituendum hominem in quodam felicitatis statu; ergo illa omnia data sunt cum aliquo ordine inter se. Nam multitudo sine ordine est confusio, et ideo quae a Deo sunt, ordinata sunt, imo cum summa sapientia, et pulchritudine ordinantur: optimus autem ordo postulat, ut quando multa in unum conveniunt, inferiora superioribus subordinata sint, et quod in eis est supremum, sit quasi caput, et fundamentum aliorum; ergo ita fuit constituta originalis justitia. Unde cum in illa collectione gratia fuerit principalis forma, illa censenda est quasi essentialis in illa justitia, reliqua vero omnia tamquam proprietates ejus, vel tamquam auxilia, et ornamenta illi adjuncta ad perfectius vivendum, et operandum secundum justitiam, et sine defectu."

Prob. II. Si nomine gratiae intelligamus solam simplicem formam gratiae existentis in essentia animae, illa imprimis comparatur ad habitus operativos per se infusos, tamquam essentia ad proprietates: et hac ratione dicitur esse illorum radix, et fundamentum. Si vero sit sermo de tota gratia habituali, prout includit habitus operativos per se infusos, et praebet animae supernaturalem rectitudinem; sic etiam gratia fuit fundamentum, et radix illius rectitudinis naturalis, quae per justitiam originalem supra puram naturam addebatur. Quia, teste Augustino, imo teste experientia et effectu, quem Scriptura narrat, illa naturae integritas, seu rectitudo sub hac lege data est, ut quamdiu prior rectitudo erga Deum duraret, etiam inferior rectitudo naturalis conservaretur, et priori destructa, posterior consequenter amitteretur; ergo signum est, gratiam etiam fuisse fundamentum rectitudinis naturalis saltem ex lege, et pacto Dei. Imo supposita elevatione humanae naturae ad finem supernaturalem, et statum gratiae, id ex natura rei consequebatur, quia non potest homo in hoc statu se avertere a Deo fine supernaturali, quin contra rationem etiam naturalem peccet, et consequenter rectitudinem naturalem deserat, et ideo perfecta etiam rectitudo naturalis in supernaturali fundari debuit.

Prob. III. Cum homo in eo statu propter finem supernaturalem conditus sit, quidquid perfectionis recepit in rectitudine naturali, datum illi est ad conservandum felicius, et melius rectitudinem supernaturalem, et ut posset homo facile, et sine impedimentis tendere in illum finem sine peccato, et cum magno merito; ergo omnis illa perfectio intuitu gratiae data est, et sub ea ratione censeri potest tanquam speciale adjutorium gratiae; ergo fuit in illa fundatum, et radicatum, et propter illam tanquam propter formam principalem donatum. Atque eodem modo concludi potest de aliis perfectionibus pertinentibus ad robur, et impassibilitatem corporis. Nam haec etiam propter virtutis operationem data sunt tanquam dispositiones, quae et evitationem mali, et operationem boni faciliorem reddebant. Et praeterea si aliquid considerari potest in originali justitia, quod vel ad hominis ornamentum, vel ad naturalem commoditatem, aut jucunditatem pertineat, totum id datum est homini ut amico Dei et filio, justo et innocenti, et ideo datum fuit dependenter a prima gratia in statu innocentiae collata; fuit ergo illa gratia fundamentum reliquorum bonorum originalis justitiae. - Has probationes sumpsimus ex Suarez (de op. sex. dier. l. 3. c. 20. nn. 21. 22. 23.) - Eadem saepe tradit D. Th.: 1. p. q. 95. a. 1. 1. 2. q. 83. a. 2. ad 2. - c. g. l. 4. cap. 52., etc. 230. Therefore, with these things having been set down, it is easily shown:

Proposition XXII. Among the gifts of original justice, sanctifying grace must be held as the root and foundation of the others.

Proof I. Original justice formally and adequately was a certain

collection of several perfections given by God for constituting man in a certain state of felicity; therefore all those things were given with some order among themselves. For a multitude without order is confusion, and therefore the things which are from God are ordered; indeed, they are ordered with the highest wisdom and beauty. But the best order demands that, when many things come together into one, the lower things be subordinated to the higher, and that what is supreme in them be as it were the head and foundation of the others; therefore original justice was so constituted. Hence, since in that collection grace was the principal form, it must be judged as quasi-essential in that justice, while all the rest are as its properties, or as helps and ornaments joined to it for living and operating more perfectly according to justice and without defect.

Proof II. If by the name grace we understand only the simple form of grace existing in the essence of the soul, that is first compared to operative habits infused in themselves as essence is to properties; and by this reason it is said to be their root and foundation. But if the discussion is about the whole of habitual grace, insofar as it includes operative habits infused in themselves and provides supernatural rectitude to the soul, then in this way grace too was the foundation and root of that natural rectitude which was added above pure nature through original justice. For, with Augustine as witness, indeed with experience and with the effect which Scripture narrates as witness, that integrity or rectitude of nature was given under this law: that as long as the prior rectitude toward God endured, the lower natural rectitude would also be preserved, and once the prior was destroyed, the latter would consequently be lost. Therefore it is a sign that grace too was the foundation of natural rectitude, at least by the law and covenant of God. Indeed, once the elevation of human nature to the supernatural end and the state of grace is supposed, this followed from the nature of the thing, because man in this state cannot turn himself away from God as supernatural end without sinning also against natural reason, and consequently abandoning natural rectitude; and therefore even perfect natural rectitude had to be founded in the supernatural.

Proof III. Since man was established in that state on account of a supernatural end, whatever of perfection he received in natural rectitude was given to him for preserving supernatural rectitude more happily and better, and so that man could tend easily, and without impediments, toward that end without sin and with great merit. Therefore all that perfection was given with a view to grace, and under that account can be judged as a special assistance of grace; therefore it was founded and rooted in it, and was given on account of it as on account of the principal form. And in the same way one can conclude concerning the other perfections pertaining to the strength and impassibility of the body. For these too were given on account of the operation of virtue as dispositions which made both the avoidance of evil and the operation of good easier. And besides, if anything can be considered in original justice which pertains either to man's ornament, or to natural convenience, or to delight, all of it was given to man as a friend and son of God, just and innocent; and therefore it was given dependently on the first grace conferred in the state of innocence. Therefore that grace was the foundation of the remaining goods of original justice. - We have taken these proofs from Suarez (On the Work of the Six Days, book 3, chapter 20, nn. 21, 22, 23). - St. Thomas often hands down the same: I, q. 95, a. 1; I-II, q. 83, a. 2, ad 2; Contra Gentiles, book 4, chapter 52, etc.

Article 3. Idea of a Supernatural Being or Gift

LatineEnglish

Corrected Latin Text
Articulus Tertius.
Idea Entis Seu Doni Supernaturalis. The Idea Of A Supernatural Being Or Gift.

231. Ad verum supernaturalis doni conceptum assequendum, necesse est imprimis, variis supernaturalis acceptionibus traditis, veram determinare et expolire - documenta dein Ecclesiae proferre et exponere - ut in his veram supernaturalis ideam fundari

ostendatur. Haec distinctis paragraphis praestabimus. 231. In order to attain the true concept of a supernatural gift, it is necessary first, after the various acceptations of supernatural have been handed down, to determine and polish the true one; then to bring forward and explain the documents of the Church, so that it may be shown that the true idea of the supernatural is founded in them. We shall accomplish these things in distinct paragraphs.

§ I. § I.

232. Duplex supernaturalis conceptus distingui potest: respectivus unus, quatenus ens supernaturale consideratur in ordine ad naturam, supra quam est; alter absolutus, quatenus ens supernaturale in se consideratur, non attendendo ad naturam, quam superat. De absoluto melius agitur ubi de entibus supernaturalibus in specie est sermo; ideoque pauca de illo dicemus in fine §; hic potius respectivum supernaturalis conceptum illustrabimus. 232. A twofold concept of the supernatural can be distinguished: one respective, insofar as a supernatural being is considered in order to the nature above which it is; the other absolute, insofar as a supernatural being is considered in itself, without attending to the nature which it surpasses. The absolute is better treated where there is discussion of supernatural beings in species; and therefore we shall say a few things about it at the end of the paragraph. Here we shall rather illustrate the respective concept of the supernatural.

233. Supernaturale itaque, juxta vim vocis, significat aliquid supra naturam; unde per oppositionem ad naturale exponi solet. Jamvero naturale multiplices habet acceptiones, quas notare juverit sive ad verum supernaturalis conceptum illustrandum, sive ad objectiones praecavendas, quae ex aequivocatione verborum peti solent. 233. Therefore supernatural, according to the force of the word, signifies something above nature; whence it is usually explained by opposition to natural. Now natural has manifold acceptations, which it will be useful to note both for illustrating the true concept of the supernatural and for forestalling objections which are usually drawn from equivocation of words.

234. a) "Naturale dicitur," inquit Bellarminus (de grat. prim. hom. cap. 5.) "id omne, quod habetur a nativitate, qua significatione dicimur natura filii irae, Eph. 2. Et hoc modo justitiam originalem fatemur dici posse naturalem. Sed haec significatio ad quaestionem praesentem non pertinet, propterea quod naturale hoc modo acceptum non opponitur supernaturali, cum tam naturalia, quam supernaturalia dona possint haberi a nativitate, ut notum est." - Atque hoc modo statum Adami ante peccatum vocavit aliquando naturam S. Augustinus. Ita l. 3. de lib. arb. c. 19. n. 54.: "Naturam aliter dicimus, cum proprie loquimur, naturam hominis, in qua primum in suo genere inculpabilis factus est, aliter istam, in qua ex illius damnati poena et mortales et ignari et carni subditi nascimur, juxta quem modum dicit Apostolus: fuimus enim et nos naturaliter filii irae." Item lib. 1. Retract. c. 10. n. 3.: "Ipsa enim (in qua conditus est) vere ac proprie natura hominis dicitur: translato autem vocabulo utimur, ut naturam dicamus etiam, qualis nascitur homo:" etc. 15. n. 6.: "Proprie natura dicitur, in qua sine vitio creati sumus."

b) Naturale dici potest id, quod est naturae consentaneum, quodque eam non destruit, sed ornat, ac perficit. Qua ratione S. Augustinus libro de Spiritu, et litera, cap. 26. dictum esse docet ab Apostolo: "Gentes quae legem non habent, naturaliter quae legis sunt, faciunt." Rom. 2. Quia enim vitium est contra naturam, gratia vero sanat naturam, cum ex gratia lex impletur, naturaliter impleri non inepte dici potest. Caeterum de naturali hoc modo accepto, nulla quaestio est, cum ejusmodi naturale non supernaturali, sed ei quod est contra naturam opponatur, et non solum justitia originalis, sed etiam gratiae donum quodcumque, et ipsa etiam vita aeterna hoc modo dicenda sit naturalis.

c) Dicitur naturale, quod tametsi donum sit gratuitum, tamen naturam juvat, ac perficit in operibus naturalibus, neque eam elevat ad opera ulla

supernaturalia. Et hoc modo justitia originalis, si distincta esse intelligatur a gratia gratum faciente, donum naturale dici potest.

d) Naturale aliquid dici potest extensive, quatenus non est bonum mere personale, sed extenditur ad totam naturam. Huic non opponitur supernaturale, sed personale; et secundum hoc, dona justitiae originalis naturalia dici possunt, quatenus non solum Adae personae, sed in eo toti humanae naturae erant collata.

e) Naturale etiam dicitur transitive id quod licet ad naturam proprie non pertineat, debet tamen simul cum natura transfundi. Ita dona justitiae originalis dici possunt naturalia, quatenus ex divina ordinatione ab Adamo transmitti debebant ad omnes ejus posteros, et transmissa fuissent, si Adam non peccasset.

f) Naturale dicitur id quod est debitum naturae: huic opponitur supernaturale. Supernaturale igitur est naturae superadditum, seu quod ex ipso excessu supra naturam, est naturae indebitum, ac proinde gratuitum. 234. a) "Natural is called," says Bellarmine (On the Grace of the First Man, chapter 5), "everything which is had from birth; by which signification we are called by nature children of wrath, Ephesians 2. And in this way we confess that original justice can be called natural. But this signification does not pertain to the present question, because natural accepted in this way is not opposed to supernatural, since both natural and supernatural gifts can be had from birth, as is known." - And in this way St. Augustine sometimes called the state of Adam before sin nature. Thus book 3, On Free Choice, chapter 19, n. 54: "We speak of nature in one way, when we properly speak of the nature of man, in which first, in its own kind, he was made blameless; in another way, this nature, in which from the punishment of that condemned man we are born mortal and ignorant and subjected to the flesh, according to which mode the Apostle says: for we too were by nature children of wrath." Likewise book 1, Retractations, chapter 10, n. 3: "For that itself in which he was established is truly and properly called the nature of man; but we use the word by transference, so that we also call nature that in which man is born;" etc. 15, n. 6: "Properly nature is called that in which we were created without defect."

b) Natural can be called that which is consonant with nature and which does not destroy it, but adorns and perfects it. By this reason St. Augustine, in the book On the Spirit and the Letter, chapter 26, teaches that it was said by the Apostle: "The Gentiles who do not have the law, naturally do the things that are of the law," Romans 2. For because vice is contrary to nature, but grace heals nature, when the law is fulfilled from grace, it can not unfittingly be said to be fulfilled naturally. But concerning natural accepted in this way, there is no question, since natural of this kind is opposed not to supernatural, but to that which is contrary to nature; and not only original justice, but also any gift of grace whatsoever, and even eternal life itself, must be called natural in this way.

c) That is called natural which, although it is a gratuitous gift, nevertheless helps and perfects nature in natural works, and does not elevate it to any supernatural works. And in this way original justice, if it is understood to be distinct from grace making one pleasing, can be called a natural gift.

d) Something can be called natural extensively, insofar as it is not a merely personal good, but is extended to the whole nature. To this is opposed not supernatural, but personal; and according to this, the gifts of original justice can be called natural, insofar as they were conferred not only upon the person of Adam, but in him upon the whole of human nature.

e) Natural is also said transitively of that which, although it does not properly pertain to nature, nevertheless ought to be poured forth together with nature. Thus the gifts of original justice can be called natural, insofar as by divine ordination they had to be transmitted from Adam to all his descendants, and would have been transmitted if Adam had not sinned.

f) Natural is said of that which is owed to nature: to this supernatural is opposed. Therefore the supernatural is something superadded to nature, or that which, from its very excess above nature, is not owed to nature, and consequently is gratuitous.

235. Imprimis supernaturale dicitur indebitum. Quod ut intelligatur, notandum est 1. cum D. Thoma (1. 2. q. 111. a. 1. ad 2.) quod "Potest intelligi duplex debitum: unum quidem ex merito proveniens, quod refertur ad personam, cujus est agere meritoria opera, secundum illud ad Rom. 4. 4.: Ei qui operatur, merces imputatur secundum debitum, non secundum gratiam.

Aliud est debitum secundum conditionem naturae; puta si dicamus, debitum esse homini quod habeat rationem, et alia quae ad humanam pertinent naturam. Neutro autem modo dicitur debitum propter hoc quod Deus creaturae obligetur, sed potius in quantum creatura debet subjici Deo, ut in ea divina ordinatio impleatur; quae quidem est ut talis natura tales conditiones vel proprietates habeat, et quod talia operans talia consequatur; dona igitur naturalia carent primo debito. Sed dona supernaturalia utroque debito carent."

Notandum est 2. quod tripliciter aliquid potest esse naturae debitum. a) Debitum constitutive, quia illam in suo esse constituit; sic anima et corpus, quibus humana natura constat dicuntur homini debita. Poterat Deus pro suo lubitu hominem creare aut non creare, semel tamen supposita divina voluntate creandi hominem, anima et corpus sunt ei debita. - b) Debitum consecutive, quia ab ipsa essentia manat, vel ut schola D. Thomae loquebatur, ex principiis naturae, scilicet ab ipsa substantia animae et corporis, per se efficitur. - c) Debitum exigitive, quia quamvis ab extrinseco adveniat, illud tamen a natura exigitur, non ut sit, sed ut bene sit, non necessitate essentiae, sed necessitate finis, ac propterea Deus nequit illud negare, salvis suis attributis; sic concursus ad agendum secundum insitas vires, destinatio ad finem proportionatum dicuntur homini debita. - Supernaturale excludit quodcumque debitum, ac proinde est indebitum naturae, quatenus nec illam constituit, nec ab illa manat aut exigitur.

Notandum est 3. quo sensu Deus dicatur aliquid debere creaturae, et quomodo illud vere debeat sibimetipsi. "In nomine ergo debiti," inquit D. Thomas (1. p. q. 21. a. 1. ad 3.) "importatur quidam ordo exigentiae vel necessitatis alicujus, ad quod ordinatur. Est autem duplex ordo considerandus in rebus. Unus, quo aliquid creatum ordinatur ad aliud creatum, sicut partes ordinantur ad totum, et accidentia ad substantias, et unaquaeque res ad suum finem. Alius ordo, quo omnia creata ordinantur in Deum. Sic igitur et debitum attendi potest dupliciter in operatione divina: aut secundum quod aliquid debetur Deo, aut secundum quod aliquid debetur rei creatae; et utroque modo Deus debitum reddit. Debitum enim est Deo ut impleatur in rebus id quod ejus sapientia et voluntas habet, et quod suam bonitatem manifestat; et secundum hoc justitia Dei respicit decentiam ipsius, secundum quam reddit sibi quod sibi debetur. Debitum etiam est alicui rei creatae quod habeat id quod ad ipsam ordinatur; sicut homini, quod habeat manus, et quod ei alia animalia serviant; et sic etiam Deus operatur justitiam, quando dat unicuique quod ei debetur secundum rationem suae naturae et conditionis. Sed hoc debitum dependet ex primo, quia hoc unicuique debetur quod est ordinatum ad ipsum secundum ordinem divinae sapientiae. Et licet Deus hoc modo debitum alicui det, non tamen ipse est debitor, quia ipse ad alia non ordinatur, sed potius alia in ipsum."

Et l. 2. c. g. c. 29.: "In creaturarum productione debitum invenitur tripliciter. Primo modo, ut sumatur conditionale debitum a tota rerum universitate ad quamlibet ejus partem quae ad perfectionem requiritur universi; si enim tale universum fieri Deus voluit, debitum fuit ut solem et aquam faceret et hujusmodi, sine quibus universum esse non potest. Secundo, ut sumatur conditionale debitum ex una creatura ad aliam; ut, si animalia et plantas Deus esse voluit, debitum fuit ut caelestia corpora faceret hic, ex quibus conservantur; et, si hominem esse voluit, oportuit facere plantas et animalia et alia hujusmodi, quibus homo indiget ad esse perfectum; quamvis haec et illa Deus ex mera fecerit voluntate. Tertio, ut in unaquaque creatura sumatur conditionale debitum ex suis partibus et proprietatibus et accidentibus, quibus dependet creatura quantum ad esse vel quantum ad aliquam sui perfectionem; sicut, supposito quod Deus hominem facere vellet, debitum ex hac suppositione fuit ut animam et corpus in eo conjungeret, et sensus et alia hujusmodi adjumenta, tam intrinseca quam extrinseca, ei praeberet; in quibus omnibus, si recte attenditur, Deus creaturae debitor non dicitur, sed suae dispositioni implendae." 235. First, the supernatural is called not owed. In order that this may be understood, it must be noted, first, with St. Thomas, I-II, q. 111, a. 1, ad 2, that "a twofold debt can be understood: one indeed coming from merit, which is referred to the person whose role it is to do meritorious works, according to Romans 4:4: To him who works, the reward is reckoned according to debt, not according to grace. Another is a debt according to the condition of nature; for instance, if we say that it is owed to man that he have reason, and the other things which pertain to human nature. But in neither way is it called debt because God is obligated to the creature, but rather insofar as the creature ought to be subjected to God, so that the divine ordination may be fulfilled in it; which

indeed is that such a nature should have such conditions or properties, and that one doing such things should obtain such things. Therefore natural gifts lack the first debt. But supernatural gifts lack both debts."

It must be noted, second, that something can be owed to nature in three ways. a) Owed constitutively, because it constitutes it in its being; thus soul and body, by which human nature consists, are called owed to man. God could, according to his own will, create man or not create him; yet once the divine will of creating man is supposed, soul and body are owed to him. - b) Owed consecutively, because it flows from the essence itself, or, as the school of St. Thomas used to speak, is effected from the principles of nature, namely from the very substance of soul and body, of itself. - c) Owed exigently, because although it comes from without, it is nevertheless demanded by nature, not so that it may be, but so that it may be well, not by necessity of essence, but by necessity of the end; and on that account God cannot deny it while preserving his attributes. Thus concurrence for acting according to innate powers, and destination to a proportioned end, are called owed to man. - The supernatural excludes any debt whatsoever, and consequently is not owed to nature, insofar as it neither constitutes nature, nor flows from it, nor is demanded by it.

It must be noted, third, in what sense God is said to owe something to the creature, and how that thing is truly owed to himself. "Therefore in the name of debt," says St. Thomas, I, q. 21, a. 1, ad 3, "there is imported a certain order of exigency or necessity of something to which it is ordered. Now a twofold order must be considered in things. One, by which some created thing is ordered to another created thing, as parts are ordered to the whole, and accidents to substances, and each thing to its own end. Another order, by which all created things are ordered to God. Thus, therefore, debt can be attended to in two ways in the divine operation: either according as something is owed to God, or according as something is owed to a created thing; and in both ways God renders what is owed. For it is owed to God that there be fulfilled in things that which his wisdom and will have, and which manifests his goodness; and according to this the justice of God regards his own fittingness, according to which he renders to himself what is owed to himself. It is also owed to some created thing that it have that which is ordered to it, as it is owed to man that he have hands, and that the other animals serve him; and so also God works justice when he gives to each thing what is owed to it according to the account of its nature and condition. But this debt depends on the first, because this is owed to each thing: that which is ordered to it according to the order of divine wisdom. And although God in this way gives a debt to something, nevertheless he himself is not a debtor, because he himself is not ordered to others, but rather others to him."

And book 2, Contra Gentiles, chapter 29: "In the production of creatures, debt is found in three ways. In the first way, so that a conditional debt is taken from the whole universe of things to any part of it which is required for the perfection of the universe; for if God willed such a universe to be made, it was owed that he make the sun and water and things of this sort, without which the universe cannot exist. Secondly, so that a conditional debt is taken from one creature to another; as, if God willed animals and plants to exist, it was owed that he make heavenly bodies here, by which they are preserved; and if he willed man to exist, it was necessary to make plants and animals and other things of this sort, which man needs for perfect being, although God made these and those from mere will. Thirdly, so that in each creature a conditional debt is taken from its parts and properties and accidents, upon which the creature depends with respect to being or with respect to some perfection of itself; as, supposing that God wished to make man, from this supposition it was owed that he join soul and body in him, and provide him with senses and other helps of this sort, both intrinsic and extrinsic. In all of these, if one attends rightly, God is not called debtor to the creature, but to his own disposition to be fulfilled."

236. Supernaturale dicitur indebitum naturae. Quamvis naturae nomen multipliciter sumatur, omissis tamen hic significationibus, quae ad rem non faciunt, dicimus nomine naturae denotari substantiam finitam, et omne accidens sive consecutive sive exigitive illi debitum. - Prout vero consideratur una vel altera substantia finita, vel totus complexus substantiarum creatarum et aliquid illis indebitum dicitur; habetur, uti mox explicabitur, praeternaturale, aut

supernaturale. 236. The supernatural is called not owed to nature. Although the name nature is taken in many ways, yet, omitting here the significations which do not bear on the matter, we say that by the name nature there is denoted a finite substance, and every accident owed to it either consecutively or exigently. But according as one or another finite substance, or the whole complex of created substances, is considered, and something is said not to be owed to them, one has, as will soon be explained, the preternatural or the supernatural.

237. Jam aliquid dicendum de praecipuis divisionibus supernaturalis. a) Nonnulli illud dividunt in supernaturale simpliciter tale, quod non unam aut alteram sed universam naturam, seu substantias finitas omnes excedit: et in supernaturale secundum quid, quod unam dumtaxat vel alteram naturam supergreditur; et hoc nomen supernaturalis proprie non meretur.

b) Supernaturale simpliciter tale dividitur in absolute ac essentialiter supernaturale, quod convenit soli Deo, cujus excellentia et dignitas omnem naturam excedens illi essentialis est ac imparticipate convenit; unde Auctor l. de Div. Nom. c. 1. et 2. alibique saepius Deum ac Deitatem supersubstantialem appellat; et in supernaturale participatum atque hinc accidentaliter tale, cujus excellentia supra naturam creaturae congruit.

c) Supernaturale accidentaliter tale aliud est supernaturale quoad substantiam, cujus entitas seu essentia excedit naturam, uti sunt gratia sanctificans, lumen gloriae, unio hypostatica; aliud supernaturale quoad modum, cujus entitas naturam non superat; transgreditur tamen modus quo talis entitas producitur vel acquiritur; qualia sunt restitutio visus aut recuperatio sanitatis instantanea. 237. Now something must be said about the chief divisions of the supernatural. a) Some divide it into the supernatural such simply, which exceeds not one or another nature but universal nature, or all finite substances; and into the supernatural in a qualified respect, which surpasses only one or another nature; and this does not properly merit the name supernatural.

b) The supernatural such simply is divided into the absolutely and essentially supernatural, which belongs to God alone, whose excellence and dignity, exceeding every nature, is essential to him and belongs to him unparticipatedly; whence the Author of the book On the Divine Names, chapters 1 and 2, and often elsewhere, calls God and Deity supersubstantial; and into the participated supernatural, and hence such accidentally, whose excellence above nature is suitable to a creature.

c) Of the supernatural such accidentally, one kind is supernatural with respect to substance, whose entity or essence exceeds nature, as are sanctifying grace, the light of glory, and the hypostatic union; another is supernatural with respect to mode, whose entity does not surpass nature, yet the mode by which such an entity is produced or acquired does pass beyond nature, such as the instantaneous restoration of sight or recovery of health.

238. Ex his sequitur 1. quod tradita partitio boni in naturale et supernaturale est logice accurata, seu adaequata. Talis enim dicitur illa divisio quae fit per membra ita opposita, ut careant medio; atqui inter debitum naturae (naturale) et indebitum (supernaturale) non datur medium; siquidem praeter id quod continetur intra totius finitae naturae ambitum, et id quod supra illum est nihil est. Ergo.

Sequitur 2. quod potest tamen, perspicuitatis gratia, supernaturale bifariam dispesci. Quod enim est naturae indebitum, vel tale est solum ratione modi, aut solum respectu alicujus naturae; vel tale est quoad substantiam et respectu totius naturae: primo modo habetur quod dici solet praeternaturale; altero vero habetur quod propriissimo sensu dicitur supernaturale. Hinc partitio ordinis, aut boni in naturale, praeternaturale, et supernaturale. Anima et corpus, intellectus et sensus, operatio et finis proportionatus in homine pertinent ad ordinem naturalem. - Visio in caeco a nativitate, immortalitas in homine pertinent ad ordinem praeternaturalem. - Gratia sanctificans, visio Dei intuitiva in qualibet creatura pertinent ad ordinem supernaturalem.

Atque eodem recidit quod paulo aliter exponit Suarez (de op. sex dier. l. 3. c. 12. n. 23.): "Adverto," inquit, "naturale et supernaturale duobus modis posse accipi in praesenti. Nam dici potest donum supernaturale illud, quod elevat hominem ad supernaturalem finem, et ad aliquid operandum quod super totum ordinem naturae sit, et solis naturalibus viribus fieri non possit. Unde

per distinctionem, et oppositionem ad hujusmodi supernaturale donum naturale dicitur, quidquid perficit naturam tantum in ordine ad finem, et rectitudinem naturalem. Veruntamen naturale donum tam late sumptum subdistingui debet, nam aliquod est donum perficiens naturam in ordine suo, quod illi debitum est tanquam aliquo modo consequens naturam, ut sunt naturales potentiae, et actus, seu concursus ad illos, et habitus, ut per actus comparantur, et siquid aliud hujusmodi est. Aliud vero esse potest donum perficiens quidem naturam in ordine suo, non tamen consequens illam, nec illi debitum, ut sunt scientiae per accidens infusae, et extraordinarium adjutorium ad cavendum omnem naturalem deceptionem, aut veniale peccatum vel fomitem, aut corporis passiones, etc."

Sequitur 3. quod si praeternaturale cum naturali et supernaturali conferatur, poterit diversa ratione illi vel huic accedere. Si enim praeternaturale consideratur prout est aliquo modo indebitum, convenit cum supernaturali: si vero consideratur prout vel est indebitum quoad modum, sed non quoad substantiam; vel, si indebitum quoad substantiam, non indebitum toti, sed alicui naturae; tunc perfectio, quam affert vel erit debita quoad substantiam, vel erit debita alicui naturae, et in hoc convenit cum naturali. Hoc autem mirum non est; siquidem proprium est medii de utroque extremo aliquid participare. 238. From these things it follows, first, that the handed-down partition of good into natural and supernatural is logically accurate, or adequate. For that division is called such which is made by members so opposed that they lack a middle; but between what is owed to nature (natural) and what is not owed (supernatural) there is no middle, since besides that which is contained within the ambit of all finite nature, and that which is above it, there is nothing. Therefore.

It follows, second, that nevertheless, for the sake of clarity, the supernatural can be divided in two ways. That which is not owed to nature is either such only by reason of mode, or only with respect to some nature; or it is such with respect to substance and with respect to the whole of nature. In the first way there is had what is usually called preternatural; in the other, what is called supernatural in the most proper sense. Hence the partition of order or good into natural, preternatural, and supernatural. Soul and body, intellect and sense, operation and proportioned end in man pertain to the natural order. - Sight in one blind from birth, immortality in man, pertain to the preternatural order. - Sanctifying grace and the intuitive vision of God in any creature pertain to the supernatural order.

And the same thing comes back to what Suarez explains a little differently (On the Work of the Six Days, book 3, chapter 12, n. 23): "I note," he says, "that natural and supernatural can be accepted in two ways in the present matter. For that can be called a supernatural gift which elevates man to a supernatural end and to the doing of something which is above the whole order of nature and cannot be done by merely natural powers. Whence, by distinction from and opposition to a supernatural gift of this sort, whatever perfects nature only in order to a natural end and rectitude is called natural. Nevertheless, natural gift taken so broadly must be subdivided; for one gift is perfective of nature in its own order, which is owed to it as somehow consequent upon nature, as are natural powers and acts, or concurrence toward them, and habits as they are acquired through acts, and anything else of this kind. But another gift can exist which indeed perfects nature in its own order, yet does not follow upon it nor is owed to it, as are sciences infused by accident, and extraordinary assistance for avoiding every natural deception, or venial sin, or the tinder, or bodily sufferings, etc."

It follows, third, that if the preternatural is compared with the natural and the supernatural, it will be able by a diverse account to approach either the one or the other. For if the preternatural is considered insofar as it is in some way not owed, it agrees with the supernatural. But if it is considered insofar as it is either not owed with respect to mode, but not with respect to substance; or, if not owed with respect to substance, not not-owed to the whole, but to some nature, then the perfection which it brings will either be owed with respect to substance, or will be owed to some nature, and in this it agrees with the natural. But this is not wonderful, since it is proper to the middle to participate something from each extreme.

239. Haec quidem de supernaturali respective considerato. Nunc pauca de absoluto supernaturalis conceptu. Supernaturale, in suo conceptu absoluto dicit aliquid ordinis divini. Etenim, ex dictis, supernaturale est supra universam naturam creatam et creabilem: hoc

autem Deus aut divinum est, vel nihil est. Unde creaturae intelligentes ad supernaturalem ordinem per gratiam sanctificantem elevatae dicuntur Deificatae. 239. These things indeed concern the supernatural considered respectively. Now a few things concerning the absolute concept of the supernatural. The supernatural, in its absolute concept, bespeaks something of the divine order. For, from what has been said, the supernatural is above every created and creatable nature; but this is either God or divine, or it is nothing. Hence intelligent creatures elevated to the supernatural order through sanctifying grace are called deified.

240. Hunc absolutum supernaturalis conceptum a revelatione derivari probabitur praesertim ubi sermo erit de supernaturalitate gratiae sanctificantis, et visionis intuitivae. Nunc ad illum, quantum satis est, illustrandum, tria adnotabimus.

1. Hic non loquimur de essentialiter supernaturali; sed de supernaturali participato. Jamvero participatio nequit intelligi, nisi per quamdam unionem; si ergo cum creaturae elevantur ad ordinem supernaturalem, deificantur, debent uniri cum Deo. Unde Dionys. Areop. (Eccl. Hier. cap. 1.) dicit: "est autem haec Deificatio ad Deum, quantum fieri potest, assimilatio unioque."

At vero quaenam est natura hujus unionis? aliqua enim unio cum Deo concipitur etiam in ordine naturali. Unio cum Deo in ordine supernaturali est unio immediata, cum Deo quidditative sumpto, seu cum Deo uti in se est. Hinc, ex. gr., humana natura in Christo dicitur deificata, quatenus est substantialiter immediate unita ipsi Personae Verbi. - Beati in caelis dicuntur deificati, quatenus videntes Deum, eidem uniuntur; in cognitione enim semper est unio inter cognoscentem et cognitum: unio autem est immediata, in visione intuitiva, quia per hanc Deum quidditative, uti in se est intuentur.

2. Deificatio creaturae neque fit naturam destruendo, neque naturam et gratiam permiscendo, sed elevando per gratiam. Hoc facile intelligetur ex dicendis praesertim in tract. de Gratia; sed ut aliquo exemplo res ad oculos ponatur, sufficit attendere ad mysterium Incarnationis: natura humana integra et impermixta unitur divinae naturae in Persona Verbi. Vid. Schrader (de tripl. ord., a. n. 104.)

3. Nequit elevatio ad ordinem supernaturalem perfici per quamdam quasi intrinsecam explicationem bonorum naturae, sic enim natura perficeretur manendo tamen semper in suo ordine; sed per infusionem novi doni quod sit ordinis divini.

Unde D. Th. (c. g. l. 3. c. 53.) ait: "Nihil potest ad altiorem operationem elevari nisi per hoc quod ejus virtus fortificatur. Contingit autem dupliciter alicujus virtutem fortificari: Uno modo, per simplicem ipsius virtutis intentionem, sicut virtus activa calidi augetur per intensionem caloris, ut possit efficere vehementiorem actionem in eadem specie; alio modo, per novae formae appositionem, sicut diaphani virtus augetur ad hoc ut possit illuminare, per hoc quod fit lucidum actu per formam lucis receptam in ipso de novo; et hoc quidem virtutis augmentum requiritur ad alterius speciei operationem consequendam. Virtus autem intellectus creati naturalis non sufficit ad divinam substantiam videndam, ut ex praedictis patet. Ergo oportet quod augeatur ei virtus ad hoc quod ad talem visionem perveniat. Non sufficit autem augmentum per intensionem naturalem virtutis, quia talis visio non est ejusdem rationis cum visione naturali intellectus creati; quod ex distantia visorum patet. Oportet igitur quod fiat augmentum virtutis intellectivae per alicujus novae dispositionis adeptionem." 240. That this absolute concept of the supernatural is derived from revelation will be proved especially where there is discussion of the supernaturality of sanctifying grace and of the intuitive vision. Now, for illustrating it as much as is sufficient, we shall note three things.

1. Here we are not speaking of the essentially supernatural, but of the participated supernatural. Now participation cannot be understood except through a certain union. Therefore, if when creatures are elevated to the supernatural order they are deified, they must be united with God. Hence Dionysius the Areopagite (Ecclesiastical Hierarchy, chapter 1) says: "Now this deification is, as far as can be, assimilation and union to God."

But what is the nature of this union? For some union with God is conceived even in the natural order. Union with God in the supernatural order is immediate union with God taken quidditatively, or with God as he is in himself. Hence, for example, human nature in Christ is called deified insofar as it is substantially and immediately united to the very

Person of the Word. - The blessed in heaven are called deified insofar as, seeing God, they are united to him; for in cognition there is always union between the knower and the known. But the union is immediate in the intuitive vision, because through this they behold God quidditatively, as he is in himself.

2. The deification of the creature is made neither by destroying nature, nor by mixing nature and grace together, but by elevating through grace. This will easily be understood from the things to be said, especially in the treatise on Grace; but so that the matter may be placed before the eyes by some example, it is enough to attend to the mystery of the Incarnation: human nature, whole and unmixed, is united to the divine nature in the Person of the Word. See Schrader (On the Threefold Order, from n. 104).

3. Elevation to the supernatural order cannot be accomplished through a certain quasi-intrinsic unfolding of the goods of nature, for in that way nature would be perfected while nevertheless always remaining in its own order; but through the infusion of a new gift which is of the divine order.

Hence St. Thomas, Contra Gentiles, book 3, chapter 53, says: "Nothing can be elevated to a higher operation except by this, that its power is strengthened. Now it happens that the power of something is strengthened in two ways. In one way, by the simple intensification of the power itself, as the active power of something hot is increased by the intensification of heat, so that it can effect a more vehement action in the same species. In another way, by the addition of a new form, as the power of something transparent is increased so that it can illuminate, by this, that it becomes actually luminous through the form of light newly received in it; and this increase of power is indeed required for attaining an operation of another species. But the natural power of a created intellect does not suffice for seeing the divine substance, as is clear from what has been said. Therefore its power must be increased for this, that it may reach such a vision. But increase by intensification of the natural power is not sufficient, because such a vision is not of the same account as the natural vision of the created intellect; which is clear from the distance of the things seen. Therefore it is necessary that there be an increase of the intellective power through the attainment of some new disposition."

§ II.
Documenta Ecclesiae Referuntur, Et Breviter Elucidantur. § II.
The Documents Of The Church Are Reported And Briefly Elucidated.

241. Ecclesiae documenta, ex quibus verum supernaturalis conceptum haurimus, praecipue continentur Const. S. Pii V. Ex omnibus afflictionibus, 1567. - Const. Gregorii XIII. Provisionis nostrae, 1579. - Const. Urbani VIII. In eminenti, 1641. - Const. Clementis XI. Unigenitus, 1713. - Const. Pii VI. Auctorem fidei, 1794. 241. The documents of the Church from which we draw the true concept of the supernatural are chiefly contained in the Constitution of St. Pius V, Ex omnibus afflictionibus, 1567; the Constitution of Gregory XIII, Provisionis nostrae, 1579; the Constitution of Urban VIII, In eminenti, 1641; the Constitution of Clement XI, Unigenitus, 1713; and the Constitution of Pius VI, Auctorem fidei, 1794.

242. Ex Const. S. Pii V. propositiones damnatae, quae faciunt ad rem nostram sunt praesertim sequentes. - XXI. "Humanae naturae sublimatio et exaltatio in consortium divinae naturae debita fuit integritati primae conditionis, et proinde naturalis dicenda est, et non supernaturalis." - XXIII. "Absurda est eorum sententia, qui dicunt hominem ab initio, dono quodam supernaturali et gratuito, supra conditionem naturae suae fuisse exaltatum, ut fide, spe, et charitate Deum supernaturaliter coleret." - XXIV. "A vanis et otiosis hominibus, secundum insipientiam philosophorum, excogitata est sententia, quae ad Pelagianismum rejicienda est, hominem ab initio sic constitutum, ut per dona naturae superaddita fuerit largitate conditoris sublimatus et in Dei filium adoptatus." - XXVI.

"Integritas primae creationis non fuit indebita humanae naturae exaltatio, sed naturalis ejus conditio." LV. "Deus non potuisset ab initio talem creare hominem, qualis nunc nascitur." - LXXVIII. "Immortalitas primi hominis non erat gratiae beneficium, sed naturalis conditio." - LXXIX. "Falsa est doctorum sententia, primum hominem potuisse a Deo creari et institui sine justitia naturali."

In fine autem hujus Constitutionis Apostolicae dicitur: "Quas quidem sententias stricto coram nobis examine ponderatas, quanquam nonnullae aliquo pacto sustineri possent, in rigore et proprio verborum sensu ab assertoribus intento haereticas, erroneas, suspectas, temerarias, scandalosas et in pias aures offensionem immittentes respective ... damnamus, circumscribimus, et abolemus." 242. From the Constitution of St. Pius V, the condemned propositions which bear upon our matter are especially the following. - XXI. "The sublimation and exaltation of human nature into fellowship with the divine nature was owed to the integrity of the first condition, and therefore must be called natural and not supernatural." - XXIII. "Absurd is the opinion of those who say that man from the beginning, by a certain supernatural and gratuitous gift, was exalted above the condition of his own nature, so that by faith, hope, and charity he might worship God supernaturally." - XXIV. "By vain and idle men, according to the folly of philosophers, there was devised the opinion, which must be rejected as Pelagianism, that man from the beginning was so constituted that by gifts superadded to nature he was elevated by the liberality of the Creator and adopted as a son of God." - XXVI. "The integrity of the first creation was not an exaltation not owed to human nature, but its natural condition." LV. "God could not from the beginning have created such a man as is now born." - LXXVIII. "The immortality of the first man was not a benefit of grace, but a natural condition." - LXXIX. "False is the opinion of the doctors that the first man could have been created and established by God without natural justice."

But at the end of this Apostolic Constitution it is said: "These opinions, having indeed been weighed by strict examination before us, although some of them could in some way be sustained, in the rigor and proper sense of the words intended by the assertors, as respectively heretical, erroneous, suspect, rash, scandalous, and bringing offense to pious ears ... we condemn, circumscribe, and abolish."

243. Gregorius XIII. in cit. Const. sui Praedecessoris sententiam confirmavit, ac Franciscum Toletum suum e Soc. Jesu Theologum misit, qui anno 1580 jussit Bullam in frequentissimo totius Academiae conventu recitari. Tum Baius "damno," inquit, "(omnes propositiones in Bulla damnatas), secundum Bullae ipsius intentionem et sicut Bulla damnat;" caeteri vero Doctores, Licentiati, Baccalaurei, et Studiosi Lovanienses uno ore repetebant: "articulos damnamus, Bullam reverenter suscipimus, atque obedientiam pollicemur." 243. Gregory XIII, in the cited Constitution, confirmed the judgment of his Predecessor, and sent Francis Toletus, his theologian from the Society of Jesus, who in the year 1580 ordered the Bull to be recited in a very full assembly of the whole Academy. Then Baius said, "I condemn (all the propositions condemned in the Bull), according to the intention of the Bull itself and as the Bull condemns"; but the other Doctors, Licentiates, Bachelors, and Students of Louvain repeated with one voice: "we condemn the articles, we reverently receive the Bull, and we promise obedience."

244. Urbanus VIII. in praefata Const. damnans Jansenii librum, cui titulus Augustinus affert, inter caeteras hanc rationem: "Cum autem," inquit, "ex diligenti, et matura ejusdem Libri, cui titulus Augustinus, lectione postmodum compertum fuerit, in eodem Libro multas ex Propositionibus a Praedecessoribus nostris olim, ut praefertur, damnatas contineri, et magno cum Catholicorum scandalo, et auctoritatis dictae Sedis contemptu, contra praefatas damnationes, et prohibitiones defendi, nos huic malo in scandalum totius Reipublicae Christianae, et fidei Catholicae perniciem vertenti, opportunum remedium adhibere volentes, Pii et Gregorii Praedecessorum hujusmodi Constitutiones praedictas, omniaque et singula in eis contenta, Apostolica auctoritate tenore praesentium perpetuo confirmamus, et approbamus; Librumque praedictum, cui titulus est, August., articulos, opiniones, et sententias in dictis Constitutionibus reprobatas, atque damnatas, ut a nobis compertum est, continentem, et

renovantem .... prohibemus." - Propositiones autem Baii a Jansenio renovatae, quae ad rem praesentem faciunt, sunt 26a, 55a, 78a. 244. Urban VIII, in the prefaced Constitution condemning the book of Jansenius whose title is Augustinus, brings forward, among others, this reason: "But since," he says, "from a diligent and mature reading of the same Book, whose title is Augustinus, it was afterwards discovered that in the same Book many of the Propositions formerly condemned by our Predecessors, as is said above, are contained, and, to the great scandal of Catholics and contempt of the authority of the said See, are defended against the aforesaid condemnations and prohibitions, we, wishing to apply a suitable remedy to this evil which turns to the scandal of the whole Christian Commonwealth and the ruin of the Catholic faith, by the Apostolic authority of the present tenor perpetually confirm and approve the aforesaid Constitutions of Pius and Gregory our Predecessors, and each and all of the things contained in them; and the aforesaid Book, whose title is Augustinus, containing and renewing, as has been discovered by us, the articles, opinions, and judgments reproved and condemned in the said Constitutions ... we prohibit." - But the propositions of Baius renewed by Jansenius which bear on the present matter are the 26th, 55th, and 78th.

245. In praedicta Const. Clementis XI. pluribus aliis Const. Apost. confirmata, proscribitur inter caeteras prop. XXXV., quae sic se habet: "Gratia Adami est sequela creationis, et erat debita naturae sanae et integrae." 245. In the aforesaid Constitution of Clement XI, confirmed by several other Apostolic Constitutions, among others proposition XXXV is proscribed, which has itself thus: "The grace of Adam is a consequence of creation, and was owed to sound and integral nature."

246. Denique ex cit. Const. Pii VI., censurae, quae huc faciunt, sunt 16a et 17a. Prima est: "Doctrina Synodi de statu felicis innocentiae, qualem eum repraesentat in Adamo ante peccatum, complectentem non modo integritatem, sed et justitiam interiorem cum impulsu in Deum per amorem charitatis, atque primaevam sanctitatem aliqua ratione post lapsum restitutam; quatenus complexive accepta innuit, statum illum sequelam fuisse creationis, debitum ex naturali exigentia et conditione humanae naturae, non gratuitum Dei beneficium; falsa, alias damnata in Baio et Quesnellio, erronea, favens haeresi Pelagianae."

Altera est: "Propositio his verbis enuntiata: edocti ab Apostolo, spectamus mortem non jam ut naturalem conditionem hominis, sed revera ut justam poenam culpae originalis; quatenus sub nomine Apostoli subdole allegato insinuat mortem, quae in praesenti statu inflicta est velut justa poena peccati per justam subtractionem immortalitatis, non fuisse naturalem conditionem hominis, quasi immortalitas non fuisset gratuitum beneficium, sed naturalis conditio; captiosa, temeraria, Apostolo injuriosa, alias damnata." 246. Finally, from the cited Constitution of Pius VI, the censures which bear on this matter are the 16th and 17th. The first is: "The doctrine of the Synod concerning the state of happy innocence, as it represents that state in Adam before sin, comprising not only integrity, but also interior justice with an impulse toward God through the love of charity, and primeval sanctity restored in some way after the fall; insofar as, taken comprehensively, it insinuates that that state was a consequence of creation, owed from the natural exigency and condition of human nature, not a gratuitous benefit of God; false, elsewhere condemned in Baius and Quesnel, erroneous, favoring the Pelagian heresy."

The other is: "The proposition expressed in these words: taught by the Apostle, we regard death no longer as the natural condition of man, but truly as the just punishment of original fault; insofar as, with the name of the Apostle craftily alleged, it insinuates that death, which in the present state has been inflicted as the just punishment of sin through the just subtraction of immortality, was not the natural condition of man, as if immortality had not been a gratuitous benefit, but a natural condition; captious, rash, injurious to the Apostle, elsewhere condemned."

247. Ut vis harum condemnationum pateat, aliqua sunt hic praestituenda. I. Censuerunt nonnulli, etiam inter Theologos catholicos, non omnes Baii propositiones damnatas fuisse propter doctrinam, sed aliquas solum damnatas esse propter acre judicium quo contrariam sententiam criminantur. Hinc inferebant sententiam, seu doctrinam retineri posse; censuram vero, seu judicium illud acre esse relinquendum praesertim ob pacem fidelium. 247. In order that the force of these condemnations may be clear, some things must here be laid down beforehand. I. Some judged, even among Catholic theologians, that not all the propositions of Baius were condemned on account of doctrine, but that some were condemned only on account of the harsh judgment by which they incriminate the contrary opinion. Hence they inferred that the opinion or doctrine could be retained, but that the censure, or that harsh judgment, had to be relinquished, especially for the peace of the faithful.

248. Sed dicendum Baii propositiones damnatas esse propter doctrinam. Nam a) in cit. Const. S. Pii V. dicitur: "quas quidem sententias stricto coram nobis examine ponderatas:" quid autem examine stricto opus est, si non de ipsa doctrina judicium est ferendum?

b) Damnantur illae propositiones "in proprio verborum sensu ab Auctoribus intento:" quae verba Bullae non possent intelligi, si ob pacem fidelium, ob censuram, et non doctrinam propositiones damnarentur.

c) Initio cit. Const. S. P. dolet "quod religio Christiana, tantis jampridem turbinibus agitata, novis quotidie propositis opinionibus conflictetur, Christique populus, antiqui hostis suggestionibus dissectus, in alios atque alios errores passim et promiscue deferatur;" quae omnia, ut dixit deinde Gregorius XIII. in praecit. Const. spectant "maxime fidei catholicae conservationem:" judicium ergo latum est de ipsa doctrina.

d) Certe aliquae propositiones, quas immerito aliqui sustineri posse quoad doctrinam autumabant, nullam continent censuram, uti, ex. gr., 27. 55. etc.

e) Quoad propositiones de re praesente, superius relatas, certe 21. 26. 55. 78. nullum continent acre judicium; ac proinde, damnatae sunt propter doctrinam. Cum autem aliae de eadem materia, licet censuram contrariae sententiae contineant, repetant tamen eamdem doctrinam, quae in primis continetur; damnatae dicendae sunt etiam propter doctrinam.

f) Si quod esset dubium de hac re, omnino evanesceret ex censura 16. in Bulla Auctorem fidei Pii VI: ibi enim non modo damnatur doctrina Synodi Pistoriensis de statu primi hominis, sed dicitur jam damnata in Baio. Ergo hujus propositiones, quae referuntur ad statum justitiae originalis, propter doctrinam damnatae sunt. 248. But it must be said that the propositions of Baius were condemned on account of doctrine. For a) in the cited Constitution of St. Pius V it is said: "these opinions, having indeed been weighed by strict examination before us." But what need is there of strict examination, if judgment is not to be rendered concerning the doctrine itself?

b) Those propositions are condemned "in the proper sense of the words intended by the Authors." These words of the Bull could not be understood if the propositions were condemned on account of the peace of the faithful, on account of the censure, and not the doctrine.

c) At the beginning of the cited Constitution the Supreme Pontiff grieves "that the Christian religion, already long agitated by such great storms, is being shaken by daily proposed new opinions, and that the people of Christ, cut apart by the suggestions of the ancient enemy, is being carried everywhere and indiscriminately into various errors"; all of which things, as Gregory XIII afterwards said in the previously cited Constitution, regard "especially the preservation of the Catholic faith." Therefore judgment was passed concerning the doctrine itself.

d) Certainly some propositions, which some undeservedly thought could be sustained with respect to doctrine, contain no censure, as, for example, 27, 55, etc.

e) With respect to the propositions concerning the present matter, reported above, certainly 21, 26, 55, and 78 contain no harsh judgment; and consequently they were condemned on account of doctrine. But since the others on the same matter, although they contain a censure of the contrary opinion, nevertheless repeat the same doctrine which is contained in the first propositions, they too must be said to have been condemned on account of doctrine.

f) If there were any doubt concerning this

matter, it would wholly vanish from censure 16 in the Bull Auctorem fidei of Pius VI. For there not only is the doctrine of the Synod of Pistoia concerning the state of the first man condemned, but it is said to have already been condemned in Baius. Therefore his propositions which are referred to the state of original justice were condemned on account of doctrine.

249. II. Statim post damnationem Baii placuit nonnullis dicere quod propositiones illae non erant damnatae "sensu ab assertoribus intento;" sed quia poterant ab aliis in falsum sensum detorqueri. Unde quaestio de "famoso commate Piano." Dicebant nempe non esse comma ponendum immediate post verbum "possent" (Recole verba S. Pii V. superius recitata), sed post verbum "intento;" ita ut sensus esset quod etsi propositiones illae sustineri possent in sensu ab auctoribus intento, (hic ponebant comma) attamen "haereticas, erroneas damnamus." 249. II. Immediately after the condemnation of Baius, it pleased some to say that those propositions were not condemned "in the sense intended by the assertors," but because they could be turned aside by others into a false sense. Hence the question concerning the "famous Pian comma." Namely, they said that the comma should not be placed immediately after the word "could" (recall the words of St. Pius V recited above), but after the word "intended," so that the sense would be that although those propositions could be sustained in the sense intended by the authors (here they placed the comma), nevertheless "as heretical, erroneous, we condemn them."

250. Sed dicendum omnino propositiones illas damnatas esse sensu ab assertoribus intento. Nam a) jussu Urbani VIII. anno 1644 Romae authenticum exemplar impressum est Const. S. Pii V., et comma illud positum est ubi nos illud posuimus. - In eo loco erat illud comma in exemplari Bullae apud Toletum, uti testatur Ripalda. Item in Autographo custodito in Archiviis S. Officii, teste Card. de Lugo.

b) Ipsa constructio phraseos exigit, ut comma illud ponatur immediate post verbum "possent": siquidem tunc verba illa "quamquam nonnullae aliquo pacto sustineri possent" opponuntur sequentibus "in rigore et proprio verborum sensu ab assertoribus intento;" sed si comma ponatur post "intento," nihil est cui opponatur illud "quamquam aliquo pacto."

c) Si propositiones, de quibus agitur, non fuissent damnatae sensu ab assertoribus intento, ideoque sensu Baii, cur damnatae essent? Num ob acre judicium? Sed hoc effugium jam exclusum est. - Num quia poterant ab aliis in pravum sensum detorqueri? Sed tunc nulla esset propositio, quae damnari non posset; siquidem et Sacrae Scripturae et Constitutiones ipsae Apostolicae in pravum sensum a pravis hominibus quandoque detorquentur.

d) Si eaedem propositiones non fuissent damnatae in sensu auctoris objectivo, seu "proprio verborum sensu ab assertoribus intento," nemo posset scire quid tandem S. P. damnaverit. - Unusquisque posset defendere quamlibet ex illis propositionibus, siquidem nulla in Bulla determinate definitur, quae in rigore et proprio verborum sensu sustineri non possit. - Nullus proinde fuisset effectus condemnationis.

III. Quaeri hic potest quanam censura multatas autumamus propositiones Baii superius relatas, quae ad praesentem quaestionem faciunt; nam S. P. nulli peculiari propositioni peculiarem censuram applicavit? Resp. 1. cum Suarez (prol. VI. de grat.) Summum P. sollicitum potius fuisse de tota doctrina exterminanda, quam de illa peculiari censurae applicatione quoad speciem vel gradum ejus: unde sufficiebat illa generalis censura plura membra continens, quaelibet enim earum notarum ad extirpandum doctrinam sufficiebat. - 2. Certum est, ex dictis, nullam esse propositionem, cui aliqua saltem minima censura non sit applicanda; quaenam vero unicuique propositioni, cum in Bulla S. Pii V. non determinetur, debet aliunde cognosci. - 3. Ex cit. Bulla Auctorem fidei Pii VI. scimus propositiones negantes gratuitatem donorum originalis justitiae esse damnatas in Baio uti falsas, erroneas, faventes haeresi Pelagianae. 250. But it must be said wholly that those propositions were condemned in the sense intended by the assertors. For a) by order of Urban VIII, in the year 1644 at Rome an authentic copy of the Constitution of St. Pius V was printed, and that comma was placed where we placed it. - In that place that comma was in the copy of the Bull possessed by Toletus, as Ripalda testifies. Likewise in the Autograph kept in the Archives of the Holy

Office, according to Cardinal de Lugo.

b) The very construction of the phrase requires that that comma be placed immediately after the word "could"; since then those words "although some could in some way be sustained" are opposed to the following words "in the rigor and proper sense of the words intended by the assertors." But if the comma is placed after "intended," there is nothing to which that "although in some way" is opposed.

c) If the propositions in question had not been condemned in the sense intended by the assertors, and therefore in the sense of Baius, why were they condemned? Because of a harsh judgment? But this escape has already been excluded. - Because they could be turned aside by others into a depraved sense? But then there would be no proposition which could not be condemned, since both Sacred Scripture and the Apostolic Constitutions themselves are sometimes turned aside into a depraved sense by depraved men.

d) If the same propositions had not been condemned in the objective sense of the author, or the "proper sense of the words intended by the assertors," no one could know what at last the Supreme Pontiff had condemned. - Each person could defend any one of those propositions, since none is determinately defined in the Bull as unable to be sustained in the rigor and proper sense of the words. - Consequently there would have been no effect of the condemnation.

III. Here it can be asked by what censure we think the propositions of Baius reported above, which bear on the present question, were punished; for the Supreme Pontiff did not apply a special censure to any special proposition. I reply: 1. with Suarez (Prolegomenon VI, On Grace), that the Supreme Pontiff was solicitous rather to exterminate the whole doctrine than about that special application of censure with respect to its species or degree; whence that general censure containing several members was sufficient, for any one of those notes sufficed for extirpating the doctrine. - 2. It is certain, from what has been said, that there is no proposition to which at least some minimal censure should not be applied; but which censure belongs to each proposition, since it is not determined in the Bull of St. Pius V, must be known from elsewhere. - 3. From the cited Bull Auctorem fidei of Pius VI, we know that the propositions denying the gratuity of the gifts of original justice are condemned in Baius as false, erroneous, favoring the Pelagian heresy.

Corrected Latin Text
§ III.
Verus Supernaturalis Conceptus Ad Ecclesiae Mentem Statuitur. § III.
The True Concept Of The Supernatural Is Established According To The Mind Of The Church.

251. Expositum supernaturalis conceptum verum esse, et non nostro ingenio inventum, ostendere aggredimur. Illud autem praestabimus hic, recitata Ecclesiae documenta diligentius expendendo; plures enim probationes, sive ex Scriptura sive ex Patribus, tunc trademus, cum de supernaturalitate donorum justitiae originalis in specie sermo erit. 251. We undertake to show that the concept of the supernatural which has been set forth is true, and not invented by our own talent. But we shall accomplish that here by examining more diligently the documents of the Church which have been recited; for we shall hand down several proofs, whether from Scripture or from the Fathers, when there is discussion of the supernaturality of the gifts of original justice in species.

252. Itaque asserimus:

Prop. XXIII. Ex mente Ecclesiae id supernaturale dicendum est, quod 1. est indebitum - 2. per se - 3. naturae - 4. constitutive, consecutive et exigitive.

Decl. 1ma pars. Cum, ex dictis, supernaturale dicatur per oppositionem ad naturale, multiplices acceptiones plus minusve proprias habere potest: ostendendum est ergo imprimis quod vera acceptio, ad mentem Ecclesiae, supernaturalis, est ut sit bonum indebitum.

Prob. a) Baius in prop. 21. asserit exaltationem humanae naturae in consortium divinae ideo naturalem et non supernaturalem dicendam esse, quia erat debita. Ergo, ad mentem Ecclesiae, quae propositionem illam damnavit, exaltatio humanae naturae dicenda

est supernaturalis, quia indebita.

b) In prop. 26. asserens Baius integritatem primae conditionis esse naturalem, opponit indebitum naturali. Ergo, ad mentem Ecclesiae damnantis illam propositionem, negari debet integritatem esse naturalem, et asseri debet esse indebitam; seu, quod idem est, supernaturale dicendum est, quod est indebitum.

c) In cens. 16. Bullae Auctorem fidei dicitur: "Doctrina Synodi ... quatenus innuit statum illum (justitiae originalis) ... fuisse debitum ex naturali exigentia falsa, etc." Ergo statum illum dicere debemus indebitum, atque hoc sensu supernaturalem. - Idem erui potest ex aliis propositionibus.

Decl. 2da pars. Baius voces naturalis et supernaturalis vero saepe sensu usurpavit, ideoque supernaturale id esse dixit, quod est naturae indebitum. Cum vero hanc supernaturalis notionem exaltationi humanae naturae applicaret, docuit gratiam fuisse debitam naturae ante peccatum, indebitam vero post peccatum - ideoque naturalem in Adamo, cum primo conditus fuit, supernaturalem in nobis, cum per Christum illam recuperamus - supernaturalem in nobis per accidens vel ratione modi, non per se et quoad substantiam. Hinc statuebat quod, ut gratia sanctificans et ei respondens vita aeterna sit alicui subjecto (ex. gr., humanae naturae) supernaturalis, non sufficit quod in eo nulla sit exigentia eorum donorum secundum naturam, sed requiritur positiva indignitas per peccatum.

"Eo modo," inquit (De primi hom. justitia cap. 10.), "quo sanitas corporis gratia est, cum neque viribus naturae, neque opera medici reparari potest, sed sola creatoris beneficentia redditur; non quod res sit supernaturalis, aut naturali hominis integritati superaddita, sicut prophetia, gratia sanitatum, et alia multa, quibus sine malo caremus. Sed quod ipse efficiendi modus atque ratio secundum nativam operandi consuetudinem, in rebus creatis non inveniatur, sed ex superiore quodam et insolito atque occulto divinae sapientiae consilio proveniat."

Prob. a) Juxta propp. 21. 26. etc. Baii; 35. Quesnelli, et doctrinam Synodi Pistoriensis in cit. censura 16.; gratia, integritas, exaltatio humanae naturae in consortium divinae, dicuntur dona debita, seu naturalia Adamo, et in eo humanae naturae ante peccatum. Sed illae propp. sunt ab Ecclesia damnatae. Ergo ad mentem Ecclesiae dicendum est supernaturalia illa fuisse et indebita per se, et non per accidens seu propter peccatum.

b) Gratia sanctificans Angelis collata eadem est, ac gratia sanctificans, quam nos post peccatum consequimur per Christum; atqui in ipsis Angelis innocentibus, gratia fuit, seu donum indebitum et supernaturale; ergo positiva indignitas per peccatum non requiritur ut gratia sanctificans et visio intuitiva eam consequens sint supernaturalia: seu, quod idem est, haec dona sunt indebita per se, et non per accidens ad sensum Baii.

Unde S. Augustinus (De Civ. Dei l. 12. c. 9.), inquit: "Istam bonam voluntatem (Angelorum) quis faceret nisi ille, qui eos cum bona voluntate, id est cum amore casto, quo illi adhaererent, creavit, simul in eis et condens naturam, et largiens gratiam. Unde sine bona voluntate, hoc est Dei amore nunquam Sanctos Angelos fuisse credendum est ... Confitendum igitur cum debita laude creatoris non ad solos sanctos homines pertinere, verum etiam de sanctis Angelis dici posse, quod caritas Dei diffusa sit in eis per Spiritum Sanctum qui datus est eis."

S. Fulgentius (l. 2. ad Transimundum c. 3.): "Non alia gratia stantem Angelum a ruina potuit custodire, nisi illa quae lapsum hominem post ruinam potuit reparare. Una est in utroque gratia, operata in hoc ut surgeret, in illo ne caderet."

S. Bernardus (in Cant. serm. 22.): "Qui erexit hominem lapsum, dedit stanti Angelo ne laberetur, sic illum de captivitate eruens, sicut istum a captivitate defendit; et hac ratione fuit aeque utriusque Redemptor, solvens illum et servans istum."

Decl. 3a pars. Distinximus superius (n. 235.) inter debitum naturae et debitum operum: primum vocari solet physicum, morale alterum. Jansenius docuit dona supernaturalia esse quidem indebita quatenus excludunt debitum morale, minime vero quatenus excludere debeant meritum etiam physicum. "Considerandum est," inquit (de statu naturae purae, l. 1. c. 2.) "gratiae propriissime dictae solummodo secundum doctrinam Scripturarum et Augustini, repugnare opus creaturae, cui illa debeatur. Hoc est enim quod Apostolica doctrina tradit: si gratia, jam non ex operibus, alioquin gratia jam non est gratia. Qua de causa sexcentis locis Augustinus sola opera velut gratiae destructiva submovet e gratuita vocatione et justificatione peccatoris ... aeque gratuitam gratiam nuncupat quod sentimus, et quod intelligimus, quam quod homines sumus." - Ad excludendum hunc errorem asserimus supernaturale esse indebitum naturae.

Prob. a) In Propp. damnatis in Baio, in prop. 35. Quesnelli, et in cens. 16. Bull. Pii VI. expresse damnatur doctrina eorum, qui naturalia

dicebant dona justitiae originalis, quia erant debita naturae (non agebatur de operibus). Ergo ad mentem Ecclesiae tenendum est, quod supernaturale excludit etiam debitum physicum.

b) Quoniam Jansenius S. Augustini auctoritate abutitur, pauca ex S. Doctore subjicimus. S. Augustinus aperte docet 1. gratiam excludere omne debitum. Ita Ep. ad Sixtum, n. 40.: "Si autem gratia, utique nullis meritis reddita, sed gratuita bonitate donata." - De pecc. orig., cap. 24.: "Non enim Dei gratia, gratia erit ullo modo, nisi gratuita fuerit omni modo." - 2. S. Augustinus aperte distinxit inter meritum naturae et operum. Ita (De lib. arb., l. 3. c. 24.) ait: "Sicut rationalis natura tamquam meritum est praecepti accipiendi, sic praecepti observatio meritum est accipiendae sapientiae." Item lib. Con. Secundinum, c. 10. - l. de Bono persev., c. 8. - 3. Conferens haeresim Manichaeorum cum haeresi Pelagiana, utramque declarat fidei inimicam. "His morbis," inquit (cont. duas Epist. Pelag., l. 7., c. 2.), "inter se contrariis Manichaei Pelagianique confligunt, dissimili voluntate, simili vanitate, separati opinione diversa. Jam vero gratiam Christi simul oppugnant, baptismum ejus simul evacuant, carnem ejus simul exhonorant; sed etiam haec modis causisque diversis. Nam Manichaei meritis naturae bona, Pelagiani autem meritis voluntatis bonae perhibent divinitus subveniri. Illi dicunt debet hoc Deus laboribus, calamitatibus, incommodis quibus natura erat obnoxia membrorum suorum; isti dicunt: debet hoc Deus virtutibus servorum suorum. Utrisque ergo merces non imputatur secundum gratiam, sed secundum debitum." - 4. Si gratuitum seu supernaturale excluderet solum debitum operum et non naturae; creatio, natura nostra, ejus facultates, etc., ita essent supernaturalia, sicut ipsa gratia sanctificans: hoc quidem contendebat Pelagius, sed contrarium constanter asseruit S. Augustinus. Ita, ex. gr., Epist. ad Sixtum, c. 3., ait: "Cum ab istis quaeritur, quam gratiam Pelagius cogitaret sine ullis praecedentibus meritis dari, quando [in Diospolitana Synodo] anathematizabat eos qui dicunt, gratiam Dei secundum merita nostra dari, respondent: Sine ullis praecedentibus meritis gratiam, ipsam humanam esse naturam, in qua conditi sumus. Neque enim antequam essemus mereri aliquid poteramus ut essemus. Abjiciatur a Christianorum cordibus ista fallacia. Nam omnino non istam gratiam commendat Apostolus qua creati sumus, ut homines essemus." - Et [Epist. ad Innocentium, cap. 7.]: "Etsi quadam non improbanda ratione dicitur gratia Dei qua creati sumus ut ... essemus et viveremus, et sentiremus et intelligeremus ... alia est tamen, qua praedestinati vocamur, justificamur, glorificamur ... De hac gratia quaestio vertebatur ... Hanc apostolica doctrina gratiam non immerito isto nomine appellat, qua salvamur et justificamur ex fide Christi... Illam vero gratiam, qua creati sumus homines, etiamsi ita appellandam non immerito intelligimus, mirum est tamen si ita appellatam in ullis legitimis, propheticis, evangelicis, apostolicisque literis legimus."

c) Ratio id ipsum confirmat. Nam, uti bene arguit Casini, S. J., [Quid est homo, sive controversia de statu purae naturae art. 1.] "Arctius strictiusque est multo, quam morale, debitum physicum. Si quidem meritum non solum congruum, sed etiam condignum nullo praemio remunerari, nisi promissio aut pactum aliquod intercesserit, Deo solutissimum est quin ullam propterea homini faciat injuriam. Ut est enim supremus dominus, potest eo nomine opus aliquod servo imperare, nec illi quidquam praemii constituere. Contra vero, si neget aut adimat naturae, quod est proprium ipsius, ei vim aliquam afferat, ut adversarii concedunt. Multo magis igitur gratiae et favori adversatur, debitum physicum, quod est ex naturali conditione atque exigentia, quam debitum morale ex opere ortum atque ex antecedenti aliquo merito. Sic, quod is regnum accipiat, cui debitum est jure sanguinis et familiae, negarique sine magna injuria et violentia non potest, minus habet gratiae et favoris, quam quod gentes aliquae ac populi eum sibi regem constituant, qui pro iis aliquid fortiter gesserit. Quamvis enim quod primo datur, naturae quodammodo et conditioni tribuatur, sanguini scilicet ac generi, quod vero alteri datur, tribuatur operibus; si tamen natura et conditio majus debitum et quandam quasi necessitatem efficiunt, ejus electio, ut magis debita ac necessaria, minus quoque gratuita est, favorisque et gratiae vel nihil vel minimum habet. Quid igitur in re nostra, ubi, quae bona adversarius usurpat nomine gratiae, eadem naturae hominum obligata atque devincta esse dicit eo debiti genere, quod Deo ipsi necessitatem plane insuperabilem afferat ab eoque infringi ac violari non possit?"

Decl. 4a pars. Lutherus, Calvinus, eorumque sectatores dona justitiae originalis ita humanae naturae propria quandoque asserunt, ut videantur dicere ad ipsam essentiam pertinere; ideoque esse debita constitutive. Saepius tamen eadem debita dicunt solum consecutive. Vid. Bellarm. de gr.

primi hom. cap. 1. Baius etsi dona justitiae originalis consecutive debita aliquando diceret, tamen contentus erat, si ei concederetur eadem esse debita solum exigitive. Unde (cap. 11.) cum sibi objecisset: "Naturalis qualitas est, quae ex naturae principiis oritur; sed nemo dixerit, Adae justitiam, quae tantae excellentiae fuit, ut eum divinae naturae consortem redderet, ex anima ejus et corpore tanquam efficiente causa exortam;" respondet: "Naturale non causae aut originis suae comparatione dicitur, sed rei, cui sic inest, ut ad naturalem ejus integritatem pertineat, sitque ejus absentia malum, sive ex ejus principiis sive aliunde accedat.... Quapropter primi hominis justitia sive ex naturae principiis orta fuerit, sive immediate a Deo collata, adhuc tamen illi naturalis fuit, quia sic ad ejus integritatem pertinebat, ut sine ea non posset salva existere miseriaque carere." Vid. etiam cap. 5. Quare nos asserimus dona supernaturalia esse indebita naturae, etiam exigitive.

Prob. a) Propositiones damnatae in Baio, damnatae fuerunt sensu objectivo ab assertoribus intento; atqui dum Baius asserebat dona justitiae originalis esse debita, illud intelligebat saltem exigitive. Ergo tenendum est quod sunt etiam exigitive indebita.

b) Unde in saepe citata cens. 16. ex Bulla Auctorem fidei, dicitur: Doctrina Synodi de statu felicis innocentiae quatenus ... innuit statum illum sequelam fuisse creationis, debitum ex naturali exigentia falsa etc. Caeterum haec pars thesis fusius pertractabitur, cum possibilitas status purae naturae adstruetur. 252. Therefore we assert:

Proposition XXIII. According to the mind of the Church, that must be called supernatural which is 1. not owed; 2. of itself; 3. to nature; 4. constitutively, consecutively, and exigently.

Declaration of the first part. Since, from what has been said, supernatural is said by opposition to natural, it can have manifold acceptations, more or less proper. Therefore it must first be shown that the true acceptance, according to the mind of the Church, of supernatural is that it be a good not owed.

Proof. a) Baius in proposition 21 asserts that the exaltation of human nature into fellowship with the divine was therefore to be called natural and not supernatural, because it was owed. Therefore, according to the mind of the Church, which condemned that proposition, the exaltation of human nature must be called supernatural because it was not owed.

b) In proposition 26, Baius, asserting that the integrity of the first condition is natural, opposes what is not owed to what is natural. Therefore, according to the mind of the Church condemning that proposition, it must be denied that integrity is natural, and it must be asserted that it is not owed; or, what is the same, that must be called supernatural which is not owed.

c) In censure 16 of the Bull Auctorem fidei, it is said: "The doctrine of the Synod ... insofar as it insinuates that that state (of original justice) ... was owed from natural exigency, false, etc." Therefore we must call that state not owed, and in this sense supernatural. - The same can be drawn from the other propositions.

Declaration of the second part. Baius often used the words natural and supernatural in a true sense, and therefore said that the supernatural is that which is not owed to nature. But when he applied this notion of the supernatural to the exaltation of human nature, he taught that grace was owed to nature before sin, but not owed after sin; and therefore natural in Adam when he was first established, supernatural in us when we recover it through Christ; supernatural in us by accident or by reason of mode, not of itself and with respect to substance. Hence he maintained that, in order for sanctifying grace and eternal life corresponding to it to be supernatural to some subject, for example human nature, it is not sufficient that in that subject there be no exigency of those gifts according to nature, but there is required a positive unworthiness through sin.

"In that way," he says (On the Justice of the First Man, chapter 10), "in which health of body is grace, when it can be repaired neither by the powers of nature nor by the work of a physician, but is restored by the beneficence of the Creator alone; not because the thing is supernatural, or superadded to the natural integrity of man, as prophecy, the grace of healings, and many other things are, without which we lack no evil. But because the very mode and account of effecting it, according to the native custom of operating, is not found in created things, but proceeds from a certain higher and unusual and hidden counsel of divine wisdom."

Proof. a) According to propositions 21, 26, etc. of Baius, proposition 35 of Quesnel, and the doctrine of the Synod of Pistoia in the

cited censure 16, grace, integrity, and the exaltation of human nature into fellowship with the divine are called gifts owed, or natural, to Adam, and in him to human nature before sin. But those propositions have been condemned by the Church. Therefore, according to the mind of the Church, it must be said that those things were supernatural and not owed of themselves, and not by accident or on account of sin.

b) The sanctifying grace conferred upon the Angels is the same as the sanctifying grace which we obtain after sin through Christ; but in the innocent Angels themselves grace was, that is, was a gift not owed and supernatural. Therefore positive unworthiness through sin is not required in order that sanctifying grace and the intuitive vision consequent upon it be supernatural; or, what is the same, these gifts are not owed of themselves, and not by accident in the sense of Baius.

Hence St. Augustine says (City of God, book 12, chapter 9): "Who would make that good will of the Angels except he who created them with a good will, that is, with the chaste love by which they would adhere to him, at once establishing nature in them and bestowing grace? Hence it must be believed that the holy Angels were never without a good will, that is, without the love of God ... Therefore we must confess, with due praise of the Creator, that it pertains not only to holy men, but can also be said of the holy Angels, that the charity of God has been poured forth in them through the Holy Spirit who has been given to them."

St. Fulgentius says (book 2, to Transimundus, chapter 3): "No other grace could guard the standing Angel from ruin, except that which could repair fallen man after ruin. There is one grace in both, working in this one that he should rise, in that one lest he should fall."

St. Bernard says (On the Canticle, sermon 22): "He who raised fallen man gave to the standing Angel that he should not slip; thus freeing the one from captivity, as he defended the other from captivity; and by this reason he was equally the Redeemer of each, releasing the one and preserving the other."

Declaration of the third part. We distinguished above (n. 235) between the debt of nature and the debt of works: the first is usually called physical, the other moral. Jansenius taught that supernatural gifts are indeed not owed insofar as they exclude moral debt, but by no means insofar as they must also exclude physical merit. "It must be considered," he says (On the State of Pure Nature, book 1, chapter 2), "that according to the doctrine of the Scriptures and of Augustine, only the work of a creature to which grace is owed is repugnant to grace most properly so called. For this is what Apostolic doctrine hands down: if by grace, now not from works, otherwise grace is now not grace. For this reason in six hundred places Augustine removes only works, as destructive of grace, from the gratuitous calling and justification of the sinner ... he equally calls grace gratuitous that we sense and that we understand, as that we are men." - To exclude this error we assert that the supernatural is not owed to nature.

Proof. a) In the propositions condemned in Baius, in proposition 35 of Quesnel, and in censure 16 of the Bull of Pius VI, the doctrine of those who called the gifts of original justice natural because they were owed to nature is expressly condemned; there was no question of works. Therefore, according to the mind of the Church, it must be held that the supernatural excludes even physical debt.

b) Since Jansenius abuses the authority of St. Augustine, we add a few things from the holy Doctor. St. Augustine openly teaches: 1. that grace excludes every debt. Thus in the Epistle to Sixtus, n. 40: "But if grace, certainly not rendered by any merits, but given by gratuitous goodness." - On Original Sin, chapter 24: "For the grace of God will in no way be grace, unless it has been gratuitous in every way." - 2. St. Augustine openly distinguished between the merit of nature and of works. Thus in On Free Choice, book 3, chapter 24, he says: "Just as rational nature is, as it were, a merit for receiving a precept, so observance of the precept is a merit for receiving wisdom." Likewise book against Secundinus, chapter 10; book On the Good of Perseverance, chapter 8. - 3. Comparing the heresy of the Manichaeans with the Pelagian heresy, he declares both hostile to the faith. "With these diseases," he says (Against Two Epistles of the Pelagians, book 7, chapter 2), "contrary to each other, the Manichaeans and Pelagians are in conflict, with dissimilar will, similar vanity, separated by diverse opinion. But now they together attack the grace of Christ, together empty out his baptism, together dishonor his flesh; but even these things in diverse ways and for diverse causes. For the Manichaeans declare that good things are divinely supplied to the merits of nature, but the Pelagians to the merits of a good will. The

former say: God owes this to the labors, calamities, and inconveniences to which the nature of his members was liable; the latter say: God owes this to the virtues of his servants. Therefore to both the reward is reckoned not according to grace, but according to debt." - 4. If the gratuitous or supernatural excluded only the debt of works and not of nature, creation, our nature, its faculties, etc., would be supernatural just as sanctifying grace itself is. Pelagius indeed contended this, but St. Augustine constantly asserted the contrary. Thus, for example, in the Epistle to Sixtus, chapter 3, he says: "When it is asked of these men what grace Pelagius thought was given without any preceding merits, when [in the Synod of Diospolis] he anathematized those who say that the grace of God is given according to our merits, they answer: without any preceding merits grace is human nature itself, in which we were established. For before we existed we could not merit anything so that we might exist. Let that fallacy be cast away from Christian hearts. For the Apostle does not commend at all that grace by which we were created, so that we should be men." - And [Epistle to Innocent, chapter 7]: "Although by a certain not disapproved reasoning that may be called the grace of God by which we were created so that ... we should exist and live, and sense and understand ... nevertheless that grace is another by which, having been predestined, we are called, justified, glorified ... Concerning this grace the question was being turned ... This grace Apostolic doctrine not undeservedly calls by that name, by which we are saved and justified from the faith of Christ... But that grace by which we were created men, although we understand that it may not undeservedly be so called, it is nevertheless wonderful if we read that it is so called in any legitimate, prophetic, evangelical, and apostolic letters."

c) Reason confirms the same thing. For, as Casini, S.J., argues well [What Is Man, or the Controversy concerning the State of Pure Nature, article 1]: "Physical debt is much narrower and stricter than moral debt. Indeed, for merit not only congruous but even condign to be remunerated by no reward, unless some promise or covenant has intervened, is most free to God without his thereby doing any injury to man. For since he is supreme lord, by that title he can command some work to a servant, and appoint no reward for him. But on the contrary, if he denies or takes away from nature what is proper to it, he brings some violence upon it, as the adversaries concede. Therefore physical debt, which is from natural condition and exigency, is much more opposed to grace and favor than moral debt arisen from a work and from some antecedent merit. Thus, that someone receive a kingdom to whom it is owed by right of blood and family, and cannot be denied without great injury and violence, has less of grace and favor than that some peoples and nations establish as king over themselves one who has done something bravely for them. For although what is given to the first is attributed in some way to nature and condition, namely to blood and family, while what is given to the other is attributed to works; nevertheless, if nature and condition produce a greater debt and a certain quasi-necessity, his election, as more owed and necessary, is also less gratuitous, and has either nothing or very little of favor and grace. What then in our matter, where the good things which the adversary usurps under the name of grace he says are bound and fastened to the nature of men by that kind of debt which brings upon God himself a necessity plainly insuperable, and which cannot be broken or violated by him?"

Declaration of the fourth part. Luther, Calvin, and their followers sometimes assert that the gifts of original justice are so proper to human nature that they seem to say they pertain to its very essence, and therefore are owed constitutively. More often, however, they say that the same gifts are owed only consecutively. See Bellarmine, On the Grace of the First Man, chapter 1. Baius, although he sometimes said that the gifts of original justice were owed consecutively, nevertheless was content if it were conceded to him that the same gifts were owed only exigently. Hence, in chapter 11, when he had objected to himself: "A natural quality is one which arises from the principles of nature; but no one will have said that Adam's justice, which was of such excellence that it rendered him a sharer of the divine nature, arose from his soul and body as from an efficient cause"; he responds: "Natural is not said by comparison with its cause or origin, but by comparison with the thing in which it so inheres that it pertains to its natural integrity, and its absence is an evil, whether it comes from its principles or from elsewhere.... Therefore the justice of the first man, whether it arose from the principles of nature, or was immediately conferred by God, nevertheless was still natural to him, because it so pertained to his integrity

that without it he could not exist safe and lack misery." See also chapter 5. Wherefore we assert that supernatural gifts are not owed to nature, even exigently.

Proof. a) The propositions condemned in Baius were condemned in the objective sense intended by the assertors; but when Baius asserted that the gifts of original justice were owed, he understood that at least exigently. Therefore it must be held that they are also not owed exigently.

b) Hence in the often cited censure 16 from the Bull Auctorem fidei, it is said: The doctrine of the Synod concerning the state of happy innocence insofar as ... it insinuates that that state was a consequence of creation, owed from natural exigency, false, etc. But this part of the thesis will be treated more fully when the possibility of the state of pure nature is asserted.

253. Nota. Falsas supernaturalis doni notiones traditas ab iis qui christianam revelationem agnoscunt in superius disputatis refutavimus. Norunt omnes, quod rationalistae revelationem rejicientes, nequeunt verum supernaturalis conceptum assequi. - Loquuntur tamen de supernaturali ordine, sed ita ut ejus characterem pervertant. Sic, ex. gr., id esse naturale, dicunt quod sensibus et experientiae subest; supernaturale vero illud, quod sensus et experientiam fugit - vel naturale id esse definiunt, quod immediate per causas secundas perficitur: supernaturale autem id, quod immediata actione Deus producit.

Comparando hos falsos conceptus supernaturalis cum vero a nobis tradito, facile esset eosdem refellere; sed frustra id praestaretur contra rationalistas, qui non admittunt revelationem, ex cujus fontibus nos debemus supernaturalis ideam haurire. Si ergo contra ipsos agendum esset, utut nomine supernaturalis abuterentur, nobis exponendus esset imprimis conceptus supernaturalis, quem dedimus. Dein vero rationibus, quas indicabimus cum de visione intuitiva sermo erit, ostendenda esset doni supernaturalis a nobis definiti possibilitas - motivis credibilitatis revelatio christiana adstruenda esset - ex hac, supernaturalis ordinis existentia demonstraretur. - Evidens est quaestiones cum rationalistis, ab existentia doni vere supernaturalis initium sumere non posse. 253. Note. We have refuted in the disputations above the false notions of supernatural gift handed down by those who acknowledge Christian revelation. All know that the rationalists, rejecting revelation, cannot attain the true concept of the supernatural. Yet they speak of the supernatural order, but in such a way that they pervert its character. Thus, for example, they say that what lies beneath the senses and experience is natural; but supernatural is that which escapes sense and experience. Or they define that as natural which is accomplished immediately through secondary causes, but as supernatural that which God produces by immediate action.

By comparing these false concepts of the supernatural with the true one handed down by us, it would be easy to refute them; but this would be done in vain against rationalists who do not admit revelation, from whose sources we must draw the idea of the supernatural. Therefore, if it were necessary to deal against them, although they abuse the name supernatural, first the concept of the supernatural which we have given would have to be explained by us. Then, by the reasons which we shall indicate when there is discussion of the intuitive vision, the possibility of the supernatural gift as defined by us would have to be shown; Christian revelation would have to be asserted by the motives of credibility; from this the existence of the supernatural order would be demonstrated. - It is evident that questions with rationalists cannot take their beginning from the existence of a truly supernatural gift.

Article 4. On Sanctifying Grace Conferred Upon Adam

LatineEnglish

Corrected Latin Text
Articulus Quartus.
De Gratia Sanctificante Adae Collata.

254. Quatuor praecipue quaestiones moveri hic possunt: utrum Adam habuerit gratiam sanctificantem - quonam tempore infusa ei fuerit - utrum fuerit ei

indebita - utrum denique gratia sanctificans ita universam naturam excedat, ut nulli creaturae possit esse debita. Has quaestiones ex ordine pertractabimus. 254. Four principal questions can be raised here: whether Adam had sanctifying grace; at what time it was infused into him; whether it was not owed to him; and finally whether sanctifying grace so exceeds universal nature that it could be owed to no creature. We shall treat these questions in order.

§ I.
Utrum Adam In Gratia Sanctificante Constitutus Fuerit. § I.
Whether Adam Was Constituted In Sanctifying Grace.

255. Non est hic locus naturam gratiae sanctificantis explicandi; sed, ut intelligatur id, de quo agimus, communem et ab omnibus receptam ejus descriptionem subjicimus. Gratia sanctificans itaque est supernaturale Dei donum, permanenter inhaerens animae, quo homo immediate et formaliter sanctus efficitur, justus, Deo gratus, filius Dei adoptivus, capax eliciendi opera meritoria vitae aeternae, ejusdemque haeres. 255. This is not the place for explaining the nature of sanctifying grace; but so that that of which we are treating may be understood, we set down the common description of it received by all. Therefore sanctifying grace is the supernatural gift of God, permanently inhering in the soul, by which man is made immediately and formally holy, just, pleasing to God, an adoptive son of God, capable of eliciting works meritorious of eternal life, and heir of the same.

256. Totum catholicum dogma de redemptione ac de gratia nititur doctrina de primitiva protoparentum justitia et sanctitate; unde de hac plures habentur Ecclesiae definitiones. Concilium Arausicanum II. can. 19. habet: "Natura humana, etiamsi in illa integritate, in qua est condita, permaneret, nullo modo seipsam, Creatore suo non adjuvante, servaret. Unde cum sine Dei gratia salutem non possit custodire, quam accepit, quomodo sine Dei gratia poterit reparare, quod perdidit." - Conc. Trid. sess. V., Decr. de pecc. orig., can. 1. ait: "Si quis non confitetur, primum hominem Adam, cum mandatum Dei in paradiso fuisset transgressus, statim sanctitatem et justitiam, in qua constitutus fuerat, amisisse, etc.:" - et can. 2.: "Si quis Adae praevaricationem sibi soli, et non ejus propagini asserit nocuisse; et acceptam a Deo sanctitatem et justitiam, quam perdidit, sibi soli, et non nobis etiam eum perdidisse, anathema sit." 256. The whole Catholic dogma concerning redemption and concerning grace rests upon the doctrine concerning the primitive justice and sanctity of the first parents; whence concerning this there are several definitions of the Church. The Second Council of Orange, canon 19, has: "Human nature, even if it had remained in that integrity in which it was established, would in no way preserve itself, unless its Creator assisted it. Hence, since without the grace of God it cannot guard the salvation which it received, how without the grace of God will it be able to repair what it has lost?" - The Council of Trent, session V, Decree on Original Sin, canon 1, says: "If anyone does not confess that the first man Adam, when he had transgressed the commandment of God in paradise, immediately lost the sanctity and justice in which he had been constituted, etc." - and canon 2: "If anyone asserts that Adam's prevarication harmed him alone, and not his offspring; and that he lost for himself alone, and not also for us, the sanctity and justice received from God, which he lost, let him be anathema."

257. Verba autem illa Conc. Trid. "Sanctitatem et justitiam, in qua constitutus fuerat," atque "acceptam a Deo sanctitatem et justitiam" adjecta non esse praeter intentionem principalem, sed ex professo apposita, clare colligitur non modo ex unanimi Theologorum consensu et utriusque canonis tenore, sed etiam ex eo quod Patres canonem verbis S. Augustini dicentis hominem in sanctitate creatum esse jam conceptum rejecerint, atque verba illa consulto elegerint, ut melius patebit in § sequente. 257. But

that those words of the Council of Trent, "the sanctity and justice in which he had been constituted," and "the sanctity and justice received from God," were added not beyond the principal intention, but were placed there by design, is clearly gathered not only from the unanimous consent of theologians and from the tenor of both canons, but also from the fact that the Fathers rejected the canon already conceived in the words of St. Augustine saying that man was created in sanctity, and deliberately chose those words, as will be clearer in the following paragraph.

258. His positis, dicimus:

Prop. XXIV. Divina revelatione constat Protoparentes in sanctitate et justitia constitutos fuisse, seu gratiam sanctificantem a Deo accepisse.

Prob. I. Legitur Gen. 1., 26.: "Faciamus hominem ad imaginem, et similitudinem nostram" et v. 27.: "Et creavit Deus hominem ad imaginem suam." - Sap. 2., 23.: "Deus creavit hominem inexterminabilem, et ad imaginem similitudinis suae fecit illum." - Unde: agitur in cit. testimoniis de formatione protoparentum, et dicuntur facti ad imaginem et similitudinem Dei; atqui imago haec intelligenda est non modo secundum naturam, sed etiam secundum gratiam; ergo.

Prob. min. Etsi Patres explicent imaginem Dei in homine secundum mentem, seu animam, quae est pars humanae naturae (n. 90); eam tamen explicant etiam secundum gratiam. Et quidem plures distinguentes inter imaginem et similitudinem, illam de natura, hanc de gratia interpretantur; alii nulla facta distinctione, imaginem et similitudinem simul de natura et gratia intelligunt; nullus est qui neget imaginem Dei in primo homine etiam secundum gratiam. - Quae insuper communis SS. PP. interpretatio evidens habet fundamentum in Sacra Scriptura. In 1. Cor., 15., ex. gr. dicitur: "portemus et imaginem caelestis" - et Rom. 8.: "Praedestinavit ... conformes fieri imagini filii sui." Ergo.

Methodius (in Conv.): "Indigebat enim secundum imaginem Dei factus, quod secundum illius similitudinem erat accipere. Idque cum perficere absolvereque missum esset Verbum in mundum, prius formam nostram suscepit ... ut, ob quos ipse nostram induit, divinam rursus capere possemus." - Paulinus (Ep. 2. ad Sev.): "Ut vere ad originalem gloriam reformemur, si divinam similitudinem Christi imitatione capiamus: nam in Adam solam nobis imaginem remansisse, etc." - Maximus (Cent. 3. n. 25.): "Secundum imaginem quidem Dei est omnis natura rationalis, secundum similitudinem vero tantum boni et sapientes: illud secundum naturam, hoc ex gratia etc." - Bernardus (Serm. 1. de Annunc.): "Ad imaginem nempe et similitudinem Dei factus est homo; in imagine arbitrii libertatem, virtutes habens in similitudine. Et similitudo quidem periit, verumtamen in imagine pertransit homo, etc." - Basilius (Serm. asc.): "Homo ad imaginem et similitudinem Dei factus est; sed per peccatum anima ad vitiosas cupiditates impulsa, deformavit imaginis pulchritudinem (ex similitudine ortam.) Revertamur igitur ad gratiam initio nobis concessam, ex qua excidimus per peccatum ... sc. imitantes divinae naturae ab affectibus vacuitatem et ita vitae divinae similitudinem adepti et perpetuo in aeterna illa beatitudine mansuri." - S. Augustinus (de sp. et an. c. 10.): "Ille spiritus dicitur factus ad imaginem et similitudinem Dei, in quo est cognitio veritatis et amor virtutis. Imago siquidem in cognitione, similitudo in dilectione: imago, quia rationalis, similitudo, quia spiritualis." - S. Irenaeus (l. 5. adv. haereses, c. 6.): "Si spiritus Dei animae junctus cum creatura unitur, per hanc ipsam spiritus effusionem spiritualis et perfectus homo constituitur, et hic est, qui secundum imaginem et similitudinem Dei factus est. Si autem animae deest spiritus tunc homo habet quidem imaginem in plasmate, sed non obtinet similitudinem per spiritum."

Prob. II. Legitur Eccles. 7. 30.: "Solummodo hoc inveni, quod fecerit Deus hominem rectum, et ipse se infinitis miscuerit quaestionibus." - Unde: agitur in hoc testimonio de morali rectitudine, secundum quam homo constituitur justus; siquidem, uti patet ex contextu, Ecclesiastes docet hominem insipienter agere dum quaerens suam felicitatem, studet sua desideria passionesque malas explere; atque huic stulto opponit hominem illum, qui rectus fuit ab initio. Atqui moralis rectitudo in eodem testimonio debet intelligi de rectitudine supernaturali, quae est per gratiam sanctificantem. Ergo.

Prob. min. Ex usu constanti Sacrae Scripturae, vox illa rectum, cum sermo est de morali perfectione, significat justum justitia supernaturali; ergo. Prob. antec.: Ps. 111., 2.: "Generatio rectorum benedicetur." - Cant. 1. 4.: "Recti diligunt Deum." Ps.

106. 4.: "videbunt recti et laetabuntur: et omnis iniquitas oppilabit os suum." Ps. 32. 1.: "Exultate justi in Domino; rectos decet collaudatio." Ps. 109. 14.: "verumtamen justi confitebuntur nomini tuo: et habitabunt recti cum vultu tuo," etc.

Prob. III. Legitur Eph. 4., 22. 23. "Renovamini spiritu mentis vestrae, et induite novum hominem, qui secundum Deum creatus est in justitia et sanctitate veritatis." - Et Col. 3., 8-10. "Nolite mentiri invicem, expoliantes vos veterem hominem cum actibus suis, et induentes novum eum, qui renovatur in agnitionem secundum imaginem ejus, qui creavit illum."

Certum est in cit. testimoniis Apostolum hortari ad renovationem hominis interioris per gratiam sanctificantem. Loquitur enim de renovatione in justitia et sanctitate veritatis - de renovatione quae fiat recuperando imaginem Dei, utique supernaturalem, siquidem naturalis non amittitur per peccatum - de renovatione obtinenda per Christum.

Quaestio est inter interpretes utrum per "hominem qui secundum Deum creatus est" debeat intelligi Christus an Adam. Non refert hic hanc quaestionem expendere; nam potest ex cit. testimoniis thesis nostra probari, sive directe verba illa intelligantur de Adamo, sive de Christo.

Revera a) si intelligantur directe de Adamo; ergo Adam dum creatus a Deo fuit, i. e., ante peccatum, constitutus fuit in justitia et sanctitate, habuit imaginem Dei supernaturalem, seu ornatus fuit gratia sanctificante. - b) Si vero eadem verba directe intelligantur de Christo, hortamur ab Apostolo ad induendum justitiam Christi, seu ad acquirendum gratiam sanctificantem per quamdam renovationem; renovatio autem non fit nisi iterum induendo quod depositum fuit; ergo jam aliquando homo erat sanctus et justus; seu habuit gratiam, quam amissam debet per Christum recuperare. - c) Verba illa "qui secundum Deum creatus est:" et "renovatur in imaginem ejus, qui creavit illum" aperte alludunt ad illud Gen. 1. 27.: "Et creavit Deus hominem ad imaginem suam: ad imaginem Dei creavit illum." Ergo alludunt ad Adam in prima sua conditione, ac proinde saltem indirecte de eo sunt etiam intelligenda. Hinc sensus verborum Apostoli esset: Renovamini, illud quod perdidistis recuperando; ut quemadmodum primus homo Adam ad imaginem et similitudinem Dei conditus fuit, ita et vos, induentes Jesum Christum, eamdem justitiam habeatis.

Unde S. Augustinus (de Gen. ad lit. l. 1. c. 24.): "Renovamur ergo," inquit, "spiritu mentis nostrae secundum imaginem ejus, qui creavit nos, quam peccando Adam perdidit." - Et (c. 26.): "Vide ergo quid sequatur: Induite novum hominem, qui secundum Deum creatus est in justitia et sanctitate veritatis: ecce quod perdidit Adam peccando." - Et S. Leo (Serm. 1. de jejun. decim. mensis.): "Ad quam (dignitatem supernaturalem) quotidie nos utique reparat gratia Salvatoris, dum quod cecidit in Adam primo, erigitur in secundo."

De tota hac quaestione Cf. Bellarminum (de grat. primi hom. cap. 2. 3.) ubi invenies praesertim plura SS. Patrum testimonia - solutionem objectionis, quae peti solet ex 1. Cor. 15., pro qua cons. etiam Bern. a Piconio - solutiones objectionum, quae sumuntur ex S. Augustino; pro quibus cons. etiam Gotti Tract. 10. quaest. 3. dub. 3. §. 3. 258. With these things set down, we say:

Proposition XXIV. It is established by divine revelation that the first parents were constituted in sanctity and justice, or received sanctifying grace from God.

Proof I. It is read in Genesis 1:26: "Let us make man to our image and likeness," and verse 27: "And God created man to his own image." - Wisdom 2:23: "God created man inexterminable, and made him to the image of his likeness." - Hence: in the cited testimonies the formation of the first parents is being treated, and they are said to have been made to the image and likeness of God; but this image must be understood not only according to nature, but also according to grace; therefore.

Proof of the minor. Although the Fathers explain the image of God in man according to mind, or soul, which is part of human nature (n. 90), nevertheless they also explain it according to grace. And indeed several, distinguishing between image and likeness, interpret the former of nature, the latter of grace; others, making no distinction, understand image and likeness together of nature and grace; there is no one who denies the image of God in the first man also according to grace. - Moreover this common interpretation of the holy Fathers has an evident foundation in Sacred Scripture. In 1 Corinthians 15, for example, it is said: "let us bear also the image of the heavenly one"; and Romans 8: "He predestined ... to be made conformable to the image of his Son." Therefore.

Methodius (in Conv.): "For he who was made according to the image of God needed to receive what was according

to his likeness. And when the Word was sent into the world to perfect and complete this, he first took our form ... so that we, for whose sake he put on our form, might again receive the divine." - Paulinus (Epistle 2, to Severus): "That we may truly be reformed to original glory, if we receive the divine likeness by imitation of Christ: for in Adam the image alone remained to us, etc." - Maximus (Centuries 3, n. 25): "According to the image of God indeed is every rational nature, but according to likeness only the good and wise: the former according to nature, the latter from grace, etc." - Bernard (Sermon 1, On the Annunciation): "Man was indeed made to the image and likeness of God; in the image having freedom of choice, virtues in the likeness. And the likeness indeed perished, yet nevertheless man passes through in the image, etc." - Basil (Ascetical Sermon): "Man was made to the image and likeness of God; but through sin the soul, driven to vicious desires, deformed the beauty of the image (arisen from the likeness). Therefore let us return to the grace granted to us at the beginning, from which we fell away through sin ... namely by imitating the freedom from passions of the divine nature, and thus having obtained the likeness of divine life, and being about to remain perpetually in that eternal beatitude." - St. Augustine (On Spirit and Soul, chapter 10): "That spirit is said to have been made to the image and likeness of God, in which there is knowledge of truth and love of virtue. Image indeed in knowledge, likeness in love: image because rational, likeness because spiritual." - St. Irenaeus (book 5, Against Heresies, chapter 6): "If the Spirit of God, joined to the soul, is united with the creature, through this very outpouring of the Spirit the spiritual and perfect man is constituted, and this is he who was made according to the image and likeness of God. But if the Spirit is lacking to the soul, then man indeed has the image in the formed thing, but does not obtain the likeness through the Spirit."

Proof II. It is read in Ecclesiastes 7:30: "Only this have I found, that God made man right, and he has mixed himself into infinite questions." - Hence: in this testimony moral rectitude is being treated, according to which man is constituted just; since, as is clear from the context, Ecclesiastes teaches that man acts foolishly when, seeking his happiness, he strives to fulfill his desires and evil passions; and to this fool he opposes that man who was right from the beginning. But moral rectitude in the same testimony must be understood of supernatural rectitude, which is through sanctifying grace. Therefore.

Proof of the minor. From the constant usage of Sacred Scripture, that word right, when the discussion is about moral perfection, signifies one just by supernatural justice; therefore. Proof of the antecedent: Psalm 111:2: "The generation of the right will be blessed." - Canticle 1:4: "The right love God." Psalm 106:4: "the right will see and will rejoice: and every iniquity will stop its mouth." Psalm 32:1: "Rejoice, you just, in the Lord; praise befits the right." Psalm 109:14: "nevertheless the just will confess your name: and the right will dwell with your face," etc.

Proof III. It is read in Ephesians 4:22-23: "Be renewed in the spirit of your mind, and put on the new man, who according to God has been created in justice and sanctity of truth." - And Colossians 3:8-10: "Do not lie to one another, stripping yourselves of the old man with his acts, and putting on the new one, who is renewed unto knowledge according to the image of him who created him."

It is certain that in the cited testimonies the Apostle exhorts to the renewal of the interior man through sanctifying grace. For he speaks of renewal in justice and sanctity of truth; of renewal which is made by recovering the image of God, certainly supernatural, since the natural image is not lost through sin; of renewal to be obtained through Christ.

There is a question among interpreters whether by "the man who according to God has been created" Christ or Adam must be understood. It does not matter here to examine this question; for our thesis can be proved from the cited testimonies whether those words are understood directly of Adam or of Christ.

In reality, a) if they are understood directly of Adam, then Adam, when he was created by God, that is, before sin, was constituted in justice and sanctity, had the supernatural image of God, or was adorned with sanctifying grace. - b) But if the same words are understood directly of Christ, we are exhorted by the Apostle to put on the justice of Christ, or to acquire sanctifying grace through a certain renewal; but renewal is not made except by putting on again what had been laid aside; therefore at some time man was already holy and just, or had grace which, having been lost, he must recover through Christ. - c) Those words

"who according to God has been created" and "is renewed unto the image of him who created him" openly allude to Genesis 1:27: "And God created man to his image: to the image of God he created him." Therefore they allude to Adam in his first condition, and consequently at least indirectly must also be understood of him. Hence the sense of the Apostle's words would be: Be renewed, by recovering that which you have lost, so that just as the first man Adam was established to the image and likeness of God, so you also, putting on Jesus Christ, may have the same justice.

Hence St. Augustine says (On Genesis to the Letter, book 1, chapter 24): "Therefore we are renewed in the spirit of our mind according to the image of him who created us, which Adam lost by sinning." - And chapter 26: "See therefore what follows: Put on the new man, who according to God has been created in justice and sanctity of truth: behold what Adam lost by sinning." - And St. Leo (Sermon 1, On the Fast of the Tenth Month): "To this dignity (the supernatural dignity), the grace of the Savior surely repairs us daily, while what fell in the first Adam is raised up in the second."

On this whole question compare Bellarmine (On the Grace of the First Man, chapters 2 and 3), where you will find especially several testimonies of the holy Fathers, the solution of the objection which is usually drawn from 1 Corinthians 15, for which consult also Bernard a Piconio, and the solutions of the objections which are taken from St. Augustine; for these consult also Gotti, treatise 10, question 3, doubt 3, § 3.

§ II.
Utrum Adam Gratiam Acceperit In Primo Instanti Creationis. § II.
Whether Adam Received Grace In The First Instant Of Creation.

260. Conveniunt omnes DD. catholici in doctrina paulo ante statuta, Adamum ante peccatum gratia sanctificante instructum fuisse; verum non aeque omnes conveniunt quoad tempus, quo illam accepit. Etenim non pauci inter antiquos Theologos, uti S. Bonaventura, Scotus, Magister sententiarum, Halensis, etc. putarunt primum hominem habuisse quidem a primo suo creationis instanti rectitudinem quamdam tum animae tum corporis, seu illa dona justitiae originalis quae licet perficiant hominem, non tamen eum perficiunt per se in ordine ad finem supernaturalem; sed nonnisi post aliquod tempus obtinuisse gratiam sanctificantem, per quam recte intrinsece disponebatur in ordine ad illum finem. Praecipuum hujus sententiae fundamentum erat, quod Adam gratiam accepit se disponendo ad illam; dispositio autem ad gratiam debet, aiebant, tempore praecedere ipsam gratiae infusionem. 260. All Catholic Doctors agree in the doctrine established a little earlier, that Adam before sin was furnished with sanctifying grace; but not all agree equally about the time at which he received it. For not a few among the older theologians, such as St. Bonaventure, Scotus, the Master of the Sentences, Halensis, etc., thought that the first man indeed had from the first instant of his creation a certain rectitude both of soul and body, or those gifts of original justice which, although they perfect man, nevertheless do not perfect him of themselves in order to a supernatural end; but that only after some time did he obtain sanctifying grace, by which he was intrinsically rightly disposed in order to that end. The principal foundation of this opinion was that Adam received grace by disposing himself for it; but the disposition for grace, they said, must precede in time the infusion of grace itself.

261. At vero D. Thomas variis in locis (1. p. q. 95. a. 1. - 2. 2. q. 5. a. 1. 2. dist. 29. q. 1. a. 2. et alibi) docet quod Adam conditus fuit in gratia sanctificante. Quam sententiam deinde communiter sequuti sunt Theologi, ita ut recentiores pene universi illam uti certam tradant - certum est tamen contrariae sententiae nullam notam inuri posse. Nam primus canon Conc. Trid. superius recitatus, in quo dicitur Adam amisisse justitiam "in qua constitutus fuerat" antea habebat "in qua conditus fuerat": mutatio autem facta fuit "Paceco monente," inquit Card. Pallavicini (Hist. Conc. Trid. l. 7. c. 9.), "non esse citra controversiam, an Adamus interiorem sanctitatem obtinuerit primo, quo creatus fuerit

momento ... unde patet, quam infirma a quibusdam deducatur probatio ad id affirmandum ex verbis Concilii, quae nunc extant." 261. But St. Thomas in various places (I, q. 95, a. 1; II-II, q. 5, a. 1; II, dist. 29, q. 1, a. 2, and elsewhere) teaches that Adam was established in sanctifying grace. Theologians then commonly followed this opinion, so that nearly all more recent authors hand it down as certain. It is certain, however, that no note can be branded upon the contrary opinion. For the first canon of the Council of Trent recited above, in which Adam is said to have lost the justice "in which he had been constituted," previously had "in which he had been created." But the change was made, "Pacheco advising," says Cardinal Pallavicini (History of the Council of Trent, book 7, chapter 9), "that it was not beyond controversy whether Adam obtained interior sanctity in the first moment in which he was created ... whence it is clear how weak is the proof deduced by some for affirming this from the words of the Council which now stand."

262. Quoad praedictum prioris sententiae fundamentum, concedit D. Thomas (2. dist. 29. q. 1. a. 2.), quod "probabilius est, ut cum homo creatus fuit, in naturalibus integris, quae otiosa esse non poterant, quod in primo instanti creationis ad Deum conversus, gratiam consecutus sit." Quod sequentibus rationibus confirmari potest:

a) conveniens est ut sanctificatio fiat modo conformi subjecto; hoc modo fit, si fiat posita dispositione in adultis, et sine ulla propria dispositione in infantibus usu rationis carentibus; Adam conditus fuit in statu adulto. Ergo.

b) Per infusionem gratiae sanctificantis constituitur amicitia inter Deum et hominem, imo perficitur matrimonium quoddam spirituale; sed haec exigunt mutuum consensum. Ergo.

c) "Justificatio," inquit Suarez (de op. sex dier. l. 3. c. 19. n. 3.) "cum proprio actu, vel per proprium actum perfectiori modo fit, quam per solum habitum. Unde idem D. Thomas 3. p. q. 34. art. 3. Sicut actus, inquit, est perfectior, quam habitus, et quod est per se, eo quod est per aliud, ita justificatio secundum proprium actum perfectior est. Et ideo addit hanc esse sanctificationem adultorum, aliam vero, quae fit sine actu, esse puerorum. Sed Adam sanctificatus fuit perfecto modo, et ut adultus, et non ut infans; ergo sanctificatus est actu operans sanctificationem; quod est sanctificari secundum proprium actum. Minor quoad priorem partem probatur, quia opera Dei perfecta sunt, sed sanctificatio Adae fuit proprium Dei opus; ergo debuit perfecto modo fieri cum ex parte recipientis capacitas non deesset. Unde probatur altera pars, quia Adam in adulta aetate creatus fuit, et sufficienter dispositus ad utendum ratione; ergo ut adultus sanctificari debuit et non ut infans." 262. With respect to the aforesaid foundation of the earlier opinion, St. Thomas concedes (II, dist. 29, q. 1, a. 2) that "it is more probable that, when man was created in integral natural things, which could not be idle, in the first instant of creation, turned toward God, he obtained grace." This can be confirmed by the following reasons:

a) It is fitting that sanctification be made in a mode conformable to the subject. It is made in this way if it is made with a disposition set down in adults, and without any proper disposition in infants lacking the use of reason. Adam was established in an adult state. Therefore.

b) Through the infusion of sanctifying grace there is constituted friendship between God and man; indeed a certain spiritual marriage is perfected. But these require mutual consent. Therefore.

c) "Justification," says Suarez (On the Work of the Six Days, book 3, chapter 19, n. 3), "with a proper act, or through a proper act, is made in a more perfect mode than through habit alone. Hence the same St. Thomas, III, q. 34, art. 3, says: As act is more perfect than habit, and what is through itself than what is through another, so justification according to a proper act is more perfect. And therefore he adds that this is the sanctification of adults, but the other, which is made without act, is of children. But Adam was sanctified in a perfect mode, both as an adult and not as an infant; therefore he was sanctified by an act working sanctification, which is to be sanctified according to a proper act. The minor, as to the former part, is proved because the works of God are perfect; but the sanctification of Adam was God's proper work; therefore it had to be made in a perfect mode, since on the part of the recipient capacity was not lacking. Whence the other part is proved, because Adam was created in adult age and sufficiently disposed for using reason; therefore he had to be sanctified as

an adult and not as an infant."

263. Negat tamen D. Thomas, ex eo quod Adam acceperit gratiam sese disponendo ad illam, sequi quod gratiam non acceperit in primo creationis instanti. "Cum motus," inquit, (1. p. q. 95. a. 1. ad 5.) "voluntatis non sit continuus, nihil prohibet, etiam in primo instanti suae creationis primum hominem gratiae consensisse." Revera omnes docent Angelos gratia fuisse ornatos in primo instanti, juxta illud S. Augustini: "Deus erat simul condens naturam et largiens gratiam;" et tamen plures inter ipsos Scotistas concedunt illam consecutos fuisse propria dispositione. Est dogma fidei B. V. Mariam gratiam in primo suae conceptionis instanti accepisse; et communiter docent eamdem non absque propria dispositione obtinuisse, licet illud fuerit, uti monet Suarez, l. c. n. 6. "singulare gratiae privilegium ... quia ille modus utendi ratione in infantibus miraculosus est." 263. Nevertheless St. Thomas denies that, from the fact that Adam received grace by disposing himself for it, it follows that he did not receive grace in the first instant of creation. "Since the motion," he says (I, q. 95, a. 1, ad 5), "of the will is not continuous, nothing prevents the first man, even in the first instant of his creation, from having consented to grace." In reality, all teach that the Angels were adorned with grace in the first instant, according to that saying of St. Augustine: "God was at once establishing nature and bestowing grace"; and nevertheless several even among the Scotists concede that they obtained it by their own disposition. It is a dogma of faith that the Blessed Virgin Mary received grace in the first instant of her conception; and they commonly teach that she obtained the same not without her own disposition, although that was, as Suarez notes in the cited place, n. 6, "a singular privilege of grace ... because that mode of using reason in infants is miraculous."

264. Caeterum si alicui haec duo conciliari non posse viderentur, retinenda potius esset infusio gratiae in primo instanti, quam ejus assecutio per proprium actum; tum quia primum nititur sacrae scripturae et SS. Patrum testimoniis, tum quia alterum nonnisi ut probabile traditur ab omnibus ex quibusdam rationibus convenientiae. 264. But if these two things should seem to someone unable to be reconciled, the infusion of grace in the first instant should rather be retained than its attainment through a proper act; both because the first rests on testimonies of Sacred Scripture and of the holy Fathers, and because the other is handed down by all only as probable from certain reasons of fittingness.

265. His itaque declaratis, dicimus:

Prop. XXV. Protoparentes in ipsa creatione in justitia et sanctitate constituti sunt a Deo, qui proinde uno eodemque tempore fuit et naturae Creator, et sanctificantis gratiae benignissimus Largitor.

Prob. I. Inter dona, per quae Adam dicitur factus ad imaginem et similitudinem Dei, uti probavimus in thesi praecedente, continetur etiam gratia sanctificans; atqui illa dona collata illi fuere in primo creationis instanti, uti patet. Ergo.

Prob. II. Dona quae continentur sub illis verbis "Deus fecit hominem rectum" fatentibus omnibus, collata Adae fuere in primo creationis instanti: unde ex eo testimonio deducebant Theologi contrariae sententiae, Adamum in ipsa creatione consecutum fuisse rectitudinem quamdam naturalem, vel potius praeternaturalem. Atqui inter dona, quae continentur sub illis verbis, est etiam gratia sanctificans, uti probavimus antea. Ergo.

Prob. III. ex D. Th. (cit. q. 95. a. 1.): "Quod fuerit (Adam) etiam conditus in gratia, ut alii dicunt, videtur requirere ipsa rectitudo primi status, in qua Deus hominem fecit, secundum illud Eccle. 7. 30.: Deus fecit hominem rectum. Erat enim haec rectitudo secundum hoc quod ratio subdebatur Deo, rationi vero inferiores vires, et animae corpus. Prima autem subjectio erat causa et secundae, et tertiae. Quamdiu enim ratio manebat Deo subjecta, inferiora ei subdebantur, ut Augustinus dicit, c. 16. lib. 1. de Remiss. peccatorum. Manifestum est autem quod illa subjectio corporis ad animam, et inferiorum virium ad rationem non erat naturalis; alioquin post peccatum mansisset, cum etiam in daemonibus data naturalia post peccatum permanserint, ut Dionysius dicit, 14. c. de div. Nom. part. 4. lect. 19. Unde

manifestum est quod et illa prima subjectio, qua ratio Deo subdebatur, non erat solum secundum naturam, sed secundum supernaturale donum gratiae; non enim potest esse quod effectus sit potior quam causa."

Prob. IV. ex Suarez (de op. sex dier. l. 3. c. 17. n. 15.): "Deus creaturas produxit in statu perfecto ad ferendum fructum uniuscujusque fini consentaneum, ut supra de creaturis etiam homine inferioribus diximus; ergo multum magis credendum est, creasse hominem perfectum ad fructificandum in ordine ad supernaturalem finem, propter quem illum creabat."

"Secundo probari potest a simili, quia Deus creavit Angelos in gratia; ergo et hominem, nam sicut utramque naturam aequalitatem quandam in gloriae statu habere voluit, ita in statu viae verisimile est, utramque aequaliter in gratia creasse. Quam aequiparationem multi ex citatis Patribus faciunt, et superius in num. 4. latius explicata est."

"Tertio est optima conjectura, quia si Adam perseverasset in statu justitiae, filii ejus nascerentur in gratia; ergo multo magis dicendum est primum eorum parentem fuisse in gratia creatum. Consequentia secundum prudentem rationem videtur per se nota. Antecedens vero infra tractandum est. Nunc vero declaratur a posteriori, quia nunc infantes ab instanti conceptionis incipiunt esse in peccato, quia carent gratia, quam habere deberent; ergo e converso, si radix non fuerit infecta, statim gratiam reciperent, quam habere debuissent."

Vid. ll. cc. ex D. Thoma et Suaresio, ubi plura SS. Patrum testimonia, et objectiones solutas invenies. 265. Therefore, with these things declared, we say:

Proposition XXV. The first parents were constituted by God in justice and sanctity in creation itself; and therefore at one and the same time he was both Creator of nature and most benign Bestower of sanctifying grace.

Proof I. Among the gifts through which Adam is said to have been made to the image and likeness of God, as we proved in the preceding thesis, sanctifying grace also is contained; but those gifts were conferred upon him in the first instant of creation, as is clear. Therefore.

Proof II. The gifts which are contained under those words "God made man right," by everyone's confession, were conferred upon Adam in the first instant of creation; whence from that testimony the theologians of the contrary opinion deduced that Adam in creation itself had obtained a certain natural, or rather preternatural, rectitude. But among the gifts which are contained under those words is also sanctifying grace, as we proved before. Therefore.

Proof III. From St. Thomas (cited q. 95, a. 1): "That he was also established in grace, as others say, the very rectitude of the first state in which God made man seems to require, according to Ecclesiastes 7:30: God made man right. For this rectitude was according to this, that reason was subjected to God, the lower powers to reason, and the body to the soul. But the first subjection was the cause both of the second and of the third. For as long as reason remained subject to God, the lower things were subjected to it, as Augustine says, chapter 16, book 1, On the Remission of Sins. But it is manifest that that subjection of the body to the soul, and of the lower powers to reason, was not natural; otherwise after sin it would have remained, since even in the demons natural gifts remained after sin, as Dionysius says, chapter 14, On the Divine Names, part 4, lecture 19. Whence it is manifest that even that first subjection, by which reason was subjected to God, was not only according to nature, but according to the supernatural gift of grace; for it cannot be that the effect is more powerful than the cause."

Proof IV. From Suarez (On the Work of the Six Days, book 3, chapter 17, n. 15): "God produced creatures in a perfect state for bearing fruit consonant with the end of each one, as we said above concerning creatures even inferior to man; therefore much more must it be believed that he created man perfect for bearing fruit in order to the supernatural end for the sake of which he was creating him."

"Secondly it can be proved from a likeness, because God created the Angels in grace; therefore also man. For just as he willed each nature to have a certain equality in the state of glory, so in the state of the way it is likely that he created each equally in grace. Many of the cited Fathers make this equalization, and it was explained more broadly above in number 4."

"Thirdly there is an excellent conjecture, because if Adam had persevered in the state of justice, his children would be born in grace; therefore much more must it be said that the first parent of them was created in grace. The consequence according to prudent reason seems self-evident. But the antecedent must be treated below. Now, however, it

is declared a posteriori, because now infants from the instant of conception begin to be in sin, because they lack the grace which they ought to have; therefore conversely, if the root had not been infected, they would immediately receive the grace which they ought to have had."

See the cited places from St. Thomas and Suarez, where you will find several testimonies of the holy Fathers and solved objections.

Corrected Latin Text
§ III.
Utrum Gratia Sanctificans Adae Collata Fuerit Donum Indebitum. § III.
Whether Sanctifying Grace Conferred Upon Adam Was A Gift Not Owed.

266. Cum quaeritur utrum gratia sanctificans sit donum supernaturale, ideoque indebitum, potest quaestio dupliciter intelligi: 1. utrum sit indebita homini, Angelis, universae naturae creatae. 2. utrum sit indebita universae naturae etiam creabili seu possibili. 266. When it is asked whether sanctifying grace is a supernatural gift, and therefore not owed, the question can be understood in two ways: 1. whether it is not owed to man, to the Angels, and to universal created nature; 2. whether it is not owed to universal nature even creatable or possible.

267. Quoad primam quaestionem, est doctrina catholica gratiam sanctificantem esse indebitam toti naturae creatae, uti patet ex propp. damnatis in Baio et ex universa doctrina de gratia. Quoad alteram vero, non defuerunt aliquot Theologi, inter quos Ripalda, qui censerent dari posse aliquam creaturam, cui gratia sanctificans ac proinde dona quae connaturaliter eam consequuntur sint debita: creaturam illam vocabant substantiam intrinsece supernaturalem. 267. With respect to the first question, it is Catholic doctrine that sanctifying grace is not owed to the whole of created nature, as is clear from the propositions condemned in Baius and from the whole doctrine concerning grace. But with respect to the other question, there have not been lacking some theologians, among whom was Ripalda, who judged that there could be given some creature to whom sanctifying grace, and consequently the gifts which connaturally follow it, would be owed. They called that creature an intrinsically supernatural substance.

268. Quaestio haec expendi potest vel ex fontibus revelationis, vel ex rationis principiis. Quae ex principiis rationis afferri solent, communiter tradunt Theologi ubi de visione intuitiva agitur: nos hunc morem sequemur. Quae vero a fontibus revelationis immediate derivantur, quamvis tum gratiam sanctificantem tum visionem intuitivam attingant (utriusque enim eadem est ratio, cum una connaturaliter alteri jungatur), alia tamen ad illam, alia ad hanc magis directe pertinent. Hic, cum de gratia sit sermo, quae ad hanc spectant afferemus. 268. This question can be weighed either from the sources of revelation or from the principles of reason. The things which are usually brought forward from the principles of reason are commonly handed down by theologians where the intuitive vision is treated; we shall follow this custom. But the things which are derived immediately from the sources of revelation, although they touch both sanctifying grace and the intuitive vision, for the account of each is the same, since one is connaturally joined to the other, nevertheless some pertain more directly to the former, others to the latter. Here, since the discussion is about grace, we shall bring forward the things which regard grace.

269. Satis nobis esset in praesente quaestione ostendere gratiam sanctificantem fuisse indebitam homini cum primo conditus fuit; sed cum alia quaestio de qualibet etiam possibili creatura melius determinet veram supernaturalitatem hujus doni, utramque simul pertractabimus. Ne tamen prolixior, quam par sit, fiat disceptatio, pauca seligemus argumenta, quae dum directe probant gratiam esse indebitam cuicumque creaturae, hoc ipso demonstrant indebitam esse homini. 269. In the present question

it would be enough for us to show that sanctifying grace was not owed to man when he was first established. But since the other question concerning any possible creature also better determines the true supernaturality of this gift, we shall treat both together. Yet lest the discussion become more lengthy than is proper, we shall select a few arguments which, while they directly prove that grace is not owed to any creature, by that very fact demonstrate that it is not owed to man.

270. His igitur claritatis gratia praestitutis, dicimus:

Prop. XXVI. Gratia sanctificans ita supernaturalis dicenda est, ut nulla sit natura creata aut creabilis, cui possit esse debita.

Prob. I. Ex Scriptura. Joannis 1. 12.: "Dedit eis potestatem, filios Dei fieri." - Rom. 5. 2.: "Per quam habemus accessum per fidem in gratiam istam, in qua stamus et gloriamur in spe gloriae filiorum Dei." - 8. 14.: "Quicumque enim spiritu Dei aguntur, ii sunt filii Dei." - 15. "accepistis spiritum adoptionis filiorum, in qua clamamus Abba, Pater." S. Joan. 3, 1.: "Videte qualem charitatem dedit nobis Pater, ut filii Dei nominemur et simus." - 2. Pet. c. 1. 3. seq.: "Quomodo omnia nobis divinae virtutis suae, quae ad vitam et pietatem donata sunt, per cognitionem ejus qui vocavit nos propria gloria et virtute, per quem maxima et pretiosa nobis promissa donavit: ut per haec efficiamini divinae consortes naturae." - 2. Cor. 3. 18.: "Nos vero omnes, revelata facie gloriam Domini speculantes, in eamdem imaginem transformamur a claritate in claritatem, tanquam a Domini Spiritu." - Jo. 6. 58.: "Sicut misit me vivens Pater, et ego vivo propter Patrem: et qui manducat me, et ipse vivet propter me," etc.

Ex his, et multis aliis Sacrae Scripturae testimoniis patet gratiam sanctificantem habere tamquam formalem effectum, ut faciat eum, cui infunditur, Filium Dei. - Filius autem habet similitudinem in natura cum patre; hoc verum est de filio naturali; hic enim per generationem accipit eamdem specie naturam patris: verum est etiam de filio adoptivo; unde qui alium adoptat in filium inter homines, supponit in eo eamdem naturam. - Filius Dei naturalis est unicus; qui ergo per gratiam sanctificantem fiunt filii Dei, sunt filii per adoptionem. Deus nequit supponere in nobis similitudinem, quam filiatio etiam adoptiva exigit: dum ergo, nos filios suos adoptivos facit, infundit nobis hanc similitudinem. Haec similitudo in natura creaturae cum Deo nequit quidem esse creaturae essentialis, seu nequit pertinere ad ipsam essentiam ejus, uti patet; sed, licet accidentalis, est tamen vera et intrinseca, et non solum extrinseca et per denominationem: ita ut, quemadmodum filii Dei et nominamur, et sumus; ita similes Dei vere efficimur. Unde est veritas definita a Conc. Trid. contra novatores, quod justi constituimur per aliquod donum inhaerens animae. - Hoc donum animae inhaerens intrinsece, per quod sumus justi, filii Dei, etc., est gratia sanctificans. Unde per gratiam sanctificantem efficimur consortes divinae naturae, transformamur in eamdem imaginem Dei, deificamur, uti loquitur Scriptura.

Haec omnia fusius exponenda sunt in tractatu de gratia; sed hic satis est innuisse, ut possimus ad rem nostram ita arguere:

a) Nulli naturae est debitum id quod est proprium superioris naturae; equo, ex. gr., non est debita perfectio propria hominis; homini non est debita perfectio quae est propria Angeli. Ergo quod excellentius est homine, Angelo, quacumque natura creata aut creabili, nequit ulli esse debitum. Atqui gratia sanctificans est perfectio excedens omnem creaturam creatam et creabilem, siquidem, uti constat ex dictis, est ordinis divini. Ergo. - Unde S. Aug., locum illum Ps. 81. 6. "Ego dixi, Dii estis, et filii Excelsi omnes," ita exponit (l. 2. con. Maximin. cap. 15. n. 2.): "Manifestum est ergo, quia homines dixit deos, ex gratia sua deificatos. Si filii Dei facti sumus, deificati sumus; sed hoc est gratiae adoptantis, non naturae generantis."

b) Qui gratiam habet sanctificantem, fit hoc ipso filius Dei adoptivus. Atqui adoptio non natura, aut hujus exigentia constat, uti patet vel inter homines; sed voluntate et libera electione adoptantis hujusmodi propinquitatis nexu se sponte adstringentis. Ergo. - Unde illud Jac. 1. 18. "Voluntarie genuit nos verbo veritatis" bene explicat Cornelius a Lapide per gratuitum beneplacitum et benevolentiam: cujus est simile illud Oseae 14. "diligam eos spontanee."

Prob. II. Ex Patribus. Patres 1. constanter tribuunt gratiae sanctificanti effectum deificationis, et adoptionis in filios Dei. - 2. Unanimiter docent gratiam sanctificantem indebitam esse homini tum lapso tum innocenti. - 3. Imo indebitam esse et Angelis:

S. Basilius (l. de Sp. Sancto, c. 9.): "Merae et intelligibiles et ultramundanae virtutes (Angeli) sanctae tum sunt tum

nominantur, ex gratia per Spiritum infusa sanctimoniam nactae ... Sanctificatio non est absque spiritu. Neque enim caelorum virtutes suapte natura sanctae sunt (nam si id esset, nulla re differrent a Spiritu S.); sed juxta portionem, qua se invicem superant, a Spiritu habent sanctificationis mensuram." - Et c. 26.: "Principatus, et Potestates, et omnis creatura talis, quae ex attentione et studio sanctitatem habent, non jure naturae sanctae dicentur."

S. Ambrosius (De Sp. Sancto, l. 1. c. 7.): "Quemadmodum sanctificans Apostolos Spiritus non est humanae consors naturae, ita etiam sanctificans Angelos non habet consortium creaturae. Si qui autem putant, non esse spiritualem (i. e. a Spiritu S. infusam) in Angelis sanctitatem, sed aliam quandam gratiam suae proprietate naturae, hi inferiores profecto Angelos hominibus judicabunt." - Vid. etiam (n. 253. b.)

4. Patres indebitam dicunt gratiam sanctificantem sive homini sive Angelo, quia sunt creatura, ac proinde illam indebitam praedicant cuicumque creaturae.

Cyrillus Alex. (thes. l. 12. c. 15.): "Creatura serva est et Creator Dominus; sed creatura quoque Domino suo conjuncta a propria conditione liberatur et in meliorem traducitur ... Servi nos Dei sumus secundum naturam, ipse Dominus ... Si ergo nos per gratiam dii et filii sumus, erit Verbum Dei, cujus gratia et filii Dei facti sumus, reipsa vere Filius Dei." - Et c. 13.): "Est enim verus ille Filius existens a Patre, sed nos ejus benignitate adoptivi, gratiae loco id accipientes: Ego dixi, dii estis, et filii Excelsi omnes. Creata quippe et serva natura ad res supernaturales vocatur solo nutu et voluntate Patris: Filius vero et Deus et Dominus ... quum ex ipsa substantia Patris effulserit, proprium ejus bonum secundum naturam sibi adsciscit."

S. Petrus Chrysologus (Serm. 72. in or. Domin.): "'Pater noster, qui es in caelis.' Hoc est, quod pavebam dicere; hoc est, quod trepidabam proferre; hoc est, quod neque caelestium neque terrestrium quemque sinebat servitutis propriae conditio suspicari: caeli et terrae, carnis et Dei tantum repente tantum posse provenire commercium, ut Deus in hominem (in incarnatione), homo in Deum, Dominus in servum, servus verteretur in filium, fieretque divinitatis et humanitatis ineffabili modo una et sempiterna cognitio. Et quidem Deitatis erga nos dignatio tanta est, ut scire nequeat, quid potissimum mirari debeat, creatura: utrum quod se Deus ad nostram deposuit servitutem, an quod nos ad divinitatis suae rapuit dignitatem."

S. Athanasius (or. 2. 59.): "Deus non solum eos homines facit, sed et filios dixit, tanquam si illos genuisset. Est autem Dei benevolentia, quod quorum sit conditor, horum postea per benevolentiam Patrem se faciat, quod tum contingit, quum creati homines, ut ait Apostolus, Spiritum Filii ejus, clamantem Abba Pater, in suis cordibus suscipiunt ... Nec enim alio modo possunt filii fieri, quum ex natura sua sint creati, nisi Spiritum ejus, qui est naturalis et verus Filius acceperint."

Plura SS. Patrum testimonia invenies apud Casini (Quid est homo - sive controversia, etc. aa. 1. et 6.). - Unde:

a) Patres, sicut Scriptura, gratiae sanctificanti tribuunt deificationem et adoptionem divinam; ergo ex Patrum auctoritate eadem consequentia inferenda est, ac paulo ante ex Scriptura deducebamus, nempe: gratia sanctificans indebita est homini, Angelo, cuicumque creaturae.

b) Ratio, propter quam Patres negant gratiam sanctificantem esse debitam, sive homini sive Angelis, est quia hi sunt natura servi. - Loquuntur autem de servitute, quae consequitur necessario ipsam rationem entis creati; et non de servitute peccati. Nam 1. aperte dicunt quod omnis natura creata est serva, quia creata. - 2. Per peccata creatura fit serva peccati et daemonis, et excidit ab officio servi Dei: Patres autem opponunt servitutem Dei Filiationi divinae. - 3. Scriptura et Patres opponunt creatam naturam tamquam servam Filio Dei naturali, docentque per adoptionem illi communicari ea, quae huic soli per naturam conveniunt. - Atqui talis ratio servitutis viget non modo in omni creatura existente, sed etiam possibili. Ergo.

Nota. Nulla est difficultas contra hanc thesim, quod dari possint accidentia intrinsece supernaturalia, uti est ex. gr., ipsa gratia sanctificans. Nam 1. Ratio servitutis, quemadmodum et ratio filiationis, proprie cadit in personam terminantem substantiam; nullo pacto in accidentia; unde non est eadem repugnantia.

2. "Accidentia," inquit Suarez (De Deo l. 2. c. 9. n. 15.) "sunt instituta ad perficiendas substantias et supplendum defectus earum, et ideo per accidentia superaddita participare potest inferior substantia aliquo modo id quod est proprium superioris. Eo vel maxime quod in unaquaque re primum fundamentum et quasi mensura omnium proprietatum connaturalium est propria substantia et ideo in ipsis terminis involvitur repugnantia, cum dicitur substantia supernaturalis. At vero accidentia adduntur substantiae; et quando ab extrinseco veniunt, non est necesse ut omnino

commensurentur imperfectioni ejus, in qua recipiuntur; sed possunt esse participationes altioris naturae et ex objecto, vel aliunde habere perfectionem suam, non est igitur similis ratio." 270. Therefore, with these things laid down for the sake of clarity, we say:

Proposition XXVI. Sanctifying grace must be called so supernatural that there is no created or creatable nature to which it could be owed.

Proof I. From Scripture. John 1:12: "He gave them power to become sons of God." - Romans 5:2: "Through whom we have access by faith into this grace in which we stand, and we glory in the hope of the glory of the sons of God." - 8:14: "For whoever are led by the Spirit of God, they are the sons of God." - 15: "you have received the spirit of adoption of sons, in which we cry Abba, Father." 1 John 3:1: "See what charity the Father has given us, that we should be called and should be sons of God." - 2 Peter 1:3ff.: "As all things of his divine power which pertain to life and piety have been given to us, through the knowledge of him who called us by his own glory and virtue, through whom he has given us the greatest and precious promises: that through these you may be made partakers of the divine nature." - 2 Corinthians 3:18: "But we all, with unveiled face beholding the glory of the Lord, are transformed into the same image from brightness into brightness, as by the Spirit of the Lord." - John 6:58: "As the living Father sent me, and I live because of the Father: and he who eats me, he also shall live because of me," etc.

From these and many other testimonies of Sacred Scripture it is clear that sanctifying grace has as its formal effect that it makes him into whom it is infused a Son of God. But a son has likeness in nature with the father. This is true of a natural son, for through generation he receives the same nature in species as the father; it is also true of an adoptive son, whence someone who adopts another as a son among men supposes the same nature in him. - The natural Son of God is unique. Therefore those who through sanctifying grace are made sons of God are sons through adoption. God cannot suppose in us the likeness which even adoptive filiation demands; therefore, while he makes us his adoptive sons, he infuses this likeness into us. This likeness in the nature of the creature with God indeed cannot be essential to the creature, or pertain to its very essence, as is clear; but although accidental, it is nevertheless true and intrinsic, and not only extrinsic and by denomination, so that, just as we are both called and are sons of God, so also we are truly made like God. Hence it is a truth defined by the Council of Trent against the innovators, that we are constituted just through some gift inhering in the soul. - This gift intrinsically inhering in the soul, through which we are just, sons of God, etc., is sanctifying grace. Hence through sanctifying grace we are made partakers of the divine nature, we are transformed into the same image of God, we are deified, as Scripture speaks.

All these things must be explained more fully in the treatise on grace; but here it is enough to have suggested them, so that we can argue for our matter in this way:

a) To no nature is owed that which is proper to a higher nature; to a horse, for example, there is not owed the perfection proper to man; to man there is not owed the perfection which is proper to an Angel. Therefore what is more excellent than man, than an Angel, than any created or creatable nature, cannot be owed to any. But sanctifying grace is a perfection exceeding every created and creatable creature, since, as is clear from what has been said, it is of the divine order. Therefore. - Hence St. Augustine explains that place, Psalm 81:6, "I have said, You are gods, and all sons of the Most High," in this way (book 2 against Maximinus, chapter 15, n. 2): "It is manifest, therefore, that he called men gods, deified from his grace. If we have been made sons of God, we have been deified; but this is from the grace of one adopting, not from the nature of one generating."

b) He who has sanctifying grace, by this very fact becomes an adoptive son of God. But adoption consists not by nature, or by the exigency of nature, as is clear even among men, but by the will and free election of the adopter, who binds himself freely by a bond of nearness of this kind. Therefore. - Hence Cornelius a Lapide well explains that saying of James 1:18, "Of his own will he begot us by the word of truth," through gratuitous good pleasure and benevolence; like this is that saying of Hosea 14: "I will love them freely."

Proof II. From the Fathers. The Fathers 1. constantly attribute to sanctifying grace the effect of deification and adoption as sons of God; 2. unanimously teach that sanctifying grace is not owed to man, whether fallen or innocent; 3. indeed, that it is not owed even to the Angels:

St. Basil (On the Holy Spirit, chapter 9): "The pure and

intelligible and supra-mundane powers (the Angels) both are and are named holy, having obtained sanctity from grace infused through the Spirit ... Sanctification is not without the Spirit. For the powers of heaven are not holy by their own nature (for if that were so, they would differ in nothing from the Holy Spirit); but according to the portion by which they surpass one another, they have the measure of sanctification from the Spirit." - And chapter 26: "Principalities, and Powers, and every such creature which has sanctity from attention and zeal, will not be called holy by right of nature."

St. Ambrose (On the Holy Spirit, book 1, chapter 7): "Just as the Spirit sanctifying the Apostles is not a sharer of human nature, so also the Spirit sanctifying the Angels does not have fellowship with a creature. But if any think that sanctity in the Angels is not spiritual, that is, infused by the Holy Spirit, but some other grace from the property of their own nature, these will surely judge the Angels inferior to men." - See also n. 253, b.

4. The Fathers say that sanctifying grace is not owed either to man or to an Angel because they are creatures, and consequently they proclaim it not owed to any creature.

Cyril of Alexandria (Thesaurus, book 12, chapter 15): "The creature is servant and the Creator Lord; but the creature also, joined to its Lord, is freed from its own condition and is transferred into a better one ... We are servants of God according to nature; he is Lord ... If therefore we are gods and sons through grace, the Word of God, by whose grace we also have been made sons of God, will in reality be truly Son of God." - And chapter 13: "For he is the true Son existing from the Father, but we are adoptive by his kindness, receiving this in place of grace: I have said, you are gods, and all sons of the Most High. For created and servant nature is called to supernatural things by the sole nod and will of the Father; but the Son, God and Lord ... since he has shone forth from the very substance of the Father, claims as his own his proper good according to nature."

St. Peter Chrysologus (Sermon 72, on the Lord's Prayer): "'Our Father, who art in heaven.' This is what I feared to say; this is what I trembled to utter; this is what the condition of his own servitude allowed no one, whether heavenly or earthly, to suspect: that suddenly so great an exchange of heaven and earth, of flesh and God, could occur, so that God would be turned into man (in the incarnation), man into God, Lord into servant, servant into son, and there would be made in an ineffable mode one and everlasting knowledge of divinity and humanity. And indeed the condescension of Deity toward us is so great that the creature cannot know what especially it ought to marvel at: whether that God lowered himself to our servitude, or that he seized us up to the dignity of his divinity."

St. Athanasius (oration 2, 59): "God not only makes them men, but also called them sons, as if he had begotten them. But it belongs to the benevolence of God that, of those of whom he is Creator, he later makes himself Father through benevolence; this happens when created men, as the Apostle says, receive in their hearts the Spirit of his Son crying Abba, Father ... For in no other way can they become sons, since by their own nature they are created, unless they have received the Spirit of him who is the natural and true Son."

You will find several testimonies of the holy Fathers in Casini (What Is Man - or the Controversy, etc., articles 1 and 6). Hence:

a) The Fathers, like Scripture, attribute deification and divine adoption to sanctifying grace. Therefore from the authority of the Fathers the same consequence must be inferred as we deduced a little earlier from Scripture, namely: sanctifying grace is not owed to man, to an Angel, or to any creature.

b) The reason on account of which the Fathers deny that sanctifying grace is owed either to man or to Angels is that these are servants by nature. But they are speaking of servitude which necessarily follows the very account of created being, and not of the servitude of sin. For 1. they openly say that every created nature is servant because it is created. - 2. Through sins the creature becomes servant of sin and of the devil, and falls away from the office of servant of God; but the Fathers oppose the servitude of God to divine Filiation. - 3. Scripture and the Fathers oppose created nature, as servant, to the natural Son of God, and teach that through adoption those things are communicated to it which belong to him alone through nature. But such an account of servitude has force not only in every existing creature, but also in every possible one. Therefore.

Note. It is no difficulty against this thesis that there can be intrinsically supernatural accidents, as, for example, sanctifying grace itself. For 1. the account of servitude, just as also the account of filiation, properly falls upon the person terminating a substance; in no way upon

accidents; whence there is not the same repugnance.

2. "Accidents," says Suarez (On God, book 2, chapter 9, n. 15), "are instituted for perfecting substances and supplying their defects, and therefore through superadded accidents an inferior substance can participate in some way in that which is proper to a superior one. Especially because in each thing the first foundation and as it were measure of all connatural properties is the proper substance, and therefore a repugnance is involved in the very terms when one says supernatural substance. But accidents are added to substance; and when they come from without, it is not necessary that they be altogether commensurate with the imperfection of that in which they are received; but they can be participations of a higher nature, and from the object or from elsewhere have their perfection. Therefore the account is not similar."

Article 5. On the First Man's Immunity from Concupiscence

LatineEnglish

Corrected Latin Text
Articulus Quintus.
De Primi Hominis Immunitate A Concupiscentia.

271. Duobus paragraphis praesentem quaestionem absolvemus; imprimis enim ostendemus Adamum donum integritatis accepisse - dein vero hujusmodi donum ejus naturae indebitum fuisse demonstrabimus. 271. We shall complete the present question in two paragraphs; for first we shall show that Adam received the gift of integrity, and then we shall demonstrate that a gift of this kind was not owed to his nature.

§ I.
Utrum Adam A Concupiscentia Fuerit Immunis. § I.
Whether Adam Was Immune From Concupiscence.

272. Pauca praenotamus ad intelligendum indolem hujus doni. Cum homo sit natura composita ex anima et corpore, duplex est in eo appetitus, sicut duplex cognitionis genus: appetitus sensitivus et intellectualis. Appetitus sensitivus vocari etiam solet concupiscentia. 272. We pre-note a few things for understanding the character of this gift. Since man is by nature composed of soul and body, there is in him a twofold appetite, just as there is a twofold kind of cognition: sensitive and intellectual appetite. Sensitive appetite is also usually called concupiscence.

273. Concupiscentia potest considerari in actu primo, seu prout est quaedam facultas, cujus objectum est bonum sensibile delectabile; et in actu secundo, seu prout in actum prodit. A concupiscentia primo modo considerata nequit certo dici Adam fuisse immunem, siquidem bonum est et vera perfectio humanae naturae. 273. Concupiscence can be considered in first act, or insofar as it is a certain faculty, whose object is delectable sensible good; and in second act, or insofar as it issues into act. Adam certainly cannot be said to have been immune from concupiscence considered in the first way, since it is a good and a true perfection of human nature.

274. Agitur ergo de ipso motu concupiscentiae. Sed duplex hujusmodi motuum genus distingui potest: "quidam," inquit Suarez (de op. sex dier. l. 3. c. 12. n. 3.), "dici possunt naturales, et innoxii, seu indifferentes in ordine ad mores, non solum quia in se boni, aut mali non sunt, sed etiam, quia non inducunt ad aliquid turpe, ut moraliter malum, ut est dolor aliquis, vel displicentia de objecto disconvenienti sensui, item fames, sitis, et similes effectus, vel eorum contrarii. Alii vero sunt motus noxii moraliter, quia vel inclinant ad aliquid de se turpe, si voluntarie fiant, vel difficilem reddunt operationem virtutis. Et de hoc genere motuum inferioris appetitus hic praecipue

loquimur." 274. Therefore the question concerns the very motion of concupiscence. But a twofold kind of motions of this sort can be distinguished: "some," says Suarez (On the Work of the Six Days, book 3, chapter 12, n. 3), "can be called natural and harmless, or indifferent in order to morals, not only because in themselves they are neither good nor bad, but also because they do not induce one to something base as morally evil, as is some pain, or displeasure over an object disagreeable to sense, likewise hunger, thirst, and similar effects, or their contraries. But others are morally harmful motions, because they either incline to something base of itself, if they are made voluntarily, or render the operation of virtue difficult. And here we are chiefly speaking of this kind of motions of the lower appetite."

275. Donum itaque immunitatis a concupiscentia, quod et donum integritatis vocari solet, consistit in exemptione a motibus appetitus sensitivi, qui ad malum inclinant vel a bono retardant; quatenus rationis imperium praeveniunt, vel eidem resistunt. Quamvis autem dicatur exemptio a motibus, seu actibus, non est tamen solum actuale, sed etiam habituale, homo enim eo instructus non modo ab illis motibus inordinatis liber erat, sed habebat insuper permanentem dispositionem, qua appetitus sensitivus voluntatis imperio subdebatur. 275. Therefore the gift of immunity from concupiscence, which is also usually called the gift of integrity, consists in exemption from the motions of the sensitive appetite which incline to evil or retard from good, insofar as they anticipate the command of reason or resist it. But although it is called exemption from motions or acts, it is nevertheless not only actual, but also habitual; for a man furnished with it was not only free from those disordered motions, but also had besides a permanent disposition by which the sensitive appetite was subjected to the command of the will.

276. Si quis autem quaerat per quaenam media obtinuerit Adam hoc perfectum rationis ac voluntatis dominium in appetitum sensitivum; responderi potest omnia media ad duo capita revocari posse: ad extrinsecam Dei providentiam, et ad quamdam intrinsecam perfectionem. 276. But if someone asks through what means Adam obtained this perfect dominion of reason and will over the sensitive appetite, it can be answered that all the means can be reduced to two heads: to the extrinsic providence of God, and to a certain intrinsic perfection.

277. Quoad extrinsecam Dei providentiam, notat Suarez (l. c. n. 17.): "Potuit Deus partim negando concursum ad omnes hos motus, partim providendo, ne objecta perturbantia hanc animi pacem et tranquillitatem occurrerent, partim applicando, et excitando rationem, et voluntatem, atque etiam phantasiam, partim per alios occultos modos providentiae suae hanc subordinationem appetituum illaesam conservare." 277. With respect to the extrinsic providence of God, Suarez notes (cited place, n. 17): "God could preserve this subordination of the appetites unharmed partly by denying concurrence to all these motions, partly by providing that objects disturbing this peace and tranquility of the soul should not occur, partly by applying and exciting reason and will, and also phantasy, partly through other hidden modes of his providence."

278. Sed praeter extrinsecam Dei providentiam, admitti debet quaedam intrinseca recta dispositio. Nam "Ad perfectum modum operandi, spectat, ut proximum agens sit intrinsece dispositum ad illam operationem, ad quam recte faciendam a primo agente ordinatur, et movetur. Ergo cum Dei opera sint perfecta, non est verisimile per solam extrinsecam providentiam hoc donum primis hominibus contulisse." 278. But besides the extrinsic providence of God, a certain intrinsic right disposition must be admitted. For "to the perfect mode of operating, it pertains that the proximate agent be intrinsically disposed for that operation to which it is ordered and moved by the first agent for rightly

doing it. Therefore, since the works of God are perfect, it is not likely that he conferred this gift on the first men through extrinsic providence alone."

279. Illa autem intrinseca recta dispositio non consistit in uno tantum simplici habitu. Nam, uti bene observat idem Suarez (l. c. n. 19.), "haec perfectio in multis potentiis requirebatur; in ratione ad considerandum, et judicandum, seu imperandum convenienter in voluntate ad sequendam rectam rationem delectabiliter, et ad movendum appetitum fortiter, et in ipso appetitu ad obediendum prompte; sed unus simplex habitus non poterat has omnes potentias intrinsece perficere; ergo non fuit unus tantum habitus. Et confirmatur haec ratio, quia ut recte dixit D. Thom. 2. 2. q. 2. art. 2. quando actus pendet a pluribus activis principiis, ad perfectionem ejus requiritur, ut omnia illa principia activa sint perfecte disposita. Haec autem dispositio ad bene agendum in potentiis animae quae respiciunt objecta, est habitus; ergo, cum haec perfectio, de qua tractamus, ex pluribus animae potentiis pendeat, in omnibus illis rectam dispositionem habitualem postulabat, ac proinde plures habitus saltem ex parte potentiarum includebat." 279. But that intrinsic right disposition does not consist in only one simple habit. For, as the same Suarez well observes (cited place, n. 19), "this perfection was required in many powers: in reason for considering and judging, or commanding suitably; in the will for following right reason delightfully, and for moving the appetite strongly; and in the appetite itself for obeying promptly. But one simple habit could not intrinsically perfect all these powers; therefore there was not only one habit. And this reason is confirmed, because, as St. Thomas rightly said, II-II, q. 2, art. 2, when an act depends upon several active principles, for its perfection it is required that all those active principles be perfectly disposed. But this disposition for acting well in powers of the soul which regard objects is habit; therefore, since this perfection of which we treat depends upon several powers of the soul, it demanded a right habitual disposition in all of them, and consequently included several habits at least on the part of the powers."

280. His declaratis, dicimus:

Prop. XXVII. Inter dona protoparentibus collata numerari debet immunitas a concupiscentia, seu integritas, qua sentiendi appetendique facultas voluntati rationali penitus subjiceretur.

Prob. I. Conc. Trid. sess. 5. c. 5. decernit a Christo restitutum esse quod perdiderant primi parentes "remanere tamen in baptizatis concupiscentiam vel fomitem quae cum ad agonem relicta sit, nocere non consentientibus, sed viriliter per Christi Jesu gratiam repugnantibus, non valet." Quibus verbis clare significat illam concupiscentiam in protoparentibus non extitisse. Unde Catechismus Conc. Trid. p. 1. n. 23. ait: "Quod autem ad animam pertinet, eam (Deus) ad imaginem et similitudinem suam formavit, liberumque ei arbitrium tribuit; omnes praeterea motus animi atque appetitiones ita in eo temperavit, ut rationis imperio nunquam non parerent."

Prob. II. Legitur Gen. 2. 25.: "Erat uterque nudus, Adam scilicet et uxor ejus, et non erubescebant." - 3. 7. dicitur quod post peccatum "aperti sunt oculi amborum; cumque cognovissent se esse nudos consuerunt folia ficus, et fecerunt sibi perizomata." - Et quum Adam dixisset Deo, 3. 10.: "Vocem tuam audivi in paradiso; et timui, eo quod nudus essem, et abscondi me;" Dominus respondit, 3. 11.: "Quis enim indicavit tibi, quod nudus esses, nisi quod ex ligno, de quo praeceperam tibi ne comederes, comedisti." - Unde: Adam et Eva ante peccatum, quamvis essent nudi, nullam patiebantur erubescentiam; quam tamen experti sunt statim post peccatum. Erubescentia autem, de qua hic agitur est effectus concupiscentiae; ergo ante peccatum a concupiscentia erant immunes. Neque enim illa carentia potest explicari ex defectu usus rationis, sicut absurde asseruerunt quidam rationalistae: quod non modo probat aetas adulta, praeclara scientia, etc., in qua primi parentes conditi fuere, sed vel ipsum sequens peccatum, quo incapaces sunt qui carent usu rationis.

Prob. III. Legitur Rom. 7. 19. 20.: "Non enim quod volo bonum, hoc facio, sed quod nolo malum, hoc ago. Si autem quod nolo, illud facio, jam non ego operor illud, sed quod habitat in me, peccatum." Et v. 25. concludit dicens: "Igitur ego ipse mente servio legi Dei; carne autem legi peccati." - Unde: Loquitur hic Apostolus, uti patet non modo ex ipsis verbis, sed ex toto contextu, de

concupiscentia rebelli, eamque vocat peccatum: non autem est peccatum formale, quia deest consensus voluntatis; cur ergo vocat illam peccatum? Scilicet, ut ait Conc. Trid. sess. 5. can. 5. "quia ex peccato est et ad peccatum inclinat." Unde merito advertit Suarez (l. c. n. 6.): "Dicens, ex peccato, aperte docet ante peccatum non fuisse, nam si antea fuisset, nullo modo effectus peccati extitisset: concupiscentia autem, seu fomes, nihil aliud est, quam ipsemet appetitus, ut per motus suos rationem praevenit, et ad peccandum inducit. Et hac ratione dixit idem Concil. ibidem can. 1. totum Adam per illam praevaricationis offensam secundum corpus, et animam in deterius commutatum fuisse."

Prob. IV. Ex Patribus. S. Augustinus (de Gen. ad litt. l. 11. c. 1.) ait: "Erant ergo ambo nudi: verum est, omnino nuda erant corpora duorum hominum in paradiso conversantium. Nec pudebat eos. Quid enim puderet, quando nullam legem senserant in membris suis repugnantem legi mentis suae? ... Quae illos poena post praevaricationem secuta est, usurpante inobedientia prohibitum, et justitia puniente commissum. Quod antequam fieret, nudi erant, ut dictum est, et non confundebantur: nullus erat motus in corpore cui verecundia deberetur; nihil putabant velandum, quia nihil senserant refraenandum."

S. Chrys. (In Gen. hom. 15. n. 14.): "Usque ad praevaricationem," scribit, "quasi angeli versabantur in paradiso, non concupiscentiis flagrantes, non aliis affectionibus obnoxii sed prorsus incorruptibiles et immortales neque indigebant amictu et vestimento. Peccato enim nondum praesente, gratia quae superne venerat vestiti erant, et ideo non erubescebant."

S. Fulgentius (de verit. praed. et grat. c. 16. n. 25.): "Hae necessitates (inter quas enumerabat etiam, quod caro concupiscit adversus spiritum) non desinunt in hoc corpore mortis mortaliter viventibus Sanctis, ut agnoscant, se illam gratiam sanctae libertatis et pacis primae perdidisse."

S. Gregorius M. (proemio in 3. Ps. paenit., si tamen is est illius operis auctor): "In paradiso primus homo deliciis potitus, sicut nullam in anima poterat sentire esuriem, ita etiam omnem, quae ex carne nascitur, ignorabat passionem."

S. Joan. Damascen. (Hom. in ficum arefactam, n. 3.): "Protoparentes etsi corpore nudi erant, divina tamen gratia tegebantur. Corporale nullum ipsis indumentum erat, sed incorruptela vestiebantur ... At vero ex quo inobsequentes fuerunt, procul facti sunt a gratia, qua ante tegebantur." - Alia Patrum testimonia dabimus in thesi sequente. 280. With these things declared, we say:

Proposition XXVII. Among the gifts conferred upon the first parents there must be counted immunity from concupiscence, or integrity, by which the faculty of sensing and desiring was thoroughly subjected to the rational will.

Proof I. The Council of Trent, session 5, chapter 5, decrees that what the first parents had lost was restored by Christ, but that "there remains in the baptized concupiscence or the tinder, which, since it has been left for struggle, cannot harm those who do not consent, but resist manfully through the grace of Christ Jesus." By these words it clearly signifies that that concupiscence did not exist in the first parents. Hence the Catechism of the Council of Trent, part 1, n. 23, says: "But as regards the soul, God formed it to his own image and likeness, and gave it free choice; moreover he so tempered in him all motions and appetitions of the soul that they always obeyed the command of reason."

Proof II. It is read in Genesis 2:25: "Both were naked, Adam namely and his wife, and they were not ashamed." - In 3:7 it is said that after sin "the eyes of both were opened; and when they had known themselves to be naked they sewed fig leaves and made themselves coverings." - And when Adam had said to God, 3:10: "I heard your voice in paradise; and I was afraid, because I was naked, and I hid myself," the Lord responded, 3:11: "For who indicated to you that you were naked, unless you ate from the tree from which I had commanded you not to eat?" - Hence: Adam and Eve before sin, although they were naked, suffered no shame; yet they experienced it immediately after sin. But the shame of which there is question here is an effect of concupiscence; therefore before sin they were immune from concupiscence. Nor can that lack be explained from defect of the use of reason, as certain rationalists absurdly asserted; this is proved not only by the adult age, excellent knowledge, etc., in which the first parents were established, but even by the sin itself which followed, of which those who lack the use of reason are incapable.

Proof III. It is read in Romans 7:19-20: "For the good which I will, I do not do; but the evil which I will not, that I do. But if I do that which I will not, now it is not

I who work it, but sin which dwells in me." And in verse 25 he concludes, saying: "Therefore I myself with the mind serve the law of God; but with the flesh the law of sin." - Hence: Here the Apostle speaks, as is clear not only from the words themselves, but from the whole context, about rebellious concupiscence, and he calls it sin. But it is not formal sin, because consent of the will is lacking. Why then does he call it sin? Namely, as the Council of Trent says, session 5, canon 5, "because it is from sin and inclines to sin." Hence Suarez deservedly observes (cited place, n. 6): "By saying from sin, it openly teaches that it did not exist before sin; for if it had existed before, it would in no way have existed as an effect of sin. But concupiscence, or the tinder, is nothing other than the appetite itself, insofar as through its motions it anticipates reason and induces one to sin. And for this reason the same Council said there in canon 1 that the whole Adam, through that offense of prevarication, was changed for the worse according to body and soul."

Proof IV. From the Fathers. St. Augustine says (On Genesis to the Letter, book 11, chapter 1): "Therefore both were naked: it is true, the bodies of the two men conversing in paradise were entirely naked. Nor were they ashamed. For why should they be ashamed, when they had sensed no law in their members resisting the law of their mind? ... This punishment followed them after the prevarication, when disobedience usurped what was forbidden, and justice punished what had been committed. Before this happened, they were naked, as has been said, and were not confounded: there was no motion in the body to which modesty was owed; they thought nothing had to be veiled, because they had sensed nothing had to be restrained."

St. Chrysostom writes (Homily on Genesis 15, n. 14): "Until the prevarication, they lived in paradise as Angels, not burning with concupiscences, not liable to other affections, but altogether incorruptible and immortal, nor did they need cloak and garment. For when sin was not yet present, they were clothed with the grace which had come from above, and therefore they were not ashamed."

St. Fulgentius (On the Truth of Predestination and Grace, chapter 16, n. 25): "These necessities (among which he had also counted that the flesh lusts against the spirit) do not cease in the Saints living mortally in this body of death, so that they may acknowledge that they have lost that grace of holy liberty and first peace."

St. Gregory the Great (in the proemium to the third penitential Psalm, if indeed he is the author of that work): "In paradise the first man, having obtained delights, just as he could feel no hunger in the soul, so also he was ignorant of every passion which is born from the flesh."

St. John Damascene (Homily on the Withered Fig Tree, n. 3): "The first parents, although naked in body, nevertheless were covered by divine grace. They had no bodily clothing, but they were clothed with incorruption ... But once they became disobedient, they were made far from the grace by which they had been covered before." - We shall give other testimonies of the Fathers in the following thesis.

§ II.
Utrum Integritas Primae Conditionis Fuerit Indebita. § II.
Whether The Integrity Of The First Condition Was Not Owed.

281. Antequam huic quaestioni respondeamus, juverit aliqua praenotare, ad praeoccupandas praesertim objectiones, quae ex S. Augustino peti solent. 281. Before we answer this question, it will be useful to pre-note some things, especially for forestalling objections which are usually drawn from St. Augustine.

282. Ac imprimis concupiscentia potest tripliciter considerari: 1. ut est potentia per se indifferens, quemcumque actum antecedens. - 2. ut est in actu, et inclinat, sive ad licita sive ad illicita, nondum tamen accedente voluntate. - 3. ut motus concupiscentiae cum voluntatis consensu conjungitur. Sub hoc triplici aspectu, videndum est, utrum concupiscentia sit bonum vel malum, utrum sit a Deo vel non; ut inde innotescat, utrum Deus potuerit hominem cum concupiscentia,

seu sine integritatis dono condere, et quid S. Augustinus senserit de hac re. 282. And first, concupiscence can be considered in three ways: 1. as it is a power indifferent of itself, preceding any act whatsoever; 2. as it is in act, and inclines either to lawful or to unlawful things, while the will has not yet approached; 3. as the motion of concupiscence is joined with the consent of the will. Under this threefold aspect, it must be seen whether concupiscence is good or evil, whether it is from God or not, so that from there it may become known whether God could have established man with concupiscence, or without the gift of integrity, and what St. Augustine thought about this matter.

283. Concupiscentia spectata ut facultas quaedam adhuc indifferens, seu nondum operans, certe a) est per se bona; est enim pars humanae naturae, quae est bona; est pars hominis, qui cum sit animal rationale, debet esse instructus facultate, qua tendat in bonum sensibile. - b) Nec ullo pacto concupiscentia sic considerata dici potest habitus vitiosus; siquidem talis habitus nonnisi ad malum inclinat; concupiscentia autem, seu appetitus sensitivus est facultas, quae tendere potest ad objectum sive bonum sive malum. - c) quod si ipsa potentia tendendi ad objectum etiam malum, mala dici velit, talis non aliter erit ac peccabilitas, erit nempe malum physicum, non morale, vel erit potius malum, ut aiunt, metaphysicum, quod consistit in simplici limitatione ulterioris perfectionis, quodque commune est omni creaturae. 283. Concupiscence viewed as a certain faculty still indifferent, or not yet operating, certainly a) is good of itself; for it is part of human nature, which is good; it is part of man, who, since he is a rational animal, ought to be furnished with a faculty by which he tends toward sensible good. - b) Nor in any way can concupiscence so considered be called a vicious habit; since such a habit inclines only to evil, but concupiscence, or the sensitive appetite, is a faculty which can tend toward an object either good or evil. - c) But if the very power of tending even toward an evil object should be called evil, such will not be otherwise than peccability; namely, it will be a physical evil, not a moral one, or rather it will be an evil, as they say, metaphysical, which consists in the simple limitation of further perfection, and which is common to every creature.

284. Hinc patet, a) quod certe Deus, auctor humanae naturae, est etiam auctor appetitus sensitivi, qui in se bonus est. - b) quod tamen nequit dici auctor potestatis in malum tendendi, quae est in eo appetitu; nequit enim Deus dici proprie auctor limitationis, quae est causa illius potestatis. - c) quod eadem potestas nequit ex intentione primaria tribui Deo, qui per se intendit naturam humanam bonam, cum appetitu sensitivo in se bono; quemadmodum, inquit D. Thomas 1. 2. q. 85. a. 6. "quod gladius sit frangibilis et rubiginem contrahens, quod ex naturali ferri dispositione consequitur" artifici tribuendum non est. - d) quod possit nihilominus Deo tribui ex intentione secundaria et ordinata ad victoriam, nempe, uti docet S. Augustinus (de pecc. merit. et remiss. l. 2. c. 33. n. 53.), ut "per has difficultates erudiatur proficiens in agone justitiae." Unde S. Bernardus (de gr. et lib. arb. c. 7. n. 22.) ait: "Datum homini posse peccare, ut non proinde peccaret, sed ut gloriosior inde appareret, si non peccaret, cum peccare possit ... Neque fuit culpa dantis, sed abutentis, qui ipsam videlicet facultatem convertit in usum peccandi, quam acceperat ad gloriam non peccandi." - Et S. Augustinus (de Gen. l. 9. c. 6. n. 8.): "Probatur et exercetur virtus; et est palma gloriosior, non consensisse tentatum, quam non potuisse tentari ... Concedimus meliorem esse naturam, quae omnino peccare nollet; concedant et ipsi, non esse malam naturam, quae sic sancta est, ut posset non peccare, si nollet." 284. Hence it is clear: a) that certainly God, the author of human nature, is also the author of the sensitive appetite, which is good in itself; b) that nevertheless he cannot be called author of the power of tending to evil which is in that appetite, for God cannot properly be called author of the limitation which is the cause of that power; c) that the same power cannot be attributed to God from primary intention, since he intends of himself human nature as good, with the sensitive appetite good in itself; just as, says St. Thomas, I-II, q. 85, a. 6, "that a sword is breakable and contracts rust, which follows

from the natural disposition of iron," is not to be attributed to the craftsman; d) that it can nevertheless be attributed to God from a secondary intention ordered to victory, namely, as St. Augustine teaches (On the Merits and Remission of Sins, book 2, chapter 33, n. 53), so that "through these difficulties one advancing in the struggle of justice may be instructed." Hence St. Bernard says (On Grace and Free Choice, chapter 7, n. 22): "It was given to man to be able to sin, not so that he would therefore sin, but so that he would appear more glorious from this, if he did not sin, although he could sin ... Nor was there fault in the giver, but in the abuser, who indeed turned that faculty into the use of sinning, which he had received for the glory of not sinning." - And St. Augustine (On Genesis, book 9, chapter 6, n. 8): "Virtue is proved and exercised; and the palm is more glorious, not to have consented when tempted, than not to have been able to be tempted ... We concede that the nature which would be wholly unwilling to sin is better; let them also concede that the nature which is so holy that it could not sin if it willed is not evil."

285. Concupiscentia considerata ut est in actu, sed ante quamcumque voluntatis operationem, ferri potest in licitum vel illicitum. Si feratur in objectum licitum, nulla est difficultas. Si vero feratur in objectum illicitum, dicendum est a) quod non est proprie moraliter mala, seu non est formale peccatum, uti declaravit Conc. Trid. quando docuit per baptismum tolli totum id, quod habet veram rationem peccati, et tamen remanere in renatis fomitem. - Unde S. Augustinus (Retract. l. 1. c. 9. n. 4.) ait: "Solam voluntatem esse, qua et peccatur et recte vivitur." - Et (Op. imper. c. Julianum, l. 4. nn. 43-48.) "Illius (primi hominis) virtus haec erat: eam [concupiscentiam] non habere; nostra virtus est, ei non consentire." - S. Anselmus [de Conc. Virg. c. 4.]: "Nec ipsi appetitus, quos Apostolus carnem vocat [quae concupiscit adversus spiritum], et legem peccati, [quae est in membris repugnans legi mentis], justi vel injusti sunt per se considerati. Non enim hominem justum vel injustum faciunt sentientem, sed injustum tantum voluntate, quum non debet, consentientem."

b) Quod tamen motus concupiscentiae in illicitum, etiam ante consensum voluntatis nequit dici bonus, sed potius malus; unde S. Augustinus saepe illum vocavit vitium. Sed est malum physicum, non morale; naturae, non liberae voluntatis. - Malus est ille motus concupiscentiae in homine, quatenus in homine est etiam mens, seu pars superior, motus autem ille menti resistit, quando haec vult ipsum comprimere; et mentem perturbat, quum animam incitat, ut relicto appetitu rationali, illud idem et eadem ratione appetat, quod appetitus sensibilis appetit. - Unde idem concupiscentiae motus hanc ipsam rationem mali non habet in brutis, quibus non est intellectus. "Hoc in pecoribus," inquit S. Augustinus [l. 2. op. imp. c. Julian. 230.], "ideo non est malum, quia caro non concupiscit adversus spiritum." Et [ib. l. 4.]: "Haec autem libido ideo malum non est in belluis, quoniam non repugnat rationi, qua carent."

c) Quod consequenter non erubescimus concupiscentiae, quia ejus motus, de quibus hic agimus, sunt verum peccatum nec, juxta S. Augustinum, quia in praesenti sunt effectus peccati. Sed malum pudendum est concupiscentia, quia erubescimus non morum atque animi solum, sed etiam corporis vitia, quia pudet quidquid aliquo modo dedecet naturam rationalem: dedecet autem, ut vidimus, quod motus animalis appetitus membra commoveat praeter et contra imperium voluntatis. Unde S. Augustinus [l. 4. eo Julian.] ait: "Non erat decens ut puderet, quando membra movebat voluntatis imperium, non caro concupiscens adversus spiritum." Cf. etiam de Civ. Dei l. 14. c. 23.

285. Tota haec doctrina de concupiscentia certis principiis, et Patrum, praesertim S. Augustini, ut vidimus, auctoritate nititur. Ut tamen melius S. Augustini mens innotescat, paucis revocamus in mentem statum quaestionis inter ipsum et Julianum. Julianus itaque cum Pelagianis negabat peccatum originale; affectabat tamen, sicut illi, Scripturas revereri. Unde S. Augustinus sic arguebat contra illum: Dicitur Deus fecisse hominem rectum, et dona Dei sunt sine paenitentia; sed homo nunc non est rectus, uti patet ex concupiscentia "caro enim concupiscit adversus spiritum, id quod non licet libet." Ergo haec lucta, seu hic defectus rectitudinis est supplicium peccati. Atqui hanc luctam experiuntur omnes, etiam qui personale peccatum non commiserunt; ergo est supplicium peccati originalis. Julianus non audebat negare Scripturam asserentem Deum fecisse hominem rectum; non poterat rebellionem concupiscentiae

negare; dicebat ergo concupiscentiam non esse malum, sed bonum, ac proinde ex lucta carnis adversus spiritum non bene argui defectum rectitudinis in homine. - S. Augustinus reponebat hanc luctam esse malum, quod pluribus probabat: ex. gr., si non est malum, cur erubescimus? vel, debemus continentia, quae est virtus, pugnare contra concupiscentiam; ergo haec est vitium, etc. 285. Concupiscence considered as it is in act, but before any operation of the will whatsoever, can be borne toward what is lawful or unlawful. If it is borne toward a lawful object, there is no difficulty. But if it is borne toward an unlawful object, it must be said: a) that it is not properly morally evil, or is not formal sin, as the Council of Trent declared when it taught that through baptism the whole of that which has the true account of sin is taken away, and yet the tinder remains in the reborn. - Hence St. Augustine says (Retractations, book 1, chapter 9, n. 4): "The will alone is that by which one both sins and lives rightly." - And (Unfinished Work against Julian, book 4, nn. 43-48): "This was the virtue of that man (the first man): not to have it [concupiscence]; our virtue is not to consent to it." - St. Anselm [On Virgin Conception, chapter 4]: "Nor are the appetites themselves, which the Apostle calls the flesh [which lusts against the spirit], and the law of sin [which is in the members resisting the law of the mind], just or unjust considered in themselves. For they do not make the man sensing just or unjust, but unjust only when he consents by the will, when he ought not."

b) That nevertheless the motion of concupiscence toward what is unlawful, even before the consent of the will, cannot be called good, but rather evil; whence St. Augustine often called it a vice. But it is a physical evil, not moral; of nature, not of free will. - That motion of concupiscence is evil in man insofar as in man there is also mind, or the higher part, and that motion resists the mind when the mind wishes to restrain it; and it disturbs the mind when it incites the soul so that, having left behind the rational appetite, it desires the same thing and for the same reason as the sensitive appetite desires. - Hence the same motion of concupiscence does not have this very account of evil in brute animals, in whom there is no intellect. "In beasts," says St. Augustine [book 2 of the Unfinished Work against Julian, 230], "this is therefore not evil, because the flesh does not lust against the spirit." And [ibid., book 4]: "But this lust is therefore not evil in beasts, because it does not fight against reason, which they lack."

c) Consequently, we are not ashamed of concupiscence because its motions, of which we are here treating, are true sin, nor, according to St. Augustine, because in the present they are effects of sin. But concupiscence is an evil to be ashamed of because we are ashamed not only of vices of morals and of soul, but also of the body, because whatever in any way misbeseems rational nature causes shame. But, as we have seen, it misbeseems rational nature that the motion of animal appetite move the members apart from and against the command of the will. Hence St. Augustine [book 4 against Julian] says: "It was not fitting that there be shame when the command of the will moved the members, not the flesh lusting against the spirit." Compare also City of God, book 14, chapter 23.

285 bis. This whole doctrine concerning concupiscence rests upon certain principles and upon the authority of the Fathers, especially St. Augustine, as we have seen. Yet so that the mind of St. Augustine may become better known, we recall in a few words the state of the question between him and Julian. Julian, then, with the Pelagians denied original sin; nevertheless, like them, he affected reverence for the Scriptures. Hence St. Augustine argued against him in this way: God is said to have made man right, and the gifts of God are without repentance; but man now is not right, as is clear from concupiscence, "for the flesh lusts against the spirit; what is not lawful is pleasing." Therefore this struggle, or this defect of rectitude, is a punishment of sin. But all experience this struggle, even those who have committed no personal sin; therefore it is the punishment of original sin. Julian did not dare to deny Scripture asserting that God made man right; he could not deny the rebellion of concupiscence; therefore he said that concupiscence is not evil, but good, and consequently that from the struggle of flesh against spirit a defect of rectitude in man is not rightly argued. - St. Augustine answered that this struggle is evil, which he proved by several things: for example, if it is not evil, why are we ashamed? Or, we must fight against concupiscence by continence, which is a virtue; therefore this is a vice, etc.

286. Ex his omnibus patet 1. S. Augustinum loqui de concupiscentia in statu praesenti, supposita prima hominis conditione, in qua singulari Dei beneficio, homo erat rectus et liber a concupiscentia. - 2. S. Augustinum loqui non de ipsa facultate, vel ejus actu tendente in licitum, sed de actu concupiscentiae in illicitum. - 3. Hoc sensu concupiscentiam dicere malum, vitium; sed non verum malum morale seu peccatum: verum tamen malum physicum, dedecens naturam rationalem, tale ut possit infligi uti poena. - 4. S. Augustinum negare Deum esse auctorem concupiscentiae ut tendentis in illicitum, vel quia loquitur quandoque de statu praesenti in quo concupiscentia est poena peccati; vel quia lucta illa procedit ex limitatione nostrae naturae, eamque Deus noluit intentione primaria. - 5. Hinc S. Augustinum nullo pacto docere hominem non potuisse condi ab initio, sicut nunc nascitur, nempe cum concupiscentiae lucta: quod ultimum melius adhuc patebit ex dicendis. 286. From all these things it is clear: 1. that St. Augustine speaks of concupiscence in the present state, with the first condition of man supposed, in which by the singular benefit of God man was right and free from concupiscence; 2. that St. Augustine speaks not of the faculty itself, or of its act tending toward what is lawful, but of the act of concupiscence toward what is unlawful; 3. that in this sense he calls concupiscence an evil, a vice, but not a true moral evil or sin; yet a true physical evil, misbeseeming rational nature, such that it can be inflicted as a punishment; 4. that St. Augustine denies that God is the author of concupiscence as tending toward what is unlawful, either because he sometimes speaks of the present state in which concupiscence is a punishment of sin, or because that struggle proceeds from the limitation of our nature, and God did not will it by primary intention; 5. hence that St. Augustine in no way teaches that man could not have been established from the beginning just as he is now born, namely with the struggle of concupiscence; this last point will be still clearer from the things to be said.

287. Haec quidem sufficiunt ad solvendum objectiones omnes, quae praesertim ex S. Augustino peti solent, una tamen excepta, quae est hujusmodi: Si juxta S. Doctorem, lucta carnis contra spiritum non esset malum morale, seu peccatum, et posset in quacumque hypothesi repeti ab humana natura; non dixisset (op. imperf. l. 6. c. 4.): "Tu autem, qui nesciens quid loquaris, objicis mihi, quod dicam Deum creare peccatum; resiste Manichaeo dicenti, in discordia carnis et spiritus inter se contrarias mali et boni apparere naturas. Tuum est quod respondeamus, ut pestis ista vincatur, hanc scilicet discordiam peccatum primi hominis in nostram vertisse naturam; quod tu negando conaris ut vincant, satisque manifestaris fictus Manichaeorum oppugnator, et verus adjutor."

Resp. Si non repetatur concupiscentiae rebellio, in praesenti ordine, ex peccato, Manichaei possent inferre dari Deum malum et mali auctorem, non quia haec esset bona consequentia, sed quia cum pertinaces essent in suo errore, difficillime possent concipere pugnam illam tribuendam esse limitationi naturae. Unde ipse S. Doctor, ut vidimus (Retract. l. 1. c. 9.), ait: "Quamvis ignorantia et difficultas, etiamsi essent hominis primordia naturalia; nec sic culpandus, sed laudandus esset Deus sicut in eodem tertio libro disputavimus. Quae disputatio contra Manichaeos habenda est, qui non accipiunt Scripturas sanctas veteris testamenti, in quibus originale peccatum narratur." - (Et de don. persev. c. 11.): "Etiamsi verum esset quod dicunt Pelagiani, ignorantiam et difficultatem, sine quibus nullus hominum nascitur, primordia, non supplicia esse naturae: vincerentur tamen Manichaei, qui volunt duas, boni scilicet et mali coaeternas esse naturas." 287. These things indeed are sufficient for solving all the objections which are usually drawn especially from St. Augustine, with one exception, which is of this sort: If according to the holy Doctor the struggle of flesh against spirit were not a moral evil, or sin, and could in any hypothesis be repeated from human nature, he would not have said (Unfinished Work, book 6, chapter 4): "But you, who do not know what you are saying, object to me that I say God creates sin; resist the Manichaean saying that, in the discord of flesh and spirit, contrary natures of evil and good appear among themselves. It is yours that we answer, so that that pest may be conquered, namely that the sin of the first man turned this discord into our nature; by denying

this you try that they should conquer, and you are sufficiently manifest as a feigned opponent of the Manichaeans and a true helper."

Reply. If the rebellion of concupiscence is not traced back, in the present order, to sin, the Manichaeans could infer that there is an evil God and author of evil, not because this would be a good consequence, but because, since they were obstinate in their error, they could with greatest difficulty conceive that that battle must be attributed to the limitation of nature. Hence the holy Doctor himself, as we saw (Retractations, book 1, chapter 9), says: "Although ignorance and difficulty, even if they were natural beginnings of man, God would not even thus be blamed, but praised, as we argued in that same third book. That disputation must be held against the Manichaeans, who do not receive the holy Scriptures of the Old Testament, in which original sin is narrated." - And (On the Gift of Perseverance, chapter 11): "Even if it were true what the Pelagians say, that ignorance and difficulty, without which no man is born, are beginnings, not punishments, of nature: nevertheless the Manichaeans would be conquered, who maintain that there are two coeternal natures, namely of good and of evil."

288. His praestitutis, dicimus:

Prop. XXVIII. Integritas, seu immunitas a concupiscentia, quam Adam habuit in prima sui conditione, erat donum humanae naturae indebitum.

Veritas hujus thesis clare eruitur ex propp. 26. 55. 79. damnatis in Baio; et ex censura 16. in Bulla Auctorem Fidei, superius relatis.

Prob. I. ex Patribus. Immunitas a concupiscentia, qua primus homo instructus fuit, juxta Patres a) tribuenda est singulari Dei benevolentiae, imo gratiae. - b) Perturbatio ex sensuum rebellione ex ipsa hominis natura manat. c) Imperturbatio est propria vel corporis glorificati, vel Angelorum, vel ipsius Dei. Atqui quod est hujusmodi, nequit humanae naturae esse debitum. Ergo.

Prob. maj. a) S. Augustinus (de Gen. con. Manich. l. 2. c. 16.), docet de primis parentibus "ut sine iis affectionibus viverent, quae contra rationem accidunt mentemque perturbant, gratiae et magnae siquidem gratiae fuisse assignandum." - S. Jo. Chrys. (Hom. 16. in cap. 2. Gen.): "Ablata est gloria, quae illos circumdabat, quia se indignos tali honore fecerant ... Nudati propter peccatum supernae gratiae amictu, et sensibilis suae spoliationis sensum acceperunt. Veste illa nova et admirabili gloriae ac supernae benevolentiae expoliatos Deus sentire fecit, quae ante ob singularem illius in se benevolentiam non sentiebant."

Prob. maj. b) Clemens Alex. (Strom. l. 4.): "Hominis virtus, cum sit sua essentia perturbationibus obnoxius etc." - Nemesius (Phil. lib. de Nat. hom. c. 1.): "Homo non modo rationis particeps, sed etiam animal est ... necessarii vitae usus animalis motusque turbidi persaepe rationem attentant." - S. Augustinus (de pecc. merit. et remiss. l. 2. c. 22.): "Quid est, gustato cibo prohibito, nuditas indicata, nisi peccato nudatum, quod gratia contegebat? Gratia quippe Dei magna ibi erat, ubi terrenum et animale corpus bestialem libidinem [quam pro sua natura habere debuisset] non habebat." - S. Maximus (Martyr. cent 2. c. 20. Oecumenic.): "Cum naturae et gratiae non sit eadem ratio, non est ambigendum, quo pacto quidam Sanctorum affectiones aliquando superabant, quandoque vero succumbebant potius affectionibus, cum sciamus miraculum ad gratiam pertinere, affectionem autem ad naturam." - S. Joan. Dam. (l. 3. de fide, c. 20.): "Hae passiones et secundum naturam in Christo Domino fuerunt et supra naturam. Etenim secundum naturam in illo ciebantur, quum naturam pati (vel affici) sineret; supra naturam autem, quia in Domino quae naturalia erant, voluntatem minime praevertebant."

Prob. maj. c) S. Augustinus [Ep. ad Marcellinum, 145.]: "Quis omnia enarret carnalis infirmitatis incommoda? Quae utique non erunt, quum hoc corruptibile induerit incorruptionem, ut absorbeatur mortale a vita. Tunc itaque spiritale corpus regit omnino pro arbitrio; nunc vero, non omni modo, sed sicut leges universitatis (quae per se naturales neque necessario poenales) sinunt." - Clemens Alex. (Paedag. l. 1. c. 2.) dicit "Christum Dominum Patri simillimum, quod omnino ab humanis perturbationibus liberum, etc."

Prob. II. Ideo Baius, Jansenius, etc., docuere integritatem esse debitam humanae naturae, quia ita concupiscentia est mala, ut non potuerit cum ea hominem condere; atqui hoc est falsum.

Prob. min. 1. Ex superius dictis in expositione quaestionis. - 2. directe

ex S. Augustino (Retract. l. 1. c. 9.): "Ad quam miseriam juste damnationis pertinet ignorantia et difficultas (quae oritur ex concupiscentia, uti patet ex praecedentibus), quam patitur omnis homo ab exordio nativitatis suae, nec ab isto malo nisi Dei gratia quisquam liberatur. Quam miseriam Pelagiani nolunt ex justa damnatione descendere, negantes originale peccatum: quamvis ignorantia et difficultas, etiamsi essent hominis primordia naturalia, nec sic culpandus Deus, sed laudandus esset, sicut in eodem tertio libro de libero arbitrio disputavimus." - 3. Ex communi consensu Doctorum. Sufficit cit. D. Thomam, qui saepe repetit quod scripserat (2. disp. 31. q. 1. a. 2. ad 3.): "Poterat Deus a principio quando hominem condidit, etiam alium hominem ex limo terrae formare, quem in conditione suae naturae relinqueret, ut scilicet mortalis et passibilis esset, et pugnam concupiscentiae ad rationem sentiens: in quo nihil humanae naturae derogaretur, quia hoc ex principiis naturae consequitur. Non tamen iste defectus in eo rationem culpae aut poenae habuisset, quia non per voluntatem iste defectus causatus fuisset." - Scotus eadem habet 2. sent., dist. 29. q. unic. n. 3. et 6.

Prob. III. ex ratione. Defectus, a quibus liberabatur homo per donum integritatis, sunt 1. ut motus appetitus sensitivi praeveniant imperium voluntatis. - 2. ut eidem resistant: unde S. Augustinus (Op. imperf. l. 1. n. 71.) ait: "Non voluntatem cupiditas duxit, non praecessit voluntatem, non restitit voluntati." Atqui uterque defectus est homini naturalis, quatenus procedit ab ipsa ejus limitata natura. Ergo immunitas ab illis est supernaturalis seu indebita.

Prob. min. quoad 1am partem. Appetitus sensitivus naturaliter movetur praesentato objecto sibi conveniente; voluntas autem non potest semper praevenire ne objectum occurrat sensibus, nisi prius ab intellectu moveatur: cum autem intellectus per sensus excitetur, prius etiam immutatio sensus, et appetitus praecedit: ac proinde non est semper in potestate naturali voluntatis humanae, sicut dixit S. Augustinus, quin visis tangatur.

Prob. min. quoad 2am partem. Tamdiu causa necessaria persistit in actu, quamdiu ei suppetunt ea, per quae in actum perducta est. Atqui excitantia appetitum sensitivum [species in phantasia, commotio spirituum, ut aiunt, perturbatio humorum, etc.] perdurare possunt etiam post et contra imperium voluntatis. Ergo. "Ipse appetitus," inquit Suarez [de op. sex dier. l. 3. c. 12. n. 10.], "non obedit voluntati despotice, ut ait Aristot. seu serviliter, sed civili, et politico modo media cognitione, seu phantasia, quam non semper potest corrigere voluntas per solam naturalem efficaciam."

Cf. omnino pro hac quaestione Casini [Quid est homo, etc. art. 4.] - Pro objectionibus Sardagna [Vol. 4. pag. 439.], et Cercia [Append. ad tract. de Grat. Prol. 4. lect. 4. seqq.]

Nota I. Experientia teste, non solum in appetitu sensibili sunt quidam motus ad peccatum inclinantes; sed lucta quaedam, vel in superiori hominis parte saepe obtinet. Nimis allicimur, ex. gr., amore honoris, excellentiae, aliorumque hujus generis: haec cum spiritualia sint, sensibilem appetitum per se non afficiunt; sed, sicut in bono sensibili accidit, humanam naturam pronam reddunt ad malum morale, minusque expeditam ad morale bonum. Hinc praeter concupiscentiam sensibilem admittenda est concupiscentia quaedam spiritalis.

Haec ad illam maximam habet analogiam. Nam a) sicut in natura composita hominis duplex distingui debet, ut diximus, cognitio et appetitus: ita quoque in rationali hominis parte duplex distingui debet ratio, inferior et superior. Ratio inferior intendit temporalibus rebus, illas contemplando secundum se, easdemque aestimando, vel quatenus inter seipsas utcumque conveniunt, vel quatenus nobis commodo et delectationi sunt. Ratio superior vero "intendit," ut ait S. Augustinus (de Trin. l. 12. c. 7.), "aeternis conspiciendis aut consulendis" quatenus Deum contemplatur, aut creaturas, prout hae cum Dei lege consentiunt. Vid. 1. p. q. 79. a. 9.

b) Sicut motus appetitus sensitivi praevenire potest judicium rationis et imperium voluntatis, quia ut diximus, sequitur cognitionem sensibilem, quae prior est cognitione intellectuali; ita ratio inferior, et consequens eam appetitus, praevenire potest rationem superiorem, quatenus prius percipimus bona creata quam increata, et in rebus creatis prius percipimus bonitatem eam, qua illae nobis commodo vel delectationi sunt, quam eam, qua Deo ejusque legi consentiunt.

c) Sicut motus appetitus sensitivi perseverare possunt contra imperium voluntatis, quatenus, ut diximus, etiam post imperium voluntatis perseverare possunt causae, quibus excitati fuere; ita apprehensio rationis inferioris, et motus respondentis ei appetitus perseverare possunt contra imperium rationis superioris, quatenus hujus vi non statim auferuntur causae, quibus illi fuerunt excitati. Hinc sicut in uno homine, in una anima est pugna inter duas facultates, appetitum sensibilem

et appetitum rationalem; ita in uno homine, in una anima, imo in una eademque facultate est pugna, siquidem, uti docet D. Th. l. c. ad 1. "in quantum ratio dividitur secundum diversa officia, ratio superior et inferior partes dicuntur, et non quia sunt diversae potentiae." Vid. D. Thomam in 2. dist. 24. q. 2. 3.

Ex quibus sequitur, quod eodem sensu ac appetitus sensitivus, potest ratio inferior dici bona vel mala, esse a Deo vel non - eodem modo ac Adam, in quo fuit ab initio perfecta integritas, dicitur immunis a concupiscentia sensibili, dicitur etiam immunis a concupiscentia spiritali - eadem ratione ac immunitas a prima, immunitas etiam ab altera erat ei indebita. Vid. adnot. D. Scheeben ad art. 4. cit. disert. Casini.

Nota II. Etsi aliqui Patres, uti Nyssenus (de hom. opif. c. 17.), Damascenus (l. 2. c. 30.) aliter senserint; certum tamen est genus humanum fuisse per generationem ex conjunctione maris feminaeque propagandum in statu justitiae originalis, absque inordinatione libidinis. Nam a) generatio est modus naturalis communicandi naturam animalem, et est bonum naturae. - b) Masculus et femina ab initio creati sunt, et tamen Adam et Eva in statu justitiae conditi fuere: eos in matrimonium junxit Deus ante peccatum, iisque ante peccatum dixit: "crescite et multiplicamini." - c) Propagatur originale peccatum, ut vidimus, in omnes qui per communem generationem ab Adamo descendunt, et eodem modo communicata omnibus fuisset justitia originalis, si Adam non peccasset: haec non possent intelligi, si dum Adam erat in statu originalis justitiae et dum peccavit, nondum fuisset instituta humani generis propagatio per generationem. d) Unde S. Augustinus (de pecc. orig. c. 33.), ait: "Essent procul dubio nuptiae etiam non praecedente peccato, quia neque ob aliam causam viro adjutorium non alius vir sed femina facta est. Et illa verba 'crescite et multiplicamini' non est damnandorum praedictio peccatorum, sed foecundatarum benedictio nuptiarum." Vid. 1. p. q. 98. aa. 1. 2. 288. With these things laid down beforehand, we say:

Proposition XXVIII. Integrity, or immunity from concupiscence, which Adam had in his first condition, was a gift not owed to human nature.

The truth of this thesis is clearly drawn from propositions 26, 55, and 79 condemned in Baius, and from censure 16 in the Bull Auctorem Fidei, reported above.

Proof I. from the Fathers. The immunity from concupiscence with which the first man was furnished, according to the Fathers, a) must be attributed to the singular benevolence of God, indeed to grace; b) disturbance from the rebellion of the senses flows from the very nature of man; c) imperturbability is proper either to a glorified body, or to the Angels, or to God himself. But what is of this kind cannot be owed to human nature. Therefore.

Proof of the major a). St. Augustine (On Genesis against the Manichaeans, book 2, chapter 16) teaches concerning the first parents that "that they should live without those affections which occur against reason and disturb the mind must be assigned to grace, and indeed to great grace." - St. John Chrysostom (Homily 16 on Genesis chapter 2): "The glory which surrounded them was taken away, because they had made themselves unworthy of such honor ... Stripped because of sin of the cloak of heavenly grace, they received the sense of their sensible despoiling. God made them sense, once they had been stripped of that new and admirable garment of glory and heavenly benevolence, the things which before they did not sense because of his singular benevolence toward them."

Proof of the major b). Clement of Alexandria (Stromata, book 4): "The virtue of man, since by his essence he is liable to disturbances, etc." - Nemesius (Philosophical Book on the Nature of Man, chapter 1): "Man is not only a sharer in reason, but is also an animal ... the necessary uses of animal life and turbulent motions very often attack reason." - St. Augustine (On the Merits and Remission of Sins, book 2, chapter 22): "What is the nakedness indicated after the forbidden food was tasted, except that what grace covered was laid bare by sin? For there was great grace of God there, where the earthly and animal body did not have bestial lust [which it ought to have had by its nature]." - St. Maximus (Martyr, century 2, chapter 20, Oecumenic.): "Since nature and grace do not have the same account, there is no doubt in what way some of the Saints at times overcame affections, but at other times rather succumbed to affections, since we know that miracle pertains to grace, but affection to nature." - St. John Damascene (book 3, On the Faith, chapter 20): "These passions in Christ

the Lord were both according to nature and above nature. For they were stirred in him according to nature, when he permitted nature to suffer or be affected; but above nature, because in the Lord the things which were natural in no way anticipated the will."

Proof of the major c). St. Augustine [Epistle to Marcellinus, 145]: "Who can narrate all the inconveniences of carnal infirmity? These certainly will not exist when this corruptible puts on incorruption, so that what is mortal may be swallowed up by life. Then, therefore, the spiritual body rules wholly according to choice; but now, not in every way, but as the laws of the universe (which are of themselves natural and not necessarily penal) allow." - Clement of Alexandria (Paedagogue, book 1, chapter 2) says "Christ the Lord is most like the Father, because wholly free from human disturbances, etc."

Proof II. Baius, Jansenius, etc., taught that integrity was owed to human nature for this reason: because concupiscence is so evil that God could not have established man with it. But this is false.

Proof of the minor. 1. From the things said above in the exposition of the question. - 2. Directly from St. Augustine (Retractations, book 1, chapter 9): "To that misery of just condemnation belong ignorance and difficulty (which arises from concupiscence, as is clear from the preceding things), which every man suffers from the beginning of his birth, nor is anyone liberated from that evil except by the grace of God. The Pelagians do not wish this misery to descend from just condemnation, denying original sin; although ignorance and difficulty, even if they were natural beginnings of man, God would not even thus be blamed, but praised, as we argued in that same third book On Free Choice." - 3. From the common consent of the Doctors. It is enough to cite St. Thomas, who often repeats what he had written (II, disp. 31, q. 1, a. 2, ad 3): "God could from the beginning, when he established man, also form another man from the slime of the earth, whom he would leave in the condition of his nature, namely so that he would be mortal and passible, and sensing the battle of concupiscence against reason: in him nothing would be derogated from human nature, because this follows from the principles of nature. Nevertheless this defect would not have had in him the account of fault or punishment, because this defect would not have been caused through the will." - Scotus has the same in II Sentences, dist. 29, single question, nn. 3 and 6.

Proof III. from reason. The defects from which man was freed through the gift of integrity are: 1. that the motions of the sensitive appetite anticipate the command of the will; 2. that they resist it. Hence St. Augustine (Unfinished Work, book 1, n. 71) says: "Cupidity did not lead the will, did not precede the will, did not resist the will." But each defect is natural to man insofar as it proceeds from his very limited nature. Therefore immunity from them is supernatural or not owed.

Proof of the minor as to the first part. The sensitive appetite is naturally moved when an object suitable to it has been presented; but the will cannot always prevent an object from occurring to the senses unless it is first moved by the intellect. But since the intellect is excited through the senses, the alteration of sense, and of appetite, also precedes first. And consequently it is not always in the natural power of the human will, as St. Augustine said, not to be touched by things seen.

Proof of the minor as to the second part. A necessary cause persists in act as long as those things through which it was brought into act are supplied to it. But things exciting the sensitive appetite [species in phantasy, commotion of spirits, as they say, disturbance of humors, etc.] can endure even after and against the command of the will. Therefore. "The appetite itself," says Suarez [On the Work of the Six Days, book 3, chapter 12, n. 10], "does not obey the will despotically, as Aristotle says, or servilely, but in a civil and political manner, by means of cognition or phantasy, which the will cannot always correct by its merely natural efficacy."

Compare altogether on this question Casini [What Is Man, etc., article 5]. - For objections, Sardagna [vol. 4, page 439], and Cercia [Appendix to the treatise On Grace, Prol. 4, lecture 4ff.].

Note I. Experience testifying, there are not only in the sensible appetite certain motions inclining to sin, but a certain struggle often obtains even in the higher part of man. We are too much enticed, for example, by love of honor, excellence, and other things of this kind. Since these are spiritual, they do not affect the sensible appetite of themselves; but, just as happens in sensible good, they render human nature prone to moral evil

and less ready for moral good. Hence besides sensible concupiscence a certain spiritual concupiscence must be admitted.

This has the greatest analogy to the former. For a) just as in the composite nature of man there must be distinguished, as we said, a twofold cognition and appetite, so also in the rational part of man there must be distinguished a twofold reason, lower and higher. Lower reason attends to temporal things, contemplating them according to themselves, and estimating them either insofar as they agree in some way among themselves, or insofar as they are for our convenience and delight. But higher reason "attends," as St. Augustine says (On the Trinity, book 12, chapter 7), "to eternal things to be beheld or consulted," insofar as it contemplates God, or creatures as these agree with God's law. See I, q. 79, a. 9.

b) Just as the motion of the sensitive appetite can anticipate the judgment of reason and the command of the will, because, as we said, it follows sensible cognition, which is prior to intellectual cognition, so lower reason, and the appetite consequent upon it, can anticipate higher reason, insofar as we perceive created goods before uncreated goods, and in created things we first perceive that goodness by which they are for our convenience or delight, before that by which they agree with God and his law.

c) Just as the motions of the sensitive appetite can persevere against the command of the will, insofar as, as we said, the causes by which they were excited can persevere even after the command of the will, so the apprehension of lower reason, and the motion of the appetite corresponding to it, can persevere against the command of higher reason, insofar as by the force of the latter the causes by which the former were excited are not at once removed. Hence, just as in one man, in one soul, there is battle between two faculties, the sensible appetite and the rational appetite, so in one man, in one soul, indeed in one and the same faculty, there is battle, since, as St. Thomas teaches in the cited place ad 1, "insofar as reason is divided according to diverse offices, higher and lower reason are called parts, and not because they are diverse powers." See St. Thomas in II, dist. 24, q. 2, 3.

From these things it follows that lower reason can be called good or bad, from God or not, in the same sense as the sensitive appetite. In the same way as Adam, in whom there was perfect integrity from the beginning, is called immune from sensible concupiscence, he is also called immune from spiritual concupiscence. By the same reason as immunity from the first, immunity also from the other was not owed to him. See D. Scheeben's note to article 4 of the cited dissertation of Casini.

Note II. Although some Fathers, such as Nyssen (On the Making of Man, chapter 17) and Damascene (book 2, chapter 30), thought otherwise, nevertheless it is certain that the human race was to be propagated by generation from the union of male and female in the state of original justice, without the disorder of lust. For a) generation is the natural mode of communicating animal nature, and is a good of nature. - b) Male and female were created from the beginning, and nevertheless Adam and Eve were established in the state of justice; God joined them in marriage before sin, and before sin said to them: "increase and multiply." - c) Original sin is propagated, as we have seen, to all who descend from Adam through common generation; and in the same way original justice would have been communicated to all if Adam had not sinned. These things could not be understood if, while Adam was in the state of original justice and while he sinned, the propagation of the human race through generation had not yet been instituted. d) Hence St. Augustine says (On Original Sin, chapter 33): "There would undoubtedly have been marriages even had sin not preceded, because not for another reason was a helper made for the man, not another man but a woman. And those words 'increase and multiply' are not a prediction of sins to be condemned, but a blessing of marriages to be made fruitful." See I, q. 98, aa. 1, 2.

Article 6. On the Immortality of the First Man

LatineEnglish

Corrected Latin Text
Articulus Sextus.
De Immortalitate Primi Hominis.

289. Propositae methodo inhaerentes, statuemus factum collationis hujus doni - et deinde ejus praeternaturalitatem. - Quaedam tamen sunt adjicienda tum ut vera ejusdem natura innotescat, tum ut difficultates praeoccupentur. 289. Adhering to the proposed method, we shall establish the fact of the conferral of this gift, and then its preternaturality. Yet certain things must be added, both so that its true nature may become known, and so that difficulties may be forestalled.

§ I.
Utrum Primus Homo Factus A Deo Fuerit Immortalis. § I.
Whether The First Man Was Made Immortal By God.

290. Ecclesiae doctrina de hac re traditur, in Conc. Milevitano II. a. 416.: "Placuit constituere: - Ut, quicumque dicit, Adam primum hominem mortalem factum, ita ut sive peccaret sive non peccaret, moreretur in corpore, hoc est, de corpore exiret, non peccati merito, sed necessitate naturae, anathema sit." - In Conc. Arausicano II. a. 529.: "Si quis soli Adae praevaricationem suam, non et ejus propagini, asserit nocuisse, aut certe mortem tantum corporis, quae poena peccati est, non autem et peccatum, quod mors est animae, per unum hominem in omne genus humanum transisse testatur, injustitiam Deo dabit, contradicens Apostolo dicenti: Per unum hominem, etc." Eadem habet Conc. Trid. sess. 5. Decret. de pecc. orig. can. 1. 2. 290. The doctrine of the Church on this matter is handed down in the Second Council of Milevis, A.D. 416: "It has pleased us to establish: That whoever says that Adam, the first man, was made mortal, so that whether he sinned or did not sin he would die in the body, that is, depart from the body, not by the merit of sin, but by necessity of nature, let him be anathema." - In the Second Council of Orange, A.D. 529: "If anyone asserts that Adam's prevarication harmed him alone, and not also his offspring, or certainly testifies that only the death of the body, which is the punishment of sin, but not also sin, which is the death of the soul, passed through one man into the whole human race, he will give injustice to God, contradicting the Apostle who says: Through one man, etc." The Council of Trent has the same, session 5, decree on original sin, canons 1 and 2.

291. Difficultas in hac re ex eo petitur, quod cum corpus Adae iisdem constaret elementis, quibus nostrum nunc constat; videtur, sicut nostrum, fuisse corruptibile, ac proinde non immortale. Vid. Suarez (de op. sex dier. l. 3. c. 14. n. 6.) 291. The difficulty in this matter is drawn from this, that since Adam's body consisted of the same elements of which ours now consists, it seems, like ours, to have been corruptible, and consequently not immortal. See Suarez, On the Work of the Six Days, book 3, chapter 14, n. 6.

292. Ut occurramus huic difficultati, et simul indolem immortalitatis Adamo concessae intelligamus, notandum est cum D. Th. 1. q. 97. a. 1. "quod aliquid potest dici incorruptibile tripliciter. Uno modo ex parte materiae, eo scilicet quod non habet materiam, sicut Angelus ... et hoc dicitur secundum naturam incorruptibile. Alio modo dicitur aliquid incorruptibile ex parte formae, quia scilicet rei corruptibili per naturam inhaeret aliqua dispositio, per quam totaliter a corruptione prohibetur; et hoc dicitur incorruptibile secundum gloriam: quia, ut dicit Augustinus in Epist. ad Dioscorum tam potenti natura Deus fecit animam, ut ex ejus beatitudine redundet in corpus plenitudo sanitatis, et incorruptionis vigor. Tertio modo dicitur aliquid incorruptibile ex parte causae efficientis: et hoc modo homo in statu innocentiae fuisset incorruptibilis et immortalis ... Non enim corpus ejus erat indissolubile per aliquem immortalitatis vigorem in eo existentem." 292. In order to meet this difficulty, and at the same time to understand the character of the immortality granted to Adam, it must be noted with St. Thomas, I, q. 97, a. 1, "that something can be called incorruptible in three ways. In one way on the part of matter, namely because it

does not have matter, as an Angel ... and this is called incorruptible according to nature. In another way something is called incorruptible on the part of form, because, namely, in a thing corruptible by nature there inheres some disposition through which it is totally prevented from corruption; and this is called incorruptible according to glory: because, as Augustine says in the Epistle to Dioscorus, God made the soul of so powerful a nature that from its beatitude there redounds into the body the fullness of health and the vigor of incorruption. In a third way something is called incorruptible on the part of the efficient cause; and in this way man in the state of innocence would have been incorruptible and immortal ... For his body was not indissoluble through some vigor of immortality existing in it."

293. Unde bene concludit Suarez l. c. n. 8. quod ea immortalitas fuit Adae concessa "quae intrinsecam capacitatem mortis non excludit, sed solum confert, ut illa potentia in actum non reducatur. Quia vero hoc erat infallibile ex promissione divina, ideo theologice loquendo illa potestas non moriendi immortalitas quaedam vocari potest, et e contrario Adam dicitur factus mortalis peccando, quia illud privilegium propter peccatum amisit." 293. Hence Suarez rightly concludes in the cited place, n. 8, that the immortality granted to Adam was one "which does not exclude the intrinsic capacity of death, but only grants that that potency not be reduced to act. But because this was infallible from divine promise, therefore, speaking theologically, that power of not dying can be called a certain immortality; and, on the contrary, Adam is said to have been made mortal by sinning, because he lost that privilege on account of sin."

294. Haec eadem est doctrina S. Augustini (apud Petavium, de op. sex dier. c. 6. n. 7.) ait: "Illud quippe (corpus Adae) ante peccatum, et mortale secundum aliam, et immortale secundum aliam causam dici poterat; id est, mortale, quia poterat mori, immortale, quia poterat non mori. Aliud est enim non posse mori, sicut quasdam naturas immortales creavit Deus; aliud est autem posse non mori. Secundum quem modum primus creatus est homo immortalis; quod ei praestabatur de ligno vitae, non de constitutione naturae; a quo ligno separatus est cum peccasset, ut posset mori, qui nisi peccasset, posset non mori. Mortalis ergo erat conditione corporis animalis, immortalis autem beneficio Conditoris. Si enim corpus animale, utique mortale, quia et mori poterat, quamvis et immortale ideo, quia et non mori poterat." 294. This same is the doctrine of St. Augustine (apud Petavius, On the Work of the Six Days, chapter 6, n. 7), who says: "That body (of Adam), before sin, could be called both mortal according to one cause and immortal according to another; that is, mortal because it could die, immortal because it could not die. For it is one thing not to be able to die, as God created certain immortal natures; but another thing to be able not to die. According to this mode the first man was created immortal; this was furnished to him from the tree of life, not from the constitution of nature. From that tree he was separated when he had sinned, so that he could die, who, unless he had sinned, could not die. Therefore he was mortal by the condition of the animal body, but immortal by the benefit of the Creator. For if an animal body, certainly mortal, because it could also die, though also immortal for this reason, because it could also not die."

295. Ex his facile explicantur quaedam, sive apud PP. sive apud antiquos Theologos, dicta: "Adam erat mortalis, sed non moriturus" - "mortalis erat et immortalis" - "nec erat plane mortalis, nec plane immortalis," etc. 295. From these things certain sayings, whether among the Fathers or among the older theologians, are easily explained: "Adam was mortal, but not going to die"; "he was mortal and immortal"; "he was neither wholly mortal nor wholly immortal," etc.

296. Sed haec omnia adhuc clariora fient, si expendamus media, quibus Deus immortalitatem homini in prima conditione conferebat. Duobus modis, uti notat Suarez, mors homini evenire potest, scilicet ab extrinseca causa, ut per ignem, aquam, ensem, etc., quae

dicitur mors violenta; vel ab intrinseco, quae dicitur mors naturalis. Ab utroque mortis modo immunis erat homo in primo statu; causa vero praeservationis pro utroque non erat eadem. 296. But all these things will become still clearer if we weigh the means by which God conferred immortality upon man in the first condition. In two ways, as Suarez notes, death can happen to man, namely from an extrinsic cause, as by fire, water, sword, etc., which is called violent death; or from within, which is called natural death. Man in the first state was immune from each mode of death; but the cause of preservation for each was not the same.

297. Ad praeservandum hominem a morte violenta, non erat necessaria in homine aliqua intrinseca qualitas, ut nonnullis placuit; sed sufficit admittere peculiarem extrinsecam Dei providentiam, ut docet D. Th. in 2. dist. 19. q. 1. a. 4. dicens: "Ab hoc modo corruptionis conservabat hominem illaesum divina providentia." Et 1. p. q. 97. a. 2. ad 4.: "corpus hominis in statu innocentiae poterat praeservari partim quidem per propriam rationem, per quam poterat nociva vitare; partim etiam per divinam providentiam, quae sic ipsum tuebatur, ut nihil ei occurreret ex improviso, a quo laederetur." Quod confirmat Suarez (de op. sex dier. c. 14. n. 13.), dicens: "Illa qualitas (intrinseca) ... nimis esset miraculosa, et nullum habet fundamentum ... Nec enim ad convenientem providentiae ordinem erat alius necessarius, nam per prudentem ipsius hominis diligentiam, adjuncta peculiari Dei providentia, et custodia per se, vel per Angelos, sufficienter, satisque convenienter poterat homo ab his extrinsecis incommodis praeservari. Nam, v. g., ut homo non posset ab igne comburi, vel nimium calefieri, quid necesse erat, esse tali qualitate affectum, ut quamvis in ignem ingrederetur ab illo pati non posset, cum multo facilius esset vitare nimiam ad ignem propinquitatem. Alioqui etiam dicendum esset, hominem fuisse per intrinsecam qualitatem ita affectum, ut licet ambularet super aquas, non mergeretur, vel licet mergeretur, non suffocaretur. At haec, et similia incredibilia sunt: multo ergo verius et facilius dicitur, haec omnia incommoda per prudentiam praecaveri potuisse, et consequenter etiam vitanda fuisse." 297. For preserving man from violent death, there was not necessary in man some intrinsic quality, as pleased some; but it is enough to admit the peculiar extrinsic providence of God, as St. Thomas teaches in II, dist. 19, q. 1, a. 4, saying: "From this mode of corruption divine providence preserved man unharmed." And I, q. 97, a. 2, ad 4: "The body of man in the state of innocence could be preserved partly indeed through his own reason, by which he could avoid harmful things, and partly also through divine providence, which protected him in such a way that nothing would unexpectedly occur to him by which he would be harmed." Suarez confirms this (On the Work of the Six Days, chapter 14, n. 13), saying: "That intrinsic quality ... would be too miraculous and has no foundation ... Nor was anything else necessary for the fitting order of providence, for through man's own prudent diligence, joined with the peculiar providence of God, and guardianship by himself or through Angels, man could sufficiently and fittingly enough be preserved from these extrinsic inconveniences. For, for example, so that man could not be burned by fire, or heated too much, what need was there for him to be affected by such a quality that, although he entered into fire, he could not suffer from it, when it was much easier to avoid excessive nearness to fire? Otherwise it would also have to be said that man was so affected through an intrinsic quality that, although he walked upon waters, he would not sink, or although he sank, he would not be suffocated. But these and similar things are incredible. Therefore it is much more truly and easily said that all these inconveniences could have been guarded against by prudence, and consequently also had to be avoided."

298. Ad praeservandum vero primum hominem a morte naturali, uti fert communior Theologorum sententia, Patrum doctrinae conformior, nec ulla admittenda est intrinseca qualitas. Vid. Suarez, l. c. n. 29. Ut vero explicent positive modum praeservationis ab hac mortis causa, notant quod duobus modis potest mors naturalis evenire: vel 1. ex defectu convenientis alimenti; vel 2. ex humorum elementorumque, quibus humanum corpus est concretum, discordia, quae tandem ad ultimam ipsius perniciem erumpat. - Hunc alterum modum mortis ab intrinseco explicans D. Th.

1. p. q. 97. a. 4. ait: "Illud quod generatur ex aliquo extrinseco, adjunctum ei quod prius erat imminuit virtutem activam speciei: sicut aqua adjuncta vino, primo quidem convertitur in saporem vini; sed secundum quod magis, et minus additur, diminuit vini fortitudinem; et tandem vinum fit aquosum. Sic igitur videmus quod in principio virtus activa speciei est adeo fortis quod potest convertere de alimento non solum quod sufficit ad restaurationem deperditi, sed etiam quod sufficit ad augmentum; postmodum vero quod aggeneratur, non sufficit ad augmentum, sed solum ad restaurationem deperditi; tandem vero in statu senectutis nec ad hoc sufficit; unde sequitur decrementum, et finaliter dissolutio corporis." 298. But for preserving the first man from natural death, as the more common opinion of theologians, more conformable to the doctrine of the Fathers, holds, no intrinsic quality must be admitted either. See Suarez, cited place, n. 29. But in order to explain positively the mode of preservation from this cause of death, they note that natural death can happen in two ways: either 1. from defect of suitable food, or 2. from discord of the humors and elements from which the human body is concreted, which at last breaks out into its final destruction. Explaining this second mode of death from within, St. Thomas says, I, q. 97, a. 4: "That which is generated from something extrinsic, joined to what was there before, diminishes the active power of the species; just as water joined to wine is indeed at first converted into the taste of wine, but according as more and less is added, it diminishes the strength of the wine, and finally the wine becomes watery. Thus, therefore, we see that in the beginning the active power of the species is so strong that it can convert from food not only what suffices for the restoration of what has been lost, but also what suffices for increase. Afterwards, however, what is generated in addition does not suffice for increase, but only for the restoration of what has been lost. Finally, in the state of old age, it does not suffice even for this; whence there follows decrease and finally the dissolution of the body."

299. Primo defectui subventum est per fructus arborum communium Paradisi: unde dicitur Gen. 2.: "ex ligno Paradisi comede;" et S. Augustinus ait: "cibus aderat ne esuriret, potus ne sitiret." Quoad alium vero defectum, imprimis in ipso corpore data est perfecta dispositio, et humorum contemperatio, ita ut inter se habere non possent vehementem actionem, quae aegritudinem vel aliquam similem dispositionem omnino praeternaturalem ab extrinseco possent inducere. Deinde per justitiae donum datum est, ut non possent humores nimium alterari, aut ex ferventi passione, aut ex nimio labore, quia in hoc statu in his omnibus esset maxima moderatio, et sic ait S. Aug. supra, "Nihil corruptionis in corpore, vel ex corpore ullas molestias ullis ejus sensibus ingerebat, nullus intrinsecus morbus, nullus actus metuebatur extrinsecus, summa in carne sanitas." Praeterea etiam ex parte illorum fructuum, seu alimentorum, quibus priori defectui subveniebatur, provisum est, ut optimae qualitatis essent, ita ut ex magna facilitate, et cum minima alteratione partium corporis hominis possent in illius substantiam converti, et ad hoc etiam juvabat optima, et salubris loci dispositio, et hoc est, quod August. citato loco de civitate Dei, dixit, "Sicut in Paradiso nullus aestus, aut frigus, sic in ejus habitatore, nulla ex cupiditate, vel timore offensio, nihil omnino triste, non lassitudo fatigabat otiosum, non somnus premebat invitum." 299. The first defect was supplied through the fruits of the common trees of Paradise; whence it is said in Genesis 2: "Eat from the tree of Paradise"; and St. Augustine says: "Food was present lest he hunger, drink lest he thirst." But with respect to the other defect, first in the body itself there was given a perfect disposition and tempering of the humors, so that they could not have among themselves a vehement action which could induce sickness or some similar disposition altogether preternatural from without. Then through the gift of justice it was given that the humors could not be excessively altered either from burning passion or from excessive labor, because in this state there would be the greatest moderation in all these things. And so St. Augustine says above: "No corruption in the body, or from the body, brought any troubles upon any of its senses; no sickness within, no act from without was feared; there was the highest health in the flesh." Besides, also on the part of those fruits or foods by which the prior defect was supplied, it was provided that they be of the best quality, so that with great ease and with the least alteration of the parts of man's body they could be converted into his

substance. The best and wholesome disposition of the place also assisted toward this. And this is what Augustine said in the cited place of The City of God: "Just as in Paradise there was no heat or cold, so in its inhabitant there was no offense from desire or fear, nothing at all sad; no weariness fatigued him at leisure, no sleep oppressed him unwilling."

300. Verum licet haec omnia sufficerent ad servandum corpus in debita dispositione pro aliquo tempore; ad mortem tamen omnino arcendam opus fuit alio remedio, quod Deus praestitit in Ligno vitae. Unde S. Augustinus inquit: "Lignum vitae aderat, ne hominem senecta dissolveret." Et iterum "Quamdiu in creatoris lege duravit, dignus fuit edere de arbore vitae, ut mori non posset. Neque enim corpus tale erat, ut dissolvi esset impossibile, sed fructus arboris vitae corruptionem corporis inhibebat." 300. But although all these things would suffice for preserving the body in due disposition for some time, nevertheless for wholly warding off death there was need of another remedy, which God furnished in the Tree of Life. Hence St. Augustine says: "The tree of life was present, lest old age dissolve man." And again: "As long as he endured in the law of the Creator, he was worthy to eat from the tree of life, so that he could not die. For the body was not such that it was impossible for it to be dissolved, but the fruit of the tree of life inhibited the corruption of the body."

301. De hoc ligno vitae, ad rem nostram, sequentia ex magis recepta doctrina adnotamus. 1. Fructus illius arboris non erat solum figura incorruptionis, quam Deus daturus esset; sed per propriam efficaciam sibi inditam conferebat vigorem et renovationem. Secus enim non oportuisset Adamum ejicere de Paradiso, ne forte, ut legitur Gen. 3., comedendo de illo cibo particeps fieret immortalitatis; Deus enim non promiserat illum effectum, nisi homini in sua obedientia perseveranti.

2. Licet exhibitio immortalitatis per arborem vitae certo fuerit homini praeternaturalis; quaestio tamen est utrum efficacia illa fuerit ipsi arbori connaturalis an supernaturalis. Plures adhaerent S. Augustino (De Gen. ad litt. l. 8. c. 5.) dicenti: "Quamquam corporalem cibum, talem tamen illa arbor praestabat, quo corpus hominis sanitate stabili firmaretur, non sicut ex alio cibo, sed nonnulla inspiratione salubritatis occulta."

3. Fructus ligni vitae non tantum alebat corpus per modum cibi; sed etiam reficiebat, confortabat, reparabat per modum medicinae "nimirum vel per novas qualitates ipsum temperamentum connaturale corporis perficiendo si quid in illo diminutum fuerat, vel intendendo nativas qualitates et alias remittendo."

4. Lignum vitae habebat quidem virtutem conservandi vitam non tantum ad longum tempus, sed perpetuo, ut videtur certum; non tamen semel sumptus, sed saepius temporibus opportunis, uti fert communior sententia post S. Augustinum, D. Thomam, etc. apud Suarez (Op. cit. c. 15. n. 4. seqq.) Quod n. 7. explanans, ait: "Ponamus Adamum creatum in optimo statu vitae, et complexionis suae per annum, vel quodlibet aliud designatum tempus vixisse, cibum sumendo ex aliis lignis Paradisi, et postea semel comedere de ligno vitae. Tunc certe per illam sumptionem ad summum reduceretur ad illum optimum statum, in quo creatus fuit, quia vel non poterat esse melior, vel si melior fingitur, non esset naturalis, nec corpori humano accommodatus. Ergo post primam sumptionem, utendo iterum aliis cibis, ille optimus status iterum minueretur; ergo ne tandem corrumperetur, necessarium illi fuisset iterum sumi de ligno vitae." 301. Concerning this tree of life, for our matter, we note the following things from the more received doctrine. 1. The fruit of that tree was not only a figure of the incorruption which God was going to give, but by its own efficacy given to it conferred vigor and renewal. Otherwise it would not have been necessary to cast Adam out of Paradise, lest perhaps, as is read in Genesis 3, by eating of that food he would become a participant of immortality. For God had not promised that effect except to man persevering in his obedience.

2. Although the exhibition of immortality through the tree of life certainly was preternatural to man, nevertheless there is a question whether that efficacy was connatural or supernatural to the tree itself. Several adhere to St. Augustine, who says (On Genesis to the Letter, book 8, chapter 5): "Although that tree provided bodily food, nevertheless it was such that the

body of man was strengthened by it with stable health, not as from another food, but by some hidden inspiration of healthfulness."

3. The fruit of the tree of life not only nourished the body by way of food, but also restored, strengthened, and repaired it by way of medicine, "namely either by perfecting through new qualities the very connatural temperament of the body if anything in it had been diminished, or by intensifying native qualities and remitting others."

4. The tree of life indeed had the power of preserving life not only for a long time, but perpetually, as seems certain; yet not when taken once, but more often at suitable times, as the more common opinion holds after St. Augustine, St. Thomas, etc., apud Suarez (cited work, chapter 15, n. 4ff.). Explaining this in n. 7, he says: "Let us suppose Adam created in the best state of life and of his complexion, and that he lived for a year, or any other designated time, taking food from the other trees of Paradise, and afterwards ate once from the tree of life. Then certainly through that taking he would be reduced at most to that best state in which he was created, because either he could not be better, or if he is imagined better, that would not be natural nor accommodated to the human body. Therefore after the first taking, by using other foods again, that best state would again be diminished; therefore lest he finally be corrupted, it would have been necessary for him again to take from the tree of life."

302. His expositis, dicimus:

Prop. XXIX. Contulit Deus protoparentibus immortalitatis donum, quo a necessitate moriendi immunes numquam mortui fuissent, si in accepta justitia perseverassent.

Prob. I. ex Scriptura. Legitur Gen. 2. 17.: "In quocumque enim die comederis ex eo, morte morieris," i. e., obnoxius eris morti, mortalis efficieris. Quamvis Gregorius et Eucherius haec verba intelligant de morte animae, certum est tamen, secus ac Pelagius sentiebat, ea intelligenda esse etiam et primitus de morte corporis. Quod aperte constat non modo ex constanti PP. interpretatione, sed ex ipso contextu. His enim verbis minatur Deus illam poenam, ad quam deinde damnavit Adam post peccatum, illum autem damnavit ad poenam mortis corporalis, uti patet ex verbis in 3. Gen. "In sudore vultus tui vesceris pane, donec revertaris in terram, de qua sumptus es, quia pulvis es, et in pulverem reverteris." Unde: Si Adam non habuisset in prima sui conditione immortalitatis donum, non potuisset Deus illi mortem comminari in praevaricationis poenam, et dicere "in qua die comederis, eris morti obnoxius:" absque praevaricatione enim fuisset Adam in eadem conditione. Atqui comminatus est Deus mortem in praevaricationis poenam. Ergo.

Conf. Sap. 1. 13. seq. dicitur: "Quoniam Deus mortem non fecit, nec laetatur in perditione vivorum. Creavit enim, ut essent omnia." - 2. 23. seq.: "Quoniam Deus creavit hominem inexterminabilem, et ad imaginem similitudinis suae fecit illum. Invidia autem diaboli mors introivit in orbem terrarum." Quibus directe declaratur hominem, prout e manu Dei processit, non fuisse obnoxium morti.

Dicitur Rom. 5. 12.: "Propterea sicut per unum hominem peccatum in hunc mundum intravit, et per peccatum mors, etc." - 10. 8.: "Si autem Christus in vobis est, corpus quidem mortuum est propter peccatum, spiritus vero vivit propter justificationem." Et 1. Cor. 15. 21.: "Quoniam quidem per hominem mors, et per hominem resurrectio mortuorum." Ex quibus patet, juxta Apostolum, mortem primum orbi terrarum pedem intulisse propter peccatum Adae; ergo ante peccatum Adam erat immortalis.

Prob. II. Ex Patribus. Tatianus (c. Graec. c. 7.): "Non facti sumus, ut moreremur: morimur autem nostra culpa." Theophilus Ant. (l. 2. ad Autol. c. 27.): "Homo sua inobedientia mortem sibi arcessivit." S. Cyprianus (Serm. de pat.): "In illa prima transgressione praecepti firmitas corporis cum immortalitate discessit." - S. Athanasius (l. de Incar. Verb. n. 4-6.): "Si autem legem transgrederentur, scirent, se naturalem mortis corruptionem esse passuros, morientes in mortem putredinemque solvendos." - S. Ambrosius (l. de bono mort. c. 4.): "Deus mortem non fecit, sed postquam homo lapsus in flagitium est, sententiam tulit, ut terra in terram suam remearet." S. Augustinus (l. 13. de Civ. Dei. c. 24.): "Unde constat, inter Christianos, veraciter catholicam tenentes fidem, etiam ipsam nobis corporis mortem, non lege naturae, quia nullam mortem homini Deus fecit, sed merito inflictam esse peccati." Plura Patrum testimonia invenies in thesi sequenti. 302. With these things explained, we say:

Proposition XXIX. God conferred upon the first

parents the gift of immortality, by which, immune from the necessity of dying, they would never have died if they had persevered in the justice received.

Proof I. from Scripture. It is read in Genesis 2:17: "For on whatever day you eat from it, you shall die the death," that is, you will be liable to death, you will be made mortal. Although Gregory and Eucherius understand these words of the death of the soul, nevertheless it is certain, contrary to what Pelagius thought, that they must also and principally be understood of the death of the body. This is openly clear not only from the constant interpretation of the Fathers, but from the context itself. For by these words God threatens that punishment to which he then condemned Adam after sin; but he condemned him to the punishment of bodily death, as is clear from the words in Genesis 3: "In the sweat of your face you shall eat bread, until you return to the earth from which you were taken, because you are dust, and to dust you shall return." Hence: if Adam had not had the gift of immortality in his first condition, God could not have threatened him with death as punishment of prevarication, and said "on the day you eat, you will be liable to death"; for without prevarication Adam would have been in the same condition. But God threatened death as punishment of prevarication. Therefore.

Confirmation. In Wisdom 1:13ff. it is said: "For God did not make death, nor does he rejoice in the destruction of the living. For he created all things that they might be." - 2:23ff.: "For God created man inexterminable, and made him to the image of his likeness. But by the envy of the devil death entered into the world." By these words it is directly declared that man, as he proceeded from the hand of God, was not liable to death.

It is said in Romans 5:12: "Therefore, as through one man sin entered into this world, and through sin death, etc." - 8:10: "But if Christ is in you, the body indeed is dead because of sin, but the spirit lives because of justification." And 1 Corinthians 15:21: "For indeed through man came death, and through man the resurrection of the dead." From these things it is clear that, according to the Apostle, death first set foot in the world on account of Adam's sin; therefore before sin Adam was immortal.

Proof II. From the Fathers. Tatian (Against the Greeks, chapter 7): "We were not made so that we should die; but we die by our own fault." Theophilus of Antioch (book 2, to Autolycus, chapter 27): "Man by his disobedience summoned death to himself." St. Cyprian (Sermon on Patience): "In that first transgression of the command, firmness of body departed together with immortality." - St. Athanasius (book On the Incarnation of the Word, nn. 4-6): "But if they should transgress the law, they would know that they would suffer the natural corruption of death, dying unto death and being dissolved into decay." - St. Ambrose (book On the Good of Death, chapter 4): "God did not make death, but after man slipped into crime, he pronounced the sentence that earth should return into its earth." St. Augustine (book 13 of The City of God, chapter 24): "Whence it is established among Christians truly holding the Catholic faith that even the very death of the body is inflicted upon us not by the law of nature, because God made no death for man, but by the merit of sin." You will find several testimonies of the Fathers in the following thesis.

Corrected Latin Text
§ II.
Utrum Immortalitas Fuerit Donum Indebitum. § II.
Whether Immortality Was A Gift Not Owed.

303. Ex propositionibus 55. et praesertim 78. damnatis in Baio constat, juxta doctrinam Ecclesiae, immortalitatem protoparentibus concessam, esse donum humanae naturae indebitum. 303. From propositions 55 and especially 78 condemned in Baius, it is established, according to the doctrine of the Church, that the immortality granted to the first parents was a gift not owed to human nature.

304. Ut bene hanc doctrinam tueamur, videndum est quomodo naturalis sit nobis mors; inde enim patebit quomodo immortalitas sit indebita. Notat D. Thomas

2. 2. q. 164. a. 1. ad 1. "quod naturale dicitur quod ex principiis naturae causatur. Naturae autem per se principia sunt forma et materia. Forma autem hominis est anima rationalis, quae est de se immortalis; et ideo mors non est naturalis homini ex parte suae formae. Materia autem hominis est corpus tale quod est ex contrariis compositum, ad quod sequitur ex necessitate corruptibilitas: et quantum ad hoc mors est homini naturalis." 304. In order to defend this doctrine well, it must be seen how death is natural to us; for from this it will be clear how immortality is not owed. St. Thomas notes, II-II, q. 164, a. 1, ad 1, "that natural is said of what is caused from the principles of nature. But the principles of nature of themselves are form and matter. Now the form of man is the rational soul, which of itself is immortal; and therefore death is not natural to man on the part of his form. But the matter of man is a body of such a kind that it is composed of contraries, upon which corruptibility follows by necessity: and with respect to this death is natural to man."

305. Neque ex eo quod forma hominis sit immortalis, sequitur quod exigat ex necessitate conjungi cum materia incorruptibili. Nam, uti observat idem S. Doctor q. 5. de malo, art. 5.: "Si in natura inveniri potuisset aliquod corpus ex elementis compositum, quod esset incorruptibile; procul dubio tale corpus esset conveniens animae secundum naturam. Sicut si posset inveniri ferrum infrangibile, et rubiginem non contrahens, esset convenientissima materia ad serram, (ad cultellum:) et talem artifex quaereret. Sed quia talis inveniri non potest, accipitur qualis potest: scilicet dura, sed frangibilis. Similiter quia natura non potest invenire corpus ex elementis compositum, quod secundum naturam materia sit incorruptibile; aptatur naturaliter animae incorruptibili corpus organicum, licet corruptibile." - Et 1. p. q. 76. a. 5. ad 1., inquit: "De necessitate materiae sequitur quod sit corruptibile (corpus). Si quis vero dicat, quod Deus potuit hanc necessitatem vitare; dicendum est quod in constitutione rerum naturalium non consideratur quid Deus facere possit, sed quid naturae rerum conveniat." Cf. h. l. 305. Nor from the fact that the form of man is immortal does it follow that by necessity it demands to be joined with incorruptible matter. For, as the same holy Doctor observes, q. 5 On Evil, art. 5: "If there could have been found in nature some body composed from the elements which was incorruptible, without doubt such a body would be suitable to the soul according to nature. Just as if there could be found iron unbreakable and not contracting rust, it would be the most suitable matter for a saw (for a knife), and the craftsman would seek such. But because such cannot be found, it is accepted such as it can be: namely hard, but breakable. Similarly because nature cannot find a body composed from the elements which according to the nature of matter is incorruptible, an organic body, although corruptible, is naturally fitted to the incorruptible soul." - And I, q. 76, a. 5, ad 1, he says: "From the necessity of matter it follows that the body is corruptible. But if someone says that God could avoid this necessity, it must be said that in the constitution of natural things one does not consider what God can do, but what befits the nature of things." Compare this place.

306. Quamvis haec doctrina perspicua sit, duo tamen praesertim opponunt adversarii; unum ex auctoritate, alterum ex ratione. - Ex auctoritate: afferunt Conc. Araus., quod can. 2. sancivit: "Injustitiam Deo dare, qui censent Adamum moriturum fuisse, etiamsi non peccasset." - S. Augustinum, qui l. 13. de civ. Dei c. 15. asserit "corporis mortem non lege naturae, sed merito inflictam esse peccati." - Similia autem saepe docet S. Doctor, eademque tradunt S. Gelasius I. (Epist 7. ad Epis. Piceni), S. Anselmus (l. 2. cur homo Deus, cap 2.), etc. Ergo, aiunt, hi omnes sensere hominem innocentem, salva Dei justitia et bonitate, non potuisse creari obnoxium morti; seu, immortalitatem, excluso peccato, esse humanae naturae debitam. Sed huic objectionum capiti facile occurritur; respondetur enim dist. cons.: sensere hominem innocentem non potuisse creari morti obnoxium, salva Dei justitia et bonitate, in praesenti providentia, seu supposita gratuita Dei promissione immortalitatis conc.; in alia providentia possibili, seu praescindendo ab illa gratuita promissione neg. Veritas hujus responsionis eruitur ex testimoniis partim allatis, partim afferendis, et ex ipso statu quaestionis inter S. Augustinum et Pelagianos. 306. Although this

doctrine is clear, the adversaries especially oppose two things: one from authority, the other from reason. - From authority: they bring forward the Council of Orange, which sanctioned in canon 2: "They give injustice to God who judge that Adam would have died even if he had not sinned." - St. Augustine, who in book 13 of The City of God, chapter 15, asserts that "the death of the body was inflicted not by the law of nature, but by the merit of sin." But the holy Doctor often teaches similar things, and St. Gelasius I (Epistle 7 to the Bishops of Picenum), St. Anselm (book 2, Why God Became Man, chapter 2), etc., hand down the same. Therefore, they say, all these thought that innocent man, with God's justice and goodness preserved, could not have been created liable to death; or, that immortality, sin excluded, was owed to human nature. But this head of objections is easily met. For the conclusion is distinguished: they thought that innocent man could not have been created liable to death, with God's justice and goodness preserved, in the present providence, or with the gratuitous promise of immortality supposed: conceded; in another possible providence, or abstracting from that gratuitous promise: denied. The truth of this response is drawn from the testimonies partly already adduced, partly to be adduced, and from the very state of the question between St. Augustine and the Pelagians.

307. Ex ratione vero objiciunt: Si non esset homini debita immortalitas corporis, deberetur ei resurrectio; sed haec videtur esse majus beneficium; ergo. - Majorem autem probant variis modis; sed praesertim 1.: Patres et Theologi communiter probant resurrectionem corporum ex eo quod homo ipse, et non solum pars ejus, destinatur ad beatitudinem: homo autem est compositum ex anima et corpore. Non sola anima est, quae in hac vita bene aut male de Deo meretur; ac proinde non sola anima, sed etiam corpus, juxta Dei providentiam, debet praemium vel poenam recipere. Ergo si indebita esset homini immortalitas, debita esset resurrectio.

2. Dici nequit animam eorum, qui bene se gesserunt in hac vita habere, dum est in termino, statum minus perfectum eo, quem habuit, dum esset in via; sed ita esset, si in statu beatitudinis maneret a corpore separata. Ergo si naturale est illi ut aliquando separetur, naturale etiam erit iterum illi conjungi.

3. Homini in statu purae naturae debita certe esset beatitudo naturalis; sed hanc non posset assequi, si anima maneret separata a corpore; siquidem anima naturaliter appeteret unionem cum illo, et quamdiu manet aliquis naturalis appetitus sine assecutione sui objecti, beatitudo est impossibilis. Ergo si naturale esset homini mori, naturale, seu debitum esset resurgere.

4. Cum anima sit secundum suam essentiam forma corporis, naturale est illi corpus informare - quod si non informet, erit in statu violento. Sed beatitudo cum hoc statu est incompossibilis. Ergo. 307. But from reason they object: If immortality of body were not owed to man, resurrection would be owed to him; but this seems to be a greater benefit; therefore. But they prove the major in various ways, and especially, first: the Fathers and theologians commonly prove the resurrection of bodies from the fact that man himself, and not only a part of him, is destined to beatitude; but man is a composite of soul and body. It is not the soul alone which in this life merits well or badly concerning God; and consequently not the soul alone, but also the body, according to God's providence, ought to receive reward or punishment. Therefore if immortality were not owed to man, resurrection would be owed.

2. It cannot be said that the soul of those who conducted themselves well in this life has, while it is in the term, a state less perfect than that which it had while it was on the way; but so it would be if in the state of beatitude it remained separated from the body. Therefore if it is natural to the soul that it be separated at some time, it will also be natural for it to be joined again.

3. To man in the state of pure nature natural beatitude would certainly be owed; but he could not attain this if the soul remained separated from the body, since the soul would naturally desire union with it, and as long as some natural appetite remains without attainment of its object, beatitude is impossible. Therefore if it were natural for man to die, it would also be natural, or owed, for him to rise again.

4. Since the soul according to its essence is the form of the body, it is natural for it to inform the body; but if it does not inform, it will be in a violent state. But beatitude is incompatible with this state. Therefore.

308. Ut his, sane gravibus, difficultatibus satisfaciamus, tria imprimis notanda sunt. 1. Duplici modo possumus considerare resurrectionem: quatenus anima iterum conjungitur suo corpori, vel ut antea erat, corruptibili et miseriis obnoxio; vel a corruptibilitate et miseriis liberato, sicut fit in praesenti providentia. Si hoc altero modo resurrectio spectetur, nemo dubitat eam esse humanae naturae indebitam; et res per se patet.

2. Si vero primo modo consideratur resurrectio, poterit fortasse alicui videri non improbabile quod sit homini debita juxta leges providentiae Dei Auctoris naturae. Quod si ita esset, facile solverentur propositae difficultates, uti patet; et simul maneret veritas quod immortalitas est donum indebitum.

3. At vero videtur omnino tenendum quod resurrectio est indebita non tantum propter gloriam corporum resurgentium, sed etiam propter solam reparationem et vivificationem corporis defuncti. - Revera concedunt omnes solum Deum posse resurrectionem operari, et nullam esse virtutem in natura, quae illud possit: "ea quae sunt unius speciei," inquit D. Th. sup. 3. p. q. 75. a. 3., "unum habent determinatum modum originis ... Sed naturalis modus quo homo oritur est generatio ejus ex simili in specie, quod non est in resurrectione. Ergo non erit naturalis." Deum autem non operari resurrectionem corporum, quia hoc exigitur a natura, ut plura omittam, sic declarat Suarez (in 3. p. tom. 2. disp. 44. sect. 7.): "Hoc explicatur ex differentia inter animae creationem, et resurrectionem. Ad primam enim unionem animae, et corporis possunt agentia naturalia disponere materiam, dispositione ex natura sua postulante talem formam, quocirca pertinet ad naturalem providentiam, et concursum debitum, ut Deus illam infundat: at vero in ordine ad iteratam unionem, quae in resurrectione fit, nihil possunt causae naturales efficere, nec materiam ita disponere, ut postulet illius animae unionem; ergo non potest illa resurrectio dici simpliciter naturalis." - Haec doctrina videtur conformis locutionibus Sacrae Scripturae et Patrum qui de resurrectione (etiam praescindendo a gloria corporum, quam reprobi non habebunt) loquuntur tamquam de re supernaturali. Sit pro omnibus S. Cyprianus:

"Homo," inquit (Serm. de resurr. Christi), "qui ex caelesti, et terrena materia compactus est, vestitus extrinsecus pelle, et carnibus, tempus accepit, quo te jubente redderet terrae, quod de terra assumpserat, et ad immaterialem originem reverteretur spiritus, cujus natura dissolutionis non admittit injuriam. Corpus putredine, et caro vermibus consumenda, secundum naturae suae rationem non poterat aeternitatis privilegio perfrui: et quod sibi jure non competebat, a conditore nequibat exigere. Neque ulla eorum interrogatio super hoc merebatur responsum. Sed tu, optime Domine, ultro gratiam volens dare spiritui, decrevisti clementius, ut ex societate, et clientela, quam reddiderat animae caro, aliquid ei commodi proveniret, et quae ei vehiculum fuerat, et particeps studiorum, in recompensatione ministerii iterum dilecto accolae consociata, pudica, et pacifica rediret, nullas secum revehens contumelias, quibus deinceps quietis internae concuteret puritatem. Sed et hoc Domine, ad cumulum beneficii addidisti, ut inter legem carnis, et spiritus nulla postmodum esset diversitas, nec post initum foedus, ulla iterum inter eos recrescat rebellio, sed per manum tuam reconciliatio ordinata stabilis in perpetuum perseveret. Te igitur jubente terra fit caro, et expulsa de domo iterum conjungatur viro, non jam ancilla sed libera: et habitant unius moris in domo, murmurationibus consopitis, quas olim compugnantes inter se concupiscentiae concitabant." 308. In order to satisfy these, certainly serious, difficulties, three things must first be noted. 1. We can consider resurrection in two ways: insofar as the soul is again joined to its body, either as it was before, corruptible and liable to miseries; or as freed from corruptibility and miseries, as happens in the present providence. If resurrection is viewed in this second way, no one doubts that it is not owed to human nature; and the matter is clear of itself.

2. But if resurrection is considered in the first way, it could perhaps seem to someone not improbable that it is owed to man according to the laws of the providence of God as Author of nature. If this were so, the proposed difficulties would easily be solved, as is clear; and at the same time the truth would remain that immortality is a gift not owed.

3. But it seems altogether to be held that resurrection is not owed not only on account of the glory of risen bodies, but even on account of the mere restoration and vivification of the dead body. In reality, all concede that God alone can work resurrection, and that there is no power in nature which can do it. "Things which are of one species," says St. Thomas, Supplement, q. 75, a. 3, "have one determinate mode

of origin ... But the natural mode by which man arises is his generation from something similar in species, which is not the case in resurrection. Therefore it will not be natural." And that God does not work the resurrection of bodies because this is demanded by nature, Suarez declares in this way, omitting several things (on III, tome 2, disp. 44, sect. 7): "This is explained from the difference between the creation of the soul and resurrection. For natural agents can dispose matter for the first union of soul and body, with a disposition which of its nature demands such a form; for which reason it pertains to natural providence and owed concurrence that God infuse it. But in order to the repeated union which is made in resurrection, natural causes can effect nothing, nor so dispose matter that it demands the union of that soul. Therefore that resurrection cannot be called simply natural." - This doctrine seems conformable to the expressions of Sacred Scripture and the Fathers, who speak of resurrection as of a supernatural thing, even abstracting from the glory of bodies, which the reprobate will not have. Let St. Cyprian stand for all:

"Man," he says (Sermon on the Resurrection of Christ), "who was compacted from heavenly and earthly matter, clothed outwardly with skin and flesh, received a time in which, at your command, he would return to the earth what he had taken from the earth, and the spirit, whose nature does not admit the injury of dissolution, would return to its immaterial origin. The body to be consumed by decay, and the flesh by worms, according to the account of its nature could not enjoy the privilege of eternity; and what did not belong to it by right it could not demand from the Creator. Nor did any questioning of them concerning this deserve an answer. But you, best Lord, freely willing to give grace to the spirit, decreed more mercifully that, from the society and service which the flesh had rendered to the soul, some advantage should come to it, and that the flesh which had been its vehicle and sharer in studies, joined again in recompense of ministry to the beloved inhabitant, should return modest and peaceful, carrying back with itself no insults by which thereafter it would shake the purity of internal quiet. But this too, Lord, you added to the heap of benefit: that afterwards there should be no diversity between the law of flesh and spirit, nor after the covenant was entered should any rebellion grow up again between them, but that the reconciliation ordered by your hand should persevere stable forever. Therefore at your command earth becomes flesh, and, expelled from the house, is again joined to the man, now not a handmaid but free; and they dwell in the house of one character, with the murmurings stilled which once warring concupiscences stirred up among themselves."

309. Hac autem supposita vera doctrina de supernaturalitate resurrectionis, en quomodo propositis difficultatibus responderi potest:

Resp. 1mae. a) "Satis est," inquit Suarez, l. c., "ut homo possit esse beatus tamquam homo ... Homo enim non appetit esse beatus, nisi quamdiu est; ad beatitudinem ergo naturalem hominis satis est, quod durare possit, quandiu existit homo. Quia ergo homo natura sua corruptibilis est, ideo beatitudo etiam, quae naturaliter conferri potest homini, ut est integrum individuum speciei humanae non est simpliciter perpetua, sed temporalis. Quia vero anima hominis est perpetua, ideo in illa perpetuo durare potest beatitudo hominis quantum ad id, quod in ea essentiale est, scilicet quoad cognitionem et amorem Dei naturalem. Et hoc tantum est debitum, ac consentaneum naturis rerum: quidquid vero ultra hoc additur, supernaturale est."

b) "Anima," inquit idem Auctor eodem loco, "est principium proprium, ac per se actionis bonae, aut malae, satis est hominem in ea recipere praecipuum virtutis praemium: corpus autem, quod tantum est organum animae, sicut in hac tantum vita mortali esset instrumentum virtutis, ita in eadem posset recipere aliquod praemium suae actioni proportionatum. Quod non oportet, ut consistat in divitiis temporalibus, et voluptatibus, quae non solent ad virtutis exercitationem valde esse utiles: sed in aliis bonis, vel auxiliis, quibus corpus ipsum facilius et commodius possit ad virtutis studium accendi. Nullo ergo modo debita est homini resurrectio ex sola providentia naturali."

c) Rationes illae et aliae similes sunt convenientiae, non necessitatis. Bene autem adhibitae sunt praesertim a Patribus et a D. Thoma c. g., ut negantibus possibilitatem resurrectionis suaderent illam non modo non repugnare, sed convenienter admitti. Unde D. Thomas sup. 3. p. q. 75. a. 3. ad 2. ait: "Ex rebus naturalibus non cognoscitur aliquid non naturale ratione demonstrante, sed ratione persuadente potest cognosci aliquid

supra naturam, quia eorum quae supra naturam sunt, ea quae sunt in natura aliquam similitudinem repraesentant; sicut unio animae et corporis repraesentat animae unionem ad Deum per gloriam fruitionis, ut Magister dicit, 2, dist. 1. Et simili modo exempla quae Apostolus et Gregorius inducunt, fidei resurrectionis adminiculantur." Cf. Sylvium in h. l.

Resp. 2dae. Anima potest considerari quoad suum esse, et quoad suas operationes. - Unde a) quoad esse: cum eadem numero sit anima, quae in corpore erat et separata manet; ejusdem substantiae erit in utroque statu - conservat etiam anima in statu separationis eamdem existentiam, quam habebat in corpore; si enim illam amitteret corrumperetur - anima separata est persona, sicut quando erat unita; et utrobique dici potest semipersona. Nam "anima in corpore," inquit Suarez (de anima l. 6. c. 1. n. 5.), "et extra illud est subsistens communicabiliter respectu corporis, incommunicabiliter respectu inferiorum, hoc tantum differens, quod actu se communicet, vel non communicet, quod non variat rationem semipersonae: dicitur autem semipersona, tum quia est tantum pars naturae, cum tamen de ratione personae sit, ut connaturalis sit terminus naturae integrae, individuae scilicet substantiae: tum quia non est omnino incommunicabilis, quod tamen de ratione personae esse, notissimum est, cum oporteat esse integrum suppositum." Cf. h. l. Unde idem Auctor (l. c. cap. 9. n. 3.), concludit: "Tota substantia animae, quae est in corpore manet extra corpus: non ergo perficitur anima, nec fit imperfectior propter communicationem vel separationem. At enim dum corpori unitur, totum perficit hominem."

b) Quoad operationes. In ordine ad operationes perficitur extensive anima in corpore: nam separata a corpore nequit exercere operationes vitae vegetativae, sensitivae, etc. - In statu tamen separationis perfectiori modo exercet vitae intellectivae operationes, quae sunt praecipuae. "Primo," inquit Suarez (de anima l. 6. c. 8. n. 2.), "quia intelligit se quidditative, quod in corpore non praestat. Secundo concipit intelligentias propriis conceptibus, et non per negationes, quod non sic in corpore. Tertio Deum melius cognoscit quia cognoscit melius effectus illius, et meliores. Quarto, cum sit libera a corpore, aptior est ad intelligendum, et ad perseverandum in actibus intellectus, ut D. Th. art. 2. ad 1. docet, et colligitur ex illo Sapientiae 9. Corpus, quod corrumpitur, aggravat animam, et terrena inhabitatio deprimit sensum multa cogitantem."

Praeterea docet D. Thomas 1. p. q. 89. a. 1. ad 3.: "Quod anima separata non intelligit per species innatas, nec per species quas tunc abstrahit, nec solum per species conservatas, ut objectio probat; sed per species ex influentia divini luminis participatas, quarum anima fit particeps, sicut et aliae substantiae separatae, quamvis inferiori modo. Unde tam cito cessante conversione ad corpus, ad superiora convertitur. Nec tamen propter hoc cognitio vel potentia non est naturalis; quia Deus est Auctor non solum influentiae gratuiti luminis, sed etiam naturalis." Cf. hunc art.

Jamvero observat Suarez l. c. n. 3., "Anima separata melius intelligit per species acquisitas, quam conjuncta, quia est liberior, et lumen intellectus expeditius. Per infusas melius intelligit, quam per acquisitas, quia infusae sunt perfectiores, atque animae pro illo statu magis proportionatae, quam acquisitae; estque rationabile, ut anima per conversionem ad superiora melius intelligat, quam per conversionem ad inferiora. Unde patet quod separata per infusas melius intelliget, quam conjuncta per acquisitas, quae est ultima comparatio. Itaque modis omnibus melius intelliget separata."

Resp. 3tiae. Agitur hic de reunione animae cum corpore corruptibili, et non glorioso; hoc enim non pertinet ad statum purae naturae. - Nec agitur de appetitu naturali, qui, uti docet Suarez (l. c. cap. 10. n. 2.) "est solum rei quaedam aptitudo naturalis, quae metaphorice nomine appetitus explicatur, ut dictum a nobis est l. physicor. et alibi non semel, sed anima separata semper retinet eandem aptitudinem ad corpus, semperque est pars ex natura sua ad perficiendum aliud." Haec autem simplex aptitudo non impedit beatitudinem. - Agitur ergo tantum de appetitu elicito, qui est motus facultatis appetitivae in suum objectum, praevia cognitione. Jamvero, dicimus animam separatam non desiderare reunionem cum corpore desiderio efficaci et absoluto, nempe tali, quod possit ejus naturalem beatitudinem impedire. Nam a) non videtur dari tale desiderium in bonum impossibile (nisi ex Dei potentia absoluta) et indebitum; atqui talis est resurrectio in statu purae naturae; ergo. - b) Anima recte judicaret reunionem cum corpore sibi cedere in malum potius, quam in bonum; amitteret enim statum magis spiritualem et liberum ab omni gravamine corporis: et licet edere posset denuo aliquas operationes; amitteret tamen perfectissimas alias, et consortium substantiarum separatarum. Cf. Suarez cit. c. 10. n. 4.

Resp.

4ae. a) Status animae in corpore est naturalis, utpote conformis ejus essentiae (est enim forma): non ideo tamen status separationis est violentus, sed est etiam naturalis, cum anima ex sua essentia sit etiam subsistens et immortalis. "Ex conditione," inquit Suarez (l. c. cap. 9. n. 5.), "naturae suae vindicat uniri corpori corruptibili, ex quo naturaliter sequitur debere tandem ab illo separari, post separationem vero naturale quoque illi est ita manere, id est, ex se habet vires ad manendum, ac de facto manet in statu satis perfecto, ubi explet quamdam inclinationem naturalem perfectissimam."

b) Status unionis animae cum corpore corruptibili naturalis quidem est, sed est potius naturalis imperfectio. "Multa enim," ait Suarez n. 4., "conveniunt rebus inseparabiliter, non ut perfectiones earum, sed potius ut imperfectiones, ut ita dicam, miseriae, quae ex imperfectione subjecti consequuntur, sic naturale est homini esse mortalem, non ut perfectio, sed ut imperfectio, sic in praesenti propria conditio est animae nostrae uniri corpori corruptibili, naturalisque modus inceptionis ejus. Ex quo si aliquod detrimentum patitur in operando, naturalis profecto imperfectio ejus est, ac miseria, non violentia; quemadmodum melius esset animae semper ratione uti, nec carere unquam usu rationis, et tamen naturale illi est per aliquot annos eo usu carere, neque hoc violentum dici potest, sed quaedam naturalis imperfectio." 309. But with this true doctrine concerning the supernaturality of resurrection supposed, behold how the proposed difficulties can be answered:

Reply to the first. a) "It is enough," says Suarez in the cited place, "that man can be blessed as man ... For man does not desire to be blessed except as long as he exists. Therefore for the natural beatitude of man it is enough that it can endure as long as man exists. Therefore, because man is corruptible by his nature, even the beatitude which can naturally be conferred on man, as he is an integral individual of the human species, is not simply perpetual, but temporal. But because the soul of man is perpetual, therefore in it the beatitude of man can endure perpetually as to that which is essential in it, namely as to natural knowledge and love of God. And only this is owed and consonant with the natures of things; but whatever is added beyond this is supernatural."

b) "The soul," says the same Author in the same place, "is the proper and per se principle of good or bad action; it is enough for man to receive in it the principal reward of virtue. But the body, which is only the organ of the soul, just as in this mortal life alone it would be the instrument of virtue, so in the same life it could receive some reward proportioned to its action. It is not necessary that this consist in temporal riches and pleasures, which are not usually very useful for the exercise of virtue, but in other goods or helps by which the body itself can more easily and conveniently be kindled toward the pursuit of virtue. Therefore resurrection is in no way owed to man from merely natural providence."

c) Those and other similar reasons are reasons of fittingness, not of necessity. But they were fittingly applied especially by the Fathers and by St. Thomas in the Contra Gentiles, so that they might persuade those denying the possibility of resurrection that it not only is not repugnant, but is fittingly admitted. Hence St. Thomas, Supplement, q. 75, a. 3, ad 2, says: "From natural things something non-natural is not known by a demonstrating reason; but by a persuading reason something above nature can be known, because those things which are in nature represent some likeness of those things which are above nature; just as the union of soul and body represents the union of the soul to God through the glory of fruition, as the Master says, II, dist. 1. And in a similar way the examples which the Apostle and Gregory introduce support the faith of resurrection." Compare Sylvius on this place.

Reply to the second. The soul can be considered with respect to its being and with respect to its operations. Hence a) with respect to being: since the soul which was in the body and remains separated is numerically the same, it will be of the same substance in each state; the soul in the state of separation also preserves the same existence which it had in the body, for if it lost that, it would be corrupted; the separated soul is a person, just as when it was united; and in each state it can be called a semi-person. For "the soul in the body," says Suarez (On the Soul, book 6, chapter 1, n. 5), "and outside it, is subsisting communicably with respect to the body, incommunicably with respect to inferiors, differing only in this, that it actually communicates itself or does not communicate itself, which does not vary the account of semi-person. But it is called a semi-person, both because it is only part of a nature, though it belongs to the account of person that it be the connatural

terminus of an integral nature, namely of an individual substance; and because it is not altogether incommunicable, which nevertheless is most well known to belong to the account of person, since it must be an integral supposit." Compare this place. Hence the same Author concludes (cited place, chapter 9, n. 3): "The whole substance of the soul which is in the body remains outside the body; therefore the soul is not perfected, nor is it made more imperfect, on account of communication or separation. But while it is united to the body, it perfects the whole man."

b) With respect to operations. In order to operations the soul is perfected extensively in the body; for separated from the body it cannot exercise the operations of vegetative, sensitive life, etc. Yet in the state of separation it exercises in a more perfect mode the operations of intellective life, which are the principal ones. "First," says Suarez (On the Soul, book 6, chapter 8, n. 2), "because it understands itself quidditatively, which it does not provide in the body. Secondly, it conceives intelligences by proper concepts, and not through negations, which it does not do so in the body. Thirdly, it knows God better because it knows his effects better, and better effects. Fourthly, since it is free from the body, it is more apt for understanding and for persevering in acts of the intellect, as St. Thomas teaches, art. 2, ad 1, and is gathered from Wisdom 9: The body which is corrupted weighs down the soul, and the earthly habitation depresses the mind thinking many things."

Moreover St. Thomas teaches, I, q. 89, a. 1, ad 3: "The separated soul does not understand through innate species, nor through species which it then abstracts, nor only through conserved species, as the objection proves; but through species participated from the influence of divine light, of which the soul is made a partaker, just as also the other separated substances are, although in a lower mode. Hence, as soon as conversion to the body ceases, it is converted to higher things. Nor on account of this is the cognition or power not natural, because God is the Author not only of the influence of gratuitous light, but also of natural light." Compare this article.

Now Suarez observes in the cited place, n. 3: "The separated soul understands better through acquired species than when joined, because it is freer, and the light of the intellect is less hindered. It understands better through infused species than through acquired ones, because the infused are more perfect and more proportioned to the soul for that state than the acquired; and it is reasonable that the soul should understand better through conversion to higher things than through conversion to lower things. Hence it is clear that when separated it will understand better through infused species than when joined through acquired ones, which is the final comparison. And so in every mode it will understand better when separated."

Reply to the third. Here the discussion concerns the reunion of the soul with a corruptible body, and not a glorious one; for this does not pertain to the state of pure nature. Nor is the discussion about natural appetite, which, as Suarez teaches (cited place, chapter 10, n. 2), "is only a certain natural aptitude of the thing, which is metaphorically explained by the name appetite, as was said by us in book 1 of the Physics and elsewhere more than once; but the separated soul always retains the same aptitude toward the body, and is always by its nature a part for perfecting another." But this simple aptitude does not impede beatitude. Therefore the discussion is only about elicited appetite, which is the motion of an appetitive faculty into its object, previous cognition being supposed. Now we say that the separated soul does not desire reunion with the body with an efficacious and absolute desire, namely of such a kind that it could impede its natural beatitude. For a) there does not seem to be such a desire for an impossible and unowed good, except by God's absolute power; but such is resurrection in the state of pure nature; therefore. b) The soul would rightly judge that reunion with the body would fall to it as an evil rather than as a good; for it would lose a more spiritual state free from every weight of the body. And although it could again put forth some operations, nevertheless it would lose other most perfect ones, and the fellowship of separated substances. Compare Suarez, cited chapter 10, n. 4.

Reply to the fourth. a) The state of the soul in the body is natural, as conformable to its essence, for it is form; nevertheless the state of separation is not therefore violent, but is also natural, since the soul from its essence is also subsistent and immortal. "From the condition," says Suarez (cited place, chapter 9, n. 5), "of its nature it claims to be united to a corruptible body, from which it naturally follows that it must at last be separated from it; but after separation it is also natural to it to remain thus, that is, it has from itself powers for remaining, and in fact remains in a

sufficiently perfect state, where it fulfills a certain most perfect natural inclination."

b) The state of union of the soul with a corruptible body is indeed natural, but it is rather a natural imperfection. "For many things," says Suarez, n. 4, "belong to things inseparably, not as their perfections, but rather as imperfections, so to speak, miseries which follow from the imperfection of the subject. Thus it is natural to man to be mortal, not as a perfection, but as an imperfection. Thus in the present the proper condition of our soul is to be united to a corruptible body, and this is the natural mode of its inception. If from this it suffers some detriment in operating, this is certainly its natural imperfection and misery, not violence; just as it would be better for the soul always to use reason, and never to lack the use of reason, and yet it is natural to it for some years to lack that use, nor can this be called violent, but a certain natural imperfection."

310. His praestitutis, dicimus:

Prop. XXX. Immortalitas protoparentibus concessa fuit donum humanae naturae innoxiae indebitum.

Prob. I. Ex Patribus. Dionys. (de div. nom. c. 8.): "Omnia divina justitia ordinat et determinat cuique convenientia rebus distribuit, prout cujusque congruit dignitati. Etenim si haec recte dicimus, ii qui divinam justitiam cavillantur, dum minime advertunt, suam ipsi injustitiam manifesto damnant: aiunt enim mortalibus deberi immortalitatem, et rebus imperfectis perfectionem."

S. Irenaeus (l. 5. c. 2.): "Corpora nostra resurgent suo tempore, Verbo Dei resurrectionem eis donante, in gloriam Dei Patris, qui huic mortali immortalitatem circumdat et corruptibili incorruptelam gratuito donat, quoniam virtus Dei in infirmitate perficitur, ut experimento discamus, quoniam ex illius magnitudine et non ex nostra natura habemus in aeternum perseverantiam."

S. Athanasius (de Incarn. Verbi n. 5.): "Homo enim natura sua mortalis est, quippe qui de nihilo factus est. Attamen propter suam cum illo, qui est, similitudinem, si eam constanti ejus contemplatione servasset, naturalem corruptionem retudisset;" et n. 5.: "Homines, sibi ipsis causa mortis exstiterunt, ex natura quidem mortales, sed gratia, qua Verbi erant participes, naturae conditionem si boni permansissent, effugientes."

Cyrillus Alex. (l. 1. in Jo. c. 1. v. 14.): "Est homo rationale quidem animal, sed compositum ex anima nimirum et hac fragili atque terrena carne. Cum autem factus esset a Deo et ad ortum productus, non habens ex propria natura incorruptibilitatem et immortalitatem." etc. - Alia Patrum testimonia vide apud Casini (Quid est homo, etc. art. 2.)

Prob. II. Ex ratione. Ex dictis constat (n. 296) homini posse mortem accidere vel ab intrinseca, vel ab extrinseca causa, prout mors est naturalis vel violenta. Atqui a neutra liberatio homini est debita. Ergo.

Prob. min. quoad 1am partem; ex ipsa intrinseca hominis constitutione sequitur, ut superius explanavimus, ut possit et debeat naturaliter mori; ergo nequit esse illi debitum ut ab intrinseco nec possit nec debeat mori.

Prob. min. quoad 2am partem. Ut liberetur homo a morte violenta, ita ut non possit hac morte mori, necessaria est, ut vidimus, specialis quaedam Dei providentia. Atqui haec est homini indebita. Ergo.

Vid. Casini (Quid est homo, etc., art. 2., disp. a ratione.) 310. With these things laid down, we say:

Proposition XXX. The immortality granted to the first parents was a gift not owed to innocent human nature.

Proof I. From the Fathers. Dionysius (On the Divine Names, chapter 8): "Divine justice orders and determines all things, and distributes to each the things fitting to them, as agrees with the dignity of each. For if we say these things rightly, those who cavil at divine justice, while they least observe it, manifestly condemn their own injustice; for they say that immortality is owed to mortals, and perfection to imperfect things."

St. Irenaeus (book 5, chapter 2): "Our bodies will rise again in their own time, the Word of God giving resurrection to them, unto the glory of God the Father, who clothes this mortal thing with immortality and gratuitously gives incorruption to the corruptible, because the power of God is perfected in weakness, so that by experience we may learn that from his greatness, and not from our nature, we have perseverance unto eternity."

St. Athanasius (On the Incarnation of the Word, n. 5): "For man by his nature is mortal, since he was made from nothing. Nevertheless, on account of his likeness with him who is,

if he had preserved it by constant contemplation of him, he would have blunted natural corruption"; and n. 5: "Men became the cause of death to themselves, mortal indeed by nature, but by the grace by which they were partakers of the Word, escaping the condition of nature if they had remained good."

Cyril of Alexandria (book 1 on John, chapter 1, verse 14): "Man is indeed a rational animal, but composed, namely, of soul and of this fragile and earthly flesh. But when he had been made by God and brought forth to origin, he did not have incorruptibility and immortality from his own nature," etc. - See other testimonies of the Fathers in Casini (What Is Man, etc., article 2).

Proof II. From Reason. From what has been said (n. 296), it is established that death can happen to man either from an intrinsic or from an extrinsic cause, according as death is natural or violent. But liberation from neither is owed to man. Therefore.

Proof of the minor as to the first part: from the very intrinsic constitution of man it follows, as we explained above, that he can and ought naturally to die; therefore it cannot be owed to him that from within he neither can nor ought to die.

Proof of the minor as to the second part. In order that man be freed from violent death, so that he cannot die by this death, as we have seen, a certain special providence of God is necessary. But this is not owed to man. Therefore.

See Casini (What Is Man, etc., article 2, disputation from reason).

Article 7. Whether Man in His First Condition was Impassible Through Grace

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Corrected Latin Text
Articulus Septimus.
Utrum Homo in Prima Sui Conditione Fuerit per Gratiam Impassibilis.

311. Simul hic comprehendimus quae pertinent tum ad passiones animi tum ad morbos et dolores corporis, simulque quaerimus utrum Adam fuerit ab illis immunis, et utrum haec immunitas fuerit donum superadditum ejus naturae; post ea enim, quae disputavimus de immunitate a concupiscentia et a morte, quae hic dicturi sumus, facile intelligentur. 311. Here we comprehend at the same time the things which pertain both to the passions of the soul and to diseases and pains of the body; and at the same time we ask whether Adam was immune from them, and whether this immunity was a gift superadded to his nature. For after the things which we have discussed concerning immunity from concupiscence and from death, the things which we shall say here will be easily understood.

312. Est vera doctrina, fundamentum habens in Scriptura, et a Patribus tradita, quod primi Parentes, in prima sui conditione, liberi ab aerumnis doloribusque, quibus nos subjicimur, in quodam felicitatis statu singulari Dei beneficio constituti fuere. 312. It is true doctrine, having its foundation in Scripture and handed down by the Fathers, that the first Parents, in their first condition, were free from the hardships and pains to which we are subjected, and were constituted, by a singular benefit of God, in a certain state of happiness.

313. Contra hanc doctrinam insurgunt ex una parte recentiores quidam rationalistae illum felicitatis statum negantes ex communibus argumentis, quibus quidquid supernaturale est inficiantur; ex alia vero parte Baius, Jansenius, Quesnellus asserentes quidem statum illum felicitatis, sed simul homini innocenti debitum esse statuentes: cum enim in aerumnis hujus vitae nonnisi mali et poenae rationem agnoscant, non potuisse, aiunt, homini innocenti infligi. Prop. 72. damnata in Baio est: "Omnes omnino justorum afflictiones sunt ultiones peccatorum ipsorum: unde et Job, et Martyres, quae passi sunt, propter peccata sua passi sunt." - Jansenius (tom. 2. edit. Lov. pag. 938.) scribit: "Ex ipsis terminis crudelitatem et injustitiam spirat, innocentem animam, nulli peccato obnoxiam, ad

miserias status praesentis condemnare." Et pag. 873.: "Mors corporis nequit innocenti creaturae sine merito praecedentis iniquitatis a Deo infligi." Et pag. 945.: "Ex miseriis purae naturae cogimur ad diversas impietates, ad blasphemiam in Deum, ad Manichaeismum." - Prop. Quesnelli 70. est: "Numquam Deus affligit innocentes: et afflictiones semper serviunt vel ad puniendum peccatum, vel ad purificandum peccatorem." 313. Against this doctrine there rise up, on the one side, certain more recent rationalists, who deny that state of happiness from the common arguments by which they deny whatever is supernatural; but, on the other side, Baius, Jansenius, and Quesnel, who indeed assert that state of happiness, but at the same time establish that it was owed to innocent man. For since in the hardships of this life they recognize nothing except the account of evil and of punishment, they say that they could not have been inflicted on innocent man. Proposition 72 condemned in Baius is: "Absolutely all afflictions of the just are punishments for their own sins: hence both Job and the Martyrs suffered the things which they suffered on account of their own sins." - Jansenius (tome 2, Louvain edition, page 938) writes: "From the very terms it breathes cruelty and injustice to condemn an innocent soul, liable to no sin, to the miseries of the present state." And page 873: "Death of the body cannot be inflicted by God on an innocent creature without the merit of a preceding iniquity." And page 945: "From the miseries of pure nature we are driven to various impieties, to blasphemy against God, to Manichaeism." - Proposition 70 of Quesnel is: "God never afflicts the innocent; and afflictions always serve either for punishing sin or for purifying the sinner."

314. Pauca claritatis gratia praenotamus. Ac imprimis "passio," inquit D. Thomas, 1. p. q. 97. a. 2., "dupliciter dicitur, uno modo proprie; et sic pati dicitur quod a sua naturali dispositione removetur; passio enim est effectus actionis. In rebus autem naturalibus contraria agunt et patiuntur ad invicem, quorum unum removet alterum a sua naturali dispositione. Alio modo dicitur passio communiter secundum quamcumque mutationem, etiamsi pertineat ad perfectionem naturae, sicut intelligere, vel sentire dicitur pati quoddam. Hoc igitur secundo modo homo in statu innocentiae passibilis erat, et patiebatur et secundum animam, et secundum corpus. Primo autem modo dicta passione, erat impassibilis et secundum animam, et secundum corpus, sicut et immortalis." 314. For the sake of clarity we make a few preliminary notes. And first, "passion," says St. Thomas, I, q. 97, a. 2, "is said in two ways: in one way properly; and thus that is said to suffer which is removed from its natural disposition, for passion is the effect of action. But in natural things contraries act and suffer mutually, one of which removes the other from its natural disposition. In another way passion is said commonly, according to any change whatever, even if it pertains to the perfection of nature, just as understanding or sensing is said to be a certain suffering. Therefore in this second way man in the state of innocence was passible, and suffered both according to soul and according to body. But with passion taken in the first way, he was impassible both according to soul and according to body, just as he was immortal."

315. Ex hac animadversione sequitur 1. quod "illae passiones," uti docet D. Th., 1. p. q. 95. a. 2. c., "quae possunt esse boni praesentis, ut gaudium et amor; vel quae sunt futuri boni in suo tempore habendi, ut desiderium et spes non affligens, fuerunt in statu innocentiae; aliter tamen quam in nobis. Nam in nobis appetitus sensualis, in quo sunt passiones, non totaliter subest rationi; non erant in eo (statu innocentiae) passiones animae, nisi ex rationis judicio consequentes."

Sequitur 2.: "Somnus," inquit D. Thomas 2. dist. 19. q. 1. a. 3. ad. 3., "quandoque convenit ex causa naturali, sicut ex vaporatione alimenti, vel ex humiditate cerebri, ut in prima aetate; et sic videtur, utraque de causa potuisse esse somnum in primo statu. Quandoque vero ex causa innaturali, sicut ex labore, aut aegritudine: et sic non fuisset ibi somnus. Somnus enim quantum in se est, est passio ad perfectionem totius animalis pertinens, eo quod in somno intenduntur virtutes naturales, et quietantur virtutes animales, ut postmodum fortiores sint in actibus suis."

Sequitur 3. quod cum homo in statu innocentiae haberet vitam etiam animalem, deberet cibis uti. "Cibus," ait D. Th. l. c. a. 2. ad 2., "sumebatur

ad restaurationem deperditi, et ad augmentum corporis in quantitate perfecta, et ad multiplicationem speciei per viam seminalem, secundum quod nutritiva augmentativae, et generativae deservire dicitur." Nec inde sequitur fuisse in eo statu passionem laesivam; siquidem, uti monet Suarez (de op. sex dier. l. 3. c. 14. n. 26.), temperamentum unicuique homini conveniens et connaturale non consistit in indivisibili, sed habet quamdam latitudinem, intra quam variari potest sine defectu vel laesione corporis. Imo futura etiam erat in statu innocentiae fames et sitis, non quidem quatenus important aliquam molestiam, sed prout important nudum appetitum edendi et bibendi; cibus enim non est gratus et jucundus nisi esurienti. Unde S. Aug. (de civ. Dei l. 13. c. 20.) ait: "Alebantur ergo aliis, quae sumebant, ne animalia corpora molestiae aliquid esuriendo, et sitiendo sentirent."

Sequitur 4. quod in statu innocentiae non omnis labor abfuisset, uti patet ex Gen. 2. 15. "posuit eum in Paradiso voluptatis, ut operaretur, et custodiret illum;" omnis tamen abfuisset molestia et defatigatio, quam nunc labor secum affert. Unde S. Jo. Chrys. (Hom. 14. in Gen.) ait: "Dixit: Posuit illum in horto voluptatis; addit, ut coleret illum et custodiret. Etiam hoc magnae curae et providentiae nostri argumentum est. Nam cum omnibus deliciis potirentur ibi vitam agentes, tam oblectamentis eorum, quae videbant, quam laetitia eorum, quibus fruebantur, ut ne immodica prosperitate homo insolesceret (omnem enim malitiam docuit otium), propterea praecepit Deus, ut operaretur illum et custodiret. Quid autem? dicet aliquis, illius cura indigebat paradisus? Non hoc dico, sed voluit, ut parvam quandam sibique congruam gereret curam partim custodiendo, partim operando. Si enim laboris omnis fuisset expers, protinus ex multo otio in ignaviam delapsus esset: nunc vero in operatione occupatus, quae neque dolorem, neque molestiam adferret, moderatior utique atque continentior esse debuit." 315. From this observation it follows, first, that "those passions," as St. Thomas teaches, I, q. 95, a. 2, corpus, "which can be of a present good, such as joy and love, or which are of a future good to be had in its own time, such as desire and hope that does not afflict, were in the state of innocence; nevertheless otherwise than in us. For in us the sensual appetite, in which the passions are, is not totally subject to reason; in that state of innocence there were no passions of the soul except those following from the judgment of reason."

It follows, secondly: "Sleep," says St. Thomas, II Sent., dist. 19, q. 1, a. 3, ad 3, "sometimes belongs from a natural cause, as from the vaporization of food or from the humidity of the brain, as in the first age; and thus it seems that, from each cause, sleep could have existed in the first state. But sometimes it belongs from an unnatural cause, as from labor or sickness; and thus there would not have been sleep there. For sleep, considered in itself, is a passion pertaining to the perfection of the whole animal, because in sleep the natural powers are intensified and the animal powers are quieted, so that afterwards they may be stronger in their acts."

It follows, thirdly, that since man in the state of innocence also had animal life, he would have had to use foods. "Food," says St. Thomas in the cited place, a. 2, ad 2, "was taken for the restoration of what was lost, and for the increase of the body into perfect quantity, and for the multiplication of the species through the seminal way, according as the nutritive power is said to serve the augmentative and generative powers." Nor does it follow from this that in that state there was a harmful passion; since, as Suarez notes (On the Work of the Six Days, book 3, chapter 14, n. 26), the temperament suitable and connatural to each man does not consist in an indivisible point, but has a certain latitude within which it can be varied without defect or injury of the body. Indeed, in the state of innocence there would also have been hunger and thirst, not indeed insofar as they imply some distress, but insofar as they imply the bare appetite for eating and drinking; for food is not pleasing and delightful except to one who is hungry. Hence St. Augustine (The City of God, book 13, chapter 20) says: "They were therefore nourished by other things which they took, lest their animal bodies should feel any distress by hungering and thirsting."

It follows, fourthly, that in the state of innocence not every labor would have been absent, as is clear from Genesis 2:15, "he placed him in the Paradise of pleasure, that he might work and guard it"; nevertheless every distress and weariness which labor now brings with itself would have been absent. Hence St. John Chrysostom (Homily 14 on Genesis) says: "He said: He placed him in the garden of pleasure; he adds, that he should cultivate it and guard it. This too is an argument of great care and providence for us. For since they who lived there enjoyed all delights, both by the charms of the things which

they saw and by the gladness of the things which they enjoyed, lest man should grow insolent through excessive prosperity (for leisure taught every evil), God therefore commanded that he work it and guard it. But what? someone will say, did Paradise need his care? I do not say this, but he willed that man exercise a certain small care suitable to himself, partly by guarding, partly by working. For if he had been free from every labor, he would at once have fallen from much leisure into sloth; but now, occupied in work which would bring neither pain nor distress, he certainly ought to have been more moderate and more continent."

316. His declaratis, dicimus:

Prop. XXXI. Protoparentes 1. liberi ab aerumnis ac doloribus, constituti fuerunt in singulari externae felicitatis statu; 2. qui tamen erat eorum naturae indebitus.

Prob. 1ma pars. a) Hanc felicitatem ex Scriptura ea ostendunt, quae leguntur Gen. 2. 15. seqq. de loco, in quo collocati fuerunt, videlicet in paradiso voluptatis - quae Gen. 1. 26.; Eccli. 17. 3.; Ps. 8. dicuntur de dominio, quod Protoparentibus in res creatas concessum fuit - quae ex Gen. 1. et 2. de immunitate a molestis laboribus et de copia bonorum, quibus primi homines divina largitate affluebant.

b) Unde S. Jo. Chrys., l. c., ait: "Non simpliciter dixit in horto, sed apposuit voluptatis, ut excellentem voluptatem, qua fruiturus esset inhabitando, nobis declararet." - S. Aug. (de civ. Dei, l. 14. c. 29.): "Vivebat itaque homo in paradiso, sicut volebat, quamdiu hoc volebat quod Deus jusserat. Vivebat fruens Deo, ex quo bono erat bonus; vivebat sine ulla egestate, ita semper vivere habens in potestate: cibus aderat, ne esuriret: potus, ne sitiret; lignum vitae, ne illum senecta dissolveret. Nihil corruptionis in corpore, vel ex corpore ullas molestias ullis ejus sensibus ingerebat. Nullus intrinsecus morbus, nullus extrinsecus ictus metuebatur. Summa in carne sanitas, in anima tota tranquillitas. Sicut in paradiso nullus aestus, aut frigus, ita in ejus habitatore nulla ex cupiditate, vel timore accedebat bonae voluntatis offensio. Nihil omnino triste, nihil erat inaniter laetum; gaudium vero perpetuabatur ex Deo, in quem flagrabat caritas de corde puro, et conscientia bona, et fide non ficta; atque inter se conjugum fida ex honesto amore societas, concors mentis corporisque vigilia, et mandati sine labore custodia. Non lassitudo fatigabat otiosum, non somnus premebat invitum." Vid. Petav. de opif. sex dier. l. 2. c. 6.

c) D. Thomas 1. p. q. 95. a. 2. c. inquit: "Omnium passionum animae quaedam ordinantur ad bonum, ut amor et gaudium; quaedam ad malum, ut timor et dolor. Et quia in primo statu nullum malum aderat, nec imminebat, nec aliquod bonum aberat, quod cuperet bona voluntas pro tempore illo habendum, ut patet per Augustinum, 14. de Civ. Dei, loc. nunc. cit., omnes illae passiones quae respiciunt malum, in Adam non erant, ut timor, et dolor, et hujusmodi; similiter nec illae passiones quae respiciunt bonum non habitum, et tunc habendum, ut cupiditas aestuans."

d) Primaevam protoparentum felicitatem gentium traditiones confirmant. Communis est enim apud omnes nationes opinio de saeculo aureo, nempe de prisca vita ab aerumnis, quibus nunc premimur, libera, ac proinde beatissima; etsi hanc ideam quisque pro suo ingenio ac sensu informaverit. Jamvero, admissa veritate facti, admissa nempe existentia illius beatae vitae, facile hujusmodi traditiones explicantur; secus vero, nequit intelligi quomodo populi omnes religione, moribus, indole, aetate, lingua, regione longe a se dissiti in eandem opinionem concesserint. Vid. Dan. Huetium (Quaest. Alnetan. l. 2. c. 11.)

Prob. 2da pars. I. Ideo, juxta adversarios, immunitas ab aerumnis esset humanae naturae debita, quia habent illae rationem veri mali - quod non potest infligi nisi uti poena - et faciunt hominem vere miserum ac propterea Deus esset injustus, si hominem innocentem eisdem subjiceret. Atqui contrarium omnino constanter docuere Patres. Ergo.

Prob. min. a) Patres docent miserias hujus vitae non esse quid in se vere malum. S. Justinus de iis loquens (expl. q. 46.), ait: "Neque in eo, quod salubre est, quidquam inest mali." - S. Jo. Chrys. (hom. 8. in c. 4. Tim.): "Haec sciens, quaenam sint bona, quae mala, quae media, disce: ut puta bonum virtus, nequitia malum, media vero divitiae, paupertas, vita, mors. Cum ista didiceris, adde, quod ideo premantur justi, ut coronentur, peccatores vero, ut poenas exsolvant." S. Hier. (in Amos. 3. 6.): "Malum quod Dominus facit in civitate, non contrarium est virtuti, sed afflictio et cruciatus, quod non per se malum est, sed malum videtur his esse, qui sustinent." Et (l. 15. in cap. 55. Isaiae):

"Perspicuum est divitias et egestatem, sanitatem et languorem neque bona esse neque mala."

b) Docent aerumnas non habere solum rationem poenae. Gaudentius (in praef. ad Ben.): "Doloris triplex est ratio, correctionis, purgationis, probationis, etc." - S. Aug. (de agone Christ. c. 7.): "Nec enim nos moveat, quod in hac vita, secundum carnem, quam portant justi, multa gravia et adversa tolerant; nihil enim mali patiuntur, quia jam possunt dicere, quod ille vir spiritalis exultat et praedicat, Apostolus Paulus, dicens: Gloriamur in tribulationibus, scientes quoniam tribulatio patientiam operatur." - Et (l. 2. de pecc. mer. et rem. c. 23. n. 53.): "Si propter peccatum dixit Deus homini, in sudore vultus tui etc., quare et post remissionem labor hic permanet? Respondemus dicentes, ante remissionem esse illa supplicia peccatorum, post remissionem autem certamina exercitationesque justorum." - S. Gregorius (Mor. in Job., Praef. c. 9. n. 12.): "Percussionum quippe diversa sunt genera. Alia namque est percussio, qua peccator percutitur, ut sine retractatione puniatur (vera miseria et aeterna); alia qua peccator percutitur, ut corrigatur; alia qua nonnunquam quisque percutitur non ut praeterita corrigat, sed ne futura committat; alia qua plerumque percutitur, per quam nec praeterita culpa corrigitur, nec futura prohibetur, sed ut, dum inopinata salus percussionem sequitur, salvantis virtus cognita ardentius ametur, cumque innoxius flagellis atteritur, ei per patientiam meritorum summa conferatur."

c) Docent hujus vitae aerumnas non modo posse a Deo citra injustitiam justis infligi, sed insuper ejus tribuendas esse bonitati. S. Aug. (Ep. 210. 1.): "Quod ergo non misericorditer praestatur hominibus a Domino Deo, a quo et tribulatio beneficium est. Nam res prospera donum est consolantis, res autem adversa donum est admonentis Dei." - Cyr. Alex. (in Gen. l. 5.): "Cur Deus sanctis non confert id, quod delectat, absque labore? Ne inexercitatos sineret esse et virtutis mercedem largiretur."

d) Docent ex hominis natura procedere, eumque miserum minime facere. S. Athanasius (disp. 2. c. gent. n. 4.): "Si gratiam concessam servarent, et in bono permanerent, praeter promissam in caelis immortalitatem, vita maeroris, doloris et solicitudinis vacua in Paradiso fruerentur. Sin vero latam legem transgressi, mali fierent, certo scirent, se mortis corruptionem secundum naturam subituros." - S. Fulgentius (ep. 2. ad Gallam c. 9.): "Alia sunt, quae sic a Deo temporaliter donantur, ut temporaliter auferantur, sicut est abundantia divitiarum, incolumitas corporum et si quae sunt similia, quae nec miseros possunt facere homines nec beatos. Ideo haec et bonis et malis a Domino dantur, et nonnunquam bonis malisque divinitus auferuntur. Beatus fuit Job, quum in divitiis juste viveret, sed beatior, quum in paupertate justior extitisset. Beatus fuit in corporis sospitate, sed beatior est factus in vulnere ... Attende etiam duos, unum in divitiis et sanitate miserum (divitem in Evangelio), alterum (Lazarum) in egestate et vulnere multum beatum." - Plura PP. testimonia vid. apud Casini op. c. art. 3.

Prob. II. Ex ratione. a) Quae diximus de concupiscentia et mortalitate, eodem modo, imo a fortiori aptari possunt sive passionibus animi, sive doloribus corporis. Atqui immunitas a concupiscentia et immortalitas, uti ostendimus, sunt dona humanae naturae indebita. Ergo.

b) Plures, praeter rationem poenae, possumus assignare rationes, propter quas Deus hominem subjiciat miseriis hujus vitae: pro supremo dominio quod habet, potest in sui gloriam hoc sacrificium holocausti exigere a sua creatura - mala hujus vitae promovent rerum temporalium contemptum - humilitatem edocent - occultas animi vires excitant - virtutem animi augent - possunt et praemium per patientiam augere. Atqui hujusmodi rationes valent etiam pro homine innocente. Ergo.

Nota. Fere omnes difficultates, praesertim ex S. Augustino desumptae, solvuntur ex iis quae adnotavimus (n. 306.) Pro iis vero, quae citant adversarii ex disp. 1. et 2. cont. Fortunatum, ubi inter caetera scribit S. Doctor: "crudelitatis fore, si Deus hujus vitae aerumnis animas nullius peccati reas addiceret;" notandum est insuper 1. quod Fortunatus, Manichaeus, inter eas miserias ponebat peccatum, cujus non liberum arbitrium nostrum, sed Deum Auctorem faciebat - 2. quod miserias hujus vitae non in nostri utilitatem, sed in Dei saeviendi libidinem referebat. - Unde (disp. 1. c. Fort. n. 27.) ita, ex S. Aug., anima hominis expostulat cum Deo: "Non est mihi servatum liberum arbitrium. Tu nosti necessitatem, qua pressa sum: cur mihi vulnera imputas, quare me cogis ad poenitentiam, cum tu sis causa vulnerum meorum, cum tu scias, quae passa sum, gentem tenebrarum in me fecisse, te auctore?" 316. With these things declared, we say:

Proposition XXXI. The first parents 1. were free from

hardships and pains, and were constituted in a singular state of external happiness; 2. nevertheless this state was not owed to their nature.

Proof of the first part. a) From Scripture those things show this happiness which are read in Genesis 2:15 ff. concerning the place in which they were placed, namely in the Paradise of pleasure; those things which are said in Genesis 1:26, Ecclesiasticus 17:3, and Psalm 8 concerning the dominion which was granted to the first Parents over created things; and those things from Genesis 1 and 2 concerning immunity from distressing labors and concerning the abundance of goods with which the first men abounded by divine largess.

b) Hence St. John Chrysostom, in the cited place, says: "He did not simply say in a garden, but added of pleasure, so that he might declare to us the excellent pleasure which he would enjoy by dwelling there." - St. Augustine (The City of God, book 14, chapter 29): "Therefore man lived in Paradise as he wished, as long as he wished what God had commanded. He lived enjoying God, from whose good he was good; he lived without any want, having it in his power always to live thus: food was present, lest he hunger; drink, lest he thirst; the tree of life, lest old age dissolve him. Nothing of corruption in the body, or from the body, brought any distresses upon any of his senses. No internal disease, no external blow was feared. Highest health in the flesh, entire tranquillity in the soul. Just as in Paradise there was no heat or cold, so in its inhabitant no offense of good will came from desire or fear. There was nothing sad at all, nothing vainly glad; but joy was perpetuated from God, toward whom charity burned from a pure heart, and a good conscience, and faith not feigned; and between the spouses there was faithful society from honorable love, harmonious vigilance of mind and body, and custody of the command without labor. Weariness did not fatigue one at leisure; sleep did not oppress one unwilling." See Petavius, On the Work of the Six Days, book 2, chapter 6.

c) St. Thomas, I, q. 95, a. 2, corpus, says: "Of all the passions of the soul, some are ordered to good, such as love and joy; some to evil, such as fear and pain. And because in the first state no evil was present or threatening, nor was any good absent which the good will would desire to have for that time, as is clear through Augustine, book 14 of The City of God, in the place now cited, all those passions which regard evil were not in Adam, such as fear and pain and things of this kind; likewise neither were those passions which regard a good not possessed and then to be possessed, such as burning desire."

d) The traditions of the nations confirm the primeval happiness of the first parents. For there is among all nations a common opinion concerning a golden age, namely concerning an ancient life free from the hardships by which we are now pressed, and consequently most blessed, although each people formed this idea according to its own character and sense. Now, once the truth of the fact is admitted, namely once the existence of that blessed life is admitted, traditions of this kind are easily explained; but otherwise it cannot be understood how all peoples, far distant from one another in religion, customs, character, age, language, and region, came together into the same opinion. See Daniel Huet, Quaestiones Alnetanae, book 2, chapter 11.

Proof of the second part, I. According to the adversaries, immunity from hardships would be owed to human nature because those hardships have the account of a true evil - which cannot be inflicted except as punishment - and make man truly miserable; and for that reason God would be unjust if he subjected innocent man to them. But the Fathers altogether constantly taught the contrary. Therefore.

Proof of the minor. a) The Fathers teach that the miseries of this life are not something truly evil in themselves. St. Justin, speaking of them (Explanation of Question 46), says: "Nor is there anything evil in that which is salutary." - St. John Chrysostom (homily 8 on chapter 4 of Timothy): "Knowing these things, learn what things are good, what evil, what middle: for example, virtue is good, wickedness evil, but riches, poverty, life, death are middle. When you have learned these things, add that the just are pressed so that they may be crowned, but sinners so that they may pay penalties." St. Jerome (on Amos 3:6): "The evil which the Lord does in the city is not contrary to virtue, but affliction and torment; this is not evil of itself, but seems to be evil to those who endure it." And (book 15 on chapter 55 of Isaiah): "It is clear that riches and want, health and sickness, are neither good nor evil."

b) They teach that hardships do not have only the account of punishment. Gaudentius (in the preface to Ben.): "There is a threefold account of pain: correction, purgation, probation, etc." - St. Augustine (On the Christian

Combat, chapter 7): "Nor should it move us that in this life, according to the flesh which the just bear, they tolerate many grave and adverse things; for they suffer nothing evil, because they can already say what that spiritual man exults and proclaims, the Apostle Paul, saying: We glory in tribulations, knowing that tribulation works patience." - And (book 2, On the Merits and Remission of Sins, chapter 23, n. 53): "If on account of sin God said to man, In the sweat of your face, etc., why does this labor remain even after remission? We answer by saying that before remission those things are punishments of sinners, but after remission they are contests and exercises of the just." - St. Gregory (Morals on Job, Preface, chapter 9, n. 12): "There are indeed diverse kinds of blows. For one blow is that by which a sinner is struck so that he may be punished without reconsideration (true and eternal misery); another by which a sinner is struck so that he may be corrected; another by which sometimes someone is struck, not that he may correct past things, but lest he commit future things; another by which he is often struck, through which neither a past fault is corrected nor a future one prevented, but so that, when unexpected health follows the blow, the known power of the Savior may be loved more ardently, and when an innocent person is worn down by scourges, the highest sum of merits may be conferred on him through patience."

c) They teach that the hardships of this life not only can be inflicted by God upon the just without injustice, but furthermore are to be attributed to his goodness. St. Augustine (Epistle 210.1): "What, then, is not mercifully bestowed upon men by the Lord God, from whom even tribulation is a benefit? For a prosperous thing is the gift of God consoling, but an adverse thing is the gift of God admonishing." - Cyril of Alexandria (on Genesis, book 5): "Why does God not confer on the saints that which delights without labor? Lest he allow them to be unexercised and bestow the reward of virtue."

d) They teach that they proceed from the nature of man and do not in the least make him miserable. St. Athanasius (Disputation 2 against the Gentiles, n. 4): "If they preserved the grace granted and remained in good, beyond the immortality promised in heaven, they would enjoy in Paradise a life free from sadness, pain, and solicitude. But if, transgressing the law given, they became evil, they would know certainly that they would undergo the corruption of death according to nature." - St. Fulgentius (Epistle 2 to Galla, chapter 9): "There are other things which are so temporally given by God that they are temporally taken away, such as abundance of riches, soundness of bodies, and any similar things, which can make men neither miserable nor blessed. Therefore these things are given by the Lord both to the good and to the evil, and sometimes are divinely taken away from the good and the evil. Job was blessed when he lived justly in riches, but more blessed when in poverty he had become more just. He was blessed in health of body, but he was made more blessed in wound ... Consider also two men, one miserable in riches and health (the rich man in the Gospel), the other (Lazarus) very blessed in want and wound." - See more testimonies of the Fathers in Casini, cited work, article 3.

Proof II. From reason. a) The things which we have said concerning concupiscence and mortality can be applied in the same way, indeed a fortiori, either to the passions of the soul or to pains of the body. But immunity from concupiscence and immortality, as we have shown, are gifts not owed to human nature. Therefore.

b) Besides the account of punishment, we can assign several reasons on account of which God may subject man to the miseries of this life: because of the supreme dominion which he has, he can require this holocaust-sacrifice from his creature for his own glory; the evils of this life promote contempt of temporal things; they teach humility; they stir up hidden powers of the soul; they increase virtue of soul; and they can also increase reward through patience. But reasons of this kind hold even for innocent man. Therefore.

Note. Almost all difficulties, especially those drawn from St. Augustine, are solved from the things which we noted above (n. 306). But for those things which the adversaries cite from disputations 1 and 2 against Fortunatus, where among other things the holy Doctor writes that "it would be cruelty if God should assign to the hardships of this life souls guilty of no sin," it must be noted besides: 1. that Fortunatus the Manichaean placed among those miseries sin, of which he made not our free will but God the Author; 2. that he referred the miseries of this life not to our advantage, but to God's lust for cruelty. - Hence (disputation 1 against Fortunatus, n. 27), according to St. Augustine, the soul of man remonstrates with God in this way: "Free will was not preserved for me. You know the necessity by

which I have been pressed: why do you impute wounds to me, why do you compel me to penance, when you are the cause of my wounds, when you know that what I have suffered, the race of darkness has done in me, with you as author?"

Article 8. On the Knowledge of the First Man in the State of Innocence

LatineEnglish

Corrected Latin Text
Articulus Octavus.
De Scientia Primi Hominis in Statu Innocentiae.

318. Quaerimus in hoc articulo utrum inter caetera dona, quibus Deus cumulavit primum hominem, fuerit etiam donum scientiae, simul ejus naturam investigando. Cum autem scientia possit esse naturalis et supernaturalis; de utraque distinctis paragraphis agemus. 318. In this article we ask whether, among the other gifts with which God heaped up the first man, there was also the gift of knowledge, while at the same time investigating its nature. But since knowledge can be natural and supernatural, we shall treat each in distinct paragraphs.

§ I.
Utrum Adam Habuerit Scientiam Rerum Naturalium. § I.
Whether Adam Had Knowledge Of Natural Things.

319. Est communis et certa sententia habuisse Adam statim ac creatus fuit naturalem scientiam sibi a Deo inditam. Antequam illam sententiam probemus, pauca praenotamus de natura et objecto illius scientiae. 319. It is the common and certain opinion that Adam, as soon as he was created, had natural knowledge implanted in him by God. Before we prove that opinion, we make a few preliminary notes concerning the nature and object of that knowledge.

320. Ac imprimis quoad naturam, scientia rerum naturalium Adae indita fuit secundum essentiam ejusdem speciei cum scientia, quae discursu et inventione humana acquiri potest; ac proinde fuit supernaturalis quoad modum, sed non quoad substantiam; infusa non per se, sed per accidens. "Primus homo," inquit D. Thomas 1. p. q. 94. a. 3. ad 1., "habuit scientiam omnium per species a Deo infusas; nec tamen scientia illa fuit alterius rationis a scientia nostra, sicut nec oculi quos caeco nato Christus dedit fuerunt alterius rationis ab oculis quos natura produxit." Revera illa scientia data est Adae, ut perficeretur intellectus ejus in naturali ordine et secundum naturalem appetitum sciendi, ut videbimus; sufficit ergo si fuerit quoad substantiam naturalis quamvis ex dono Dei fuerit infusa. 320. And first, with respect to its nature, the knowledge of natural things implanted in Adam was, according to its essence, of the same species as the knowledge which can be acquired by human discourse and discovery; and consequently it was supernatural with respect to mode, but not with respect to substance; infused not per se, but by accident. "The first man," says St. Thomas, I, q. 94, a. 3, ad 1, "had knowledge of all things through species infused by God; nor nevertheless was that knowledge of another account than our knowledge, just as neither were the eyes which Christ gave to the man born blind of another account than the eyes which nature produced." In reality that knowledge was given to Adam so that his intellect might be perfected in the natural order and according to the natural appetite for knowing, as we shall see; therefore it is sufficient if it was natural with respect to substance, although by the gift of God it was infused.

321. Ex hoc merito infert Suarez (de op. sex dier. l. 3. c. 9. n. 7.), 1. quod simul cum habitu hujus scientiae infudit Deus Adamo species intelligibiles, sine quibus non poterat habitus ille in actum prodire; dicere enim quod Adam debuerit ipse sua industria acquirere

species necessarias, ut uteretur sua scientia, esset contrarium fini, propter quem scientia illa infundebatur, et alienum a perfecto modo operandi Dei, uti patebit ex probationibus thesis. - 2. Quod species illae, quamvis infusae, tales nihilo minus fuerunt, quales solent per sensus accipi et a phantasmatibus abstrahi; species enim debent esse proportionatae habitui. - 3. Quod scientia illa, quoad usum, debuit habere dependentiam a phantasmatibus; connaturale est enim animae conjunctae intelligere concomitante phantasmate. - 4. Quod consequenter fuerunt "Adae etiam infusa in interno sensu, seu phantasia, vel cogitativa omnia phantasmata ad usum illius scientiae necessaria." - 5. Quod scientia naturalis Adami erat, sicut nostra, discursiva. Qua in re notandum est quod discursus potest esse vel causalis seu illativus, vel successivus. In scientia primi hominis erat certe primus discursus, ac proinde quamvis simul tempore cognosceret, ex. gr., effectus et Deum; ex effectibus tamen cognoscebat Deum. Si vero de eadem Dei cognitione naturali agatur, dici potest quod erat in Adamo innocente sine discursu successivo; cum enim Adam jam haberet species rerum et habitum perfectum, et alias contemplari posset effectum, ex. gr., seipsum, et Deum per modum unius; simul poterat effectum et Deum ex effectu cognoscere. Atque ita intelligitur quod docet D. Th. 1. p. q. 94, a. 1. ad 3., dicens: "Non oportebat primum hominem pervenire in Dei cognitionem per demonstrationem sumptam ab aliquo effectu; sicut nobis est necessarium; sed simul in effectibus, praecipue intelligibilibus, suo modo Deum cognoscebat." 321. From this Suarez rightly infers (On the Work of the Six Days, book 3, chapter 9, n. 7), 1. that together with the habit of this knowledge God infused into Adam intelligible species, without which that habit could not proceed into act; for to say that Adam had to acquire by his own industry the species necessary for using his knowledge would be contrary to the end on account of which that knowledge was being infused, and alien to the perfect mode of God's working, as will be clear from the proofs of the thesis. - 2. That those species, although infused, nevertheless were such as are customarily received through the senses and abstracted from phantasms; for species ought to be proportioned to the habit. - 3. That this knowledge, with respect to use, had to have dependence on phantasms; for it is connatural to the joined soul to understand with an accompanying phantasm. - 4. That consequently there were also infused into Adam, in the internal sense, or phantasy, or cogitative power, all phantasms necessary for the use of that knowledge. - 5. That Adam's natural knowledge was, like ours, discursive. In this matter it must be noted that discourse can be either causal or illative, or successive. In the knowledge of the first man there certainly was the first discourse, and consequently although he knew at the same time, for example, effects and God, nevertheless he knew God from effects. But if the discussion concerns the same natural knowledge of God, it can be said that it was in innocent Adam without successive discourse; for since Adam already had the species of things and a perfect habit, and at other times could contemplate an effect, for example himself, and God after the mode of one thing, he could at the same time know the effect and God from the effect. And in this way one understands what St. Thomas teaches, I, q. 94, a. 1, ad 3, saying: "It was not necessary for the first man to arrive at knowledge of God through a demonstration taken from some effect, as is necessary for us; but at the same time in effects, especially intelligible ones, he knew God in his own mode."

322. Quoad objectum vero naturalis scientiae Adamo infusae, docet D. Thomas 1. p. q. 94. a. 3. c.: "Primus homo sic institutus est in statu perfecto quantum ad corpus, ut statim posset generare, ita etiam institutus est in statu perfecto quantum ad animam, ut statim posset alios instruere et gubernare. Non potest autem aliquis instruere, nisi habeat scientiam. Et ideo primus homo sic institutus est a Deo, ut haberet omnium scientiam in quibus homo natus est instrui. Et haec sunt omnia illa quae virtualiter existunt in primis principiis per se notis, quaecumque scilicet naturaliter homines cognoscere possunt." - Quod exponens Suarez (l. c. n. 11.), inquit: "In eo gradu, in quo scientia ab hominibus acquiri potest, Adamus illam perfectam habuit, et quidquid vel unus, vel plures homines longo tempore, et magna industria, ac multiplici observatione de caelis, aut elementis, aut mixtis consequi possent, id totum per hanc scientiam Adamo inditum est. Et e contrario quod humana diligentia, et virtute sciri non potest inquirendo, sub illa etiam scientia comprehensum non est." <span

id="p322">322. But with respect to the object of the natural knowledge infused into Adam, St. Thomas teaches, I, q. 94, a. 3, corpus: "The first man was instituted in a perfect state with respect to the body, so that at once he could generate; so also he was instituted in a perfect state with respect to the soul, so that at once he could instruct and govern others. But no one can instruct unless he has knowledge. And therefore the first man was so instituted by God that he had knowledge of all things in which man is born to be instructed. And these are all those things which virtually exist in the first principles known through themselves, namely whatever things men can know naturally." - Explaining this, Suarez says (cited place, n. 11): "In that degree in which knowledge can be acquired by men, Adam had it perfect; and whatever one or more men, over a long time and with great industry and manifold observation, could attain concerning the heavens, or the elements, or mixed bodies, all that was implanted in Adam through this knowledge. And, conversely, what cannot be known by human diligence and power by inquiry was not comprehended under that knowledge either."

323. Unde sequitur 1. quod Adam non cognovit futura libera contingentia et aliorum hominum internas cogitationes: haec enim objecta non cadunt sub humanam scientiam.

Sequitur 2. quod Adam habuit scientiam de Deo, uti patet. Cognovit etiam Angelorum existentiam. Philosophi enim gentiles agnoverunt existentiam substantiarum spiritualium; atque hanc notitiam hausisse etiam videntur "ex sensibilibus effectibus, qui virtute daemonum, vel aliorum spirituum fiunt:" ergo Adam per naturalem scientiam sibi inditam, saltem magna probabilitate et vehementi conjectura, id assequi potuit. Notat tamen Suarez (l. c. n. 20.): "Utraque tamen cognitio (de possibilitate et existentia Angelorum) erat per conceptus universales, quia Angeli utroque modo ex vi effectuum solum concipiuntur sub ratione substantiae spiritualis, intellectualis, et creatae, ac completae, et independentis a corpore in sua cognitione, sicut etiam in esse, et in eo gradu cognoscitur esse, vel posse esse multitudinem, et varietatem, quae omnia confusa, et universalia sunt. Neque ex vi hujus scientiae habuit Adam principia, per quae in cognitionem magis propriam, aut distinctam Angelorum perveniret." - Cognovit tandem Adam per eamdem scientiam res materiales creatas omnes quoad species, non omnes vero quoad individua, uti videntur omnes concedere. Vid. Suarez l. c. n. 14. 323. Hence it follows, first, that Adam did not know future free contingents and the internal thoughts of other men; for these objects do not fall under human knowledge.

It follows, secondly, that Adam had knowledge concerning God, as is clear. He also knew the existence of Angels. For the gentile philosophers recognized the existence of spiritual substances; and they seem also to have drawn this knowledge "from sensible effects which are produced by the power of demons or other spirits." Therefore Adam, through the natural knowledge implanted in him, could attain this, at least with great probability and vehement conjecture. Suarez notes, however (cited place, n. 20): "Yet each knowledge (concerning the possibility and existence of Angels) was through universal concepts, because Angels in each way are conceived from the force of effects only under the account of spiritual, intellectual, created, complete substance, independent of a body in its cognition as also in being; and in that degree it is known that there is, or can be, multitude and variety, all of which things are confused and universal. Nor by the force of this knowledge did Adam have principles through which he might arrive at a more proper or distinct knowledge of Angels." - Finally, through the same knowledge Adam knew all created material things with respect to species, but not all with respect to individuals, as all seem to concede. See Suarez, cited place, n. 14.

324. Ex iis, quae dicta sunt tum de natura tum de objecto hujus scientiae Adae, patet 1. quod etsi quoad perfectionem essentialem eadem fuerat ac scientia nostra acquisita; in perfectione tamen accidentali, actus illius scientiae multis rationibus potuerunt caeterorum hominum scientiam excedere. "Primo," inquit Suarez (l. c. n. 21.), "propter excellentiam ingenii quam in Adamo fuisse diximus. Secundo propter optimum corporis temperamentum, et magnam perfectionem internorum, et externorum sensuum, quae ad munus intelligendi multum juvat. Tertio, quia

verisimile est, species et phantasmata a Deo infusa fuisse perfectissima, et subtilissima intra naturalem ordinem, et habitum ipsius scientiae fuisse valde intensum. Denique habuit Adam in illo statu, ut infra dicemus, quandam naturae integritatem per subordinationem appetitus inferioris ad superiorem, quae omnem animae perturbationem, et involuntariam distractionem auferebat; quae animi compositio ad perfectam intelligentiam, et considerationem multum juvat. Igitur ex his principiis, et circumstantiis facile intelligitur, actus hujus scientiae in Adamo fuisse longe majoris perfectionis, quam in caeteris hominibus esse soleant."

Patet 2. quod potuit Adam in sua scientia proficere, sive quoad modum, quatenus quae per scientiam infusam cognoscebat, poterat deinde per scientiam experimentalem cognoscere, uti etiam de Christo concedunt; sive quoad numerum scitorum si sermo sit de individuis. Quod ultimum docet etiam D. Thomas 1. p. q. 94. a. 3. c. in fin., ubi, uti notat Sylvius, tacite corrigit id quod art. 4. q. 18. de ver. docuerat. "Alia vero," inquit, "quae nec naturali hominis studio cognosci possunt, nec sunt necessaria ad gubernationem vitae humanae, primus homo non cognovit; sicut sunt cogitationes hominum, futura contingentia, et quaedam singularia, puta quot lapilli jaceant in flumine, et alia hujusmodi." 324. From those things which have been said both concerning the nature and concerning the object of this knowledge of Adam, it is clear, first, that although with respect to essential perfection it was the same as our acquired knowledge, nevertheless in accidental perfection the acts of that knowledge could exceed the knowledge of other men for many reasons. "First," says Suarez (cited place, n. 21), "on account of the excellence of talent which we have said was in Adam. Secondly, on account of the best temperament of the body and the great perfection of the internal and external senses, which greatly assists the function of understanding. Thirdly, because it is likely that the species and phantasms infused by God were most perfect and most subtle within the natural order, and that the habit of the knowledge itself was very intense. Finally, Adam had in that state, as we shall say below, a certain integrity of nature through the subordination of the lower appetite to the higher, which removed every perturbation of the soul and involuntary distraction; this composition of soul greatly assists perfect understanding and consideration. Therefore from these principles and circumstances it is easily understood that the acts of this knowledge in Adam were of far greater perfection than they usually are in other men."

It is clear, secondly, that Adam could make progress in his knowledge, whether with respect to mode, insofar as the things which he knew through infused knowledge he could afterwards know through experimental knowledge, as they concede also concerning Christ; or with respect to the number of things known, if the discussion is about individuals. St. Thomas also teaches this last point, I, q. 94, a. 3, corpus, at the end, where, as Sylvius notes, he tacitly corrects what he had taught in De veritate, q. 18, a. 4. "But other things," he says, "which can neither be known by the natural study of man, nor are necessary for the government of human life, the first man did not know; such are the thoughts of men, future contingents, and certain singulars, for instance how many pebbles lie in a river, and other things of this kind."

325. His itaque expositis, dicimus:

Prop. XXXII. Habuit Adam statim ac creatus fuit naturalem scientiam a Deo sibi inditam.

Prob. I. Legitur Gen. 2. 19. 20.: "Formatis igitur, Dominus Deus, de humo cunctis animantibus terrae, et universis volatilibus caeli, adduxit ea ad Adam, ut videret quid vocaret ea; omne enim quod vocavit Adam animae viventis, ipsum est nomen ejus. Appellavitque Adam nominibus suis cuncta animalia, et universa volatilia caeli, et omnes bestias terrae." Unde: Imponere nomina cunctis animalibus convenienter ad eorum naturam, requirit certe rerum naturalium scientiam; atqui, ex cit. testimonio, imposuit Adam nomina animantibus, et quidem convenienter ad eorum naturam; sic enim Patres, et unanimiter Theologi interpretantur illud "Omne quod vocavit Adam ... ipsum est nomen ejus." Ergo. Unde S. Jo. Chrys. (hom. 14. in Gen.) dicit: "Quod magna sapientia praeditus fuerit, disce ex his, quae nunc fiunt. Et adduxit illa, etc. fecit hoc Deus demonstraturus nobis magnam illius sapientiam." Et infra: "Ne igitur subito praetereas, sed cogita quanta fuerit sapientia volatilibus, etc. et omnibus congrua, et convenientia suae

naturae imponit nomina." Et iterum infra: "Qui potest congruis nominibus jumenta appellare, et volatilia caeli, et alias bestias, quomodo non omni sapientia, et industria pollet?" - Et S. Aug. (op. imperf. c. Julian. l. c. 1.): "Neque secundum Christianam cogitatis fidem, qualis sit factus Adam, qui universis generibus animarum vivarum nomina imposuit: quod excellentissimae fuisse indicium sapientiae, in saecularibus etiam litteris legimus. Nam ipse Pythagoras, a quo Philosophiae nomen exortum est, dixisse fertur, illum fuisse omnium sapientissimum, qui vocabula primus indidit rebus."

Prob. II. Legitur Eccli. 17. 1. 5. 6. 7.: "Deus creavit de terra hominem, et secundum imaginem suam fecit illum ... Creavit ex ipso adjutorium simile sibi: consilium, et linguam, et oculos, et aures, et cor dedit illis excogitandi: et disciplina intellectus replevit illos. Creavit illis scientiam spiritus, sensu implevit cor illorum: et mala et bona ostendit illis. Posuit oculum suum super corda illorum, ostendere illis magnalia operum suorum." Quamvis haec verba maxime indicent supernaturalem cognitionem, absque dubio tamen naturalem etiam scientiam comprehendunt. Nam a) sunt valde universalia - b) ad perfectam disciplinam intellectus pertinet etiam scientia naturalis: eam autem perfectionem assecutum esse Adam videntur ostendere verba "replevit illos" - c) multa cognoscuntur per hanc scientiam, quae ad Dei gloriam referuntur - d) dicitur ibid. vv. 3. 4. "Dedit illi potestatem eorum quae sunt super terram. Posuit timorem illius super omnem carnem, et dominatus est bestiarum et volatilium:" ad usum autem hujus potestatis et dominii necessaria erat scientia, uti jam notavit S. Jo. Chrys. l. c. Ergo.

Prob. III. Ratione D. Thomae cit. q. 94.: "Quia res primitus a Deo institutae sunt, non solum ut in seipsis essent, sed etiam ut essent aliorum principia, ideo productae sunt in statu perfecto, in quo possent esse principia aliorum. Homo autem potest esse principium alterius, non solum per generationem corporalem, sed etiam per instructionem et gubernationem. Et ideo sicut primus homo institutus est in statu perfecto quantum ad corpus, ut statim posset generare, ita etiam institutus est in statu perfecto quantum ad animam, ut statim posset alios instruere et gubernare. Non potest autem aliquis instruere, nisi habeat scientiam. Et ideo primus homo sic institutus est a Deo, ut haberet omnium scientiam in quibus homo natus est instrui."

Prob. IV. Ex Suarez (l. c. n. 4.) "Omnes alias res universi tam corporales, quam spirituales in statu perfecto creavit; ergo et hominem ex corpore, et spiritu compositum. Nam et ipsum hominem secundum corpus perfectum creavit; ergo multo magis secundum animam." - Ostendit deinde hanc scientiam valde necessariam fuisse "Primo ad integritatem, et felicitatem illius status, in quo homo ante peccatum constituebatur, quem in discursu sequentium capitum explicabimus. Secundo, quia si homo ignorans crearetur, ut ipse scientiam sibi acquireret, necessarium esset longo tempore in magna ignoratione versari. Quia humana scientia longo tempore, et magno labore acquiritur, adeo ut ad unam scientiam perfecte acquirendam vix longum vitae tempus sufficiat, nedum ad omnes. Praesertim cum esset sola inventione, et sine disciplina addiscenda, et acquirenda, quod longe difficilius est. Tertio, quia impossibile est homini solis naturae suae viribus scientiam veritatum etiam naturalium puram, et sine admixtione multorum errorum inquirendo, invenire. Propter quod ad providentiam auctoris naturae pertinuit hominem creare ita perfectum, ut sine errore posset naturales veritates intelligere."

Nota. Si Adam perseveravisset in statu justitiae originalis, filii ejus non fuissent nati cum perfecta scientia. Etenim "de iis," inquit D. Th. 1. p. q. 101. a. 1., "quae sunt supra naturam, soli auctoritati creditur. Unde ubi auctoritas deficit, sequi debemus naturae conditionem. Est autem naturale homini ut scientiam per sensus acquirat, sicut supra dictum est, qu. 55. art. 2. et q. 84. art. 7.; et ideo anima unitur corpori, quia indiget eo ad suam propriam operationem; quod non esset, si statim a principio scientiam haberet non acquisitam per sensitivas virtutes. Et ideo dicendum est, quod pueri in statu innocentiae non nascerentur perfecti in scientia, sed eam in processu temporis absque difficultate acquisivissent inveniendo, vel addiscendo." - Et Suarez (de op. sex dier. l. 5. c. 8. n. 20.) addit: "Adam enim creatus est in aetate adulta, et perfecto rationis usu, in qua aetate jam erat de se capax scientiarum naturalium. Unde si illis caruisset, propriae ignorantiae fuisset subjectus: in filiis autem parvulis carentia scientiarum non fuisset ignorantia, sed pura nescientia, ut supra declaratum est. Deinde Adam non solum creatus est, ut persona privata, sed ut caput, et consequenter ut doctor, et instructor ipsius naturae; et ideo ratione sui muneris scientias omnes postulabat, et juxta convenientem providentiae ordinem illi erant debitae. Quae ratio

in filiis locum non haberet, ut per se notum est." 325. Therefore, with these things explained, we say:

Proposition XXXII. Adam, as soon as he was created, had natural knowledge implanted in him by God.

Proof I. It is read in Genesis 2:19-20: "Therefore, the Lord God having formed from the ground all the living creatures of the earth and all the birds of heaven, he brought them to Adam, that he might see what he would call them; for whatever Adam called a living soul, that is its name. And Adam called by their own names all the animals, and all the birds of heaven, and all the beasts of the earth." Hence: to impose names on all animals suitably to their nature certainly requires knowledge of natural things; but, from the cited testimony, Adam imposed names on the living creatures, and indeed suitably to their nature; for thus the Fathers and unanimously the theologians interpret that phrase, "Whatever Adam called ... that is its name." Therefore. Hence St. John Chrysostom (homily 14 on Genesis) says: "Learn from the things which are now done that he was endowed with great wisdom. And he brought them, etc.; God did this in order to show us his great wisdom." And below: "Therefore do not pass over it suddenly, but consider how great was the wisdom: on the birds, etc., and on all things he imposes names congruent and suitable to their own nature." And again below: "He who can call the beasts of burden, and the birds of heaven, and the other beasts by congruent names, how does he not possess every wisdom and industry?" - And St. Augustine (Unfinished Work against Julian, cited place, book 1): "Nor do you think according to the Christian faith what sort Adam was made, who imposed names on all kinds of living souls: that this was an indication of most excellent wisdom we read even in secular literature. For Pythagoras himself, from whom the name of Philosophy took its rise, is said to have said that he was wisest of all who first assigned words to things."

Proof II. It is read in Ecclesiasticus 17:1, 5, 6, 7: "God created man from the earth, and made him according to his own image ... He created from him a helper like himself; counsel, and tongue, and eyes, and ears, and a heart for thinking he gave to them; and he filled them with discipline of intellect. He created for them knowledge of spirit, filled their heart with sense; and showed them good and evil. He placed his eye upon their hearts, to show them the magnificent things of his works." Although these words chiefly indicate supernatural cognition, nevertheless beyond doubt they also comprehend natural knowledge. For a) they are very universal; b) natural knowledge also pertains to perfect discipline of the intellect, and the words "he filled them" seem to show that Adam attained that perfection; c) many things are known through this knowledge which are referred to the glory of God; d) it is said in the same place, verses 3-4: "He gave him power over those things which are upon the earth. He placed the fear of him over all flesh, and he had dominion over beasts and birds"; but for the use of this power and dominion knowledge was necessary, as St. John Chrysostom already noted in the cited place. Therefore.

Proof III. From the reason of St. Thomas in the cited q. 94: "Because things were first instituted by God not only that they might exist in themselves, but also that they might be principles of others, therefore they were produced in a perfect state, in which they could be principles of others. But man can be the principle of another not only through bodily generation, but also through instruction and government. And therefore, just as the first man was instituted in a perfect state with respect to the body, so that at once he could generate, so also he was instituted in a perfect state with respect to the soul, so that at once he could instruct and govern others. But no one can instruct unless he has knowledge. And therefore the first man was so instituted by God that he had knowledge of all things in which man is born to be instructed."

Proof IV. From Suarez (cited place, n. 4): "He created all other things of the universe, both corporeal and spiritual, in a perfect state; therefore also man, composed from body and spirit. For he created man himself perfect with respect to body; therefore much more with respect to soul." - He then shows that this knowledge was very necessary: "First, for the integrity and happiness of that state in which man was constituted before sin, which we shall explain in the course of the following chapters. Secondly, because if man were created ignorant, so that he himself might acquire knowledge for himself, it would be necessary for him to spend a long time in great ignorance. For human knowledge is acquired over a long time and with great labor, so much so that scarcely a long time of life

suffices for perfectly acquiring one knowledge, much less all of them; especially since it would have to be learned and acquired by discovery alone and without instruction, which is far more difficult. Thirdly, because it is impossible for man by the powers of his nature alone to discover, by inquiry, pure knowledge of even natural truths and without admixture of many errors. On account of this it pertained to the providence of the author of nature to create man so perfect that he could understand natural truths without error."

Note. If Adam had persevered in the state of original justice, his children would not have been born with perfect knowledge. For "concerning those things," says St. Thomas, I, q. 101, a. 1, "which are above nature, one believes authority alone. Hence where authority fails, we ought to follow the condition of nature. But it is natural to man to acquire knowledge through the senses, as was said above, q. 55, art. 2, and q. 84, art. 7; and therefore the soul is united to the body because it needs it for its proper operation. This would not be so if from the beginning it had knowledge not acquired through the sensitive powers. And therefore it must be said that children in the state of innocence would not be born perfect in knowledge, but would have acquired it in the course of time without difficulty, by discovery or by learning." - And Suarez (On the Work of the Six Days, book 5, chapter 8, n. 20) adds: "For Adam was created in adult age and with the perfect use of reason, at which age he was already of himself capable of natural sciences. Hence if he had lacked them, he would have been subject to proper ignorance; but in little children the lack of sciences would not have been ignorance, but pure nescience, as was declared above. Then, Adam was created not only as a private person, but as head, and consequently as teacher and instructor of nature itself; and therefore by reason of his office he required all sciences, and according to the fitting order of providence they were owed to him. This reason would not have place in the children, as is known of itself."

Corrected Latin Text
§ II.
An, et Qualis Fuerit Supernaturalium Cognitio Adae Infusa. § II.
Whether, And Of What Kind, Adam's Infused Cognition Of Supernatural Things Was.

326. Tria hic breviter attingemus: 1. naturam scientiae supernaturalium, quam Adam habuit in statu innocentiae - 2. existentiam hujus scientiae - 3. ejusdem objectum. 326. Here we shall briefly touch on three things: 1. the nature of the knowledge of supernatural things which Adam had in the state of innocence; 2. the existence of this knowledge; 3. its object.

327. Quoad naturam, conveniunt omnes 1. quod haec scientia erat supernaturalis non modo ex parte revelationis et rei revelatae; sed etiam ex parte assensus. Nam creatus fuit Adam in statu gratiae; debuit ergo habere cognitionem huic statui proportionatam: eo vel magis, quod ad gratiam suscipiendam, propriis actibus se disposuit; fundamentum autem cujuscumque actus supernaturalis disponentis ad justitiam est cognitio, quae proinde debet necessario esse vere supernaturalis.

2. Omnes etiam pro certo habent, cognitionem Adae in illo statu non fuisse inferiorem nostra fide, in substantia, et specie sua, quia et gratia fuit ejusdem speciei cum nostra, et status ejus fuit aliquo modo excellentior, et felicior nostro; cum ergo sit de fide certum, nostram fidem esse supernaturalem ex parte ipsius assensus, et ex parte auxilii ad illum necessarii, idem de cognitione Adae citra dubium tenendum. Vid. Suarez (de op. sex dier. l. 3. c. 18. n. 11.)

3. Quaestio solummodo est, utrum eadem cognitio fuerit vera fides supernaturalis et divina ejusdem rationis ac nostra. - Videntur illud negavisse Hugo a S. Victore et Alensis; sententia tamen communis affirmat. Unde S. Augustinus (de civ. Dei l. 14. c. 26.), dicit: "Habuisse hominem in statu innocentiae gaudium verum, quod perpetuabatur ex Deo, in quem flagrabat charitas de corde puro, conscientia bona, et fide non ficta." - S. Ambrosius (in Luc. l. 7. c. 10.): "Adam nudatus est mandati caelestis custodia destitutus, et exutus fidei vestimento lethale vulnus accepit." D. Th. 1. p. q. 95. a. 3. c.: "Quaedam (virtutes) vero sunt quae de sui ratione imperfectionem

important vel ex parte actus, vel ex parte materiae. Et si hujusmodi imperfectio non repugnat perfectioni primi status, nihilominus hujusmodi virtutes poterant esse in primo statu; sicut fides, quae est eorum quae non videntur. Perfectio enim primi status non se extendebat ad hoc ut videret Deum per essentiam, et ut haberet eum fruitione finalis beatitudinis. Unde fides et spes esse poterant in primo statu et quantum ad habitum, et quantum ad actum." 327. With respect to its nature, all agree, first, that this knowledge was supernatural not only on the part of revelation and of the thing revealed, but also on the part of assent. For Adam was created in the state of grace; therefore he had to have cognition proportioned to this state, especially because he disposed himself by his own acts for receiving grace. But the foundation of any supernatural act disposing to justice is cognition, which consequently must necessarily be truly supernatural.

2. All also hold as certain that the cognition of Adam in that state was not inferior to our faith in its substance and species, because both grace was of the same species as ours, and his state was in some way more excellent and happier than ours. Since, therefore, it is certain by faith that our faith is supernatural on the part of the assent itself, and on the part of the help necessary for it, the same must without doubt be held concerning the cognition of Adam. See Suarez (On the Work of the Six Days, book 3, chapter 18, n. 11).

3. The question is only whether this same cognition was true supernatural and divine faith of the same account as ours. Hugh of St. Victor and Alexander of Hales seem to have denied this; nevertheless the common opinion affirms it. Hence St. Augustine (The City of God, book 14, chapter 26) says: "Man in the state of innocence had true joy, which was perpetuated from God, toward whom charity burned from a pure heart, a good conscience, and faith not feigned." - St. Ambrose (on Luke, book 7, chapter 10): "Adam was stripped, destitute of the custody of the heavenly command, and, divested of the garment of faith, received a lethal wound." St. Thomas, I, q. 95, a. 3, corpus: "But there are certain virtues which by their account imply imperfection either on the part of the act or on the part of the matter. And if imperfection of this kind is not repugnant to the perfection of the first state, nevertheless virtues of this kind could exist in the first state; such as faith, which is of those things which are not seen. For the perfection of the first state did not extend to this, that man should see God through essence and have him by the fruition of final beatitude. Hence faith and hope could exist in the first state both with respect to habit and with respect to act."

328. Quoad existentiam, patet quod Adam habuit in statu innocentiae hanc cognitionem supernaturalium, seu fidem supernaturalem et divinam. Quod probatur imprimis ex eo, quod habuit justitiam, ut antea probavimus: simul autem cum gratia sanctificante infunditur etiam fides. Deinde:

a) Certum est quod Adam ante peccatum non habuit visionem Dei intuitivam, unde nec fuit impeccabilis 1. p. q. 94. a. 1.: hinc certum est etiam quod non fuit in statu comprehensoris, sed viatoris; unde fuit in statu merendi, et ad hoc habuit a Deo praeceptum, ut per obedientiam posset de Deo bene mereri. Atqui conditio necessaria ad meritum est cognitio supernaturalis, seu fides; et est proprium justi viatoris eamdem cognitionem habere. Ergo. Revera, inquit Suarez (l. c. n. 3.): "Hoc est omnino certum; tum quia non minus est necessaria in viatore, cognitio termini, in quem tendit, quam intentio, et voluntas tendendi in illum: est terminus beatitudo supernaturalis, quae sine revelatione supernaturali cognosci non potest. Tum etiam, quia sicut voluntas supponit intellectum, ita supernaturales virtutes voluntatis supponunt supernaturalem cognitionem in intellectu."

b) Cum Adam in statu innocentiae, ex dictis, fuerit viator, debuit habere spem: atqui spes fidem cui innititur necessario supponit: ergo. - Major sic declarat Suarez l. c.: Habuit "Adam simul cum gratia, et charitate spem futurae beatitudinis, quia sicut is qui videt jam non sperat, et e converso, qui non videt ut justificari possit, et in beatitudinem tendere, necesse est, ut speret. Et ideo nunc ad justificationem necessaria est spes, ut Conc. Trident. Sess. 6., docet, in quo eadem est ratio de homine in statu innocentiae, quod attinet ad spem beatitudinis, nam spes remissionis peccatorum tunc non erat necessaria, nondum existente peccato. Potuit autem, et debuit sperari auxilium bene operandi et perseverandi, quia propositum obediendi Deo, et perseverandi in ejus obedientia tunc etiam necessarium erat." 328. With respect to existence,

it is clear that Adam had in the state of innocence this cognition of supernatural things, or supernatural and divine faith. This is proved first from the fact that he had justice, as we proved before; but together with sanctifying grace faith also is infused. Then:

a) It is certain that Adam before sin did not have the intuitive vision of God, whence neither was he impeccable, I, q. 94, a. 1. Hence it is also certain that he was not in the state of one who comprehends, but of one on the way; hence he was in a state of meriting, and for this he had from God a precept, so that through obedience he could merit well concerning God. But the necessary condition for merit is supernatural cognition, or faith; and it is proper to a just wayfarer to have the same cognition. Therefore. In reality, says Suarez (cited place, n. 3): "This is altogether certain, both because cognition of the term toward which he tends is no less necessary in the wayfarer than intention and will of tending toward it. The term is supernatural beatitude, which cannot be known without supernatural revelation. Also because, just as will supposes intellect, so the supernatural virtues of the will suppose supernatural cognition in the intellect."

b) Since Adam in the state of innocence, from what has been said, was a wayfarer, he had to have hope; but hope necessarily supposes the faith on which it rests; therefore. - Suarez declares the major in this way in the cited place: "Adam, together with grace and charity, had hope of future beatitude, because just as he who sees now does not hope, so conversely, he who does not see, in order that he may be justified and tend into beatitude, must hope. And therefore now hope is necessary for justification, as the Council of Trent, Session 6, teaches; in which there is the same reason concerning man in the state of innocence as regards hope of beatitude, for hope of remission of sins was not then necessary, since sin did not yet exist. But the help of operating well and persevering could and had to be hoped for, because the purpose of obeying God and persevering in his obedience was also then necessary."

329. Quoad objectum. 1.) Cum ex Hebr. 11. 6.: "credere enim oportet accedentem ad Deum quia est, et inquirentibus se remunerator sit;" sequitur quod cognovit Adam supernaturaliter Deum esse - et esse objectum supernaturalis beatitudinis - principium salutis, justitiae et gratiae - remuneratorem, qui redditurus est praemium divini et supernaturalis ordinis.

2.) Videtur etiam cognovisse Mysterium Trinitatis. Hoc docuit S. Epiphanius (con. haeres. in Praef.), dicens: "Adam protoplastus formatus est, non circumcisus, sed carne praeputium habens. Non autem erat idolatra, et novit Patrem Deum, et Filium et Spiritum Sanctum, propheta enim erat." Quod infra probat, "Quia novit, quod Pater dixit Filio, faciamus hominem ad imaginem, et similitudinem nostram." Quod desumitur etiam ex D. Thoma 2. 2. q. 2. a. 8.

3.) Quoad mysterium Incarnationis, imprimis notandum est, quod potest illud cognosci, seu credi vel quoad substantiam, quatenus proponitur unio humanae naturae cum divino Verbo, et consequenter Christus verus Deus et verus homo, tamquam verus Filius Dei adorandus; vel potest credi quoad finem redemptionis hominum. Adam hoc secundo modo non cognovit mysterium Incarnationis, uti communiter docent (Vid. Suarez l. c. n. 10.); sed est communis et vera sententia quod primo modo illud cognovit. Etenim:

a) Legitur Gen. 2. 23. 24.: "Hoc nunc os ex ossibus meis, et caro de carne mea. Quamobrem relinquet homo patrem suum, et matrem, et adhaerebit uxori suae: et erunt duo in carne una." De quibus verbis Apostolus ad Eph. 5. 31. ait: "Sacramentum hoc magnum est, ego autem dico in Christo et Ecclesia." Atqui hoc Sacramentum certe Adam cognovit, uti docent S. Jo. Chrys. (hom. 16. in Gen.), S. Augustinus (de Gen. ad lit. l. 9. c. 19.), S. Epiphanius (haeres. 48.), S. Hieronymus (in 5. ad Eph.), etc. Ergo.

b) Philonus (Const. 5. in fin.), cum dixisset: "Talem factam esse unionem Dei, et humanitatis, ut jure dicatur Deus homo, et homo Deus," addit "quod Adam primus omnium parens futurum divinitus praevidit, cum exclamavit, hoc nunc os ex ossibus meis, praeviderat enim Deum aliquando ex homine nasciturum, cui homines tandem adhaesuri erant per fidem, spem, et charitatem." - S. Prosper (in 1. cap. de Praedest. et Promis. Dei): "Sacramentum magnum Christi, et Ecclesiae fuisse promissum Adae, quod promissum, inquit, ipse speravit." Si autem speravit, profecto cognovit.

c) Unde D. Thomas, licet doceat quod Verbum non fuisset incarnatum, nisi Adam peccasset; tamen 2. 2. q. 2. a. 7. c., inquit: "Ante statum peccati homo habuit explicitam fidem de Christi incarnatione, secundum quod

ordinabatur ad consummationem gloriae, non autem secundum quod ordinabatur ad liberationem a peccato per passionem et resurrectionem, quia homo non fuit praescius peccati futuri. Videtur autem incarnationis Christi praescius fuisse per hoc quod dixit: `Propter hoc relinquet homo patrem et matrem, et adhaerebit uxori suae,' ut habetur Genes. 2. 24. Et hoc Apostolus, ad Ephes. 5. 32. dicit, `sacramentum magnum esse in Christo et Ecclesia;' quod quidem sacramentum non est credibile primum hominem ignorasse." Cf. cit. c. 18. Suaresii. 329. With respect to object. 1. Since from Hebrews 11:6, "for it is necessary that one approaching God believe that he is, and that he is a rewarder to those who seek him," it follows that Adam knew supernaturally that God is; that he is the object of supernatural beatitude; the principle of salvation, justice, and grace; and the rewarder who will render the reward of the divine and supernatural order.

2. He also seems to have known the Mystery of the Trinity. St. Epiphanius taught this (Against Heresies, in the Preface), saying: "Adam the first-formed was formed, not circumcised, but having foreskin in the flesh. But he was not an idolater, and he knew God the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit, for he was a prophet." He proves this below: "Because he knew that the Father said to the Son, Let us make man to our image and likeness." This is also drawn from St. Thomas, II-II, q. 2, a. 8.

3. With respect to the mystery of the Incarnation, it must first be noted that it can be known, or believed, either with respect to substance, insofar as the union of human nature with the divine Word is proposed, and consequently Christ, true God and true man, is to be adored as the true Son of God; or it can be believed with respect to the end of the redemption of men. Adam did not know the mystery of the Incarnation in this second way, as they commonly teach (see Suarez, cited place, n. 10); but it is the common and true opinion that he knew it in the first way. For:

a) It is read in Genesis 2:23-24: "This now is bone from my bones, and flesh from my flesh. Wherefore a man shall leave his father and mother, and shall cleave to his wife, and they shall be two in one flesh." Concerning these words the Apostle says at Ephesians 5:31: "This is a great sacrament, but I speak in Christ and in the Church." But Adam certainly knew this Sacrament, as St. John Chrysostom (homily 16 on Genesis), St. Augustine (On Genesis according to the Letter, book 9, chapter 19), St. Epiphanius (heresy 48), St. Jerome (on Ephesians 5), etc., teach. Therefore.

b) Philo (Constitution 5, at the end), after he had said that "such a union of God and humanity was made that by right God is called man, and man God," adds "that Adam, the first parent of all, foresaw the future thing divinely when he exclaimed, This now is bone from my bones; for he had foreseen God at some time would be born from man, to whom men would at last cleave through faith, hope, and charity." - St. Prosper (in book 1, chapter on The Predestination and Promises of God): "The great Sacrament of Christ and the Church was promised to Adam; which promise, he says, he himself hoped for." But if he hoped, certainly he knew.

c) Hence St. Thomas, although he teaches that the Word would not have been incarnate unless Adam had sinned, nevertheless says, II-II, q. 2, a. 7, corpus: "Before the state of sin man had explicit faith concerning the Incarnation of Christ, according as it was ordered to the consummation of glory, but not according as it was ordered to liberation from sin through the Passion and Resurrection, because man was not foreknowing of future sin. But he seems to have been foreknowing of Christ's Incarnation through this, that he said: `For this reason a man shall leave father and mother and shall cleave to his wife,' as is had in Genesis 2:24. And this the Apostle, at Ephesians 5:32, says is `a great sacrament in Christ and the Church'; indeed it is not credible that the first man was ignorant of this sacrament." Compare the cited chapter 18 of Suarez.

Article 9. Whether the First Parents were Immune from Error and from Venial Sin

LatineEnglish

Corrected Latin Text
Articulus Nonus.
Utrum ab Errore et a Peccato Veniali Immunes Fuerint Protoparentes.

330. Utramque hanc immunitatem simul complectimur, ut haec, quae sunt minoris momenti, paucis expedientes, statim quae ad finem supernaturalem pertinent aggredi possimus. 330. We comprehend both these immunities together, so that, by dispatching in a few words these things which are of lesser moment, we may at once approach those things which pertain to the supernatural end.

331. Quoad immunitatem ab errore, notandum est imprimis cum Suarez (de op. sex. dier. l. 3. c. 10. nn. 14. seq.), quod triplici modo potest error contingere in intellectu, nempe absque ulla culpa - cum culpa veniali - cum mortali. "Primo modo," inquit, "potest nunc homo errare speculative in judicio probabilis opinionis, in quo nihil peccat, quando prudenter se gerit, quamvis contingat judicium in re falsum esse. Secundo modo potest homo errare cum culpa veniali si ferat judicium imprudenter, et cum aliqua levi temeritate, sine alio gravi damno sui, vel alterius. Tertius modus deceptionis manifestum est in haeresi, et in judicio temerario contra honorem proximi, et similibus."

Jamvero videtur concedendum quod Adam potuerit in errorem incidere tertio modo: cum enim constet non fuisse in statu innocentiae immunem a libertate peccandi, nec ulla ratio sit excipiendi hoc peccatum; sequitur quod potuerit in errorem per grave peccatum incidere. Hoc autem, uti bene observat Suarez, non obstat quominus dicatur Adam in statu innocentiae non potuisse decipi; siquidem "vi illius voluntatis peccaminosae ab illo statu caderet, et ita prius esset peccator, quam judicium erroneum haberet." - Patebit ex inferius dicendis hominem in statu innocentiae non potuisse committere peccatum veniale; ideoque nec poterat secundo modo in errorem incidere. Superest ergo quaestio de errore, in quem quis incideret absque ulla culpa. 331. With respect to immunity from error, it must first be noted with Suarez (On the Work of the Six Days, book 3, chapter 10, nn. 14 ff.) that error can occur in the intellect in three ways, namely without any fault, with venial fault, and with mortal fault. "In the first way," he says, "man can now err speculatively in the judgment of a probable opinion, in which he sins in nothing when he conducts himself prudently, although it happens that the judgment is false in reality. In the second way man can err with venial fault if he forms a judgment imprudently and with some slight rashness, without other grave harm to himself or another. The third mode of deception is manifest in heresy, and in a rash judgment against the honor of a neighbor, and in similar things."

Now it seems it must be conceded that Adam could have fallen into error in the third way; for since it is established that in the state of innocence he was not immune from freedom of sinning, and there is no reason to except this sin, it follows that he could have fallen into error through grave sin. But this, as Suarez well observes, does not prevent it from being said that Adam in the state of innocence could not have been deceived; since "by force of that sinful will he would fall from that state, and thus he would be a sinner before he had an erroneous judgment." - It will be clear from the things to be said below that man in the state of innocence could not commit venial sin; and therefore neither could he fall into error in the second way. Therefore the question remains concerning error into which someone would fall without any fault.

332. Est sententia communis, vera et tenenda, juxta Suarez (l. c. n. 3.), quod Adam in statu innocentiae non poterat absque ulla culpa errare. Nam:

a) S. Augustinus (de lib. arb. l. 3. c. 18.), dicit: "Approbare falsa pro veris, ut erret invitus, non est natura instituti hominis, sed poena damnati." Et l. lib. retract. cap. 9. confirmat ignorantiam, et difficultatem esse poenas primi peccati, nulla autem est deterior ignorantia, quam error. Et in Enchirid. c. 16. et sequentibus, ex professo probat, quemcumque errorem etiam in materia levissima inter mala hujus vitae deputandum esse, et ad quandam miseriam pertinere, ut in cap. 21. dicit. At vero lib. 14. de Civit. cap. 10. dicit, non interveniente peccato nullum malum potuisse in primis hominibus inveniri. Ac denique lib. 11. Gen. ad liter. cap. 30. dicit, non fuisse Evam a serpente decipiendam, nisi jam per superbiam peccasset, in quo supponit, ante peccatum decipi non potuisse.

b) D. Thomas 1. p. q. 94. a. 4. c. ait: "Ut Augustinus dicit 14. de Civitate Dei cap. 10. ante med., 'in illo statu erat devitatio tranquilla peccati, qua

manente nullum malum omnino esse poterat.' Manifestum est autem quod sicut verum est bonum intellectus, ita falsum est malum ejus, ut dicitur in 6. Ethicorum, cap. 2. Unde non poterat esse quod, innocentia manente, intellectus hominis alicui falso acquiesceret quasi vero. Sicut enim in membris corporis primi hominis erat quidem carentia perfectionis alicujus, puta claritatis, non tamen aliquod malum inesse poterat: ita in intellectu poterat esse carentia notitiae alicujus, nulla tamen poterat ibi esse existimatio falsi." Cf. h. art., et Suarez cit. c. 10. 332. It is the common, true, and to-be-held opinion, according to Suarez (cited place, n. 3), that Adam in the state of innocence could not err without any fault. For:

a) St. Augustine (On Free Choice, book 3, chapter 18) says: "To approve false things as true, so that one errs unwillingly, is not the nature of instituted man, but the punishment of condemned man." And in book 1 of the Retractations, chapter 9, he confirms that ignorance and difficulty are punishments of the first sin, but there is no ignorance worse than error. And in the Enchiridion, chapter 16 and following, he explicitly proves that any error, even in the lightest matter, is to be reckoned among the evils of this life and pertains to a certain misery, as he says in chapter 21. But in book 14 of The City, chapter 10, he says that, sin not intervening, no evil could have been found in the first human beings. And finally in book 11 of On Genesis according to the Letter, chapter 30, he says that Eve would not have been deceived by the serpent unless she had already sinned through pride, in which he supposes that before sin she could not have been deceived.

b) St. Thomas, I, q. 94, a. 4, corpus, says: "As Augustine says in book 14 of The City of God, chapter 10, before the middle, 'in that state there was a tranquil avoidance of sin, and while this remained there could be no evil at all.' But it is manifest that, just as the true is the good of the intellect, so the false is its evil, as is said in book 6 of the Ethics, chapter 2. Hence it could not be that, while innocence remained, the intellect of man would assent to something false as though true. For just as in the members of the body of the first man there was indeed the lack of some perfection, for instance brightness, yet no evil could be present; so in the intellect there could be lack of some knowledge, yet there could be there no estimation of the false." Compare this article and Suarez, cited chapter 10.

333. Praeter dona scientiae et immunitatis ab errore, quibus mirifice perficiebatur intellectus protoparentum, infudit certe illis Deus omnimodam rectitudinem in voluntate. - Et quidem, si sermo sit de rectitudine supernaturali, nihil est quod hic addamus post ea quae diximus de gratia sanctificante et charitate. - Duplex autem perfectio, seu rectitudo naturalis in voluntate considerari potest - prima dicitur innocentiae, quae consistit in carentia omnis culpae: nemini dubium est hanc habuisse Adam - altera dicitur virtutis positivae, quae consistit in habitibus studiosis rectis ordinis naturalis, seu in hujus ordinis virtutibus. 333. Besides the gifts of knowledge and immunity from error, by which the intellect of the first parents was wonderfully perfected, God certainly infused into them every sort of rectitude in the will. And indeed, if the discussion is about supernatural rectitude, there is nothing here for us to add after the things which we have said concerning sanctifying grace and charity. But a twofold perfection, or natural rectitude, can be considered in the will: the first is called the perfection of innocence, which consists in the lack of every fault; no one doubts that Adam had this. The other is called the perfection of positive virtue, which consists in right virtuous habits of the natural order, or in the virtues of this order.

334. Jamvero certum est etiam hominem ante peccatum habuisse omnes virtutes morales, quae per actus bonos naturalis ordinis acquiri possunt, quae proinde fuerunt infusae tantum per accidens. Nam a) virtutes ex suo genere acquisitae perficiunt et complent rectitudinem voluntatis, per quam voluntas rectae rationi naturali est subjecta, atque recte disposita est ad appetitum inferiorem in officio honestatis continendum; atqui habuit Adam hanc perfectissimam rectitudinem. Ergo. - b) Ad perfectionem simpliciter hominis magis pertinent virtutes morales, quam scientia

rerum naturalium; unde quamvis aliqui Theologi dubitent de scientia acquisita, conveniunt omnes quod virtutes morales infusae per accidens fuerunt in anima Christi a primo instanti suae conceptionis. Atqui infusa fuit Adamo scientia rerum naturalium. Ergo. 334. Now it is also certain that man before sin had all the moral virtues which can be acquired through good acts of the natural order, and which consequently were infused only by accident. For a) virtues acquired from their own genus perfect and complete the rectitude of the will, through which the will is subject to right natural reason and is rightly disposed for keeping the lower appetite in the office of honesty; but Adam had this most perfect rectitude. Therefore. b) Moral virtues pertain more to the perfection of man simply than knowledge of natural things does; hence although some theologians doubt concerning acquired knowledge, all agree that moral virtues infused by accident were in the soul of Christ from the first instant of his conception. But knowledge of natural things was infused into Adam. Therefore.

335. Unica in hac re difficultas est: deficiente objecto alicujus virtutis, deest ipsa virtus; sed aliquarum moralium virtutum objectum deficiebat in statu justitiae originalis; ergo. Deficiebat, ex. gr., objectum poenitentiae, quod est peccatum commissum - objectum misericordiae, quia nulla erat miseria, etc. 335. The only difficulty in this matter is: when the object of some virtue is lacking, the virtue itself is lacking; but the object of some moral virtues was lacking in the state of original justice; therefore. For example, the object of penitence was lacking, which is committed sin; the object of mercy, because there was no misery, etc.

336. Resp. tamen 1. Virtutes sunt habitus; habitus autem bene stare possunt sine actu. Nam a) habitus est prior, et bene disponit hominem ad actum, sive illum effecturus sit sive non. b) Habitus non respicit materiam ut praesentem vel futuram, sed tantum ut possibilem; et ita habere poterat locum cujuslibet virtutis materia in statu innocentiae. c) Possibile erat homini innocenti amittere illum statum, quem de facto amisit; et ita utile erat habere virtutes per accidens infusas, de quibus agimus, quae in illo manerent si caderet, ut de facto manserunt. Unde merito D. Thomas 1. p. q. 95. a. 3. c. ait: "Si vero imperfectio, quae est de ratione virtutis alicujus, repugnat perfectioni primi status, poterat hujusmodi virtus ibi esse secundum habitum, et non secundum actum, ut patet de poenitentia, quae est dolor de peccato commisso, et de misericordia, quae est dolor de miseria aliena. Perfectioni autem primi status repugnat tam dolor, quam culpa et miseria. Unde hujusmodi virtutes erant in primo homine secundum habitum, et non secundum actum. Erat enim primus homo sic dispositus, ut si peccatum praecessisset, doleret; et similiter si miseriam in alio videret, eam pro posse repelleret: sicut Philosophus dicit, in Ethic., c. ult. in fin., quod 'verecundia, quae est de turpi facto, contingit studioso solum sub conditione; est enim sic dispositus quod verecundaretur, si turpe aliquid committeret.'"

Resp. 2. Imo notat Suarez quod possent etiam aliqui actus earum virtutum in statu innocentiae elici. "Potuisset (Adam) primo exercere actus internos conditionatos, ut in poenitentia esset hic actus, si peccarem dolerem, in misericordia, si proximus indigeret, illi subvenirem. Secundo posset exercere actus complacentiae circa honestatem objectivam talium virtutum. Tertio specialiter virtus poenitentiae, quamvis non posset detestari malum commissum, ut probat ratio facta, posset odio habere peccatum, quod offertur ut committendum, et habere voluntatem non faciendi Deo injuriam. Misericordia etiam non semper, per se requirit dolorem in miserente, nam voluntas sublevandi miserum, si absque dolore haberi possit, revera erit actus misericordiae. Hoc autem modo si status innocentiae duraret, posset unus homo cadere, et alter innocens habere voluntatem subveniendi illi, cum displicentia de malo ejus, quae posset haberi sine tristitia, vel dolore." Cf. Suarez (de op. sex dier. c. 11.) 336. Nevertheless I reply, first: virtues are habits; but habits can well stand without act. For a) a habit is prior and disposes man well toward an act, whether he is going to effect that act or not. b) A habit does not regard matter as present or future, but only as possible; and thus the matter of any virtue could have a place in the state of innocence.

c) It was possible for innocent man to lose that state, which in fact he lost; and thus it was useful to have the virtues infused by accident, of which we are speaking, which would remain in him if he fell, as in fact they did remain. Hence St. Thomas rightly says, I, q. 95, a. 3, corpus: "But if the imperfection which belongs to the account of some virtue is repugnant to the perfection of the first state, such a virtue could exist there according to habit, and not according to act, as is clear concerning penitence, which is sorrow over committed sin, and concerning mercy, which is sorrow over another's misery. But both sorrow and fault and misery are repugnant to the perfection of the first state. Hence virtues of this kind were in the first man according to habit, and not according to act. For the first man was so disposed that if sin had preceded, he would grieve; and similarly if he saw misery in another, he would repel it as far as he could: just as the Philosopher says, in the Ethics, the last chapter, at the end, that 'shame, which concerns a base deed, happens to the virtuous man only under a condition; for he is so disposed that he would be ashamed if he committed something base.'"

Reply 2. Indeed Suarez notes that some acts of those virtues could also be elicited in the state of innocence. "First, Adam could have exercised conditioned internal acts, so that in penitence there would be this act: if I sinned, I would grieve; in mercy: if my neighbor were in need, I would help him. Secondly, he could exercise acts of complacency concerning the objective honesty of such virtues. Thirdly, especially the virtue of penitence, although it could not detest an evil committed, as the reason given proves, could hate sin which is offered as something to be committed, and have the will not to do injury to God. Mercy also does not always, of itself, require sorrow in the one having mercy; for the will to relieve the miserable, if it can be had without sorrow, will truly be an act of mercy. But in this way, if the state of innocence endured, one man could fall and another innocent man could have the will to help him, with displeasure concerning his evil, which could be had without sadness or sorrow." Compare Suarez (On the Work of the Six Days, chapter 11).

337. Sed hanc rectitudinem primam hominis cumulavit Deus dono exemptionis a peccato veniali. Quod, ut bene intelligatur, notandum est imprimis, peccatum veniale duplici modo committi posse: vel ex surreptione, quatenus ex imperfecta deliberatione per motum aliquem illam praevenientem committitur, uti contingere potest etiam in materia gravi; vel cum perfecta deliberatione fit, et ideo solum in materia levi locum habet. - Scotus docuit potuisse hominem in statu innocentiae peccare venialiter utroque modo. Altisiodorensis tenuit potuisse venialiter peccare cum plena deliberatione, sed non ex surreptione: tertia sententia, quam D. Thomas, D. Bonaventura, Suarez vocant communem, asserit nullo modo potuisse hominem in statu justitiae originalis venialiter peccare. "Communiter ponitur," inquit D. Thomas 1. 2. q. 89. a. 3., "quod homo in statu innocentiae non potuit venialiter peccare ... Sic ergo intelligendum est quod non potuit peccare venialiter, quia non potuit esse ut committeret aliquid quod esset de se peccatum veniale, antequam integritatem primi status amitteret, peccando mortaliter." Probatur autem.

a) Quoad venialia ex surreptione argumento D. Thomae l. c. "Peccatum veniale ex surreptione contingit propter imperfectionem actus; imperfectio autem actus contingit propter quemdam defectum ordinis ex eo quod inferius non continetur firmiter sub superiori. Quod enim in nobis insurgat subitus motus sensualitatis, contingit ex hoc quod sensualitas non est omnino subdita rationi; quod vero insurgat subitus motus in ratione ipsa, provenit in nobis ex hoc quod ipsa executio actus rationis non subditur deliberationi, quae est ex altiori bono. In statu autem innocentiae, ut in 1. habitum est, quaest. 95. art. 1. erat infallibilis ordinis firmitas, ut semper inferius contineretur sub superiori, quamdiu summum hominis contineretur sub Deo, ut etiam Augustinus dicit 14. de Civit. Dei, cap. 13. et ideo oportebat quod inordinatio in homine non esset, nisi inciperet ab hoc quod summum hominis non subderetur Deo; quod fit per peccatum mortale."

b) Quoad omnia peccata venialia. Si conferantur quae diximus de justitia originali (in qua gratia sanctificans est veluti radix et fundamentum caeterorum donorum) cum iis, quae diximus art. 7. hujus disp., praesertim ex Aug., patet Deum statuisse ut status ille justitiae illaesus et integer permaneret, quamdiu homo non averteretur ab ultimo fine; atqui si potuisset homo in eo statu peccatum veniale quocumque modo committere, status justitiae non mansisset integer et illaesus; ergo.

Prob.

min. 1. Ipsum peccatum veniale est formaliter diminutio quaedam illius status, siquidem est diminutio rectitudinis. 2. Peccatum veniale est objectum doloris et tristitiae; sed in illo statu nullus erat dolor, nulla tristitia. - 3. Immunitas ab omni poena pertinebat ad illum statum; sed per peccatum veniale fit homo reus alicujus poenae.

Unde praeclare Suarez (de op. sex dier. l. 3. c. 13. n. 24.) rem concludit, dicens: "Vivebat," inquit (Augustinus), "homo in Paradiso, sicut volebat, quamdiu hoc volebat, quod Deus jusserat, vivebat fruens Deo, ex quo bono erat bonus: vivebat sine ulla egestate." Quod verbum ultimum ponderari potest, nam pejus peccatum veniale est, quam quaelibet egestas, imo ipsummet veniale peccatum magna est miseria. Addit infra, "Summa in carne sanitas, in animo tota tranquillitas." Quomodo autem animus sapiens, et justus cum peccato veniali posset esse tranquillus? Et si in corpore summa sanitas, cur non magis in anima? at ubi est peccatum veniale, non est summa animae sanitas. Et subjunxit inferius, "Nihil omnino triste, nihil inaniter laetum." Est autem inanis laetitia quoddam genus venialis peccati; ergo, sicut hoc ab illo statu August. excludit, ita censet de reliquis, est enim eadem ratio. Cf. integrum cit. cap. ex Suarez. 337. But God heaped up this first rectitude of man with the gift of exemption from venial sin. In order that this may be well understood, it must first be noted that venial sin can be committed in two ways: either by surreption, insofar as it is committed from imperfect deliberation through some motion anticipating that deliberation, as can happen even in grave matter; or it happens with perfect deliberation, and therefore has place only in light matter. Scotus taught that man in the state of innocence could have sinned venially in each way. The Altisiodorensian held that he could have sinned venially with full deliberation, but not by surreption. The third opinion, which St. Thomas, St. Bonaventure, and Suarez call common, asserts that man in the state of original justice could in no way have sinned venially. "It is commonly posited," says St. Thomas, I-II, q. 89, a. 3, "that man in the state of innocence could not sin venially ... Therefore it must be understood in this way, that he could not sin venially, because it could not be that he would commit something which of itself was venial sin before he lost the integrity of the first state by sinning mortally." But it is proved:

a) With respect to venial sins by surreption, by the argument of St. Thomas in the cited place. "Venial sin by surreption occurs on account of the imperfection of the act; but imperfection of the act occurs on account of a certain defect of order, from the fact that the lower is not firmly contained under the higher. For that a sudden motion of sensuality rises up in us happens from the fact that sensuality is not altogether subject to reason; but that a sudden motion rises up in reason itself arises in us from the fact that the very execution of the act of reason is not subjected to deliberation, which is from a higher good. But in the state of innocence, as was held in I, q. 95, a. 1, there was infallible firmness of order, so that the lower was always contained under the higher, as long as man's highest part was contained under God, as Augustine also says in book 14 of The City of God, chapter 13. And therefore disorder in man had to exist only if it began from this, that man's highest part was not subject to God; which happens through mortal sin."

b) With respect to all venial sins. If the things which we have said concerning original justice, in which sanctifying grace is as it were the root and foundation of the other gifts, are compared with those things which we said in article 7 of this disputation, especially from Augustine, it is clear that God established that that state of justice should remain unharmed and whole as long as man did not turn away from the last end. But if man in that state could have committed venial sin in any way whatever, the state of justice would not have remained whole and unharmed. Therefore.

Proof of the minor. 1. Venial sin itself is formally a certain diminution of that state, since it is a diminution of rectitude. 2. Venial sin is the object of sorrow and sadness; but in that state there was no sorrow, no sadness. 3. Immunity from every punishment pertained to that state; but through venial sin man becomes guilty of some punishment.

Hence Suarez excellently concludes the matter (On the Work of the Six Days, book 3, chapter 13, n. 24), saying: "Man lived," says Augustine, "in Paradise as he wished, as long as he wished what God had commanded; he lived enjoying God, from whose good he was good; he lived without any want." This last word can be weighed, for venial sin is worse than any want whatever; indeed venial sin itself is a great misery. He adds below, "Highest health in the flesh, entire tranquillity in the soul." But how could a wise and just soul be tranquil

with venial sin? And if there was highest health in the body, why not more so in the soul? But where there is venial sin, there is not highest health of soul. And he adds below, "Nothing at all sad, nothing vainly glad." But vain gladness is a certain kind of venial sin; therefore, just as Augustine excludes this from that state, so he judges concerning the rest, for the reason is the same. Compare the whole cited chapter from Suarez.

Article 10. On the End to which the First Parents were Destined

LatineEnglish

Corrected Latin Text
Articulus Decimus.
De Fine ad Quem Destinati Fuerunt Primi Parentes.

338. Finis connaturaliter debitus gratiae sanctificanti est visio Dei intuitiva. - De hoc agi etiam solet in tract. de Deo, in quaestione de Dei visibilitate; et in tractatu de beatitudine. Quaestio hujus loci propria est de visionis intuitivae supernaturalitate. Hanc pertractantes, quae ad ejus intelligentiam sunt omnino necessaria delibabimus. 338. The end connaturally owed to sanctifying grace is the intuitive vision of God. This is also usually treated in the treatise on God, in the question concerning the visibility of God, and in the treatise on beatitude. The question proper to this place concerns the supernaturality of the intuitive vision. In treating this, we shall touch upon the things which are altogether necessary for understanding it.

§ I.
Quid Sit Visio Intuitiva Dei. § I.
What The Intuitive Vision Of God Is.

339. In Constitutione Benedicti XII, quae incipit Benedictus Deus, 4. Kal. Febr. 1336., legitur: "Hac in perpetuum valitura constitutione auctoritate Apostolica definimus, quod ... animae Sanctorum vident divinam essentiam visione intuitiva et etiam faciali, nulla mediante creatura in ratione objecti visi se habente, sed divina essentia immediate se nude, clare et aperte eis ostendente." - Conc. Florent. in Decr. unionis Graecorum declaravit animas Sanctorum "intueri clare ipsum Deum trinum et unum, sicuti est." 339. In the Constitution of Benedict XII which begins Benedictus Deus, February 4, 1336, it is read: "By this constitution, to have force in perpetuity, we define by Apostolic authority that ... the souls of the Saints see the divine essence with intuitive and also face-to-face vision, with no creature mediating in the account of object seen, but with the divine essence immediately showing itself to them nakedly, clearly, and openly." - The Council of Florence, in the Decree of Union with the Greeks, declared that the souls of the Saints "clearly behold the triune and one God himself, just as he is."

340. Ut haec Ecclesiae doctrina intelligatur, notamus imprimis cum D. Thoma 1. p. q. 67. a. 1. quod nomen visionis "primo impositum est ad significandum actum sensus visus; sed propter dignitatem et certitudinem hujus sensus extensum est hoc nomen, secundum usum loquentium, ad omnem cognitionem aliorum sensuum; dicimus enim: Vide quomodo sapit, vel quomodo redolet, vel quomodo est calidum, et ulterius etiam ad cognitionem intellectus secundum illud Matth. 5. 8.: 'Beati mundo corde, quoniam ipsi Deum videbunt.'" 340. In order that this doctrine of the Church may be understood, we first note with St. Thomas, I, q. 67, a. 1, that the name vision "was first imposed to signify the act of the sense of sight; but on account of the dignity and certitude of this sense, this name was extended, according to the usage of speakers, to every cognition of the other senses. For we say: See how it

tastes, or how it smells, or how hot it is; and further even to the cognition of the intellect, according to Matthew 5:8: 'Blessed are the clean of heart, for they shall see God.'"

341. Ex his sequitur quod visio differt a simplici cognitione tripliciter. Cognitio potest esse confusa et obscura; visio debet esse clara et distincta. Cognitio potest esse abstractiva; visio debet esse intuitiva - cognitio potest esse mediata; visio debet esse immediata. 341. From these things it follows that vision differs from simple cognition in three ways. Cognition can be confused and obscure; vision must be clear and distinct. Cognition can be abstractive; vision must be intuitive. Cognition can be mediate; vision must be immediate.

342. Visio debet esse 1. cognitio clara et distincta, quatenus res secundum entitatem suam propriam cognoscitur; quo modo color videtur ab oculo. Et haec opponitur 1. confusae cognitioni, qua res per accidens cognoscitur, ut homo sub conceptu visibilis; 2. cognitioni, qua res per superiora essentialia cognoscitur, ut homo conceptu animalis. Est ergo cognitio clara et distincta, quum per se ipsam vel quidditatem propriam res cognoscitur. 342. Vision must be, first, clear and distinct cognition, insofar as the thing is known according to its own proper entity, in the way in which color is seen by the eye. And this is opposed, first, to confused cognition, by which a thing is known per accidens, as man under the concept of visible; second, to cognition by which a thing is known through higher essentials, as man by the concept of animal. Therefore cognition is clear and distinct when the thing is known through itself or through its proper quiddity.

343. Visio debet esse 2. cognitio intuitiva, quatenus res quidem secundum se cognoscitur, et in sua praesentia cognoscitur, uti est, ex. gr., illa qua video corpus meum. Haec opponitur cognitioni, quae dicitur abstractiva, qua cognoscere quidem possum rem secundum suam propriam entitatem, sed non secundum praesentiam. "Et attende," inquit Toledo in 1. p. q. 12. a. 2., "quod abstractiva non abstrahit ab existentia, ut quidam dicunt, quia cognoscitur res abstractive cum existentia, quia cognoscitur ut existens; sed abstrahit a praesentia." - Suarez autem (de Deo, l. 2. c. 18. n. 5.) addit: "Licet per causam vel effectum possit cognosci res ut existens, etiamsi absens sit, et in se non videatur; tamen quod existentia rei evidenter cognoscatur in se ipsa absque alio medio cognito, intelligi non potest absque praesentia rei, maxime si talis cognitio sit propria ipsius rei prout in se est. Deinde inquiro, quid nomine praesentiae intelligatur, si enim est indistantia localis, haec et necessaria non est ad intuitivam visionem, ut patet in visu corporeo, et intellectu Angelico, qui intueri potest res etiamsi loco distent, et praeterea hoc non habet locum in Deo, qui cum sit immensus videri non potest ut loco distans a vidente. Aut illa praesentia est objectiva, et haec deesse non potest respectu actus, quia fit per ipsammet visionem; ergo non potest esse visio rei existentis in se ipsa, et prout in se est, quin illa res sit objective praesens intellectui per ipsam visionem." 343. Vision must be, secondly, intuitive cognition, insofar as the thing is indeed known according to itself and is known in its presence, as, for example, the cognition by which I see my body. This is opposed to the cognition which is called abstractive, by which I can indeed know a thing according to its proper entity, but not according to presence. "And observe," says Toledo on I, q. 12, a. 2, "that abstractive cognition does not abstract from existence, as some say, because a thing is known abstractively with existence, since it is known as existing; but it abstracts from presence." But Suarez (On God, book 2, chapter 18, n. 5) adds: "Although through a cause or effect a thing can be known as existing, even if it is absent and is not seen in itself, nevertheless that the existence of a thing be evidently known in itself without another known medium cannot be understood without the presence of the thing, especially if such cognition is proper to the thing itself as it is in itself. Then I ask what is understood by the name presence. For if it is local undistance, this is neither necessary for intuitive vision, as is clear in bodily sight and in the Angelic intellect, which can intuit

things even if they are distant in place, and besides this has no place in God, who, since he is immense, cannot be seen as locally distant from the one seeing. Or that presence is objective, and this cannot be lacking with respect to the act, because it is made through the vision itself. Therefore there cannot be vision of a thing existing in itself, and as it is in itself, unless that thing is objectively present to the intellect through the vision itself."

344. Hinc patet cur visio Dei intuitiva dicitur etiam cognitio Dei sicuti est, seu quidditativa; eam enim nihil aliud esse intelligimus quam propriam rei cognitionem per quam de illa re cognoscuntur omnes proprietates essentiales, ipsa essentia ejus - cur visio Dei intuitiva opponitur cognitioni in aenigmate; huic enim opponitur cognitio clara et distincta - cur denique visio intuitiva Dei opponitur cognitioni ex parte, cum enim Deus simplicissimus sit, quando secundum praesentiam cognoscitur, totus cognoscitur. 344. Hence it is clear why the intuitive vision of God is also called cognition of God just as he is, or quidditative cognition; for we understand it to be nothing other than the proper cognition of a thing through which all the essential properties of that thing, its very essence, are known. It is also clear why the intuitive vision of God is opposed to cognition in a riddle; for clear and distinct cognition is opposed to this. Finally, it is clear why the intuitive vision of God is opposed to partial cognition, since, because God is most simple, when he is known according to presence, he is known whole.

345. "Visio debet esse cognitio immediata. Qua in re notari debet quadruplex esse medium, quo aliqua res cognosci a nobis potest; puta quo, sub quo, in quo, per quod. Quo id est, quod se tenet ex parte objecti, et recipitur in potentia ipsam ad cognitionem determinans; et hoc vocatur species objecti. Non est species, quae cognoscitur, sed qua aliquid cognoscitur. Sub quo est id, quod vel potentiam roborat ad cognoscendum, vel ipsum objectum ad agendum in potentiam: et hoc in oculo est lumen sensibile, et in intellectu lumen quoddam spirituale, quidquid hoc sit. In quo id est, quod est rei similitudo aliqua: unde ipsum cognoscentes dicimur rem illam cognoscere; ita tamen, quod non procedit cognitio ultra illud medium, quo modo dum omnia ista cognoscimus, aliquo modo Deum cognoscimus; sed in istis, et tanto magis, quanto res est perfectior; nam exactior erit similitudo. Per quod est, quando ex cognitione ejus ascendimus, et formamus alterius cognitionem; quod in discursu fit, quo per effectus cognitionem veniamus in earum notitiam. Et sic dicitur ad Rom. 1. 'Invisibilia Dei, per ea quae facta sunt, intellecta, conspiciuntur.'" Ita Tolet. l. c. - Vid. etiam D. Thomam quodlib. 7. art. 1.

Visio Dei intuitiva certe non dicitur immediata quatenus excludit medium sub quo, illud enim, ut videbimus, est lumen gloriae quod admitti debet; imo medium sub quo proprie non facit ut cognitio non sit immediata - certe, ex cit. Const. Ben. XII, excludit medium in quo et per quod. - Quaestio solum est de medio quo. 345. "Vision must be immediate cognition. In this matter it must be noted that there is a fourfold medium by which some thing can be known by us, namely: `quo`, `sub quo`, `in quo`, and `per quod`. The medium `quo` is that which holds itself on the part of the object and is received in the power, determining it to cognition; and this is called the species of the object. It is not the species which is known, but that by which something is known. The medium `sub quo` is that which either strengthens the power for knowing, or strengthens the object itself for acting upon the power; and this in the eye is sensible light, and in the intellect a certain spiritual light, whatever this may be. The medium `in quo` is that which is some likeness of the thing; hence, knowing it, we are said to know that thing, yet in such a way that cognition does not proceed beyond that medium. In this way, when we know all those things, we somehow know God, but in those things, and so much the more as the thing is more perfect; for the likeness will be more exact. The medium `per quod` exists when from cognition of it we ascend and form cognition of another; this occurs in discourse, by which through cognition of effects we come into knowledge of their causes. And thus it is said at Romans 1: 'The invisible things of God, being understood through the things that have been made, are beheld.'" Thus Toledo in the cited place. - See also St. Thomas,

Quodlibet 7, article 1.

The intuitive vision of God certainly is not called immediate insofar as it excludes the medium `sub quo`; for that, as we shall see, is the light of glory, which must be admitted. Indeed the medium `sub quo` properly does not make cognition non-immediate. Certainly, from the cited Constitution of Benedict XII, it excludes the medium `in quo` and `per quod`. The question is only about the medium `quo`.

Corrected Latin Text

346. Necessitatem medii quo ad cognitionem in genere sic explicat D. Th. 1. p. q. 12. a. 2.: "Ad visionem tam sensibilem, quam intellectualem, duo requiruntur, scilicet virtus visiva, et unio rei visae cum visu. Non enim fit visio in actu, nisi per hoc quod res visa quodammodo est in vidente. Et in rebus quidem corporalibus apparet quod res visa non potest esse in vidente per suam essentiam, sed solum per suam similitudinem; sicut similitudo lapidis est in oculo, per quam fit visio in actu, non autem ipsa substantia lapidis." 346. St. Thomas explains the necessity of the medium `quo` for cognition in general in this way, I, q. 12, a. 2: "For vision, both sensible and intellectual, two things are required, namely the visual power and the union of the thing seen with sight. For vision does not come about in act except through this, that the thing seen is in some way in the one seeing. And in corporeal things it is apparent that the thing seen cannot be in the one seeing through its essence, but only through its likeness; just as the likeness of the stone is in the eye, through which vision comes about in act, but not the substance itself of the stone."

347. Ut autem innotescat qualis sit similitudo objecti, quae est in cognoscente, animadvertendum est cum Suarez (de Deo, l. 2. c. 13. n. 1.) quod "triplex similitudo potest in mente intelligi per quam possit fieri cognitio alicujus rei, quas nominare possumus, impressam, expressam, et objectivam, seu per modum actus primi, vel per modum actus secundi, vel per modum objecti, seu repraesentantem effective, formaliter, vel objective. Exemplum sensibile esse potest in visu: datur enim species impressa, datur etiam actus videndi, qui censetur etiam esse similitudo intentionalis. Et dicitur formaliter repraesentare, quia informando potentiam facit illi praesens objectum, et ideo dicitur etiam repraesentare in actu secundo, in quo differt ab specie impressa, quae tantum effective, et de se in actu primo repraesentat. Conveniunt vero inter se, quod ipsae per se loquendo, et in cognitione directa, non videntur, quando per eas videtur objectum, quia non terminant visionem sed altera est principium ejus, altera est ipsa visio. Praeter has vero dari potest similitudo objectiva, ut in visu esse potest imago amici exterius proposita ad intuendum in illa amicum." 347. But in order that it may become known what sort of likeness of the object is in the knower, it must be observed with Suarez (On God, book 2, chapter 13, n. 1) that "a threefold likeness can be understood in the mind through which cognition of some thing can come about, which we can name impressed, expressed, and objective, or by way of first act, or by way of second act, or by way of object, or as representing effectively, formally, or objectively. A sensible example can be found in sight: for there is an impressed species, and there is also the act of seeing, which is also judged to be an intentional likeness. And it is said to represent formally, because by informing the power it makes the object present to it; and therefore it is also said to represent in second act, in which it differs from the impressed species, which represents only effectively and of itself in first act. But they agree with each other in this, that, speaking per se and in direct cognition, they themselves are not seen when the object is seen through them, because they do not terminate the vision; rather one is its principle, the other is the vision itself. Besides these, there can be an objective likeness, as in sight there can be an image of a friend externally proposed for intuiting the friend in it."

348. Similitudo objectiva jam exclusa est a visione intuitiva excludendo medium in quo; ergo superest ut medium quo sit similitudo impressa vel

expressa, quae dici solet species. De utraque specie, impressa et expressa, quaeritur utrum locum habeat in visione Dei intuitiva. 348. Objective likeness has already been excluded from intuitive vision by excluding the medium `in quo`; therefore it remains that the medium `quo` is an impressed or expressed likeness, which is usually called a species. Concerning each species, impressed and expressed, it is asked whether it has a place in the intuitive vision of God.

349. Quoad speciem impressam, quamvis diversa ejus munera distingui soleant (Vid. Suarez l. c. cap. 12. nn. 6-13.), praecipuum tamen quod maxime ad rem nostram facit, est ut determinet intellectum ad actum. Intellectus enim cum sit potentia, de se indeterminatus est ad agendum; ut ergo in actum prodeat, indiget determinari - haec determinatio nequit procedere nisi ab objecto - objectum nequit intellectum determinare, nisi aliquo pacto illi uniatur - haec unio debet fieri in ipso intellectu, hujus enim operationes sunt vitales et immanentes: unde illud "cognitio contingit secundum quod cognitum est in cognoscente" - nequit objectum conjungi semper per seipsum cum potentia cognoscitiva; necesse est ergo ut imprimat in potentia suam similitudinem, tamquam sui vicariam, per quam veluti foecundet potentiam cognoscitivam, et constituat illam in actu primo proximo et completo ad cognoscendum. 349. With respect to impressed species, although its various offices are usually distinguished (see Suarez in the cited place, chapter 12, nn. 6-13), nevertheless the principal one, which most pertains to our matter, is that it determines the intellect to act. For since the intellect is a potency, of itself it is undetermined for acting; therefore in order that it proceed into act, it needs to be determined. This determination cannot proceed except from the object. The object cannot determine the intellect unless in some way it is united to it. This union must take place in the intellect itself, for its operations are vital and immanent; hence that phrase, "cognition occurs according as the thing known is in the knower." The object cannot always be joined through itself with the cognitive power. Therefore it is necessary that it impress in the power its likeness, as its vicar, through which it as it were fecundates the cognitive power and constitutes it in first act, proximate and complete for knowing.

350. Jamvero est sententia D. Thomae fere communi (nunc communi) Theologorum consensu tempore Suaresii recepta (l. c. c. 12. n. 21.), quod visio Dei intuitiva de facto est sine specie impressa. Nam species impressa, in visione intuitiva, superflua est; ergo de facto non datur. Prob. antec. Species impressa necessaria est, ut suppleat defectum objecti, quod per seipsum nequit uniri potentiae et sic illam determinare, vel quia non existit, vel quia non est praesens, vel quia per seipsum non est proxime intelligibile. Atqui nullum horum accidit in Deo, qui necessario existit, potest fieri intime praesens intellectui beato, et quia actualissimus, est summe intelligibilis. Ergo. 350. Now it is the opinion of St. Thomas, received in the time of Suarez by the almost common, now common, consent of theologians (cited place, chapter 12, n. 21), that the intuitive vision of God in fact is without impressed species. For impressed species in intuitive vision is superfluous; therefore in fact it is not given. The antecedent is proved. Impressed species is necessary in order to supply the defect of an object which cannot through itself be united to the power and thus determine it, either because it does not exist, or because it is not present, or because through itself it is not proximately intelligible. But none of these things occurs in God, who necessarily exists, can be made intimately present to the blessed intellect, and, because he is most actual, is supremely intelligible. Therefore.

351. Sed quaeri hic solet, utrum saltem de potentia Dei absoluta possit dari species impressa in visione Dei intuitiva. - Discrepant hac in re Doctores. Card. Tolet. autem revocat hanc ad aliam quaestionem, utrum nempe species impressa sit similitudo formalis objecti, vel solum effectiva, ut audivimus superius a Suarez, aut etiam virtualis, quatenus non est "similitudo

aliqua formalis, vel imago depicta ipsius objecti, sed solum est veluti semen et instrumentum, in quo sufficit virtualis assimilatio" uti loquitur idem Auctor (c. 12. n. 12.) - Qui primum tenent (vid. Sylv. in 1. p. q. 12. a. 2.), negant dari posse in visione intuitiva Dei speciem impressam, siquidem impossibile est, aiunt, ut ulla creata species repraesentet perfecte formaliter Deum. Qui alterum vero, consequenter docent de potentia Dei absoluta dari posse in visione intuitiva Dei speciem intelligibilem. Aliis tamen videtur eadem species esse possibilis, licet concedatur istam esse formalem objecti similitudinem. Cf. Suarez l. c. cap. 13. 351. But here it is usually asked whether at least by the absolute power of God an impressed species could be given in the intuitive vision of God. The Doctors differ in this matter. Cardinal Toledo, however, recalls this to another question, namely whether impressed species is a formal likeness of the object, or only an effective one, as we heard above from Suarez, or even a virtual one, insofar as it is not "some formal likeness or painted image of the object itself, but is only like a seed and instrument, in which virtual assimilation suffices," as the same Author speaks (chapter 12, n. 12). Those who hold the first (see Sylvius on I, q. 12, a. 2) deny that an impressed species can be given in the intuitive vision of God, since it is impossible, they say, that any created species should perfectly represent God formally. But those who hold the second consequently teach that by the absolute power of God an intelligible species can be given in the intuitive vision of God. Yet to others the same species seems possible, even though it is conceded that it is a formal likeness of the object. Compare Suarez in the cited place, chapter 13.

352. Factum solum respicientes, concludimus cum Valentia (tom. 1. disp. 1. q. 12. p. 2.): Ex his "primo intelligitur, essentiam divinam duplici nomine concurrere ad visionem beatificam, videlicet et ut universalissimum agens est, et ut objectum est talis visionis. Secundo, intelligitur, quidnam sit illud quod dici solet, essentiam divinam supplere in proposito vicem speciei intelligibilis, juxta doctrinam D. Thomae hic articul. 2. ad 3. Est enim nihil aliud, quam praestari per essentiam divinam in illa visione beatifica multo melius id, quod solet per se praestari ab intelligibili specie; nempe ut et concurrat cum intellectu ex parte objecti ad eam visionem, et reddat proinde intellectum potentem complete ad intelligendum, seu videndum. Nam ut essentia divina, tamquam objectum ejus intellectionis, perfectius unitur se ipsa cum intellectu, sicut fons et principium ejus, quam si uniretur ei solum secundum aliquod accidens, quod esset ipsius similitudo, et inhaereret intellectui; ita etiam perfectius munera illa speciei intelligibilis in proposito praestat. Quod enim species intelligibilis sit accidens, et inhaereat, id non requiritur ad intellectionem per se, sicut docet optime D. Thomas 1. p. q. 56. a. 1. Tertio hinc intelligitur, quomodo id accipi debeat, quod recte a Theologis dici solet, intellectum beati constitui formaliter in actu primo intelligibili per essentiam divinam, ut supplentem in proposito vicem speciei. Est enim hoc nihil aliud, quam quod jam dictum est; nempe reddi intellectum potentem per illam ad eliciendam intellectionem, seu visionem beatificam, quatenus ipsa scilicet essentia divina, tamquam objectum, cum intellectu concurrit ad hanc operationem." 352. Looking only to the fact, we conclude with Valencia (tome 1, disputation 1, q. 12, p. 2): From these things "first it is understood that the divine essence concurs with the beatific vision under a twofold title, namely both as the most universal agent and as the object of such vision. Secondly, it is understood what that is which is usually said: that the divine essence in the present matter supplies the place of the intelligible species, according to the doctrine of St. Thomas here, article 2, ad 3. For it is nothing other than that through the divine essence in that beatific vision there is provided, much better, what is usually provided per se by an intelligible species; namely that it both concurs with the intellect on the part of the object for that vision, and consequently renders the intellect completely able to understand or see. For just as the divine essence, as the object of that intellection, is more perfectly united by itself with the intellect, as its source and principle, than if it were united to it only according to some accident which would be its likeness and would inhere in the intellect; so also it more perfectly provides in the present matter those offices of the intelligible species. For that an intelligible species is an accident and inheres is not required for

intellection per se, as St. Thomas teaches excellently, I, q. 56, a. 1. Thirdly, from this it is understood how that should be taken which is rightly usually said by theologians: that the intellect of the blessed is constituted formally in intelligible first act through the divine essence, as supplying in the present matter the place of a species. For this is nothing other than what has already been said, namely that through it the intellect is rendered able to elicit intellection, or beatific vision, insofar as the divine essence itself, as object, concurs with the intellect for this operation."

353. Nunc de specie expressa. Ac imprimis, dari hanc speciem expressam seu verbum mentis, si agatur de cognitione intellectuali in genere, certissimum est ex sententia non modo Philosophorum, sed etiam Theologorum et Patrum, qui hac via explicant generationem Verbi Divini per actum cognitionis aeterni Patris. 353. Now concerning expressed species. And first, that this expressed species, or word of the mind, is given, if the discussion concerns intellectual cognition in general, is most certain from the opinion not only of philosophers, but also of theologians and Fathers, who explain in this way the generation of the Divine Word through the act of cognition of the eternal Father.

354. Quid autem sit hoc verbum mentis, nequit melius exprimi quam verbis D. Thomae (de pot. q. 8. a. 1.): "Intelligens," inquit, "in intelligendo ad quatuor potest habere ordinem: scilicet ad rem quae intelligitur, ad speciem intelligibilem, qua fit intellectus in actu, ad suum intelligere, et ad conceptionem intellectus. Quae quidem conceptio a tribus praedictis differt. A re quidem intellecta, quia res intellecta est interdum extra intellectum; conceptio autem intellectus non est nisi in intellectu; et iterum conceptio intellectus ordinatur ad rem intellectam sicut ad finem; propter hoc enim intellectus conceptionem rei in se format ut rem intellectam cognoscat. Differt autem a specie intelligibili: nam species intelligibilis, qua fit intellectus in actu, consideratur ut principium actionis intellectus; cum omne agens agat secundum quod est in actu; actu autem fit per aliquam formam, quam oportet esse actionis principium. Differt autem ab actione intellectus; quia praedicta conceptio consideratur ut terminus actionis, et quasi quoddam per ipsam constitutum. Intellectus enim sua actione format rei definitionem, vel etiam propositionem affirmativam seu negativam. Haec autem conceptio intellectus in nobis proprie verbum dicitur: hoc enim est quod verbo exteriori significatur: vox enim exterior neque significat ipsum intellectum, neque speciem intelligibilem, neque actum intellectus; sed intellectus conceptionem qua mediante refertur ad rem." 354. But what this word of the mind is cannot be better expressed than by the words of St. Thomas (On Power, q. 8, a. 1): "The one understanding," he says, "in understanding can have order to four things: namely to the thing which is understood, to the intelligible species by which the intellect is made in act, to its own understanding, and to the conception of the intellect. This conception indeed differs from the three aforesaid. From the thing understood, because the thing understood is sometimes outside the intellect; but the conception of the intellect is only in the intellect; and again the conception of the intellect is ordered to the thing understood as to an end, for because of this the intellect forms in itself the conception of the thing, so that it may know the thing understood. But it differs from the intelligible species: for the intelligible species, by which the intellect is made in act, is considered as the principle of the action of the intellect, since every agent acts according as it is in act; and it is made in act through some form, which must be the principle of action. But it differs from the action of the intellect, because the aforesaid conception is considered as the term of the action and as something constituted by it. For by its action the intellect forms the definition of the thing, or also an affirmative or negative proposition. But this conception of the intellect in us is properly called word; for this is what is signified by the exterior word. For the exterior voice signifies neither the intellect itself, nor the intelligible species, nor the act of the intellect, but the conception of the intellect by mediation of which it is referred to the thing."

355. Ex quo colligimus 1. quod praeter similitudinem objecti, quam objectum ipsum imprimit in intellectu (species impressa) datur similitudo objecti, quam ipse intellectus intelligendo exprimit intra se (species expressa): unde illud: "intellectus intelligendo fit quodammodo omnia." - 2. Quod haec species expressa, cum procedat ab intellectu per modum partus cujusdam vitalis et interni, dicitur conceptus. - 3. Quod cum intellectus, sibi exprimendo objectum quasi interne sibi loquatur, species expressa dicitur etiam verbum. "Advertendum est," inquit Suarez (de anima l. 3. c. 5. n. 10.), "verbum dicere primo dictum esse de vocibus, tamen hinc transferri ad specialem loquutionem, quae intelligendo fit, est enim quaedam loquutio in mente, qua quis sibimet loquitur, unde verbum dicere usitatissime tribuitur loquutioni spirituali, juxta illud Matthaei 9. et Lucae 1. 'Scribae et pharisaei dicebant intra se,' et Sapientiae 1. 'Dixerunt impii intra se cogitantes,' et in Psalmo 13. 'Dixit insipiens in corde suo,' etc., dicere ergo, et loqui proprie usurpatur de actibus intellectus, ex quo colligit August. 15. de Trinitate cap. 10. vocem verbum extentam esse ad significandum proprie conceptum mentis, ideo forte, quia loquutio exterior ex interiori dimanat." 355. From this we gather, first, that besides the likeness of the object which the object itself impresses in the intellect (the impressed species), there is given a likeness of the object which the intellect itself, by understanding, expresses within itself (the expressed species); hence that phrase: "the intellect by understanding becomes in some way all things." Secondly, that this expressed species, since it proceeds from the intellect by way of a certain vital and internal birth, is called concept. Thirdly, that since the intellect, by expressing the object to itself, as it were speaks internally to itself, the expressed species is also called word. "It must be observed," says Suarez (On the Soul, book 3, chapter 5, n. 10), "that to say a word was first said of voices; nevertheless from here it is transferred to the special speech which occurs by understanding, for there is a certain speech in the mind by which one speaks to oneself. Hence to say a word is very commonly attributed to spiritual speech, according to that passage of Matthew 9 and Luke 1, 'The scribes and Pharisees were saying within themselves,' and Wisdom 1, 'The impious said within themselves, thinking,' and in Psalm 13, 'The fool said in his heart,' etc. Therefore to say and to speak are properly used of acts of the intellect, from which Augustine gathers, book 15 On the Trinity, chapter 10, that the word `word` has been extended to signify properly the concept of the mind, perhaps for this reason, because exterior speech flows from interior speech."

356. His itaque praestitutis de natura verbi mentalis, et de ejus existentia quoad cognitionem intellectualem in genere, quaestio est utrum detur etiam in visione intuitiva Dei. Haec quaestio multum agitari solet a Theologis: nobis sufficiet sequentia adnotare.

1. Si quaeratur utrum Beati videntes Deum intuitive habeant in suo intellectu aliquam Dei similitudinem, quidquid tandem sit ea similitudo; responsio unanimis est affirmativa. Unde illud: "similes ei erimus, quoniam videbimus eum sicuti est."

2. Si Verbum mentis dicatur esse ipsa intellectio, seu actio intelligendi, nulla facta distinctione; responsio certa est in visione intuitiva dari verbum seu speciem expressam. Hoc tam certum est, quam certum est dari visionem, quae sit actus intellectus Beatorum. Unde hac in re conveniunt etiam recentiores Thomistae, quidquid veteres dixerint. Vid. Gotti tract. 3. q. 3. dub. 1. §. 3. fin.; Billuart, de Deo Dis. 4. a. 6. ob. 8. - Ita saltem videntur intelligenda quae habet S. Augustinus (de Trin. l. 9. c. 11.): "Cum Deum novimus, ea notitia ... verbum est, fitque aliqua Dei similitudo illa notitia." - Et (l. 15. c. 16.): "Cum similes ei erimus, quando videbimus eum sicuti est, tunc quidem verbum nostrum non erit falsum." - Et (de civ. Dei l. 14. c. 17.): "In hac imagine tunc perfecta erit similitudo, quando Dei erit perfecta visio."

3. In ipsa intellectione distingui debet, saltem distinctione rationis, ratio actionis et ratio similitudinis, repraesentationis, verbi. "Hujusmodi enim conceptio," inquit D. Th., cit. l. de pot., "sive verbum, qua intellectus noster intelligit rem aliam a se, ab alio exoritur, et aliud repraesentat. Oritur quidem ab intellectu per suum actum; est autem similitudo rei intellectae." Si autem sola rationis distinctio admittitur inter actionem intelligendi et conceptum seu verbum, evidens est ex dictis quod in visione intuitiva Dei datur verbum.

4. Ut ergo intelligatur ratio

discrepantiae inter Doctores quoad quaestionem, utrum in visione intuitiva Dei datur verbum mentale, alia theoria recolenda est, a qua illa quaestio quodammodo pendet. - Docent ergo aliqui intellectionem posse considerari in fieri et in facto esse: in fieri habet, aiunt, rationem actionis et productionis; in facto esse habet rationem termini, ideoque verbi, siquidem verbum est terminus intellectionis. Jamvero, dicunt, verbum idem est cum intellectione in facto esse; sed distinguitur ab intellectione in fieri, sicut terminus productus ab actione qua producitur: hanc autem distinctionem dicunt esse modalem. Cf. Suarez (de anim. l. 3. c. 5.) - Applicantes hanc theoriam quaestioni praesenti, statuunt visionem intuitivam in fieri esse actionem productivam termini seu verbi, quod modaliter distinguitur a visione in fieri, quamvis idem sit cum visione in facto esse. Verbum proinde definiunt "esse qualitatem, quae per actionem intelligendi in mente fit, et ab ea ita pendet, ut non duret nisi quamdiu mens actu cogitat, seu operatur ... qualitatem illam esse imaginem repraesentantem aliquo expresso modo rem cognitam." Cf. Suarez (de Deo l. 2. c. 11.) - Hoc autem non impedit quominus visio intuitiva Dei sit immediata, quia in cognitione directa verbum non est id quod cognoscitur, sed id quo cognoscitur, actio enim "quae in visione beatifica intervenit, immediate tendit ad verbum creatum ut ad rem productam, ad Deum vero ut ad objectum, quia ad illum tendit, ut ad rem cognoscendam, non ad suum terminum." Suarez (l. c. n. 10.)

Aliis vero Theologis, inter quos de Lugo (de Incarn. disp. 19. n. 20.) videtur visio intuitiva prout est actio solum virtualiter distingui a visione prout est conceptus seu verbum. Cum ergo negant dari in visione intuitiva verbum creatum, proprie negant dari illam qualitatem ex natura rei distinctam a visione in fieri. Vid. Sylv. in 1. p. q. 12. a. 2.

Theologi primae sententiae urgent hanc rationem: quaelibet actio debet habere terminum; sed visio intuitiva est actio; ergo debet habere terminum; visio autem intuitiva est actio intellectus, et terminus hujus actionis non est nisi verbum. Ergo.

Resp. alterius sententiae Auctores distinguendo: omnis actio debet habere terminum, nempe vel objectum ad quod tendat et in quo sistat, vel aliquid quod producat con.; semper terminum, quem producat neg.

Inst. primi: Actio semper est alicujus productiva, ergo, cum visio intuitiva sit actio, debet habere terminum, quem producat.

Resp. alii: negando omnem actionem esse productionem. Visio intuitiva, aiunt, est vitalis tendentia intellectus in Deum proxime et immediate sibi intelligibilem. "Quaerenti ergo, quid visione beata agit beatus, respondendum est eum hoc agere quod ejus intellectus sit actu intelligens et perfectus, quodque intellectionem elicit et Deum videt." 356. Therefore, with these things laid down concerning the nature of the mental word and concerning its existence with respect to intellectual cognition in general, the question is whether it is also given in the intuitive vision of God. This question is usually much discussed by theologians; it will be enough for us to note the following things.

1. If it is asked whether the Blessed, seeing God intuitively, have in their intellect some likeness of God, whatever in the end that likeness may be, the unanimous response is affirmative. Hence that phrase: "we shall be like him, because we shall see him just as he is."

2. If the word of the mind is said to be intellection itself, or the action of understanding, with no distinction made, the certain response is that in the intuitive vision there is given a word or expressed species. This is as certain as it is certain that there is given a vision which is an act of the intellect of the Blessed. Hence in this matter even the more recent Thomists agree, whatever the older ones may have said. See Gotti, treatise 3, q. 3, doubt 1, § 3, end; Billuart, On God, disputation 4, a. 6, objection 8. - At least in this way those things which St. Augustine has seem to be understood (On the Trinity, book 9, chapter 11): "When we know God, that knowledge ... is a word, and some likeness of God is made by that knowledge." - And (book 15, chapter 16): "When we shall be like him, when we shall see him just as he is, then indeed our word will not be false." - And (The City of God, book 14, chapter 17): "In this image the likeness will then be perfect, when the vision of God will be perfect."

3. In intellection itself there must be distinguished, at least by a distinction of reason, the account of action and the account of likeness, representation, word. "For a conception of this kind," says St. Thomas in the cited book On Power, "or word, by which our intellect understands a thing other than itself, arises from one thing and represents another. It arises indeed from the intellect through its act, but it is the likeness of the thing

understood." But if only a distinction of reason is admitted between the action of understanding and the concept or word, it is evident from what has been said that in the intuitive vision of God there is given a word.

4. Therefore, so that the reason for the disagreement among the Doctors concerning the question whether a mental word is given in the intuitive vision of God may be understood, another theory must be recalled, on which that question in some way depends. Some teach, therefore, that intellection can be considered `in fieri` and `in facto esse`: `in fieri`, they say, it has the account of action and production; `in facto esse` it has the account of term, and therefore of word, since the word is the term of intellection. Now they say that the word is the same as intellection `in facto esse`, but is distinguished from intellection `in fieri`, as the produced term is distinguished from the action by which it is produced; and this distinction they say is modal. Compare Suarez (On the Soul, book 3, chapter 5). Applying this theory to the present question, they establish that intuitive vision `in fieri` is the action productive of a term or word, which is modally distinguished from vision `in fieri`, although it is the same as vision `in facto esse`. Consequently they define the word "to be a quality which is made in the mind through the action of understanding, and depends on it in such a way that it does not endure except as long as the mind actually thinks or operates ... that quality is an image representing in some expressed mode the thing known." Compare Suarez (On God, book 2, chapter 11). But this does not prevent the intuitive vision of God from being immediate, because in direct cognition the word is not that which is known, but that by which it is known. For the action "which intervenes in beatific vision tends immediately to the created word as to the thing produced, but to God as to the object, because it tends to him as to the thing to be known, not as to its own term." Suarez (cited place, n. 10).

But to other theologians, among whom is de Lugo (On the Incarnation, disp. 19, n. 20), intuitive vision insofar as it is action seems to be distinguished only virtually from vision insofar as it is concept or word. Therefore when they deny that a created word is given in intuitive vision, they properly deny that there is given that quality distinct by the nature of the thing from vision `in fieri`. See Sylvius on I, q. 12, a. 2.

The theologians of the first opinion press this reason: every action must have a term; but intuitive vision is an action; therefore it must have a term. But intuitive vision is an action of the intellect, and the term of this action is nothing except a word. Therefore.

The authors of the other opinion reply by distinguishing: every action must have a term, namely either an object to which it tends and in which it rests, or something which it produces: conceded; always a term which it produces: denied.

The first insist: action is always productive of something; therefore, since intuitive vision is an action, it must have a term which it produces.

The others reply by denying that every action is production. Intuitive vision, they say, is a vital tendency of the intellect into God, who is proximately and immediately intelligible to it. "Therefore to one asking what the blessed person does by the blessed vision, it must be answered that he does this: that his intellect is actually understanding and perfected, and that he elicits intellection and sees God."

357. Si agatur non de intellectione in genere, sed de visione intuitiva, non clare apparet quaenam fuerit mens D. Thomae in hac controversia, uti videre est apud cit. utriusque sententiae Auctores. Hos consulat qui plura cupit: nos litem minime dirimimus. 357. If the discussion concerns not intellection in general, but intuitive vision, it does not clearly appear what the mind of St. Thomas was in this controversy, as can be seen among the cited authors of each opinion. Let one who wants more consult them; we by no means settle the dispute.

§ II.
Utrum visio Dei intuitiva sit possibilis. § II.
Whether the Intuitive Vision of God Is Possible.

358. Contra possibilitatem visionis intuitivae ex triplici capite argui solet. Ex Scriptura, ex auctoritate Patrum, praesertim Joannis Chrysostomi - ex ratione.

Quae ex Patribus afferri solent videri possunt apud Perrone de Deo Creat. Quae vero ex Scriptura desumunt eo recidunt, quod ibi dicatur Deus invisibilis. Cui difficultatum capiti facile respondetur ex animadversione communi apud Theologos, quam sic concinne et clare exponit Card. Tolet. 1. p. q. 12. a. 1.

"Quum loca Scripturae sint expressa probantia Deum ab intellectu videri posse, oportet sensum convenientem horum quaerere, in quibus oppositum videtur dici. Sed revera nulla est contradictio, nec esse potest. Quadruplex potest esse responsio collecta ex dictis Sanctorum. Prima est Chrysostomi Homil. XIV. super Joannem, quae etiam est Augustini qq. de Trinit. tom. 3. et utitur S. Thomas ad 1. quod loca, in quibus dicitur Deus videri non posse, sunt intelligenda de visione comprehensiva, qua Deus cognoscitur secundum omnem suam perfectionem. Tali autem cognitione non potest ab ullo intellectu creato intelligi; incomprehensibilis enim est. Secunda est ex Augustino Epist. 111. quod intelligenda sunt de visione corporea; Deus enim nullo sensu, nec oculo corporeo videri potest. Tertia est Epiphanii lib. III. contra haereses haeres. 70. quod sunt intelligenda secundum naturam: scilicet nullus homo naturaliter potest Deum secundum se videre; per gratiam tamen elevatur ad talem visionem. Ad Rom. 6. 'Gratia Dei vita aeterna.' Quarta est Durandi IV. Sent. d. 49. ubi Doctores hanc materiam tractant q. 2. ad 4. quod dum homo est in statu isto corruptibili, non potest videre Deum; id enim beatorum est." 358. Against the possibility of the intuitive vision, argument is usually made from a threefold head: from Scripture, from the authority of the Fathers, especially John Chrysostom, and from reason. The things usually brought forward from the Fathers may be seen in Perrone, On God the Creator. But the things which they take from Scripture come down to this: that there God is said to be invisible. To this head of difficulties an easy answer is given from the observation common among theologians, which Cardinal Toletus expounds neatly and clearly in I, q. 12, a. 1:

"Since the places of Scripture are explicit which prove that God can be seen by the intellect, one must seek the fitting sense of those texts in which the opposite seems to be said. But in truth there is no contradiction, nor can there be. A fourfold answer can be gathered from the sayings of the Saints. The first is that of Chrysostom, Homily XIV on John, which is also Augustine's in the Questions on the Trinity, tom. 3, and St. Thomas uses it in reply to the first objection: namely, that the places in which God is said not to be able to be seen are to be understood of comprehensive vision, by which God is known according to all his perfection. But by such cognition he cannot be understood by any created intellect; for he is incomprehensible. The second is from Augustine, Epistle 111: that they are to be understood of corporeal vision; for God can be seen by no sense, nor by the bodily eye. The third is that of Epiphanius, book III Against Heresies, heresy 70: that they are to be understood according to nature, namely, that no man can naturally see God according to himself; nevertheless through grace he is elevated to such vision. On Romans 6: 'The grace of God is eternal life.' The fourth is Durandus's, IV Sent., d. 49, where the Doctors treat this matter, q. 2, ad 4: that while man is in this corruptible state, he cannot see God; for that belongs to the blessed."

359. Objectio denique ex ratione, quae aliquam difficultatem facit, est hujusmodi: Nulla potentia potest elevari ultra latitudinem sui objecti specificativi, siquidem desineret esse talis potentia. Atqui Deus intuitive visus est extra latitudinem objecti specificativi cujuslibet intellectus creati. Ergo. 359. Finally, the objection from reason, which makes some difficulty, is of this sort: No potency can be elevated beyond the breadth of its own specificative object, since it would cease to be such a potency. But God, seen intuitively, is outside the breadth of the specificative object of any created intellect. Therefore.

360. Haec autem objectio, paucis mutatis, facile urgetur contra possibilitatem ordinis supernaturalis in genere. Quod ut intelligatur, notamus quod impossibilitas ordinis supernaturalis, si daretur, repeti posset vel ab ordine creato, vel a Deo elevante supra illum ordinem, vel a creatura supra eumdem ordinem elevanda. Nullius momenti sunt quae ab ordine creato peti solent; jam enim diximus per elevationem ad ordinem supernaturalem, naturalem ordinem non destrui,

sed stabilius evehi; non deprimi, sed exaltari; non immutari in se, sed perfici; non confundi cum illo, sed distinctum ab eo manere; non illi tandem opponi, sed subjici. Difficultates ex hac parte eaedem fere essent ac illae quae contra possibilitatem miraculi afferri solent. - Sufficit meminisse quae docet D. Thomas 1. p. q. 25. a. 5.: "Ordo a Divina sapientia rebus inditus, in quo ratio justitiae consistit, ut supra dictum est, quaest. 21. art. 2. non adaequat divinam sapientiam, ut sic divina sapientia limitetur ad hunc ordinem. Manifestum est autem quod tota ratio ordinis quem sapiens rebus a se factis imponit, a fine sumitur. Quando igitur finis est proportionatus rebus propter finem factis, sapientia facientis limitatur ad aliquem determinatum ordinem. Sed divina bonitas est finis improportionabiliter excedens res creatas. Unde divina sapientia non determinatur ad aliquem ordinem rerum, ut non possit alius cursus rerum effluere. Unde dicendum est simpliciter quod Deus potest alia facere quam quae facit." 360. But this objection, with a few changes, is easily pressed against the possibility of the supernatural order in general. That this may be understood, we note that the impossibility of the supernatural order, if it were granted, could be taken either from the created order, or from God elevating above that order, or from the creature to be elevated above that same order. The things usually sought from the created order are of no moment; for we have already said that through elevation to the supernatural order the natural order is not destroyed, but more firmly raised; not cast down, but exalted; not changed in itself, but perfected; not confused with that order, but remaining distinct from it; and finally not opposed to it, but subjected. Difficulties on this side would be almost the same as those usually brought forward against the possibility of miracle. It is enough to remember what St. Thomas teaches in I, q. 25, a. 5: "The order put into things by Divine wisdom, in which the ratio of justice consists, as was said above, q. 21, art. 2, does not equal divine wisdom in such a way that divine wisdom is limited to this order. But it is manifest that the whole ratio of the order which a wise maker imposes on things made by himself is taken from the end. Therefore, when the end is proportioned to the things made for the end, the wisdom of the maker is limited to some determinate order. But divine goodness is an end exceeding created things beyond all proportion. Hence divine wisdom is not determined to some one order of things, such that another course of things could not flow forth. Hence it must be said simply that God can make other things than those which he makes."

361. A Deo repeti nequit impossibilitas entis supernaturalis, nisi res in se ipsa repugnantiam involvat; siquidem divina potentia, cum sit infinita, ad ea omnia se porrigit, quae habent rationem entis; ea tantum rationem entis non habent quae contradictionem involvunt. Quae ex divina immutabilitate objici solent, nullius momenti esse agnoscuntur ex animadversione, quam tradit D. Thomas 1. p. q. 105. a. 6. ad 3.: "Dicendum," inquit, "quod Deus sic rebus certum ordinem indidit, ut tamen sibi reservaret, quod ipse aliquando aliter ex causa esset facturus. Unde cum praeter hunc ordinem (naturalem) agit, non mutatur." 361. The impossibility of a supernatural being cannot be taken from God, unless the thing involves repugnance in itself; since divine potency, because it is infinite, extends itself to all those things which have the ratio of being; only those things which involve contradiction do not have the ratio of being. The things usually objected from divine immutability are recognized to be of no moment from the observation which St. Thomas hands down in I, q. 105, a. 6, ad 3: "It must be said," he says, "that God has put a fixed order into things in such a way that nevertheless he reserved to himself that he himself would sometimes, for a cause, act otherwise. Hence when he acts beyond this (natural) order, he is not changed."

362. Itaque tota difficultas, si qua esset, exurgeret ex ipsa creatura elevanda. Cum, inquiunt, rerum essentiae sint immutabiles, repugnat aliquod ens elevari ad bonum supra suam speciem; sic enim desineret esse id quod est: si additur ratio cani, hic desinet esse canis, sed fiet animal rationale, nempe homo. Sed si ordo supernaturalis esset possibilis, elevaretur creatura ad aliquod bonum supra suam speciem, siquidem acciperet bonum ordinis divini. Ergo. <div

class="pl-en">362. Therefore the whole difficulty, if there were any, would arise from the creature itself which is to be elevated. Since, they say, the essences of things are immutable, it is repugnant for some being to be elevated to a good above its own species; for in this way it would cease to be what it is. If reason is added to a dog, it will cease to be a dog, but will become a rational animal, namely man. But if the supernatural order were possible, a creature would be elevated to some good above its own species, since it would receive the good of the divine order. Therefore.

363. Ad hujus difficultatis solutionem 1. exponenda est theoria de potentia obedientiali - 2. applicanda est visioni intuitivae. Ac imprimis potentia obedientialis definiri potest: aptitudo rerum creatarum, ut pro arbitrio agentis superioris, ejusque auxilio ipsis indebito, munus impleant, quod nativa virtute et concursu sibi debito implere non possunt. Dividitur in passivam et activam. Prima est in ordine ad recipiendos effectus supernaturales: altera est in ordine ad illos producendos. Voluntas nostra, ex. gr., capax est recipiendi auxilium gratiae (potentia obedientialis passiva), quo accepto capax fit eliciendi simul cum illo actum supernaturalem (potentia obedientialis activa). 363. For the solution of this difficulty, 1. the theory concerning obediential potency must be explained; 2. it must be applied to the intuitive vision. And first, obediential potency can be defined as: the aptitude of created things whereby, at the will of a superior agent and by his aid not owed to them, they fulfill an office which they cannot fulfill by native virtue and by the concurrence owed to them. It is divided into passive and active. The first is in order to receiving supernatural effects; the other is in order to producing them. Our will, for example, is capable of receiving the help of grace (passive obediential potency), by which, once received, it becomes capable of eliciting, together with it, a supernatural act (active obediential potency).

364. Dari hujusmodi potentiam patet a) ex doctrina S. Augustini exposita (n. 158.) - b) Ex communi Theologorum consensu. D. Thomas saepissime loquitur de hac re. Ita, ex. gr., de pot. q. 6. a. 1. ad 18. ait: "Quanto aliqua virtus activa est altior, tanto eamdem rem potest perducere in altiorem effectum: et inde est quod res aliqua est in potentia ad diversa secundum habitudinem ad diversos agentes. Unde nihil prohibet quin natura creata sit in potentia ad aliqua facienda per divinam potentiam, quae inferior potentia, facere non potest: et ista vocatur potentia obedientiae, secundum quod quaelibet creatura Creatori obedit." Item 1. p. q. 115. a. 3. ad 4.; in 1 dist. 42. a. 2. ad 4. etc.

c) Ex ratione. Nam, ut innuit D. Thomas, quo perfectior est agens ejusque virtus, eo majora potest in aliquo subjecto - virtus Dei est supra virtutem cujuslibet rei creatae - ergo magis potest efficere Deus in suis creaturis, quam ipsae possint - atqui tamen Deus nequit efficere quod repugnat - ergo debet esse in creaturis non repugnantia (aptitudo) ad hoc ut in ipsis a Deo producatur aliquis effectus, qui a virtute creata produci nequit - atqui haec aptitudo dicitur potentia obedientialis. Ergo.

Praeterea idem paulo aliter erui potest ex Dei dominio. "Ratio hujus subordinationis," inquit Suarez (Met. disp. 31. sect. 14. n. 7-8.), "a priori sumenda est ex pleno dominio quod Deus habet in suam creaturam, ut ea uti possit in omnem usum qui non involverit repugnantiam aut contradictionem. Hujusmodi enim plenum dominium ad infinitam Dei omnipotentiam pertinet; non enim est dominium omni ex parte perfectum, nisi includat potestatem ad omnem usum possibilem. Huic autem pleno dominio Dei correspondet in creatura plena subjectio; nam duo haec correlativa sunt; ad hanc autem subjectionem necessaria est talis conditio ex parte creaturae, ratione cujus apta sit ad exsequendum quidquid Deus voluerit, vel recipiendo vel agendo. Unde sicut non potest Deus ens creatum efficere, cujus plenum et perfectum dominium non habeat, ita non potest ens creatum fieri, quod non habeat praedictam conditionem et subordinationem seu subjectionem ad Deum." 364. That potency of this sort is given is clear a) from the doctrine of St. Augustine set forth above (n. 158); b) from the common consensus of theologians. St. Thomas very often speaks of this matter. Thus, for example, De potentia, q. 6, a. 1, ad 18, he says: "The higher some active virtue is, the more it can bring the same thing through to a higher effect; and hence it is that some thing is in potency to different things according to

its relation to different agents. Hence nothing prevents created nature from being in potency to some things to be done by divine potency, which a lower potency cannot do; and this is called the potency of obedience, according as every creature obeys the Creator." Likewise I, q. 115, a. 3, ad 4; in I Sent., dist. 42, a. 2, ad 4, etc.

c) From reason. For, as St. Thomas suggests, the more perfect an agent and its virtue is, the greater things it can do in some subject. The virtue of God is above the virtue of any created thing; therefore God can effect more in his creatures than they themselves can. But nevertheless God cannot effect what is repugnant; therefore there must be in creatures a non-repugnance, that is, an aptitude, for some effect to be produced in them by God which cannot be produced by created virtue. But this aptitude is called obediential potency. Therefore.

Besides, the same thing can be drawn out in a slightly different way from God's dominion. "The reason for this subordination," says Suarez (Metaphysical Disputations, disp. 31, sect. 14, nn. 7-8), "is to be taken a priori from the full dominion which God has over his creature, so that he can use it for every use which does not involve repugnance or contradiction. For full dominion of this sort belongs to God's infinite omnipotence; for dominion is not perfect in every respect unless it includes power for every possible use. But to this full dominion of God there corresponds in the creature full subjection; for these two are correlatives. And for this subjection such a condition is necessary on the part of the creature, by reason of which it is apt for carrying out whatever God has willed, whether by receiving or by acting. Hence, just as God cannot make a created being over which he does not have full and perfect dominion, so a created being cannot be made which does not have the aforesaid condition and subordination or subjection to God."

365. Si autem quaeratur in quo consistat haec potentia obedientialis; respondetur. 1. Saltem dicit non repugnantiam in creatura ad aliquos effectus ex divina virtute recipiendos vel producendos; secus enim non esset capacitas, sed incapacitas, non esset ullo pacto potentia, sed impotentia. Unde fit, quod, ut jam monuerat S. Augustinus, non possit Deus omnes effectus in omnibus creaturis producere. "Bonam," ait 1. 4. c. Julian. c. 3., "dicis hominum naturam, quae talis gratiae opitulationem meretur, quod gratanter audirem, si hoc propterea, quia rationalis natura est, diceres: neque enim gratia Dei lapidibus, aut lignis pecoribusve praestatur, sed quia imago Dei est, meretur (apta est) hanc gratiam."

2. Non consistit in mera non repugnantia, sed potentia est positiva et realis, uti communiter docent Molina, Suarez, Valentia, etc. Etenim potentia obedientialis (praesertim de qua hic agimus, ad gratiam et ad gloriam) vere influit in actus supernaturales; atqui realis influxus nequit egredi nisi ab aliquo positivo et reali; ergo. Revera, ut suo loco dicetur, voluntas adjuta gratia, ipsa etiam est immediatum principium actus; intellectus elevatus per lumen gloriae, ipse etiam elicit visionem: hi enim actus sunt simul vitales et supernaturales.

3. Potentia obedientialis non consistit in aliqua re superaddita naturis creaturarum, et ab eis realiter distincta; sed est ipsa entitas creaturae vel potentiae ejus naturalis considerata in ordine ad effectus supernaturales, uti docent Molina, Valentia, etc., et concedit etiam Suarez. Sic, ex. gr., ipse intellectus noster capax est (habet potentiam obedientialem) recipiendi lumen gloriae, et cum eo eliciendi actum visionis beatificae. 365. But if it is asked in what this obediential potency consists, the answer is given as follows. 1. At least it says non-repugnance in the creature for receiving or producing some effects from divine virtue; otherwise it would not be capacity, but incapacity; it would not be potency in any way, but impotence. Hence it follows that, as St. Augustine had already warned, God cannot produce all effects in all creatures. "You call the nature of men good," he says in book 4 Against Julian, c. 3, "which merits the help of such grace; and I would gladly hear this if you said it for this reason, that it is a rational nature. For the grace of God is not bestowed on stones, or woods, or beasts, but because it is the image of God, it merits (is apt for) this grace."

2. It does not consist in mere non-repugnance, but the potency is positive and real, as Molina, Suarez, Valentia, and others commonly teach. For obediential potency, especially that of which we are treating here, toward grace and toward glory, truly flows into supernatural acts; but a real influx cannot proceed except from something positive and real; therefore. In

truth, as will be said in its own place, the will aided by grace is itself also the immediate principle of the act; the intellect elevated by the light of glory itself also elicits the vision; for these acts are at once vital and supernatural.

3. Obediential potency does not consist in some thing superadded to the natures of creatures and really distinct from them; rather, it is the very entity of the creature, or of its natural potency, considered in order to supernatural effects, as Molina, Valentia, and others teach, and Suarez also grants. Thus, for example, our intellect itself is capable, that is, has obediential potency, of receiving the light of glory and, with it, eliciting the act of beatific vision.

366. Unde quaerenti utrum potentia obedientialis sit naturalis an supernaturalis, respondendum est cum distinctione. "Certum est enim," inquit Suarez (Met. disp. 43. sect. 4. n. 16.) "hanc potentiam non esse aliquam rem superadditam naturis rerum aut ab eis in re ipsa distinctam; nam oporteret illi supponere aliam capacitatem, de qua eadem rediret quaestio. Unde secundum hunc respectum potest dici talis potentia naturalis subjecto, quia et est cum illo naturaliter congenita, et est ipsamet entitas naturalis ejus. Quomodo dixit Augustinus: Posse habere fidem et caritatem, naturae est fidelium; et D. Thomas eodem sensu ait, rationalem animam naturaliter esse capacem gratiae; et iterum ait, habilitatem animae ad gratiam consequi naturam ejus. At vero comparatione ad actum et ad agens, a quibus potentia simpliciter denominatur, non potest haec potentia dici naturalis, ut recte dicit D. Thomas tum quia ille actus est simpliciter et in se supernaturalis; tum etiam quia non potest a naturali agente reduci ad actum; tum praeterea, quia neque talis actus est ex natura rei debitus tali potentiae, neque ipsa habet naturalem inclinationem ad illum juxta veriorem theologorum sententiam. Et ideo vocari solet haec potentia obedientialis seu potentia obedientiae." 366. Hence, to one asking whether obediential potency is natural or supernatural, one must answer with a distinction. "For it is certain," says Suarez (Metaphysical Disputations, disp. 43, sect. 4, n. 16), "that this potency is not some thing superadded to the natures of things or distinct from them in reality itself; for one would have to suppose another capacity for it, concerning which the same question would return. Hence according to this respect such potency can be called natural to the subject, both because it is naturally connate with it, and because it is its very natural entity. In this way Augustine said: To be able to have faith and charity belongs to the nature of the faithful; and St. Thomas in the same sense says that the rational soul is naturally capable of grace; and again he says that the soul's aptitude for grace follows upon its nature. But in comparison with the act and with the agent, from which potency is denominated simply, this potency cannot be called natural, as St. Thomas rightly says, both because that act is simply and in itself supernatural, and also because it cannot be reduced to act by a natural agent, and moreover because such an act is not owed from the nature of the thing to such a potency, nor does the potency itself have a natural inclination toward it according to the truer opinion of theologians. And therefore this potency is customarily called obediential potency or potency of obedience."

367. Ex his sequitur 1. aliqua fieri posse a creatura exercente naturales vires cum concursu Dei ordinario: ad illa habet creatura potentiam naturalem - aliqua a creatura et in creatura fieri omnino non posse (ex. gr., materiam cogitantem): ad illa creatura habet omnimodam impotentiam - aliqua denique fieri quidem non posse a creatura et in creatura sibi relicta cum concursu ordinario, sed fieri posse, Deo novum robur, novam virtutem infundente: ad illa habet creatura potentiam obedientialem.

Sequitur 2. quod etsi ex una parte nulla est repugnantia ut aliqua fiant in creatura, ad quae non potest naturali sua virtute pertingere (siquidem Deus plus potest in nobis quam nos ipsi); ex alia tamen parte, si talia fiant, ea non sunt naturalia, sed supernaturalia, siquidem potentia obedientialis non dicit exigentiam, sed meram aptitudinem ad effectum et agentem indebitum. 367. From these things it follows, 1. that some things can be done by a creature exercising natural powers with God's ordinary concurrence: for these the creature has natural potency. Some things cannot in any way be done by a creature and in a creature, for example, thinking matter: for these the creature has every-way impotence. Finally, some things indeed

cannot be done by a creature and in a creature left to itself with ordinary concurrence, but can be done when God infuses a new strength, a new virtue: for these the creature has obediential potency.

It follows, 2. that although on the one hand there is no repugnance that some things be done in the creature to which it cannot reach by its natural virtue, since God can do more in us than we ourselves can, nevertheless on the other hand, if such things are done, they are not natural but supernatural, since obediential potency does not say exigency, but mere aptitude for an effect and an agent not owed.

368. Nunc, ut ex proposita theoria solvatur objectio contra possibilitatem visionis intuitivae, duplex distinguendum est intellectus objectum: unum est proprium seu proportionatum, quod vocari etiam solet specificativum; aliud vero adaequatum, quod dicitur etiam terminativum. Objectum specificativum, uti nomen ipsum indicat, debet esse proportionatum intellectui non modo prout intellectus est, sed prout est intellectus talis speciei: ad illud ergo poterit intellectus suis viribus pertingere. Objectum vero adaequatum est illud quod veluti respondet intellectui, prout est facultas quaedam immaterialis, praescindendo a gradu immaterialitatis specifico: ad illud nequit intellectus naturaliter se extendere; poterit tamen, si supernaturaliter confortetur, seu habet ad illud potentiam obedientialem. 368. Now, in order that the objection against the possibility of intuitive vision may be solved from the theory proposed, a twofold object of the intellect must be distinguished. One is proper or proportionate, which is also customarily called specificative; the other is adequate, which is also called terminative. The specificative object, as the name itself indicates, must be proportioned to the intellect not only insofar as it is intellect, but insofar as it is intellect of such a species; therefore the intellect will be able to reach it by its own powers. But the adequate object is that which, as it were, corresponds to intellect insofar as it is a certain immaterial faculty, abstracting from the specific grade of immateriality. The intellect cannot naturally extend itself to this object; nevertheless, if it is supernaturally strengthened, it will be able to do so, or it has obediential potency toward it.

369. Objectum proprium seu proportionatum intellectus nostri in statu unionis est quidditas rei materialis et consequenter quidquid per connotationem ad illam et ad illius modum est cognoscibile. Objectum enim debet esse proportionatum facultati, facultas subjecto, siquidem operatio sequitur esse: anima nostra habet nunc esse in materia. Eodem modo objectum proprium intellectus animae separatae debet esse proportionatum tali ejus essendi modo; et ita de intellectu Angelico. 369. The proper or proportionate object of our intellect in the state of union is the quiddity of a material thing and consequently whatever is knowable by connotation to it and according to its mode. For the object must be proportioned to the faculty, and the faculty to the subject, since operation follows being: our soul now has being in matter. In the same way the proper object of the intellect of the separated soul must be proportioned to such a mode of its being; and likewise concerning the angelic intellect.

370. Objectum vero adaequatum cujuslibet intellectus, ideoque etiam intellectus nostri, qui infimus est, est ens in tota latitudine sua spectatum. Nam objectum adaequatum ambit omnia, circa quae versari potest potentia: atqui intellectus potest aliquo modo cognoscere quidquid habet rationem entis; ergo. Prob. min. "Experientia," inquit Suarez (de anim. 1. 4. c. 1. n. 2.), "constat, et inductione; namque intellectus noster cognoscit Deum, Angelos, et res materiales, earumque accidentia, et essentiam; ergo, etc. Secundo, quidquid est intelligibile, potest intellectu cognosci, nam intelligibile, et intellectus sibi mutuo respondent, atque adaequantur, sed quidquid habet entitatem est intelligibile; ergo idipsum potest intellectus noster cognoscere aliquo modo." Cf. h. l. 370. But the adequate object of any intellect, and therefore also of our intellect, which is the lowest, is being considered in its whole breadth. For the adequate object embraces all things concerning which a potency can be occupied. But intellect can in some way know

whatever has the ratio of being; therefore. The minor is proved. "It is established by experience," says Suarez (On the Soul, book 4, c. 1, n. 2), "and by induction; for our intellect knows God, angels, and material things, and their accidents and essence; therefore, etc. Secondly, whatever is intelligible can be known by intellect, for the intelligible and intellect mutually correspond to one another and are made adequate to one another. But whatever has entity is intelligible; therefore that very thing can be known in some way by our intellect." Cf. here.

371. Deus intuitive videndus nequit esse objectum proportionatum alicujus intellectus creati, uti patebit cum de supernaturalitate visionis agetur; sed est objectum adaequatum intellectus nostri, siquidem est aliquid intelligibile: naturalibus ergo viribus non possumus, sed supernaturali vi confortati, elevati, possumus illum intuitive videre. Resp. ergo in forma prop. objectioni: nulla potentia potest agere extra suum objectum; dist. specificativum et adaequatum conc.; specificativum solum, subd. naturaliter conc., supernaturaliter neg. 371. God, who is to be seen intuitively, cannot be the proportionate object of any created intellect, as will be clear when the supernaturalness of the vision is treated; but he is the adequate object of our intellect, since he is something intelligible. Therefore by natural powers we cannot see him intuitively; but strengthened and elevated by supernatural force, we can. Therefore I answer in form to the proposed objection: no potency can act outside its object; I distinguish: outside its specificative and adequate object, granted; outside its specificative object alone, I subdistinguish: naturally, granted; supernaturally, denied.

372. Et ex hoc patet etiam discrimen inter intellectum et sensus, quoad rem praesentem. "Divina enim substantia," inquit D. Thomas (c. g. 1. 3. c. 54.) "non sic est extra facultatem creati intellectus, quasi aliquid omnino extraneum ab ipso, sicut est sonus a visu, vel substantia immaterialis a sensu. Nam divina substantia est primum intelligibile, et totius intellectualis cognitionis principium. Sed est extra facultatem intellectus creati, sicut excedens virtutem ejus, sicut excellentia sensibilium sunt extra facultatem sensuum. Unde et Philosophus in secundo (Metaph., text. comm. 7.) dicit, quod intellectus noster se habet ad rerum manifestissima, sicut oculus noctuae ad lucem solis. Indiget igitur confortari intellectus creatus aliquo divino lumine ad hoc, quod divinam essentiam videre possit." Vid. etiam 1. p. q. 12. art. 4. ad 3. 372. And from this the difference between intellect and the senses, with respect to the present matter, is also clear. "For the divine substance," says St. Thomas (Contra Gentiles, book 3, c. 54), "is not outside the faculty of created intellect as though it were something wholly foreign to it, as sound is to sight, or an immaterial substance to sense. For the divine substance is the first intelligible and the principle of all intellectual cognition. But it is outside the faculty of created intellect as exceeding its virtue, just as the excellence of sensible things is outside the faculty of the senses. Hence also the Philosopher in the second book of the Metaphysics, text comm. 7, says that our intellect is related to the most manifest things as the eye of the owl is to the light of the sun. Therefore the created intellect needs to be strengthened by some divine light in order that it may be able to see the divine essence." See also I, q. 12, art. 4, ad 3.

§ III.
Utrum visio Dei intuitiva sit supernaturalis. § III.
Whether the Intuitive Vision of God Is Supernatural.

373. Supernaturalitas visionis intuitivae, quemadmodum diximus de gratia sanctificante (266), considerari potest 1. in ordine ad totam naturam creatam - 2. in ordine ad naturam etiam creabilem. 373. The supernaturalness of the intuitive vision, as we said concerning sanctifying grace (266), can be considered 1. in relation to all created nature; 2. in relation even

to creatable nature.

374. Quoad 1um, est doctrina catholica visionem intuitivam esse finem indebitum homini, Angelis, universae proinde creatae naturae. Clemens V. in Conc. Vienn. inter alios errores Beguardorum et Beguinarum, hunc damnavit n. 5.: "Quod quaelibet intellectualis natura in se ipsa naturaliter est beata, quodque anima non indiget lumine gloriae, ipsam elevante, ad Deum videndum et eo beate fruendum." - Inter propositiones vero damnatas in Baio ad rem praesentem praesertim faciunt 1. 3. 4. 5. et 6. 374. As to the first, it is Catholic doctrine that the intuitive vision is an end not owed to man, to the angels, and therefore to the whole of created nature. Clement V, in the Council of Vienne, among other errors of the Beguards and Beguines, condemned this one, n. 5: "That any intellectual nature whatsoever is naturally blessed in itself, and that the soul does not need the light of glory elevating it for seeing God and blessedly enjoying him." But among the propositions condemned in Baius, especially 1, 3, 4, 5, and 6 bear upon the present matter.

375. Notamus hic solum nos nullo pacto admittere modum loquendi quorumdam Theologorum, qui etsi in conclusione docerent visionem intuitivam esse finem naturae nostrae indebitum, ut tamen se expedirent ab aliqua difficultate, de qua inferius erit sermo, dicebant "beatitudinem finem hominis naturalem esse quoad appetitum non quoad consecutionem." Vid. Bellar. (de grat. primi hom. c. 7.). In hanc sententiam merito advertit Suarez (Proleg. 4. de grat. c. 1. n. 8.): "Distingui solet finis ultimus quoad consecutionem, vel quoad intentionem, seu appetitionem, et ita dicitur esse duplex quoad consecutionem, quia unus naturaliter, alter nonnisi supernaturaliter obtineri potest, licet uterque sit naturalis quoad appetitionem. Sed in hoc duplicem repugnantiam invenio, una est, duplicem esse finem ultimum quoad appetitionem. Nam si appetitus naturae humanae non sistit in aliquo bono naturali, sed ultra tendit ad supernaturale, profecto nullum naturale bonum est finis ultimus ejus: nam finis ultimus includit negationem tendentiae in ulteriorem finem, alioqui alter finis non est ultimus, si ibi non sistitur. Et sumitur aperte ex Aristotel. primo Ethicorum, capite 7. dicente felicitatem non appeti propter aliud, sed tantum propter se. Altera repugnantia est, quod finis supernaturalis quoad consecutionem, sit naturalis quoad appetitionem, cum appetitus naturalis non fundetur, nisi in naturali potestate, ut in Metaphysica latius tractatur, et in materia de Beatitudine dictum est. Unde si beatitudo patriae est naturalis quoad tendentiam, et intentionem naturalis appetitus etiam erit naturalis quoad aliquam perfectionem naturalem. Ex quo fit, ut supra argumentamur, non potuisse hominem non creari propter illum finem." Eadem habet (de Deo, 1. 2. c. 8. n. 4.) 375. Here we note only that we in no way admit the manner of speaking of certain theologians who, although in conclusion they taught that the intuitive vision is an end not owed to our nature, nevertheless, in order to extricate themselves from some difficulty of which there will be discussion below, said that "beatitude is man's natural end with respect to appetite, not with respect to attainment." See Bellarmine, On the Grace of the First Man, c. 7. Against this opinion Suarez rightly observes (Proleg. 4, On Grace, c. 1, n. 8): "The ultimate end is customarily distinguished with respect to attainment, or with respect to intention, or appetition, and in this way it is said to be twofold with respect to attainment, because one can be obtained naturally, the other only supernaturally, although each is natural with respect to appetition. But in this I find a twofold repugnance. One is that there be a twofold ultimate end with respect to appetition. For if the appetite of human nature does not rest in some natural good, but tends beyond to the supernatural, assuredly no natural good is its ultimate end; for the ultimate end includes the negation of a tendency toward a further end, otherwise the other end is not ultimate, if rest is not taken there. And this is taken openly from Aristotle in the first book of the Ethics, chapter 7, when he says that happiness is not sought for the sake of something else, but only for its own sake. The other repugnance is that an end supernatural with respect to attainment should be natural with respect to appetition, since natural appetite is not founded except in natural power, as is treated more broadly in Metaphysics and has been said in the matter of Beatitude. Hence if the beatitude of the homeland

is natural with respect to the tendency and intention of natural appetite, it will also be natural with respect to some natural perfection. From this it follows, as we argued above, that man could not have been not created for that end." He has the same things in On God, book 2, c. 8, n. 4.

376. Quoad 2um, non defuerunt Theologi, quibus non erat evidens repugnare ut Deus conderet aliquam creaturam, cui debita esset gratia et visio intuitiva: ideoque in dubio reliquerunt utrum visio intuitiva sit supernaturalis respectu cujuslibet naturae etiam creabilis. Attamen vel hi Theologi fassi sunt pondus auctoritatis pro sententia affirmativa. Ita, ex. gr., Ripalda (de ente supern., disp. 23. sect. 2. n. 3.): "Stando auctoritati," inquit, "absolute est tuenda sententia quae negat possibilem substantiam supernaturalem, ac proinde affirmat supernaturalia esse supra omnem substantiam creabilem;" quamvis addit: "Auctoritas talis sententiae negantis tanta non est ut absque nota temeritatis non possit defendi libere affirmans." - Becanus (de attrib. divin. c. 9. q. 5. n. 4.), ait: "Posterior (sententia affirmans supernaturalitatem visionis intuitivae respectu cujuslibet naturae etiam creabilis) habet plures auctores pro se, et in scholis magis recepta est: ac proinde tutius est illi adhaerere." 376. As to the second, there have not been lacking theologians to whom it was not evident that it is repugnant for God to found some creature to which grace and the intuitive vision would be owed; and therefore they left in doubt whether the intuitive vision is supernatural with respect to any nature whatsoever, even a creatable one. Nevertheless even these theologians admitted the weight of authority for the affirmative opinion. Thus, for example, Ripalda (On Supernatural Being, disp. 23, sect. 2, n. 3): "Standing by authority," he says, "the opinion which denies a possible supernatural substance and therefore affirms that supernatural things are above every creatable substance must absolutely be maintained"; although he adds: "The authority of such a denying opinion is not so great that the affirming opinion cannot be freely defended without a note of temerity." Becanus (On the Divine Attributes, c. 9, q. 5, n. 4) says: "The latter opinion, affirming the supernaturalness of the intuitive vision with respect to any nature whatsoever, even a creatable one, has more authors on its side and is more received in the schools; and therefore it is safer to adhere to it."

377. Nunc vero sententia illa, olim magis recepta, videtur communis, neque, si argumentis ex auctoritate attendimus, ullum dubium patitur. Quare dicimus:

PROP. XXXIII. Visio intuitiva Dei est finis ita omnem naturae exigentiam excedens, ut nulla sit natura, creata aut creabilis, cui possit esse debita.

Prob. I. Ex Script. et Patribus. Proponitur visio intuitiva a) uti haereditas. Rom. 8. 17.: "Si autem filii, et haeredes; haeredes quidem Dei, cohaeredes autem Christi." - Coloss. 3. 24.: "Scientes quod a Domino accipietis retributionem haereditatis." etc.

b) Proponitur uti merces et promissio. Jacob. 1. 12.: "Beatus vir, qui suffert tentationem, quoniam cum probatus fuerit, accipiet coronam vitae, quam repromisit Deus diligentibus se." - 2. 5.: "Haeredes regni, quod repromisit Deus diligentibus se." - Heb. 10. 23.: "Teneamus spei nostrae confessionem indeclinabilem, fidelis enim est qui repromisit." etc.

c) Proponitur uti beatitudo propria Dei et regnum. Math. 25. 21.: "Euge serve bone et fidelis, quia super pauca fuisti fidelis, supra multa te constituam, intra in gaudium Domini tui." - Apoc. 3. 21.: "Qui vicerit, dabo ei sedere in throno meo; sicut et ego vici et sedi cum Patre meo in throno ejus." - Luc. 22. 28-31.: "Vos autem estis, qui permansistis mecum in tentationibus meis; et ego dispono vobis, sicut disposuit mihi Pater, regnum, ut edatis et bibatis super mensam meam in regno meo, et sedeatis super thronos judicantes duodecim tribus Israel."

d) Proponitur uti consummatio similitudinis cum Deo, seu Deificationis. 1. Joan. 3. 2.: "Nunc sumus filii Dei, et nondum apparuit, quid erimus. Scimus, quoniam, quum apparuerit, similes ei erimus, quia videbimus eum sicuti est." - 2. Cor. 3. 18.: "Nos vero omnes revelata facie gloriam Domini speculantes, in eamdem imaginem transformamur," etc.

Unde: 1. Haereditas non est de se connaturalis et debita, nisi filio; atqui visio beatifica est haereditas divina; ergo nequit esse debita, nisi filiis Dei. Atqui filiatio divina quae habetur per gratiam sanctificantem, nulli creaturae potest esse debita (n. 270. Prob. I. b)). Ergo.

2. Retributio, quae ut sit debita, requirit specialem promissionem ex parte

retribuentis quae respondet merito fundato in aliquo gratuito retribuentis dono - quae excedit omne meritum, est vere indebita seu supernaturalis. Atqui talis est visio intuitiva non modo respectu hominum et Angelorum, sed respectu cujuscumque creaturae. Ergo.

Prob. min. quoad promissionem. Patet imprimis ex cit. testimoniis Sacrae Scripturae, in quibus vita aeterna dicitur absolute et veluti antonomastice repromissio. Confirmatur ex Patribus. S. Augustinus (Enarr. in Ps. 83. n. 16.): "Debitorem Dominus ipse se fecit non accipiendo, sed promittendo: non ei dicitur redde, quod accepisti; sed redde quod promisisti." - Et (serm. 159. de verb. Apost. Rom. 8. 30. et 31. et cap. 2. n. 2.): "In his, quae nondum habemus, tenemus debitorem. Debitor enim factus est non aliquid a nobis accipiendo, sed quod ei placuit promittendo. Aliter enim dicimus homini, debes mihi, quia dedi tibi; et aliter dicimus, debes mihi, quia mihi promisisti. Quando dicis, debes mihi, quia dedi tibi, a te processit beneficium, sed mutuatum, non donatum. Quando autem dicis, debes mihi, quia promisisti mihi, tu nihil dedisti et tamen exigis. Bonitas enim ejus, qui promisit, dabit." - Eadem habet SS. Basilius, Ambrosius, Hilarius, Chrysost., Fulgentius, Gregorius, etc.

Prob. min. quoad donum gratuitum in quo fundatur meritum. Omnes actus eatenus proportionem habent cum vita aeterna, seu cum visione intuitiva, quatenus sunt actus filii Dei, et supernaturali gratia informantur. Atqui gratia haec indebita est cuicumque creaturae, uti superius ostendimus. Ergo. Unde S. Augustinus (1. c. in Ps. 83.): "Unde debitor Deus? Accepit aliquid? Cui debet aliquid Deus? Ecce videmus, quia tenet eum debitorem Paulus: consecutus est misericordiam, exigens veritatem: reddet mihi, inquit, Dominus in illo die. Qui tibi reddet nisi quod tibi debet? Unde tibi debet? Quid ei dedisti? Qui prior dedit illi et retribuetur ei?" - S. Fulgentius (in praef. lib. ad Monim.): "Ille auctor est debiti, qui auctor est doni. Nam et se ipsum sua largitate dignatus est facere debitorem: non quia indigens ab aliquo accipit, sed quoniam abundans largius tribuit." - S. Dionys. (de Eccl. Hier. c. 1.): "Haec salus iis, qui salvantur, non nisi jam deificatis potest contingere." - S. Irenaeus (1. 4. c. 20. n. 5.): "Potens in omnibus Deus videbitur in regno coelorum paternaliter: Spiritu quidem praeparante hominem in Filium Dei, Filio autem adducente ad Patrem, Patre autem incorruptelam donante in aeternam vitam, quae cuicumque evenit ex eo, quod videat Deum."

Prob. min. quoad excessum retributionis. Si merces operibus servi danda est, ea erit bonum quoddam servum decens, non ipsa haereditas filiorum, non regnum, non illud gaudium, quo fruitur ipse Deus. Atqui visio intuitiva est haereditas filiorum, regnum, ipsa Dei beatitudo; et quaelibet creatura, secundum naturam, est serva. Ergo.

Prima pars hujus min. constat ex recit. test. Sacrae Script.; altera ex recit. test. Patrum (n. 270. Prob. II. 4.) Confirmari potest ex S. Aug., qui (de Civ. Dei, 1. 13. c. 1. n. 2.), ait: "Quamvis non omnis beata possit esse creatura, (neque enim hoc munus adipiscuntur aut cupiunt ferae, ligna, saxa et si quid ejusmodi est), ea tamen quae potest, non ex se ipsa potest, quia ex nihilo creata est, sed ex illo a quo creata est." - S. Ambrosius (lib. med. orat. 7.): "Creatura tua, cui est aliud vivere, aliud beate vivere, omne quod vivit et quod beate vivit, non debet nisi gratiae tuae." - Marcus Archiep. (ejus meminit Nicephorus 1. 2. c. 35. apud Corderium): "Magis autem," inquit, "Dominus ostendere volens, omne praeceptum esse debitum quoddam, adoptationem vero nostram, proprio ipsius sanguine factam, hominibus esse donatam, ait: cum feceritis omnia," etc.: "Quamobrem regnum caelorum non est merces operum" (id catholico sensu accipiendum), "sed gratia Dei fidelibus servis praeparata. Neque servus petit libertatem tamquam mercedem, sed tamquam debitor bene operatur, illa vero ex gratia conceditur."

Mirum est quod contra hoc argumentum Becanus, alioquin magnae perspicaciae Theologus, dicat (1. c. q. 4. n. 5.) "Secundum argumentum contendit omnes creaturas naturaliter esse servas Dei, ac proinde nullam posse naturaliter esse filiam Dei: At non recte hoc infertur: Nam primo certum est, eamdem creaturam diverso titulo posse esse servam et filiam Dei: servam per naturam: filiam per gratiam. Hoc convenit omnibus justis, sive in hac, sive in altera vita existentibus. Omnes sunt servi per naturam: filii per gratiam: Ergo hoc solum hic quaeritur, an quis simul possit esse servus et filius per naturam: Puto posse, sed diverso respectu. Potest esse servus ratione creationis; filius ratione operationis."

Sed resp. 1. Potest quidem creatura esse serva Dei secundum naturam, filia secundum gratiam; sed non potest esse serva et filia Dei secundum idem, idest secundum naturam: talis autem esset, si gratia et gloria essent illi debitae. - 2. Illa operatio vel est sequela creationis, quatenus competit creaturae secundum naturam; et tunc cum per creationem sit serva et non filia, talis erit etiam per

operationem; vel est illa operatio indebita naturae creaturae; et jam est per donum superadditum, seu indebitum quod fit filia.

3. Beatitudo, quae est propria et connaturalis Deo - quae supponit Deificationem creaturae - quae est consummatio illius Deificationis, nequit competere secundum naturam ulli creaturae. Atqui talis est visio intuitiva Dei. Ergo.

His addi possent quae peti solent ex illo "Nemo novit Patrem, nisi Filius, et cui voluerit Filius revelare" - Ex testimoniis Sac. Script., quibus Deus dicitur invisibilis - adjecta PP. interpretatione de invisibilitate secundum vires naturales creaturae. Sed has, et datas probationes, quas vix delineavimus, invenies multis SS. Patrum testimoniis confirmatas et evolutas apud Casini (Quid est homo, etc., Moguntiae 1862.)

Prob. II. ex S. Bonaventura (in 2 Sent. dist. 27. a. 1. q. 3.). Gratia et gloria non differunt secundum essentiam; atqui, uti superius ostendimus, gratia est indebita cuilibet creaturae. Ergo etiam gloria, seu visio intuitiva.

Prob. maj. a) "Aut gloria reddit acceptum Deo, aut non: si non, ergo non tantum placet Deo gloria, quantum gratia: ergo nec status patriae, quantum status viae: quod est inconveniens. Si sic, ergo cum iste sit proprius actus gratiae, necesse est gloriam esse gratiam."

b) "Quando aliquis de gratia transit ad gloriam, aut perdit gratiam, aut non: si perdit gratiam, ergo videtur quod desinat esse gratus Deo, et quod gloria et gratia habeant ad invicem repugnantiam: quorum utrumque falsum est. Si non perdit, cum gratia sit vita animae, sicut ostensum est supra, et in una anima tantum sit una vita, aut gloria non erit vita, aut gratia et gloria erunt idem per essentiam: sed constat quod gloria est vita; ergo, etc."

c) "Perfectum, aut imperfectum, non variant rem secundum essentiam: sed gratia dicit assimilationem animae ad Deum secundum statum imperfectionis, gloria vero secundum statum perfectionis: ergo, etc."

Unde gratia dicitur semen gloriae, - et Prov. 4. 18. legitur: "Justorum autem semita, quasi lux splendens, procedit et crescit usque ad perfectam diem." - Unde etiam fides, cognitio supernaturalis viae, est imperfecta respectu visionis intuitivae, quae est cognitio patriae: per fidem cognoscimus per speculum, in aenigmate, ex parte; in caelis videbimus facie ad faciem, cognoscemus sicut cogniti sumus. - Spes est veluti inchoata et imperfecta possessio objecti, quod in coelis possidemus perfecte. Spes dicitur inchoata possessio, quia justus jus habet ad videndum Deum, qui fidelis est; hinc illud "spe gaudentes": gaudium proprie est de bono aliquo pacto possesso. Tandem charitas, quae numquam excidit, eadem est in via et in patria; sed in patria est consummata. Vid. 1. Cor. 13. a v. 10.

Prob. III. ex D. Thoma, qui 1. 3. c. g. cap. 52. plures affert rationes, sed in 1. p. q. 12. a. 4. unam eligit, quam breviter proponemus.

Modus cognoscendi, qui excedit alicujus modum essendi, seu naturam ejus, nequit ei esse naturalis; siquidem operatio sequitur esse, et cognitio contingit secundum quod cognitum est in cognoscente. Atqui modus, quo beati in caelis vident Deum (intuitive), excedit modum essendi cujuslibet creaturae, seu quamcumque naturam creatam et creabilem. Ergo visio Dei intuitiva nequit ulli creaturae esse naturalis.

Prob. min. Modus, quo beati in caelis vident Deum, est secundum modum essendi ipsius Dei: "videbimus eum sicuti est": unde eodem modo, nempe intuitive, Deus connaturaliter et necessario cognoscit seipsum, etsi praeterea seipsum comprehendat. Atqui modus essendi Dei excedit modum essendi cujuslibet creaturae, seu est supra quamcumque naturam creatam et creabilem. Ergo modus, quo beati in caelis vident Deum (intuitive), excedit quamcumque naturam creatam et creabilem.

Ut vis hujus argumenti melius innotescat, et simul vindicetur ab impugnationibus Scoti et aliorum, duo praecipue notanda sunt. Primum est quod cum docet D. Thomas "Si modus essendi rei cognitae excedit modum naturae cognoscentis, oportet quod cognitio illius rei sit supra naturam," non considerat D. Thomas modos essendi particulares aut specificos, sed genericos et universales; distinguit enim diversos essendi modos in ordine ad cognitionem; cognitio fit secundum immaterialitatem; immaterialitas vero, quae est cognoscibilitatis radix, genericis et universalibus essendi modis continetur. - Vid. Sylv. in c. 1.

Hinc merito tres solum essendi modi distinguuntur in ordine ad cognitionem intellectualem, quatuor in ordine ad cognitionem in genere. "Primus est," inquit Tolet. post D. Th., "ejus qui est forma in materia individuata et totaliter recepta, ut formae materiales corruptibiles. Secundus eorum, quae in materia quidem sunt, tamen cum hoc subsistunt per se, ut anima rationalis. Tertius est eorum, quae subsistunt, et nullo modo in materia sunt; tamen sic subsistunt, quod in eis esse non est de eorum essentia, quales sunt angeli. Quartus eorum, quae subsistunt et

sine materia, et esse habent idem cum essentia, et hic est Deus solus."

Ex qua animadversione sequitur 1. quod principium illud "si modus essendi, etc.," potest ex experientia et analogia veluti inductive demonstrari. "Quae se habent primo modo," inquit Tolet., "quia totaliter in materia sunt, non cognoscunt nisi res in materia, ut bruta. Quae se habent secundo modo, quia partim in materia, partim sine materia sunt, non cognoscunt naturaliter nisi ea, quae vel in materia sunt, vel a materia abstrahuntur; ut anima rationalis, quae per phantasmata intelligit, non autem cognoscit alia superioris modi, seu angelos. Semper loquor de cognitione rei per essentiam et distincta. Quae se habent tertio modo, cognoscunt similia, seu angelos, sed non superiorem ordinem. Deus est, cui naturaliter convenit seipsum cognoscere."

Sequitur 2. quod nullius momenti est illa objectio Scoti, qui dicebat ex illo principio "si modus essendi, etc.," sequi Angelum inferiorem non posse naturaliter cognoscere Angelum superiorem; omnes enim Angeli sunt in eodem essendi gradu generico. Vid. Suarez (de Deo, 1. 2. c. 9. n. 12.)

Alterum, quod notandum diximus in hoc argumento, est illud procedere de modo cognoscendi naturali. Quando enim cognitio est naturalis, tunc procedit a principiis naturae, ac consequenter debet esse illi proportionata, cum effectus nequeat superare causam. Sed si agatur de cognitione per donum superadditum, evidens est quod non possit nec debeat esse proportionata soli naturae cognoscentis, sed naturae elevatae per illud donum. Jamvero cum natura aliqua creata elevatur per gratiam ad videndum Deum intuitive, hoc ipso cognitio haec non supponit quod illa natura sit actus purissimus: ipsa enim compositio naturae et doni superadditi destruit rationem actus purissimi. Sed si eadem creata natura posset suis viribus videre sicuti est Deum, qui est actus purissimus, nempe videre Deum sicut connaturale est Deo videre seipsum; tunc creatura deberet habere eumdem modum essendi Dei, nempe deberet esse actus purissimus. Vid. (n. 270. Nota.) 377. But now that opinion, once the more received, seems common, and, if we attend to arguments from authority, admits no doubt. Therefore we say:

PROPOSITION XXXIII. The intuitive vision of God is an end so exceeding every exigency of nature that there is no nature, created or creatable, to which it can be owed.

Proof I, From Scripture and the Fathers. The intuitive vision is proposed a) as an inheritance. Romans 8:17: "But if sons, also heirs; heirs indeed of God, and coheirs with Christ." Colossians 3:24: "Knowing that from the Lord you will receive the recompense of the inheritance," etc.

b) It is proposed as reward and promise. James 1:12: "Blessed is the man who suffers temptation, because when he has been proved, he will receive the crown of life, which God has promised to those who love him." James 2:5: "Heirs of the kingdom, which God has promised to those who love him." Hebrews 10:23: "Let us hold the confession of our hope unwavering, for he who promised is faithful," etc.

c) It is proposed as God's own beatitude and kingdom. Matthew 25:21: "Well done, good and faithful servant; because you have been faithful over a few things, I will set you over many; enter into the joy of your Lord." Apocalypse 3:21: "He who has conquered, I will grant him to sit on my throne, as I also conquered and sat with my Father on his throne." Luke 22:28-31: "But you are those who have remained with me in my temptations; and I dispose to you, as my Father disposed to me, a kingdom, that you may eat and drink at my table in my kingdom, and sit upon thrones judging the twelve tribes of Israel."

d) It is proposed as the consummation of likeness with God, or of Deification. 1 John 3:2: "Now we are sons of God, and it has not yet appeared what we shall be. We know that, when he shall appear, we shall be like him, because we shall see him as he is." 2 Corinthians 3:18: "But we all, with unveiled face beholding the glory of the Lord, are transformed into the same image," etc.

Hence: 1. Inheritance is not of itself connatural and owed except to a son; but the beatific vision is a divine inheritance; therefore it cannot be owed except to sons of God. But divine filiation, which is had through sanctifying grace, can be owed to no creature (n. 270, Proof I, b). Therefore.

2. A recompense which, in order to be owed, requires a special promise on the part of the one recompensing, corresponding to merit founded in some gratuitous gift of the one recompensing, and which exceeds every merit, is truly not owed or supernatural. But such is the intuitive vision not only with respect to men and angels, but with respect to any creature whatsoever. Therefore.

The minor is proved with respect to the promise. It is clear first from the cited

testimonies of Sacred Scripture, in which eternal life is called absolutely and, as it were, by antonomasia, "the promise." It is confirmed from the Fathers. St. Augustine (Enarration on Psalm 83, n. 16): "The Lord himself made himself a debtor, not by receiving, but by promising; it is not said to him, return what you received, but return what you promised." And (Sermon 159, On the Words of the Apostle, Romans 8:30 and 31, and c. 2, n. 2): "In those things which we do not yet have, we hold him as debtor. For he was made debtor not by receiving something from us, but by promising what pleased him. For in one way we say to a man, you owe me, because I gave to you; and in another way we say, you owe me, because you promised me. When you say, you owe me, because I gave to you, the benefit proceeded from you, but as lent, not as given. But when you say, you owe me, because you promised me, you gave nothing and yet you exact. For the goodness of him who promised will give." Sts. Basil, Ambrose, Hilary, Chrysostom, Fulgentius, Gregory, and others have the same.

The minor is proved with respect to the gratuitous gift in which merit is founded. All acts have proportion with eternal life, or with the intuitive vision, only insofar as they are acts of a son of God and are informed by supernatural grace. But this grace is not owed to any creature whatsoever, as we showed above. Therefore. Hence St. Augustine, in the same place on Psalm 83: "Whence is God a debtor? Has he received something? To whom does God owe anything? Behold, we see that Paul holds him as debtor: he obtained mercy, exacting truth: the Lord, he says, will return to me on that day. What will he return to you except what he owes you? Whence does he owe you? What did you give to him? Who first gave to him, and it will be repaid to him?" St. Fulgentius (preface to the book to Monimus): "He is the author of the debt who is the author of the gift. For by his own generosity he deigned to make himself debtor: not because, being needy, he receives from anyone, but because, being abundant, he gives more lavishly." St. Dionysius (Ecclesiastical Hierarchy, c. 1): "This salvation can happen to those who are saved only when they have already been deified." St. Irenaeus (book 4, c. 20, n. 5): "God, powerful in all things, will be seen in the kingdom of the heavens paternally: the Spirit indeed preparing man into the Son of God, the Son leading him to the Father, and the Father giving incorruption unto eternal life, which comes to each one from this, that he sees God."

The minor is proved with respect to the excess of the recompense. If a reward is to be given for the works of a servant, it will be some good befitting a servant, not the inheritance itself of sons, not the kingdom, not that joy which God himself enjoys. But the intuitive vision is the inheritance of sons, the kingdom, the beatitude itself of God; and every creature, according to nature, is a servant. Therefore.

The first part of this minor is established from the cited testimonies of Sacred Scripture; the other from the cited testimonies of the Fathers (n. 270, Proof II, 4). It can be confirmed from St. Augustine, who (City of God, book 13, c. 1, n. 2) says: "Although not every creature can be blessed (for beasts, trees, stones, and whatever is of that sort neither obtain nor desire this gift), nevertheless that creature which can be blessed cannot be so from itself, because it was created out of nothing, but from him by whom it was created." St. Ambrose (book of meditations, prayer 7): "Your creature, for whom to live is one thing and to live blessedly another, owes all that it lives and all that it lives blessedly only to your grace." Marcus the Archbishop, whom Nicephorus mentions in book 2, c. 35, according to Corderius: "But the Lord, wishing more to show that every precept is a certain debt, but that our adoption, made by his own blood, has been given to men, says: when you have done all things," etc.; "Wherefore the kingdom of heaven is not the reward of works" (this must be taken in a Catholic sense), "but the grace of God prepared for faithful servants. Nor does a servant ask freedom as a reward, but as a debtor he works well; that freedom, however, is granted from grace."

It is astonishing that against this argument Becanus, otherwise a theologian of great perspicacity, says (l. c., q. 4, n. 5): "The second argument contends that all creatures are naturally servants of God, and therefore that none can naturally be a daughter or son of God. But this is not rightly inferred. For first, it is certain that the same creature can by a different title be a servant and a child of God: a servant by nature; a child by grace. This belongs to all the just, whether existing in this life or in the other. All are servants by nature; children by grace. Therefore this alone is asked here, whether someone can at the same time be a servant and a child by nature. I think that this is possible, but in a different respect. He can be a

servant by reason of creation; a child by reason of operation."

But I answer: 1. A creature indeed can be a servant of God according to nature and a child according to grace; but it cannot be a servant and child of God according to the same thing, that is, according to nature. Yet it would be such if grace and glory were owed to it. 2. That operation either is a consequence of creation, insofar as it belongs to the creature according to nature, and then, since by creation it is a servant and not a child, it will also be such through operation; or that operation is not owed to the creature's nature, and now it is through a superadded gift, or an unowed gift, that it becomes a child.

3. Beatitude which is proper and connatural to God, which supposes the Deification of the creature, and which is the consummation of that Deification, cannot belong according to nature to any creature. But such is the intuitive vision of God. Therefore.

To these could be added the things usually sought from that text, "No one knows the Father except the Son, and he to whom the Son wills to reveal him"; from the testimonies of Sacred Scripture by which God is called invisible; and with the interpretation of the Fathers added, concerning invisibility according to the natural powers of the creature. But these proofs, and the proofs already given, which we have scarcely sketched, you will find confirmed and developed by many testimonies of the holy Fathers in Casini, What Is Man, etc., Mainz, 1862.

Proof II, from St. Bonaventure (in II Sent., dist. 27, a. 1, q. 3). Grace and glory do not differ according to essence; but, as we showed above, grace is not owed to any creature. Therefore neither is glory, or the intuitive vision.

The major is proved. a) "Either glory renders one accepted by God, or it does not. If not, therefore glory does not please God as much as grace does; therefore neither does the state of the homeland please him as much as the state of the way: which is unfitting. If it does, then, since this is the proper act of grace, it is necessary that glory be grace."

b) "When someone passes from grace to glory, either he loses grace, or he does not. If he loses grace, then it seems that he ceases to be pleasing to God, and that glory and grace have repugnance to one another, both of which are false. If he does not lose it, since grace is the life of the soul, as was shown above, and in one soul there is only one life, either glory will not be life, or grace and glory will be the same by essence. But it is established that glory is life; therefore, etc."

c) "The perfect or the imperfect do not vary a thing according to essence; but grace states the assimilation of the soul to God according to the state of imperfection, while glory states it according to the state of perfection; therefore, etc."

Hence grace is called the seed of glory; and in Proverbs 4:18 it is read: "But the path of the just, like a shining light, goes forward and increases even to perfect day." Hence also faith, the supernatural cognition of the way, is imperfect with respect to the intuitive vision, which is the cognition of the homeland: through faith we know through a mirror, in a riddle, in part; in heaven we shall see face to face, we shall know as we have been known. Hope is, as it were, an inchoate and imperfect possession of the object which in heaven we possess perfectly. Hope is called an inchoate possession because the just person has a right to seeing God, who is faithful; hence that saying, "rejoicing in hope": joy properly concerns a good possessed in some way. Finally charity, which never falls away, is the same on the way and in the homeland; but in the homeland it is consummated. See 1 Corinthians 13, from v. 10.

Proof III, from St. Thomas, who in Contra Gentiles III, c. 52, brings forward several reasons, but in I, q. 12, a. 4, chooses one, which we shall briefly propose.

A mode of knowing which exceeds someone's mode of being, or his nature, cannot be natural to him, since operation follows being, and cognition takes place according as the thing known is in the knower. But the mode by which the blessed in heaven see God intuitively exceeds the mode of being of any creature whatsoever, or any nature whatever created and creatable. Therefore the intuitive vision of God cannot be natural to any creature.

The minor is proved. The mode by which the blessed in heaven see God is according to the mode of being of God himself: "we shall see him as he is." Hence in the same mode, namely intuitively, God connaturally and necessarily knows himself, although besides this he comprehends himself. But God's mode of being exceeds the mode of being of any creature whatsoever, or is above any nature whatever created and creatable. Therefore the mode by which the blessed in heaven see God intuitively exceeds any nature whatever created and creatable.

In order that the force of this argument may be better known, and at the same time

vindicated from the attacks of Scotus and others, two things especially must be noted. The first is that when St. Thomas teaches, "If the mode of being of the thing known exceeds the mode of the nature of the knower, it is necessary that cognition of that thing be above nature," St. Thomas is not considering particular or specific modes of being, but generic and universal modes; for he distinguishes diverse modes of being in order to cognition. Cognition occurs according to immateriality; but immateriality, which is the root of cognoscibility, is contained by generic and universal modes of being. See Sylvester on this chapter.

Hence rightly only three modes of being are distinguished in order to intellectual cognition, four in order to cognition in general. "The first," says Toletus after St. Thomas, "is of that which is a form in individuated matter and totally received, as corruptible material forms. The second is of those things which indeed are in matter, yet together with this subsist through themselves, as the rational soul. The third is of those things which subsist and are in no way in matter; yet they so subsist that in them existence is not of their essence, such as angels are. The fourth is of those things which subsist both without matter and have existence the same as essence, and this is God alone."

From this observation it follows, 1. that that principle, "if the mode of being, etc.," can be demonstrated, as it were, inductively from experience and analogy. "Those things which have themselves in the first mode," says Toletus, "because they are totally in matter, know only things in matter, as brute animals do. Those which have themselves in the second mode, because they are partly in matter and partly without matter, naturally know only those things which either are in matter or are abstracted from matter, as the rational soul, which understands through phantasms, but does not know other things of a higher mode, or angels. I am always speaking of cognition of a thing through its essence and distinctly. Those things which have themselves in the third mode know similar things, or angels, but not the higher order. God is the one to whom it naturally belongs to know himself."

It follows, 2. that Scotus's objection is of no moment, when he said that from that principle, "if the mode of being, etc.," it follows that a lower angel cannot naturally know a higher angel; for all angels are in the same generic grade of being. See Suarez, On God, book 2, c. 9, n. 12.

The other thing which we said must be noted in this argument is that it proceeds concerning the natural mode of knowing. For when cognition is natural, then it proceeds from the principles of nature, and consequently must be proportioned to that nature, since an effect cannot surpass its cause. But if the question is of cognition through a superadded gift, it is evident that it cannot and need not be proportioned to the nature of the knower alone, but to the nature elevated through that gift. Now when some created nature is elevated through grace to seeing God intuitively, by this very fact this cognition does not suppose that that nature is purest act; for the very composition of nature and superadded gift destroys the ratio of purest act. But if the same created nature could by its own powers see God as he is, who is purest act, that is, see God as it is connatural to God to see himself, then the creature would have to have the same mode of being as God, namely it would have to be purest act. See n. 270, Note.

378. Ex his omnibus patet quod si velit assignari, secundum rationem, radix repugnantiae in eo quod aliqua creatura naturaliter videat Deum intuitive, ea consistit in ipsa improportione facultatis cognoscitivae creaturae, ac proinde ipsius esse creati ad illud objectum.

"Unde," ait Suarez (de Deo 1. 2. c. 9. n. 15.) "ut esset substantia creata supernaturalis, deberet esse substantia, quae esset purus actus, quia sine hac perfectione non posset connaturaliter uniri Deo, prout in se est, in ratione objecti cognoscibilis. Sicut ergo repugnat, substantiam esse creatam, et non habere eas imperfectiones potentialitatis, et compositionis, ex quibus oriri diximus, ut non possit idem lumen esse commensuratum tali substantiae ut subjecto, et Deo ut in se est ut objecto: ita repugnat dari substantiam illo modo supernaturalem. Quia naturale esset illi substantiae, habere lumen commensuratum sibi, et ipsam respiciens ut objectum maxime proprium, et consequenter non posset simul respicere Deum ipsum secundum se." Cf. integrum h. caput. 378. From all these things it is clear that if, according to reason, one wishes to assign the root of the repugnance in the claim that some creature naturally sees God intuitively, that root consists in the very disproportionality of the

creature's cognitive faculty, and therefore of its created being, to that object.

Translator's note: The PDF text layer has the broken reading `ipsius esse crea ad illud objectum`; this has been corrected to `ipsius esse creati ad illud objectum`, "of its created being to that object."

"Hence," says Suarez (On God, book 2, c. 9, n. 15), "in order that there be a created supernatural substance, it would have to be a substance which was pure act, because without this perfection it could not be connaturally united to God, as he is in himself, under the ratio of a cognoscible object. Therefore just as it is repugnant for a substance to be created and not to have those imperfections of potentiality and composition, from which we said it arises that the same light cannot be commensurate with such a substance as subject and with God as he is in himself as object, so it is repugnant for there to be a substance supernatural in that way. For it would be natural to that substance to have a light commensurate with itself, and regarding it itself as the maximally proper object, and consequently it could not at the same time regard God himself according to himself." Compare the whole of this chapter.

§ IV.
De lumine gloriae. § IV.
On the Light of Glory.

379. Ex verbis Clem. V. in Conc. Vienn. superius recitatis non modo tenendum est quod visio intuitiva Dei est supernaturalis, sed etiam quod anima indiget lumine gloriae ipsam elevante ad videndum Deum. 379. From the words of Clement V in the Council of Vienne cited above, one must hold not only that the intuitive vision of God is supernatural, but also that the soul needs the light of glory elevating it to seeing God.

380. Ad declarandam et tuendam hanc Ecclesiae doctrinam, necesse est 1. dicere quid sit lumen gloriae - 2. ostendenda est ejus necessitas - 3. breviter indicandum est quomodo ad visionem intuitivam concurrat. 380. To explain and defend this doctrine of the Church, it is necessary 1. to say what the light of glory is; 2. to show its necessity; 3. briefly to indicate how it concurs toward the intuitive vision.

381. Quoad 1um, claritatis gratia, excludimus imprimis aliquas opiniones, quae nullo modo teneri posse videntur. Atque 1. Per lumen gloriae nequit intelligi ipsum lumen increatum, sed donum quoddam creatum. Nam a) Conc. Vienn. loquitur de lumine gloriae eo modo, quo theologi loqui solebant: omnes autem, uti testatur Suarez (1. c. n. 5.) per lumen gloriae intelligebant aliquid creatum - b) "Lumen gloriae increatum non proprie elevat hominis intellectum, nisi quatenus aliquid in ipso intellectu Deus operatur supra naturam ejus. Nam ipsum lumen increatum per se ipsum non unitur formaliter intellectui. Sicut voluntas non elevatur ad amandum per ipsam charitatem increatam, et per essentiam Dei, sed quatenus in voluntate aliquid infundit." Quare sicut rejicimus ex Conc. Trid., sententiam eorum, qui dicebant nos formaliter justos esse per ipsam Personam Sp. Sancti, (tenendum est enim nos formaliter justos constitui per aliquod donum creatum intrinsece animae inhaerens); sic rejicimus opinionem eorum, qui negant lumen quoddam creatum animam elevans ad videndum Deum.

2. Creatum donum, in quo consistit lumen gloriae, non est ipsa visio, sed aliquid ab ipsa visione distinctum. Nam a) Conc. ait animam per lumen gloriae elevari ad videndum Deum; ergo distinguit lumen a visione. Lumen enim datur ad visionem, nec visio dicitur animam ad visionem elevare. - b) Id Conc. Vienn. decernitur, quod Beguardi negabant; sed illi non negabant visionem, sed ad illam habendam non necessarium esse lumen asserebant; ergo. Vid. Suarez (de Deo 1. 2. c. 14. n. 6.)

3. Lumen gloriae creatum non est species intelligibilis. Nam a) Species intelligibilis non elevat potentiam, sed unitur potentiae jam habenti vires ad cognoscendum objectum, et determinat illam: atqui juxta Conc. Vienn. lumen gloriae elevat animam ad videndum Deum; ergo. b) Communis DD. sententia, uti vidimus, negat dari hanc speciem

intelligibilem in visione intuitiva Dei: num haec sententia damnata fuit a Conc.? Vid. Suarez (1. c. n. 8.) 381. As to the first, for the sake of clarity, we first exclude some opinions which seem in no way able to be held. And 1. by the light of glory one cannot understand the uncreated light itself, but a certain created gift. For a) the Council of Vienne speaks of the light of glory in the way in which theologians were accustomed to speak; but all, as Suarez testifies (l. c., n. 5), understood something created by the light of glory. b) "The uncreated light of glory does not properly elevate man's intellect, except insofar as God works something in the intellect itself above its nature. For the uncreated light itself is not formally united to the intellect by itself. Just as the will is not elevated to loving by uncreated charity itself and by the essence of God, but insofar as he infuses something into the will." Wherefore, just as from the Council of Trent we reject the opinion of those who said that we are formally just through the very Person of the Holy Spirit, since it must be held that we are formally constituted just through some created gift intrinsically inhering in the soul, so we reject the opinion of those who deny some created light elevating the soul to seeing God.

2. The created gift in which the light of glory consists is not the vision itself, but something distinct from the vision itself. For a) the Council says that the soul is elevated by the light of glory to seeing God; therefore it distinguishes the light from the vision. For the light is given for the vision, nor is the vision said to elevate the soul to vision. b) What the Beguards denied is decreed by the Council of Vienne; but they did not deny the vision, but asserted that the light was not necessary for having it. Therefore. See Suarez, On God, book 2, c. 14, n. 6.

3. The created light of glory is not an intelligible species. For a) an intelligible species does not elevate a potency, but is united to a potency already having powers for knowing the object, and determines it; but according to the Council of Vienne, the light of glory elevates the soul to seeing God; therefore. b) The common opinion of the Doctors, as we have seen, denies that this intelligible species is given in the intuitive vision of God. Was this opinion condemned by the Council? See Suarez, l. c., n. 8.

382. His ergo exclusis, per lumen gloriae intelligitur "virtus quaedam creata supernaturalis a Deo infusa, qua intellectus redditur proxime potens et habilis ad videndum Deum."

Diximus 1. virtus. Nam, uti docet D. Thomas 2. 2. q. 175. a. 3. ad 2. lumen gloriae bifariam dispescitur: uno modo recipitur per modum habitus permanentis; altero modo per modum passionis transeuntis. Hoc secundo modo habuit lumen gloriae Apostolus (si verum est quod vidit Deum.) Sed si sermo sit de lumine gloriae beatorum in caelis, per illud virtus intelligitur habitus quidam infusus, qualitas quaedam permanens.

Diximus 2. quo intellectus redditur proxime potens et habilis ad videndum Deum. Quod, ut intelligatur, notandum est cum D. Th. 1. p. q. 12. a. 2., "ad videndum Deum duo requiri, unum est virtus visiva, aliud unio rei visae cum visu." Quare si lumen gloriae necessarium dicitur ad visionem, vel se habet ex parte objecti, vel ex parte potentiae, vel ex parte unionis objecti cum potentia. Sed lumen gloriae non se tenet proprie ex parte unionis; siquidem in cognitione unio fit per speciem intelligibilem: ut dictum est, in visione Dei intuitiva non datur species intelligibilis creata - ipsa divina essentia immediate unitur intellectui - lumen gloriae est donum aliquod creatum. Neque necessitas luminis se tenet ex parte objecti, quod de se est summe visibile, seu intelligibile. Superest ergo ut lumen se habeat ex parte potentiae, quae cum sit naturaliter impotens ad videndum Deum, per illam virtutem superadditam, per illud lumen fit proxime potens et habilis ad videndum Deum. Haec fuit constans sententia D. Thomae, cujus plura loca colligit et exponit Suarez (de Deo 1. 2. c. 15. nn. 1. 2.) 382. Therefore, with these things excluded, by the light of glory is understood "a certain created supernatural virtue infused by God, by which the intellect is rendered proximately powerful and able to see God."

We said, 1. virtue. For, as St. Thomas teaches in II-II, q. 175, a. 3, ad 2, the light of glory is divided in two ways: in one way it is received by way of a permanent habit; in another way, by way of a transient passion. In this second way the Apostle had the light of glory, if it is true that he saw God. But if the discussion is about the light of glory of the blessed in heaven, by it is understood a virtue, a certain infused habit, a certain permanent quality.

We said, 2. by which the

intellect is rendered proximately powerful and able to see God. In order that this may be understood, one must note with St. Thomas, I, q. 12, a. 2, that "two things are required for seeing God: one is the seeing virtue, the other the union of the thing seen with the sight." Wherefore if the light of glory is said to be necessary for the vision, either it holds itself on the part of the object, or on the part of the potency, or on the part of the union of the object with the potency. But the light of glory does not properly hold itself on the part of the union, since in cognition union comes about through an intelligible species; as has been said, in the intuitive vision of God no created intelligible species is given, the divine essence itself is immediately united to the intellect, and the light of glory is some created gift. Nor does the necessity of the light hold itself on the part of the object, which of itself is supremely visible, or intelligible. Therefore it remains that the light holds itself on the part of the potency, which, since it is naturally impotent for seeing God, through that superadded virtue, through that light, becomes proximately powerful and able to see God. This was the constant opinion of St. Thomas, many passages of which Suarez gathers and explains (On God, book 2, c. 15, nn. 1-2).

383. Contra autem sensere Scotus et Durandus, qui, uti refert Suarez (1. c. c. 8. n. 3.), putarunt intellectum nostrum esse de se aptum ad videndum Deum, ac proinde sine ulla virtute superaddita videre illum posse per hoc solum quod Deus sit illi praesens. - Negabant tamen visionem hujusmodi dicendam esse naturalem; quia Deus non est nobis praesens in ratione objecti, nisi voluntarie se manifestat. Vide Suarez (1. c. c. 9. n. 4.). 383. But Scotus and Durandus thought the contrary. As Suarez reports (l. c., c. 8, n. 3), they thought that our intellect is of itself apt for seeing God, and therefore that it can see him without any superadded virtue by this alone, that God is present to it. Nevertheless they denied that a vision of this sort should be called natural, because God is not present to us under the ratio of object unless he voluntarily manifests himself. See Suarez, l. c., c. 9, n. 4.

384. De hac Scoti et Durandi sententia, haec habet Card. Tolet. (in 1. p. q. 12. a. 5.): "Lumen gloriae infusum est in beato intellectu ad Deum videndum. Haec conclusio est contra Scotum et Durandum. Est conclusio de fide; oppositum est error damnatus in Conc. Vienn. et habetur in Clement. Ad nostrum de Haereticis. Unus error Beguardorum quintus erat, quod non indiget intellectus lumine infuso gloriae ad videndum Deum, quod ibi damnatur. Nec mirum, quod Scotus et Durandus oppositum habeant, quia eorum scripta fuerunt ante Concilium illud, quod celebratum fuit sub Clemente V. anno MCCCXI. quo tempore jam eorum opera edita fuisse videntur, quamvis illo fere tempore floruerint. Unde modo non debet esse res sub opinione." Suarez vero, et Lessius putant sententiam Scoti non fuisse damnatam a Conc.; sed sententiam D. Th. et communem esse valde Concilio consentaneam. 384. Concerning this opinion of Scotus and Durandus, Cardinal Toletus has these words (on I, q. 12, a. 5): "The light of glory is infused in the blessed intellect for seeing God. This conclusion is against Scotus and Durandus. It is a conclusion of faith; the opposite is an error condemned in the Council of Vienne and is found in the Clementine Ad nostrum, On Heretics. One error of the Beguards was the fifth, that the intellect does not need the infused light of glory for seeing God, which is condemned there. Nor is it surprising that Scotus and Durandus hold the opposite, because their writings were before that Council, which was celebrated under Clement V in the year 1311, at which time their works already seem to have been published, although they flourished at almost that time. Hence now the matter ought not to be under opinion." Suarez and Lessius, however, think that the opinion of Scotus was not condemned by the Council; but that the opinion of St. Thomas and the common opinion are very consonant with the Council.

385. Juxta hanc sententiam ergo facile intelligitur verum luminis gloriae munus, quod sic praeclare exponit Lessius (de sum. bono, 1. 2. c. 8. n. 52.): "Tria praestat hoc mirandum lumen. Primo, elevat mentem ad statum divinum, eamque efficit deiformem (ut

S. Dionysius loquitur) et similem Patri. Mens enim sic illustrata et elevata constituitur in actu primo, et vires accipit ad productionem visionis essentiae divinae. Secundo, expandit mentis capacitatem in immensum, ut sit capax immensi et illimitati boni: sicut si uter qui per se tantum sit capax unius amphorae, ita interius extendatur et dilatetur, ut possit intra se complecti totum Oceanum. Sicut enim lumen istud corporale facit ut oculus corporis se extendat ad hujus mundi vastitatem, eamque intra se miro quodam modo complectatur: ita lumen spiritale et divinum facit, ut mens cui insederit se possit extendere, et intra se quodammodo complecti totam Dei immensitatem. Hic tamen adverte, hos duos effectus luminis gloriae, quos per se ipsum formaliter praestat, non esse omnino distinctos, sed necessario conjunctos: nam hoc ipso quo mentem elevat, eique vires ad producendam visionem tribuit, eamdem etiam expandere debet ad illam visionem capiendam: quia illa visio non alibi quam in ipsa, ab ipsa mente, ope luminis, est producenda. Tertio, mentem sic elevatam et expansam determinat et rapit in visionem, eam eminenti modo juvando et simul concurrendo ad illius visionis productionem: et simul essentia divina intime praesens intellectui, concurrit instar sigili ad eam visionem formandam et sibi assimilandam. En primarium officium hujus eminentissimi luminis." 385. According to this opinion, therefore, the true office of the light of glory is easily understood, which Lessius explains splendidly in this way (On the Supreme Good, book 2, c. 8, n. 52): "This wondrous light provides three things. First, it elevates the mind to a divine state, and makes it deiform, as St. Dionysius says, and like the Father. For the mind thus illumined and elevated is constituted in first act, and receives powers for the production of the vision of the divine essence. Second, it expands the capacity of the mind into immensity, so that it is capable of the immense and unlimited good: as if a wineskin which by itself is capable of only one amphora were so internally stretched and dilated that it could contain within itself the whole ocean. For just as this bodily light causes the eye of the body to extend itself to the vastness of this world, and to embrace it within itself in a certain wondrous way, so spiritual and divine light causes the mind in which it has settled to be able to extend itself and, in some way, to embrace within itself the whole immensity of God. Yet note here that these two effects of the light of glory, which it formally provides through itself, are not wholly distinct, but necessarily conjoined; for by the very fact that it elevates the mind and gives it powers for producing the vision, it must also expand the same mind for receiving that vision, because that vision is to be produced nowhere else than in the mind itself, by the mind itself, by the help of the light. Third, it determines and carries the mind thus elevated and expanded into vision, helping it in an eminent way and at the same time concurring toward the production of that vision; and at the same time the divine essence, intimately present to the intellect, concurs like a seal toward forming that vision and assimilating it to itself. Behold the primary office of this most eminent light."

386. Quoad 2um, asserimus:

PROP. XXXIV. Datur in beatis lumen gloriae naturalem eorum intellectus defectum ex parte potentiae supplens, quo adjuti beati actum visionis eliciunt.

Prob. I. Visio intuitiva est certe actus supernaturalis; atqui nequit actus supernaturalis procedere ex viribus alicujus potentiae naturalibus; ergo requiritur in beatis ad videndum Deum aliquod auxilium ex parte potentiae, hujus defectum supplens. Sed hoc auxilium dicitur lumen gloriae. Ergo.

Conf. In voluntate beatorum est habitus charitatis, quo Deum amant; ergo pari ratione debet esse aliquid in intellectu, quo Deum vident: sed non est fides, quia haec obscura est, et, ut ait Apostolus, evacuabitur; ergo erit aliud auxilium, lumen gloriae.

Prob. II. Datur certe in caelis lumen gloriae, quo beati Deum vident. Atqui illud se habere debet ex parte potentiae, illam elevans et ejus defectum supplens. Ergo.

Prob. maj. (quam caeterum, si agatur de lumine gloriae utcumque intellecto, nemo catholicorum negat) ex Scriptura. Ps. 35.: "In lumine tuo videbimus lumen." Apocal. 21.: "Civitas beatorum non eget sole, neque luna, nam claritas Dei illuminabit eam." Isaiae 60.: "Non erit tibi amplius sol ad lucendum per diem, nec splendor lunae illuminabit te: sed erit tibi Dominus in lucem sempiternam, et Deus tuus in gloriam tuam."

Prob. min. Si lumen gloriae non se haberet ex parte potentiae, se haberet ex parte objecti (de specie impressa nihil dicimus

tum quia et ipsa est vicaria objecti, tum quia species impressa creata jam exclusa est.) Atqui dici nequit quod se habeat solum ex parte objecti. Nam

a) Quamdiu potentia manet improportionata ad aliquod objectum, utut illi hoc praesentetur, nequit ab ea attingi; atqui si lumen gloriae se haberet solum ex parte objecti, intellectus beatorum maneret improportionatus ad videndum Deum; Deus enim in se visus est objectum supernaturale, et intellectus beatorum non haberet, nisi vires naturales. Ergo.

b) Quantumvis res fidei perfecte proponantur, explicentur, et concipiantur animo, non possumus illis assentiri ut oportet ad salutem, nisi potentia ipsa habitu fidei, vel auxilio supernaturali elevetur et juvetur ad talem assensum eliciendum. Simili modo quantumvis voluntati perfecte proponatur Deum esse amandum super omnia; non potest tamen illum amare amore supernaturali, nisi juvetur ex parte sua dono charitatis. Quod si ad tales actus qui multo minus sunt excellentes et supernaturales, ipsae potentiae ex parte sua compleri et juvari debent: perspicuum est, id multo magis esse necessarium ad visionem beatificam, quae est in supremo gradu rei supernaturalis.

c) Si lumen gloriae non se haberet ex parte potentiae elevans illam, visio intuitiva vere esset naturalis; ergo. Prob. antec. Tunc, fatentibus adversariis, tota supernaturalitas consisteret in eo, quod Deus posset pro suo lubitu se praesentem facere intellectui, vel non; atqui deberet se praesentem facere; ergo. - Prob. min. Quid Deus debeat alicui naturae nequit melius judicari, quam ex ejusdem viribus; si enim natura habet vires sufficientes ad aliquid, illud dicitur ei debitum. Atqui si lumen gloriae non se haberet ex parte potentiae, sed solum ex parte objecti, potentia, seu intellectus, ut adversarii tenent, haberet vires sufficientes ad videndum Deum. Ergo.

Hoc argumentum optime evolvit Suarez (1. c. c. 15. nn. 9-13.) exemplo Angelorum. Angeli indigent speciebus ut videant alios Angelos - species illis infunduntur a Deo - naturales tamen dicuntur, quia Angeli habent naturalem vim sufficientem ad videndos alios Angelos - si ergo haberet eorum intellectus vim sufficientem ad videndum Deum intuitive, cur non dicendum esset, quod si Deus se praesentem facit eorum intellectui, naturaliter agit? "Quamobrem," ita merito concludit cit. Auctor n. 14., "semper censui, aliam sententiam non esse probandam, neque admittendam ullo modo, et quo magis, ac magis illam considero, eo firmius huic judicio adhaereo. Praesertim quia nullum vidi fundamentum auctoritatis, vel rationis, quod ullam ingerat difficultatem." 386. As to the second, we assert:

PROPOSITION XXXIV. There is in the blessed the light of glory supplying the natural defect of their intellect on the part of the potency; aided by it, the blessed elicit the act of vision.

Proof I. The intuitive vision is certainly a supernatural act; but a supernatural act cannot proceed from the natural powers of some potency; therefore in the blessed, for seeing God, some aid is required on the part of the potency, supplying this defect. But this aid is called the light of glory. Therefore.

Confirmation. In the will of the blessed there is the habit of charity by which they love God; therefore by like reason there ought to be something in the intellect by which they see God. But it is not faith, because this is obscure and, as the Apostle says, will be emptied out; therefore it will be another aid, the light of glory.

Proof II. Certainly there is in heaven the light of glory by which the blessed see God. But that light must hold itself on the part of the potency, elevating it and supplying its defect. Therefore.

The major is proved, which, moreover, if the question is about the light of glory understood in any way, none of the Catholics denies, from Scripture. Psalm 35: "In your light we shall see light." Apocalypse 21: "The city of the blessed does not need sun or moon, for the brightness of God will illuminate it." Isaiah 60: "You shall no longer have the sun for light by day, nor shall the splendor of the moon illuminate you; but the Lord will be for you an eternal light, and your God your glory."

The minor is proved. If the light of glory did not hold itself on the part of the potency, it would hold itself on the part of the object; concerning an impressed species we say nothing, both because it too is vicarious of the object, and because a created impressed species has already been excluded. But it cannot be said that it holds itself only on the part of the object. For:

a) So long as a potency remains disproportioned to some object, however much that object is presented to it, it cannot be attained by that potency. But if the light of glory held itself only on the part of the object, the intellect of the blessed would remain disproportioned to seeing God; for God seen in himself is a supernatural object, and the intellect of the blessed would have only natural powers. Therefore.

b)

However perfectly the things of faith are proposed, explained, and conceived by the mind, we cannot assent to them as is necessary for salvation unless the potency itself is elevated and helped by the habit of faith, or by supernatural aid, for eliciting such assent. In a similar way, however perfectly it is proposed to the will that God must be loved above all things, nevertheless it cannot love him with supernatural love unless it is helped on its own part by the gift of charity. But if for such acts, which are much less excellent and supernatural, the potencies themselves must be completed and helped on their own part, it is clear that this is much more necessary for the beatific vision, which is in the highest grade of supernatural reality.

c) If the light of glory did not hold itself on the part of the potency by elevating it, the intuitive vision would truly be natural; therefore. The antecedent is proved. Then, as the adversaries admit, the whole supernaturalness would consist in this, that God could according to his pleasure make himself present to the intellect, or not; but he would have to make himself present; therefore. The minor is proved. What God owes to some nature cannot be judged better than from that nature's powers; for if a nature has powers sufficient for something, that thing is said to be owed to it. But if the light of glory did not hold itself on the part of the potency, but only on the part of the object, the potency, or intellect, as the adversaries hold, would have sufficient powers for seeing God. Therefore.

Suarez very well develops this argument (l. c., c. 15, nn. 9-13) by the example of angels. Angels need species in order to see other angels; the species are infused into them by God; nevertheless they are called natural, because angels have a natural power sufficient for seeing other angels. Therefore, if their intellect had a power sufficient for seeing God intuitively, why should it not be said that, if God makes himself present to their intellect, it acts naturally? "Wherefore," thus the cited author rightly concludes, n. 14, "I have always judged that the other opinion is not to be approved, nor admitted in any way; and the more and more I consider it, the more firmly I adhere to this judgment, especially because I have seen no foundation of authority or reason which introduces any difficulty."

387. Quoad 3um, ut intelligatur quomodo lumen gloriae concurrit ad visionem, notandum est 1. "in visione tria spectari posse. Primo, est ipsa visionis substantia. Secundo, ipsius productio seu processio, et assidua dependentia a substantia viva, qualis est anima. Tertio, ejus receptio in eadem anima. Substantia visionis est non modus aliquis tenuis, sicut in corporibus figura; sed solida qualitas et veluti pictura et imago objecti; quae ab Augustino verbum mentis dicitur. Haec totam animam penetrat, ac pingit, eamque objecto assimilat; sicut species colorum ope luminis ab objectis in aerem diffusae ipsum variis coloribus et figuris pingunt, et viridem, flavum, caeruleum, rubrum, etc. miro modo efficiunt, etsi ob tenuitatem non videantur, nisi cum certa ratione corpore denso et candido e regione opposito excipiuntur... Productio visionis fit a substantia vivente a qua ita procedit, ut ab illa assidue dependeat, sicut lumen solis in aere ita procedit a sole, ut continenter ab eo dependeat, et conservari debeat. Receptio fit in eadem substantia a qua procedit. Idem cernitur in aliis omnibus actibus vitalibus, qui idcirco immanentes dicuntur."

Notandum est 2. "tria principia ad hanc visionem eliciendam concurrere, nimirum intellectum, lumen gloriae intellectui infusum, et essentiam divinam. Ab intellectu habet, quod sit actio vitalis et vita animae: a lumine gloriae, quod sit supernaturalis et divini ordinis, et clara ac distincta contemplatio: ab essentia divina, quod sit illius imago et visio potius quam alterius rei... Itaque necesse est, Primo, ut procedat ab intellectu, seu a substantia intelligente: quia alioquin non erit vitalis intellectio, nec vita; ac proinde nec animam poterit beare, ut supra ostensum est. Deinde etiam debet procedere effective a lumine gloriae, vel auxilio supernaturali, quod vires illius luminis suppleat (haec enim in praesenti negotio non distinguo) alioquin non erit supernaturalis nec divinae indolis, neque clare objectum repraesentabit. Non enim intellectus vi suae naturae potest talem excellentiam actui suo imprimere, sed opus habet dono aliquo divino, cujus ope id praestet. Itaque ista excellentia per se et proprie provenit ab hoc dono, et hoc donum per se primo et directe est illius excellentiae causa. Denique debet etiam aliquo modo procedere ab essentia divina cujus est visio, et ad quam ad objectum suum primarium terminatur: quia hujus est similitudo et imago, et hanc clare distincteque repraesentat; quare ad eam formandam essentia debet

concurrere. Sine enim tali concursu non facile concipi potest quomodo, ipsi essentiae efficiatur similis. Cur enim conceptus quem mens in se format, est potius imago hujus objecti, quam alterius, si objectum nullo modo concurrit?" 387. As to the third, in order that it may be understood how the light of glory concurs toward the vision, it must be noted 1. that "three things can be considered in the vision. First, there is the substance itself of the vision. Second, its production or procession, and its continual dependence on a living substance, such as the soul is. Third, its reception in the same soul. The substance of the vision is not some thin mode, as figure is in bodies, but a solid quality and, as it were, a painting and image of the object, which Augustine calls the word of the mind. This penetrates the whole soul, paints it, and assimilates it to the object; just as the species of colors, diffused into the air from objects by the help of light, paint the air itself with various colors and figures, and make it green, yellow, blue, red, etc., in a wondrous way, although because of their subtlety they are not seen unless, according to a certain relation, they are received by a dense and white body placed opposite them... The production of the vision comes about from the living substance from which it so proceeds that it continually depends on it, just as the light of the sun in the air so proceeds from the sun that it continually depends on it and must be conserved by it. Reception occurs in the same substance from which it proceeds. The same is discerned in all other vital acts, which for this reason are called immanent."

It must be noted 2. that "three principles concur for eliciting this vision, namely the intellect, the light of glory infused into the intellect, and the divine essence. From the intellect the vision has that it is a vital action and the life of the soul; from the light of glory, that it is supernatural and of the divine order, and a clear and distinct contemplation; from the divine essence, that it is an image and vision of it rather than of another thing... Therefore it is necessary, first, that it proceed from the intellect, or from an intelligent substance, because otherwise it will not be a vital intellection, nor life, and consequently it will not be able to beatify the soul, as was shown above. Then it must also proceed effectively from the light of glory, or from supernatural aid which supplies the powers of that light, for I do not distinguish these in the present matter; otherwise it will not be supernatural nor of divine character, nor will it clearly represent the object. For the intellect by the force of its own nature cannot impress such excellence upon its act, but needs some divine gift by whose help it provides this. Therefore this excellence per se and properly comes from this gift, and this gift per se, primarily and directly, is the cause of that excellence. Finally, it must also in some way proceed from the divine essence whose vision it is, and to which as its primary object it is terminated, because it is a likeness and image of this, and clearly and distinctly represents this; wherefore the essence must concur toward forming it. For without such concurrence it cannot easily be conceived how it is made similar to the essence itself. For why is the concept which the mind forms in itself an image of this object rather than of another, if the object concurs in no way?"

388. Cum ergo concursus tum intellectus tum luminis necessarius sit ad visionem, unica quaestio, quae superest quoad naturam concursus ex parte luminis, ea est quae agitatur inter Thomistas et alios Theologos. Primi enim tenent intellectum solum radicaliter et remote concurrere ad visionem, cujus proinde unica ratio totalis proxima est lumen gloriae. Vid. Gotti (Tract. 3. q. 4. dub. 3.) Alii vero tenent ex intellectu et lumine gloriae haberi unicum principium proximum visionis. 388. Since, therefore, the concurrence both of the intellect and of the light is necessary for the vision, the one question that remains concerning the nature of the concurrence on the part of the light is that which is debated between the Thomists and other theologians. For the former hold that the intellect concurs toward the vision only radically and remotely, and that consequently the sole total proximate ratio of the vision is the light of glory. See Gotti, tract. 3, q. 4, doubt 3. But others hold that from the intellect and the light of glory there is one proximate principle of the vision.

389. Cum haec quaestio respiciat omnes actus supernaturales, paucis hic indicabimus quod nobis videtur tenendum. Itaque visio intuitiva procedit ab

intellectu informato et elevato per lumen gloriae, ac proinde cum intellectus tum lumen gloriae influunt in illam. Quando autem dicitur intellectus elevatus influere in visionem, intelligitur quod influat non solum per lumen gloriae, quo informatur; sed per se ipsum, seu per suam entitatem, secundum hanc enim dat illi ut sit actus vitalis. - Imo quamvis possit dici intellectum habere activitatem remotam quoad visionem intuitivam Dei, quatenus indiget compleri per lumen gloriae, ut possit illam elicere; vero tamen sensu activitas illa dicitur proxima, quatenus semel completa per habitum, proxime et immediate in suo gradu influit in visionem, quemadmodum lumen ipsum. - Ex intellectu ergo et lumine exurgit unicum principium proximum et adaequatum visionis, cujus intellectus solus, vel lumen solum non est nisi principium inadaequatum et partiale. Partiale quidem partialitate causae, non partialitate effectus; siquidem effectus est actus simplex, et totus quantus est, est simul vitalis et supernaturalis; ideoque nequit pars veluti illius produci ab intellectu, pars a lumine gloriae. 389. Since this question concerns all supernatural acts, here we shall briefly indicate what seems to us must be held. Therefore the intuitive vision proceeds from the intellect informed and elevated by the light of glory, and consequently both the intellect and the light of glory flow into it. But when the elevated intellect is said to flow into the vision, it is understood that it flows not only through the light of glory by which it is informed, but through itself, or through its own entity, for according to this it gives to the vision that it is a vital act. Indeed, although it can be said that the intellect has remote activity with respect to the intuitive vision of God, insofar as it needs to be completed by the light of glory so that it can elicit it, nevertheless in a true sense that activity is called proximate, insofar as, once completed by the habit, it proximately and immediately flows in its own grade into the vision, just as the light itself does. Therefore from the intellect and the light there arises one proximate and adequate principle of the vision, of which the intellect alone, or the light alone, is only an inadequate and partial principle. It is partial indeed by partiality of cause, not by partiality of effect, since the effect is a simple act, and, whole as it is, is at once vital and supernatural; and therefore one part of it cannot, as it were, be produced by the intellect and another part by the light of glory.

390. Quare de visione intuitiva potest dici quod Apostolus 1. Cor. 15. de aliis actibus supernaturalibus: "Non ego autem, sed gratia Dei mecum." Super quae verba S. Bern. in lib. de gr. et lib. arb. circa finem: "Potuit," inquit, "dicere per me; sed quia minus erat, maluit dicere mecum: praesumens se non solum operis esse ministrum per effectum; sed etiam operantis quodammodo socium per consensum." Et infra: "Quod a sola gratia coeptum est, pariter ab utroque perficitur; ut mixtim non sigillatim; simul, non vicissim per singulos profectus operentur; non partim gratia, partim liberum arbitrium; sed totum singula opere individuo peragunt, totum quidem hoc et totum illa." Vid. Suarez 1. 6. de gr. c. 4. et c. 5. n. 15. et c. 7. nn. 1-6. Vid. etiam Becanum (de attrib. div. cap. 9. q. 4. n. 4.) 390. Wherefore of the intuitive vision one can say what the Apostle says in 1 Corinthians 15 concerning other supernatural acts: "Yet not I, but the grace of God with me." On these words St. Bernard, in the book On Grace and Free Choice, near the end, says: "He could have said through me; but because that was less, he preferred to say with me, presuming that he was not only the minister of the work through the effect, but also in some way a companion of the one working through consent." And below: "What was begun by grace alone is completed equally by both, so that they work mixedly, not separately; together, not in turn through individual advances; not partly grace and partly free choice, but each performs the whole by an undivided work, indeed the whole by this and the whole by that." See Suarez, book 6 On Grace, c. 4, and c. 5, n. 15, and c. 7, nn. 1-6. See also Becanus, On the Divine Attributes, cap. 9, q. 4, n. 4.

391. Dices contra statutam propos.: Si lumen gloriae esset quid creatum, poterit dari intellectus creatus naturaliter videns Deum, ac proinde substantia creata intrinsece supernaturalis. - Revera intellectus creatus simul cum lumine gloriae est quid finitum; ergo Deus, qui potest intellectum perfectiorem et perfectiorem in indefinitum condere, devenire poterit ad unum

intellectum, qui sit tantae perfectionis, quantae est intellectus perfusus lumine gloriae.

Resp. Identitas intellectus cum vi propria luminis gloriae est perfectio major illa, quae exurgit ex compositione intellectus et luminis gloriae ei accidentaliter superadditi, cum unitas ipsa et identitas sit perfectio major compositione. - Quod autem ea perfectio major sit quacumque perfectione finita, iis argumentis ostenditur, quibus probavimus visionem intuitivam Dei non posse esse connaturalem nisi Deo. Unde merito D. Th. eidem objectioni respondet 1. p. q. 12. a. 5. ad 3.: "Dispositio ad formam ignis non potest esse naturalis nisi habenti formam ignis. Unde lumen gloriae non potest esse naturale creaturae, nisi creatura esset naturae divinae; quod est impossibile. Per hoc enim lumen fit creatura rationalis deiformis." 391. You will say against the stated proposition: If the light of glory were something created, a created intellect naturally seeing God could be given, and consequently an intrinsically supernatural created substance. For in truth a created intellect together with the light of glory is something finite; therefore God, who can found a more and more perfect intellect indefinitely, will be able to arrive at one intellect which is of as much perfection as is an intellect suffused with the light of glory.

I answer: The identity of the intellect with the proper power of the light of glory is a perfection greater than that which arises from the composition of intellect and light of glory accidentally superadded to it, since unity itself and identity is a perfection greater than composition. But that this greater perfection is beyond any finite perfection is shown by those arguments by which we proved that the intuitive vision of God cannot be connatural except to God. Hence St. Thomas rightly responds to the same objection in I, q. 12, a. 5, ad 3: "A disposition to the form of fire cannot be natural except to one having the form of fire. Hence the light of glory cannot be natural to a creature, unless the creature were of divine nature, which is impossible. For by this light the rational creature is made deiform."

§ V.
Praecipuae difficultates contra supernaturalitatem visionis intuitivae enodantur. § V.
The Principal Difficulties Against the Supernaturalness of the Intuitive Vision Are Untied.

392. Obj. 1. Beatitudo, quam homo naturaliter appetit, est ei debita, ideoque naturalis; atqui naturaliter appetit homo visionem intuitivam: ergo.

Conf. 1. Plures Scholastici docuere dari in homine naturalem appetitum visionis intuitivae. Conf. 2. Praesertim vero D. Thomas illud constanter docet. Vid. 1. p. q. 12. a. 1.; 1. 2. q. 3. a. 8.; et q. 5. a. 3. ad. 3.; c. g. 1. 3. cc. 50. 51. etc. 392. Objection 1. Beatitude, which man naturally desires, is owed to him, and therefore is natural; but man naturally desires the intuitive vision; therefore.

Confirmation 1. Several Scholastics taught that there is in man a natural appetite for the intuitive vision. Confirmation 2. Especially St. Thomas constantly teaches this. See I, q. 12, a. 1; I-II, q. 3, a. 8; and q. 5, a. 3, ad 3; Contra Gentiles III, cc. 50-51, etc.

393. Obj. II. Homo in quocumque statu nequit esse beatus, nisi Deum diligat super omnia; atqui nequit Deum super omnia naturaliter diligere; ergo.

Conf. D. Augustinus praeter amorem charitatis, qui supernaturalis est, non agnoscit nisi terrenam cupiditatem, quae mala est: ergo non admittit amorem Dei naturalem. 393. Objection II. Man in whatever state cannot be blessed unless he loves God above all things; but he cannot naturally love God above all things; therefore.

Confirmation. St. Augustine, besides the love of charity, which is supernatural, recognizes only earthly cupidity, which is evil; therefore he does not admit a natural love of God.

394. Resp. 1ae obj. dist. Beatitudo, quam homo naturaliter appetit appetitu innato, et exigentiae conc.; appetitu elicito subd.; appetitu elicito ordinato,

absoluto, efficaci conc.; appetitu elicito inordinato, conditionato, inefficaci nego. 394. I answer to the first objection by distinguishing. The beatitude which man naturally desires by innate appetite, and by appetite of exigency, I concede; by elicited appetite, I subdistinguish; by elicited appetite that is ordered, absolute, and efficacious, I concede; by elicited appetite that is disordered, conditioned, and inefficacious, I deny.

395. Unde, duplex distinguendus est appetitus, innatus unus, alter elicitus. Appetitus innatus dicitur ex analogia appetitus eliciti, et definiri potest ordinatio seu propensio naturae ad aliquod bonum, nulla praesupposita cognitione illius. "Consistit," inquit Suarez, "in pondere naturae, et ideo communis est cum aliis viventibus, et inanimatis; et in quibus inest, perpetuo inest... non dicit rem aliquam, aut realem modum distinctum a potentia naturali; sed explicat per metaphoram vim et naturam ipsius potentiae naturalis." - Appetitus vero elicitus est actus vitalis tendens in bonum cognitum: "unde," inquit idem Auctor, "est proprium viventium vita animali, vel rationali; et solum adest quando vivens actu cognoscit et operatur." 395. Hence a twofold appetite must be distinguished: one innate, the other elicited. Innate appetite is so called by analogy with elicited appetite, and can be defined as the ordering or propensity of nature toward some good, with no cognition of it presupposed. "It consists," says Suarez, "in the weight of nature, and therefore is common with other living things and with inanimate things; and in those things in which it exists, it exists perpetually... it does not state some thing, or a real mode distinct from natural potency; but through a metaphor explains the force and nature of the natural potency itself." But elicited appetite is a vital act tending toward a known good: "hence," says the same author, "it is proper to beings living animal or rational life; and is present only when the living being actually knows and operates."

396. Porro appetitus innatus dispescitur in appetitum innatum exigentiae, et simplicis capacitatis, seu aptitudinis. Primus fertur in bonum naturae proportionatum et debitum, quod si possidere non possit, natura erit misera; alter vero dicit simpliciter potentiam susceptivam boni, quamvis illud sit indebitum; quod proinde si non possideatur, natura non privabitur perfectione sibi debita, nec erit misera. Appetitus innatus aptitudinis respondet, uti patet potentiae obedientiali. 396. Further, innate appetite is divided into innate appetite of exigency, and of simple capacity, or aptitude. The first is borne toward a good proportioned and owed to nature; if it cannot possess that good, nature will be miserable. But the other simply states a receptive potency for a good, although that good is not owed; and therefore if it is not possessed, nature will not be deprived of a perfection owed to it, nor will it be miserable. Innate appetite of aptitude corresponds, as is clear, to obediential potency.

397. Appetitus elicitus inefficax, conditionatus, imperfectus est et ferri potest in bonum etiam indebitum et impossibile - item potest dari appetitus inordinatus rei indebitae aut impossibilis. Sed appetitus elicitus efficax, absolutus, ordinatus nequit ferri nisi in bonum debitum et possibile. - Quod non possit attingi objectum indebitum aut impossibile, non facit naturam miseram - quod si appetitu inordinato elicito aliquis appetens bonum impossibile aut indebitum, miser fit; talis erit sua culpa, et nullo pacto hoc tribuendum esset Auctori naturae. 397. Inefficacious, conditioned, imperfect elicited appetite exists and can be borne toward a good that is even unowed and impossible; likewise there can be a disordered appetite for a thing unowed or impossible. But efficacious, absolute, ordered elicited appetite cannot be borne except toward a good that is owed and possible. The fact that an unowed or impossible object cannot be attained does not make nature miserable; but if by a disordered elicited appetite someone desiring an impossible or unowed good becomes miserable, he will be such by his own fault, and this should in no way be attributed to the Author of nature.

398. His breviter adnotatis, siquidem ex philosophia ea praesupponimus, dicendum est 1. quod datur in homine appetitus innatus visionis intuitivae, si intelligatur de appetitu innato simplicis aptitudinis: datur enim in homine, ut vidimus, potentia obedientialis ad illam.

2. Non datur vero in homine appetitus naturalis innatus exigentiae ad visionem intuitivam. Nam a) appetitus naturalis innatus exigentiae fundatur in potentia, quae naturalis sit etiam in ordine ad objectum; atqui nec homo, nec ulla creatura habet talem potentiam ad videndum Deum intuitive, uti probavimus; ergo. - b) Certum est distingui duplicem beatitudinem, naturalem et supernaturalem, et naturalem appeti ab homine appetitu innato exigentiae; ergo eodem appetitu nequit appeti visio intuitiva, quae est supernaturalis beatitudo: secus enim beatitudo illa naturalis non satiaret hominis appetitum, et sic non esset beatitudo. Vid. Suarez (de ult. fin. hom. disp. 16. sect. 2. a n. 6.)

3. Non datur in homine appetitus elicitus naturalis absolutus et efficax visionis intuitivae. Nam a) Si ita appeteret homo naturaliter visionem intuitivam, ea non obtenta, misera esset humana natura; sed si hoc, visio intuitiva esset naturalis et debita; ergo. - b) Appetitus elicitus, de quo hic agimus, fundatur in appetitu innato exigentiae; atqui non datur in homine talis appetitus ad visionem intuitivam; ergo. c) "Hic appetitus efficax," inquit Suarez (1. c. sect. 3. n. 5.), "virtute includit absolutam voluntatem exequendi omnia media necessaria ad illam beatitudinem consequendam; sed hanc voluntatem non potest homo habere suis viribus naturalibus; si enim non potest habere naturaliter efficacem voluntatem credendi vera, et supernaturali fide, quae est medium necessarium, quomodo poterit habere aliam voluntatem quae hanc continet, et plures alias?"

4. Appetitus elicitus conditionatus et inefficax visionis intuitivae potest esse, uti patet ex dictis, non solum in homine illuminato ex ratione supernaturali, sed etiam in pura natura. Animadvertit tamen Suarez (1. c. n. 7.): "Solum est duplex differentia, quia ex revelatione facile apprehenditur illa beatitudo ut magnum bonum, et possibile, tamen ex solo naturali discursu vix possit in mente hominis cadere, non tamen repugnaret aliquo modo, et conditionate apprehendi, id est, quod esset bonum videre primam causam, si esset possibile. Secunda differentia est, quia postquam per revelationem constat homini esse ordinatum ad illam beatitudinem, homo toto affectu, non quidem perfecto, sed quantum ipse potest, illam desiderat, nec est contentus, nec quietus extra illam, saltem in via: at vero stando in pura natura, licet homo conciperet aliquale desiderium conditionatum illius visionis, tamen si prudenter se gereret, non esset inquietus, sed esset sua naturali sorte contentus: sicut etiam posset homo illo modo appetere intelligere sine discursu, qui tamen appetitus nec solicitaret, nec inquietaret animam, quia cognosceret esse de re valde aliena ab humana natura." Cf. cit. disp. 16. de ult. fin.; et Prol. 4. de grat. c. 1. 398. With these things briefly noted, since we presuppose them from philosophy, one must say, 1. that there is in man an innate appetite for the intuitive vision, if it is understood of innate appetite of simple aptitude; for there is in man, as we have seen, obediential potency toward it.

2. But there is not in man a natural innate appetite of exigency toward the intuitive vision. For a) natural innate appetite of exigency is founded in a potency which is natural also in order to the object; but neither man nor any creature has such a potency for seeing God intuitively, as we proved; therefore. b) It is certain that a twofold beatitude is distinguished, natural and supernatural, and that the natural is desired by man by innate appetite of exigency; therefore by the same appetite the intuitive vision cannot be desired, since it is supernatural beatitude; otherwise that natural beatitude would not satisfy man's appetite, and so would not be beatitude. See Suarez, On the Ultimate End of Man, disp. 16, sect. 2, from n. 6.

3. There is not in man a natural, absolute, and efficacious elicited appetite for the intuitive vision. For a) if man naturally desired the intuitive vision in that way, then, if it were not obtained, human nature would be miserable; but if this were so, the intuitive vision would be natural and owed; therefore. b) The elicited appetite of which we are treating here is founded in innate appetite of exigency; but there is no such appetite in man toward the intuitive vision; therefore. c) "This efficacious appetite," says Suarez (l. c., sect. 3, n. 5), "virtually includes an absolute will of executing all the means necessary for attaining that beatitude; but man cannot have this will by his natural powers; for if he cannot naturally have an efficacious will of believing truths, and with supernatural faith, which is a necessary means, how will he be able to have

another will which contains this one and several others?"

4. Conditioned and inefficacious elicited appetite for the intuitive vision can exist, as is clear from what has been said, not only in a man illumined by supernatural reason, but also in pure nature. Suarez nevertheless observes (l. c., n. 7): "There is only a twofold difference, because from revelation that beatitude is easily apprehended as a great good and as possible; yet from natural discourse alone it could scarcely fall into man's mind, but it would not be repugnant for it in some way and conditionally to be apprehended, that is, that it would be good to see the first cause, if it were possible. The second difference is that after it is established for man through revelation that he is ordered to that beatitude, man desires it with his whole affection, not indeed perfectly, but as much as he can, and he is not content or at rest outside it, at least on the way. But standing in pure nature, although man might conceive some conditioned desire of that vision, nevertheless, if he conducted himself prudently, he would not be restless, but would be content with his natural lot; just as man could also in that way desire to understand without discourse, yet that appetite would neither solicit nor disturb the soul, because it would know that this concerns a thing very alien from human nature." Compare the cited disputation 16 On the Ultimate End, and Prolegomenon 4 On Grace, c. 1.

399. Resp. 1ae Conf. a) Communis fuit Scholasticorum sententia potuisse hominem creari in puris naturalibus absque destinatione ad visionem intuitivam. "Assertio haec," inquit Suarez (Prol. 4. de gr. c. 1. n. 16.), "ut opinor communis est Theologorum, licet eam magis supponant, quam disputant, distinguendo varios status humanae naturae, et illos inter se conferendo." Unanimiter etiam docuere visionem intuitivam esse simpliciter supernaturalem. - b) Aliqui dixerunt dari in nobis appetitum naturalem innatum ad visionem intuitivam; sed, uti patet ex eorum doctrina, loquebantur de appetitu merae aptitudinis. Vid. Ripalda (de Ente supern. disp. 8. sect. 4.) - c) Cum autem constet de eorum vera doctrina, quod non tam accurate aliqui aliqua dixerint, facile intelligitur ex eo, quod ante errores Baii erant in tranquilla possessione veritatis. 399. I answer to the first confirmation: a) It was the common opinion of the Scholastics that man could have been created in pure natural things without destination to the intuitive vision. "This assertion," says Suarez (Prolegomenon 4, On Grace, c. 1, n. 16), "as I think, is common among theologians, although they rather suppose it than dispute it, by distinguishing various states of human nature and comparing them with one another." They also unanimously taught that the intuitive vision is simply supernatural. b) Some said that there is in us a natural innate appetite for the intuitive vision; but, as is clear from their doctrine, they were speaking of an appetite of mere aptitude. See Ripalda, On Supernatural Being, disp. 8, sect. 4. c) But since their true doctrine is established, the fact that some said some things less accurately is easily understood from this, that before the errors of Baius they were in tranquil possession of the truth.

400. Resp. 2ae Conf. Certum est a) quod D. Thomas accurate distinxit duplicem beatitudinem naturalem et supernaturalem. "Ultima autem perfectio," inquit, 1. p. q. 62. a. 1. "rationalis seu intellectualis naturae est duplex: una quidem quam potest assequi virtute suae naturae: et haec quodam modo beatitudo vel felicitas dicitur. Unde et Aristoteles, 10. Ethic. c. 8., perfectissimam hominis contemplationem, qua optimum intelligibile, quod est Deus, contemplari potest in hac vita, dicit esse ultimam hominis felicitatem. Sed super hanc felicitatem est alia felicitas, quam in futuro expectamus, qua videbimus Deum sicuti est; quod quidem est supra cujuslibet intellectus creati naturam, ut supra ostensum est."

b) Docet visionem intuitivam in homine potuisse esse simplicem carentiam, et non privationem (in statu purae naturae.) "Carentia," inquit q. 4. de malo, "divinae visionis dupliciter convenit alicui: uno modo sic, quod non habeat ex se, unde possit ad divinam visionem pervenire: et sic carentia visionis divinae competeret ei, qui in solis naturalibus esset absque peccato. Sic enim carentia divinae visionis non esset poena, sed defectus consequens omnem naturam creatam." etc.

c) Constanter docet visionem intuitivam esse supernaturalem respectu hominis, Angeli, cujuscumque naturae creatae. Sufficit exhibere quae praeclare scribit in 3. Dist. 23. Qu. 1. art. 4. q. 3.: "Finis, ad quem divina

largitas hominem ordinavit, scilicet fruitio sui ipsius, est supra facultatem naturae creatae elevatus: quia nec oculus vidit, nec auris audivit, nec in cor hominis ascendit, quae praeparavit Deus diligentibus se, ut dicitur 1. Cor. 2. Unde per naturalia tantum homo non habet sufficienter inclinationem ad illum finem." Apostolica verba uberiore commentario explanat Aquinas his verbis. "Oculus non vidit. Ostenditur, illam gloriam visionis apertae ab hominibus ignorari dupliciter. Primo, quod non subjacet humanis sensibus, a quibus omnis humana cognitio initium sumit. Et ponit duos sensus: primo visionis, quae deservit inventioni; cum dicit, quod oculus non vidit... Et hoc ideo, quia non est aliquid coloratum, et visibile. Secundo ponit sensum auditus, qui deservit disciplinae, dicens: Nec auris audivit, scilicet ipsam gloriam, quia non est sonus, nec vox sensibilis. Deinde excludit notitiam ejus intellectualem. Unde dicit: Nec in cor hominis ascendit... Proprie dicitur in cor hominis ascendere id, quod ab inferiori pervenit ad hominis intellectum, puta a sensibilibus. Res enim sunt in intellectu secundum modum ejus: res igitur inferiores sunt in intellectu altiori modo, quam in se ipsis; et ideo, quando ab intellectu capiuntur, quodammodo in cor ascendunt. Illa vero, quae sunt intellectu superiora, altiori modo sunt in se ipsis, quam in intellectu: et ideo quando ab intellectu capiuntur, quodammodo descendunt." Vid. De Rubeis (de pecc. orig. cap. 32.)

d) Negat dari appetitum visionis intuitivae elicitum naturalem efficacem, absolutum, qui faciat hominem miserum si illam non assequatur. "Sciendum," inquit in 2. sent. dist. 33. q. 2. a. 1., "quod ex hoc quod caret aliquis eo, quod suam proportionem excedit, non affligitur, si sit rectae rationis; sicut nullus sapiens affligitur, quod non potest volare, sicut avis, vel quia non est rex vel imperator, cum sibi non sit debitum: affligeretur autem, si privaretur eo, ad quod habendum aliquo modo aptitudinem habuit... pueri autem nunquam fuerunt proportionati ad hoc, quod vitam aeternam haberent, quia nec eis debebatur ex principiis naturae, cum omnem facultatem naturae excedat, nec actus proprios habere potuerunt, quibus tantum bonum consequerentur, et ideo nihil omnino dolebunt de carentia visionis intuitivae."

e) Quod ergo D. Th. dicat esse in nobis naturalem appetitum videndi Deum, intelligi potest aliquando de appetitu innato merae aptitudinis - aliquando de appetitu elicito inefficaci et conditionato - aliquando de appetitu elicito absoluto, sed supposita elevatione. - Unde ad probandum possibilitatem visionis intuitivae usus est etiam cognitione, quam de illa habuit, fide praelucente. Cf. de Rubeis (op. cit. capp. 34. 35.) 400. I answer to the second confirmation. It is certain a) that St. Thomas accurately distinguished a twofold beatitude, natural and supernatural. "But the ultimate perfection," he says in I, q. 62, a. 1, "of rational or intellectual nature is twofold: one indeed which it can attain by the virtue of its own nature; and this is in some way called beatitude or happiness. Hence Aristotle too, in Ethics 10, c. 8, says that man's most perfect contemplation, by which he can contemplate in this life the best intelligible, which is God, is man's ultimate happiness. But above this happiness there is another happiness, which we expect in the future, by which we shall see God as he is; and this indeed is above the nature of any created intellect, as was shown above."

b) He teaches that the intuitive vision in man could have been a simple lack and not a privation, in the state of pure nature. "Lack," he says in q. 4 De malo, "of the divine vision belongs to someone in two ways: in one way, such that he does not have from himself that by which he can arrive at the divine vision; and in this way lack of the divine vision would belong to one who was in natural things alone without sin. For in this way lack of the divine vision would not be punishment, but a defect following upon every created nature," etc.

c) He constantly teaches that the intuitive vision is supernatural with respect to man, angel, and any created nature whatsoever. It is enough to present what he splendidly writes in III Sent., dist. 23, q. 1, art. 4, q. 3: "The end to which divine generosity has ordered man, namely the enjoyment of himself, is elevated above the faculty of created nature, because eye has not seen, nor ear heard, nor has it ascended into the heart of man, what God has prepared for those who love him, as is said in 1 Corinthians 2. Hence through natural things alone man does not have a sufficient inclination toward that end." Aquinas explains the apostolic words with fuller commentary in these words. "Eye has not seen. It is shown that that glory of open vision is unknown by men in two ways. First, because it does not lie under the human senses, from which all human cognition takes its beginning. And he posits two senses: first, the sense of sight, which serves discovery, when he says that eye has not seen... And

this is because it is not something colored and visible. Second, he posits the sense of hearing, which serves teaching, saying: Nor has ear heard, namely that glory itself, because it is not sound, nor a sensible voice. Then he excludes intellectual knowledge of it. Hence he says: Nor has it ascended into the heart of man... That is properly said to ascend into the heart of man which comes to man's intellect from something lower, for example from sensible things. For things are in the intellect according to its mode; therefore lower things are in the intellect in a higher mode than they are in themselves; and therefore, when they are grasped by the intellect, they in some way ascend into the heart. But those things which are above the intellect are in themselves in a higher mode than in the intellect; and therefore when they are grasped by the intellect, they in some way descend." See De Rubeis, On Original Sin, cap. 32.

d) He denies that there is an elicited natural, efficacious, absolute appetite for the intuitive vision, which would make man miserable if he did not attain it. "It must be known," he says in II Sent., dist. 33, q. 2, a. 1, "that from the fact that someone lacks that which exceeds his proportion, he is not afflicted, if he is of right reason; just as no wise man is afflicted that he cannot fly like a bird, or because he is not a king or emperor, since this is not owed to him. But he would be afflicted if he were deprived of that for the having of which he had aptitude in some way... But children were never proportioned to this, that they should have eternal life, because it was not owed to them from the principles of nature, since it exceeds every faculty of nature, nor could they have had proper acts by which they would attain so great a good; and therefore they will grieve in no way at all over the lack of the intuitive vision."

e) Therefore when St. Thomas says that there is in us a natural appetite for seeing God, it can be understood sometimes of innate appetite of mere aptitude; sometimes of inefficacious and conditioned elicited appetite; sometimes of absolute elicited appetite, but with elevation supposed. Hence for proving the possibility of the intuitive vision he also used the cognition which he had concerning it, with faith shining beforehand. Compare De Rubeis, op. cit., capp. 34-35.

401. Resp. 2ae obj. Duplex distinguendus est amor Dei: naturalis, qui consequitur cognitionem, quam de Deo naturaliter acquirimus per creaturas; supernaturalis, qui praeexigit in via cognitionem fidei, in patria visionem. Haec duplicis amoris distinctio retinenda est ex propp. 34. et 36. damnatis in Baio; nec non ex Bulla Auctorem fidei, cens. 24., in qua legitur: "Qua vero parte inter dominantem cupiditatem et charitatem dominantem nulli ponuntur affectus medii, a natura ipsa insiti suapteque natura laudabiles, qui una cum amore beatitudinis naturalique propensione ad bonum remanserunt velut extrema lineamenta et reliquiae imaginis. Ex S. Aug. de Spir. et litt. cap. 28. Perinde ac si inter dilectionem divinam, quae nos perducit ad regnum, et dilectionem humanam illicitam, quae damnatur, non daretur dilectio humana licita, quae non reprehenditur. Ex S. August. serm. 349., de char. edit. maurin. falsa, alias damnata." - Quae vero ex S. Aug. objici solent non est hujus loci expendere. Vid., si lubet Faure (in capp. 1. 2. Enchir. S. Aug.) 401. I answer to the second objection. A twofold love of God must be distinguished: natural love, which follows the cognition which we naturally acquire concerning God through creatures; and supernatural love, which on the way requires beforehand the cognition of faith, and in the homeland the vision. This distinction of twofold love must be retained from propositions 34 and 36 condemned in Baius, and also from the bull Auctorem fidei, censure 24, in which one reads: "In that part, however, where between dominant cupidity and dominant charity no intermediate affections are posited, implanted by nature itself and praiseworthy by their own nature, which together with love of beatitude and natural propensity to good remained as the outermost outlines and remains of the image. From St. Augustine, On the Spirit and the Letter, cap. 28. Just as if between divine love, which leads us to the kingdom, and illicit human love, which is condemned, there were not given a licit human love, which is not reprehended. From St. Augustine, sermon 349, On Charity, Maurist edition: false, otherwise condemned." But the things that are usually objected from St. Augustine are not for this place to weigh. See, if you wish, Faure, on chapters 1-2 of St. Augustine's Enchiridion.

402. NOTA. Ad solvendum difficultates, quae ex Patribus praesertim ex S. Aug. peti solent, juverit 1. notare Patres loqui de statu praesenti, in quo certe Deus diligendus est amore supernaturali ut simus beati. - 2. Recolere varias acceptiones jam traditas vocis naturalis; inde enim palam fiet quo sensu amor charitatis possit aut non possit dici naturalis. - 3. Meminisse S. Augustinum saepe sumpsisse nomen charitatis ad significandum quamcumque bonam dilectionem, cui propterea merito opponebat cupiditatem, seu dilectionem malam. - 4. Animadvertere S. Augustinum quandoque usum esse argumento ad hominem contra Pelagium. Hic enim dicebat visionem intuitivam esse finem hominis naturalem; negabat tamen parvulos decedentes sine baptismo illam consequi: unde aiebat Augustinus "cur patrimonium abripis innocenti?" Vid. Casini (op. cit. cap. 7.) 402. NOTE. For resolving the difficulties that are usually sought from the Fathers, especially from St. Augustine, it will help 1. to note that the Fathers speak of the present state, in which certainly God must be loved by supernatural love so that we may be blessed; 2. to recall the various acceptations already handed down of the word "natural," for from this it will become plain in what sense the love of charity can or cannot be called natural; 3. to remember that St. Augustine often took the name charity to signify any good love whatever, to which therefore he rightly opposed cupidity, or bad love; 4. to observe that St. Augustine sometimes used an argument ad hominem against Pelagius. For Pelagius said that the intuitive vision is man's natural end, yet denied that little ones dying without baptism attain it; hence Augustine said, "why do you snatch away the patrimony from the innocent?" See Casini, op. cit., cap. 7.

Article 11. Whether the State of Pure Nature is Possible

LatineEnglish

Utrum status purae naturae sit possibilis.

403. Diximus (n. 219.) statum naturae duo importare, unum positivum, alterum negativum. Nemo unquam negavit possibilitatem status illius quoad ejus positivum elementum; posse nempe humanam naturam a Deo condi cum iis omnibus, quae illam constituunt aut ab ea profluunt vel exiguntur admittunt omnes. Item nemo unquam negavit posse humanam naturam condi sine peccato. Si qua ergo est quaestio tota versatur quoad illa dona, quibus de facto cumulavit Deus primum hominem; et quaeritur utrum sine illis, nempe sine gratia sanctificante, sine destinatione ad visionem intuitivam, sine dono integritatis, immortalitatis, etc., potuerit Deus hominem creare. 403. We said (n. 219) that the state of nature imports two things, one positive, the other negative. No one has ever denied the possibility of that state as to its positive element; namely, everyone admits that human nature can be founded by God with all those things which constitute it, or flow from it, or are demanded by it. Likewise no one has ever denied that human nature can be founded without sin. Therefore, if there is any question, the whole of it turns on those gifts with which God in fact heaped up the first man; and it is asked whether God could have created man without them, namely, without sanctifying grace, without destination to the intuitive vision, without the gift of integrity, of immortality, etc.

404. Post ea quae disputavimus de supernaturalitate aut praeternaturalitate illorum donorum, responsio affirmativa propositae quaestioni deberet esse evidens: si enim omnia illa dona sunt indebita, consequens est potuisse a Deo humanam naturam sine illis creari. Non defuerunt tamen Theologi, qui dicerent statum purae naturae possibilem esse de potentia Dei absoluta, non vero de potentia Dei ordinata - vel possibilem quidem esse, minime vero convenientem. - Contra hanc distinctionem dirigitur praesens quaestio; sed imprimis verus ejus sensus est determinandus. 404. After the things

which we have disputed concerning the supernaturalness or preternaturalness of those gifts, an affirmative answer to the proposed question ought to be evident: for if all those gifts are not owed, it follows that human nature could have been created by God without them. Nevertheless, there have not been lacking theologians who said that the state of pure nature is possible by God's absolute power, but not by God's ordered power; or that it is indeed possible, but by no means fitting. The present question is directed against this distinction; but first its true sense must be determined.

405. Veram distinctionem inter Dei potentiam absolutam et ordinatam proponit D. Thomas 1. p. q. 25. a. 5. ad 1.: "Quia," inquit, "potentia intelligitur ut exequens, voluntas autem ut imperans, et intellectus et sapientia ut dirigens; quod attribuitur potentiae secundum se consideratae, dicitur Deus posse secundum potentiam absolutam; et hujusmodi est omne illud in quo potest salvari ratio entis, ut supra dictum est, art. 3. hujus quaest.; quod autem attribuitur potentiae divinae, secundum quod exequitur imperium voluntatis justae, hoc dicitur Deus posse facere de potentia ordinaria." 405. St. Thomas proposes the true distinction between God's absolute and ordered power in I, q. 25, a. 5, ad 1: "Because," he says, "power is understood as executing, but will as commanding, and intellect and wisdom as directing, that which is attributed to power considered according to itself is said to be something God can do according to absolute power; and of this sort is everything in which the ratio of being can be preserved, as was said above, article 3 of this question. But that which is attributed to divine power according as it executes the command of a just will, this is said to be something God can do by ordinary power."

406. Quam distinctionem explicans Suarez (de Deo 1. 3. c. 9. nn. 18. 19.), ait: "Potentia sumi potest vel per se, ac praecise spectata, vel ut conjuncta liberae voluntati, et quasi alligata ordini ab ipsa voluntate praescripto. Et juxta hanc duplicem considerationem videtur sumpta vulgaris distinctio Theologorum de divina potentia in absolutam et ordinatam in omni opinione certum est, potentiam non dici absolutam, vel ordinatam, nisi per respectum ad voluntatem, nam quatenus soluta concipitur ab omni lege, seu decreto voluntatis dicitur absoluta, ordinata vero, ut conjuncta illi. Potest autem hoc esse duobus modis. Unus est, quatenus potentia intelligitur conjuncta alicui legi universali... In qua lege potest Deus dispensare, cum voluerit, ut cum solem sistere facit, quod, juxta hanc expositionem censetur per potentiam absolutam fecisse. Alius modus est, ut potentia intelligatur conjuncta decreto aeternae voluntatis Dei de omnibus, et singulis, quae in quolibet tempore operatus est, et ita quidquid de facto operatur, dicitur facere per potentiam ordinatam, quia semper operatur juxta decretum suum, et ita solum ea dicetur posse de absoluta potentia, quae nunquam facturus est. Et uterque modus est satis usitatus, prior tamen videtur magis conformis communi modo loquendi, et commodior."

Jam, si sensu D. Thomae communiter in scholis recepto sumatur distinctio potentiae Dei absolutae et ordinatae, nulla, quoad rem praesentem, potest esse controversia: omnes enim concedunt quod supposito Providentiae ordine, quo Deus voluit elevationem humanae naturae, status purae naturae non est possibilis de potentia Dei ordinata. 406. Explaining this distinction, Suarez (On God, book 3, c. 9, nn. 18-19) says: "Power can be taken either per se and precisely considered, or as joined to free will and, as it were, bound to the order prescribed by that will itself. And according to this twofold consideration the common distinction of theologians concerning divine power into absolute and ordered seems to have been taken. In every opinion it is certain that power is not called absolute or ordered except by relation to will; for insofar as it is conceived as loosed from every law or decree of will, it is called absolute, but ordered as joined to it. But this can be in two ways. One is insofar as power is understood as joined to some universal law... In this law God can dispense when he wills, as when he makes the sun stand still, which, according to this exposition, is judged to have been done by absolute power. The other mode is that power is understood as joined to the decree of God's eternal will concerning all things and each thing which he has worked at any time; and thus whatever he in fact works is said to be done by ordered power, because he always works according to his decree, and thus only those things which he will

never do will be said to be possible by absolute power. And each mode is sufficiently usual, yet the former seems more conformable to the common manner of speaking and more convenient."

Now, if the distinction of God's absolute and ordered power is taken in the sense of St. Thomas, commonly received in the schools, there can be no controversy regarding the present matter: for all concede that, supposing the order of Providence by which God willed the elevation of human nature, the state of pure nature is not possible by God's ordered power.

407. Sed Theologi, contra quos disputamus, aliter intelligunt potentiam Dei absolutam et ordinatam. Nam 1. potentiam absolutam vocant divinam omnipotentiam sejunctim spectatam ab aliis attributis sapientiae, bonitatis et justitiae; ordinatam autem, eamdem omnipotentiam cum illis attributis conjunctam - vel 2. appellant potentiam absolutam divinam omnipotentiam conjunctam solum cum justitia; ordinatam vero, eamdem omnipotentiam conjunctam etiam cum sapientia et bonitate. 407. But the theologians against whom we dispute understand God's absolute and ordered power otherwise. For 1. they call absolute power divine omnipotence considered separately from the other attributes of wisdom, goodness, and justice; but ordered power they call that same omnipotence joined with those attributes. Or 2. they call absolute power divine omnipotence joined only with justice; but ordered power that same omnipotence joined also with wisdom and goodness.

408. Hinc dicunt statum purae naturae esse possibilem de potentia Dei absoluta, seu non repugnare ex parte omnipotentiae in se spectatae vel ex parte omnipotentiae conjunctae cum justitia: impossibilem esse de potentia ordinata, seu repugnare ex parte divinae potentiae conjunctae cum justitia, sapientia et bonitate - vel saltem conjunctae cum sapientia et bonitate. 408. Hence they say that the state of pure nature is possible by God's absolute power, or that it is not repugnant on the part of omnipotence considered in itself, or on the part of omnipotence joined with justice; but that it is impossible by ordered power, or is repugnant on the part of divine power joined with justice, wisdom, and goodness, or at least joined with wisdom and goodness.

409. Atque eodem recidit alia distinctio, juxta quam statum purae naturae possibilem quidem, sed non convenientem adstruunt: possibilem enim dicunt, quia cum omnipotentia comparatus nullam repugnantiam exhibet; non vero convenientem, quia dedecet alia divina attributa. Unde Bellelli (Mens Augustini, 1. 3. c. 23. ad 3.), ait: "dicimus adjutorium supernaturale non esse juxta exigentiam naturae, secundum se praecise acceptae, sed prout stat sub providentia Dei justissima." - Et (ad 4.): "Signanter ei (supernaturali) non adversatur ut sit debitum jure justissimae Providentiae, quae sine causa nequit rationabiliter deficere in necessariis." - Et Berti (August. systema vindic., Diss. 2. c. 1. §. 6. n. 8.) dicit: "Creaturae rationalis finem ultimum esse Deum, hujusque intuitivam visionem Naturae integrae nulloque peccato corruptae supernaturalia gratiae auxilia conferenda fuisse, ut posset finem suum adipisci, non quod ejusmodi auxilia sint naturalia, pertineantque ad naturae constitutionem; sed potius quia ad finem suum consequendum rationales creaturae egent adminiculis naturae ordinem excedentibus, et quae propterea ipsis quadammodo debeantur, sive decentia Creatoris, ut docuit Card. Norisius, sive lege justissima Providentiae... ut Bellellius contendit." 409. And another distinction falls back to the same thing, according to which they maintain that the state of pure nature is indeed possible, but not fitting. For they say it is possible because, compared with omnipotence, it presents no repugnance; but not fitting, because it is unbecoming to the other divine attributes. Hence Bellelli (The Mind of Augustine, book 3, c. 23, ad 3) says: "We say that supernatural aid is not according to the exigency of nature, taken precisely according to itself, but according as it stands under the most just providence of God." And (ad 4): "It is not significantly opposed to it, namely to the supernatural, that it be owed by the right of most just Providence, which cannot

reasonably fail in necessary things without cause." And Berti (The Augustinian System Vindicated, diss. 2, c. 1, § 6, n. 8) says: "The ultimate end of the rational creature is God, and his intuitive vision; supernatural helps of grace had to be conferred upon an integral nature corrupted by no sin, so that it could attain its end, not because helps of this sort are natural and pertain to the constitution of nature, but rather because, for attaining their end, rational creatures need supports exceeding the order of nature, and which therefore are in some way owed to them, whether by the fittingness of the Creator, as Cardinal Noris taught, or by the law of most just Providence... as Bellelli contends."

410. Ut melius determinetur status quaestionis, duo adhuc notanda sunt. Primum est quod quando illi Theologi vocant potentiam Dei ordinatam omnipotentiam conjunctam cum sapientia, non loquuntur de sapientia, seu scientia dirigente divinae voluntatis decretum, quo hominis elevationem Deus voluit (haec enim sapientia inseparabilis est ab illo decreto, et sic vero sensu sumerent potentiam Dei ordinatam); sed loquuntur de divina sapientia in se inspecta, ita ut Deus, si condidisset hominem propter alium finem, quam propter visionem intuitivam, omnino sine sapientia egisset. Secundum vero est quod quando iidem Theologi dicunt statum purae naturae, non convenientem, seu destinationem ad visionem intuitivam convenientem, non loquuntur de mera convenientia, quemadmodum, ex. gr. Incarnatio Verbi dicitur conveniens; sed de convenientia inducente necessitatem, cujus oppositum Deum, divina attributa dedeceat.

Quare verus quaestionis sensus est: utrum antecedenter ad decretum, quo Deus voluit statum elevationis, potuerit hominem condere in statu purae naturae (sine destinatione ad visionem intuitivam, sine immunitate a concupiscentia, mortalem, passibilem, etc.), salvis suis attributis justitiae, sapientiae, bonitatis. 410. In order that the state of the question may be better determined, two things must still be noted. The first is that when those theologians call God's ordered power omnipotence joined with wisdom, they are not speaking of wisdom, or knowledge, directing the decree of the divine will by which God willed man's elevation; for this wisdom is inseparable from that decree, and thus they would be taking God's ordered power in the true sense. Rather, they are speaking of divine wisdom considered in itself, so that if God had founded man for another end than for the intuitive vision, he would have acted wholly without wisdom. The second is that when the same theologians say that the state of pure nature is not fitting, or that destination to the intuitive vision is fitting, they are not speaking of mere fittingness, in the way, for example, that the Incarnation of the Word is called fitting; rather, they are speaking of a fittingness inducing necessity, the opposite of which would be unbecoming to God and to the divine attributes.

Wherefore the true sense of the question is this: whether, antecedently to the decree by which God willed the state of elevation, he could have founded man in the state of pure nature, without destination to the intuitive vision, without immunity from concupiscence, mortal, passible, etc., while preserving his attributes of justice, wisdom, and goodness.

411. NOTA. Objectiones, quae contra hanc thesim afferri possunt, et quae revera afferuntur a cit. Auctoribus, sunt eaedem, quae opponuntur supernaturalitati donorum justitiae originalis. Una tamen est, quam juverit breviter proponere et solvere. 411. NOTE. The objections which can be brought against this thesis, and which in fact are brought by the cited authors, are the same as those which are opposed to the supernaturalness of the gifts of original justice. Yet there is one which it will help to propose and solve briefly.

412. Dicunt: Si status purae naturae esset vere possibilis, ex morte, concupiscentia, miseriis hujus vitae non posset ostendi existentia peccati originalis; atqui S. Aug. et alii saepe hoc argumento usi sunt; ergo.

Resp. 1. Eos omnes usos fuisse hoc argumento, supposito statu elevationis, quem ex Scriptura probaverant contra illos, qui S. Script. auctoritatem non rejiciebant. - 2. D. Thomas 1. 4. c. g. "Peccati originalis in humano genere probabiliter

quaedam signa apparent... Posset tamen aliquis dicere, hujusmodi defectus tam corporales quam spirituales non esse poenales, sed naturales defectus ex necessitate materiae consequentes. Necesse est enim corpus humanum, quum sit ex contrariis compositum, corruptibile esse, et sensibilem appetitum in ea, quae secundum sensum sunt delectabilia, moveri, quae interdum sunt contraria rationi... Sed tamen (licet haec verissima sint, ut alibi D. Thomas ipse constanter docet), si quis recte consideret, satis probabiliter poterit aestimare... Ut si quod hujus dominii impedimentum ex defectu naturae contingeret, ejus speciali et supernaturali beneficio tolleretur." 412. They say: If the state of pure nature were truly possible, the existence of original sin could not be shown from death, concupiscence, and the miseries of this life; but St. Augustine and others often used this argument; therefore.

I answer: 1. All of them used this argument with the state of elevation supposed, which they had proved from Scripture against those who did not reject the authority of Sacred Scripture. 2. St. Thomas, Contra Gentiles IV: "Certain signs of original sin appear with probability in the human race... Yet someone could say that defects of this sort, both bodily and spiritual, are not penal, but natural defects following from the necessity of matter. For it is necessary that the human body, since it is composed of contraries, be corruptible, and that the sensible appetite be moved toward those things which are delightful according to sense, which sometimes are contrary to reason... But nevertheless, although these things are most true, as St. Thomas himself constantly teaches elsewhere, if one considers rightly, he will be able to judge quite probably... so that if any impediment of this dominion were to occur from a defect of nature, it would be removed by his special and supernatural benefit."

Disputation IV — On Man's Fall, or on Original Sin

Article 1. On the Sin of the First Parents

LatineEnglish

DE HOMINIS LAPSU, SEU DE PECCATO ORIGINALI. ON THE FALL OF MAN, OR ON ORIGINAL SIN.

413. Praeclarissima illa dona, quibus Deus protoparentes instruxit in prima eorum conditione, non ipsis solum, sed in illis toti humanae naturae collata fuere. Qua de re specialem propositionem non statuimus, tum quia recolendo Sacrae Script. et Patrum testimonia, quibus munera illa Adamo collata esse ostendimus, facile et nobis in illo collata demonstrantur; tum quia ex dicendis de eorumdem donorum amissione, haec veritas satis superque innotescet. 413. Those most splendid gifts with which God furnished the first parents in their first condition were conferred not on them alone, but in them on the whole of human nature. We do not establish a special proposition concerning this matter, both because, by recalling the testimonies of Sacred Scripture and of the Fathers by which we showed that those gifts were conferred on Adam, it is easily demonstrated that they were conferred also on us in him, and because from the things to be said concerning the loss of those same gifts, this truth will become more than sufficiently known.

414. Causam ergo inquirimus, qua factum est, ut licet ex largitate conditoris ad supernaturalem et cujusdam felicitatis statum evecti fuerimus, omnes tamen innumeris miseriis subjiciamur. Hanc vero causam manifestavit Apostolus, dicens: "Per unum hominem peccatum in hunc mundum intravit, et per peccatum mors, etc." Unde S. Aug. (op. imperf. c. Julian. 1. 6. c. 21.) ait: "Sicut enim poenae humanarum miseriarum, quas communiter perferunt filii Adam a die exitus de ventre matris eorum, ideo sunt omnium, de quorum praevaricatione ista venerunt: ita ipsorum duorum praevaricatio tam magnum peccatum debet intelligi, ut posset omnium ex viro et muliere nascentium in deterius mutare naturam, et communi reatu tamquam haereditarii debiti obligare chirographum." 414. Therefore we inquire into the cause by which it came about that, although from the largess of the Creator we had been raised to a supernatural state and a state of a certain happiness, nevertheless all of us are subjected to innumerable miseries. The Apostle manifested this cause when he said: "Through one man sin entered into this world, and through sin death," etc. Hence St. Augustine (Unfinished Work against Julian, book 6, c. 21) says: "For just as the penalties of human miseries, which the children of Adam commonly bear from the day of their exit from their mother's womb, belong to all because these things came from their prevarication, so the prevarication of those two must be understood as so great a sin that it could change for the worse the nature of all those born from man and woman, and bind the document of debt by a common guilt, as though of an hereditary debt."

415. Statuto igitur facto, quod primi parentes graviter peccaverunt, de illius peccati in totum humanum genus transfusione, seu de originali peccato agendum est. Hujus existentiam - naturam - propagationem - effectus, prout tempus dabit, investigabimus. 415. Therefore, once the fact has been established that the first parents gravely sinned, we must treat of the transfusion of that sin into the whole human race, or of original sin. Its existence, nature, propagation, and effects, as time permits, we shall investigate.

De peccato protoparentum.

416. In hoc articulo statuemus imprimis existentiam peccati protoparentum - dein vero ejusdem naturam paucis exponemus. 416. In this article we shall establish first the existence of the sin of the first parents; then we shall briefly explain its nature.

§ I.
Utrum primi parentes graviter peccaverint. § I.
Whether the First Parents Sinned Gravely.

417. Conc. Trid. sess. 5. can. 1. docet: "Si quis non confitetur primum hominem Adam, cum mandatum Dei in Paradiso fuisset transgressus, statim sanctitatem et justitiam, in qua constitutus fuerat, amisisse, incurrisseque per offensam praevaricationis hujusmodi iram et indignationem Dei, atque ideo mortem, quam antea illi comminatus fuerat Deus, et cum morte captivitatem sub ejus potestate qui mortis deinde habuit imperium, hoc est, diaboli, totumque Adam, per illam praevaricationis offensam, secundum corpus et animam in deterius commutatum fuisse; anathema sit." 417. The Council of Trent, session 5, canon 1, teaches: "If anyone does not confess that the first man Adam, when he had transgressed the commandment of God in Paradise, immediately lost the sanctity and justice in which he had been constituted, and incurred through the offense of this prevarication the wrath and indignation of God, and therefore death, which God had previously threatened him with, and with death captivity under the power of him who thereafter had the empire of death, that is, the devil, and that the whole Adam, through that offense of prevarication, was changed for the worse according to body and soul, let him be anathema."

418. Ut catholica haec veritas ita statuatur, ut adversariorum effugia praeoccupentur, pauca praenotamus. Ac imprimis, uti refert Bellarminus (de Amiss. gr. et it. pecc. 1. 3. c. 1.) non defuerunt qui assererent primos parentes nec peccasse nec peccare potuisse ea ratione ducti, quod verba in 1 Gen., ut non ederent de ligno scientiae boni et mali, non legem fuisse dicerent, sed admonitionem more medicorum, cum aliquid noxium prohibent. Quem errorem confirmabant ex 1. Tim. 1., ubi dicitur quod lex non est posita justo sed peccatori. Ut ergo de protoparentum peccato constet, ostendi debet existentia praecepti, quod transgrediendo peccaverunt. 418. In order that this Catholic truth may be established in such a way that the evasions of the adversaries may be anticipated, we note a few things beforehand. And first, as Bellarmine reports (On the Loss of Grace and the State of Sin, book 3, c. 1), there have not been lacking those who asserted that the first parents neither sinned nor could have sinned, led by this reason: that the words in Genesis 1, that they should not eat of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, were not a law, they said, but an admonition after the manner of physicians when they prohibit something harmful. They confirmed this error from 1 Timothy 1, where it is said that law is not laid down for the just but for the sinner. Therefore, in order that the sin of the first parents may be established, the existence must be shown of a precept which they sinned by transgressing.

419. Ut autem natura illius praecepti intelligatur, dicendum est ut docet D. Th. opusc. 2. c. 118., quod "ejus ligni esus non ideo prohibitus est, quia secundum se malus esset, sed ut homo saltem in hoc modico aliquid observaret, ea sola ratione, quia esset a Deo praeceptum." Quibus verbis indicat etiam S. Doctor rationem illius praecepti, quam SS. Patres tradiderant. Ita S. Jo. Chrys. (hom. 14. in Gen.), inquit: "Haec faciebat (scilicet Deus) quasi Dominus aliquis liberalis domum magnam alicui concredens, ut dominium sibi salvum maneat, parvam tantum pecuniam dandam ab illo praescribat." - Et S. Aug. (de Gen. ad litt. 1. 8. c. 13.): "Ut causam jussionis hujus non diutius requiramus, si haec ipsa magna est utilitas homini, quod Deo servit, jubendo Deus utile facit, quidquid jubere voluerit." 419. But in order that the nature of that precept may be understood, one must say, as St. Thomas teaches in Opusc. 2, c. 118, that "the

eating of that tree was not prohibited because it was evil according to itself, but so that man at least in this small thing might observe something for this reason alone, that it had been commanded by God." In these words the holy Doctor also indicates the reason of that precept, which the holy Fathers had handed down. Thus St. John Chrysostom, Homily 14 on Genesis, says: "God was doing these things as some liberal lord entrusting a great house to someone, so that his dominion may remain safe, prescribes that only a small sum of money be given by him." And St. Augustine (On Genesis to the Letter, book 8, c. 13): "That we may not seek the cause of this command for too long, if this itself is a great utility for man, that he serves God, God by commanding makes useful whatever he has willed to command."

420. Quamvis autem, uti bene notat Suarez (de op. sex dier. 1. 3. c. 21. n. 9.), praeceptum illud non fuisset simpliciter necessarium "ut homo per subjectionem suam, dominatum Dei recognosceret, vel ut ei obedientiam praestaret, nam sine dubio, et cognitio illa multis aliis modis haberi, et obedientia in aliis praeceptis exerceri poterat: nihilominus tamen convenientissimum fuit illud praeceptum ad peculiarem modum subjectionis, et obedientiae restringere, quia in aliis praeceptis aliqua ratio mali, vel incommodi praeter Dei prohibitionem invenitur, et ideo, ut ait August. dicto cap. 1. 3. talis prohibitio facta est, quod ex sola transgressione voluntatis Dei mala esset, ut inde ostenderetur inobedientiae malitia, quia ex sola ratione obedientiae abstinere bonum fuit, et comedere malum, quod alias seclusa prohibitione malum non esset." - Ex fine ipso hujus praecepti, ejusdem, ut videbimus, gravitas deduci potest. 420. But although, as Suarez rightly notes (On the Work of the Six Days, book 3, c. 21, n. 9), that precept was not simply necessary "so that man through his subjection might recognize God's dominion, or so that he might render obedience to him, for without doubt both that cognition could be had in many other ways, and obedience could be exercised in other precepts; nevertheless it was most fitting to restrict that precept to a peculiar mode of subjection and obedience, because in other precepts some ratio of evil or inconvenience is found besides God's prohibition. And therefore, as Augustine says in the cited chapter, book 3, such a prohibition was made, so that it would be evil from the transgression of God's will alone, so that from this the malice of disobedience might be shown, because from the ratio of obedience alone abstaining was good, and eating was evil, which otherwise, the prohibition set aside, would not be evil." From the very end of this precept, as we shall see, its gravity can be deduced.

421. Si quis quaereret cur arbor illa dicta sit scientiae boni et mali; respondet Suarez (1. c. n. 6.): "Illius nominis variae redduntur rationes. Greg. Nyssen. lib. de opificio hominis c. 20. hanc reddit, quod fructus ille sub specie boni oblatus, mali experientiam induxit. Et huc etiam spectat ratio alia, quod ita dicta fuerit scientia boni et mali, quia serpens hanc scientiam per illius esum promisit; ita ut nomen sit, quasi per antiphrasim impositum, sicut dixit Deus, 'Ecce Adam sicut unus ex nobis factus est, sciens bonum et malum.' Ratio vero frequentius recepta est, nomen illud impositum esse ab eventu, quia comedendo de illa arbore experimento cognovit bonum, quod amisit; et malum in quod incidit, ut ait Chrysost. hom. 16. in Gen. circa finem. Vel per illud novit peccatum, ut ait Theodor. quaest. 62. in Gen. Vel quia ostensum est inobedientiae malum, et quantum fuisset obedientiae bonum, ut ait S. Aug. 14. de Civit. c. 17. et lib. 8. Gen. ad litt. c. 6. et 13., et cum eo D. Thomas 1. p. q. 102. a. 1. ad 4." 421. If someone should ask why that tree is called the tree of knowledge of good and evil, Suarez answers (l. c., n. 6): "Various reasons are given for that name. Gregory of Nyssa, in the book On the Making of Man, c. 20, gives this one: that that fruit, offered under the appearance of good, brought in the experience of evil. And another reason also looks to this: that it was called the knowledge of good and evil because the serpent promised this knowledge through eating it, so that the name is imposed, as it were, by antiphrasis, just as God said, 'Behold Adam has become as one of us, knowing good and evil.' But the more frequently received reason is that that name was imposed from the event, because by eating of that tree he knew by experience

the good which he lost and the evil into which he fell, as Chrysostom says, Homily 16 on Genesis, near the end. Or through it he knew sin, as Theodoret says, question 62 on Genesis. Or because the evil of disobedience was shown, and how great the good of obedience would have been, as St. Augustine says in book 14 City of God, c. 17, and book 8 On Genesis to the Letter, cc. 6 and 13, and with him St. Thomas, I, q. 102, a. 1, ad 4."

422. His itaque declaratis, dicimus:

PROP. XXXVI. Protoparentibus 1. verum impositum fuit praeceptum quod 2. transgressi - 3. graviter peccaverunt et 4. justitiam originalem amiserunt.

Prob. 1ma pars I. Ex Scriptura. Legitur enim Gen. 2. 16. 17.: "Praecepitque ei dicens: Ex omni ligno paradisi comede. De ligno autem scientiae boni et mali ne comedas: in quocumque enim die comederis ex eo, morte morieris." - Et c. 3. 1. seqq.: "Qui (serpens) dixit ad mulierem: Cur praecepit vobis Deus ut non comederetis de omni ligno paradisi? Cui respondit mulier: De fructu lignorum, quae sunt in paradiso, vescimur: de fructu vero ligni, quod est in medio paradisi, praecepit nobis Deus ne comederemus, et ne tangeremus illud, ne forte moriamur."

Unde: a) Moises, scriptor historicus, utitur repetitis vicibus voce praecepit; eandem adhibent mulier tentata, serpens a quo tentatur: nihil obstat quominus vox illa proprio sensu sumatur. Ergo agitur de vero praecepto et non de simplici admonitione.

b) Cum superior aliquid prohibet sanctione adjecta, vere legem vel praeceptum imponit; sed Deus prohibens ne comederent de ligno scientiae boni et mali, addidit: "quocumque die ex eo comederis, morte morieris"; ergo.

c) Esus illius fructus saepe in aliis Script. locis infra citandis dicitur transgressio, peccatum - mors, quam Deus comminatus fuerat, dicitur poena illius peccati. Ergo fuit impositum verum praeceptum, ne comederent de illo fructu.

Prob. II. Ex Patribus. Clemens Alex. (strom. 1. 5.), ait: "Adam fuit perfectus: elegit autem quod vetitum erat." - S. Cyprianus (1. de Incarn. Verbi): "In origine statim mundi et generis humani, Adam praecepti immemor et datae legis transgressor fuit." - S. Irenaeus (1. 5. adv. haeres. c. 19.), loquitur de seductione Evae "quae per verba Angeli (mali) ad violandum praeceptum divinum et Deum deserendum incitata fuit." S. Chrysostomus (Hom. 16. in Gen.): "Gustus ille inobedientiae erat argumentum, et praevaricatio mandati a Deo traditi," etc.

Prob. III. Ex inanitate rationis oppositae. "Siquidem," ait Bellarminus 1. c., "ex eo quod ipsi docent, primos homines non peccasse, quia legem non habuerunt, cum essent justi, sequitur, nullos homines peccare, quin etiam fieri non posse, ut ulli homines peccent. Nam si peccatum praerequirit legem cum sit praevaricatio legis: et lex praerequirit peccatum, cum lex justo non ponatur, sed peccatori; ergo peccatum semper praerequirit peccatum, nullum igitur fuit primum peccatum. Et si primum non fuit, unde caetera extiterunt? Quare necesse est, ut vel fuerit lex ante peccatum, et falsa sit adversariorum opinio; vel certe nulla sint, nec fuerint unquam in mundo peccata, qui est error Libertinorum, quorum impudentia (ut diximus libro superiore) non argumentis, sed tormentis, et suppliciis tantum coercenda esset."

Plura praeclare disserit cit. Auctor, et in fine subdit interpretationem S. Augustini ad objectum testim. Apostoli ex 1. Tim.: "S. Augustinus lib. de spiritu et litera cap. 10. hunc eundem locum Apostoli ex cap. 1. prioris ad Tim. Justo non est lex posita, sed injustis, vult similem esse locis illis ejusdem Apostoli, 'Non estis sub lege, sed sub gratia,' Rom. 6. et, 'Si spiritu ducimini, non estis sub lege.' Galat. 5.; quae loca non significant, justos non teneri legibus, vel non peccare, si legem non servent, sed non habere legem supra se, quasi cervicibus imminentem, et flagello minantem, ac terrentem, ut habent injusti, qui timore poenae bonum operantur. Operantur enim justi bonum amore justitiae, ac libenti animo, operaturi etiam si lex non esset, vel poenam nullam minaretur. Quocirca in lege potius sunt, quam sub lege, ut Apostolus de se loquitur 1. Corinth. 9. ubi dicit, se sub lege non esse, et tamen sine lege non esse, sed in lege esse Christi."

Prob. 2da pars. Quod materialiter saltem transgressi sint praeceptum ne comederent de arbore scientiae boni et mali, aperte traditur in Scriptura. Nam Gen. 3. 6. legitur: "Vidit igitur mulier quod bonum esset lignum ad vescendum, et pulchrum oculis, aspectuque delectabile: et tulit de fructu illius, et comedit; deditque viro suo, qui comedit." Quod autem formalis fuerit illa transgressio, probatur sic: Ut legis transgressio sit formale peccatum, requiritur et sufficit legis cognitio et libertas. Atqui non defuit

protoparentibus praecepti cognitio; mulier enim serpenti, a quo tentata fuit, respondit: "De fructu vero ligni, quod est in medio paradisi, praecepit nobis Deus ne comederemus, et ne tangeremus illud, ne forte moriamur." Nec defuit libertas, quae certe pertinet ad humanam naturam, et ipsi adversarii (Novatores) homini innocenti non denegant. Ergo.

Prob. 3a pars. I. Dicitur Eccli. 10. 14.: "Initium superbiae hominis, apostatare a Deo: quoniam ab eo, qui fecit illum, recessit cor ejus; quoniam initium omnis peccati est superbia." - Et Tob. 4. 14.: "Superbiam nunquam in tuo sensu aut in tuo verbo dominari permittas: in ipsa enim initium sumpsit omnis perditio." Unde: peccatum, quod includit apostasiam, recessum a Deo, et quod est initium omnis perditionis, est certe grave. Atqui tale fuit peccatum protoparentum. Ergo.

Prob. II. Sanctio addita praecepto, fuit "quocumque die comederis ex eo, morte morieris." Morti autem debent addi omnia mala, uti patet ex iis, quae in praecedente disputatione diximus. Unde, gravitas praecepti, uti bene notat Suarez (1. c. n. 10.) ex comminatione mortis addita praecepto aperte comprobatur. "Nam si intelligatur de morte animae, ut voluit Philo, et senserunt Gregor. et Eucherius in ipsa comminatione formaliter continetur praedicta mortalis gravitas; si vero intelligatur de morte corporis (ut ad litteram intelligi debet juxta Paulum, et Concilium Trid.) ex comminatione tam gravis poenae ita colligitur praeceptum illud obligasse sub gravi culpa, et ideo Patres communiter de utraque morte corporis, et animae comminationem illam interpretati sunt."

Prob. III. Ex fine ipso praecepti, et auctoritate Patrum. Nam a) S. Augustinus (de Civ. Dei 1. 14. c. 12.), ait: "Non ideo debet aliquis existimare leve, aut parvum fuisse illud commissum, quia in esca factum est non mala quidem, neque noxia, sed quia prohibita est, nam obedientia commendata est in praecepto, quae virtus in creatura rationali mater quodammodo est omnium custosque virtutum."

b) Idem (op. imp. cont. Julian. 1. 1. c. 105.) peccatum Adae vocat ineffabiliter grave peccatum. Et (1. 3. c. 65.): "Adam tanta impietate peccavit, quantam nos metiri et aestimare non possumus, sed quantam illam judicaverit Deus." - Saepe S. Doctor enumerat varias circumstantias, quae peccatum illud aggravant. Notat enim 1. (de Civ. Dei 1. 14. c. 12.) quod Adam habuit unum tantum praeceptum positivum - 2. quod deerant, quae nos impediunt ab observantia legis; nulla enim erat in ipso ignorantia, nulla infirmitas aut concupiscentia. etc.; unde c. 633. concludit: "Quanto enim magis homo fruebatur Deo, tanto majore impietate dereliquit Deum, et factus est malo dignus aeterno, qui hoc in se peremit bonum, quod esse posset aeternum" - 3. quod multa erant, quae ad servandum divinum mandatum impellerent. Unde (de Civ. Dei 1. 14. c. 15.), scribit: "Contemptus est Deus jubens, qui creaverat, qui ad imaginem suam fecerat, qui caeteris animalibus praeposuerat, qui in paradiso constituerat, qui rerum omnium copiam salutisque praestiterat, qui praeceptis nec pluribus, nec gravibus, nec difficilibus oneraverat."

Prob. 4a pars. Dona justitiae originalis, ut vidimus, sunt praecipue gratia sanctificans, et illam consequens destinatio ad visionem intuitivam - immunitas a concupiscentia - a morte - ab aerumnis hujus vitae. Atqui haec omnia amiserunt primi parentes per peccatum. Ergo.

Prob. min. quoad gratiam sanctificantem et jus ad aeternam beatitudinem. Legitur 2. Cor. 6. 14.: "Quae participatio justitiae cum iniquitate? aut quae societas lucis ad tenebras?" Et 1. Jo. 3. 9.: "Omnis qui natus est ex Deo, peccatum non facit: quoniam semen ipsius in eo manet, et non potest peccare." Rom. 5. 6.: "Judicium quidem ex uno in condemnationem: gratia autem ex multis delictis in justificationem." Et 5. 18.: "Sicut per unius delictum in omnes homines in condemnationem: sic per unius justitiam in omnes homines in justificationem vitae." - Quibus verbis aperte docetur peccatum non posse cum gratia et charitate componi; secum ferre mortem spiritualem - inducere condemnationem, ac proinde exclusionem ab aeterna vita et beatitudine.

Prob. min. quoad immunitatem a concupiscentia et a morte ex iis, quae diximus superius de his donis; praesertim (nn. 290. et 302.)

Prob. min. quoad immunitatem ab aerumnis. a) Gen. 3. 16-19. dicitur: "Mulieri quoque dixit: Multiplicabo aerumnas tuas, et conceptus tuos: in dolore paries filios, et sub viri potestate eris, et ipse dominabitur tui. Adae vero dixit: Quia audisti vocem uxoris tuae, et comedisti de ligno, ex quo praeceperam tibi ne comederes, maledicta terra in opere tuo: in laboribus comedes ex ea cunctis diebus vitae tuae. Spinas et tribulos germinabit tibi, et comedes herbam terrae. In sudore vultus tui vesceris pane, donec revertaris in terram de qua sumptus es: quia pulvis es, et in pulverem reverteris." - Et 3. 23. seq.: "Et emisit eum Dominus Deus de paradiso voluptatis, ut operaretur terram, de qua sumptus est. Ejecitque Adam: et collocavit ante

paradisum voluptatis Cherubim, et flammeum gladium atque versatilem, ad custodiendam viam ligni vitae."

b) S. Theophilus Antiochenus (Ad Autol. 1. 2. n. 25.): "Primo homini mandati praetergressio id attulit, ut e paradiso ejiceretur; non quod mali quidquam inesset ligno scientiae; sed ex peccato tamquam ex fonte in hominem fluxerunt labores, dolores, molestiae, ac denique mors ipsa." - S. Ambrosius (de Paradiso c. 14. n. 70.): "Adam ubi es? id est, de quibus bonis, de qua beatitudine, de qua gratia, in quam miseriam recedisti?" 422. With these things therefore explained, we say:

PROPOSITION XXXVI. 1. A true precept was imposed on the first parents, which 2. they transgressed; 3. they sinned gravely; and 4. they lost original justice.

Proof of the first part, I. From Scripture. For in Genesis 2:16-17 it is read: "And he commanded him, saying: Eat of every tree of paradise. But of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, do not eat; for on whatever day you eat from it, you shall die the death." And chapter 3:1ff.: "He, the serpent, said to the woman: Why has God commanded you that you should not eat of every tree of paradise? To whom the woman answered: Of the fruit of the trees which are in paradise, we eat; but of the fruit of the tree which is in the midst of paradise, God has commanded us that we should not eat, and that we should not touch it, lest perhaps we die."

Hence: a) Moses, a historical writer, uses repeatedly the word "commanded"; the same word is employed by the tempted woman, and by the serpent by whom she is tempted. Nothing prevents that word from being taken in its proper sense. Therefore it is a question of a true precept and not of a simple admonition.

b) When a superior prohibits something with a sanction added, he truly imposes a law or precept; but God, prohibiting them from eating of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, added: "on whatever day you eat from it, you shall die the death"; therefore.

c) The eating of that fruit in other places of Scripture to be cited below is often called transgression and sin; death, which God had threatened, is called the punishment of that sin. Therefore a true precept was imposed, that they should not eat of that fruit.

Proof II. From the Fathers. Clement of Alexandria, Stromata, book 5, says: "Adam was perfect; but he chose what was forbidden." St. Cyprian (On the Incarnation of the Word): "At once at the origin of the world and of the human race, Adam was forgetful of the precept and a transgressor of the law given." St. Irenaeus, book 5 Against Heresies, c. 19, speaks of the seduction of Eve, "who through the words of the evil angel was incited to violating the divine precept and abandoning God." St. Chrysostom, Homily 16 on Genesis: "That tasting was an argument of disobedience and a prevarication of the command handed down by God," etc.

Proof III. From the emptiness of the opposing reason. "Indeed," Bellarmine says in the cited place, "from what they themselves teach, that the first men did not sin because they did not have a law, since they were just, it follows that no men sin; indeed that it cannot happen that any men sin. For if sin presupposes law, since it is a prevarication of law, and law presupposes sin, since law is not laid down for the just but for the sinner, then sin always presupposes sin; therefore there was no first sin. And if there was no first sin, whence did the rest arise? Wherefore it is necessary either that there was law before sin, and that the opinion of the adversaries is false, or certainly that there are not, nor have there ever been, any sins in the world, which is the error of the Libertines, whose shamelessness, as we said in the previous book, should be restrained not by arguments, but only by tortures and punishments."

The cited author discusses many things splendidly, and at the end adds St. Augustine's interpretation of the objected testimony of the Apostle from 1 Timothy: "St. Augustine, in the book On the Spirit and the Letter, c. 10, wants this same passage of the Apostle from chapter 1 of the first letter to Timothy, 'Law is not laid down for the just, but for the unjust,' to be similar to those places of the same Apostle, 'You are not under law, but under grace,' Romans 6, and, 'If you are led by the Spirit, you are not under law,' Galatians 5. These places do not mean that the just are not bound by laws, or that they do not sin if they do not keep the law, but that they do not have the law above them, as though hanging over their necks and threatening and terrifying with a whip, as the unjust have, who work good from fear of punishment. For the just work good from love of justice and with a willing spirit, and would work even if there were no law or if it threatened no punishment. Therefore they are rather in the law than under

the law, as the Apostle says of himself in 1 Corinthians 9, where he says that he is not under law, and nevertheless that he is not without law, but is in the law of Christ."

Proof of the second part. That they at least materially transgressed the precept not to eat of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil is openly handed down in Scripture. For in Genesis 3:6 it is read: "Therefore the woman saw that the tree was good for eating, and beautiful to the eyes, and delightful to behold; and she took of its fruit and ate, and gave to her husband, who ate." But that this transgression was formal is proved thus: for a transgression of law to be formal sin, cognition of the law and freedom are required and suffice. But cognition of the precept was not lacking to the first parents; for the woman answered the serpent by whom she was tempted: "But of the fruit of the tree which is in the midst of paradise, God has commanded us that we should not eat and should not touch it, lest perhaps we die." Nor was freedom lacking, which certainly belongs to human nature, and which the adversaries themselves, the Innovators, do not deny to innocent man. Therefore.

Proof of the third part. I. Ecclesiasticus 10:14 says: "The beginning of man's pride is to apostatize from God, because his heart withdrew from him who made him; because the beginning of every sin is pride." And Tobit 4:14: "Never permit pride to rule in your sense or in your word; for in it every perdition took its beginning." Hence a sin which includes apostasy, withdrawal from God, and which is the beginning of every perdition, is certainly grave. But such was the sin of the first parents. Therefore.

Proof II. The sanction added to the precept was "on whatever day you eat from it, you shall die the death." But to death must be added all evils, as is clear from the things which we said in the preceding disputation. Hence, as Suarez rightly notes (l. c., n. 10), the gravity of the precept is openly proved from the threat of death added to the precept. "For if it is understood of the death of the soul, as Philo wished, and as Gregory and Eucherius thought, the aforesaid mortal gravity is formally contained in the very threat. But if it is understood of bodily death, as according to the letter it must be understood according to Paul and the Council of Trent, from the threat of so grave a punishment it is gathered that that precept obliged under grave fault; and therefore the Fathers commonly interpreted that threat of both deaths, of body and of soul."

Proof III. From the very end of the precept and the authority of the Fathers. For a) St. Augustine (City of God, book 14, c. 12) says: "No one ought therefore to think that that deed was light or small because it was done in a food, not indeed evil or harmful, but because it was forbidden; for obedience was commended in the precept, which virtue in a rational creature is in a certain way the mother and guardian of all virtues."

b) The same Augustine (Unfinished Work against Julian, book 1, c. 105) calls Adam's sin an ineffably grave sin. And in book 3, c. 65: "Adam sinned with so great an impiety as we cannot measure and estimate, but as God judged it." Often the holy Doctor enumerates various circumstances which aggravate that sin. For he notes, 1. in City of God, book 14, c. 12, that Adam had only one positive precept; 2. that the things which hinder us from observing the law were lacking, for there was no ignorance in him, no weakness or concupiscence, etc.; hence in c. 633 he concludes: "For the more man enjoyed God, the greater the impiety with which he abandoned God, and he was made worthy of eternal evil, since he destroyed in himself that good which could have been eternal"; 3. that there were many things which impelled him to keeping the divine command. Hence in City of God, book 14, c. 15, he writes: "God commanding was despised: he who had created, who had made him to his image, who had set him over the other animals, who had established him in paradise, who had provided an abundance of all things and of salvation, who had burdened him with precepts neither many, nor grave, nor difficult."

Proof of the fourth part. The gifts of original justice, as we have seen, are chiefly sanctifying grace and the destination to the intuitive vision consequent upon it; immunity from concupiscence, from death, and from the hardships of this life. But the first parents lost all these things through sin. Therefore.

The minor is proved with respect to sanctifying grace and the right to eternal beatitude. It is read in 2 Corinthians 6:14: "What participation has justice with iniquity? Or what fellowship has light with darkness?" And 1 John 3:9: "Everyone who is born of God does not commit sin, because his seed remains in him, and he cannot sin." Romans 5:6: "Judgment indeed from one unto condemnation; but grace from many offenses unto justification." And 5:18: "As through the offense of one unto all men unto condemnation, so through the justice of one unto all men unto

justification of life." By these words it is openly taught that sin cannot be composed with grace and charity; that it carries spiritual death with itself; that it induces condemnation, and consequently exclusion from eternal life and beatitude.

The minor is proved with respect to immunity from concupiscence and from death from the things which we said above concerning these gifts, especially nn. 290 and 302.

The minor is proved with respect to immunity from hardships. a) In Genesis 3:16-19 it is said: "To the woman also he said: I will multiply your hardships and your conceptions; in pain you shall bring forth children, and you shall be under the power of your husband, and he shall rule over you. But to Adam he said: Because you have listened to the voice of your wife and have eaten of the tree from which I had commanded you not to eat, cursed is the earth in your work; in labors you shall eat from it all the days of your life. Thorns and thistles it shall bring forth for you, and you shall eat the herb of the earth. In the sweat of your brow you shall eat bread, until you return to the earth from which you were taken, because you are dust, and into dust you shall return." And 3:23ff.: "And the Lord God sent him out of the paradise of pleasure, that he might work the earth from which he was taken. And he cast out Adam, and placed before the paradise of pleasure Cherubim and a flaming and turning sword, to guard the way of the tree of life."

b) St. Theophilus of Antioch (To Autolycus, book 2, n. 25): "To the first man, the transgression of the command brought this, that he was cast out of paradise; not because anything evil was in the tree of knowledge, but from sin, as from a fountain, there flowed into man labors, pains, distresses, and finally death itself." St. Ambrose (On Paradise, c. 14, n. 70): "Adam, where are you? That is, from what goods, from what beatitude, from what grace, into what misery have you withdrawn?"

423. NOTA. Est communis et certa sententia Adam et Evam obtinuisse sui peccati veniam, et aeternam salutem consecutos esse. Legitur enim Sap. 10. 1.: "Haec (sapientia) illum qui primus formatus est a Deo, pater orbis terrarum, cum solus esset creatus, custodivit, et eduxit illum a delicto suo." - S. Augustinus (Ep. 99. ad Evodium) inquit: "Ecclesiam fere totam consentire Christum, cum ad inferos descendit, inde Adamum liberasse." - S. Gregor. (Ep. 31. alibi 195.): "Adam postmodum per poenitentiam ad vitam rediit." - S. Augustinus (de pecc. mort. 1. 2. c. 34.) de primis hominibus ait: "Post peccatum juste vivendo, merito creduntur per Domini sanguinem ab aeterno supplicio liberati." - S. Gregorius Nazianzenus (Or. 31. in 19. Matth.): "Utrumque (Adamum et Evam) serpens decepit: utrumque Christus passione sua salute donavit." Vid. Suarez (de op. sex dier. 1. 4. c. 9.) 423. NOTE. It is a common and certain opinion that Adam and Eve obtained pardon for their sin and attained eternal salvation. For in Wisdom 10:1 it is read: "This, namely wisdom, guarded him who was first formed by God, father of the world, when he alone had been created, and led him out of his offense." St. Augustine, Epistle 99 to Evodius, says: "Almost the whole Church agrees that Christ, when he descended to the lower regions, freed Adam from there." St. Gregory, Epistle 31, otherwise 195: "Adam afterward returned to life through penitence." St. Augustine (On the Merits and Remission of Sins, book 2, c. 34) says concerning the first human beings: "After sin, by living justly, they are deservedly believed to have been freed by the blood of the Lord from eternal punishment." St. Gregory Nazianzen, Oration 31 on Matthew 19: "The serpent deceived both, Adam and Eve; Christ by his passion gave salvation to both." See Suarez, On the Work of the Six Days, book 4, c. 9.

Sectio II.
Quaedam de natura peccati protoparentum. SECTION II.
Certain Points Concerning the Nature of the Sin of the First Parents.

424. Pauca hic breviter attingimus, quae ad naturam peccati protoparentum, et modum quo in illud prolapsi sunt explicandum conferunt. Atque imprimis,

supposito D. Thomae, 2. 2. q. 163. a. 1., principio "quod ad unum peccatum multi motus concurrere possunt" conveniunt omnes primo Adae et Evae peccato alia peccata fuisse conjuncta. 424. Here we briefly touch upon a few things which contribute to explaining the nature of the sin of the first parents, and the manner in which they fell into it. And first of all, once the principle of St. Thomas, II-II, q. 163, a. 1, has been supposed, namely, "that many movements can concur toward one sin," all agree that other sins were joined with the first sin of Adam and Eve.

425. Praeter peccatum superbiae utrique, ut dicemus commune, Eva commisit peccatum infidelitatis. "Nam," inquit Suarez (de op. sex dier. l. 4. c. 2. n. 11.), "imprimis de Eva dicit Apost. 1. ad Tim. 2. 'Mulier seducta in praevaricatione fuit,' cum tamen de Adam dicat, non fuisse seductum. Illa autem seductio Evae in rebus ad fidem pertinentibus fuisse videtur; nimirum in hoc, quod serpenti dicenti, 'nequaquam moriemini,' plus credidit, quam Deo dicenti, 'morte moriemini'; ergo per hanc deceptionem in infidelitatem incidit. Item credidit promissioni serpentis, 'eritis sicut dii,' quae errorem in fide continebat. Denique credidit, Deum prohibuisse esum ligni, quasi ex invidia, ne fierent sicut dii, scientes bonum, et malum, quod etiam errorem intolerabilem continet." Vid. etiam n. 23. - Peccavit (n. 26.) "per internum etiam desiderium inchoatum, opere vero consummatum, comedendo de ligno vetito. Et hoc significant illa verba, 'Vidit mulier, quod bonum esset lignum ad vescendum, et pulchrum oculis, aspectuque delectabile, et tulit de fructu illius, et comedit.'" - "Post haec vero peccata secutum est gravissimum peccatum scandali contentum in illis verbis 'dedit viro suo'." - "Quibus tandem addi potest excusatio peccati, quam adhibuit cum a Deo fuit reprehensa. Sed forte in ea excusatione non fuit mortalis malitia, ut inferius agentes de peccatis Adae notabimus." 425. Besides the sin of pride, which, as we shall say, was common to both, Eve committed the sin of unbelief. "For," says Suarez (On the Work of the Six Days, book 4, c. 2, n. 11), "first of all, concerning Eve the Apostle says in 1 Timothy 2, 'The woman, having been seduced, was in prevarication,' although concerning Adam he says that he was not seduced. But that seduction of Eve seems to have been in things pertaining to faith; namely in this, that she believed the serpent saying, 'You shall by no means die,' more than God saying, 'You shall die the death'; therefore through this deception she fell into unbelief. Likewise she believed the promise of the serpent, 'you shall be as gods,' which contained an error in faith. Finally, she believed that God had prohibited the eating of the tree as if from envy, lest they should become as gods, knowing good and evil, which also contains an intolerable error." See also n. 23. - She sinned (n. 26) "also through an internal desire begun, but consummated by deed, by eating of the forbidden tree. And this is signified by those words, 'The woman saw that the tree was good for eating, and beautiful to the eyes, and delightful to behold; and she took of its fruit and ate.'" - "But after these sins there followed the most grave sin of scandal, contained in those words, 'she gave to her husband'." - "To these, finally, can be added the excuse of the sin which she used when she was rebuked by God. But perhaps in that excuse there was not mortal malice, as we shall note below when treating of the sins of Adam."

426. Quoad Adamum vero "Secundum ejus peccatum," ait Suarez (l. c. c. 4. n. 23.), "fuit inordinatus amor ad uxorem. Ita sumitur ex Aug. in d. lib. 14. de Civit. cap. 11. et lib. 11. Gen. ad litt. cap. 42., ubi ait, Adam comedisse de ligno ut complaceret uxori; ergo praecessit nimia benevolentia uxoris antequam de ligno comederet." - "Tertium peccatum Adae (n. 25.) recenseri potest; quod de ligno vetito comedit. Et hoc quasi per antonomasiam lapsus Adae vocatur, quia per illud totum genus humanum concidit; et ita de illo specialiter loquitur Apostolus ad Rom. 5. cum dicit, 'Per unum hominem peccatum intravit in mundum, et per peccatum mors, et ita in omnes homines mors pertransiit, in quo omnes peccaverunt.' Et similiter inferius nomine inobedientiae illud peccatum intelligit, cum dicit, 'Sicut per inobedientiam unius hominis peccatores constituti sunt multi; ita et per unius obedientiam justi constituuntur multi.'" Alii alia etiam enumerant tum Adae tum Evae peccata, de quibus

tamen non eadem est certitudo. 426. But with regard to Adam, "His second sin," says Suarez (l. c., c. 4, n. 23), "was inordinate love toward his wife. This is taken from Augustine in the cited book 14 of City of God, c. 11, and book 11 of On Genesis to the Letter, c. 42, where he says that Adam ate of the tree in order to please his wife; therefore excessive benevolence toward his wife preceded before he ate of the tree." - "The third sin of Adam (n. 25) can be reckoned as this: that he ate of the forbidden tree. And this, as it were by antonomasia, is called the fall of Adam, because through it the whole human race fell; and thus the Apostle speaks specially of it in Romans 5, when he says, 'Through one man sin entered into the world, and through sin death, and so death passed into all men, in whom all sinned.' And similarly below, under the name of disobedience, he understands that sin, when he says, 'As through the disobedience of one man many were constituted sinners, so also through the obedience of one many shall be constituted just.'" Others also enumerate other sins both of Adam and of Eve, concerning which, however, there is not the same certainty.

427. His positis, prima quaestio est: quodnam fuit primum protoparentum peccatum? Responsio communissima est primum protoparentum peccatum fuisse superbiam. Quod patet a) ex Scriptura. Recole loca ex Eccli. 10., et Tobiae 4. superius recitata. Unde hoc praecipue peccatum Deus improbavit, dicens, Gen. 3. 22.: "Ecce Adam quasi unus ex nobis factus est, sciens bonum et malum." Et S. Aug. (de Gen. ad litt. c. 39.) animadvertit in h. l.: "Verba enim sunt haec Dei, non tam huic (Adamo) insultantis, quam caeteros, ne ita superbiant deterrentis." - b) Ex Patribus. S. Ambrosius (Serm. 14. in Ps. 118.): "Superbia hominem prima dejecit." - S. Augustinus (de Gen. ad litt. l. 11. c. 8.): "Neque arbitrandum est, quod esset hominem dejecturus iste tentator, nisi praecessisset in anima hominis quaedam elatio comprimenda." - Et (de Civ. Dei, l. 14. c. 13.): "In occulto mali esse coeperunt, ut in apertam inobedientiam laberentur; non enim ad malum opus perveniretur, nisi mala voluntas praecessisset. Porro malae voluntatis initium quid potuit esse nisi superbia? initium enim omnis peccati superbia." - Eadem habet S. Prosper, S. Gregorius, S. Leo, etc. Vid. Suarez (l. c. cap. 2. n. 14. seqq.; et cap. 3. a n. 9.) 427. With these things posited, the first question is: what was the first sin of the first parents? The most common response is that the first sin of the first parents was pride. This is clear a) from Scripture. Recall the places from Ecclesiasticus 10 and Tobias 4 recited above. Hence God chiefly condemned this sin, saying, Genesis 3:22: "Behold, Adam has become as one of us, knowing good and evil." And St. Augustine (On Genesis to the Letter, c. 39) remarks on this place: "For these are words of God, not so much insulting this man (Adam), as deterring the others lest they be proud in this way." - b) From the Fathers. St. Ambrose (Sermon 14 on Psalm 118): "Pride first cast man down." - St. Augustine (On Genesis to the Letter, book 11, c. 8): "Nor should one think that that tempter would have cast man down unless there had preceded in man's soul a certain elation to be repressed." - And (City of God, book 14, c. 13): "They began to be evil in secret, so that they might fall into open disobedience; for the evil work would not have been reached unless an evil will had preceded. But what could the beginning of an evil will have been except pride? For pride is the beginning of every sin." - St. Prosper, St. Gregory, St. Leo, etc., have the same. See Suarez (l. c., c. 2, n. 14ff.; and c. 3 from n. 9).

428. Altera quaestio est: in quo consistit elatio, seu superbia protoparentum? huic quaestioni praeclare respondet D. Th. 2. 2. q. 163. a. 2. Supposito enim quod peccaverint appetendo similitudinem cum Deo, animadvertit imprimis "quod duplex est similitudo. Una omnimodae aequiparantiae: et hanc similitudinem ad Deum primi parentes non appetierunt, quia talis similitudo ad Deum non cadit in apprehensione, praecipue sapientis. Alia autem est similitudo imitationis, qualis possibilis est creaturae ad Deum, in quantum videlicet participat aliquid de similitudine ipsius secundum suum modum. Dionysius enim dicit in 9. cap. de divin. nom. (a. med. lect. 3.): 'Eadem similia sunt Deo et dissimilia: illud quidem secundum contingentem imitationem; hoc autem secundum quod causata minus habent a causa.' Quodlibet autem bonum in creatura existens est quaedam participata similitudo primi

boni. Et ideo ex hoc ipso quod homo appetiit aliquod spirituale bonum supra suam mensuram, ut dictum est art. praec., consequens est quod appetierit divinam similitudinem inordinate." 428. The second question is: in what did the elation, or pride, of the first parents consist? St. Thomas answers this question admirably, II-II, q. 163, a. 2. For, having supposed that they sinned by desiring likeness with God, he first observes "that likeness is twofold. One is of complete equality; and the first parents did not desire this likeness to God, because such likeness to God does not fall within apprehension, especially that of a wise person. But another is a likeness of imitation, such as is possible for a creature in relation to God, namely insofar as it participates something of his likeness according to its own mode. For Dionysius says in chapter 9 of The Divine Names (middle of the article, lecture 3): 'The same things are like God and unlike: the former according to contingent imitation; the latter insofar as effects have less than the cause.' But every good existing in a creature is a certain participated likeness of the first good. And therefore, from this very fact that man desired some spiritual good above his measure, as was said in the preceding article, it follows that he desired the divine likeness inordinately."

429. Explicat deinde in quo consistit similitudo imitationis, quam protoparentes inordinate appetierunt, inquiens: "Primus homo peccavit principaliter appetendo similitudinem Dei quantum ad scientiam boni et mali, sicut serpens ei suggessit, ut scilicet per virtutem propriae naturae determinaret sibi quid esset bonum et quid malum ad agendum; vel etiam ut per seipsum praecognosceret quid sibi boni vel mali esset futurum; et secundario peccavit appetendo similitudinem Dei quantum ad propriam potestatem operandi; ut scilicet virtute propriae naturae operaretur ad beatitudinem consequendam. Unde Augustinus dicit, 11. super Gen. ad litt. cap. 30., circa med., quod 'menti mulieris inerat amor propriae potestatis.'" Vid. Suarez (l. c. cap. 2. n. 19.; et cap. 3. n. 12.) 429. Then he explains in what the likeness of imitation consisted which the first parents inordinately desired, saying: "The first man sinned principally by desiring likeness to God with respect to the knowledge of good and evil, as the serpent suggested to him; namely, so that by the power of his own nature he would determine for himself what was good and what was evil for acting; or even so that by himself he would know beforehand what good or evil would befall him. And secondarily he sinned by desiring likeness to God with respect to his own power of operating; namely, so that by the power of his own nature he would operate toward attaining beatitude. Hence Augustine says, book 11 On Genesis to the Letter, c. 30, around the middle, that 'there was present in the woman's mind a love of her own power.'" See Suarez (l. c., c. 2, n. 19; and c. 3, n. 12).

430. Ex his plane consequitur primum peccatum hominis non fuisse inobedientiam; quod D. Thomas in dicta q. 163. a. 1. ad 1. expresse docet, inquiens: "Hoc, quod homo non obediret divino praecepto, non fuit propter se ab eo volitum, quia hoc non posset contingere, nisi praesupposita inordinatione voluntatis. Relinquitur ergo quod voluerit propter aliquid aliud. Primum autem quod inordinate voluit, fuit propria excellentia: et ideo inobedientia in eo causata fuit ex superbia." 430. From these things it plainly follows that the first sin of man was not disobedience; and St. Thomas expressly teaches this in the cited q. 163, a. 1, ad 1, saying: "This, that man did not obey the divine precept, was not willed by him for its own sake, because this could not happen unless a disordering of the will had been presupposed. Therefore it remains that he willed it for the sake of something else. But the first thing which he inordinately willed was his own excellence; and therefore disobedience in him was caused from pride."

431. At vero, quomodo hoc conciliari potest cum Apostolo Rom. 5. 19. dicente: "Per inobedientiam unius hominis peccatores constituti sunt multi?" Videtur enim illud peccatum primum fuisse, quod totam posteritatem corrupit. Responderi potest imprimis cum eodem D. Thoma 2. dist. 22. q. 1. a. 1. ad 3.: "Inobedientia dupliciter sumitur. Quandoque enim est speciale

peccatum, quando scilicet ex contemptu praecepti aliquis specialiter peccat. Quandoque autem sumitur, prout est conditio generalis consequens omne peccatum mortale. Cum enim praeceptum legis actus omnium virtutum ordinet, consequens est, ut quodlibet vitium transgressionem annexam praecepti habeat, et inobedientiam. Et sic dicitur: per inobedientiam unius, etc." 431. But how can this be reconciled with the Apostle saying in Romans 5:19: "Through the disobedience of one man many were constituted sinners"? For it seems that that sin was first which corrupted the whole posterity. One can answer first with the same St. Thomas, II Sent., dist. 22, q. 1, a. 1, ad 3: "Disobedience is taken in two ways. For sometimes it is a special sin, namely when someone sins specially from contempt of a precept. But sometimes it is taken as it is a general condition following upon every mortal sin. For since the precept of the law orders the acts of all the virtues, it follows that any vice whatever has annexed to it a transgression of the precept, and disobedience. And in this way it is said: through the disobedience of one, etc."

432. Suarez tamen (l. c. cap. 4. n. 25.), addit: "Licet probabile sit illam inobedientiam non fuisse formalem, id est, ex directa intentione non obediendi Deo, nec ex proprio contemptu praecepti ejus; nihilominus censeo illam fuisse specialem malitiam distinctam ab aliis, quia ex principali intentione Dei praecipientis illa prohibitio posita fuerat ad subjectionem profitendam, et quasi per modum tributi impositi in recognitionem divini dominii."

Unde (de vitiis et peccatis disp. 9. sect. 3. n. 7.), ait: "Cum Sancti videntur dicere primum Adae peccatum fuisse causam perditionis humanae naturae, loquuntur de peccato illo perfecto, et completo, quod et exterius apparuit, et expresse in Scriptura narratur. Quod docet D. Thomas 1. 2. q. 81. a. 2." Sed haec clariora fient ex inferius dicendis. 432. Suarez, however (l. c., c. 4, n. 25), adds: "Although it is probable that that disobedience was not formal, that is, not from a direct intention of not obeying God, nor from proper contempt of his precept, nevertheless I judge that it was a special malice distinct from the others, because from the principal intention of God commanding, that prohibition had been established for professing subjection, and as if by way of a tribute imposed in recognition of the divine dominion."

Hence (On Vices and Sins, disp. 9, sect. 3, n. 7), he says: "When the Saints seem to say that the first sin of Adam was the cause of the perdition of human nature, they are speaking of that perfect and complete sin which both appeared exteriorly and is expressly narrated in Scripture. This is what St. Thomas teaches, I-II, q. 81, a. 2." But these things will become clearer from what is to be said below.

433. Aliud, quod solet hic quaeri, est: cum peccatum non contingat sine aliquo pravo seu falso mentis judicio, vel saltem sine aliqua mentis perversitate; quomodo primi parentes, in scientia perfecti, ab errore immunes peccare potuerunt?

Resp. 1. Certum est nullum errorem praecessisse primum protoparentum peccatum. Unde cum D. Thomas 1. p. q. 94. a. 4., sibi objecisset illud 1. Tim. 2. 14. "mulier seducta in praevaricatione fuit;" respondet: "Ad primum ergo dicendum quod illa seductio mulieris, etsi praecesserit peccatum operis, subsecuta tamen est peccatum internae elationis. Dicit enim S. Augustinus 11. super Gen. ad litt. cap. 30. circ. med., quod 'mulier verbis serpentis non crederet, nisi jam inesset menti ejus amor propriae potestatis, et quaedam de se superba praesumptio.'"

Resp. 2. Aliquibus non videtur necessaria mentis perversitas ad peccandum, siquidem voluntas deficit contra mentis judicium. Sed qui aliquam mentis perversitatem in omni peccato agnoscunt, ita rem explicant quoad peccatum protoparentum. "Multiplicem intellectus creati defectum distinguas oportet: scilicet nescientiam eorum, quae scire quis non tenetur: tum debitae carentiam cognitionis, quae vincibilis ignorantia dicitur: errorem praeterea, quo approbantur falsa pro veris, quod falsum judicium est: considerationis denique defectum. Primum nescientiae defectum ab Adamo removere, perinde foret ac ejus mentem increatam facere: nec enim mens creata scire omnia potest, aut debet. Unde comperta res est, hanc nescientiam statui non posse proximam peccati, quod admiserunt Protoparentes, causam. Non patitur alterum defectum, nec tertium vita eorum innocens: ubi debuit esse omne bonum

integritati naturae conveniens, et omne abesse malum contrarium. Superest defectus considerationis. Proposita per serpentem similitudine cum Deo per ea verba, 'Eritis sicut dii;' cogitatio propriae excellentiae in eorum mente, ipsis volentibus, aut non repugnantibus, excitata est. Eam cogitationem ad opus applicuerunt, lato judicio de propria excellentia amanda: eamque amaverunt. Pravus amor hic fuit, superbiae labe infectus. In ea namque daemonis, similitudinem cum Deo proponentis, circumstantia, actu diligere Deum summum bonum, seque suamque excellentiam cum actuali relatione in Deum amare tenebantur. Sed judicium, quo pravus propriae excellentiae amor regebatur, non erat falsum, sed inconsideratum: ejusdemque considerationis reatus non ab aliqua priore, eademque prava, pendebat voluntate. Ex ipso pravo propriae excellentiae amore consequente, simulque coexistente procedebat: utpote quo, veluti reflectente, ipsa judicii inconsideratio approbata fuit." Vide De Rubeis (de pecc. orig. c. 47. n. 3.) 433. Another thing which is usually asked here is this: since sin does not occur without some depraved or false judgment of the mind, or at least without some perversity of mind, how could the first parents, perfect in knowledge and immune from error, have been able to sin?

Resp. 1. It is certain that no error preceded the first sin of the first parents. Hence when St. Thomas, I, q. 94, a. 4, had objected to himself that text of 1 Timothy 2:14, "the woman, having been seduced, was in prevarication," he answers: "Therefore to the first it must be said that that seduction of the woman, although it preceded the sin of deed, nevertheless followed the sin of internal elation. For St. Augustine says, book 11 On Genesis to the Letter, c. 30, around the middle, that 'the woman would not have believed the words of the serpent unless there had already been in her mind a love of her own power and a certain proud presumption concerning herself.'"

Resp. 2. To some, perversity of mind does not seem necessary for sinning, since the will fails contrary to the judgment of the mind. But those who acknowledge some perversity of mind in every sin explain the matter thus with respect to the sin of the first parents. "One must distinguish a multiple defect of created intellect: namely, ignorance of those things which one is not bound to know; then the lack of due cognition, which is called vincible ignorance; further, error, by which false things are approved as true, which is false judgment; and finally, defect of consideration. To remove the first defect of ignorance from Adam would be the same as to make his mind uncreated; for a created mind neither can nor ought to know all things. Hence it is an ascertained thing that this ignorance cannot be established as the proximate cause of the sin which the first parents committed. Their innocent life does not allow the second defect, nor the third: for there every good fitting the integrity of nature ought to have been present, and every contrary evil absent. There remains defect of consideration. When likeness with God had been proposed by the serpent through those words, 'You shall be as gods,' the thought of their own excellence was stirred up in their mind, with them willing it, or not resisting. They applied that thought to action, a judgment having been made concerning their own excellence as something to be loved; and they loved it. This was a depraved love, infected with the stain of pride. For in that circumstance of the devil proposing likeness with God, they were bound actually to love God as the highest good, and to love themselves and their own excellence with an actual relation to God. But the judgment by which the depraved love of their own excellence was governed was not false, but inconsiderate; and the guilt of that lack of consideration did not depend on some prior will, likewise depraved. It proceeded from the very depraved love of their own excellence following upon it and at the same time coexisting with it, inasmuch as by that love, as though reflecting, the very lack of consideration in the judgment was approved." See De Rubeis (On Original Sin, c. 47, n. 3).

434. Si quis denique quaereret, quomodo fieri potuit, ut primi parentes tam perfecti in intellectu, tam recti in voluntate, ab appetitus inferioris rebellione immunes peccaverint; respondendum est haec omnia dona non impedivisse defectibilitatem propriam libertatis creatae, per quam et peccare potuerunt, et peccaverunt. Si enim multi ex Angelis, majoribus viribus praediti, lapsi sunt; cur id de hominibus impossibile judicatur? 434. Finally, if someone should ask how it could happen that the first

parents, so perfect in intellect, so upright in will, immune from the rebellion of the lower appetite, sinned, one must answer that all these gifts did not impede the proper defectibility of created freedom, through which they both were able to sin and did sin. For if many of the Angels, endowed with greater powers, fell, why is that judged impossible concerning human beings?

On printed page 486 / PDF page 497, the embedded text layer contained an artifact between Proposita and per serpentem. The corrected Latin used here is: Superest defectus considerationis. Proposita per serpentem similitudine cum Deo per ea verba... This is grammatically required by the ablative absolute and is reflected in the English translation: "When likeness with God had been proposed by the serpent..."

Article 2. On the Propagation of the First Parents' Sin

LatineEnglish

De protoparentum peccati propagatione. On the Propagation of the Sin of the First Parents.

435. Peccatum a protoparentibus in paradiso commissum, in uno Adamo non constitit, sed ex eo tamquam ex semine ad ejus posteritatem promanavit. Hanc veritatem ex fontibus revelationis probabimus - a praecipuis difficultatibus vindicabimus - quibusdam adjectis quaestiunculis, ad illam penitius intelligendam. 435. The sin committed by the first parents in paradise did not remain in Adam alone, but from him, as from a seed, flowed forth to his posterity. We shall prove this truth from the sources of revelation; we shall vindicate it from the chief difficulties; and we shall add certain small questions for understanding it more deeply.

Sectio I.
Utrum Adami peccatum in ejus posteros transfusum sit. SECTION I.
Whether Adam's Sin Was Transfused Into His Descendants.

436. Agitur hic, uti patet, de existentia peccati originalis. Ejus naturam deinde investigabimus: hic ergo, ad rerum intelligentiam, sufficit innuere peccati originalis nomine nos illud intelligere, quod a peccato primi parentis in omnes, qui per carnalem generationem ab eo ortum ducunt, derivatur. "Originale peccatum," inquit S. Augustinus (op. imperf. cont. Jul. l. 5. c. 9.), "propterea significantius quam naturale dicimus, ut non divini operis, sed humanae originis intelligatur, maxime propter illud significandum, quod per unum hominem intravit in mundum." 436. Here, as is clear, the matter concerns the existence of original sin. We shall investigate its nature afterward; therefore here, for understanding the matter, it is enough to indicate that by the name of original sin we understand that which is derived from the sin of the first parent into all who draw their origin from him through carnal generation. "We call it original sin," says St. Augustine (Unfinished Work against Julian, book 5, c. 9), "more significantly than natural sin for this reason: so that it may be understood as belonging not to the divine work, but to human origin, especially for signifying that which entered into the world through one man."

437. Maximi momenti est praesens quaestio. Nam uti animadvertit idem S. Doctor (de pecc. orig. c. 28.): "In causa duorum hominum, quorum per unum venumdati sumus sub peccato, per alterum redimimur a peccatis, per unum praecipitati sumus in mortem, per alterum liberamur ad vitam, quorum ille nos in se perdidit faciendo voluntatem suam, non ejus a quo factus est; iste nos in se salvos fecit, non faciendo voluntatem suam, sed ejus a quo missus est: in horum ergo duorum hominum causa proprie fides Christiana consistit." 437. The present question is of the greatest importance. For, as the

same holy Doctor remarks (On Original Sin, c. 28): "In the case of the two men, through one of whom we were sold under sin, through the other of whom we are redeemed from sins; through one of whom we were cast headlong into death, through the other of whom we are freed unto life; of whom the former lost us in himself by doing his own will, not the will of him by whom he was made, while the latter saved us in himself by not doing his own will, but the will of him by whom he was sent: in the case, therefore, of these two men, Christian faith properly consists."

438. Relictis nunc antiquioribus hac de re Ecclesiae definitionibus, subjicimus doctrinam, quam tradidit Conc. Trid. sess. V. can. 2. 3. "Si quis Adae praevaricationem sibi soli et non ejus propagini asserit nocuisse, et acceptam a Deo sanctitatem et justitiam quam perdidit, sibi soli et non nobis etiam eum perdidisse; aut inquinatum illum per inobedientiae peccatum mortem et poenas corporis tantum in omne genus humanum transfudisse, non autem et peccatum, quod mors est animae: anathema sit, quum contradicat Apostolo dicenti: Per unum hominem peccatum intravit in mundum, et per peccatum mors, et ita in omnes homines mors pertransiit, in quo omnes peccaverunt." - "Si quis hoc Adae peccatum, quod origine unum est, et propagatione, non imitatione, transfusum inest unicuique proprium, vel per humanae naturae vires, vel per aliud remedium asserit tolli, quam per meritum unius mediatoris Domini nostri Jesu Christi; anathema sit." 438. Leaving aside now the more ancient definitions of the Church concerning this matter, we set forth the doctrine which the Council of Trent handed down, session 5, canons 2 and 3. "If anyone asserts that Adam's prevarication harmed himself alone and not his offspring, and that the sanctity and justice received from God which he lost, he lost for himself alone and not also for us; or that he, being stained by the sin of disobedience, transfused death and the punishments of the body only into the whole human race, but not also sin, which is the death of the soul: let him be anathema, since he contradicts the Apostle saying: Through one man sin entered into the world, and through sin death, and so death passed into all men, in whom all sinned." - "If anyone asserts that this sin of Adam, which is one by origin and, transfused by propagation, not by imitation, is in each one as his own, is taken away either by the powers of human nature or by any other remedy than through the merit of the one mediator our Lord Jesus Christ: let him be anathema."

439. Peccati originalis existentiam veluti indirecte inficiati sunt qui originem mali aut a principio malo repetebant, ut Gnostici et Manichaei; aut a peccatis actualibus non expiatis, ab anima commissis ante unionem cum corpore deducebant, uti Origenes et omnes Praeexistentiani. - Directe autem dogma de peccato originali impugnarunt, post Theodorum Mopsuestenum atque Rufinum, Pelagius, ex Britannia Monachus, ejusque discipuli, inter quos eminent Coelestius et Julianus. - Docuit Pelagius peccatum Adami ipsi soli nocuisse: quod autem omnes, qui ab Adamo originem ducunt, moriantur, fieri naturaliter: nam Adam, dicebat, moriturus fuisset, etiamsi non peccasset. Anathematizavit hunc errorem in Synodo Palaestina, et fassus est Adae peccatum nocuisse et ejus posteris; sed deinde discipulis suis respondit peccatum primi hominis nocuisse posteris non propagatione, sed imitatione, quatenus filii Adae non contrahunt origine illius peccatum, sed propriis actibus illud imitantur. - Convicti Pelagiani, uti videtur, argumentis catholicorum, Adamum non fuisse moriturum si non peccasset, docere coeperunt mortem corporis trahi per generationem ex Adamo, non tamen peccatum, quod est mors animae. 439. Those indirectly denied, as it were, the existence of original sin who traced the origin of evil either back to an evil principle, as the Gnostics and Manichaeans did; or derived it from unexpiated actual sins committed by the soul before union with the body, as Origen and all the Preexistence-theorists did. - But directly, after Theodore of Mopsuestia and Rufinus, Pelagius, a monk from Britain, and his disciples attacked the dogma concerning original sin; among those disciples Coelestius and Julian stand out. - Pelagius taught that the sin of Adam harmed Adam alone; but that all who draw origin from Adam die happens naturally, for Adam, he said, would have died even if he had not sinned. He anathematized this error at the Palestinian Synod, and confessed that Adam's

sin had harmed also his posterity; but afterward he answered his disciples that the sin of the first man harmed his posterity not by propagation, but by imitation, insofar as the children of Adam do not contract that sin by origin, but imitate it by their own acts. - The Pelagians, being convinced, as it seems, by the arguments of Catholics that Adam would not have died if he had not sinned, began to teach that the death of the body is drawn through generation from Adam, but not sin, which is the death of the soul.

440. Posterioribus vero temporibus Albigenses, Anabaptistae, Sociniani, Remonstrantes renovarunt errorem, qui nec mortem nec peccatum ex Adamo trahi contendit. - Errorem alium, qui mortem aliaque mala ex Adamo trahi concedit, non tamen peccatum, renovarunt Hulder. Zwinglius, Jac. Faber, etc. Hi docuerunt ex peccato primi hominis solum in nos redundare morbum quemdam - propensionem ad peccatum - peccatum metonymice, quatenus est effectus et causa peccati - vel obligationem ad mortem. Quibus plus minusve Quakeri et alii assenserunt. - Rationalistae omnes et Pantheistae nihil intentatum reliquerunt, ut ostenderent dogma peccati originalis cum recta ratione pugnare, et sic illud everterent. Sed de concordia rationis cum hoc dogmate dicemus inferius. 440. But in later times the Albigensians, Anabaptists, Socinians, and Remonstrants renewed the error which contends that neither death nor sin is drawn from Adam. - Another error, which grants that death and other evils are drawn from Adam, but not sin, was renewed by Huldrych Zwingli, Jacques Lefevre, etc. These taught that from the sin of the first man there redounds into us only a certain disease; a propensity toward sin; sin metonymically, insofar as it is the effect and cause of sin; or an obligation to death. The Quakers and others agreed with them more or less. - All Rationalists and Pantheists left nothing untried in order to show that the dogma of original sin conflicts with right reason, and so to overturn it. But concerning the agreement of reason with this dogma we shall speak below.

441. Itaque, uti patet ex allatis Ecclesiae definitionibus, et oppositis erroribus; ut peccati originalis existentiam tueamur, ostendendum est peccatum primi parentis, et non solum ejus effectus, verum et proprie dictum peccatum, et non peccatum solum metonymice sumptum propagatum esse in Adae filios - quibus propterea Adae peccatum non ideo nocuit, quia imitati sunt, sed quia illud contraxerunt. Vid. Bellarm. (de amiss. gr. et statu pecc. l. 4. cap. 2.) 441. Therefore, as is clear from the definitions of the Church that have been brought forward, and from the opposed errors, in order to defend the existence of original sin it must be shown that the sin of the first parent, and not only its effects, was propagated into the children of Adam; that a true and properly so-called sin, and not sin taken merely metonymically, was propagated into them; and that therefore Adam's sin did not harm them because they imitated it, but because they contracted it. See Bellarmine (On the Loss of Grace and the State of Sin, book 4, c. 2).

442. Dicimus ergo:

PROP. XXXVII. Adae peccatum propagatione non imitatione in ejus posteros transfusum est, seu verum datur peccatum originale.

Probatur ex V. Testamento.

I. Job 14, 1. seqq. describit hominis miseriam; et v. 4. exclamat: "Quis potest facere mundum de immundo conceptum semine? nonne tu, qui solus es?" vel, ut vertunt LXX: "Nemo mundus a sorde; ne infans quidem, cujus est unius diei vita super terram"; quae ultima verba habentur etiam in antiqua Vulgata, eademque legisse Veteres, et ad propagationem peccati originalis adhibuisse, testatur Calmet. - Hebraicus autem habet: "Quis detur mundus de immundo? non unus."

Unde: Datur sordis quaedam et immunditia universalis cuilibet homini ab origine inhaerens; atqui immunditia illa non est corporalis, sed spiritualis, seu est peccatum; ergo.

Prob. min. a) Sub nomine immunditiae in Sacra Scriptura saepe intelliguntur peccata. Sic Is. 64. 6.: "Facti sumus ut immundus omnes nos, et quasi pannus menstruatae universae justitiae nostrae." Cf. Zach. 4. - Patres etiam verba Jobi de immunditia spirituali intellexerunt.

b) Loquitur Job de

immunditia, a qua Deus solus mundare potest: haec autem ea est, quae afficit animam, a sorde enim corporis et homines mundare possunt.

c) Dicit Job v. 4.: "Et dignum ducis super hujuscemodi aperire oculos tuos, et adducere eum tecum in judicium." Unde: Loquitur de sorde, ob quam homo adducitur in judicium Dei; sed homo Dei judicio subjicitur ob immunditiam spiritualem, seu ob peccatum; ergo.

II. Legitur Ps. 50. 7.: "Ecce in iniquitatibus conceptus sum, et in peccatis concepit me mater mea." - Notandum est quod "in textu Hebraico expressius dicitur in numero singulari, prout etiam ex Hebraeo vertit S. Hieronymus: 'In iniquitate conceptus sum, et in peccato peperit me mater mea.' Etiam in versione Chaldaica, Syriaca et Arabica iniquitas et peccatum in singulari numero effertur." Quamvis potuit etiam, uti observat D. Thomas 1. 2. q. 82. a. 4. ad 1., plurali numero enunciari "vel quia in eo praeexistunt omnia peccata actualia sicut in quodam principio, unde est multiplex virtute: vel quia in peccato primi parentis, quod per originem traducitur, fuerunt plures deformitates, scilicet superbiae, inobedientiae, gulae, et alia hujusmodi; vel quia multae partes animae inficiuntur per peccatum originale."

Unde: asserit David hominem concipi in peccato; sed illud aliud non est aut esse potest, nisi peccatum originale; ergo.

Prob. min. a) Ex Patribus. S. Hilarius (in Ps. 118.); explicans illa verba Davidis "vivet anima mea et laudabit te," ait: "Vivere se in hac vita non reputat; quippe qui dixerat: 'Ecce in iniquitatibus' etc., scit sub peccati origine et sub peccati lege se natum." S. Ambrosius (Ps. 50. 7.): "Antequam nascimur, maculamur contagio, et ante usuram lucis originis ipsius excipimus injuriam: in iniquitate concipimur." - Et (l. 1. de poenit. c. 13.): "Omnes sub peccato nascimur, quorum ipse ortus in vitio est, dicente David; 'Ecce in iniquitatibus,' etc." - S. Gregorius (Mor. l. 4. n. 3.): "Unusquisque cum primi parentis culpa concipitur, dicente Propheta: 'Ecce in iniquitatibus,' etc."

b) Peccatum illud, in quo homines concipiuntur, non est actuale in puero, uti per se patet - nec est peccatum parentum. Nam praeterquam quod haec interpretatio est contraria, ut vidimus, interpretationi Patrum, opponitur etiam contextui. In toto enim illo Psalmo non aliena, sed sua peccata accusat David, et varias rationes affert ut sibi veniam imploret. Praeterea constat David ex legitimis nuptiis natum esse; unde nemo, sive inter Judaeos sive inter Christianos, unquam inventus est, qui propter illa verba matrem Davidis accusandam esse putaverit. Merito proinde S. Augustinus (Enarr. in Ps. 50. n. 10.), inquit: "Suscepit personam generis humani David, et attendit omnium vincula: propaginem mortis consideravit, originem iniquitatis advertit, et ait: Ecce enim in iniquitatibus conceptus sum.' Numquid David de adulterio natus erat, de Jesse viro justo et conjuge ejus? Quid est quod se dicit in iniquitate conceptum, nisi quia trahitur iniquitas ex Adam? Vid. Bellarm. (de amiss. grat. et statu pec. l. 4. c. 4.) - De Rubeis (de pecc. orig. cap. 18.) 442. Therefore we say:

PROPOSITION XXXVII. Adam's sin was transfused into his descendants by propagation, not by imitation; or, a true original sin is given.

It is proved from the Old Testament.

I. Job 14:1ff. describes the misery of man; and in v. 4 he exclaims: "Who can make clean one conceived of unclean seed? Is it not you, who alone are?" Or, as the Seventy translate: "No one is clean from stain; not even an infant whose life upon the earth is one day"; these last words are also found in the old Vulgate, and Calmet testifies that the ancients read the same and used them for the propagation of original sin. - But the Hebrew has: "Who can be given clean from unclean? Not one."

Hence: There is given a certain stain and universal uncleanness inhering in each human being from origin; but that uncleanness is not bodily, but spiritual, or is sin; therefore.

The minor is proved. a) Under the name of uncleanness, sins are often understood in Sacred Scripture. Thus Isaiah 64:6: "We have all become as one unclean, and all our justices as the rag of a menstruous woman." Cf. Zechariah 4. - The Fathers also understood the words of Job concerning spiritual uncleanness.

b) Job is speaking of an uncleanness from which God alone can cleanse; but this is the uncleanness which affects the soul, for human beings too can cleanse from bodily stain.

c) Job says in v. 4: "And do you consider it worthy to open your eyes upon one of this sort, and to bring him with you into judgment?" Hence: he is speaking of a stain on account of which a human being is brought into God's judgment; but a human being is subjected to God's judgment on account of spiritual uncleanness, or on account of sin; therefore.

II. Psalm 50:7 reads: "Behold, in iniquities I was conceived, and in sins my mother

conceived me." - It must be noted that "in the Hebrew text it is said more expressly in the singular number, as St. Jerome also translates from the Hebrew: 'In iniquity I was conceived, and in sin my mother bore me.' Also in the Chaldean, Syriac, and Arabic versions, iniquity and sin are expressed in the singular number." Although it could also, as St. Thomas observes, I-II, q. 82, a. 4, ad 1, be stated in the plural number, "either because all actual sins preexist in it as in a certain principle, whence it is manifold in potency; or because in the sin of the first parent, which is transmitted by origin, there were many deformities, namely of pride, disobedience, gluttony, and other such things; or because many parts of the soul are infected by original sin."

Hence: David asserts that a human being is conceived in sin; but that is not, nor can it be, anything other than original sin; therefore.

The minor is proved. a) From the Fathers. St. Hilary (on Psalm 118), explaining those words of David, "My soul shall live and shall praise you," says: "He does not reckon himself as living in this life, since he had said: 'Behold, in iniquities,' etc.; he knows that he was born under the origin of sin and under the law of sin." St. Ambrose (on Psalm 50:7): "Before we are born, we are stained by contagion, and before the use of light we receive the injury of our very origin: in iniquity we are conceived." - And (On Penance, book 1, c. 13): "We are all born under sin, we whose very origin is in fault, as David says: 'Behold, in iniquities,' etc." - St. Gregory (Moralia, book 4, n. 3): "Each one is conceived with the fault of the first parent, as the Prophet says: 'Behold, in iniquities,' etc."

b) That sin in which human beings are conceived is not actual sin in the child, as is clear in itself, nor is it the sin of the parents. For, besides the fact that this interpretation is contrary, as we have seen, to the interpretation of the Fathers, it is also opposed to the context. For in that whole Psalm David accuses not another's sins, but his own, and he brings forward various reasons in order to implore pardon for himself. Moreover, it is agreed that David was born from lawful wedlock; hence no one, whether among Jews or among Christians, has ever been found who thought that because of those words the mother of David should be accused. Deservedly, therefore, St. Augustine (Exposition on Psalm 50, n. 10) says: "David took on the person of the human race, and attended to the bonds of all; he considered the offspring of death, he adverted to the origin of iniquity, and said: Behold, for in iniquities I was conceived. Was David born of adultery, from Jesse, a just man, and his wife? What is it that he says he was conceived in iniquity, except that iniquity is drawn from Adam?" See Bellarmine (On the Loss of Grace and the State of Sin, book 4, c. 4) - De Rubeis (On Original Sin, c. 18).

Sectio III.
Nonnullae quaestiunculae circa peccatum ab Adam in posteros derivatum. SECTION III.
Certain Small Questions Concerning the Sin Derived from Adam into His Descendants.

443. Quaeritur I. quodnam Adae peccatum fuerit in posteros derivatum? Resp. fuisse peccatum illud, quod commisit contra legem prohibentem esum fructus arboris scientiae boni et mali. Quod ita probat Suarez (de vitiis et pecc. disp. 9. sect. 3. n. 7.): "Constat ex poena illa peccato imposita, in quocumque die comederis, morte morieris. Quae verba a sanctis intelliguntur dicta toti naturae humanae, ut patet ex illis verbis, 'quia audisti vocem uxoris tuae, maledicta terra, etc.' Item est sensus Pauli ad Roman. 5. cum dicit, 'si unius delicto multi mortui sunt,' et clarius infra, 'si enim unius delicto mors regnavit, etc.' Quod unum peccatum sancti intelligunt fuisse illam inobedientiam; Tridentinum quoque sessione 5. id aperte confirmat." 443. It is asked, I. which sin of Adam was derived into his descendants? Resp. It was that sin which he committed against the law prohibiting the eating of the fruit of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil. Suarez proves this thus (On Vices and Sins, disp. 9, sect. 3, n. 7): "It is clear from that penalty imposed on the sin, on whatever day you eat, you shall die the death. These words are understood by the saints as spoken to the whole of human nature, as is clear from those words, 'because you listened to the voice of your wife, cursed is the earth, etc.' Likewise this is the sense of Paul in Romans 5 when he says, 'if by the offense of one many died,' and more clearly below, 'for if

by the offense of one death reigned, etc.' The saints understand that one sin to have been that disobedience; the Council of Trent also, in session 5, openly confirms this."

444. Dices: peccatum, quod ab Adam traducitur videtur esse illud, quo amisit gratiam et caetera dona justitiae originalis: illud autem videtur fuisse primum peccatum. Sed primum Adae peccatum fuit superbia. Ergo.

Resp. "Etsi," inquit Sylv. (in 1. 2. q. 81. a. 1.), "transgressio legis divinae per actualem manducationem ligni vetiti subsecuta fuerit superbiam, continebatur tamen in illa superbia: audiens enim Adamus ab Eva, se futuros Deo similes, scientes bonum et malum, si de fructu istius ligni comederent; statim in superbiam elatus est, simulque habuit voluntatem de isto fructu comedendi; quam voluntatem dum opere externo complevit, non aliud quam peccatum mente conceptum consummavit, et sic primum peccatum usque ad consummationem productum, fuit manducatio istius fructus: quamvis quando inchoabatur, esset superbia actualem quidem manducationem praecedens, includens tamen voluntatem eam faciendi." 444. You will say: the sin which is transmitted from Adam seems to be that by which he lost grace and the other gifts of original justice; but that seems to have been the first sin. But the first sin of Adam was pride. Therefore.

Resp. "Although," says Sylvius (on I-II, q. 81, a. 1), "the transgression of the divine law through the actual eating of the forbidden tree followed upon pride, nevertheless it was contained in that pride. For when Adam heard from Eve that they would be like God, knowing good and evil, if they ate of the fruit of that tree, he was immediately lifted up into pride and at the same time had the will of eating of that fruit. When he fulfilled that will by an external deed, he consummated nothing other than the sin conceived in the mind; and thus the first sin, brought all the way to consummation, was the eating of that fruit, although when it was beginning it was pride, indeed preceding the actual eating, yet including the will of doing that eating."

445. Quaeritur II. Utrum, si Adam non comedisset de cibo vetito, sed commisisset aliud grave peccatum, hoc fuisset transfusum in posteros?

Resp. Affirmant aliqui ex hac ratione: ita, inquiunt, accepit Adam justitiam originalem, ut si eam servaret, ipsa in ejus posteros derivaretur; si vero illam amitteret, etiam ejus posteris perderet. Atqui quodcumque grave peccatum Adam commisisset, amisisset justitiam originalem. Ergo. 445. It is asked, II. whether, if Adam had not eaten of the forbidden food, but had committed some other grave sin, this would have been transfused into his descendants?

Resp. Some affirm this from this reason: Adam, they say, received original justice in such a way that if he preserved it, it would be derived into his descendants; but if he lost it, he would lose it also for his descendants. But whatever grave sin Adam had committed, he would have lost original justice. Therefore.

446. Haec videtur esse sententia D. Thomae, qui in 2. dist. 33. in fin., exponens textum de peccato gulae, inquit: "Hoc est per accidens, quod tale nocumentum naturae humanae intulit, quia scilicet fuit primum peccatum, quod naturam humanam vitiavit, et ordinem animae ad Deum interrupit in illo, ex quo omnes homines per coitum generati naturam humanam traxerunt. Quodcumque autem aliud peccatum fuisset hoc modo primum, etiam similem effectum habuisset." 446. This seems to be the opinion of St. Thomas, who in II Sent., dist. 33, at the end, explaining the text concerning the sin of gluttony, says: "It is accidental that it brought such harm upon human nature, namely because it was the first sin which vitiated human nature and interrupted the order of the soul to God in him from whom all human beings generated through intercourse drew human nature. But whatever other sin had been first in this way would also have had a similar effect."

447. Negant tamen alii, quorum praecipua ratio est: in his, quae a divina voluntate pendent, standum est iis, quae Deus revelavit; atqui ex revelatione solum

constat propter comestionem ligni vetiti inducendam esse mortem et peccatum in omnes; propter hoc enim inducta haec mala dicuntur Gen. 3. 11. "Quia audisti vocem uxoris tuae, et comedisti de ligno, etc." Ergo. Ita Suarez l. c.

Sibi proposuit D. Thomas hanc rationem, quam tamen solvit. Nam in 2. d. 3., ait: "Quamvis quidem aliter dicant, dicentes: Si Adam alio modo peccasset, non incurrisse eum necessitatem moriendi, quia haec poena illi tantum culpae videtur esse ordinata a Deo, cum dixit: Quacumque die comederis, etc." Cui respondet S. D. "Sed in hoc ostenditur, etiamsi alia peccata commisisset, quod similem poenam sustinuisset a minori. Gravius est enim, praeceptum praeterire naturalis legis, quo prohibetur illud, quod est in se malum, quam praeterire praeceptum disciplinae, quo prohibetur, quod non est malum, nisi quia prohibitum." 447. Others deny it, however, and their principal reason is: in those things which depend on the divine will, one must stand by those things which God has revealed; but from revelation it is clear only that death and sin were to be induced into all because of the eating of the forbidden tree; for these evils are said to have been induced because of this in Genesis 3:11, "Because you listened to the voice of your wife and ate of the tree, etc." Therefore. Thus Suarez in the cited place.

St. Thomas proposed this reason to himself, but solved it. For in II Sent., dist. 3, he says: "Although indeed others speak differently, saying: If Adam had sinned in another way, he would not have incurred the necessity of dying, because this penalty seems to have been ordained by God only for that fault, when he said: On whatever day you eat, etc." To this the holy Doctor responds: "But in this it is shown, even if he had committed other sins, that he would have sustained a similar penalty, from the lesser. For it is more grave to transgress a precept of natural law, by which that which is evil in itself is prohibited, than to transgress a precept of discipline, by which that is prohibited which is not evil except because it is prohibited."

448. Quaeritur III. An, si Adam solo interno actu violasset illam legem, peccatum ejus posteris nocuisset?

Resp. D. Thomas cit. l. dist. 33. docens humanam naturam per quodcumque aliud peccatum protoparentis infectam iri, addit: "sive fuisset peccatum operis, sive voluntatis." - Et Suarez l. c. ait: "Licet nihil videatur certum. Deus enim potuit utroque modo id statuere, verisimilius videri etiam transgressionem interiorem futuram fuisse sufficientem, quia illa lex simpliciter erat imposita toti naturae, et illa interior esset perfecta transgressio ejus: esset ergo aversio, et inobedientia totius naturae, et de facto nunc non transfertur ad nos propter exteriorem actum, qui malitiam non addit, sed propter id, quod veram habet rationem aversionis, et culpae." Haec videtur esse communis sententia. 448. It is asked, III. whether, if Adam had violated that law by an internal act alone, his sin would have harmed his descendants?

Resp. St. Thomas, in the cited book, dist. 33, teaching that human nature would have been infected through any other sin whatever of the first parent, adds: "whether it had been a sin of deed, or of will." - And Suarez says in the cited place: "Although nothing seems certain, for God could have established this in either way, it seems more likely that even an interior transgression would have been sufficient, because that law was imposed simply on the whole nature, and that interior transgression would have been a perfect transgression of it. Therefore it would have been an aversion and disobedience of the whole nature; and in fact now it is not transferred to us because of the exterior act, which adds no malice, but because of that which has the true ratio of aversion and fault." This seems to be the common opinion.

449. Quaeritur IV. Utrum, si Eva sola peccasset, nascerentur homines in peccato originali?

Resp. Negans sententia vera est, respondet Suarez (l. c. n. 8.) ex illo Pauli "Per unum hominem peccatum in hunc mundum intravit." "Magis (enim)," observat D. Thomas I. 2. q. 81. a. 5., "fuisset dicendum, quod per duos intrasset, cum ambo peccaverint, vel potius per mulierem, quae primo peccasset, si foemina peccatum originale in prolem transmitteret." - Ratio est, quia solus Adam fuit constitutus caput generis humani, et ideo solum ejus peccatum reputabatur totius naturae. 449. It is asked, IV. whether,

if Eve alone had sinned, human beings would be born in original sin?

Resp. The negative opinion is true, Suarez answers (l. c., n. 8), from that saying of Paul, "Through one man sin entered into this world." "For rather," St. Thomas observes, I-II, q. 81, a. 5, "it should have been said that it entered through two, since both sinned, or rather through the woman, who sinned first, if a woman transmitted original sin to offspring." - The reason is that Adam alone was constituted head of the human race, and therefore his sin alone was reckoned as the sin of the whole nature.

450. Quaeritur V. Utrum, Adamo non peccante, si alter peccaret, hujus filii nascerentur peccato infecti?

Resp. Affirmat Scotus, et ita sensit D. Thomas, de malo q. 5. a. 4. ad 8. Sed opposita est vera sententia, quam docuit D. Thomas 1. 2. q. 81. a. 2. "Ratio est," inquit Suarez (l. c. n. 9.), "quia solus Adam fuit caput suae posteritatis, et cum illo fuit quasi foedus illud contractum, quod patet primo, quia de illo tantum est nobis revelatum, et non de aliis. Secundo, quia ita fuit conveniens, alias omnium filiorum Adae salus ex voluntate singulorum et omnium parentum penderet, mortem vero quilibet eorum per se posset causare. Tertio, quia Adamus et sibi, et toti posteritati justitiam perdidit; ergo si perseverasset, eam posteritati conquireret; alias non esset aequalis pactio. Quarto, quia nunc parens justus non transfert suam justitiam ad filium; ergo similiter, si duraret status innocentiae, patet quod injustus non transferret suam injustitiam ad filium. Quinto, quia alias nunc etiam dici posset peccata Cain, vel aliorum filiorum Adae transferri ad filios." Vid. etiam S. Anselmum (de conc. virg. et pecc. orig. cap. 24.) 450. It is asked, V. whether, if Adam had not sinned, but another had sinned, the children of this latter would be born infected with sin?

Resp. Scotus affirms this, and St. Thomas thought so in De malo, q. 5, a. 4, ad 8. But the opposite is the true opinion, which St. Thomas taught in I-II, q. 81, a. 2. "The reason is," says Suarez (l. c., n. 9), "because Adam alone was the head of his posterity, and with him alone was that covenant, as it were, contracted. This is clear, first, because it has been revealed to us only concerning him, and not concerning others. Secondly, because it was fitting in this way; otherwise the salvation of all the children of Adam would depend on the will of each and every parent, while any one of them by himself could cause death. Thirdly, because Adam lost justice both for himself and for his whole posterity; therefore if he had persevered, he would have acquired it for his posterity; otherwise the compact would not be equal. Fourthly, because now a just parent does not transfer his justice to his child; therefore similarly, if the state of innocence endured, it is clear that an unjust parent would not transfer his injustice to his child. Fifthly, because otherwise even now it could be said that the sins of Cain, or of other children of Adam, are transferred to their children." See also St. Anselm (On the Virgin Conception and Original Sin, c. 24).

451. Quaeritur VI. Utrum omnia peccata Adae, vel solum comestio cibi vetiti, traducatur in posteros?

Resp. Unum tantum originale peccatum est in unoquoque homine, quod patet ex Rom. 5. 16. "Judicium quidem ex uno in condemnationem: gratia autem ex multis delictis in justificationem." 451. It is asked, VI. whether all the sins of Adam, or only the eating of the forbidden food, is transmitted into his descendants?

Resp. There is only one original sin in each human being, which is clear from Romans 5:16: "Judgment indeed was from one unto condemnation; but grace from many offenses unto justification."

452. Quaeritur VII. An Adamo non peccante, et consequenter manente statu justitiae originalis, infantes nati fuissent confirmati in gratia?

Resp. Quamvis S. Anselmus (Cur Deus homo? l. 1. c. 18.) affirmativam sententiam tenuerit; contraria tamen negans communior est et probabilior, eamque tradit D. Thomas 1. p. q. 100. a. 2. Donum enim infallibiliter in accepta justitia perseverandi specialissimum est, statui justitiae originalis indebitum, a sola libera Dei voluntate pendens: ergo non debet asseri absque positivo aliquo fundamento ex revelatione. Atqui nullum est

hujusmodi fundamentum. Ergo. - Imo videtur esse sat firmum fundamentum contrarium. Nam pueri, cum nascerentur, non habuissent plus perfectionis, quam acceperit in creatione Adam; perfectio enim tum ei collata, collata erat naturae, et per ipsum in posteros propaganda. Atqui Adam in creatione non accepit confirmationem in gratia, uti ostendit ejus culpa. Ergo.

Utrum ii, qui peccassent, potuissent in amicitiam Dei redire, et jus ad vitam aeternam recuperare - si potuissent, quonam medio - an pro illis fuisset aliqua redemptio, etc. omnino definiri non potest. Sed de his vide Suarez (de op. sex dier. l. 5. capp. 9. 10.) 452. It is asked, VII. whether, if Adam had not sinned, and consequently the state of original justice remained, infants born would have been confirmed in grace?

Resp. Although St. Anselm (Cur Deus Homo?, book 1, c. 18) held the affirmative opinion, nevertheless the contrary negative opinion is more common and more probable, and St. Thomas hands it down in I, q. 100, a. 2. For the gift of persevering infallibly in received justice is most special, not owed to the state of original justice, depending on the free will of God alone. Therefore it ought not to be asserted without some positive foundation from revelation. But there is no foundation of this sort. Therefore. - Indeed, there seems to be a fairly firm foundation for the contrary. For children, when they were born, would not have had more perfection than Adam received in creation; for the perfection then conferred on him had been conferred on nature, and was to be propagated through him into his descendants. But Adam in creation did not receive confirmation in grace, as his fault shows. Therefore.

Whether those who had sinned would have been able to return into the friendship of God and recover the right to eternal life - if they could have, by what means - whether there would have been some redemption for them, etc., cannot be defined at all. But concerning these things see Suarez (On the Work of the Six Days, book 5, cc. 9-10).

Article 3. Whether the Blessed Virgin Mary was Immune from Original Stain

LatineEnglish

Utrum Beata Virgo Maria fuerit ab originali labe immunis.

453. Libenter in hoc Dei Genetricis privilegio fusius et penitius pertractando immoraremur, nisi impositum absolvendi tractatum, quem prae manibus habemus, munus, ad alia properare nos cogeret. Exponemus itaque naturam hujus privilegii - ejus existentiam vindicabimus - attingemus denique breviter quaestionem de debito in B. V. Maria originalem maculam contrahendi. 453. We would gladly linger in treating more fully and more deeply this privilege of the Mother of God, if the duty imposed on us of completing the treatise which we have before our hands did not compel us to hasten to other matters. Therefore we shall explain the nature of this privilege; we shall vindicate its existence; finally, we shall briefly touch upon the question concerning the debt in the Blessed Virgin Mary of contracting original stain.

Sectio I.
Vera notio Immaculatae Conceptionis Beatae Mariae Virginis. SECTION I.
The True Notion of the Immaculate Conception of the Blessed Virgin Mary.

454. S. P. Pius IX. in Constit. Ineffabilis Deus, VI Idus Decemb. anno 1854, ait: "Definimus, doctrinam, quae tenet beatissimam Virginem Mariam in primo instanti suae Conceptionis fuisse singulari omnipotentis Dei gratia et privilegio, intuitu meritorum Christi Jesu Salvatoris humani generis, ab omni originalis culpae labe praeservatam immunem, esse a Deo revelatam, atque idcirco ab omnibus fidelibus firmiter constanterque credendam." 454. Supreme Pontiff Pius IX, in the

Constitution Ineffabilis Deus, on December 8, 1854, says: "We define that the doctrine which holds that the most blessed Virgin Mary, in the first instant of her Conception, by a singular grace and privilege of almighty God, in view of the merits of Christ Jesus, Savior of the human race, was preserved immune from every stain of original fault, has been revealed by God, and therefore is to be firmly and constantly believed by all the faithful."

455. Agitur 1. de privilegio B. V. Mariae collato in primo instanti suae Conceptionis. Duplicem distinguebant veteres conceptionem, activam et passivam. Prima est ipsa actio, qua per seminis commixtionem parentes prolem efformant. Unde Bened. XIV. (de Festis, l. 2. c. 15. n. 1.) loquens de conceptione activa B. V., dicit eam esse, in qua sancti ejus parentes "opere maritali invicem convenientes praestiterunt ea, quae maxime spectabant ad ipsius corporis formationem, organizationem, et dispositionem ad recipiendam animam rationalem a Deo infundendam." Altera vero est effectus generationis activae, seu ipsa prolis efformatio. 455. The matter concerns, 1. the privilege conferred on the Blessed Virgin Mary in the first instant of her Conception. The ancients distinguished a twofold conception, active and passive. The first is the very action by which parents form offspring through the mingling of seed. Hence Benedict XIV (On Feasts, book 2, c. 15, n. 1), speaking of the active conception of the Blessed Virgin, says that it is that in which her holy parents, "coming together with one another in the marital act, furnished those things which chiefly looked to the formation, organization, and disposition of her body for receiving the rational soul to be infused by God." But the other is the effect of active generation, or the very formation of the offspring.

456. Conceptio passiva bifariam dispescitur; alia est enim inchoata, alia perfecta et adaequata. Prima est efformatio corporis ejusque organizationis usque ad infusionem animae: altera habetur cum corpori jam debite disposito infunditur anima, quae a Deo creatur. Scilicet docebant communiter veteres Doctores animam humanam non ab initio formationis foetus eidem uniri, sed quando est ita dispositum, ut exigat ab illa forma informari. (Vid. Rit. Rom. de Baptismo.) Conceptio passiva adaequata vocari etiam solet animatio. "Ipsa animae infusio," inquit Bened. XIV. (l. c.), "et unio cum corpore debite organizato vulgo nominatur conceptio passiva, quae scilicet fit illo ipso instanti, quo rationalis anima corpori omnibus membris ac suis organis constanti unitur." 456. Passive conception is divided in two ways; for one is begun, the other perfect and adequate. The first is the formation of the body and of its organization up to the infusion of the soul; the other is had when the soul, which is created by God, is infused into the body already duly disposed. That is, the older Doctors commonly taught that the human soul is not united to the fetus from the beginning of its formation, but when it is so disposed as to require being informed by that form. (See the Roman Ritual on Baptism.) Adequate passive conception is also usually called animation. "The very infusion of the soul," says Benedict XIV (l. c.), "and its union with a duly organized body is commonly named passive conception, which namely takes place at that very instant at which the rational soul is united to a body consisting of all its members and organs."

457. In animatione potest duplex instans, non tempore sed natura distinctum, considerari: unum, in quo anima primo a Deo creatur et corpori infunditur; aliud, in quo gratia sanctificante caeterisque donis ornatur. Quamvis enim, uti diximus, Adam statim ac conditus fuit, gratiam acceperit (quod et in posteris ejus factum esset, si in accepta justitia perseverasset); natura tamen prius est esse, quam gratia ornari. 457. In animation a twofold instant can be considered, distinct not in time but in nature: one in which the soul is first created by God and infused into the body; another in which it is adorned with sanctifying grace and the other gifts. For although, as we said, Adam, as soon as he was created, received grace (which would also have happened in his descendants if he had persevered in the

justice received), nevertheless by nature it is prior to be than to be adorned with grace.

458. Quibus positis, colligimus 1. quod hic non agitur de conceptione activa - nec de passiva inchoata - sed de passiva adaequata. In hac dicitur B. V. Maria sanctificata et immunis a labe originali - et quidem in primo instanti hujus conceptionis, quatenus nec ante unionem animae cum corpore (animationem) nec ante nativitatem et aliquando post conceptionem gratiam accepit; sed quatenus nullum fuit temporis instans, in quo anima B. V. M. fuerit corpori unita, seu in quo B. V. M. extiterit, quin immaculata extiterit. Ita ex Dec. Alex. VII. 1662.

Colligimus 2. quomodo pleraque Patrum et veterum Scholasticorum dicta, quae dogmati de Immaculata Conceptione videntur contradicere, possint, ex eorum doctrina, catholico sensu explicari. Nam a) negant conceptionem B. V. M. fuisse immaculatam, sed loquuntur de conceptione activa, quae cum facta non sit absque concupiscentiae motu, quamvis omnino sancta, potest vocari peccatum eodem sensu ac ipsa concupiscentia.

b) Vel loquuntur de conceptione passiva inchoata, in qua cum nondum sit anima, nondum potest esse sanctitas. "Quoniam," ait S. Anselmus (de conc. virg. et pecc. orig. c. 3.), "injustitia non potest esse nisi ubi justitia debet esse; originale peccatum quod est injustitia, non est nisi in natura rationali. Rationalis autem natura non est nisi Deus, et Angelus, et anima hominis, per quam homo dicitur rationalis, et sine qua non est homo."

c) Vel carnem B. V. Mariae vocant carnem peccati, quatenus communi generationis via sumpta erat a carne Adami, quae erat caro peccati - quatenus fuisset peccato et concupiscentiae subjecta, nisi in instanti animationis praeventa fuisset speciali privilegio, etc. 458. With these things posited, we gather, 1. that here the question is not of active conception, nor of begun passive conception, but of adequate passive conception. In this conception the Blessed Virgin Mary is said to have been sanctified and immune from original stain, and indeed in the first instant of this conception, insofar as she received grace neither before the union of the soul with the body (animation), nor before nativity and at some time after conception, but insofar as there was no instant of time in which the soul of the Blessed Virgin Mary was united to the body, or in which the Blessed Virgin Mary existed, without existing immaculate. Thus from the decree of Alexander VII, 1662.

We gather, 2. how very many sayings of the Fathers and of the older Scholastics, which seem to contradict the dogma concerning the Immaculate Conception, can, from their doctrine, be explained in a Catholic sense. For a) they deny that the conception of the Blessed Virgin Mary was immaculate, but they are speaking of active conception, which, since it was not done without a movement of concupiscence, although altogether holy, can be called sin in the same sense as concupiscence itself.

b) Or they are speaking of begun passive conception, in which, since there is not yet a soul, there cannot yet be sanctity. "Since," says St. Anselm (On the Virgin Conception and Original Sin, c. 3), "injustice cannot be except where justice ought to be; original sin, which is injustice, is not except in rational nature. But rational nature is none other than God, and an Angel, and the soul of man, through which man is called rational, and without which he is not man."

c) Or they call the flesh of the Blessed Virgin Mary flesh of sin, insofar as by the common way of generation it was taken from the flesh of Adam, which was flesh of sin; insofar as it would have been subject to sin and concupiscence unless, in the instant of animation, it had been anticipated by a special privilege, etc.

459. II. Dicitur in cit. Const. Ineffabilis B. V. M. fuisse ab omni originalis culpae labe praeservatam immunem. Jamvero originalis culpa, uti inferius dicemus, formaliter consistit in privatione gratiae sanctificantis: cum ergo B. V. Maria dicitur immunis a culpa originis, dicitur a primo suae conceptionis instanti ornata gratia sanctificante. 459. II. It is said in the cited Constitution Ineffabilis that the Blessed Virgin Mary was preserved immune from every stain of original fault. Now original fault, as we shall say below, formally consists in the privation of sanctifying grace; therefore, when the Blessed Virgin Mary is said to be immune from fault of origin, she is said to have been adorned with sanctifying grace from the first instant of her conception.

460. Ex quo colligimus quomodo cum veritate hujus dogmatis componi possint alia veterum quorumdam doctorum dicta, quae in speciem contraria videntur. Illi enim non semper clare et distincte eamdem originalis culpae, quam innuimus ideam, tradiderunt; ac proinde illis non idem erat concipi sanctum, et concipi sine labe originali. Revera "tenent a) peccatum originale magis pertinere ad naturam, quam ad personam, magis ad carnem, quam ad animam; et primo inficere carnem, postea animam per ipsam unionem cum infecta carne seminaliter concepta. b) Docent peccato originali corpus infici ex eo quod in semine certae ad justitiam originalem in prolem transfundendam requisitae dispositiones desint, quae statui innocenti inerant; animam vero ex eo, quia fit infecti corporis forma. c) Loquuntur de peccato originali, quatenus per se et principaliter inficit naturam, quod per ordinariam generationem una cum natura transfundatur; sitque ab ordinaria generatione, non per Christi gratiam, sed per solam vulneris naturae in parentibus curationem separabile; per accidens vero et consequenter de eodem loquuntur ut derivato in animam et personam, per solam gratiae infusionem curabili. d) Negant peccato originali de quo disserunt, opponi directe gratiam. e) Loquuntur de peccato originali, a quo immunitas potuerit haberi, non per gratiam, sed aliis omnino modis quos ipsi recensent. f) Verba faciunt de peccato originali, cujus contagium per gratiam quae nunc datur, totaliter auferri non potest, nisi per extraordinariam gratiam defectus contagionis naturae tollatur a parentibus. g) Agunt demum de peccato originali, a quo nec ipsum Verbum incarnatum, si ordinario modo conceptum fuisset, potuisset esse liberum. Contra vero qui sententiam piam propugnant nihil horum admittunt, nec tali sensu eam adstruunt." Vid. Perrone (de Immaculato B. V. Mariae conceptu - Romae 1847. pag. 15. et 169.) 460. From this we gather how other sayings of certain older doctors, which appear contrary on the surface, can be composed with the truth of this dogma. For they did not always hand down clearly and distinctly the same idea of original fault which we have indicated; and therefore for them to be conceived holy and to be conceived without original stain were not the same. In reality "they hold a) that original sin pertains more to nature than to person, more to flesh than to soul; and that first it infects the flesh, afterward the soul through the very union with infected flesh seminally conceived. b) They teach that the body is infected by original sin from the fact that in the seed certain dispositions required for transfusing original injustice into the offspring are lacking, which dispositions were present in the innocent state; but that the soul is infected from this, that it becomes the form of an infected body. c) They speak of original sin insofar as of itself and principally it infects nature, which is transfused together with nature through ordinary generation; and is separable from ordinary generation not through the grace of Christ, but through the healing alone of the wound of nature in the parents; but accidentally and consequently they speak of the same as derived into the soul and person, curable by the infusion of grace alone. d) They deny that grace is directly opposed to the original sin about which they are disputing. e) They speak of original sin from which immunity could have been had not through grace, but in entirely other ways which they themselves enumerate. f) They speak of original sin whose contagion cannot be totally removed through the grace which is now given, unless by extraordinary grace the defect of the contagion of nature is removed from the parents. g) Finally, they treat of original sin from which not even the incarnate Word himself, if he had been conceived in the ordinary way, could have been free. But on the contrary, those who defend the pious opinion admit none of these things, nor do they establish it in such a sense." See Perrone (On the Immaculate Conception of the Blessed Virgin Mary, Rome, 1847, pp. 15 and 169).

461. III. Dicitur in praefata Const. B. V. M. fuisse praeservatam immunem a labe originis intuitu meritorum Christi. Quod, ut intelligatur, duplex distinguenda est redemptio in Christo et per Christum: una reparativa, qua quis liberatur a malo, in quod inciderat; alia, qua quis praeservatur a malo, in quod incideret, nisi per Christi merita praeventus fuisset. 461. III. It is said in the aforesaid Constitution that the Blessed Virgin Mary was preserved immune from the stain of origin in view

of the merits of Christ. In order that this may be understood, a twofold redemption in Christ and through Christ must be distinguished: one reparative, by which someone is freed from an evil into which he had fallen; the other, by which someone is preserved from an evil into which he would have fallen unless he had been anticipated through the merits of Christ.

462. Idea redemptionis praeservativae traditur a Scriptura et a Patribus. Nam Ps. 85. dicit Propheta: "Eruisti animam meam de inferno inferiori." - et Ps. 143.: "Redemisti servum tuum de gladio maligno." Nec tamen in infernum inferiorem Propheta ceciderat, aut a gladio maligno caesus fuerat; sed quia periculum erat ne id fieret, et gratia Dei periculum illud evaserat, ideo gratias agit, dicens: "Eruisti, etc."

In quem locum S. Augustinus ait: "Quemadmodum si medicus videat tibi imminentem aegritudinem forte ex aliquo labore, et dicat, parce tibi, sic te tracta, requiesce, his cibis utere, nam si non feceris, aegrotabis: tu autem si feceris, et salvus eris, recte dicis medico, liberasti me ab aegritudine, non in qua jam eras, sed in qua futurus eras. Nescio quis habens causam molestam, mittendus erat in carcerem, venit alius, defendit eum, gratias agens, quid dicit? eruisti animam meam de carcere. Suspendendus erat debitor, solutum est pro eo, liberatus dicitur de suspendio. In his omnibus non erant, sed quia talibus meritis agebantur, ut nisi subventum esset, ibi essent, inde se recte dicunt liberari, quo per liberatores suos non sunt permissi perduci." 462. The idea of preservative redemption is handed down by Scripture and by the Fathers. For in Psalm 85 the Prophet says: "You have rescued my soul from the lower hell." - And in Psalm 143: "You have redeemed your servant from the evil sword." Yet the Prophet had not fallen into the lower hell, nor had he been struck by the evil sword; but because there was danger that this would happen, and by the grace of God he had escaped that danger, therefore he gives thanks, saying: "You have rescued, etc."

On this passage St. Augustine says: "Just as if a physician should see a sickness threatening you perhaps from some labor, and should say, spare yourself, treat yourself so, rest, use these foods, for if you do not do it, you will become sick; but if you do it, and you will be healthy, you rightly say to the physician, you freed me from sickness, not one in which you already were, but one in which you were going to be. Someone having a troublesome case was going to be sent into prison; another came and defended him. Giving thanks, what does he say? You rescued my soul from prison. A debtor was going to be hanged; payment was made for him, and he is said to have been freed from hanging. In all these cases they were not in those things; but because, by such merits, they were being brought to the point that unless aid had been given, they would be there, they rightly say that they are freed from that to which they were not permitted to be brought by their liberators."

463. Jamvero, cum B. V. M. fuerit immunis a culpa originis, non indiguit redemptione reparativa; sed, cum habuerit debitum saltem remotum, ut dicemus, illam contrahendi, indiguit redemptione praeservativa; ac propterea merito dicitur immunis a culpa originis intuitu meritorum Christi. 463. Now, since the Blessed Virgin Mary was immune from fault of origin, she did not need reparative redemption; but, since she had at least a remote debt, as we shall say, of contracting it, she needed preservative redemption; and for this reason she is deservedly said to be immune from fault of origin in view of the merits of Christ.

464. Ex quo colligimus iterum a) quomodo nihil faciant contra hoc dogma dicta illa Patrum "excepta carne Christi omnem reliquam humanam carnem esse carnem peccati." - "Solum Christum fuisse absque peccato" - vel "vi suae conceptionis a peccato immunem, etc." Haec et similia significant solum Christum virtute sua fuisse semper sanctum, et caruisse ipso debito contrahendi peccatum: quod non impedit quominus B. V. Maria etsi habuerit debitum contrahendi peccatum, illud tamen per Christi merita numquam contraxerit.

b) Quomodo stet veritas ab Apostolo praedicata "in quo omnes peccaverunt" - "in omnes homines, etc." - "omnes mortui sunt, etc." Si haec et

similia testimonia intelliguntur, vel de debito vel de actu habent omnimodam universalitatem quoad omnes, qui ab Adamo descendunt via ordinariae generationis. Sin vero de actu intelligantur habent universalitatem sub conditione nisi de aliqua exceptione constet. Unde Conc. Trid. sess. 5. postquam docuerit Adamum suum peccatum "in omne genus humanum transfudisse" - "peccatum Adae propagatione transfusum omnibus," etc.; haud censuit huic universalitati obstare exceptionem in B. V. Maria, declarans "non esse suae intentionis comprehendere in hoc decreto, ubi de peccato agitur B. et immaculatam V. Mariam." 464. From this we gather again, a) how those sayings of the Fathers do nothing against this dogma: "excepting the flesh of Christ, all the remaining human flesh is flesh of sin"; "Christ alone was without sin"; or "immune from sin by the force of his conception," etc. These and similar sayings signify that Christ alone by his own power was always holy and lacked the very debt of contracting sin. This does not prevent the Blessed Virgin Mary, although she had the debt of contracting sin, from nevertheless never having contracted it through the merits of Christ.

b) We gather how the truth preached by the Apostle stands: "in whom all sinned"; "unto all men," etc.; "all died," etc. If these and similar testimonies are understood either of debt or of act, they have complete universality with respect to all who descend from Adam by the way of ordinary generation. But if they are understood of act, they have universality under the condition unless some exception is established. Hence the Council of Trent, session 5, after teaching that Adam transfused his sin "into the whole human race," and that "the sin of Adam transfused by propagation is in all," etc., did not judge the exception in the Blessed Virgin Mary to stand in the way of this universality, declaring that "it was not its intention to include in this decree, where sin is being treated, the blessed and immaculate Virgin Mary."

This chunk distinguishes active conception, begun passive conception, adequate passive conception, and animation. The translation keeps those technical distinctions literal, since the argument about the first instant of Mary's conception depends on them.

465. His itaque praestitutis, quae in hoc articulo proposita est

PROP. XXXVIII. Beatissima Virgo Maria ex primo suae Conceptionis instanti, intuitu meritorum Christi, ab omni originalis culpae labe praeservata fuit immunis.

Prob. I. Gen. 3. 15. post protoparentum lapsum, serpentem seu diabolum sub ejus forma factum visibilem ita alloquitur Deus: "Inimicitias ponam inter te et mulierem, et semen tuum et semen illius: ipsa conteret caput tuum, et tu insidiaberis calcaneo ejus."

Antequam ex hoc testimonio ad rem nostram arguamus, nonnulla ad ejus intelligentiam praemittenda sunt. 1. Ac imprimis, dubitat nemo cit. testimonium continere primam promissionem futuri hominum Salvatoris Jesu Christi: unde merito a majoribus proteuangelion dictum est. Duplici autem, ut legenti patet, constat pericope: prima "inimicitias ponam inter te et mulierem, semen tuum et semen illius" - altera "ipsa conteret, etc."

2. Scopus prophetiae, quae in citatis verbis continetur, est opponere opus reparationis operi destructionis. Scilicet serpens amicitiam cum muliere, Eva, jungens semen ejus in ruinam traxit; inimicitia praedicitur alterius mulieris, Mariae, et seminis ejus contra serpentem: haec inimicitia incipiet reparationis opus.

3. Relatio consideranda est B. V. Mariae tum ad Filium suum, tum ad humani generis hostem. In toto enim reparationis opere ostenditur mulier semper divisa a serpente ejusque semine; semper e contra cum Christo conjuncta, eademque ardens inimicitia contra serpentem ejusque progeniem.

Haec non modo evidentia sunt ex ipsis verbis citati textus, sed insuper confirmantur ex sensu traditionali. S. Jo. Chrys. (Hom. 18. in Gen. n. 7.), inducit Deum ita serpentem alloquentem: "Neque hoc contentus ero, quod super terram reptes, sed et inimicam foederisque nesciam faciam tibi mulierem, neque eam solam, sed et semen ejus semini tuo hostem perpetuum faciam." - Proclus, discipulus ac successor S. Jo. Chrysostomi, daemones in B. Virginem conjurantes describit (Orat. 7. in Dei Gen. 17.): "Quid igitur? Desistemusne ab insidiis, quia ipsa digna facta est custodia magna? Recedendumne a naturali inimicitia, quia superno ipso tegitur auxilio?" Qui deinceps paulo post comparata B. Virgine cum Eva, ita rursum daemones inter se colloquentes inducit: "Enimvero iterumne cum secunda Eva nobis instat certamen? Instruendane acies adversus impollutam

mulierem?" - Vetus Auctor homiliae in Annunciationem Deiparae (inter opera S. Jo. Chrys.): "Ave nunc igitur, et exulta. Ave et conculca serpentis caput. Ave O gratia plena, cessavit enim maledictio, expulsa est corruptio; tristia emarcuerunt, laeta florent, adest bonum a prophetis olim praedictum." - Vetus Auctor epistolae De viro perfecto Hieronymo adscriptae (in append. opp. S. Hieron.): "Mater itaque Domini Nostri Jesu Christi in illa jam tunc muliere promissa est. Haec inimicitiis opposita est serpentis: Ponam, inquit, inimicitias inter te et mulierem: non certe pono dicit, ne ad Evam hoc pertinere videretur. Verbum promissionis est, quod transmittitur in futuro. Ponam, inquit, inimicitias inter te et mulierem. Illam utique mulierem, quae Salvatorem parturiat, non quae generet fratricidam. Ponam, inquit, inimicitias inter te et mulierem, id est, suscitabo mulierem, quae repudiata facilitate credendi, non solum te non audiat, etc."

Quoad 2um autem incisum, notandum est 1. magnam esse controversiam de subjecto orationis; non enim satis constat utrum legendum sit Ipsa (mulier) vel Ipse (Christus), aut Ipsum (semen). P. Patrizi (de Immaculata Mariae origine a Deo praedicta disquisitio, part. 1. § 1.) accurate recenset textus omnes, editiones, versiones mss., quae habent aut ipsum et ipse, aut ipsa.

2. Quidquid sit de hac controversia, certum est, quod lectio latina "Ipsa conteret caput tuum" haberi debet tamquam lectio Ecclesiastica; per plura enim saecula tum privatim, tum publice admissa fuit in Ecclesia: propterea sensus, quem prae se fert, verus est, et retinendus.

3. Imo eadem lectio "Ipsa" haberi etiam debet uti lectio aequivalenter biblica. Etenim secundum incisum refert exitum illarum inimicitiarum, quas Deus statuit inter mulierem ejusque semen, et serpentem ejusque semen: exitus autem est victoria relata in serpentem. Ergo quemadmodum mulier semper est cum suo semine conjuncta in inimicitia contra serpentem, a quo est consequenter divisa; ita etiam in ipsa victoria. - Revera parallelismus inter ordinem ruinae et salutis perfectus - Patrum testimonia - usus liturgicus postulant ut mulier cum suo semine conjuncta in inimicitia contra serpentem, a suo semine non separetur in victoria.

Quare perinde est ad rem nostram, sive legatur Ipsa sive legatur Ipse vel Ipsum: si enim legitur Ipsa cum vulgata latina, sensus est quod mulier virtute seminis sui, nempe Christi, plenum referet triumphum de humani generis hoste; si autem legitur Ipsum aut Ipse, uti textus hebraicus ac samaritanus nec non versio alexandrina prae se ferunt, sensus est, quod Christus cum muliere plene de daemone triumphabit.

Unde merito Cornelius a Lapide in h. l. scribit: "cum Deus hic opponat, quasi antagonistas, mulierem cum suo semine, serpenti cum suo semine, consequenter vult dicere, mulierem cum suo semine contrituram caput serpentis: sicut e contrario serpens tam mulieris quam seminis ejus calcaneo insidiatur."

Quibus positis, multiplex ex citatis verbis desumi potest argumentum. Nam a) Praenunciatur identitas inimicitiarum inter semen mulieris et daemonem, et inimicitiarum inter daemonem et mulierem ipsam. Atqui inimicitiae inter semen mulieris, Christum, et daemonem absolutae sunt et perpetuae, quaeque nullam praecedentem amicitiam admittunt. Ergo. Sed tales non fuissent hae inimicitiae, si vel uno instanti B. V. Maria fuisset in peccato; per peccatum enim anima fit inimica Dei et amica daemonis, uti patet. Ergo.

b) Deus praenuntians inimicitias inter mulierem et serpentem non determinat tempus neque modum, sed dicit simpliciter inimicitias, inimicitias antonomastice. Quo loquendi modo significat hujusmodi inimicitias semper vigere, pugnam esse sine intermissione, ita ut sensus revera sit: mulier haec est et semper erit inimica tua, et ipsa conteret caput tuum. Atqui haec minime vera essent, si mulier vel uno instanti infecta fuisset peccato. Ergo.

c) Fit certe in citato testimonio congredientium distributio, qua ex una parte ponitur mulier cum suo semine, ex alia serpens cum suo semine. Atqui haec distributio non esset accurata, nec undequaque vera, si B. V. Maria vel uno instanti fuisset in peccato; eo enim instanti non fuisset cum Christo, sed cum serpente. Ergo.

d) Hinc patet, quod ea, quae de muliere praenunciantur non possunt intelligi solum de quadam mirabili sanctitate illius. Nam textus loquitur de duplici ordine, restitutionis et destructionis: mulier autem cum suo semine erit in ordine restitutionis; serpens e contra cum suo semine erit in ordine destructionis; ubicumque est semen mulieris, ibi erit mulier contra serpentem; ubicumque erit serpens contra semen mulieris, ibi erit et contra mulierem. Ergo quemadmodum Christus, semen mulieris, semper est extra ordinem ruinae, ita et mulier. Atqui si ageretur solum de mirabili quadam B. V. Mariae sanctitate absque exemptione a culpa originali, ipsa aliquando fuisset in ordine destructionis et ruinae. Ergo.

e) Triumphus de serpente ejusque semine communis et

identicus est Christo et Mariae; sed Christi triumphus fuit perfectus, semper enim contrivit caput serpentis ejus calcaneo insidiantis; ergo et Mariae triumphus perfectus fuit, ac proinde numquam daemonis imperio subjacuit. Solum discrimen inter Matrem et Filium est in eo, quod Christus virtute sua, Maria virtute Filii triumphum de serpente retulit. 465. Therefore, with these things set forth, the question which was proposed in this article is

PROPOSITION XXXVIII. The most Blessed Virgin Mary, from the first instant of her Conception, in view of the merits of Christ, was preserved immune from every stain of original fault.

Proof I. Genesis 3:15, after the fall of the first parents, has God address the serpent, or the devil made visible under its form, in this way: "I will put enmities between you and the woman, and your seed and her seed: she shall crush your head, and you shall lie in wait for her heel."

Before we argue from this testimony to our matter, some points must be placed first for understanding it. 1. And first of all, no one doubts that the cited testimony contains the first promise of the future Savior of human beings, Jesus Christ; hence it is deservedly called by our elders the proteuangelion, the first gospel. But, as is clear to the reader, it consists of a twofold passage: the first, "I will put enmities between you and the woman, your seed and her seed"; the other, "she shall crush," etc.

2. The purpose of the prophecy contained in the cited words is to oppose the work of reparation to the work of destruction. That is, the serpent, joining friendship with the woman, Eve, drew her seed into ruin; the enmity of another woman, Mary, and of her seed against the serpent is foretold. This enmity will begin the work of reparation.

3. The relation of the Blessed Virgin Mary must be considered both to her Son and to the enemy of the human race. For in the whole work of reparation the woman is shown as always divided from the serpent and its seed; always, on the contrary, joined with Christ, and burning with the same enmity against the serpent and its progeny.

These things are not only evident from the very words of the cited text, but are further confirmed from the traditional sense. St. John Chrysostom (Homily 18 on Genesis, n. 7) introduces God addressing the serpent thus: "Nor will I be content with this, that you crawl upon the earth, but I will also make the woman an enemy to you and ignorant of your covenant; and not her alone, but also her seed I will make a perpetual enemy to your seed." - Proclus, disciple and successor of St. John Chrysostom, describes the demons conspiring against the Blessed Virgin (Oration 7 on the Mother of God, 17): "What then? Shall we desist from plots because she has been made worthy of a great guard? Must we withdraw from natural enmity because she is covered by heavenly help itself?" Then a little afterward, having compared the Blessed Virgin with Eve, he again introduces the demons conversing among themselves in this way: "Indeed, then, does battle again press upon us with the second Eve? Must a battle line be drawn up against the unstained woman?" - An old author of a homily on the Annunciation of the Mother of God (among the works of St. John Chrysostom): "Hail now therefore, and exult. Hail, and trample the head of the serpent. Hail, O full of grace, for the curse has ceased, corruption has been expelled; sad things have withered, joyful things bloom, the good long ago foretold by the prophets is present." - An old author of the epistle On the Perfect Man ascribed to Jerome (in the appendix to the works of St. Jerome): "Therefore the Mother of Our Lord Jesus Christ was promised already then in that woman. She is opposed to the enmities of the serpent: I will put, he says, enmities between you and the woman. He certainly does not say, I put, lest this should seem to pertain to Eve. It is a word of promise, which is transmitted into the future. I will put, he says, enmities between you and the woman. Surely that woman who would bring forth the Savior, not the one who would beget the fratricide. I will put, he says, enmities between you and the woman, that is, I shall raise up a woman who, having rejected facility in believing, not only does not listen to you, etc."

But with regard to the second clause, it must be noted, 1. that there is a great controversy concerning the subject of the sentence; for it is not sufficiently clear whether one should read Ipsa (the woman), or Ipse (Christ), or Ipsum (the seed). Fr. Patrizi (Inquiry Concerning the Immaculate Origin of Mary Foretold by God, part 1, § 1) accurately reviews all the texts, editions, and manuscript versions which have either ipsum and ipse, or ipsa.

2. Whatever may be the case concerning this controversy, it

is certain that the Latin reading "She shall crush your head" must be held as an ecclesiastical reading; for through many centuries it was admitted in the Church both privately and publicly. Therefore the sense which it presents is true and must be retained.

3. Indeed, the same reading Ipsa, "she," must also be held as an equivalently biblical reading. For the second clause reports the outcome of those enmities which God established between the woman and her seed, and the serpent and its seed; but the outcome is victory won over the serpent. Therefore, just as the woman is always joined with her seed in enmity against the serpent, from whom she is consequently divided, so also she is joined in the victory itself. - In reality, the perfect parallelism between the order of ruin and the order of salvation, the testimonies of the Fathers, and liturgical use demand that the woman joined with her seed in enmity against the serpent not be separated from her seed in victory.

Wherefore it is the same for our matter whether Ipsa, Ipse, or Ipsum is read. For if Ipsa is read with the Latin Vulgate, the sense is that the woman, by the power of her seed, namely Christ, will bear away full triumph over the enemy of the human race. But if Ipsum or Ipse is read, as the Hebrew and Samaritan text as well as the Alexandrian version present, the sense is that Christ together with the woman will triumph fully over the devil.

Hence Cornelius a Lapide deservedly writes on this place: "Since God here opposes, as antagonists, the woman with her seed to the serpent with its seed, he consequently means to say that the woman with her seed will crush the head of the serpent; just as, conversely, the serpent lies in wait for the heel both of the woman and of her seed."

With these things posited, a manifold argument can be drawn from the cited words. For a) the identity is foretold of the enmities between the seed of the woman and the devil, and of the enmities between the devil and the woman herself. But the enmities between the seed of the woman, Christ, and the devil are absolute and perpetual, and admit no preceding friendship. Therefore. But these enmities would not have been such if even for one instant the Blessed Virgin Mary had been in sin; for through sin the soul becomes an enemy of God and a friend of the devil, as is clear. Therefore.

b) God, foretelling enmities between the woman and the serpent, determines neither time nor mode, but says simply enmities, enmities antonomastically. By this mode of speaking he signifies that enmities of this sort always flourish, that the struggle is without interruption, so that the sense truly is: this woman is and always will be your enemy, and she shall crush your head. But these things would by no means be true if the woman had been infected by sin even for one instant. Therefore.

c) Certainly in the cited testimony there is made a distribution of the combatants, by which on one side the woman is placed with her seed, and on the other the serpent with its seed. But this distribution would not be accurate, nor true from every angle, if the Blessed Virgin Mary had been in sin even for one instant; for in that instant she would not have been with Christ, but with the serpent. Therefore.

d) Hence it is clear that the things foretold concerning the woman cannot be understood only of a certain marvelous sanctity of hers. For the text speaks of a twofold order, of restoration and of destruction: the woman with her seed will be in the order of restoration; the serpent, on the contrary, with its seed will be in the order of destruction; wherever the seed of the woman is, there the woman will be against the serpent; wherever the serpent will be against the seed of the woman, there it will also be against the woman. Therefore, just as Christ, the seed of the woman, is always outside the order of ruin, so also is the woman. But if the matter concerned only a certain marvelous sanctity of the Blessed Virgin Mary without exemption from original fault, she at some time would have been in the order of destruction and ruin. Therefore.

e) The triumph over the serpent and its seed is common and identical to Christ and Mary; but the triumph of Christ was perfect, for he always crushed the head of the serpent lying in wait for his heel. Therefore Mary's triumph also was perfect, and consequently she was never subject to the dominion of the devil. The only difference between Mother and Son is in this: that Christ by his own power, Mary by the power of her Son, bore away triumph over the serpent.

The Latin treats the Genesis 3:15 reading Ipsa/Ipse/Ipsum as a textual controversy, but argues that the Marian sense stands either way because of the woman's inseparability from her seed in enmity and victory. I have preserved the Latin pronouns in transliteration where the argument turns on their form.

De mente S. Bernardi et D. Thoma. On the Mind of St. Bernard and St. Thomas.

466. Non abs re erit pauca dicere de S. Bernardo, qui Patrum agmen claudit, et de Doctore Angelico, qui citari solent ut oppugnatores Immaculatae Conceptionis B. V. Mariae. 466. It will not be beside the matter to say a few things about St. Bernard, who closes the line of the Fathers, and about the Angelic Doctor, who are usually cited as opponents of the Immaculate Conception of the Blessed Virgin Mary.

467. Primus in ep. 174. ad Canonicos Lugdunenses, improbat imprimis festum de immaculata Conceptione in ea Ecclesia tunc institutum, eo praesertim, quod sine Apostolicae Sedis auctoritate id factum esset. Deinde vero animadvertens cultus objectum debere esse sanctum, quaerit utrum sancta fuerit B. V. Mariae conceptio; et videtur illud negare.

Resp. tamen 1. aliquos negare illam epistolam esse S. Bernardi, quam sententiam hoc tempore propugnavit P. Ballerini (Syllog. monum. tom. 2. p. 739. seqq.)

Resp. 2. Admissa illius epistolae auctoritate, negatur S. Bernardum dogmati de Immaculata Conceptione adversari; siquidem negat conceptionem activam et passivam inchoatam fuisse sanctam, minime vero passivam adaequatam, de qua solum est quaestio. Quod probatur a) ex ipsis rationibus, quas S. Doctor adducit: "Quid adhuc," inquit, "addendum putamus his honoribus? Ut honoretur, inquiunt, conceptus, qui honorandum praeivit partum: quoniam si ille non praecessisset, nec iste esset, qui honoretur ... Quid consequentiae habet, ut quoniam sanctum praecessit natalem conceptus, propterea reputetur et ipse sanctus? Unde ergo conceptionis sanctitas? An dicitur sanctificatione praeventa, quatenus jam sancta conciperetur, ac per hoc sanctus fuerit et conceptus, quemadmodum sanctificata jam in utero dicitur, ut sanctus consequeretur et ortus? Sed non valuit ante sancta esse, quam esse, siquidem non erat antequam conciperetur. An forte inter amplexus maritales sanctitas se ipsi conceptioni immiscuit, ut simul et sanctificata fuerit et concepta? Nec hoc quidem admittit ratio. Quomodo namque aut sanctitas absque Spiritu sanctificante, aut sancto Spiritui societas cum peccato fuit? aut certe peccatum quomodo non fuit, ubi libido non defuit? Nisi forte quis dicat de Spiritu sancto eam, et non de viro conceptam fuisse; sed id hactenus inauditum. Si igitur ante conceptum sui sanctificari minime potuit, quoniam non erat, sed nec in ipso quidem conceptu propter peccatum quod inerat, restat ut post conceptum in utero jam existens sanctificationem accepisse credatur, quae excluso peccato sanctam fecerit nativitatem, non tamen et conceptionem."

b) Ita mentem S. Bernardi exposuerunt Alex. Halensis, Albertus M., D. Thomas, S. Bonaventura. Sufficit hujus testimonium proferre. "Non huic obviant," inquit (in 3. sent. dist. 3. q. 1. ad 4.), dicta S. Bernardi. Potius enim intendit excludere errorem, ne quis credat Virginem sanctificatam in Conceptione (activa scilicet, praecedente animae infusionem, de qua loquitur), quam erga Virginem nostram devotionem minuere." Ac, objecto sibi hoc Bernardi contextu: "nec in ipso conceptu (sanctificari poterat) propter peccatum, quod inerat," ita difficultatem solvit: "Constat, quod illud non est dictum propter peccatum quod esset in parentibus, quia potuissent ipsam concipere sine peccato: ergo dicit propter causam peccati, quae erat in carne. Ergo videtur, quod sanctificatio Virginis non fuerit ante infusionem animae."

Resp. 3. Etiamsi illa epistola et esset Bernardi et adversaretur dogmati de Immaculata Conceptione; nullum ex ea desumi posset argumentum. Ita enim concludit S. Bernardus: "Quae autem dixi, absque praejudicio sane dicta sint sanius sapientis. Romanae praesertim Ecclesiae auctoritati atque examini totum hoc sicut et cetera, quae ejusmodi sunt, universa reservo: ipsius si quid aliter sapio paratus judicio emendare." 467. The former, in Epistle 174 to the Canons of Lyons, first disapproves the feast of the immaculate Conception then instituted in that Church, especially because this had been done without the authority of the Apostolic See. Then, observing that the object of worship ought to be holy, he asks whether the conception of the Blessed Virgin Mary was holy; and he seems to deny it.

Resp. 1, however. Some deny that that letter is St. Bernard's, an opinion which in this time Fr. Ballerini has defended (Sylloge monumentorum,

vol. 2, p. 739ff.).

Resp. 2. If the authority of that letter is admitted, it is denied that St. Bernard opposes the dogma concerning the Immaculate Conception, since he denies that active conception and begun passive conception were holy, but by no means adequate passive conception, about which alone the question is. This is proved a) from the very reasons which the holy Doctor adduces: "What still," he says, "do we think must be added to these honors? That the conception be honored, they say, which preceded the birth to be honored; because if the former had not preceded, neither would the latter, which is honored, exist ... What consequence does it have, that because conception preceded a holy birth, therefore it too should be reckoned holy? Whence then the holiness of conception? Is it said that she was anticipated by sanctification, insofar as she was already conceived holy, and by this the conception too was holy, just as she is said, already sanctified in the womb, so that the birth too would follow holy? But she could not be holy before being, since she did not exist before she was conceived. Or perhaps among marital embraces did holiness mingle itself with the conception, so that she was simultaneously sanctified and conceived? Nor indeed does reason admit this. For how was there either holiness without the sanctifying Spirit, or association of the Holy Spirit with sin? Or certainly how was there not sin where libido was not lacking? Unless perhaps someone should say that she was conceived of the Holy Spirit, and not of a man; but this has been unheard of up to now. Therefore, if before her conception she could in no way be sanctified, because she did not exist, but not indeed in the conception itself because of the sin which was present, it remains that after conception, already existing in the womb, she is believed to have received sanctification, which, sin having been excluded, made her birth holy, but not also her conception."

b) Alexander of Hales, Albert the Great, St. Thomas, and St. Bonaventure explained the mind of St. Bernard in this way. It is enough to bring forward the testimony of the latter. "The words of St. Bernard do not stand in the way of this," he says (III Sent., dist. 3, q. 1, ad 4). "For he rather intends to exclude the error that someone should believe the Virgin sanctified in Conception (active, namely, preceding the infusion of the soul, concerning which he is speaking), than to diminish devotion toward our Virgin." And when this context of Bernard was objected to him, "not in the conception itself (could she be sanctified) because of the sin which was present," he solves the difficulty thus: "It is agreed that this was not said because of sin which was in the parents, because they could have conceived her without sin; therefore he says it because of the cause of sin which was in the flesh. Therefore it seems that the sanctification of the Virgin was not before the infusion of the soul."

Resp. 3. Even if that letter both were Bernard's and opposed the dogma concerning the Immaculate Conception, no argument could be drawn from it. For St. Bernard concludes thus: "But the things I have said have indeed been said without prejudice to one who thinks more soundly. To the authority and examination especially of the Roman Church I reserve this whole matter, as also all other things which are of this sort; if I think anything otherwise, I am prepared to amend it according to her judgment."

468. Quoad D. Thomam, peremptoria sunt ejus verba, aiunt, in 3. sent. dist. 3. q. 1. a. 1. ad 2.: "Sanctificatio B. Virginis non potuit esse decenter ante infusionem animae, quia gratiae capax nondum erat, sed nec etiam in ipso instanti infusionis, ut scilicet per gratiam tunc sibi infusam conservaretur, ne culpam originalem incurreret. Christus enim hoc singulariter in humano genere habet, ut redemptione non egeat, quia caput nostrum est, sed omnibus convenit redimi per ipsum; hoc autem esse non posset, si alia anima inveniretur, quae nunquam originali macula fuisset infecta, et ideo nec Beatae Virgini, nec alicui praeter Christum hoc concessum est." - Et in Summa Theol. 3. p. q. 27. a. 2.: "Relinquitur, quod sanctificatio B. Virginis fuerit post ejus animationem."

Resp. tamen 1. Non minus peremptoria sunt quae S. Doctor scripsit in favorem Immaculatae Conceptionis. Nam in 1. sent. dist. 44. q. 1. a. 3. ait: "Puritas intenditur per recessum a contrario, et ideo potest aliquid creatum inveniri, quo nihil purius esse potest in rebus creatis, si nulla contagione peccati inquinatum sit; et talis fuit puritas B. Virginis, quae a peccato originali et actuali immunis fuit." - Et Comment. in Ps. 18. 5., scribit: "Christus corpus suum posuit in sole, id est, in B. Virgine, quae nullam habuit obscuritatem peccati juxta Cant. 4. 7." In cap. 3. Ep. ad Galat. dicit: "Mulierem ex omnibus non inveni, quae omnino a peccatis immunis esset ad

minus originali, vel veniali. Excipitur purissima et omni laude dignissima Virgo Maria, quae omnino a peccato immunis fuit, originali et veniali."

2. Quomodo ergo haec inter se cohaerere possunt? Non pauci existimant textus oppositos Immaculatae Conceptioni non esse genuinos, sed supposititios. Quod probant a) quia textus illi in prioribus editionibus operum D. Thomae desiderantur; et ex collatione veterum cum recentioribus editionibus manifestum fit, plerasque istarum mutilas et interpolatas esse praesertim in locis, ubi sermo est de Conceptione B. Mariae Virginis.

b) Quia evidenter pugnant cum aliis sententiis certe authenticis, et non cohaerent cum principiis D. Thomae.

c) Quia ipse cit. articulus ex 3. p. q. 27. videtur interpolationis et corruptionis signa prae se ferre. Etenim quaeritur ibi solum "utrum B. Virgo fuerit sanctificata ante animationem:" responsio vero negat sanctificationem in ipsa infusione animae: scilicet plus pateret responsio, quam quaesitum. Prima etiam et secunda objectio eo tendunt, ut probent B. V. Mariam fuisse sanctificatam ante animationem: in responsione vero praesertim ad secundam, D. Thomas negaret sanctificationem in ipsa conceptione, seu animatione. Et quidem ratio, quae affertur "hoc derogaret dignitati Christi" digna haud videtur S. Doctore, eidemque ipse respondet distinguendo inter debitum contrahendi peccatum et ipsum peccatum contractum. In 4. sent. dist. 53. q. 1. a. 4. ad 3., ait: "Oportet autem ponere, quod quilibet personaliter redemptione indigeat, non solum ratione naturae: liberari autem a malo, vel a debito absolvi non potest, nisi qui debitum incurrit, vel in malum dejectus fuit." Ac paulo post: "Unde dimissio debitorum et liberatio a malo non potest intelligi quod aliquis sine debito vel immunis a malo nascatur." - Imo ipsa ratio quae affertur in corpore articuli objecti non videtur S. Doctore digna. Reducitur enim ad hoc: non fuit B. V. Maria sanctificata ante animationem; ergo sanctificata fuit post animationem. Sed facile quisque videt dari medium, in ipso instanti animationis.

3. Alii denique admittentes authenticitatem textuum objectorum conantur illos explicare ita, ut Immaculatae Conceptioni non adversentur. Si enim, aiunt, D. Thomas asserit a) B. V. M. sanctificatam fuisse post animationem, illud post importat posterioritatem non temporis, sed naturae. Ita Spada in suis Animadversionibus, Animadv. 5. - et Capponi a Porrecta in c. a. 3. p. - Vel, ut vult Joannes a S. Thoma (Cursu Theol. Tract. de approbatione et auctoritate doctrinae angelicae D. Thomae, disp. 2. art. 2.): "Ponderandum est D. Thomam negare illam gratiam praeservativam, quae fieret parentibus tantum, vel naturae, non ipsi personae; eo quod reputat ut magnum inconveniens, quod aliqua persona in se personaliter non egeat redemptione, sed gratia quae illi fit, sit in suis parentibus, vel ipsi naturae, aut principiis naturae, puta animae, vel carni ante constitutam personam, et ante animationem."

Si b) D. Thomas asserit B. V. M. indiguisse redemptione: "pondera," inquit idem Auctor l. c. "quod ad liberationem per Christum disjunctive postulat D. Thomas vel debitum, vel culpam in eo qui redimendus est; ergo si sufficienter salvat D. Thomas redemptionem per Christum in aliquo qui solum nasceretur cum debito, non amplius requirit quando loquitur de Virgine, et infert pro inconvenienti, quia alias non indigeret redemptione per Christum; intelligit enim quod non indigeret si conciperetur sine debito, aut sine peccato, non tamen si conciperetur sine peccato, dummodo conciperetur cum debito in persona. Et quoties D. Thomas infert quod non indigeret redemptione, ly non indigeret est quia includitur etiam debitum: hoc enim si datur sufficit ad indigentiam liberationis, ut ex isto loco colligitur. Et ita locus hic maxime praelucet menti D. Thomae introspiciendae in aliis locis."

c) Spada, Animadver. 3., subdit: "Licet veram rationem peccati S. Thomas non agnoscat in infectione carnis, illam tamen peccatum appellat aliquando, Apostolum Paulum secutus. Posito itaque in Maria debito et necessitate ad peccatum originale, quid mirum, si Angelicus dixerit, B. Virginem conceptam fuisse in peccato originali, ... contraxisse peccatum originale, subjectam fuisse peccato originali, vel similia? Cum enim S. Thomas expresse docuerit, B. Virginem immunem fuisse a peccato originali, cum multoties dixerit, in Maria nullum omnino fuisse peccatum, et summam attigisse eam puritatem, cum principia universae ejus doctrinae ad asserendam immunitatem a peccato originali inducant, superiores dictiones ex lege hermeneutices necessario intelligendae sunt de debito ad peccatum originale, non de culpa." 468. With regard to St. Thomas, his words are peremptory, they say, in III Sent., dist. 3, q. 1, a. 1, ad 2: "The sanctification of the Blessed Virgin could not fittingly be before the infusion of the soul, because she was not yet capable of grace; nor even in the very

instant of infusion, namely so that through grace then infused into her she would be preserved from incurring original fault. For Christ has this uniquely in the human race, that he does not need redemption, because he is our head; but it is fitting for all to be redeemed through him. But this could not be, if another soul were found which had never been infected by original stain, and therefore this was conceded neither to the Blessed Virgin nor to anyone besides Christ." - And in the Summa Theologiae III, q. 27, a. 2: "It remains that the sanctification of the Blessed Virgin was after her animation."

Resp. 1, however. No less peremptory are the things which the holy Doctor wrote in favor of the Immaculate Conception. For in I Sent., dist. 44, q. 1, a. 3, he says: "Purity is intensified by withdrawal from the contrary, and therefore some created thing can be found than which nothing can be purer among created things, if it has been stained by no contagion of sin; and such was the purity of the Blessed Virgin, who was immune from original and actual sin." - And in the Commentary on Psalm 18:5, he writes: "Christ placed his body in the sun, that is, in the Blessed Virgin, who had no darkness of sin, according to Song of Songs 4:7." On chapter 3 of the Epistle to the Galatians he says: "Among all I have not found a woman who was altogether immune from sins, at least original or venial. Excepted is the most pure Virgin Mary, most worthy of all praise, who was altogether immune from sin, original and venial."

2. How, then, can these things cohere with one another? Not a few think that the texts opposed to the Immaculate Conception are not genuine, but spurious. They prove this a) because those texts are lacking in the earlier editions of the works of St. Thomas; and from comparison of the old editions with the more recent ones it becomes manifest that very many of the latter are mutilated and interpolated, especially in places where the Conception of the Blessed Virgin Mary is discussed.

b) Because they plainly conflict with other certainly authentic opinions, and do not cohere with the principles of St. Thomas.

c) Because the cited article itself from III, q. 27, seems to display signs of interpolation and corruption. For there the question asked is only "whether the Blessed Virgin was sanctified before animation"; but the response denies sanctification in the very infusion of the soul, that is, the response would extend farther than the question. The first and second objection also tend toward proving that the Blessed Virgin Mary was sanctified before animation; but in the response, especially to the second, St. Thomas would deny sanctification in the very conception, or animation. And indeed the reason which is brought forward, "this would derogate from the dignity of Christ," hardly seems worthy of the holy Doctor, and he himself responds to the same thing by distinguishing between the debt of contracting sin and the sin actually contracted. In IV Sent., dist. 53, q. 1, a. 4, ad 3, he says: "But one must posit that each person personally needs redemption, not only by reason of nature; but one cannot be freed from evil, or absolved from debt, unless he has incurred debt, or has been cast into evil." And a little afterward: "Hence forgiveness of debts and liberation from evil cannot be understood in such a way that someone is born without debt or immune from evil." - Indeed the very reason which is brought forward in the body of the objected article does not seem worthy of the holy Doctor. For it is reduced to this: the Blessed Virgin Mary was not sanctified before animation; therefore she was sanctified after animation. But anyone easily sees that there is a middle: in the very instant of animation.

3. Finally, others, admitting the authenticity of the objected texts, try to explain them in such a way that they do not oppose the Immaculate Conception. For if, they say, St. Thomas asserts a) that the Blessed Virgin Mary was sanctified after animation, that after imports posteriority not of time, but of nature. Thus Spada in his Animadversions, Animadversion 5, and Capponi a Porrecta on this article in the Third Part. - Or, as John of St. Thomas wants (Theological Course, tract on the approval and authority of the angelic doctrine of St. Thomas, disp. 2, art. 2): "One must weigh that St. Thomas denies that preservative grace which would be done only to the parents, or to nature, not to the person herself; because he reckons it as a great inconvenience that some person in herself personally should not need redemption, but that the grace which is done to her should be in her parents, or in nature itself, or in the principles of nature, namely in soul or flesh before the person has been constituted, and before animation."

If b) St. Thomas asserts that the Blessed Virgin Mary needed redemption: "weigh," says the same Author in the cited place, "that for liberation through Christ, St. Thomas disjunctively requires either debt or fault in the one who is to be redeemed. Therefore if St. Thomas

sufficiently preserves redemption through Christ in someone who would be born with debt alone, he does not require more when he speaks of the Virgin and infers as an inconvenience that otherwise she would not need redemption through Christ; for he understands that she would not need it if she were conceived without debt or without sin, but not if she were conceived without sin, provided that she were conceived with debt in the person. And whenever St. Thomas infers that she would not need redemption, the phrase would not need it is because debt also is included. For if this is given, it suffices for the need of liberation, as is gathered from this place. And thus this place shines very brightly for looking into the mind of St. Thomas in other places."

c) Spada, Animadversion 3, adds: "Although St. Thomas does not acknowledge the true ratio of sin in the infection of the flesh, nevertheless he sometimes calls it sin, following the Apostle Paul. Therefore, once a debt and necessity toward original sin have been posited in Mary, what wonder is it if the Angelic Doctor said that the Blessed Virgin was conceived in original sin, ... contracted original sin, was subject to original sin, or similar things? For since St. Thomas expressly taught that the Blessed Virgin was immune from original sin, since he said many times that there was no sin at all in Mary and that she attained the highest purity, since the principles of his whole doctrine lead to asserting immunity from original sin, the preceding expressions, by the law of hermeneutics, must necessarily be understood of the debt toward original sin, not of fault."

469. Caeterum D. Thomas eadem 3. p. q. 27. art. 1. agens de Nativitate B. V. Mariae, ait: "Ecclesia celebrat Nativitatem B. Virginis; non autem celebratur festum in Ecclesia nisi pro aliquo sancto. Ergo B. Virgo in ipsa sua nativitate fuit sancta. Fuit ergo in utero sanctificata." Quid ergo dicturus nunc esset de Immaculata conceptione? Vid. Perrone (de Immac. B. V. Mariae conceptu, edit. cit. pag. 162. seqq.) 469. Moreover, St. Thomas, in the same III, q. 27, a. 1, treating of the Nativity of the Blessed Virgin Mary, says: "The Church celebrates the Nativity of the Blessed Virgin; but a feast is not celebrated in the Church except for someone holy. Therefore the Blessed Virgin was holy in her very nativity. Therefore she was sanctified in the womb." What, then, would he now say concerning the Immaculate Conception? See Perrone (On the Immaculate Conception of the Blessed Virgin Mary, cited edition, p. 162ff.).

470. NOTA. Objectiones fere omnes praeoccupatae sunt dum verum hujus mysterii conceptum exposuimus: caeterum legi possunt apud Perrone (Thesis Dogmatica etc.) Tria tantummodo hic breviter adnotabimus. 1. Baptismi effectus non est solum delere peccatum, sed etiam conferre characterem servorum Christi et fidelium Ecclesiae, tribuere capacitatem ad reliqua novae legis sacramenta. Baptismus non delet peccatum, nisi infundendo gratiam sanctificantem: quandoque tamen gratiam sanctificantem conferens, potest per accidens non delere peccatum, uti fit in adulto perfecte contrito antequam hoc sacramentum suscipiat. Hinc patet quomodo B. V. Maria non contraxerit maculam originalem, et nihilominus susceperit baptismum Christi, uti fert communis sententia. Caeterum ex baptismo Christi a B. V. M. suscepto non magis probatur hujus maculata origo, quam ex baptismo Joannis seu poenitentiae a Christo suscepto probetur eum quidquam poenitentia delendum habuisse.

2. Incommoda et aerumnae hujus vitae, mors ipsa non ita sunt, ut vidimus in praecedente disputatione, effectus peccati originalis, ut in alio providentiae ordine non potuerit illis homo subjici ex sola suae limitatae naturae conditione. - Nec immunitas ab illis malis ita pendebat a gratia sanctificante, in qua formalis justitia originalis consistit, ut non potuerit Deus gratiam sanctificantem restituere, peccatum delere aut ab illo praeservare, quin tamen simul ab iisdem miseriis exemptionem concederet: per baptismum in nobis deletur peccatum; manemus tamen doloribus, infirmitatibus, morti obnoxii. Hinc patet quomodo haec omnia mala nullo pacto obstent dogmati de Immaculata Conceptione B. V. Mariae; et cur merito damnata fuerit in Baio prop. 73.: "Nemo, praeter Christum, est absque peccato originali: hinc Beata Virgo mortua est propter peccatum ex Adam contractum, omnesque ejus afflictiones in hac vita sicut aliorum justorum, fuerunt ultiones peccati actualis, vel originalis." Vid. Perrone (de Immac., etc. pag. 110. seq.)

3. Etsi, ut

diximus, post S. Bernardi epistolam non pauci intra fines Ecclesiae, negaverint hoc privilegium Matris Dei per aliquod temporis intervallum; id tamen ejusdem dogmaticae definitioni non obstat. Recolantur quae in tractatu de fide diximus de vero progressu in fide, et quorum meminimus disp. 2. hujus tractatus n. 181. 470. NOTE. Nearly all objections were anticipated when we explained the true concept of this mystery; for the rest, they can be read in Perrone (Dogmatic Thesis, etc.). We shall only briefly note three things here. 1. The effect of baptism is not only to destroy sin, but also to confer the character of servants of Christ and faithful of the Church, and to bestow capacity for the remaining sacraments of the new law. Baptism does not destroy sin except by infusing sanctifying grace; sometimes, however, while conferring sanctifying grace, it can accidentally not destroy sin, as happens in an adult perfectly contrite before he receives this sacrament. Hence it is clear how the Blessed Virgin Mary did not contract original stain, and nevertheless received the baptism of Christ, as the common opinion holds. Moreover, from the baptism of Christ received by the Blessed Virgin Mary, her stained origin is no more proved than from the baptism of John, or of penance, received by Christ, it is proved that he had anything to be destroyed by penance.

2. The inconveniences and hardships of this life, and death itself, as we saw in the preceding disputation, are not effects of original sin in such a way that in another order of providence man could not have been subjected to them from the sole condition of his limited nature. - Nor did immunity from those evils so depend on sanctifying grace, in which formal original justice consists, that God could not restore sanctifying grace, destroy sin, or preserve from it, without nevertheless at the same time granting exemption from those same miseries. Through baptism sin is destroyed in us; nevertheless we remain liable to pains, weaknesses, and death. Hence it is clear how all these evils in no way stand in the way of the dogma concerning the Immaculate Conception of the Blessed Virgin Mary, and why Baius's proposition 73 was deservedly condemned: "No one, except Christ, is without original sin; hence the Blessed Virgin died because of sin contracted from Adam, and all her afflictions in this life, like those of other just persons, were punishments of actual or original sin." See Perrone (On the Immaculate, etc., p. 110ff.).

3. Although, as we said, after the letter of St. Bernard not a few within the boundaries of the Church denied this privilege of the Mother of God for some interval of time, this nevertheless does not stand in the way of its dogmatic definition. Let those things be recalled which we said in the treatise on faith concerning true progress in faith, and those things which we mentioned in disputation 2 of this treatise, n. 181.

Sectio III.
Quale peccati originalis debitum fuerit in B. V. Maria. SECTION III.
What Debt of Original Sin There Was in the Blessed Virgin Mary.

471. Distinguenda est actualis contractio peccati originalis a debito illud contrahendi. Contrahitur peccatum originale ipso momento, quo anima corpori jungitur: debitum autem existit natura et tempore ante conceptionem; et nihil est aliud, nisi necessitas peccatum originale contrahendi, nisi proles nascitura Dei privilegio praeservetur. Ex dictis, non minus certum est B. V. Mariam non contraxisse peccatum originale, quam eam habuisse aliquod debitum illud contrahendi; siquidem praeservata fuit immunis a culpa intuitu meritorum Christi, ac proinde redemptione praeservativa vere redempta. 471. The actual contraction of original sin must be distinguished from the debt of contracting it. Original sin is contracted at the very moment at which the soul is joined to the body; but the debt exists by nature and by time before conception. It is nothing other than the necessity of contracting original sin, unless the offspring about to be born is preserved by God's privilege. From what has been said, it is no less certain that the Blessed Virgin Mary did not contract original sin than that she had some debt of contracting it, since she was preserved immune from fault in view of the merits of Christ, and consequently was truly redeemed by preservative redemption.

472. Quaestio igitur est, quale fuerit illud debitum? Duplex distinguitur debitum, proximum et remotum. Proximum situm est in inclusione in pactum cum Adamo initum, seu in alligatione nostrarum voluntatum ad voluntatem Adami praevaricatoris "in quo omnes peccaverunt": remotum situm est in descensu ab Adamo per viam generationis ordinariam, vi cujus, absque speciali privilegio, omnes per se comprehensi fuissent in illo pacto, seu in illa alligatione ad voluntatem Adami. 472. Therefore the question is, what kind of debt was that? A twofold debt is distinguished, proximate and remote. The proximate is placed in inclusion in the covenant entered into with Adam, or in the binding of our wills to the will of Adam the prevaricator, "in whom all sinned." The remote is placed in descent from Adam by the way of ordinary generation, by force of which, without a special privilege, all would of themselves have been included in that covenant, or in that binding to the will of Adam.

473. De pacto illo inferius disserendum est. Nunc ad quaestionis intelligentiam, sufficit animadvertere cum Suarez (in 3. p. Vol. 2. disp. 3. sect. 2.) "ut omnes posteri Adae dicantur in illo peccasse, non satis esse ut omnes fuerint in illo contenti tamquam in primo parente, et naturali principio hominum futurorum omnium. Quia haec sola ratio per se sumpta non satis est ut peccatum parentis derivetur ad filium, neque ut filius in parente peccare dicatur. Oportuit ergo ut Deus speciali lege et pacto voluerit constituere Adam quodammodo ut caput caeterorum, et in ejus voluntate posterorum voluntates ponere, ut veluti omnium nomine praeceptum impositum aut servaret, aut transgrederetur, ita ut, eo in divina obedientia perseverante, omnes posteri quasi haereditario jure justitiam et gratiam Dei obtinerent; illo autem peccante omnes essent Deo invisi et inimici. Potest ergo intelligi, Deum in hoc ipso pacto B. Virginem excepisse, propter merita Christi praevisa, quia nullam involvit repugnantiam, quominus hoc Deus facere potuerit; quia, sicut libere voluit pactum illud cum Adamo inire, ita eadem libertate potuit matrem suam jam praevisam illa lege liberare." - Plures theologi, inter quos Suarez l. c., Vasquez, Bellarminus, etc., asserunt in B. V. Maria debitum proximum: alii vero, ut Salmeronius, Thyrsus Gonzalez, Nierembergius, et communius recentiores agnoscunt in B. V. Maria solum debitum remotum contrahendi peccatum originale. 473. Concerning that covenant we must dispute below. For understanding the present question, it is enough now to observe with Suarez (on III, vol. 2, disp. 3, sect. 2) "that, for all the descendants of Adam to be said to have sinned in him, it is not enough that all were contained in him as in the first parent and natural principle of all future human beings. For this reason alone, taken by itself, is not enough for the sin of the parent to be derived to the child, nor for the child to be said to sin in the parent. Therefore it was necessary that God, by a special law and covenant, willed to constitute Adam in some way as head of the rest, and to place the wills of his descendants in his will, so that, as if in the name of all, he would either keep or transgress the imposed precept; so that, if he persevered in divine obedience, all his descendants would obtain the justice and grace of God as if by hereditary right, but if he sinned, all would be hateful and hostile to God. Therefore it can be understood that God, in this very covenant, excepted the Blessed Virgin, because of the foreseen merits of Christ, since it involves no contradiction that God could have done this; because, just as he freely willed to enter into that covenant with Adam, so by the same freedom he could free his mother, already foreseen, from that law." - Many theologians, among whom are Suarez in the cited place, Vasquez, Bellarmine, etc., assert proximate debt in the Blessed Virgin Mary; but others, such as Salmeron, Thyrsus Gonzalez, Nieremberg, and more commonly the more recent authors, acknowledge in the Blessed Virgin Mary only the remote debt of contracting original sin.

474. His subscribentes, dicimus:

PROP. XXXIX. B. V. Maria immunis fuit a debito proximo contrahendi labem originis.

Prob. Concedenda est haec exemptio B. V. Mariae, si nulla solida ratio affertur in contrarium; atqui nulla videtur esse solida ratio in contrarium; ergo.

Prob. maj. a) Ex doctrina S. Augustini, S. Anselmi et D. Thomae talis est B. V. Mariae puritas ut vicerit omni ex parte

peccatum - ut ea puritate niteret, qua major sub Deo nequit intelligi - ut nihil sit purius ea in rebus creatis. Atqui haec omnia non essent omnino vera, si fuisset in B. V. Maria debitum proximum contrahendi peccatum; siquidem jam posset intelligi major puritas. Ergo si nulla afferatur solida ratio in contrarium, immunis ab hoc debito asserenda est.

b) Juxta regulam Petri Cellensis (l. 9. ep. 9.): "B. Virgini concedenda sunt omnia privilegia, quae ei fuisse negata positive et efficaciter non probatur - et praesumptionibus standum est, donec probetur contrarium." - Regulam hanc ratam habuit D. Thomas, qui in 3. sent. dist. 2. q. 1. a. 1., scribit: "Credendum omnino ei (Mariae) collatum esse quidquid conferri potuerit." Ergo.

c) Conveniens haud erat ut Domina subjiceretur servo, et Dei Genitrix ac Regina Angelorum subderetur capiti multo inferiori, nempe Adamo; atqui hoc factum esset, si B. V. Mariae voluntas alligata fuisset voluntati Adami praevaricatoris, seu si in ipsa fuisset debitum proximum. Ergo.

Prob. min. adducendo rationes contrarias, eisque respondendo. Dicunt ergo:

1. Est generalis propositio Apostoli omnes in Adamo peccasse; atqui haec propositio in sua universalitate esset falsa, si B. V. Maria non habuisset debitum proximum; siquidem, uti patet, tunc ea in Adamo non peccavisset. Ergo.

Resp. Dist. maj.: est generalis propositio intelligenda in sensu accommodato vel absoluto con.; intelligenda in sensu absoluto, subdist.: absque speciali privilegio con.; secus neg. - Certe Conc. Trid. sess. 5. can. 2. utitur illo Apostoli testimonio "per unum hominem ... in quo omnes peccaverunt" ad ostendendum omnes posteros Adae concipi in peccato originali: ergo, si textus ille non sumeretur in sensu accommodato, quando agitur de B. V. Maria, sequeretur, contra mentem adversariorum et nunc contra fidem Ecclesiae, non modo debitum proximum, sed ipsam etiam culpam in primo animationis instanti a Deipara fuisse contractam.

2. Legitur 1. Cor. 15.: "Sicut in Adam omnes moriuntur; ita et in Christo omnes vivificabuntur." - Et c. 5.: "Si unus pro omnibus mortuus est; ergo omnes mortui sunt; et pro omnibus mortuus est Christus," etc. "Ubi necesse est," arguit Suarez l. c., "utramque partem distributionis aeque esse universalem. Sicut ergo certum est Christum mortuum esse pro Beata Virgine ita certum est B. V. fuisse mortuam saltem in Adamo."

Resp. Eadem fere est responsio. Etenim quod omnes mortui sunt in Adamo, et omnes egent redemptione Christi, fatentibus adversariis et nunc exigente fide, nequit intelligi eodem sensu de B. V. Maria et caeteris hominibus: hi enim actu mortui sunt nascentes cum privatione gratiae sanctificantis, quae est vita animae; illa mortua fuisset, seu nata fuisset cum privatione gratiae sanctificantis, nisi speciali privilegio fuisset praeventa: illi indigent redemptione liberativa, haec praeservativa. Pari ergo ratione dici potest B. V. Mariam peccavisse in Adamo non quatenus inclusa fuit in pacto cum eo inito; sed quatenus inclusa fuisset, nisi habuisset speciale privilegium: eodemque modo praeservatam fuisse tum a contractione peccati tum a debito proximo: vere tamen fuisse redemptam, quia habuit debitum remotum.

3. Si solum debitum remotum admitteretur in Beatissima Virgine, nullo pacto fuisset redempta per Christum. Quod "explicatur," inquit Suarez l. c., "exemplo de muliere quae serva efficitur excipiendo in ipso contractu aliquem ex filiis, ne servus nasci possit. Hoc enim posito, qui postea mulierem illam a servitute redimeret, revera non redimeret filium, quia non erat obnoxius servituti, sed de se liber erat nasciturus; sic ergo, si B. Virgo non fuisset (ut ita dicam) vendita in Adamo, et de se servituti peccati obnoxia, non fuisset vere redempta. Christus enim illos solos redemit, quos Adam vendidit, et quantum in ipso erat, fecit captivos."

Resp. neg. assumptum; et ad exemplum allatum dicimus: "Si quis, cum mulier aliqua in servam venditur, in ipso contractu quempiam ejus filium exciperet, ne servus nasceretur, merito diceretur illum a servitute liberasse. Sic igitur dicetur Virgo a Christo redempta, etiamsi in Adamo non peccaverit, quoniam ex meritis ejus praevisis ita exempta est, ut in illo peccare non potuerit."

4. Atqui, aiunt, non potuisset B. V. Maria eximi a pacto cum Adamo inito. Nam, quando Deus per suum decretum voluntates nostras alligavit voluntati Adami, et Deiparam, juxta nostram sententiam, excepit, nulla adhuc existebant merita Christi; siquidem Christus non fuit praedefinitus ut Redemptor ante peccatum Adae absolute praevisum.

Resp. Huic argumento responderi potest vel dicendo Christum ut Redemptorem fuisse praedefinitum ante peccatum Adae absolute praevisum - vel dicendo Christum ut Redemptorem, pactum cum Adamo, peccati permissionem, et exemptionem Virginis ab eo pacto, uno eodemque signo fuisse definitum - vel concedendo quidem Christum ut Redemptorem fuisse praedefinitum post peccatum Adae absolute

praevisum; sed talem decretorum ordinem statuendo, qui cum praedicta exemptione conciliari possit.

Plena hujus difficultatis explicatio pendet a variis quaestionibus: utrum Verbum Incarnatum fuisset, si Adam non peccasset - quomodo, et quonam signo B. V. Maria praedestinata fuerit, etc.; prout enim diversimode respondetur his quaestionibus, diversimode explicatur quomodo B. V. Maria exempta fuit a pacto ob merita Christi. Non est hujus loci praedictas quaestiones expendere: sufficiet nobis aliquem probabilem decretorum ordinem ad exemplum exhibere, ut inde pateat fieri potuisse ut B. V. Maria exempta fuerit a pacto intuitu meritorum Christi.

Deus itaque, praelucente scientia simplicis intelligentiae, ac scientia media de libertate Christi, Adami, Deiparae, etc., hoc vel simili modo decernere concipitur: "Volo Christum cum hac libertate merendi in carne passibili, in remedium peccati, quod praevideo ab Adamo fore committendum, si ipsum producerem, caput morale posterorum constituerem, praeceptum ei imponerem, et hanc libertatem conferrem - Adamum volo producere in tempore, et hunc posterorum numerum, et in isto hanc quoque Virginem Mariam. - Decerno etiam Adamum caput morale posterorum, quorum voluntates alligo ipsius voluntati in ordine ad observationem vel transgressionem praecepti, quod ei imponere volo, de non comedendo pomo: excipio tamen hanc Virginem Mariam, quam Matrem Christi cum hoc gratiarum cumulo eligo, et quidem ob merita ejusdem Christi Redemptoris. - Volo Adamo conferre hanc libertatem, et permittere ipsius peccatum."

5. Si Adam non peccasset, Deipara accepisset gratiam sanctificantem et caetera dona justitiae originalis vi pacti cum Adamo initi, non secus ac alii homines. Ergo illius voluntas alligata fuit voluntati Adae, etc.

Resp. Negant aliqui antec., quia B. V. Maria ut futura Mater Verbi longe majores praestantioresque gratias acceptura erat in primo suae Conceptionis instanti, quam eidem promereri potuisset Adamus. - Sed transmisso antec., neg. conseq., quia quamvis fuisset in eo pacto comprehensa quoad partem favorabilem, non sequitur ideo fuisse etiam comprehensam quoad partem odiosam, uti patet ex prob. maj. hujus argumenti. 474. Subscribing to these latter, we say:

PROPOSITION XXXIX. The Blessed Virgin Mary was immune from the proximate debt of contracting the stain of origin.

Proof. This exemption must be conceded to the Blessed Virgin Mary if no solid reason is brought forward to the contrary; but there seems to be no solid reason to the contrary; therefore.

The major is proved. a) From the doctrine of St. Augustine, St. Anselm, and St. Thomas, such is the purity of the Blessed Virgin Mary that she conquered sin on every side; that she shone with that purity greater than which cannot be understood under God; that nothing is purer than she among created things. But all these things would not be altogether true if there had been in the Blessed Virgin Mary a proximate debt of contracting sin, since a greater purity could already be understood. Therefore, if no solid reason is brought forward to the contrary, she must be asserted immune from this debt.

b) According to the rule of Peter of Celle (book 9, ep. 9): "All privileges which are not positively and effectively proved to have been denied to the Blessed Virgin are to be conceded to her, and one must stand by presumptions until the contrary is proved." - St. Thomas ratified this rule, writing in III Sent., dist. 2, q. 1, a. 1: "One must altogether believe that whatever could be conferred was conferred on her (Mary)." Therefore.

c) It was hardly fitting that the Lady should be subjected to a servant, and that the Mother of God and Queen of Angels should be placed under a much inferior head, namely Adam. But this would have happened if the will of the Blessed Virgin Mary had been bound to the will of Adam the prevaricator, or if there had been proximate debt in her. Therefore.

The minor is proved by adducing the contrary reasons and responding to them. They say, therefore:

1. It is a general proposition of the Apostle that all sinned in Adam; but this proposition in its universality would be false if the Blessed Virgin Mary had not had proximate debt, since, as is clear, then she would not have sinned in Adam. Therefore.

Resp. I distinguish the major: it is a general proposition to be understood in an accommodated or absolute sense, conceded; to be understood in an absolute sense, I subdistinguish: without special privilege, conceded; otherwise, denied. - Certainly the Council of Trent, session 5, canon 2, uses that testimony of the Apostle, "through one man ... in whom all sinned," to show that all the descendants of Adam are conceived in original sin. Therefore, if that text were not taken in an accommodated sense when the

Blessed Virgin Mary is in question, it would follow, against the mind of the adversaries and now against the faith of the Church, that not only the proximate debt, but even the fault itself was contracted by the Mother of God in the first instant of animation.

2. 1 Corinthians 15 reads: "As in Adam all die; so also in Christ all shall be made alive." - And chapter 5: "If one died for all; therefore all died; and Christ died for all," etc. "Here it is necessary," Suarez argues in the cited place, "that each part of the distribution be equally universal. Therefore just as it is certain that Christ died for the Blessed Virgin, so it is certain that the Blessed Virgin was dead at least in Adam."

Resp. The response is nearly the same. For that all died in Adam and all need the redemption of Christ, by the admission of the adversaries and now as faith requires, cannot be understood in the same sense of the Blessed Virgin Mary and of the rest of human beings. For these latter actually were dead, being born with the privation of sanctifying grace, which is the life of the soul; she would have been dead, or would have been born with the privation of sanctifying grace, unless she had been anticipated by a special privilege. They need liberative redemption; she, preservative redemption. By equal reason, therefore, it can be said that the Blessed Virgin Mary sinned in Adam not insofar as she was included in the covenant entered into with him, but insofar as she would have been included, unless she had had a special privilege; and in the same way that she was preserved both from the contraction of sin and from proximate debt, but nevertheless was truly redeemed, because she had remote debt.

3. If only remote debt were admitted in the Most Blessed Virgin, in no way would she have been redeemed through Christ. This "is explained," says Suarez in the cited place, "by the example of a woman who becomes a slave, with one of her children being excepted in the very contract, lest he could be born a slave. This being posited, someone who afterward redeemed that woman from servitude would not in reality redeem the son, because he was not liable to servitude, but was going to be born free of himself. Thus therefore, if the Blessed Virgin had not been (so to speak) sold in Adam, and of herself liable to the servitude of sin, she would not have been truly redeemed. For Christ redeemed only those whom Adam sold, and, as much as was in him, made captives."

Resp. I deny the assumption; and to the example brought forward we say: "If someone, when some woman is sold into slavery, should except one of her children in the very contract, lest he be born a slave, he would deservedly be said to have freed him from servitude. Thus therefore the Virgin will be said to have been redeemed by Christ, even if she did not sin in Adam, since from his foreseen merits she was so exempted that she could not sin in him."

4. But, they say, the Blessed Virgin Mary could not have been exempted from the covenant entered into with Adam. For when God by his decree bound our wills to the will of Adam, and, according to our opinion, excepted the Mother of God, no merits of Christ yet existed; since Christ was not predefined as Redeemer before Adam's sin was absolutely foreseen.

Resp. To this argument one can respond either by saying that Christ as Redeemer was predefined before Adam's sin was absolutely foreseen; or by saying that Christ as Redeemer, the covenant with Adam, the permission of sin, and the exemption of the Virgin from that covenant were defined by one and the same sign; or indeed by conceding that Christ as Redeemer was predefined after Adam's sin was absolutely foreseen, but by establishing such an order of decrees as can be reconciled with the aforesaid exemption.

The full explanation of this difficulty depends on various questions: whether the Incarnate Word would have existed if Adam had not sinned; how and by what sign the Blessed Virgin Mary was predestined, etc. For insofar as these questions are answered in different ways, it is explained in different ways how the Blessed Virgin Mary was exempted from the covenant because of the merits of Christ. It does not belong to this place to weigh the aforesaid questions. It will be enough for us to present some probable order of decrees as an example, so that from this it may be clear that it could have happened that the Blessed Virgin Mary was exempted from the covenant in view of the merits of Christ.

Therefore, with the science of simple intelligence shining before, and middle knowledge concerning the freedom of Christ, Adam, the Mother of God, etc., God is conceived to decree in this or a similar way: "I will Christ with this freedom of meriting in passible flesh, as remedy of the sin which I foresee will be committed by Adam if I produce him, constitute him moral head of his descendants, impose a precept on him, and confer this freedom. I will to produce Adam in time, and this number of descendants, and in this number this Virgin Mary also. - I also decree Adam as moral head of his

descendants, whose wills I bind to his will in order to the observance or transgression of the precept which I will to impose on him, concerning not eating the fruit. Yet I except this Virgin Mary, whom I choose as Mother of Christ with this abundance of graces, and indeed because of the merits of the same Christ the Redeemer. - I will to confer this freedom on Adam, and to permit his sin."

5. If Adam had not sinned, the Mother of God would have received sanctifying grace and the other gifts of original justice by force of the covenant entered into with Adam, no differently than other human beings. Therefore her will was bound to the will of Adam, etc.

Resp. Some deny the antecedent, because the Blessed Virgin Mary as future Mother of the Word was going to receive far greater and more excellent graces in the first instant of her Conception than Adam could have merited for her. - But, passing over the antecedent, I deny the consequence, because although she would have been included in that covenant with respect to the favorable part, it does not therefore follow that she was also included with respect to the odious part, as is clear from the proof of the major of this argument.

475. Unde ipse Suarez, licet (l. c. et de vitiis atque peccatis, disp. 9. sect. 4.) contrariam sententiam, suo tempore, ut videtur, communiorem tenuerit; fatetur tamen (l. c. in 3. p.): "Si quis autem contendat potuisse Virginem esse obnoxiam peccato Adae contrahendo, atque adeo proprie redemptam per Christum, et nihilominus non peccasse in Adamo, sed habuisse solum debitum peccandi in illo, fuisse autem propter Christum praeservatam, non solum ne peccatum Adae contraheret, verum etiam ne in ipso peccaret: talis opinio non posset censura notari, quia utcumque salvat scripturarum locutiones." Vid. Wirceburgenses. 475. Hence Suarez himself, although in his own time, as it seems, he held the contrary opinion, which was more common (l. c. and On Vices and Sins, disp. 9, sect. 4), nevertheless confesses (l. c. on III): "But if someone should contend that the Virgin could have been liable to contracting the sin of Adam, and therefore properly redeemed through Christ, and nevertheless did not sin in Adam, but had only the debt of sinning in him, and was preserved because of Christ not only so that she would not contract Adam's sin, but also so that she would not sin in him: such an opinion could not be marked with censure, because in some way it saves the expressions of the Scriptures." See the Wurzburg theologians.

Sectio IV.
Utrum in B. V. M. fuerit fomes peccati. SECTION IV.
Whether There Was in the Blessed Virgin Mary the Fomes of Sin.

476. Hanc quaestionem hic pertractamus tum quia intimum habet nexum cum quaestione praecedente, tum quia secus, juxta praesentem tractatuum distributionem, esset omnino praetermittenda; quod debitus in Matrem Dei honor et amor minime sinit. 476. We treat this question here both because it has an intimate connection with the preceding question, and because otherwise, according to the present distribution of treatises, it would have to be passed over entirely; and due honor and love toward the Mother of God by no means permits this.

477. Fomes peccati est ipsa naturalis inclinatio appetitus sensitivi, quatenus inordinate et absque rationis consensu sensibilia interdum potest appetere. 477. The fomes of sin is the very natural inclination of the sensitive appetite, insofar as it can sometimes desire sensible things inordinately and without the consent of reason.

478. Conveniunt omnes 1. B. V. Mariam numquam habuisse actum fomitis, seu fomitem in actu secundo. - 2. Imo fomitem fuisse in ea saltem ligatum in prima ejus sanctificatione, seu in primo conceptionis instanti. - 3. Fuisse insuper in ea extinctum saltem in secunda sanctificatione, nempe quando concepit Salvatorem. Disputatur solum inter Theologos, utrum fomes

non modo ligatus, sed extinctus fuerit in B. V. Maria in prima ejus sanctificatione. 478. All agree, 1. that the Blessed Virgin Mary never had an act of the fomes, or the fomes in second act. - 2. Indeed, that the fomes was in her at least bound in her first sanctification, or in the first instant of conception. - 3. Moreover, that it was in her extinguished at least in the second sanctification, namely when she conceived the Savior. It is disputed only among theologians whether the fomes was not merely bound, but extinguished in the Blessed Virgin Mary in her first sanctification.

479. Ligari et extingui, quoad rem praesentem conveniunt in hoc, quod "utroque modo infallibiliter fit, ut appetitus nullum inordinatum motum habere possit in sensu composito, id est, posita illa gratia, vel privilegio, quo fomes ligari, vel extingui dicitur. Cum enim appetitus, seu fomes sit potentia de se naturaliter operans, praesertim in iis motibus, qui libertatem antevertunt, non potest infallibiliter impediri, ne hoc modo operetur, nisi careat aliquo principio ad operandum requisito videlicet objecto, concursu Dei, aliove simili." - Discrepant vero in eo, quod ligari dicitur fomes, quando eo in facultate remanente, ejus actus impeditur solum per extrinsecam Dei providentiam; quatenus Deus tollit occasiones, in quibus appetitus in turpes motus prorumperet, vel denegat concursum ad tales motus, etc.: extingui autem dicitur fomes, quando neque in actu primo remanet in appetitu sensitivo dispositio ad motus inordinatos, quatenus Deus ita instruit animam intrinsecis donis (virtutibus, gratiarum copia, etc.), ut nunquam possit sensus rationem antevertere, vel ei resistere. Vide quae diximus (nn. 176. seqq.) 479. Being bound and being extinguished, with regard to the present matter, agree in this, that "in either way it infallibly comes about that the appetite cannot have any inordinate movement in the composite sense, that is, once that grace or privilege is posited by which the fomes is said to be bound or extinguished. For since the appetite, or fomes, is a potency naturally operating of itself, especially in those movements which anticipate freedom, it cannot infallibly be impeded from operating in this way unless it lacks some principle required for operating, namely an object, the concurrence of God, or something similar." - But they differ in this, that the fomes is said to be bound when, while it remains in the faculty, its act is impeded only through the extrinsic providence of God, insofar as God removes occasions in which the appetite would burst forth into shameful movements, or denies concurrence for such movements, etc. But the fomes is said to be extinguished when not even in first act does there remain in the sensitive appetite a disposition toward inordinate movements, insofar as God so furnishes the soul with intrinsic gifts (virtues, abundance of graces, etc.) that sense can never anticipate reason or resist it. See what we said above (nn. 176ff.).

480. His itaque declaratis, dicimus imprimis B. V. Mariam numquam habuisse actum fomitis. Quod

Probatur I. Ex Patribus. Auctor sermonis de Nativ. Christi (inter opera S. Cypriani) haec habet: "Spiritus S. possidebat domum suam, et templum, quod sibi consecraverat, adornabat. Servabat sacrarium suum, et sanctimoniae thalamum honorabat; laetificabant consolationes hujusmodi animam benedictam, et tanti habitatoris reverentia concupiscentiarum ludibria abigebat, legem mentis lex carnis non infestabat, rebellio nulla quietem spiritus affligebat." - In Dogmatica panoplia a Card. Mai edita, (tom. 2.), dicitur Maria "concupiscentiae nescia." - Andreas Cretensis (Orat. 2. in Dormit. Deiparae) vocat eam "eremum passionum." - Petrus Damianus (Orat. 40. in Assumpt. B. V.), dicit: "Caro Virginis ex Adam assumpta, maculas Adae non admisit, sed singularis continentiae puritas in candorem lucis aeternae conversa est." S. Bernardus (Sermo de illis verbis "Signum magnum") ait: "Nihil in ea non dico tenebrosum, sed obscurum saltem, vel minus lucidum, sed ne tepidum quidem aliquid, aut non ferventissimum liceat suspicari." - Richardus a S. Victore (l. 1. de Emman.) dicit (cap. 28.) "Virgini omnem otiositatem fuisse sublatam, solam poenam fuisse relictam;" et (cap. 32.) inquit: "in caeteris sanctis magnificum fuisse, quod a vitiis non sunt expugnati, in Virgine autem, quod nec impugnata fuit."

Prob. II. Ex ratione theologica. "Primo, quia decuit Virginem ea puritate nitere, qua major sub Deo nequit intelligi. Secundo, quia hic est quidam effectus originalis peccati, magnam indecentiam, et

cum culpa magnam habens affinitatem, isti enim motus de se mali sunt, et culpabiles nisi ignorantia, vel impotentia illos vitandi, excusat. Unde argumentor tertio ex principio supra posito, quod B. Virgo nunquam venialiter peccaverit. Nam licet posset Deus non obstante fomite, et motibus ejus, impedire omnem culpam in Beata Virgine, tamen cum sapientissime, et suavissime omnia provideat, accommodat fini media, et causam disponit, prout expedit, ad intentum effectum. Quia ergo B. Virginem ab omni culpa praeservaturus erat, eamdem fecit ab omni inordinato motu liberam, quia moraliter difficillimum est pati inordinatos motus, et venialiter saltem nunquam delinquere. Unde fit nullam mentis distractionem, vel variarum cogitationum intellectus, aut phantasiae involuntarias immutationes passam unquam fuisse. Haec enim omnia imperfectionem magnam continent, et ad fomitis inordinationem pertinent." 480. With these things therefore explained, we say first that the Blessed Virgin Mary never had an act of the fomes. This is proved:

Proof I. From the Fathers. The author of the sermon on the Nativity of Christ (among the works of St. Cyprian) has these words: "The Holy Spirit possessed his own house, and adorned the temple which he had consecrated to himself. He preserved his own sanctuary and honored the chamber of holiness. Consolations of this sort gladdened the blessed soul, and reverence for so great an inhabitant drove away the mockeries of concupiscences; the law of the flesh did not trouble the law of the mind; no rebellion afflicted the quiet of the spirit." - In the Dogmatic Panoply edited by Cardinal Mai (vol. 2), Mary is called "ignorant of concupiscence." - Andrew of Crete (Oration 2 on the Dormition of the Mother of God) calls her "a desert of passions." - Peter Damian (Oration 40 on the Assumption of the Blessed Virgin) says: "The flesh of the Virgin, taken from Adam, did not admit the stains of Adam, but the purity of singular continence was turned into the brightness of eternal light." St. Bernard (Sermon on those words "A great sign") says: "Let it be allowed to suspect in it nothing, I do not say dark, but even obscure, or less luminous, but not even anything lukewarm or not most fervent." - Richard of St. Victor (On Emmanuel, book 1, c. 28) says "that every idleness was taken away from the Virgin, and only penalty was left"; and (c. 32) says: "in the other saints it was magnificent that they were not overcome by vices, but in the Virgin, that she was not even attacked."

Proof II. From theological reason. "First, because it was fitting that the Virgin should shine with that purity greater than which cannot be understood under God. Secondly, because this is a certain effect of original sin, having great unbecomingness and great affinity with fault; for these movements of themselves are evil, and culpable unless ignorance or inability to avoid them excuses. Hence I argue thirdly from the principle posited above, that the Blessed Virgin never sinned venially. For although God could, notwithstanding the fomes and its movements, impede every fault in the Blessed Virgin, nevertheless since he provides all things most wisely and most sweetly, he adapts means to the end, and disposes the cause, as is expedient, toward the intended effect. Therefore, because he was going to preserve the Blessed Virgin from every fault, he made her free from every inordinate movement, because it is morally most difficult to suffer inordinate movements and nevertheless never to offend at least venially. Hence it follows that she never suffered any distraction of mind, or involuntary alterations of the intellect or imagination through various thoughts. For all these things contain great imperfection, and pertain to the disorder of the fomes."

481. Dicimus secundo: videtur fuisse fomes in B. V. extinctus a prima ejus sanctificatione. Quod

Prob. I. "A prima sanctificatione Virginis statuit Deus nullum motum fomitis in illa permittere: ergo non solum ligavit, sed etiam extinxit in ea fomitem. Quorsum enim fomitem in actu primo (ut ita dicam) in ea relinqueret, cum omnem actum secundum esset impediturus? maxime cum hujusmodi fomes imperfectum quid sit, et de se ad malum inclinet."

Prob. II. "Dici non potest in Virgine solum fuisse impeditos hujusmodi motus per solam extrinsecam providentiam, ut ea ratione dicatur tantum fuisse ligatus, tum quia ille modus est valde imperfectus, et ideo non est, cur Virgini tribuatur: praesertim cum non sit consentaneus ordinario modo providentiae Dei, qui causis secundis principia tribuit intrinseca ad hujusmodi effectus, et ipse solum supplet ea, quae per intrinseca principia fieri a causis secundis convenienter non possunt; tum etiam quia Beata Virgo

a principio habuit gratiam, et virtutes omnes per se, et per accidens infusas valde perfectas, quibus conjunctum est illud divinum auxilium."

Prob. III. "Adae et Evae in prima sanctificatione data sunt gratia et virtutes in gradu heroico ad hunc effectum sufficiente, sed copiosior gratia, et perfectiores virtutes datae sunt Virgini in prima sua sanctificatione, ut ex principiis supra positis constat. Unde Bernard. Epist. 174. 'ego inquit, puto quod copiosior sanctificationis benedictio in eam descenderit quae ipsius non solum sanctificaverit ortum, sed vitam ab omni peccato deinceps custodierit immunem.'" 481. We say secondly: it seems that the fomes was extinguished in the Blessed Virgin from her first sanctification. This is proved:

Proof I. "From the first sanctification of the Virgin, God determined to permit no movement of the fomes in her; therefore he not only bound but also extinguished the fomes in her. For to what purpose would he leave the fomes in first act, so to speak, in her, when he was going to impede every second act? Especially since a fomes of this sort is something imperfect, and of itself inclines toward evil."

Proof II. "It cannot be said that movements of this sort were only impeded in the Virgin through extrinsic providence alone, so that for this reason it is said only to have been bound, both because that mode is very imperfect, and therefore there is no reason why it should be attributed to the Virgin, especially since it is not consonant with the ordinary mode of God's providence, who gives to secondary causes intrinsic principles for effects of this sort, and himself only supplies those things which cannot fittingly be done by secondary causes through intrinsic principles; and also because the Blessed Virgin from the beginning had grace and all virtues, both per se and per accidens infused, very perfect, with which that divine assistance is joined."

Proof III. "To Adam and Eve in their first sanctification there were given grace and virtues in a heroic degree sufficient for this effect; but more abundant grace and more perfect virtues were given to the Virgin in her first sanctification, as is clear from the principles posited above. Hence Bernard, Epistle 174, says: 'I think that a more abundant blessing of sanctification descended upon her, which not only sanctified her birth, but thereafter guarded her life immune from every sin.'"

482. Dices: non decuit carnem aliquam omnino liberari a lege fomitis, donec Filius Dei assumeret carnem sanctam, et a fomite liberam; sicut non decuit corpus aliquod humanum ante Christi corpus gloria, et immortalitate donari. - Haec est ratio, propter quam D. Thomas 3. p. q. 27. a. 3. docet fomitem in B. V. Maria fuisse quidem ligatum in prima sanctificatione, extinctum autem solum quando Verbum concepit.

Huic tamen rationi respondet Suarez (l. c. n. 11): "Nihil Christi dignitati derogat, quod hanc perfectionem matri communicaverit inferiori modo, quam in ipso fuit: ipse enim per se habuit omnem et animae, et corporis sanctitatem, Virgo autem per ipsum: ille, ut Deus homo habuit in sua voluntate humana perfectum dominium in omnes actiones suas, et in omnia objecta, quae illas poterant excitare, et ut beatus semper actu considerabat omnia unde etiam per intrinsecam providentiam, et virtutem omnia poterat praevenire. Beata autem Virgo pro statu viae non fuit tantae perfectionis capax. - Sicut autem non derogat sanctitati animae Christi, quod antequam illa extiterit, ex merito ejus multae animae fuerint sanctificatae, etiam in gradu valde perfecto, et eximio, ita non derogat puritati et sanctitati carnis Christi, quod ante formationem ejus caro matris fuerit perfecte sanctificata usque ad extinctionem fomitis, sed hoc potius commendat providentiam, charitatem, et efficaciam meriti ipsius. - Nec est simile de perfectione gloriae, illa enim est perfectio pertinens ad terminum, in quo nullus hominum constitui debuit, nec in anima, nec in corpore ante Christum, haec autem est perfectio accommodata, et communicabilis viatori." 482. You will say: it was not fitting that any flesh be entirely freed from the law of the fomes until the Son of God should assume holy flesh, free from the fomes; just as it was not fitting that any human body be endowed with glory and immortality before the body of Christ. - This is the reason on account of which St. Thomas, III, q. 27, a. 3, teaches that the fomes in the Blessed Virgin Mary was indeed bound in her first sanctification, but extinguished only when she conceived the Word.

To this reason, however, Suarez responds (l. c., n. 11): "It in no way derogates from the dignity of Christ that he communicated this perfection to his

mother in a lower mode than it was in himself; for he had by himself every sanctity of both soul and body, but the Virgin had it through him. He, as God-man, had in his human will perfect dominion over all his actions, and over all objects which could stir them up, and as blessed he always actually considered all things; whence also by intrinsic providence and power he could prevent all things. But the Blessed Virgin, for the state of the way, was not capable of so great a perfection. - Just as it does not derogate from the sanctity of the soul of Christ that before it existed, many souls were sanctified from his merit, even in a very perfect and eminent degree, so it does not derogate from the purity and sanctity of the flesh of Christ that before its formation the flesh of his mother was perfectly sanctified even to the extinction of the fomes; rather, this commends the providence, charity, and efficacy of his merit. - Nor is it similar concerning the perfection of glory; for that is a perfection pertaining to the terminus, in which no human being ought to have been constituted, either in soul or in body, before Christ. But this is a perfection accommodated and communicable to one who is a wayfarer."

Article 4. On the Nature of Original Sin

LatineEnglish

483. Statuta existentia peccati originalis, et exemptione B. V. Mariae, de peccati originalis natura disserendum est. Ut cum ordine procedamus, breviter imprimis refutabimus falsas de hac re sententias - veram deinde accurate exponere et confirmare conabimur.

§ I.

Rejiciuntur falsae opiniones. 483. The existence of original sin and the exemption of the Blessed Virgin Mary having been established, we must discuss the nature of original sin. In order that we may proceed in due order, we shall first briefly refute the false opinions concerning this matter; then we shall endeavor accurately to set forth and confirm the true one.

§ I.

The false opinions are rejected.

484. Plures olim fuere de peccati originalis natura falsae sententiae, quarum cum aliquae jam obsoletae sint, sufficiet aliquot praecipuas referre et refutare: eo vel magis, quod veritate deinde exposita, facile erit ex ea contrarias omnes opiniones refellere. 484. In former times there were many false opinions concerning the nature of original sin. Since some of these are now obsolete, it will suffice to report and refute a few principal ones, all the more because, once the truth has then been set forth, it will be easy from it to refute all contrary opinions.

485. Juverit in antecessum adnotare quod quamvis in Conc. Tridentino, teste Card. Pallavicino (lib. 7. c. 10. n. 3.) Legati aut Praesides admonitos voluere Patres "ne quid pro certo statueretur de natura ipsa originalis culpae" de qua, eodem teste (l. c. c. 8.) in generalibus Congregationibus praeviis inter Patres et Theologos disceptatum fuit; plura tamen definita fuere, quae ad naturam originalis culpae illustrandam valde conferunt. 485. It will be useful to note in advance that, although in the Council of Trent, according to Cardinal Pallavicino (book 7, chapter 10, no. 3), the Legates or Presidents wished the Fathers to be warned "that nothing should be determined as certain concerning the nature itself of original fault," about which, according to the same witness (same place, chapter 8), there had been discussion among the Fathers and theologians in the preceding general Congregations, nevertheless many things were defined which contribute greatly to illustrating the nature of original fault.

486. Haec sunt: 1. s. V. c. 2. Adam per inobedientiae peccatum, non modo mortem et poenam corporis in omne genus humanum transfudisse, sed et peccatum, quod est mors animae - 2. can. 3. Peccatum hoc est origine unum, et inest unicuique proprium - 3. can. 4. Idem peccatum trahitur ex Adam, et contrahitur generatione - 4. can. 5. Per Baptismum remittitur

reatus originalis peccati, et tollitur totum id, quod veram et propriam peccati rationem habet. Manet tamen in baptizatis concupiscentia, quae nocere non consentientibus non valet. 486. These are: 1. Session V, chapter 2: Adam, through the sin of disobedience, transmitted into the whole human race not only death and the punishment of the body, but also sin, which is the death of the soul. 2. Canon 3: this sin is one by origin and is in each person as his own. 3. Canon 4: this same sin is drawn from Adam and is contracted by generation. 4. Canon 5: through Baptism the guilt of original sin is remitted, and the whole of that which has the true and proper ratio of sin is taken away. Concupiscence, however, remains in the baptized; it cannot harm those who do not consent.

487. Ex quibus duo statim colligimus. Primum est: omnis de peccati originalis natura sententia, quae vel uni ex praedictis doctrinae capitibus definitis contradicit, est prorsus rejicienda. - Alterum est: ad catholicum dogma tuendum, sufficit talem de originalis culpae natura statuere sententiam, quae cum doctrinae capitibus ab Ecclesia definitis penitus quadret. Si qua ergo est rationalistarum difficultas, non tam Ecclesiae doctrinam, quam privatam alicujus Theologi opinionem pro fundamento habens, sine ullo fidei discrimine transmitti poterit.

Absurdissima haeresis Illyrici. 487. From these points we at once gather two things. The first is this: every opinion concerning the nature of original sin which contradicts even one of the aforesaid defined heads of doctrine is to be rejected entirely. The second is this: for safeguarding Catholic dogma, it is sufficient to establish such an opinion concerning the nature of original fault as fully accords with the heads of doctrine defined by the Church. Therefore if there is some difficulty of the rationalists which has as its foundation not so much the Church's doctrine as the private opinion of some theologian, it can be passed over without any danger to the faith.

The most absurd heresy of Illyricus.

488. Absurda Illyrici sententia de peccati originalis natura, his continetur propositionibus. Peccatum originis, substantia est, non qualitas, vel ratio, vel aliquid ejusmodi - Peccatum originis nihil est aliud nisi substantialis imago diaboli. - Anima rationalis per peccatum primi hominis substantialiter tota corrupta est, ac transformata in imaginem diaboli ex imagine Dei: ut quemadmodum in homine mortuo forma substantialis cadaveris est loco animae, ita post peccatum Adae sit in anima forma quaedam teterrima substantialis pro ea, quae ante fuerat. - Mutatio ista non potest proprie dici generatio, vel creatio, sed transformatio, qualis est, cum vinum vertitur in acetum. 488. The absurd opinion of Illyricus concerning the nature of original sin is contained in these propositions. The sin of origin is a substance, not a quality, or a ratio, or anything of that kind. The sin of origin is nothing other than the substantial image of the devil. Through the sin of the first man the rational soul was wholly corrupted substantially and transformed from the image of God into the image of the devil, so that, just as in a dead man the substantial form of the corpse is in the place of the soul, so after Adam's sin there is in the soul a certain most hideous substantial form in place of that which had been there before. This mutation cannot properly be called generation or creation, but transformation, of the sort that occurs when wine is turned into vinegar.

489. Eumdem errorem videtur docuisse Lutherus, etsi ejus discipuli conentur eum excusare. In illa enim verba "Tunc aperti sunt oculi amborum" (Comment. c. 3. Gen.), ait: "Vide quid sequatur ex illa sententia, si statuamus justitiam originalem non fuisse naturae, sed donum quoddam superfluum, superadditum. An non sicut ponis justitiam non fuisse de essentia hominis: ita etiam sequetur, peccatum quod successit, non esse de essentia hominis?" Vid. Bellarminum (de Amiss. grat. et statu pecc. l. 5. c. 2.) 489. Luther seems to have taught the same error, although his disciples try to excuse him. For on the words, "Then the eyes of both were opened" (Commentary on

Genesis, chapter 3), he says: "See what follows from that opinion, if we hold that original justice was not of nature, but a certain superfluous, superadded gift. Just as you posit that justice was not of the essence of man, will it not likewise follow that the sin which succeeded it is not of the essence of man?" See Bellarmine, On the Loss of Grace and the State of Sin, book 5, chapter 2.

490. Sed hic error facile refutatur. Nam 1. S. Joann. dicit: Omnia per ipsum facta sunt, et sine ipso factum est nihil, Jo. 1. Sanctus autem Paulus addit: Omnis creatura Dei bona est, 1. Timoth. 4. Ex quibus duobus locis evidenter sequitur nullam substantiam, sive naturam esse malam, ac per hoc neque esse peccatum. Nam cum peccatum omnium consensu sit malum, si idem peccatum substantia esset, vel non omnis substantia esset facta a Deo, quod repugnat Evangelio, vel non omnis creatura Dei bona esset, quod repugnat Apostolo.

Nec valet dicere hujusmodi substantiam factam esse malam per transformationem, ac proinde non creari a Deo, sed produci a causa secunda. "Quemadmodum," inquit Illyricus, "mulierculae norunt lac in caseum, vel butyrum convertere, et vinum in acetum transmutare, et tamen neque dicuntur, neque sunt creatrices."

Caeteris enim omissis, nihil ista faciunt ad rem, siquidem lac et vinum, res sunt naturaliter transmutabiles, et ideo non debet videri mirum, si adhibitis ab homine naturalibus causis, illa facile transmutentur. Substantiae vero spirituales, quales sunt animae rationales, et angeli, non sunt naturaliter corruptibiles, aut substantialiter mutabiles, cum materia careant, et ideo solus Deus potest eas ex nihilo condere, aut in nihilum redigere.

2. Paradoxum Illyrici funditus destruit symbolum fidei. Nam a) Primus articulus est: "Credo in unum Deum." At Illyrici delirium tot facit Deos, quot sunt mentes in originali justitia permanentes. Nam quemadmodum originale peccatum ad substantiam hominis pertinet post lapsum Adae, ex Illyrici sententia, sic etiam originalis justitia ad substantiam hominis pertinet ante lapsum ejusdem. Quia vero proprium est solius Dei, ut sit non ex accidente dono, sed substantialiter justus, ut S. Gregorius docet hom. 14. in Evang. sequitur, ut mentes primorum hominum ante lapsum, Dii quidam essent, et nunc etiam tot sint in caelo Dii, quot sunt Angeli, originali justitia praediti. Omnes enim substantialiter justi et boni sunt.

b) Idem primus articulus docet, "Unum Deum esse creatorem omnium rerum." At si vera esset Illyrici sententia, Deus non esset creator animarum hominum, sed diabolus, quae est haeresis Manichaei. Nam post lapsum Adae ipsa humanae animae substantia est peccatum, ex Illyrici sententia; peccati autem non est auctor Deus, sed diabolus, ut idem ipse Illyricus confitetur.

c) Pugnat cum articulis fidei de Incarnatione; siquidem "Non alterius naturae (inquit S. Leo in epist. 11. ad Julianum) erat ejus caro, quam nostra, nec alio illi, quam caeteris hominibus anima est inspirata principio, quae excelleret, non diversitate generis, sed sublimitate virtutis." At ex Illyrici sententia, anima nostra peccatum est, igitur aut Christus peccatum assumpsit in unitatem personae, quo nihil absurdius fingi potest, aut animam non habuit ejusdem naturae cum nostra, quod (ut diximus) Symbolo fidei manifeste repugnat.

d) Pugnat cum articulo fidei de resurrectione. Nam non resurget eadem substantia hominis, quae nunc est, et quae per mortem desinit esse. Haec enim tota ex Illyrici sententia peccatum est, et peccatum sine dubio non resurget. Igitur alia substantia producetur, ac per hoc non erit vera resurrectio, sed nova productio. Resurrectio enim non est, nisi ejus quod cecidit.

3. Refutatur idem error ex clarissimis Patrum testimoniis. S. Basilius (orat. quod Deus non sit Auctor malor.): "Non imagineris," inquit, "propriam aliquam esse substantiam mali. Nam malitia non est aliquid subsistens." - S. Gregorius Nazianzenus (orat. in sanc. Lavacr.): "Crede," inquit, "nullam esse mali essentiam, nec per se subsistere, nec a Deo creatam." - S. Ambrosius (Hexam. l. 1. c. 8.): "Utique," inquit, "non substantialis, sed accidens est malitia." Et paulo post affirmat haeresim esse pestiferam Valentini, Marcionis et Manichaei, quod malitia sit substantia. - S. Augustinus (Confess. l. 7. c. 12.): "Malum," inquit, "illud, quod quaerebam, unde esset, non est substantia, quia si substantia esset, bonum esset." Et in explicatione Ps. 73. "Quaesivi," inquit, "quid esset iniquitas, et non inveni substantiam, sed a summa substantia, te Deo, detortam in infimam voluntatis perversionem." Et lib. adversus Julianum cap. 3. "Non," inquit, "resistimus Manichaeis, nisi obtineamus, non esse mala orta nisi ex bonis, nec ea mala substantiam esse, sed substantiarum vitia creatarum." Haec nobis de haeresi tam manifesta attigisse sufficiat. Qui plura

cupit, adeat Bellarminum (l. c. capp. 2. 3.), a quo fere omnia excripsimus. 490. But this error is easily refuted. For, first, St. John says: "All things were made through him, and without him nothing was made" (John 1). And St. Paul adds: "Every creature of God is good" (1 Timothy 4). From these two passages it evidently follows that no substance or nature is evil, and therefore neither is it sin. For since by the agreement of all sin is evil, if that same sin were a substance, either not every substance would have been made by God, which is contrary to the Gospel, or not every creature of God would be good, which is contrary to the Apostle.

Nor is it valid to say that a substance of this sort has been made evil through transformation, and therefore is not created by God but produced by a secondary cause. "In the same way," says Illyricus, "little women know how to turn milk into cheese or butter, and to change wine into vinegar, and yet they neither are called nor are creators."

For, passing over other points, these examples have nothing to do with the matter, since milk and wine are things naturally capable of transmutation; and therefore it ought not seem strange if, once natural causes have been applied by a human being, they are easily transmuted. But spiritual substances, such as rational souls and angels, are not naturally corruptible or substantially mutable, since they lack matter; and therefore God alone can found them from nothing or reduce them to nothing.

2. The paradox of Illyricus destroys the creed of faith from the foundations. For a) the first article is: "I believe in one God." But the madness of Illyricus makes as many gods as there are minds remaining in original justice. For just as original sin pertains to the substance of man after the fall of Adam, according to Illyricus's opinion, so also original justice pertains to the substance of man before that fall. But because it is proper to God alone to be just not from an accidental gift, but substantially, as St. Gregory teaches in homily 14 on the Gospels, it follows that the minds of the first human beings before the fall would have been certain gods, and that even now there are as many gods in heaven as there are angels endowed with original justice. For they are all substantially just and good.

b) The same first article teaches that "one God is the creator of all things." But if Illyricus's opinion were true, God would not be the creator of human souls, but the devil would be, which is the heresy of Manichaeus. For after the fall of Adam the very substance of the human soul is sin, according to Illyricus's opinion; but God is not the author of sin, the devil is, as Illyricus himself admits.

c) It conflicts with the articles of faith concerning the Incarnation, since "his flesh was not of another nature," says St. Leo in epistle 11 to Julian, "than ours, nor was a soul breathed into him by another principle than into other human beings, though it excelled not by diversity of kind, but by loftiness of virtue." But according to Illyricus's opinion our soul is sin; therefore either Christ assumed sin into the unity of his person, than which nothing more absurd can be imagined, or he did not have a soul of the same nature as ours, which, as we have said, is manifestly contrary to the creed of faith.

d) It conflicts with the article of faith concerning the resurrection. For the same substance of man which now exists, and which ceases to be through death, will not rise again. For this whole substance, according to Illyricus's opinion, is sin, and sin undoubtedly will not rise again. Therefore another substance will be produced, and by this very fact there will not be a true resurrection, but a new production. For resurrection is only of that which has fallen.

3. The same error is refuted from the clearest testimonies of the Fathers. St. Basil, in the oration That God Is Not the Author of Evils, says: "Do not imagine that there is some proper substance of evil. For malice is not something subsisting." St. Gregory Nazianzen, in the oration on Holy Baptism, says: "Believe that there is no essence of evil, neither subsisting through itself nor created by God." St. Ambrose, Hexaemeron, book 1, chapter 8, says: "Certainly malice is not substantial, but accidental." And a little later he affirms that it is the pestiferous heresy of Valentinus, Marcion, and Manichaeus that malice is a substance. St. Augustine, Confessions, book 7, chapter 12, says: "That evil which I was asking whence it was, is not a substance, because if it were a substance, it would be good." And in the explanation of Psalm 73 he says: "I asked what iniquity was, and I did not find a substance, but a perversity of the will turned away from the highest substance, you, O God, toward the lowest things." And in the book against Julian, chapter 3, he says: "We do not resist the Manichaeans unless we maintain that evils have arisen only from goods, and that these evils are not a substance, but vices of created

substances." Let it suffice for us to have touched upon so manifest a heresy. Whoever desires more should go to Bellarmine (same place, chapters 2 and 3), from whom we have copied almost everything.

491. Non pauci inter Lutheranos peccatum originis non distinguunt a peccato actuali. Ex quo sequeretur parvulos originali peccato minime esse infectos. Hic ergo error, ex iis, quae de peccati originalis in omnes propagatione disseruimus, satis superque refutatur. Vid. Bellarm. (l. c. cap. 4.) 491. Not a few among the Lutherans do not distinguish the sin of origin from actual sin. From this it would follow that little children are by no means infected with original sin. Therefore this error is refuted sufficiently and more than sufficiently from the things which we have discussed concerning the propagation of original sin into all. See Bellarmine (same place, chapter 4).

492. Communis tamen tum Lutheranorum, tum Calvinistarum error in hac re est, quod peccatum originale proprie consistit in corruptione naturae, sive concupiscentia; quae cum maneat post baptismum, manere, aiunt, peccatum, quamvis credentibus non imputetur. Testimonia ipsa Lutheri et Calvini videri possunt apud Bellarm. (l. c. cap. 5.): contenti erimus referre verba Amesii Calviniani (apud Vitum Ebermannum in Vindiciis Bellarminianis), qui (l. 5. c. 5.) ait: "Quaestio est, utrum corruptio naturae (mortalitas corporis, et animi ignorantia, et infirmitas, et boni agendi difficultas), ac praesertim concupiscentia, qualis invenitur etiam in baptizatis, et justificatis, sit proprie peccatum? Pontificii negant, nos affirmamus." Et cap. 7.: "Sola ordinatio ad poenam tollitur in remissione peccati, non vero dignitas. Ordinationis autem illius actualis fundamentum proximum est justitia Dei, persequens peccatum vindicta: et hoc fundamentum post gratiam remissionis in Christo, non manet." Et infra: "Deus quando remittit, non judicat peccatum non esse; sed ex gratia judicat, non esse vindicta prosequendum." 492. Nevertheless the common error of both Lutherans and Calvinists in this matter is that original sin properly consists in the corruption of nature, or concupiscence; and since this remains after baptism, they say that sin remains, although it is not imputed to believers. The testimonies themselves of Luther and Calvin can be seen in Bellarmine (same place, chapter 5). We shall be content to report the words of the Calvinist Amesius (in Vitus Ebermannus, Bellarminian Vindications), who says (book 5, chapter 5): "The question is whether the corruption of nature (the mortality of the body, and the ignorance and weakness of the soul, and the difficulty of doing good), and especially concupiscence, such as is found even in the baptized and justified, is properly sin. The Papists deny it; we affirm it." And in chapter 7: "Only the ordination to punishment is taken away in the remission of sin, but not the worthiness. The proximate foundation of that actual ordination is the justice of God, pursuing sin with vengeance; and this foundation, after the grace of remission in Christ, does not remain." And below: "When God remits, he does not judge that sin does not exist; but by grace he judges that it is not to be pursued with vengeance."

493. Sed hic etiam error, qui damnatus fuit in Conc. Trid. sess. 5. can. 5., facile refutatur. Nam 1. S. Jacobus cap. 1. ait: "Unusquisque tentatur a concupiscentia sua abstractus, et illectus. Deinde concupiscentia cum conceperit, parit peccatum, peccatum vero cum consummatum fuerit generat mortem." "Quatuor res distingui videmus ab Apostolo, concupiscentiam, idest, potentiam appetendi pronam ad malum, et tres ejus motus, suggestionem, delectationem, et consensum. Sic enim eos motus appellant Theologi post Gregorium homil. 16. in Evangelia, et Bedam in commentario hujus loci. Suggestio est prima illa apprehensio rei delectabilis, quae abstrahit, et illicit animam, et siquidem trahat ad delectationem cum aliquo imperfecto consensu, sequitur secundus motus, de quo dicit Jacobus, concupiscentia, cum conceperit, idest, cum illexerit, parit peccatum. Denique si suggestio adjuncta delectatione, trahat ad perfectum consensum, existit tertius motus, de quo dicit Apostolus, peccatum vero cum consummatum fuerit, generat mortem. Non enim per consummatum intelligi debet solum peccatum operis, sed quodcumque peccatum, cui plenus accesserit voluntatis assensus. Nam

dubitari non potest, quin desiderium adulterii, si voluntarium sit, generet mortem, cum Dominus dicat Matth. 5. "Qui viderit mulierem ad concupiscendum eam, jam moechatus est eam in corde suo." Et eadem est ratio de aliis similibus. Jam igitur concupiscentiam, idest, potentiam, pronam, et primum ejus motum non appellat B. Jacobus peccatum. Partum imperfectum, hoc est, delectationem non plene deliberatam, peccatum vocat, sed non mortale; denique partum perfectum, hoc est, desiderium cum pleno consensu, peccatum plane mortale esse definit.

Unde S. Augustinus (cont. Julian. l. 6. c. 15. n. 41.) inquit: "Sed cum dicit Apostolus Jacobus, unusquisque tentatur a concupiscentia sua, abstractus et illectus: deinde concupiscentia cum conceperit, parit peccatum: profecto in his verbis partus a pariente discernitur: pariens enim est concupiscentia, partus peccatum. Sed concupiscentia non parit, nisi conceperit; non concipit, nisi illexerit, hoc est, ad malum perpetrandum obtinuerit voluntatis assensum."

2. Rom. 8. legitur: "Nihil ergo damnationis est iis, qui sunt in Christo Jesu." "Quo loco, cum in 6. et 7. cap. multa dixisset de concupiscentia, quam modo peccatum per metonymiam, modo legem membrorum appellaverat, tandem concludit, nihil esse timendum justificatis in Christo, etsi concupiscentiam illam adhuc sentiant in membris, repugnante legi mentis. Nec tam significat, nullam esse condemnationem justificatis in Christo ob concupiscentiam, quam nihil esse in eis condemnatione dignum, sive nullam esse causam condemnationis. Quod enim nondum essent actu, ac re ipsa condemnati, perspicuum erat, quia sententia damnationis non fertur, nisi post hanc vitam. Habemus igitur ex hoc loco, concupiscentiam, qualis remanet in renatis, non esse peccatum ex natura sua."

Unde S. Augustinus (ep. 200. ad Assellicum), ait: "Quamvis insint, dum sumus in corpore mortis hujus, desideria peccati, si nulli eorum adhiberemus assensum, non esset unde diceremus Patri nostro, qui est in coelis, dimitte nobis debita nostra."

3. Si concupiscentia sumatur pro motu seu actu, cui voluntas consentit, erit peccatum actuale non originale in adultis; et non potest esse in infantibus rationis usu carentibus, in quibus tamen est peccatum originale. "Si sumatur pro actu involuntario, idest, pro primis concupiscentiae motibus quibus mens resistit, nullum peccatum est; igitur multo minus peccatum erit, si sumatur pro ipsa pronitate ad actum. Consequentiam hujus argumenti adversarii concedunt, quia pronitatem ideo peccatum esse volunt, quoniam existimant eam pugnare cum lege Dei: certum autem est, eam non pugnare cum lege Dei, si actus ejus cum eadem lege non pugnat." - Prob. ergo anteced. Concupiscentia in pueris, amentibus et dormientibus peccatum non est, quia non est in potestate eorum non concupiscere, ut docent S. Augustinus lib. 10. Confession. cap. 30, S. Prosper lib. 3. de vita contemplativa cap. 6, et S. Ambrosius lib. 1. de officiis cap. 21. At non est etiam in potestate virorum sapientium et vigilantium, non habere primos illos concupiscentiae motus, ut experientia docet; igitur illi peccata non sunt, et vere dixit beatus Augustinus lib. 1. de civit. Dei cap. 25. "Quanto magis concupiscentialis inobedientia absque culpa est in corpore non consentientis, si absque culpa est in corpore dormientis?" - Vid. Bellarmin. (l. c. capp. 4-14.)

Sententiae quorumdam Theologorum. 493. But this error also, which was condemned in the Council of Trent, session 5, canon 5, is easily refuted. For, first, St. James says in chapter 1: "Each one is tempted, drawn away and enticed by his own concupiscence. Then concupiscence, when it has conceived, brings forth sin; but sin, when it has been consummated, generates death." "We see four things distinguished by the Apostle: concupiscence, that is, the power of appetition prone to evil, and its three motions: suggestion, delectation, and consent. For theologians call these motions by these names after Gregory, homily 16 on the Gospels, and Bede in his commentary on this passage. Suggestion is that first apprehension of a delightful thing, which draws away and entices the soul; and if it draws the soul to delectation with some imperfect consent, the second motion follows. Of this James says, concupiscence, when it has conceived, that is, when it has enticed, brings forth sin. Finally, if suggestion joined with delectation draws to perfect consent, the third motion exists, of which the Apostle says, sin, when it has been consummated, generates death. For by 'consummated' one must not understand only a sin of deed, but any sin whatever to which the full assent of the will has acceded. For there can be no doubt that the desire of adultery, if it is voluntary, generates death, since the Lord says in Matthew 5: 'Whoever looks at a woman so as to desire her has already committed adultery with her in his heart.' And the same account holds for other similar cases. Therefore Blessed James

does not call concupiscence, that is, the prone power, and its first motion, sin. The imperfect offspring, that is, delectation not fully deliberated, he calls sin, but not mortal sin; finally, the perfect offspring, that is, desire with full consent, he defines to be plainly mortal sin.

Hence St. Augustine, Against Julian, book 6, chapter 15, no. 41, says: "But when the Apostle James says, each one is tempted by his own concupiscence, drawn away and enticed; then concupiscence, when it has conceived, brings forth sin: certainly in these words the offspring is distinguished from the one giving birth. For concupiscence is the one giving birth; sin is the offspring. But concupiscence does not give birth unless it has conceived; it does not conceive unless it has enticed, that is, unless it has obtained the assent of the will for perpetrating evil."

2. In Romans 8 it is read: "There is therefore no condemnation for those who are in Christ Jesus." "In this passage, after he had said many things in chapters 6 and 7 concerning concupiscence, which he had called now sin by metonymy, now the law of the members, he finally concludes that nothing is to be feared by those justified in Christ, even if they still feel that concupiscence in their members resisting the law of the mind. Nor does he mean so much that there is no condemnation for those justified in Christ on account of concupiscence, as that there is nothing in them worthy of condemnation, or no cause of condemnation. For that they were not yet actually and in very fact condemned was clear, because the sentence of damnation is not passed except after this life. Therefore from this passage we have that concupiscence, such as remains in the reborn, is not sin from its own nature."

Hence St. Augustine, epistle 200 to Asellicus, says: "Although the desires of sin are in us while we are in the body of this death, if we were to give assent to none of them, there would be no source from which we should say to our Father who is in heaven, forgive us our debts."

3. If concupiscence is taken for a motion or act to which the will consents, it will be actual sin, not original sin, in adults; and it cannot exist in infants lacking the use of reason, in whom, nevertheless, there is original sin. "If it is taken for an involuntary act, that is, for the first motions of concupiscence which the mind resists, it is no sin; therefore much less will it be sin if it is taken for the proneness itself toward the act. The adversaries concede the consequence of this argument, because they wish proneness to be sin for this reason, that they think it conflicts with the law of God; but it is certain that it does not conflict with the law of God if its act does not conflict with that same law." Therefore the antecedent is proved. Concupiscence in children, the mentally unsound, and those sleeping is not sin, because it is not in their power not to feel concupiscence, as St. Augustine teaches in book 10 of the Confessions, chapter 30; St. Prosper in book 3 of On the Contemplative Life, chapter 6; and St. Ambrose in book 1 of On Duties, chapter 21. But neither is it in the power of wise and waking men not to have those first motions of concupiscence, as experience teaches; therefore those motions are not sins, and Blessed Augustine truly said in book 1 of The City of God, chapter 25: "How much more is concupiscential disobedience without fault in the body of one not consenting, if it is without fault in the body of one sleeping?" See Bellarmine (same place, chapters 4-14).

Opinions of certain theologians.

494. I. Docuerunt nonnulli Theologi corpus Adami post peccatum fuisse infectum aliqua morbida qualitate seu contagione. - Hanc qualitatem non solum fuisse in carne, sed etiam in semine Adae. Hinc fieri, ut omnes posteri, qui ex Adami semine nascuntur, contrahant eamdem qualitatem in carne. Ex hac qualitate carnis derivari similem qualitatem in animam, idque fieri in puncto conceptionis, quando anima carni conjungitur. Utramque qualitatem tam quae in anima, quam quae in corpore est, vocari posse concupiscentiam. - Solam posteriorem, quae in anima est, esse peccatum originale. - Hanc eamdem excitare in nobis prava desideria et concupiscentias. 494. I. Some theologians taught that the body of Adam after sin was infected by some morbid quality or contagion. This quality, they said, was not only in the flesh, but also in the seed of Adam. Hence it comes about that all descendants who are born from Adam's seed contract the same quality in the flesh. From this quality of the flesh a similar quality is derived into the soul, and this happens at the point of conception, when the soul is joined to the flesh. Each quality, both the

one which is in the soul and the one which is in the body, can be called concupiscence. Only the latter, which is in the soul, is original sin. This same quality excites evil desires and concupiscences in us.

495. At vero vitium concupiscentiae minime consistere in positiva aliqua qualitate superaddita patebit ex dicendis de effectibus peccati originalis. - Etiamsi daretur haec positiva qualitas in corpore, non apparet quomodo possit animam inficere aliam similem qualitatem malam in ea producendo. - Patebit ex dicendis de vera peccati originalis natura, nullam illud ponere positivam in anima qualitatem. Illa positiva qualitas, quam ipsi concupiscentiam vocant, vel tollitur per baptismum, vel non tollitur. Si tollitur, jam in homine baptizato non amplius est concupiscentia, quod constat esse falsum. Si non tollitur, jam peccatum originale manet post baptismum, quod est haereticum. - Nec valet dicere manere quidem, sed non imputari ad culpam: hic enim est error haereticorum. 495. But in truth, that the vice of concupiscence by no means consists in some positive superadded quality will be clear from what must be said concerning the effects of original sin. Even if this positive quality in the body were granted, it is not apparent how it could infect the soul by producing in it another similar evil quality. It will be clear from what must be said concerning the true nature of original sin that it posits no positive quality in the soul. That positive quality which they call concupiscence is either taken away through baptism or is not taken away. If it is taken away, then in a baptized person there is no longer concupiscence, which is plainly false. If it is not taken away, then original sin remains after baptism, which is heretical. Nor is it valid to say that it indeed remains, but is not imputed as fault; for this is the error of the heretics.

496. Sed frustra immoraremur in hac sententia refutanda, cujus falsitas sat est aperta, et quam nemo jam est qui doceat. Vid. Bellarm. (l. c. cap. 15.) 496. But we would be lingering in vain in refuting this opinion, whose falsity is sufficiently open, and which there is now no one who teaches. See Bellarmine (same place, chapter 15).

497. II. Altera Theologorum sententia hic commemoranda ea est, cujus meminit S. Anselmus (de Concept. Virg. et orig. pecc. capp. 25. 26.), et quam deinde renovarunt Albertus Pighius, et Ambrosius Catharinus. Dicebant "nasci Adae posteros caritate et justitia privatos, destitutos etiam perfecti dominii, et subjectionis rationalem mentem inter, ac sentientem appetitum et corpus vinculo, itemque poenae obnoxios. Haec illis omnia intime inesse: verum nihil esse eorum, quo peccatores constituantur, ac denominentur. - Peccatum originis quod investigatur, et ex quo praedicta proveniunt omnia, tamquam effectus ex causa, distingui non oportere ab illa prima inobedientia, qua praeceptum de ligno scientiae non gustando violavit Adamus. Unum idemque omnino omnibus inesse hominibus peccatum, quod originale dicitur: ipsumque omnino, quod commisit Adam, in posteros esse per imputationem." 497. II. The other opinion of theologians to be mentioned here is the one which St. Anselm mentions (On the Conception of the Virgin and Original Sin, chapters 25 and 26), and which Albert Pighius and Ambrosius Catharinus later renewed. They used to say "that Adam's descendants are born deprived of charity and justice, also destitute of the bond of perfect dominion and subjection between the rational mind, the sentient appetite, and the body, and likewise subject to punishment. All these things are intimately in them; but there is nothing among them by which they are constituted and named sinners. The sin of origin which is being investigated, and from which all the aforesaid things come forth as effects from a cause, ought not to be distinguished from that first disobedience by which Adam violated the command not to taste of the tree of knowledge. One and the very same sin, which is called original, is wholly in all human beings; and the very sin which Adam committed is in his descendants through imputation."

498. Quoniam cum Catholicis agitur, sufficit huic sententiae sequentes Bellarmini (l. c. cap. 16.) animadversiones opponere. "Extat apertissima Concilii

Tridentini Ecumenici definitio, in 5. sess. ubi quatuor sententiae leguntur de peccato originali, quae sunt quatuor argumenta contra Pighii, Catharinique doctrinam. Docet in primis Concilium, peccatum originis propagatione, non imitatione transfundi. At quod est unum numero non propagatur, nec vere transfunditur. Sicut etiam propagari et transfundi non potest, quod statim peractum transiit, et jam nusquam est, et nihil est."

"Docet secundo idem Concilium, peccatum originis inesse unicuique proprium. At peccatum illud unum Adami commune omnibus esse potest, proprium unicuique esse non potest. Tertio docet, per baptismi gratiam remitti parvulis id totum, quod habet in eis veram, ac propriam peccati rationem. Erit igitur aliquid in parvulis, quod veram et propriam peccati rationem habeat, quod certe de peccato Adami dici non potest, cum illud in parvulis non inhaereat. Postremo docet, peccatum originis remitti, non esse, non imputari, sed vere tolli. At si peccatum originis nihil esset aliud, nisi peccatum Adae posteris per imputationem communicatum, certe sequeretur, illud remitti, nihil esse aliud, nisi non amplius imputari. Habemus igitur sententiam Catharini et Pighii, cum Tridentino Concilio non obscure pugnare." 498. Since we are dealing with Catholics, it is enough to oppose to this opinion the following observations of Bellarmine (same place, chapter 16). "There exists the most open definition of the Ecumenical Council of Trent, in session 5, where four statements are read concerning original sin, which are four arguments against the doctrine of Pighius and Catharinus. First, the Council teaches that the sin of origin is transmitted by propagation, not by imitation. But that which is numerically one is not propagated, nor is it truly transmitted. Likewise, that which immediately passed away once completed, and now is nowhere and is nothing, cannot be propagated and transmitted."

"Second, the same Council teaches that the sin of origin is in each one as his own. But that one sin of Adam can be common to all; it cannot be proper to each one. Third, it teaches that through the grace of baptism the whole of that which has in little children the true and proper ratio of sin is remitted. Therefore there will be something in little children which has the true and proper ratio of sin, which certainly cannot be said of Adam's sin, since that sin does not inhere in little children. Finally, it teaches that the sin of origin is remitted, not that it is not, nor that it is not imputed, but that it is truly taken away. But if the sin of origin were nothing other than Adam's sin communicated to his descendants through imputation, certainly it would follow that for it to be remitted is nothing other than for it no longer to be imputed. Therefore we have that the opinion of Catharinus and Pighius conflicts not obscurely with the Council of Trent."

499. Talis debet esse explicatio naturae labis originalis, ut veram peccati rationem prae se ferat, prout definitum vidimus a Conc. Trid. Ut hoc innotescat duo hic praestabimus: 1. Veram peccati notionem delineabimus. - 2. Eadem peccato originali erit accommodanda. 499. The explanation of the nature of original stain must be such that it presents the true ratio of sin, as we saw was defined by the Council of Trent. In order that this may become known, we shall do two things here: 1. we shall delineate the true notion of sin; 2. that same notion will be accommodated to original sin.

500. I. Quare notandum est imprimis, peccati nomen, etiam in Sacris litteris, multiplici sensu sumi. Nam sumitur 1. pro poena peccati; Lev. 20. dicitur: "Portabunt ambo peccatum suum, sine liberis morientur." 2. Mach. 12. "Sancta ergo et salubris est cogitatio, pro defunctis exorare, ut a peccatis solvantur." - 2. Pro effectu peccati praeteriti, et causa novi; ad Rom. 7. "Jam non ego operor illud, sed quod habitat in me, peccatum;" de quo Trident. Sess. 5. in decreto de pecc. orig. ait: "Hanc concupiscentiam, quam aliquando Apostolus peccatum appellat. S. Synodus declarat, Ecclesiam Catholicam nunquam intellexisse peccatum appellari, quod vere et proprie in renatis peccatum sit; sed quia ex peccato est, et ad peccatum inclinat." - 3. Pro materia, in qua vel circa quam peccatur; sic vitulus aureus peccatum a Moyse dicitur Deut. 9. "Peccatum autem vestrum, quod feceratis, id est vitulum, arripiens igne combussi." - 4. Pro hostia et sacrificio pro peccatis oblato; sic Oseae 4. v. 8. dicitur: "Peccata populi mei comedent Sacerdotes." Et 2. ad Cor. 5. de Christo: "Eum, qui non noverat peccatum, pro nobis peccatum fecit, ut nos, efficeremur justitia Dei in ipso." - 5. Pro defectu morali, seu inordinatione voluntatis, quae

homini sit impedimento, quominus ad finem ultimum seu beatitudinem pervenire possit. Haec est propria peccati acceptio; et de hac agitur in praesenti quaestione. 500. I. Therefore it must first be noted that the name of sin, even in Sacred Scripture, is taken in multiple senses. For it is taken: 1. for the punishment of sin; in Leviticus 20 it is said: "Both shall bear their sin; they shall die without children." 2 Maccabees 12: "It is therefore a holy and wholesome thought to pray for the dead, that they may be loosed from sins." 2. For the effect of a past sin and the cause of a new one; Romans 7: "Now it is no longer I who do it, but sin that dwells in me." Concerning this, Trent, session 5, in the decree on original sin, says: "This concupiscence, which the Apostle sometimes calls sin, the holy Synod declares that the Catholic Church has never understood to be called sin because it is truly and properly sin in the reborn, but because it is from sin and inclines to sin." 3. For the matter in which, or concerning which, one sins; thus the golden calf is called sin by Moses in Deuteronomy 9: "But your sin which you had made, that is, the calf, I took and burned with fire." 4. For the victim and sacrifice offered for sins; thus Hosea 4:8 says: "The priests shall eat the sins of my people." And 2 Corinthians 5 says of Christ: "Him who knew no sin, he made sin for us, that we might be made the justice of God in him." 5. For a moral defect, or an inordination of the will, which is an impediment to a human being's being able to arrive at the ultimate end or beatitude. This is the proper acceptance of sin; and this is what is at issue in the present question.

501. Peccatum proprie dictum bifariam accipi solet. Uno modo pro libera transgressione praecepti: et est peccatum actuale. Hoc definitur a S. Augustino (l. 22. cont. Faustum c. 27.): "Factum, vel dictum, vel concupitum aliquid contra aeternam legem." Et a D. Thoma (q. 4. de malo, art. 2.): "Motus voluntatis ... absque ordine conveniente ad debitum finem: quae quidem inordinatio est aversio ab incommutabili bono. Et hoc est quasi formale ... nam formalis ratio moralis actus accipitur per comparationem ad finem." Alio modo accipitur pro statu perseverante aversionis a Deo ultimo fine, sub displicentia et improbatione Dei. "Nam sicut qui a sole avertitur, manet aversus in tenebris, donec ad solem iterum revertatur: et qui ab aliquo recedit, manet ea distantia, donec iterum accedat; sic etiam qui per peccatum a Deo avertitur, et recedit, non solum dum peccat, sed etiam postquam peccavit manet a Deo aversus, et longe dissitus, donec per poenitentiam convertatur, et revertatur ad Deum." Unde qui peccatum commiserunt quamdiu eorum mala voluntas non retractatur, dicuntur proprie et formaliter peccatores, dicuntur esse in peccato, habere peccatum, etc. 501. Sin properly so called is usually taken in two ways. In one way it is taken for a free transgression of a precept, and this is actual sin. This is defined by St. Augustine (Against Faustus, book 22, chapter 27) as "something done, spoken, or desired against the eternal law." And by St. Thomas (De Malo, question 4, article 2) as "a motion of the will ... without fitting order to the due end; and this inordination is aversion from the unchangeable good. And this is as it were formal ... for the formal ratio of a moral act is taken by comparison to the end." In another way it is taken for the persevering state of aversion from God as ultimate end, under the displeasure and disapproval of God. "For just as one who is turned away from the sun remains turned away in darkness until he turns again to the sun; and one who recedes from something remains at that distance until he approaches again; so also one who through sin is turned away from God and recedes from him, not only while he sins, but also after he has sinned, remains turned away from God and far removed, until through repentance he is converted and returns to God." Hence those who have committed sin, as long as their evil will is not retracted, are properly and formally called sinners; they are said to be in sin, to have sin, and so forth.

502. Si homo non fuisset elevatus ad finem et ordinem supernaturalem, peccatum habituale absolveretur privatione debitae ordinationis ad Deum ultimum finem naturalem. Sed in ordine supernaturali, homo consors factus est divinae naturae, filius Dei adoptivus, ordinatus ad finem supernaturalem, nempe ad visionem Dei intuitivam: quae omnia ei conferuntur per gratiam sanctificantem intrinsece ei inhaerentem. Quemadmodum ergo in ordine supernaturali homo dicitur

ad Deum conversus, vel ad Deum debite ordinatus per gratiam sanctificantem; ita e contra dicitur a Deo aversus, non convenienter ad Deum ordinatus, per privationem gratiae sanctificantis. Itaque, si peccatum habituale est status perseverantis aversionis a Deo ultimo fine; in ordine supernaturali erit status perseverantis privationis gratiae sanctificantis. 502. If man had not been elevated to a supernatural end and order, habitual sin would be completed by the privation of due ordination to God as the ultimate natural end. But in the supernatural order, man has been made a sharer of the divine nature, an adoptive son of God, ordained to a supernatural end, namely to the intuitive vision of God; all of which are conferred upon him through sanctifying grace intrinsically inhering in him. Therefore just as in the supernatural order man is said to be turned toward God, or duly ordered to God, through sanctifying grace, so contrariwise he is said to be turned away from God, not suitably ordered to God, through the privation of sanctifying grace. And so, if habitual sin is the state of persevering aversion from God as ultimate end, in the supernatural order it will be the state of persevering privation of sanctifying grace.

503. Dicimus privationis gratiae sanctificantis. Nam merito notat D. Thomas (2. sent. dist. 30. art. 2.): "Defectus simplicem negationem alicujus boni importat. Sed malum, nomen privationis est. Unde carentia alicujus etiamsi non sit natum haberi, defectus potest dici; sed non potest dici malum, nisi sit defectus illius boni quod natum est haberi. Unde carentia vitae in lapide potest dici defectus, sed non malum.... Et sicut illud naturae donum (justitia originalis collata non solum personae Adae, sed in eo humanae naturae universae) fuit, et fuisset in totam naturam propagatum, homine in justitia persistente; ita etiam et privatio illius boni in totam naturam producitur, quasi privatio, et vitium naturae; ad idem enim genus privatio, et habitus referuntur." 503. We say: of the privation of sanctifying grace. For St. Thomas rightly notes (2 Sentences, distinction 30, article 2): "Defect imports the simple negation of some good. But evil is a name of privation. Hence the lack of something, even if it is not naturally suited to be had, can be called a defect; but it cannot be called an evil unless it is the defect of that good which is naturally suited to be had. Hence the lack of life in a stone can be called a defect, but not an evil.... And just as that gift of nature (original justice conferred not only on the person of Adam, but in him on universal human nature) was, and would have been, propagated into the whole nature if man had persisted in justice, so also the privation of that good is produced into the whole nature as a privation and vice of nature; for privation and habit are referred to the same genus."

504. Ex his sequitur 1. quod asserentes peccatum habituale consistere in perseverante aversione a Deo idem dicunt ac nos, qui asserimus illud consistere in privatione gratiae sanctificantis. Illa enim aversio non dicit aliquid positivum, sed aliquid negativum vel privativum; dicit nempe defectum debitae conversionis ad Deum. Haec autem debita conversio ad Deum habetur per gratiam sanctificantem; status ergo privationis gratiae sanctificantis est status aversionis a Deo, status peccati.

Sequitur 2. quod asserentes peccatum habituale consistere in macula veluti relicta in anima per actum peccati, idem dicunt ac nos. Macula enim nihil aliud est nisi privatio quaedam nitoris animae; in statu praesenti nitor animae debet haberi per gratiam sanctificantem; hujus ergo privatio erit privatio nitoris, macula, peccatum. 504. From these things it follows, first, that those who assert that habitual sin consists in persevering aversion from God say the same thing as we do, who assert that it consists in the privation of sanctifying grace. For that aversion does not signify something positive, but something negative or privative; namely, it signifies the defect of due conversion to God. But this due conversion to God is had through sanctifying grace; therefore the state of privation of sanctifying grace is the state of aversion from God, the state of sin.

Second, it follows that those who assert that habitual sin consists in a stain, as if left in the soul by the act of sin, say the same thing as we do. For a stain is nothing other than a certain privation of the splendor of the soul; in the present state, the splendor of the soul must be

had through sanctifying grace; therefore the privation of this will be the privation of splendor, a stain, sin.

505. II. Ut tradita generalis notio peccati applicetur peccato originali, quod est verum peccatum, notamus imprimis peccatum originale considerari posse in Adamo, qui illud commisit - et in ejus posteris, qui illud contrahunt. - Unde distingui solet peccatum originale originans, quod fuit in Adamo; et peccatum originale originatum, quod est in posteris ejus: illud est causa, istud effectus. "Nam aliud fuit," inquit S. Anselmus (de pecc. orig. c. 26.), "peccatum Adae, aliud est peccatum infantium: illud enim fuit causa, istud effectus. Adam caruit debita justitia, non quia alius, sed quia ipse deseruit: infantes carent ipsa, non quia ipsi, sed quoniam alius dereliquit." Unde etiam distinctio peccati in peccatum personae, et peccatum naturae: prius propria et personali voluntate committitur et contrahitur: posterius ab Adamo praevaricatore per generationem contrahunt posteri ejus. "Est peccatum a natura," inquit S. Anselmus (de conc. Virg. et orig. pecc. c. 23. alias 21.), "et est peccatum a persona. Itaque quod est a persona, potest dici personale: quod autem a natura, naturale; quod dicitur originale. Et sicut personale transit ad naturam, ita naturale ad personam." - Et D. Thomas, 2. sent. dist. 30. art. 2.: "Sicut autem est quoddam bonum, quod respicit naturam, et quoddam bonum quod respicit personam; ita etiam est quaedam culpa naturae, et quaedam personae. Unde ad culpam personae requiritur voluntas personae, sicut patet in culpa actuali, quae per actum personae committitur; ad culpam vero naturae non requiritur, nisi voluntas in natura illa." 505. II. In order that the general notion of sin handed down may be applied to original sin, which is true sin, we first note that original sin can be considered in Adam, who committed it, and in his descendants, who contract it. Hence original sin is usually distinguished into original sin originating, which was in Adam, and original sin originated, which is in his descendants: the former is cause, the latter effect. "For the sin of Adam was one thing," says St. Anselm (On Original Sin, chapter 26), "and the sin of infants is another. For the former was the cause, the latter the effect. Adam lacked due justice not because another abandoned it, but because he himself abandoned it; infants lack it not because they themselves abandoned it, but because another abandoned it." Hence also there is the distinction of sin into sin of the person and sin of nature: the former is committed and contracted by one's own and personal will; the latter Adam's descendants contract by generation from Adam the prevaricator. "There is sin from nature," says St. Anselm (On the Conception of the Virgin and Original Sin, chapter 23, elsewhere 21), "and there is sin from the person. And so what is from the person can be called personal; but what is from nature can be called natural, which is called original. And just as the personal passes to the nature, so the natural passes to the person." And St. Thomas, 2 Sentences, distinction 30, article 2: "Just as there is a certain good which regards the nature, and a certain good which regards the person, so also there is a certain fault of nature and a certain fault of the person. Hence for fault of the person the will of the person is required, as is clear in actual fault, which is committed through the act of the person; but for fault of nature nothing is required except will in that nature."

506. Jamvero nihil est hic dicendum de peccato originali originante, quod, si ratio peccati spectetur, convenit cum aliis peccatis, quae personali voluntate nunc ab hominibus committuntur et contrahuntur; agitur hic solum de natura peccati originalis originati. 506. Now nothing need be said here about originating original sin, which, if the ratio of sin is considered, agrees with the other sins which are now committed and contracted by human beings through personal will; here the question concerns only the nature of originated original sin.

507. Hoc peccatum nequit esse actuale. Cum enim actus peccati, in quo posteri Adami nascuntur, commissus fuit, illi non erant, ac proinde non poterant agere. - Contrahunt hoc peccatum statim ac eorum anima corpori infunditur; et tunc incapaces sunt morali actione. - Unde damnata fuit in Baio prop. 49, quae sic se habet: "Et ex habituali voluntate dominante fit, ut

parvulus decedens sine regenerationis Sacramento, quando usum rationis consecutus erit, actualiter Deum odio habeat, Deum blasphemet, et legi Dei repugnet." - Si Adam in accepta justitia perseverasset, ejus posteri justi constituti in sua conceptione fuissent non proprio et personali actu, sed infusione justitiae habitualis. Superest ergo ut peccatum originale originatum reducatur ad peccatum habituale. Habituale peccatum diximus consistere in statu perseverante aversionis a Deo, privationis gratiae sanctificantis. Peccati ergo originalis originati ratio hac gratiae sanctificantis, nobis ex Dei lege inesse debita, privatione continetur. 507. This sin cannot be actual. For when the act of sin in which Adam's descendants are born was committed, they did not exist, and therefore they could not act. They contract this sin as soon as their soul is infused into the body; and at that time they are incapable of moral action. Hence proposition 49 was condemned in Baius, which runs thus: "And from a dominant habitual will it comes about that a little child dying without the Sacrament of regeneration, when he shall have attained the use of reason, actually hates God, blasphemes God, and resists the law of God." If Adam had persevered in the justice received, his descendants would have been constituted just in their conception, not by their own and personal act, but by the infusion of habitual justice. It remains, therefore, that originated original sin be reduced to habitual sin. We said that habitual sin consists in the persevering state of aversion from God, of the privation of sanctifying grace. Therefore the ratio of originated original sin is contained in this privation of sanctifying grace, which by the law of God ought to be present in us.

508. Nec obstat 1. quod, uti arguebat Angelus Paschalis Episcopus Motulensis in Congregatione praevia Conc. Trid. die 21 Maii an. 1546 habita frequentiori Patrum caetu plaudente (Pallav. l. 7. c. 8.): "Non aliunde declarari melius potest natura originalis noxae, sicut et cujusvis defectus, quam ex natura perfectionis oppositae. Exempli gratia, ut intelligatur quidnam sit caecitas; opus est intelligas, quid sit videndi facultas. Est enim peccatum originale vacuitas quaedam illi perfectioni opposita, quae Adamum innocentem condecorabat, et justitia originalis vocabatur." Justitia autem originalis non sola gratia sanctificante, sed caeteris etiam donis suo loco enumeratis constabat.

Respondetur enim, quod etsi peccatum originale importet privationem omnium donorum justitiae originalis, hic tamen quaeritur quaenam ex his privationibus constituat veram rationem peccati. Atqui peccatum proprie est aversio a Deo ultimo fine - conversio ad Deum ultimum finem supernaturalem habetur per gratiam sanctificantem - ergo in privatione gratiae sanctificantis consistit vera ratio peccati.

Unde D. Thomas, qui saepe docet peccatum originale consistere in privatione justitiae originalis (ejus doctrinam exponebat cit. Episcopus cum aliis in Concil. Trid.), in 2. sent. dist. 30. art. 3, ait: "Illa pars, quae per se nata est conjungi fini, est ipsa voluntas: quae habet ordinem finis omnibus aliis partibus imponere. Adeoque destitutio ipsius voluntatis ab illa rectitudine ad finem, quam habuit in institutione naturae, est formale in originali peccato." - Caeterum, si prae oculis habeatur tradita distinctio (nn. 224. seqq.) inter justitiam originalem adaequatam et inadaequatam, facile intelligitur peccatum originale importare quidem privationem justitiae originalis adaequatae sed veram rationem peccati consistere in privatione justitiae originalis inadaequatae; et hoc sensu dici posse peccatum originale esse privationem justitiae originalis. 508. Nor does it stand in the way, first, that, as Angelus Paschalis, Bishop of Motula, argued in the preliminary Congregation of the Council of Trent held on May 21, 1546, with a larger assembly of the Fathers applauding (Pallavicino, book 7, chapter 8): "The nature of original guilt, as of any defect, can be declared better from no other source than from the nature of the opposite perfection. For example, in order to understand what blindness is, you must understand what the faculty of seeing is. For original sin is a certain emptiness opposed to that perfection which adorned innocent Adam and was called original justice." But original justice consisted not only in sanctifying grace, but also in the other gifts enumerated in their place.

For the answer is that although original sin imports the privation of all the gifts of original justice, nevertheless the question here is which of these privations constitutes the true ratio of sin. But sin properly is aversion from God as

ultimate end; conversion to God as supernatural ultimate end is had through sanctifying grace; therefore the true ratio of sin consists in the privation of sanctifying grace.

Hence St. Thomas, who often teaches that original sin consists in the privation of original justice (the cited bishop, together with others, was expounding his doctrine in the Council of Trent), says in 2 Sentences, distinction 30, article 3: "That part which by itself is naturally suited to be joined to the end is the will itself, whose role it is to impose the order of the end on all the other parts. And so the destitution of the will itself from that rectitude to the end which it had in the institution of nature is what is formal in original sin." Besides, if the distinction handed down earlier (nos. 224ff.) between adequate and inadequate original justice is kept before one's eyes, it is easily understood that original sin indeed imports the privation of adequate original justice, but that the true ratio of sin consists in the privation of inadequate original justice; and in this sense original sin can be said to be the privation of original justice.

509. Nec obstat 2. quod privatio gratiae sanctificantis sit effectus et poena peccati, ac proinde non possit esse ipsum peccatum.

Etenim respondetur a) Si consideretur peccatum originale originans, quod in Adamo fuit tum actuale tum habituale; privatio perseverans gratiae sanctificantis est ipsum peccatum habituale, atque effectus et poena transgressionis actualis - b) si consideretur peccatum originale originatum relate ad peccatum originale originans: privatio permanens gratiae sanctificantis in nobis est ipsum peccatum originale, atque effectus transgressionis Adae. c) Si denique consideretur peccatum originale originatum solum; privatio gratiae sanctificantis active considerata, nempe quatenus ex parte Dei est subtractio gratiae sanctificantis, habet rationem poenae a Deo inflictae: passive vero considerata, nempe quatenus est status animae, habet rationem peccati.

Revera "gratia sanctificans, aut caritas intelligitur instar nexus cujusdam Deum inter et hominem. Ea est, qua homo subjicitur Deo, atque Deus ad hominem convertitur. Fit homo Dei amicus, ac vicissim Deus amicus hominis: atque demum dilector Dei constituitur homo, ipsumque sibi gratum habet Deus, dilectumque. Cum peccat homo; hic amittit gratiam et caritatem, eamque subtrahit Deus. Una vero gratia, aut caritate amissa ab homine, et a Deo subtracta, duo consequuntur: hominis aversio a Deo, et recessus Dei ab homine: ablatio amicitiae hominis cum Deo, et ablatio amicitiae Dei erga hominem: privatio demum subjectionis hominis erga Deum, et privatio conversionis Dei ad hominem. Jam sequitur recessum Dei ab homine, aut ablationem amicitiae Dei erga hominem, aut privationem conversionis Dei ad ipsum hominem dici, et esse peccati poenam, non culpam: eamque infligi a vindice justo Deo, cum caritatem aut gratiam sanctificantem subtrahit. At aversio hominis a Deo, aut ablatio amicitiae hominis cum Deo, aut privatio subjectionis hominis erga Deum, illa est, quam veri nominis peccatum appello, idest habituale." 509. Nor does it stand in the way, second, that the privation of sanctifying grace is the effect and punishment of sin, and therefore cannot be sin itself.

For the answer is: a) if originating original sin is considered, which in Adam was both actual and habitual, the persevering privation of sanctifying grace is habitual sin itself, and also the effect and punishment of the actual transgression; b) if originated original sin is considered in relation to originating original sin, the permanent privation of sanctifying grace in us is original sin itself, and also the effect of Adam's transgression; c) finally, if originated original sin alone is considered, the privation of sanctifying grace considered actively, namely insofar as on God's part it is the withdrawal of sanctifying grace, has the ratio of punishment inflicted by God; but considered passively, namely insofar as it is the state of the soul, it has the ratio of sin.

In reality, "sanctifying grace, or charity, is understood as a kind of bond between God and man. It is that by which man is subject to God and God is turned toward man. Man becomes God's friend, and in turn God becomes man's friend; and finally man is constituted a lover of God, and God regards him as pleasing and beloved to himself. When man sins, he loses grace and charity, and God withdraws it. But once grace or charity has been lost by man and withdrawn by God, two things follow: man's aversion from God and God's withdrawal from man; the removal of man's friendship with God and the removal of God's friendship toward man; finally, the privation of man's subjection toward God and the

privation of God's conversion toward man. Now it follows that God's withdrawal from man, or the removal of God's friendship toward man, or the privation of God's conversion toward man is called, and is, the punishment of sin, not fault; and that it is inflicted by God the just avenger when he withdraws charity or sanctifying grace. But man's aversion from God, or the removal of man's friendship with God, or the privation of man's subjection toward God, this is what I call sin in the true sense, that is, habitual sin."

510. Nec obstat 3. quod D. Thomas 1. 2. q. 82. a. 2. dicit: "Causa autem hujus corruptae dispositionis, quae dicitur originale peccatum, est una tantum, scilicet privatio originalis justitiae." - Nam, uti optime respondet Bellarminus (de amiss. gr. et stat. pecc. l. 5. c. 20.) "loquitur Sanctus Thomas de causa formali, et si causa formalis peccati originalis est privatio justitiae originalis, certe peccatum originale formaliter in privatione justitiae originalis consistit, ut idem Sanctus Thomas docet in eadem quaest. art. 3." 510. Nor does it stand in the way, third, that St. Thomas, I-II, question 82, article 2, says: "The cause of this corrupted disposition, which is called original sin, is one only, namely the privation of original justice." For, as Bellarmine answers very well (On the Loss of Grace and the State of Sin, book 5, chapter 20), "St. Thomas is speaking of the formal cause; and if the formal cause of original sin is the privation of original justice, certainly original sin formally consists in the privation of original justice, as the same St. Thomas teaches in the same question, article 3."

511. Ex his sequitur 1. quod licet peccatum originale reducatur ad peccatum habituale, nequit tamen proprie dici habitus. Habitus enim sive operativus, qui potentiam inclinat ad agendum, sive entitativus, qui subjectum disponit ad bene vel male essendum, est qualitas quaedam: peccatum vero originale est privatio. Se habet tamen peccatum originale ad modum habitus, quatenus dicit statum perseverantem, et non actionem transeuntem. Vid. D. Th. 1. p. q. 82.; et Bellarm. (de amiss. gr. et stat. pecc. l. 5. c. 19. fin.) 511. From these things it follows, first, that although original sin is reduced to habitual sin, nevertheless it cannot properly be called a habit. For a habit, whether operative, which inclines a potency to acting, or entitative, which disposes a subject to being well or badly, is a certain quality; but original sin is a privation. Nevertheless original sin is related after the manner of a habit, insofar as it signifies a persevering state and not a transient action. See St. Thomas, I, question 82; and Bellarmine (On the Loss of Grace and the State of Sin, book 5, chapter 19, end).

512. Intelligitur 2. quo sensu sit accipiendum id, quod plures Theologi post D. Thomam saepe docuerunt, nempe concupiscentiam esse materiale peccati originalis, sicut privationem gratiae dixerunt formale.

a) Sensus non est, quod privatio gratiae sanctificantis communicet concupiscentiae esse peccati, sicut forma materiae suum esse communicat; saepe enim diximus concupiscentiam de se, nempe sine voluntatis consensu, non habere veram rationem peccati.

b) Nec sensus est, quod privatio gratiae sanctificantis (forma) insit concupiscentiae (materiae) tamquam subjecto; docet enim ipse D. Thomas (2. sent. dist. 32. q. 1. a. 1. ad 3.) peccatum actuale constitui privatione debitae rectitudinis tamquam forma, et actu tamquam materia: addit tamen "non eodem modo se habere concupiscentiam ad originalem maculam, sicut actus peccati ad maculam actualem." Unde quemadmodum gratia sanctificans inest ipsi substantiae animae vel voluntati tamquam subjecto; ita privatio illius non est, nisi in anima vel voluntate.

c) Sed dicitur concupiscentia materiale peccati originalis, quia effectus comparari solet ad suam causam, sicut materiale ad formale, similiterque effectus secundarius ad primarium: inordinatio autem virium inferiorum est effectus respectu inordinationis animae, quemadmodum in justitia originali gratia sanctificans erat radix et fundamentum caeterorum donorum. Vid. Sylvium (in 1. 2. a. 3. conclusio 3.) Unde ipse D. Thomas q. 83. a. 2. ad 3. ait: "Concupiscentia se habet materialiter et ex consequenti in peccato originali." Vid. etiam de Rubeis (de pecc. orig. c. 58.

IV.) 512. Second, it is understood in what sense that should be taken which many theologians after St. Thomas have often taught, namely that concupiscence is the material element of original sin, just as they said that the privation of grace is the formal element.

a) The sense is not that the privation of sanctifying grace communicates the being of sin to concupiscence, just as form communicates its own being to matter; for we have often said that concupiscence of itself, namely without the consent of the will, does not have the true ratio of sin.

b) Nor is the sense that the privation of sanctifying grace (the form) is in concupiscence (the matter) as in a subject; for St. Thomas himself teaches (2 Sentences, distinction 32, question 1, article 1, reply 3) that actual sin is constituted by the privation of due rectitude as form, and by the act as matter; nevertheless he adds that "concupiscence is not related to the original stain in the same way as the act of sin is related to the actual stain." Hence, just as sanctifying grace inheres in the very substance of the soul or in the will as in a subject, so the privation of it is only in the soul or in the will.

c) But concupiscence is called the material element of original sin because an effect is usually compared to its cause as the material to the formal, and likewise a secondary effect to a primary effect. But the inordination of the lower powers is an effect with respect to the inordination of the soul, just as in original justice sanctifying grace was the root and foundation of the other gifts. See Sylvius (on I-II, article 3, conclusion 3). Hence St. Thomas himself, question 83, article 2, reply 3, says: "Concupiscence is related materially and by consequence in original sin." See also de Rubeis (On Original Sin, chapter 58, IV).

513. III. Ad naturam peccati originalis explicandam superesset tantummodo exponere quomodo privatio gratiae sanctificantis in iis qui nascuntur ex Adam habeat rationem voluntarii, quod est de essentia peccati. Unde D. Thomas tradita, uti paulo ante vidimus, distinctione inter defectum et privationem, statim addit (2. sent. cit. dist. 30. a. 2.): "Culpa autem super hoc (defectum et privationem) addit rationem voluntarii: ex hoc enim aliquis culpatur, quod deficit in eo, quod per suam voluntatem haberi potest. Unde oportet quod secundum hoc, quod aliquid rationem culpae habet, secundum hoc ratio voluntarii in eo reperiatur." 513. III. For explaining the nature of original sin, there would remain only to explain how the privation of sanctifying grace in those who are born from Adam has the ratio of the voluntary, which belongs to the essence of sin. Hence St. Thomas, after handing down the distinction between defect and privation, as we saw a little earlier, immediately adds (2 Sentences, cited distinction 30, article 2): "But fault adds, beyond this (defect and privation), the ratio of the voluntary; for someone is blamed from this, that he is deficient in that which can be had through his own will. Hence it is necessary that, according as something has the ratio of fault, according to this the ratio of the voluntary be found in it."

514. Verum cum inferius ostendendum sit quomodo ratio voluntarii invenitur in peccato originali, cumque, ex antea dictis, peccatum originale ab Adam in posteros derivetur; merito hic assumimus quod privatio gratiae sanctificantis in nobis habet rationem voluntarii ab ipsa transgressione praecepti ab Adamo commissa. Unde D. Thomas l. mox cit. subdit: "Defectus illius originalis justitiae, quae homini in sua creatione collata est, ex voluntate hominis accidit. Et sicut illud naturae donum fuit, et fuisset in totam naturam propagatum, homine in justitia persistente; ita etiam et privatio illius boni in totam naturam perducitur, quasi privatio, et vitium naturae; ad idem enim genus privatio, et habitus referuntur. Et in quolibet homine rationem culpae habet ex hoc, quod per voluntatem principii naturae: idest primi hominis, inductus est talis defectus." 514. But since it must be shown below how the ratio of the voluntary is found in original sin, and since, from what was said before, original sin is derived from Adam into his descendants, we rightly assume here that the privation of sanctifying grace in us has the ratio of the voluntary from the very transgression of the precept committed by Adam. Hence St. Thomas, in the place just cited, adds: "The defect of that original justice which was conferred on man in his creation

happened from the will of man. And just as that gift of nature was, and would have been, propagated into the whole nature if man had persisted in justice, so also the privation of that good is brought down into the whole nature as a privation and vice of nature; for privation and habit are referred to the same genus. And in each human being it has the ratio of fault from this, that such a defect was introduced through the will of the principle of nature, that is, of the first man."

515. Ex quibus patet 1. quod formalis ratio peccati originalis non continetur sola privatione gratiae sanctificantis; sed privatione gratiae sanctificantis per communem originem in posteros derivata - seu privatione gratiae sanctificantis propter actum peccati a primo parente libere commissum. Voluntarium enim est de ratione peccati; gratiae sanctificantis privatio, in qua nascuntur posteri Adae, non aliter habet rationem voluntarii quam per ordinem ad praevaricationem Adae; ut ergo privatio gratiae sanctificantis in nobis habeat rationem peccati, debet sumi cum illo ordine ad transgressionem Adae.

Patet 2. quod etsi per quodcumque peccatum lethale amittatur gratia sanctificans, non tamen inciditur in peccatum originale. Unde D. Thomas 1. 2. q. 86. a. 1. ad 3., ait: "macula non est aliquid positive in anima, nec significat privationem solam, sed significat privationem quamdam nitoris animae in ordine ad suam causam, quae est peccatum; et ideo diversa peccata diversas maculas inducunt; et est simile de umbra, quae est privatio luminis ex objecto alicujus corporis, et secundum diversitatem corporum objectorum diversificantur umbrae." - Et similiter in 4. dist. 18. q. 1. a. 2.: "quamvis quantum ad ipsam gratiae privationem non differant maculae peccatorum; differunt tamen quantum ad causam, ex qua macula consequitur." 515. From these things it is clear, first, that the formal ratio of original sin is not contained in the privation of sanctifying grace alone, but in the privation of sanctifying grace derived into descendants through common origin, or in the privation of sanctifying grace on account of the act of sin freely committed by the first parent. For the voluntary belongs to the ratio of sin; the privation of sanctifying grace, in which Adam's descendants are born, has the ratio of the voluntary in no other way than through order to Adam's prevarication. Therefore, in order that the privation of sanctifying grace in us may have the ratio of sin, it must be taken together with that order to Adam's transgression.

Second, it is clear that although sanctifying grace is lost through any mortal sin whatever, one does not thereby fall into original sin. Hence St. Thomas, I-II, question 86, article 1, reply 3, says: "a stain is not something positive in the soul, nor does it signify privation alone, but it signifies a certain privation of the splendor of the soul in order to its cause, which is sin; and therefore diverse sins induce diverse stains; and it is similar with a shadow, which is the privation of light from the object of some body, and shadows are diversified according to the diversity of the bodies objected." And similarly in 4 Sentences, distinction 18, question 1, article 2: "although the stains of sins do not differ with respect to the privation of grace itself, nevertheless they differ with respect to the cause from which the stain follows."

516. Paucis itaque perstringendo quae exposita sunt, facile vera de peccati originalis natura sententia statuitur, et probatur.

PROP. XL. Formalis peccati originalis ratio consistit in habituali aversione a Deo, fine supernaturali, seu in privatione gratiae et charitatis, per actum peccati a primo parente libere commissum, in posteros inducta.

Prob. I. Peccatum originale est mors animae; atqui mors animae nihil aliud est in praesenti statu, nisi privatio gratiae et charitatis; ergo.

Prob. maj. Conc. Araus. II. can. 2. docet: "peccatum, quod mors est animae, per unum hominem in omne genus humanum transisse." - Conc. Trid. sess. 5. can. 2., ait: "Si quis inquinatum illum (Adamum) per inobedientiae peccatum, mortem et poenas corporis tantum in omne genus humanum transfudisse, non autem et peccatum, quod mors est animae; anathema sit." Apostolus exhibet peccatum ab Adamo in ejus posteros derivatum per conceptum mortis; dicit enim Rom. 5. 15.: "Si unius delicto multi mortui sunt, multo magis gratia Dei et donum in gratia unius hominis in plures abundavit." Ubi opponens gratiam morti, aperte loquitur, uti statim confirmabimus, de morte animae, non corporis.

Prob. min. Mors nihil aliud est, nisi privatio vitae: mors corporis est ejus separatio ab anima, seu privatio principii

vitalis; mors ergo animae erit etiam privatio principii vitalis. Atqui principium vitae supernaturalis animae, seu principium illius vitae, qua, facta totius humanae naturae in Adamo elevatione, omnes homines debebant vivere, est gratia et charitas. Ergo hujus privatio est mors animae. - Unde Apostolus cit. c. 5. ad Rom, cum dixisset omnes homines esse mortuos per peccatum Adae, huic morti opponit gratiam Dei, quae per unum hominem in plures abundavit; gratiam, qua ex multis delictis in justificationem: gratiam, qua in Christo omnes vivificabuntur. Gratia ergo est vita animae, ac proinde illius privatio est animae mors.

Prob. II. Conc. Trid., ut diximus (n. 486.), docet peccatum originale inesse unicuique proprium, et tolli per baptismum totum id, quod habet veram rationem peccati. Atqui privatio justitiae originalis, secundum quod per eam voluntas subjiciebatur Deo, inest unicuique nascentium propria; eaque sola est, quae tota tollitur per baptismum, hoc ipso nimirum quod in baptismo confertur gratia et charitas, eorum voluntates subjiciens Deo. Ergo gratiae et charitatis privatio est peccatum originale.

Prob. III. Ab Origene (in Levit. hom. 8.) peccatum originale appellatur sordes; quod est commune iis omnibus, qui ad testimonium Job provocant, ut probent existentiam peccati originalis. - S. Ambrosius (Apolog. 2. Davidis c. 1.) vocat peccatum originale "animae maculam." - A Tertulliano (de anim. c. 40.) anima dicitur "in Adamo immunda, et peccatrix quia immunda." - A S. Augustino (de pecc. merit. et remiss. l. 2. c. 34.) anima dicitur "aversa a Deo per peccatum." Vid. de his S. Anselmum (de Conc. Virg. et pecc. orig.)

Unde: Juxta Patres peccatum originale est sordes animae - macula - aversio a Deo. Atqui, ut diximus, haec non in alio consistunt, quam in privatione gratiae sanctificantis. Ergo.

Prob. IV. Quid sit peccatum originale nequit melius intelligi, nisi per oppositionem ad justitiam originalem, cujus est privatio. Atqui inter dona justitiae originalis, nullum est cujus privatio contineat veram rationem peccati, praeter gratiam sanctificantem: quemadmodum enim haec convertit animam ad Deum, facit illam gratam et acceptam Deo, ita ejusdem privatio est aversio a Deo, et ponit animam sub Dei displicentia et improbatione; in quo consistit vera ratio peccati. Ergo. Vid. Bellarm. (de amiss. gr. et stat. pecc. l. 5. c. 19.)

Merito igitur animadvertit De Rubeis (op. c. c. 58. n. 3.): "Cur enim propriissime peccatum non dicatur (privatio gratiae et charitatis)? Est enim privatio rectitudinis, sanctitatis, et amicitiae cum Deo. Non est sola carentia, aut negatio; sed verissima privatio perfectionis juxta divina promissa debitae. Voluntaria quoque dici debet, non instar actionis quae a libera voluntate proficiscitur; sed instar effectus, qui pravam actionem consequitur, aut instar termini in quem denique ducit actio prava. Ab eo demum homo denominatur habitualiter malus, et peccator: redditurque abominabilis Deo. Privat ipsa praeterea hominem candore, et fulgore: unde macula est, et pollutio, et immundities, et labes animae. Quae sane omnia veram constituunt peccati rationem."

Accedit auctoritas DD. S. Anselmus (de conc. Virg. c. 29.), ait: "Hoc peccatum quod originale dico, aliud intelligere nequeo in eisdem infantibus, nisi ipsam quam supra posui, factam per inobedientiam Adae justitiae debitae nuditatem." - D. Thomas, cujus plura testimonia jam dedimus, 1. 2. q. 82. a. 3.: "Oportet quod id, quod est formale in originali peccato, accipiatur ex parte causae peccati originalis. Oppositorum autem oppositae sunt causae. Est igitur attendenda causa originalis peccati ex causa originalis justitiae, quae ei opponitur. Tota autem ordinatio originalis justitiae ex hoc est quod voluntas hominis erat Deo subjecta. Quae quidem subjectio primo et principaliter erat per voluntatem, cujus est movere omnes alias partes in finem, ut supra dictum est (quaest. 9. art. 1.) Unde ex aversione voluntatis a Deo consecuta est inordinatio in omnibus aliis animae viribus. Sic ergo privatio originalis justitiae, per quam voluntas subdebatur Deo, est formale in peccato originali: omnis autem alia inordinatio virium animae se habet in peccato originali ut quid materiale." Suarez (de vitiis et peccatis, disp. 9. sect. 2.), non modo traditam doctrinam docet, sed aliorum Theologorum sententias referens, ait: "variis modis explicatur a Theologis, quos tamen arbitror omnes in re convenire." 516. Therefore, briefly touching upon the things that have been set forth, the true opinion concerning the nature of original sin is easily established and proved.

PROPOSITION XL. The formal ratio of original sin consists in habitual aversion from God, the supernatural end, or in the privation of grace and charity, introduced into descendants through the act of sin freely committed by the first parent.

Proof I. Original sin is the death of the soul; but the death of the soul in the present state is nothing other than the privation of grace and

charity; therefore.

The major is proved. The Second Council of Orange, canon 2, teaches: "sin, which is the death of the soul, passed through one man into the whole human race." The Council of Trent, session 5, canon 2, says: "If anyone says that that man (Adam), stained by the sin of disobedience, transmitted into the whole human race only death and the punishments of the body, but not also sin, which is the death of the soul, let him be anathema." The Apostle presents the sin derived from Adam into his descendants through the concept of death; for he says in Romans 5:15: "If by the offense of one many died, much more has the grace of God and the gift in the grace of one man abounded unto many." There, by opposing grace to death, he is plainly speaking, as we shall immediately confirm, of the death of the soul, not of the body.

The minor is proved. Death is nothing other than the privation of life: the death of the body is its separation from the soul, or the privation of its vital principle; therefore the death of the soul will also be the privation of a vital principle. But the principle of the supernatural life of the soul, or the principle of that life by which, after the elevation of the whole of human nature had been made in Adam, all human beings ought to have lived, is grace and charity. Therefore the privation of this is the death of the soul. Hence the Apostle, in the cited chapter 5 to the Romans, after he had said that all human beings died through Adam's sin, opposes to this death the grace of God, which abounded through one man unto many; the grace by which, from many offenses, one comes into justification; the grace by which all will be made alive in Christ. Therefore grace is the life of the soul, and consequently the privation of it is the death of the soul.

Proof II. The Council of Trent, as we said (no. 486), teaches that original sin is in each one as his own, and that through baptism the whole of that which has the true ratio of sin is taken away. But the privation of original justice, according as through it the will was subjected to God, is in each of those born as his own; and this alone is what is wholly taken away through baptism, precisely by the fact that in baptism grace and charity are conferred, subjecting their wills to God. Therefore the privation of grace and charity is original sin.

Proof III. By Origen (on Leviticus, homily 8), original sin is called filth; this is common to all those who appeal to the testimony of Job in order to prove the existence of original sin. St. Ambrose (Apology of David, book 2, chapter 1) calls original sin "a stain of the soul." By Tertullian (On the Soul, chapter 40), the soul is said to be "unclean in Adam, and sinful because unclean." By St. Augustine (On the Merits and Remission of Sins, book 2, chapter 34), the soul is said to be "turned away from God through sin." See St. Anselm on these points (On the Conception of the Virgin and Original Sin).

Hence, according to the Fathers, original sin is filth of the soul, a stain, an aversion from God. But, as we said, these consist in nothing other than the privation of sanctifying grace. Therefore.

Proof IV. What original sin is cannot be better understood except by opposition to original justice, of which it is the privation. But among the gifts of original justice, there is none whose privation contains the true ratio of sin except sanctifying grace. For just as this turns the soul toward God and makes it pleasing and acceptable to God, so the privation of the same is aversion from God and places the soul under God's displeasure and disapproval; and in this the true ratio of sin consists. Therefore. See Bellarmine (On the Loss of Grace and the State of Sin, book 5, chapter 19).

Therefore De Rubeis rightly observes (cited work, chapter 58, no. 3): "For why should it not most properly be called sin (the privation of grace and charity)? For it is the privation of rectitude, holiness, and friendship with God. It is not mere lack or negation, but the truest privation of a perfection owed according to the divine promises. It must also be called voluntary, not after the manner of an action which proceeds from free will, but after the manner of an effect which follows an evil action, or after the manner of a terminus into which an evil action finally leads. From it, at last, man is denominated habitually evil and a sinner, and is rendered abominable to God. Moreover, it deprives man of brightness and radiance; hence it is a stain, pollution, uncleanness, and stain of the soul. All these things indeed constitute the true ratio of sin."

There is added the authority of the Doctors. St. Anselm (On the Conception of the Virgin, chapter 29) says: "This sin which I call original I can understand in those same infants to be nothing other than that nakedness of due justice, which I set down above, brought about through Adam's disobedience." St. Thomas, whose many testimonies we have already given, I-II, question 82, article 3: "That

which is formal in original sin must be taken on the part of the cause of original sin. But of opposites the causes are opposite. Therefore the cause of original sin must be considered from the cause of original justice, which is opposed to it. Now the whole ordering of original justice is from this, that the will of man was subject to God. This subjection was first and principally through the will, whose role it is to move all the other parts to the end, as was said above (question 9, article 1). Hence from the aversion of the will from God there followed inordination in all the other powers of the soul. Thus, therefore, the privation of original justice, by which the will was subjected to God, is what is formal in original sin; but every other inordination of the powers of the soul is related in original sin as something material." Suarez (On Vices and Sins, disputation 9, section 2), not only teaches the doctrine handed down, but, reporting the opinions of other theologians, says: "it is explained in various ways by theologians, whom nevertheless I judge all to agree in reality."

Article 5. On the Manner in which the First Parent's Sin is Handed on Into Posterity

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517. Haec quaestio semper valde difficilis visa est S. Augustino, qui (de Mor. Eccl. l. 1. c. 22. n. 40.), inquit: "Nihil esse (peccato originali) ad praedicandum notius, nihil ad intelligendum secretius." Et (l. 1. de Nupt. et Concup. c. 19. n. 2.), ait: "Ut enim quod dimissum est in parente, trahatur in prole, miris quidem modis fit; sed tamen fit ... Et quia non facili ratione indagatur, nec sermone explicatur, ab infidelibus non creditur." 517. This question always seemed very difficult to St. Augustine, who says (On the Morals of the Catholic Church, book 1, chapter 22, no. 40): "Nothing is more known for preaching than original sin; nothing is more hidden for understanding." And (On Marriage and Concupiscence, book 1, chapter 19, no. 2) he says: "For that what has been remitted in the parent is drawn in the offspring happens in marvelous ways indeed; but nevertheless it happens ... And because it is not investigated by an easy reason, nor explained by speech, it is not believed by unbelievers."

518. Cum tamen Julianus his Augustini verbis abuteretur, quasi hic dixerit nulla ratione explicari posse; idem S. Doctor (cont. Julian. l. 6. c. 5. n. 11.), se defendens ait: "Quasi dixerim nec ratione comprehendi, nec sermone explicari: subtrahens inde, quod dixi, non facili sive ratione sive sermone. Aliud est, nulla, quod tu dicis: aliud, non facili, quod ego dixi: ubi quid aliud, quam calumniosus appares? Sed etsi nulla ratione indagetur, nullo sermone explicetur; verum tamen est, quod antiquitus veraci fide catholica praedicatur, et creditur per Ecclesiam totam." 518. Yet since Julian abused these words of Augustine, as if he had said that it could be explained by no reason, the same holy Doctor, defending himself (Against Julian, book 6, chapter 5, no. 11), says: "As if I had said that it cannot be comprehended by reason nor explained by speech, while you remove from it what I said: not by an easy reason or speech. One thing is 'by none,' which you say; another is 'not by an easy one,' which I said. In this, what else do you appear to be except calumnious? But even if it were investigated by no reason and explained by no speech, nevertheless that would be true which from ancient times is preached by truthful Catholic faith and believed throughout the whole Church."

519. Ut brevitati simul et perspicuitati consulamus, omnia ad tria capita revocamus. Quomodo peccatum unius hominis potuit omnes peccatores constituere. Quomodo peccatum unius hominis voluntate commissum potest omnibus esse voluntarium. Quaenam est causa singulis hominibus Adae peccatum veluti communicans.

Sect. I.

Quomodo peccatum unius hominis potuerit omnes inficere. 519. In order to provide at once for brevity and clarity, we reduce

everything to three heads: how the sin of one man could constitute all as sinners; how the sin of one man, committed by will, can be voluntary for all; and what is the cause which, as it were, communicates Adam's sin to individual human beings.

Sect. I.

How the sin of one man could infect all.

520. Hanc quaestionem mirifice illustrat D. Thomas pluribus in locis: 1. 2. q. 81. a. 1.; 2. sent. dist. 31. a. 1. et praesertim, de malo, qu. 4. a. 1., ubi haec habet: "Considerandum est, quod aliquis homo singularis potest dupliciter considerari: uno modo, secundum quod est quaedam persona singularis: alio modo, secundum quod est pars alicujus collegii. Utroque modo potest ad eum aliquis actus pertinere. Pertinet enim ad eum, inquantum est singularis persona, ille actus quem proprio arbitrio, et per seipsum facit. Sed inquantum est pars collegii, potest ad eum pertinere actus aliquis quem per seipsum non facit, nec proprio arbitrio, sed qui fit a toto collegio, vel a pluribus e collegio, vel a Principe collegii; sicut illud, quod Princeps facit, dicitur civitas facere. Hujusmodi enim collegium hominum reputatur quasi unus homo: ita quod diversi homines in diversis officiis constituti, sunt quasi diversa membra unius corporis naturalis. Sic ergo tota multitudo hominum, a primo parente naturam humanam accipientium, quasi unum collegium, vel potius sicut unum corpus unius hominis, consideranda est. In qua quidem multitudine unusquisque homo, etiam ipse Adam, potest considerari vel quasi singularis persona, vel quasi aliquod membrum hujus multitudinis, quae per naturalem originem derivatur ab uno. Est autem considerandum, quod primo homini in sua institutione datum fuerat divinitus quoddam supernaturale donum, scilicet justitia originalis, per quam ratio subdebatur Deo, et inferiores vires rationi, et corpus animae. Hoc autem donum non fuerat datum primo homini, ut singulari personae tantum; sed ut cuidam principio totius humanae naturae: ut scilicet ab eo per originem derivaretur in posteros. Hoc autem donum acceptum, primus homo per liberum arbitrium peccans, amisit eo tenore, quo sibi datum fuerat: scilicet pro se, et pro tota sua posteritate. Defectus ergo hujus doni totam ejus posteritatem consequitur." 520. St. Thomas illuminates this question wonderfully in several places: I-II, question 81, article 1; 2 Sentences, distinction 31, article 1; and especially De Malo, question 4, article 1, where he has the following: "It must be considered that a singular human being can be considered in two ways: in one way, according as he is a certain singular person; in another way, according as he is part of some college. In both ways some act can pertain to him. For that act which he does by his own judgment and through himself pertains to him insofar as he is a singular person. But insofar as he is part of a college, some act can pertain to him which he does not do through himself nor by his own judgment, but which is done by the whole college, or by many of the college, or by the prince of the college; just as that which the prince does is said to be done by the city. For a college of human beings of this sort is reckoned as if one man, so that diverse human beings constituted in diverse offices are as if diverse members of one natural body. Thus, therefore, the whole multitude of human beings receiving human nature from the first parent must be considered as one college, or rather as one body of one man. In this multitude each human being, even Adam himself, can be considered either as a singular person or as some member of this multitude, which is derived from one by natural origin. Now it must be considered that in his institution there had been given divinely to the first man a certain supernatural gift, namely original justice, through which reason was subject to God, the lower powers to reason, and the body to the soul. But this gift had not been given to the first man as a singular person only, but as to a certain principle of the whole of human nature, so that it would be derived from him by origin into his descendants. But this received gift the first man, sinning through free choice, lost in the same tenor in which it had been given to him, namely for himself and for his whole posterity. Therefore the defect of this gift follows upon his whole posterity."

521. Quam doctrinam, ut melius intelligamus, notandum est, quod quando lex "de ligno scientiae boni et mali ne comedas" dicitur data Adamo, non modo ut erat singularis persona, verum etiam ut erat caput totius humanae naturae; hoc dupliciter potest intelligi. Vel quatenus lex illa obligabat etiam posteros ejus in propriis personis, unumquemque suo tempore - vel

quatenus ita obligabat Adamum, ut si vel solus praedictam legem transgrederetur, omnes posteri ejus privarentur justitia, et sic nascerentur in peccato. 521. In order that we may understand this doctrine better, it must be noted that when the law, "Do not eat of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil," is said to have been given to Adam, not only as he was a singular person, but also as he was head of the whole of human nature, this can be understood in two ways. Either insofar as that law bound even his descendants in their own persons, each one in his own time; or insofar as it bound Adam in such a way that if he alone transgressed the aforesaid law, all his descendants would be deprived of justice and would thus be born in sin.

522. Quod fuerit lex illa in Adamo imposita omnibus posteris ejus primo modo, ita cum communi probat Suarez (de op. sex dier. l. 3. c. 21. n. 17.): "Tum quia praeceptum illud, quamvis soli Adae fuerit immediate revelatum, comprehendit Evam; ergo signum est, illud non fuisse soli personae Adae impositum, nec tantum intuitu ejus, sed pro hominibus degentibus in Paradiso, et intuitu illius status latum fuisse. Nam hac ratione comprehendit Evam. Tum etiam, quia simul dixit Deus Adae, Ex omni ligno Paradisi comede, et de ligno scientiae boni et mali ne comedas; sed prior licentia, vel, ut multi volunt, praeceptum perpetuum fuit, et posteri Adae illo uti possent, vel etiam deberent, si status innocentiae durasset; ergo etiam secundum; nam eodem modo et tenore pronuntiatum est ... Item ratio legis, nimirum protestatio divinae subjectionis, et obedientiae perpetua erat, et non minus filiis, quam parentibus conveniens." 522. That this law was imposed in Adam upon all his descendants in the first way Suarez proves with the common opinion (On the Work of the Six Days, book 3, chapter 21, no. 17): "Both because that precept, although it was immediately revealed to Adam alone, included Eve; therefore this is a sign that it was not imposed only on the person of Adam, nor only with a view to him, but was given for human beings dwelling in Paradise and with a view to that state. For by this reason it included Eve. Also because at the same time God said to Adam, Eat of every tree of Paradise, and, Do not eat of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil; but the prior permission, or, as many think, precept, was perpetual, and Adam's descendants could use it, or even ought to use it, if the state of innocence had endured; therefore also the second, for it was pronounced in the same manner and tenor ... Likewise the reason of the law, namely the protestation of divine subjection and obedience, was perpetual, and fitting no less for the children than for the parents."

523. Quod autem etiam secundo modo eadem lex fuerit in Adamo imposita omnibus posteris ejus, patet ex eo quod omnes homines nascuntur in peccato, non quia singuli proprio personali actu edunt de ligno vetito, sed quia Adam comedit: "per inobedientiam unius peccatores constituuntur multi." - Ideo dicitur Adam caput juridicum totius generis humani, principium naturae repraesentans totum genus humanum. - Agitur de hoc altero modo explicando. 523. But that the same law was also imposed in Adam upon all his descendants in the second way is clear from the fact that all human beings are born in sin, not because each one by his own personal act eats of the forbidden tree, but because Adam ate: "by the disobedience of one many are constituted sinners." Therefore Adam is called the juridical head of the whole human race, the principle of nature representing the whole human race. This second way must be explained.

524. Ac imprimis conveniunt omnes hanc vim obligandi non habuisse legem illam solum qua lex praecise spectata communitati hominum imposita; sed necessariam fuisse positivam institutionem ex peculiari Dei voluntate. "Probatur primo (Suarez l. c. n. 22.), quia ex natura rei lex data parentibus, etiamsi detur ut vera lex, et perpetuo duratura, non obligat ullo modo filios, donec generentur, et capaces sint praecepti, ut patet in omnibus aliis legibus divinis et humanis, hac excepta; ergo ut haec lex talem vim haberet, necessaria fuit peculiaris institutio, et voluntas Dei. Et declaratur

hoc amplius in hac eadem lege. Nam si Adam non comedisset de ligno scientiae, et consequenter status innocentiae perseverasset, et postea Cain filius Adae de illo fructu comedisset, Enoch filius ejus nullo modo in eo peccaret, nec propterea justitia privaretur; ergo signum est, illam legem ex vi sua non obligasse filios in parentibus, sed tantum in suis personis, et temporibus suis; ergo quod lex illa aliter ligaverit posteros in Adamo, non fuit ex sola legis natura, sed ex peculiari voluntate, et institutione Dei." 524. And first, all agree that this law did not have this force of binding merely as a law, precisely considered, imposed on the community of human beings; rather, there had to be a positive institution from the peculiar will of God. "It is proved first (Suarez, same place, no. 22), because from the nature of the thing a law given to parents, even if it is given as a true law and as enduring perpetually, in no way binds children until they are begotten and are capable of the precept, as is clear in all other divine and human laws, except this one. Therefore, in order that this law should have such force, a peculiar institution and will of God was necessary. And this is declared further in this same law. For if Adam had not eaten of the tree of knowledge, and consequently the state of innocence had persevered, and later Cain, Adam's son, had eaten of that fruit, Enoch his son would in no way have sinned in him, nor would he have been deprived of justice on that account. Therefore this is a sign that that law by its own force did not bind children in their parents, but only in their own persons and in their own times. Therefore, that that law bound descendants otherwise in Adam was not from the nature of the law alone, but from the peculiar will and institution of God."

525. At vero non aeque convenit inter Theologos de natura illius specialis positivae institutionis. Alii enim illam explicant per pactum expressum et formale - alii per pactum implicitum et virtuale - alii per simplicem legem a Deo constitutam, et Adamum obligantem sine ejus praevio consensu. 525. But theologians do not agree equally concerning the nature of that special positive institution. For some explain it through an express and formal compact; others through an implicit and virtual compact; others through a simple law constituted by God and binding Adam without his prior consent.

526. Primam et alteram sententiam sic exponit de Rubeis (de pecc. orig. c. 61.): "Pactum expressum imaginantur nonnulli, cum utriusque partis consensu, nempe Dei, ac primi hominis, quo fuerit constitutum, ut eodem primo homine latum ipsi praeceptum observante, posteri ejus cum originali justitia nascerentur; legem ipso transgrediente, in mundum venirent cum originalis justitiae privatione. Satis esse arbitrantur alii divinum decretum, quo statuerit Deus, justitiam originalem Adamo impertiri pro ipso, proque posteris ejus, dummodo in eadem permaneret ille, supremoque divino Legislatori obediens foret. Quod attamen Dei decretum innotescere Adamo debuisse inquiunt, ut implicitum saltem dici queat pactum." 526. De Rubeis explains the first and second opinion thus (On Original Sin, chapter 61): "Some imagine an express compact, with the consent of each party, namely of God and of the first man, by which it was established that, if that first man observed the precept given to him, his descendants would be born with original justice; but if he transgressed the law, they would come into the world with the privation of original justice. Others judge that a divine decree is sufficient, by which God established that original justice would be bestowed on Adam for himself and for his descendants, provided that he remained in it and was obedient to the supreme divine Legislator. Nevertheless they say that this decree of God had to become known to Adam, so that it could at least be called an implicit compact."

527. Qui vero tertiam sententiam defendunt (communis jam est) etsi negent consensum Adami fuisse ullo pacto necessarium, ac proinde fieri ei debuisse revelationem de divino decreto, quo eo peccante omnes constituerentur peccatores; concedunt tamen probabilius videri habuisse Adam revelationem illam propter alias causas: "Una est," inquit Suarez (l. c. n.

29.), "ut Adam magnitudinem beneficii a Deo sibi collati agnoscere, et aestimare posset, nam beneficium de se perpetuum, et pro tota posteritate collatum multo majus est, quam beneficium personale tantum, etiamsi sub aliqua honesta, prudenti conditione conferatur. Secundo etiam oportuit eandem conditionem, sub qua beneficium fiebat, illi innotescere, ut ipse parens ad custodiendum depositum vigilantior, et cautior redderetur. Tertio fuit etiam hoc valde conveniens, ut ipse Adam in propria persona, et voluntate gravius obligaretur ad illud praeceptum servandum, et ut transgressio praecepti, si fieret, magis esset voluntaria, minusque excusabilis. Propter quae opinior verba illa Dei, 'In quacumque die peccaveris, morte morieris,' in eo sensu intellecta fuisse ab Adamo, in quo a Deo sunt dicta, ac proinde intellexisse Adamum, si peccaret, omnes posteros suos immortalitatem fuisse amissuros et consequenter etiam gratiam et innocentiam, quae illius status fundamentum erat." 527. But those who defend the third opinion, which is now common, although they deny that Adam's consent was in any way necessary, and consequently that a revelation had to be made to him concerning the divine decree by which, if he sinned, all would be constituted sinners, nevertheless concede that it seems more probable that Adam had that revelation for other reasons. "One is," says Suarez (same place, no. 29), "so that Adam could recognize and estimate the greatness of the benefit conferred on him by God; for a benefit in itself perpetual and conferred for the whole of posterity is much greater than a merely personal benefit, even if it is conferred under some honorable, prudent condition. Secondly, it was also fitting that the same condition under which the benefit was made should become known to him, so that the parent himself might be rendered more vigilant and cautious in guarding the deposit. Thirdly, this also was very fitting, so that Adam himself, in his own person and will, might be more gravely bound to keeping that precept, and so that the transgression of the precept, if it were to happen, would be more voluntary and less excusable. For these reasons I am of the opinion that those words of God, 'On whatever day you sin, you shall die the death,' were understood by Adam in the sense in which they were said by God, and consequently that Adam understood that, if he sinned, all his descendants would lose immortality, and consequently also grace and innocence, which was the foundation of that state."

528. Tota ergo quaestio versatur in eo, utrum pro donis justitiae originalis sive servandis, sive amittendis, Adam constitutus fuerit caput juridicum totius generis humani suo etiam consensu vel sola Dei voluntate. 528. Therefore the whole question turns on this: whether Adam was constituted juridical head of the whole human race, for the gifts of original justice either to be preserved or to be lost, also by his own consent, or by the will of God alone.

529. Dicimus hoc factum esse ex sola Dei voluntate. Nam sola Dei voluntate id factum dici debet, si sola Dei voluntas ad illud sufficit, et nullo modo probatur adhibitum etiam fuisse Adami consensum. Atqui sufficit sola Dei voluntas - et Adae consensus nullo modo probatur. Ergo.

Prob. min. quoad 1am partem. a) "Voluntas Dei per se est sufficiens ad inducendam omnem obligationem possibilem sine consensu ejus, cui eam imponere vult. Unde sicut potuit illo praecepto obligare omnes homines praesentes, et futuros, non postulando ab eis consensum, sed exigendo, ita etiam potuit totam naturam in Adamo obligare, non expectando consensum, seu voluntariam acceptationem, etiam per voluntatem Adae, sed exigendo, seu absolute, et efficaciter obligationem imponendo." - b) "Ut filii Adae nascerentur in gratia et justitia ipso Adamo non peccante, decretum efficax divinae voluntatis id statuentis sufficiebat, etiamsi Adam talis decreti notitiam non haberet, ut videtur per se notum. Ergo etiam e contrario, ut Adam peccando, non solum sibi, sed etiam posteris justitiam, et gratiam amitteret, sufficere poterat idem decretum Dei ita statuentis, etiamsi Adae fuisset ignotum. Nam oppositorum eadem est ratio. Sed tunc posteri etiam peccarent in voluntate parentis, et propter illam fierent Deo invisi, et inimici, per privationem gratiae, et justitiae; ergo comprehenderentur sub praecepto in primo parente, etiamsi de hoc comprehensionis modo parens ipse fuisset ignarus." Ita Suarez (l. c. nn. 24. 28.) Si prae oculis habeatur dona omnia justitiae originalis esse humanae naturae indebita, facile horum argumentorum vis

innotescet.

Prob. min. quoad 2am partem. Ex modo dictis sequitur, quod consensum Adae non postulabat ipsa natura rei; ergo si adhibitus fuit, hoc debet constare ex alia positiva speciali institutione Dei, seu ex revelatione. Atqui ex revelatione nullo modo probatur. Etenim quae afferuntur, sive ex Scriptura sive ex S. Augustino testimonia, vel non sunt ad rem, quia agunt de alia omnino lege, quam de lege Adae imposita in Paradiso - vel de hac quidem agunt, sed nullo modo adstruunt eam non modo fuisse legem, sed etiam pactum, ut adversarii illud intelligunt. Vid. de Rubeis (op. cit. cap. 61. n. 2.); et Suarez (l. c. nn. 25. 26.) - Caeterum hoc ex dicendis in Sect. sequente confirmabitur.

Unde merito Dominicus Soto (de Nat. et Grat. l. 1. c. 9.), ait: "Nec cogitandum est, ut quidam effingunt, pactum intercessisse inter Deum et Adam, ut cum primum peccasset, natura expoliaretur illis caelestibus donis: et ita nomine totius generis humani consensum praebuisse: atque hac de causa totum genus, eo peccante, peccasse. Est enim fabula. Nam quid Deus opus habebat Adae consensu? Scriptura enim est manifesta, quod unica fuit praeceptio, ne ederet de ligno scientiae: qua, citra ejus consensum, potuit Deus obligare totam naturam, tamquam ejus jure creationis Dominus; sicuti leges legitimi Principis, quae praesenti modo edicerentur civitati, universis in perpetuum civibus intelligerentur positae. In poenam tamen transgressionis comminatus est Deus mortem, qua (etiam) privatio justitiae designatur. Cum ergo Adam tunc erat tota natura, nulla fuit in Deo crudelitas vel asperitas: quod peccante natura denudaret eam, quibus supernaturalibus donis ex mera liberalitate exornaverat. Veluti si Princeps civitati amplissimum privilegium largiretur, dum non committeret certum crimen: quod si contra faceret, tunc nimirum sibi civitas perpetuo maneret offensa et invisa." 529. We say that this was done by the will of God alone. For it must be said to have been done by the will of God alone if the will of God alone suffices for it, and it is in no way proved that Adam's consent was also employed. But the will of God alone suffices, and Adam's consent is in no way proved. Therefore.

The minor is proved with respect to the first part. a) "The will of God of itself is sufficient for inducing every possible obligation without the consent of him upon whom he wishes to impose it. Hence just as by that precept he could bind all human beings, present and future, not by asking consent from them, but by exacting it, so also he could bind the whole nature in Adam, not waiting for consent or voluntary acceptance, even through the will of Adam, but by exacting, or absolutely and efficaciously imposing the obligation." b) "In order that the children of Adam would be born in grace and justice if Adam himself did not sin, the efficacious decree of the divine will establishing this sufficed, even if Adam did not have knowledge of such a decree, as seems self-evident. Therefore, also contrariwise, in order that Adam by sinning should lose justice and grace not only for himself, but also for his descendants, the same decree of God establishing this could suffice, even if it had been unknown to Adam. For the account of opposites is the same. But then the descendants also would sin in the will of the parent, and on account of it would become hateful and hostile to God through the privation of grace and justice; therefore they would be comprehended under the precept in the first parent, even if the parent himself had been ignorant of this mode of comprehension." Thus Suarez (same place, nos. 24 and 28). If it is kept before one's eyes that all the gifts of original justice are not owed to human nature, the force of these arguments will easily become known.

The minor is proved with respect to the second part. From what was just said it follows that the very nature of the thing did not require Adam's consent; therefore if it was employed, this must be evident from some other positive special institution of God, or from revelation. But it is in no way proved from revelation. For the testimonies adduced, whether from Scripture or from St. Augustine, either are not to the point, because they treat an entirely different law from the law imposed on Adam in Paradise, or indeed treat this law, but in no way establish that it was not only a law but also a compact, as the adversaries understand it. See de Rubeis (cited work, chapter 61, no. 2), and Suarez (same place, nos. 25 and 26). Besides, this will be confirmed from what is to be said in the following section.

Hence Dominic Soto rightly says (On Nature and Grace, book 1, chapter 9): "Nor must it be thought, as some imagine, that a compact intervened between God and Adam, so that when he first sinned, nature would be stripped of those heavenly gifts, and that in this way he gave consent in the name of the whole human race; and that for this reason, when he sinned, the whole race sinned. For it is a

fable. For what need did God have of Adam's consent? For Scripture is manifest that there was one command, that he should not eat of the tree of knowledge; by this command, apart from his consent, God could bind the whole nature as its Lord by right of creation, just as the laws of a legitimate prince which in the present mode would be issued to a city would be understood as imposed in perpetuity on all citizens. Yet as punishment for transgression God threatened death, by which also the privation of justice is designated. Therefore, since Adam then was the whole nature, there was no cruelty or harshness in God if, when nature sinned, he stripped it of those supernatural gifts with which he had adorned it from mere liberality. It is as if a prince were to grant a very ample privilege to a city so long as it did not commit a certain crime; but if it did the contrary, then indeed the city would remain perpetually offensive and hateful to him."

530. Ex his patet cur peccatum unius Adami totum humanum genus inficit; et cur e contra poenitentia Adami non restauravit posteros ad gratiam. In retractione, "aiunt Salmanticenses (tr. 13. disp. 14. dub. 3. Sect. 7.), "Adam non jam gessit munus capitis (juridici et moralis), quippe eam dignitatem peccando amisit; sed poenituit ipsum dumtaxat ut persona particularis erat, delevitque praedictum peccatum, ut praecise erat culpa personalis ipsius. Quatenus vero ad posteros naturamque humanam in Adamo contentam attinebat, irretractatum et indeletum permansit." - Quod jam docuerat D. Thomas (in Rom. c. 5. lect. 3.), inquiens: "Quamvis peccatum (personale) Adae, ait S. Thomas, deletum fuerit per suam poenitentiam, non tamen ejus poenitentia delere potuit peccatum posterorum: quia ejus poenitentia fuit per actum personalem, qui ultra ejus personam non se extendebat." 530. From these things it is clear why the sin of the one Adam infects the whole human race, and why, on the contrary, Adam's repentance did not restore his descendants to grace. "In retraction," say the Salmanticenses (tract 13, disputation 14, doubt 3, section 7), "Adam no longer bore the office of head (juridical and moral), since he lost that dignity by sinning; but he repented only insofar as he was a particular person, and he blotted out the aforesaid sin precisely as it was his personal fault. But insofar as it concerned his descendants and human nature contained in Adam, it remained unretracted and undeleted." This St. Thomas had already taught (on Romans, chapter 5, lecture 3), saying: "Although Adam's (personal) sin was blotted out through his repentance, nevertheless his repentance could not blot out the sin of his descendants, because his repentance was through a personal act, which did not extend beyond his person."

531. Imprimis duo hac in re certa sunt. Primum est, quod ratio voluntarii pertinet ad ipsam essentiam peccati, ac proinde debet aliquo modo inveniri in peccato originali, quod est verum peccatum. Unde damnata est in Baio prop. 46., quae sic se habet: "Ad rationem et definitionem peccati non pertinet voluntarium, nec definitionis quaestio est, sed causae et originis, utrum omne peccatum debeat esse voluntarium." - Et S. Augustinus (de ver. relig. c. 14.), inquit: "Defectus autem iste, quod peccatum vocatur, si tamquam febris invitum occuparet, recte injusta poena videretur, quae peccantem consequitur et quae damnatio nuncupatur. Nunc vero usque adeo peccatum voluntarium est malum, ut nullo modo sit peccatum, si non sit voluntarium: et hoc quidem ita manifestum est, ut nulla hinc doctorum paucitas, nulla indoctorum turba dissentiat." 531. First of all, two things are certain in this matter. The first is that the ratio of the voluntary pertains to the very essence of sin, and consequently must in some way be found in original sin, which is true sin. Hence proposition 46 was condemned in Baius, which runs thus: "The voluntary does not pertain to the ratio and definition of sin; nor is it a question of definition, but of cause and origin, whether every sin ought to be voluntary." And St. Augustine (On True Religion, chapter 14) says: "But if this defect, which is called sin, were to occupy someone unwillingly like a fever, the punishment which follows the sinner and which is called damnation would rightly seem unjust. But now sin is so far a voluntary evil that it is in no way sin if it is not voluntary; and indeed this is so manifest that no small number of the learned, no crowd of the unlearned, dissents from it."

532. Alterum vero est, quod peccatum originale non habet rationem voluntarii a voluntate habituali parvuli; sed a relatione quam dicit ad voluntatem Adami. Unde damnatae sunt in Baio propp. 47. 48.: "Unde peccatum originis vere habet rationem peccati sine ulla relatione ac respectu ad voluntatem, a qua originem habet." - "Peccatum originis est habituali parvuli voluntate voluntarium, et habitualiter dominatur parvulo: eo quod non gerit contrarium voluntatis arbitrium." 532. The other certain point is that original sin does not have the ratio of the voluntary from the habitual will of the little child, but from the relation which it implies to the will of Adam. Hence propositions 47 and 48 were condemned in Baius: "Therefore the sin of origin truly has the ratio of sin without any relation and respect to the will from which it has its origin." "The sin of origin is voluntary by the habitual will of the little child, and habitually dominates the little child, because he does not bear the contrary choice of the will."

533. His in tuto positis, quaestio est inter Theologos, utrum peccatum originale sit voluntarium solum relative et mediate prae voluntate capitis - vel etiam voluntate parvuli, quatenus ejus voluntas moraliter, ut aiunt, inclusa in voluntate Adami, actum ipsum peccati in eo peccante commisit. 533. With these points placed safely, the question among theologians is whether original sin is voluntary only relatively and mediately by reason of the will of the head, or also by the will of the little child, insofar as his will, as they say, morally included in the will of Adam, committed the very act of sin when Adam sinned.

534. Qui pactum, sive formale sive virtuale admittunt, inde inferunt "voluntates omnium Adami posterorum collocatas pro jure supremi dominii a Deo fuisse in una Adami voluntate. - Hinc vero tum praecepti observationem, si paruisset Adam, tum violationem ejusdem, in quam propria incidisset voluntate, posteris quoque secundum moralem aestimationem imputandam fore. Unde jam intelligi facile posse, quomodo privatio originalis justitiae potuerit Adae posteris esse voluntaria; et quomodo peccatum sit, quod in Adamo dicebatur peccatum ipsius habituale, in posteris originale. - Hocce demum sensu scripsisse Apostolum Paulum, Ecclesiaeque Patres docere, in Adamo peccasse quotquot ex ipso per generationem descendimus homines." 534. Those who admit a compact, whether formal or virtual, infer from this that "the wills of all Adam's descendants were, by right of supreme dominion, placed by God in the one will of Adam. From this, both the observance of the precept, if Adam had obeyed, and the violation of the same precept, into which he would have fallen by his own will, would have had to be imputed also to his descendants according to moral estimation. Hence it can now easily be understood how the privation of original justice could have been voluntary for Adam's descendants; and how that which in Adam was called his habitual sin is sin, original in his descendants. Finally, in this sense the Apostle Paul wrote, and the Fathers of the Church teach, that all of us human beings who descend from Adam through generation sinned in Adam."

535. Aliis vero videtur prima illa voluntarii ratio in peccato originali sufficere, nec ulla alia esse requirenda. His subscribentes, dicimus:

PROP. XLI. Peccatum originale non est voluntarium voluntate propria et personali parvuli, sed relative et mediate prae voluntate Adami capitis juridici humani generis.

Prob. I. Ex auctoritate. 1. S. Augustinus videtur omnino negare parvulos peccare propria et personali voluntate. Nam a) (de Civ. Dei, l. 16. c. 27.) ait: "omnes parvuli, non secundum suae vitae proprietatem, sed secundum communem generis humani originem, omnes in illo uno Testamentum Dei dissipaverunt, in quo omnes peccarunt."

b) (Op. imperf. l. 4. nn. 104. 105.) Objecerat Julianus: "Si omnes ille unus fuerunt, quomodo per voluntatem illius malam omnes peccaverunt, cum isti omnes, quos in illo fuisse dicis, sua potuerint voluntate peccare ... Habuerunt ergo parvuli voluntatem, non solum antequam nascerentur, verum antequam proavi eorum generarentur: et usi

sunt electionis arbitrio, priusquam substantiae eorum conderentur." Sane si S. Doctor admisisset parvulos voluntate propria et personali, quatenus moraliter inclusa in voluntate Adami, peccavisse, illud debuisset suo adversario reponere. Respondit tamen: "Non hoc (in quo omnes peccaverunt) dicitur propter arbitrium singulorum; sed propter originem seminis, unde omnes futuri erant. Secundum quam originem omnes in illo uno erant; et hi omnes unus ille erant, qui in seipsis nulli adhuc erant." - Quam responsionem confirmat exemplo Levi, qui secundum seminalem originem dicitur fuisse in lumbis Abrahae; addens: "Nec voluit nec noluit decimari: quoniam nulla ejus voluntas erat, quando secundum substantiam suam nec ipse adhuc erat; et tamen secundum rationem seminis, non mendaciter, nec inaniter dictum est, quod ibi fuit, et decimatus est." - Unde concludit: "Sic ergo omnes, qui nondum nati, nihil per proprias voluntates agere poterant boni vel mali, in uno potuerunt peccare, in quo per rationem seminalem erant: quando ille propria voluntate peccatum illud grande peccavit; naturamque in se vitiavit, mutavit, obnoxiavit, humanam: excepto uno homine, qui ex ipso quidem semine, non tamen seminali ratione procreatus est."

c) Cum dixerit S. Doctor: "usque adeo peccatum voluntarium est malum, ut nullo modo sit peccatum, nisi sit voluntarium;" haec explanans (Retract. l. 1. c. 13.), ait: "Et illud quod in parvulis dicitur peccatum originale non absurde dicitur voluntarium, quia quod a prima voluntate factum est, hoc per haereditatem factum est voluntarium."

2. S. Anselmus non modo expresse dixit: "infantes carent ipsa (justitia), non quia ipsi, sed quoniam alius dereliquit" (n. 505.); sed insuper (de Conc. Virg. c. 23.) comparationem instituens inter peccatum Adae et parvulorum, haec habet: "Quod Adam comedebat, hoc exigebat natura, quia, ut hoc exigeret sic creata erat. Quod vero de ligno vetito comedit, non hoc voluntas naturalis, sed personalis, hoc est propria fecit; quod tamen egit persona, non fecit sine natura. Persona enim erat, quod dicebatur Adam, natura, quod homo. Fecit igitur persona peccatricem naturam, quia quum Adam peccavit, homo peccavit ... Similiter fit in infantibus e converso. Nempe quod in illis non est justitia quam debent habere, non hoc fecit eorum voluntas personalis, sicut in Adam, sed egestas naturalis, quam ipsa natura accepit ab Adam. In Adam enim, extra quem de illa (natura) nihil erat, est nudata justitia quam habebat. Sic spoliavit persona naturam in Adam, et natura egens facta omnes personas, quas ipsa de se procreat, eadem egestate peccatrices et injustas fecit."

3. D. Thomas a) constanter docuit peccatum originale desumere voluntarii rationem a primo principio, ad quod refertur tamquam effectus ad causam: et in nobis esse voluntarium natura, non persona. Praeter loca superius relata, 2. sent. dist. 30. q. 1. a. 2., docet privationem gratiae sanctificantis "in quolibet homine habere rationem culpae ex hoc, quod per voluntatem principii naturae, idest primi hominis inductus est talis defectus." - De malo, q. 4. a. 1., ait: "Si ergo consideretur iste defectus, hoc modo per originem in istum hominem derivatus, secundum quod iste homo est quaedam persona singularis; sic hujusmodi defectus non potest habere rationem culpae: ad cujus rationem requiritur quod sit voluntaria. Sed si consideretur iste homo generatus, sicut quoddam membrum totius humanae naturae a primo parente propagatae, acsi omnes homines essent unus homo; sic habet rationem culpae propter voluntarium ejus principium, quod est actuale peccatum primi hominis."

b) Cum per poenitentiam proprie debeat retractari peccatum propria voluntate commissum, docet D. Thomas 3. p. q. 84. art. 2. ad. 3.: "De peccato originali paenitentia nec principaliter est (quia contra ipsum non ordinatur hoc sacramentum, sed magis baptismus), nec etiam proprie, quia peccatum originale non est nostra voluntate peractum, nisi forte in quantum voluntas Adae reputatur nostra, secundum modum loquendi quo Apostolus dicit Rom. 5. 12.: 'In quo omnes peccaverunt.' In quantum tamen large accipitur paenitentia pro quacumque detestatione rei praeteritae, potest dici poenitentia de peccato originali."

c) Unde etiam, de Malo q. 5. art. 1. ad 9., ait: "peccatum veniale, comparatum originali, quodammodo est minus. Peccatum enim veniale, comparatum huic personae vel illi, magis habet de ratione peccati, quam peccatum originale. Quia peccatum veniale est peccatum voluntarium voluntatis hujus personae: non autem peccatum originale. Sed peccatum originale, comparatum ad naturam, est gravius: quia privat naturam majori bono, quam peccatum veniale privet personam, scilicet bono gratiae. Et propter hoc debetur ei carentia visionis divinae: quia ad visionem divinam non pervenitur, nisi per gratiam, quam veniale peccatum non excludit."

Prob. II. Eatenus, juxta adversarios, peccatum originale esset parvulis voluntarium voluntate propria et personali, quatenus Deus, vi sui supremi dominii, eorum voluntates in

voluntate Adami inclusit. Atqui nec constat hoc factum esse; nec si factum esset, videretur per id explicari quod peccatum originale sit parvulis voluntarium voluntate propria et personali. Ergo.

Prob. min. quoad 1am partem. Etsi S. Augustinus, D. Thomas, etc. explanantes illud Apostoli, "in quo omnes peccaverunt" constanter doceant quod "omnes nos fuimus in Adamo" quod "omnes unus ille erant" etc.; numquam tamen haec explicant per inclusionem voluntatis nostrae in voluntate Adami, sed per originem seminis, per unitatem naturae, quae dum Adam peccavit solum in eo existebat, per institutionem illam, qua Deus Adam constituit caput juridicum totius humani generis, etc. Jamvero adversarii nullum aliud ex auctoritate fundamentum habent pro sua opinione. Recole cit. loca S. Augustini et D. Thomae, et vid. de Rubeis (op. cit. capp. 61. 66.)

Prob. min. quoad 2am partem. Utut adstruatur illa inclusio voluntatum posterorum Adae in voluntate ejus, semper manebit verum, quod voluntas, quae nullo modo existit nihil potest agere, ac proinde nihil ratione sui potest illi esse voluntarium; atqui etiam admissa illa inclusione voluntatum nostrarum in voluntate Adami, quando ille peccavit, voluntates nostrae nullo modo erant. Ergo.

Dices: "Respublicae aut principes includere subditorum voluntates in unius voluntate possunt quoad aliquos actus, effectusque civiles, qui dominium, ac jurisdictionem eorum non excedunt: ut patet in Pupillis, quorum voluntas jure civili in voluntate Tutorum reposita est. Cur ergo id simile facere numen supremum non potuerit, quod magis habet in potestate sua voluntates hominum, quam ipsi suas?"

Resp. Tametsi pupillorum voluntas v. g. dicatur quodammodo ex Principis praescripto in voluntate Tutorum reposita; id attamen negotium omne in actibus, effectibusque consistit civilibus, atque exterioribus. Agitur proprie de culpa, deque posteris hominibus, qui in culpam incidunt, ut jam exposuimus. Atqui vero ad culpam contrahendam, uni alicujus voluntati alligari eorum voluntates posse, qui non sunt, probare non videntur quae allata sunt exempla.

Prob. III. Ratio voluntarii, quae requiritur et sufficit in peccato habituali, ea est, quam habet per relationem ad actuale peccatum; atqui, ex dictis, peccatum originale in nobis habet rationem peccati habitualis, et relationem habet ad actualem transgressionem Adae; ergo ratio voluntarii, quae requiritur et sufficit ad peccatum originale in nobis, ea est, quam habet ex relatione ad actuale peccatum Adae. Secus vix intelligeretur ab omnibus tradita differentia inter peccatum naturae et peccatum personae, inter peccatum originale et personale.

Dices: Juxta Apostolum Rom. 5. omnes peccaverunt in Adamo "in quo omnes peccaverunt;" atqui non potuissent omnes in Adamo peccare, nisi omnium voluntates inclusae fuissent in una Adami voluntate, quae moraliter coram Deo reputata fuerit totius naturae voluntas; ergo.

Resp. dist. maj. Omnes peccaverunt in Adamo contrahendo peccatum (habituale) conc., committendo peccatum (actuale) nego. Unde Suarez (de vitiis et pecc. disp. 9. sect. 2.) quamvis videatur admittere nostras voluntates fuisse inclusas in voluntate Adae; seipsum tamen explicans (n. 33.), ait: "Dicendum proprie et simpliciter non peccare (parvulum) quia verbum ipsum peccare manifeste indicat actuale peccatum; sed dici debet generari in peccato, vel nasci in illo, sicut ille qui semel peccavit, non dicitur amplius peccare, licet in peccato maneat. Dices, ad Romanos 5. habetur, 'Omnes in Adam peccaverunt.' Item parvulus in eo instanti fit peccator; ergo peccat. Respondetur non fieri peccatorem committendo, sed contrahendo peccatum. Paulus vero non ait simpliciter peccare nos, sed cum addito, et in praeterito peccasse nos in Adamo, unde postea simpliciter subdit 'peccatores constituuntur multi.'" 535. To others, however, that first ratio of the voluntary in original sin seems sufficient, and no other is to be required. Subscribing to these, we say:

PROPOSITION XLI. Original sin is not voluntary by the proper and personal will of the little child, but relatively and mediately by reason of the will of Adam, juridical head of the human race.

Proof I. From authority. 1. St. Augustine seems altogether to deny that little children sin by their own and personal will. For a) (City of God, book 16, chapter 27) he says: "all little children, not according to the property of their own life, but according to the common origin of the human race, all in that one man dissipated the Testament of God, in whom all sinned."

b) (Unfinished Work, book 4, nos. 104-105) Julian had objected: "If all were that one man, how did all sin through his evil will, since all those whom you say were in him could have sinned by their own will ... Therefore little children had a will not only before they were born, but before their great-grandfathers were

begotten; and they used the choice of election before their substances were founded." Certainly, if the holy Doctor had admitted that little children sinned by their own and personal will, insofar as it was morally included in Adam's will, he ought to have answered that to his adversary. Nevertheless he answered: "This is not said (that in whom all sinned) on account of the choice of individuals, but on account of the origin of the seed, whence all were going to be. According to this origin all were in that one man; and all these were that one man, who as yet were none in themselves." He confirms this answer by the example of Levi, who according to seminal origin is said to have been in the loins of Abraham, adding: "He neither willed nor refused to be tithed, since no will of his existed when, according to his own substance, he himself did not yet exist; and nevertheless, according to the ratio of seed, it was said neither falsely nor vainly that he was there and was tithed." Hence he concludes: "Thus, therefore, all who, not yet born, could do nothing good or evil through their own wills, could sin in one man, in whom they were by the ratio of seed, when he by his own will sinned that great sin, and in himself vitiated, changed, and made liable human nature, except for one man, who indeed was begotten from that seed, but not by seminal ratio."

c) Since the holy Doctor had said, "sin is so far a voluntary evil that it is in no way sin unless it is voluntary," explaining these words (Retractations, book 1, chapter 13), he says: "And that which is called original sin in little children is not absurdly called voluntary, because what was done by the first will has been made voluntary through inheritance."

2. St. Anselm not only expressly said that "infants lack that justice, not because they themselves abandoned it, but because another abandoned it" (no. 505); but moreover, making a comparison between the sin of Adam and that of little children (On the Conception of the Virgin, chapter 23), he has the following: "That Adam ate, nature required, because it had been so created as to require this. But that he ate of the forbidden tree, this was done not by the natural will, but by the personal, that is, by his own; nevertheless what the person did, he did not do without nature. For the person was what was called Adam; the nature was what was called man. Therefore the person made the nature sinful, because when Adam sinned, man sinned ... Similarly, the reverse happens in infants. Namely, that there is not in them the justice which they ought to have, this was not done by their personal will, as in Adam, but by natural need, which nature itself received from Adam. For in Adam, outside whom there was nothing of that nature, it was stripped of the justice which it had. Thus the person stripped nature in Adam, and nature, having become needy, made all persons whom it procreates from itself sinful and unjust by the same need."

3. St. Thomas a) constantly taught that original sin derives the ratio of the voluntary from the first principle, to which it is referred as effect to cause, and that in us it is voluntary by nature, not by person. Besides the places reported above, in 2 Sentences, distinction 30, question 1, article 2, he teaches that the privation of sanctifying grace "has in each human being the ratio of fault from this, that such a defect was introduced through the will of the principle of nature, that is, of the first man." In De Malo, question 4, article 1, he says: "Therefore, if this defect, derived by origin into this human being in this way, is considered according as this man is a certain singular person, then a defect of this sort cannot have the ratio of fault, for the ratio of fault requires that it be voluntary. But if this begotten man is considered as a certain member of the whole human nature propagated from the first parent, as if all human beings were one man, then it has the ratio of fault on account of its voluntary principle, which is the actual sin of the first man."

b) Since through repentance a sin committed by one's own will ought properly to be retracted, St. Thomas teaches, III, question 84, article 2, reply 3: "Repentance concerning original sin is neither principally so, because this sacrament is not ordered against it, but rather baptism is; nor even properly so, because original sin was not performed by our will, except perhaps insofar as Adam's will is reckoned as ours, according to the mode of speaking by which the Apostle says in Romans 5:12, 'In whom all sinned.' Nevertheless, insofar as repentance is broadly taken for any detestation whatever of a past thing, repentance can be said concerning original sin."

c) Hence also in De Malo, question 5, article 1, reply 9, he says: "Venial sin, compared with original sin, is in some way less. For venial sin, compared with this person or that one, has more of the ratio of sin than original sin does, because venial sin is a voluntary sin of the will of this person, but original sin is not. But original sin, compared to nature, is

graver, because it deprives nature of a greater good than venial sin deprives the person, namely the good of grace. And for this reason the lack of the divine vision is owed to it, because the divine vision is not reached except through grace, which venial sin does not exclude."

Proof II. According to the adversaries, original sin would be voluntary for little children by their own and personal will insofar as God, by the force of his supreme dominion, included their wills in the will of Adam. But neither is it established that this was done, nor, if it had been done, would it seem to explain by this that original sin is voluntary for little children by their own and personal will. Therefore.

The minor is proved with respect to the first part. Although St. Augustine, St. Thomas, and others, explaining that statement of the Apostle, "in whom all sinned," constantly teach that "we all were in Adam," that "all were that one man," and so forth, nevertheless they never explain these things by an inclusion of our will in the will of Adam, but by the origin of seed, by the unity of nature, which, when Adam sinned, existed in him alone, by that institution by which God constituted Adam juridical head of the whole human race, and so forth. But the adversaries have no other foundation from authority for their opinion. Recall the cited places of St. Augustine and St. Thomas, and see de Rubeis (cited work, chapters 61 and 66).

The minor is proved with respect to the second part. However much that inclusion of the wills of Adam's descendants in his will is constructed, it will always remain true that a will which in no way exists can do nothing, and consequently nothing by reason of itself can be voluntary to it. But even if that inclusion of our wills in the will of Adam is admitted, when he sinned, our wills in no way existed. Therefore.

You will say: "Republics or princes can include the wills of subjects in the will of one person with respect to certain civil acts and effects which do not exceed their dominion and jurisdiction; as is clear in wards, whose will by civil law is placed in the will of their guardians. Why, therefore, could not the supreme Deity do something similar, since he has the wills of human beings more in his power than they themselves have their own?"

I answer: Although the will of wards, for example, is said in some way, by the prince's prescription, to be placed in the will of their guardians, nevertheless that whole business consists in civil and external acts and effects. Here the question is properly about fault, and about descendants of human beings who fall into fault, as we have already explained. But the examples brought forward do not seem to prove that, for contracting fault, the wills of those who do not exist can be bound to the one will of someone.

Proof III. The ratio of the voluntary which is required and sufficient in habitual sin is that which it has through relation to actual sin. But from what has been said, original sin in us has the ratio of habitual sin, and it has relation to the actual transgression of Adam. Therefore the ratio of the voluntary which is required and sufficient for original sin in us is that which it has from relation to Adam's actual sin. Otherwise the difference handed down by all between sin of nature and sin of person, between original and personal sin, would scarcely be understood.

You will say: According to the Apostle in Romans 5, all sinned in Adam, "in whom all sinned." But all could not have sinned in Adam unless the wills of all had been included in the one will of Adam, which morally before God was reckoned the will of the whole nature. Therefore.

I answer by distinguishing the major. All sinned in Adam by contracting sin, namely habitual sin, I concede; by committing sin, namely actual sin, I deny. Hence Suarez (On Vices and Sins, disputation 9, section 2), although he seems to admit that our wills were included in Adam's will, nevertheless explaining himself (no. 33), says: "It must be said that properly and simply the little child does not sin, because the very verb 'to sin' manifestly indicates actual sin; but he must be said to be generated in sin, or to be born in it, just as one who has once sinned is no longer said to sin, although he remains in sin. You will say, in Romans 5 it is held, 'All sinned in Adam.' Likewise the little child in that instant becomes a sinner; therefore he sins. The answer is that he does not become a sinner by committing, but by contracting sin. Paul, however, does not say simply that we sin, but with an addition and in the past tense, that we sinned in Adam; hence afterward he simply adds, 'many are constituted sinners.'"

536. Juxta statutam sententiam haud difficile erit solvere objectiones, quae contra propagationem peccati originalis peti solent ex ratione voluntarii seu liberi,

quae debet esse in quolibet peccato. Itaque

Obj. I. Est de ratione peccati ut sit voluntarium et liberum; atqui nihil est in parvulis, ante rationis usum, quod possit esse hujusmodi; ergo.

Resp. dist. maj. Est de ratione peccati actualis ut sit voluntarium et liberum conc.; est de ratione peccati habitualis, subd.: ut sit voluntarium et liberum per ordinem ad actum propriae voluntatis vel alterius conc.; propriae; iterum dist.: si sit peccatum personale conc.; si sit peccatum originale nego. Responsio patet ex dictis.

Inst. Atqui est de ratione peccati etiam originalis, ut sit in unoquoque voluntarium voluntate propria et personali; ergo. Prob. De ratione voluntarii est, ut sit a principio intrinseco cum cognitione finis; atqui, si peccatum originale in parvulis esset voluntarium per ordinem ad actum Adami, non esset a principio intrinseco; siquidem voluntas Adami est extrinseca parvulis. Ergo.

Resp. neg. subs.; et ad prob. dist. maj. Est de ratione voluntarii ut sit a principio intrinseco personae vel naturae conc.; personae subd.: si sit peccatum vel actus personalis conc.; si sit peccatum originale nego. Licet ergo peccatum originale sit voluntarium solum mediate ac relative prae voluntate Adami; inde tamen nullatenus sequitur illud esse voluntarium sola extrinseca denominatione. Voluntas enim Adami est quidem extrinseca personae parvuli, sed non ejus naturae; siquidem est voluntas principii naturae, et capitis juridici totius generis humani. Haec solutio est D. Thomae, qui (de malo q. 4. a. 1.) eidem difficultati sibi propositae, respondet ad 4.: "si referatur (defectus justitiae) ad personam non habet rationem voluntarii; sed si referatur ad naturam, sic habet rationem voluntarii. Et hoc modo ei debetur increpatio et poena." - Et ibid. ad 5. clarius: "Defectus per originem contractus habet quidem rationem existentis ab alio, (extrinsecus se habente,) si referatur ad personam (singularem Adami); non autem si referatur ad naturam, (ipsumque etiam ad Adamum, uti principium naturae): sic enim est quasi a principio intrinseco."

Obj. II. Voluntarium liberum illud est, quod est in potestate illius, cui voluntarium dicitur, ut sit vel non sit. Atqui non est in potestate parvulorum ut peccatum originale in illis sit vel non sit. Ergo.

Resp. dist. maj. Voluntarium in actu conc.; in habitu, subd.: si habitus originem habeat ab actu personali conc.; si originem habeat a voluntate capitis, iterum dist.: debet esse in potestate capitis, conc., debet esse in potestate uniuscujusque, neg. Sane quod est voluntarium et liberum voluntate personali debet esse in potestate personae, ut sit vel non sit: sed quod est voluntarium et liberum sola voluntate capitis, non debet esse in potestate cujuslibet membri, sed in potestate ipsius capitis. Haec etiam responsio est D. Thomae, qui (2. sent. dist. 31. a. 1.), ait: "Ratio culpae inde venit, quia illud, quod collatum fuit gratis Adae, scilicet justitia originalis, non fuit sibi collatum personaliter; sed inquantum talem naturam habebat, ut omnes scilicet, in quibus talis ab eo accepta natura inveniretur, tali dono potirentur. Et ideo cum propagatione carnis, etiam illa originalis justitia propagata fuisset. In potestate ergo naturae erat, ut talis justitia semper in ea conservaretur. Sed per voluntatem personae, existentis in natura, factum est ut hoc perderetur: et ideo hic defectus, comparatus ad naturam, rationem habet culpae in omnibus, in quibus invenitur eadem natura, accepta a persona peccante." 536. According to the established opinion, it will not be difficult to solve the objections which are usually drawn against the propagation of original sin from the ratio of the voluntary or free, which ought to be in any sin whatever. And so:

Objection I. It belongs to the ratio of sin that it be voluntary and free; but in little children, before the use of reason, there is nothing which can be of this sort; therefore.

I answer by distinguishing the major. It belongs to the ratio of actual sin that it be voluntary and free, I concede. It belongs to the ratio of habitual sin, I distinguish: that it be voluntary and free through order to an act of one's own will or of another's, I concede; of one's own will, I again distinguish: if it is personal sin, I concede; if it is original sin, I deny. The answer is clear from what has been said.

You insist: But it belongs to the ratio even of original sin that in each one it be voluntary by one's own and personal will; therefore. Proof: It belongs to the ratio of the voluntary that it be from an intrinsic principle with cognition of the end. But if original sin in little children were voluntary through order to Adam's act, it would not be from an intrinsic principle, since Adam's will is extrinsic to little children. Therefore.

I answer by denying the subsumed proposition; and to the proof I distinguish the major. It belongs to the ratio of the voluntary that it be from an intrinsic principle of the person or of the nature, I concede; of the person, I subdistinguish: if it is a personal sin or act, I concede; if it is original sin, I

deny. Therefore, although original sin is voluntary only mediately and relatively by reason of Adam's will, nevertheless from this it by no means follows that it is voluntary by merely extrinsic denomination. For Adam's will is indeed extrinsic to the person of the little child, but not to his nature, since it is the will of the principle of nature and of the juridical head of the whole human race. This is St. Thomas's solution; in De Malo, question 4, article 1, to the same difficulty proposed to him, he answers in reply 4: "if it is referred to the person, it does not have the ratio of the voluntary; but if it is referred to nature, thus it has the ratio of the voluntary. And in this way rebuke and punishment are owed to it." And in the same place, reply 5, more clearly: "A defect contracted through origin indeed has the ratio of something existing from another, extrinsically disposed, if it is referred to the person, namely to the singular person of Adam; but not if it is referred to nature, and also to Adam himself as principle of nature: for thus it is as if from an intrinsic principle."

Objection II. The voluntary free thing is that which is in the power of him to whom it is said to be voluntary, so that it be or not be. But it is not in the power of little children that original sin be or not be in them. Therefore.

I answer by distinguishing the major. The voluntary in act, I concede; in habit, I distinguish: if the habit has its origin from a personal act, I concede; if it has its origin from the will of the head, I again distinguish: it must be in the power of the head, I concede; it must be in the power of each individual, I deny. Certainly what is voluntary and free by personal will ought to be in the power of the person, so that it be or not be; but what is voluntary and free by the will of the head alone ought not to be in the power of any member whatever, but in the power of the head himself. This also is St. Thomas's answer; he says (2 Sentences, distinction 31, article 1): "The ratio of fault comes from this, that what was freely conferred on Adam, namely original justice, was not conferred on him personally, but insofar as he had such a nature, namely so that all in whom such a nature received from him would be found would possess such a gift. And therefore, with the propagation of flesh, that original justice also would have been propagated. Therefore it was in the power of nature that such justice should always be preserved in it. But through the will of the person existing in the nature, it was brought about that this was lost; and therefore this defect, compared to nature, has the ratio of fault in all in whom the same nature is found, received from the sinning person."

537. Ut respondeamus propositae quaestioni, quatuor possumus considerare. Parvulos, qui peccatum contrahunt - parentes, a quibus generantur - Adamum, in quo omnes peccaverunt - Deum, qui animam creat. 537. In order to answer the proposed question, we can consider four things: the little children who contract sin; the parents by whom they are generated; Adam, in whom all sinned; and God, who creates the soul.

538. Jamvero, quemadmodum certum est, ex dictis, parvulos non propria et personali voluntate fieri peccatores, ac proinde non esse causam sui peccati; ita pariter certum est, eorum peccati causam esse Adamum, caput juridicum totius humani generis, qui legem transgrediendo totam humanam naturam justitia spoliavit. Quare, cum Julianus objiceret: non peccat iste qui nascitur; non peccat ille qui genuit; non peccat ille qui condidit; per quas ergo rimas peccatum fingis ingressum? S. Augustinus (de nupt. et concup. l. 2. c. 28.), respondit: "Quid quaeris latentem rimam, cum habeas apertissimam januam? Per unum hominem, ait Apostolus, peccatum in hunc mundum intravit." - Et (c. 26.): "Voluntarium peccatum hominis primi originalis est causa peccati." - Sane peccatum nequit aliam habere causam praeter voluntatem a recto ordine deficientem; in peccato originali nulla est voluntas a recto ordine deficiens praeter voluntatem Adami, respectu cujus privatio gratiae sanctificantis voluntaria est in ejus posteris. Ergo. - Deus elevavit ad justitiam supernaturalem totam humanam naturam in Adamo; communicatio autem singulis hujus naturae individuis pendebat ex Adami obedientia tamquam ex conditione: qui conditionem violavit causa fuit cur omnes justitia privarentur, ac proinde causa fuit peccati, quod in privatione justitiae consistit. 538. Now, just as it is certain from what has been said that little

children do not become sinners by their own and personal will, and consequently are not the cause of their own sin, so likewise it is certain that the cause of their sin is Adam, the juridical head of the whole human race, who by transgressing the law stripped the whole of human nature of justice. Therefore, when Julian objected, "The one who is born does not sin; the one who begot him does not sin; the one who founded him does not sin; through what cracks, then, do you imagine sin entered?" St. Augustine answered (On Marriage and Concupiscence, book 2, chapter 28): "Why do you seek a hidden crack, when you have the widest open door? Through one man, says the Apostle, sin entered into this world." And in chapter 26: "The voluntary sin of the first man is the cause of original sin." Certainly sin cannot have any cause except a will deficient from right order; in original sin there is no will deficient from right order except the will of Adam, with respect to which the privation of sanctifying grace is voluntary in his descendants. Therefore. God elevated the whole of human nature in Adam to supernatural justice; but the communication of this justice to the individual members of this nature depended upon Adam's obedience as upon a condition. He who violated the condition was the cause why all were deprived of justice, and consequently was the cause of the sin which consists in the privation of justice.

539. Sed difficultas ex eo fortasse oritur, quod cum actus Adami jam transierit, nec Adam nunc influat in productione hominum; quaeritur causa proxima et immediata parvulis communicans peccatum. 539. But the difficulty perhaps arises from this, that since the act of Adam has now passed, and Adam does not now flow into the production of human beings, the proximate and immediate cause communicating sin to little children is sought.

540. Cui tamen difficultati facile occurritur animadvertendo, quod peccatum originale non indiget causa physica efficiente, quae reali et propria actione illud efficiat. Nam peccatum originale, ut vidimus, non est formaliter aliquid positivum, sed defectus seu privatio: eaque non talis quae fiat per realem alicujus formae praeexistentis expulsionem, sicut fuit in Adamo; sed per non infusionem gratiae. Unde non quaerenda est causa, quae aliquid producat vel communicet; sed potius causa cur aliquid non producatur, aut communicetur; eamque designavit Apostolus "per unum hominem." Vid. Suarez (de vit. et pecc. disp. 9. sect. 3.) 540. Yet this difficulty is easily met by observing that original sin does not need a physical efficient cause which effects it by a real and proper action. For original sin, as we saw, is not formally something positive, but a defect or privation; and not such a privation as comes about through the real expulsion of some preexisting form, as it was in Adam, but through the non-infusion of grace. Hence one must not seek a cause which produces or communicates something, but rather the cause why something is not produced or communicated; and the Apostle designated this cause by the phrase "through one man." See Suarez (On Vices and Sins, disputation 9, section 3).

541. Dices: si ita est, cur peccatum originale dicitur produci, seu contrahi per generationem? - Resp. "Peccatum originale non est peccatum hujus personae, nisi in quantum haec persona recipit naturam a primo parente: unde et vocatur peccatum naturae, secundum illud Eph. II. 3. "Eramus natura filii irae." Jamvero naturam non recipimus a primo parente nisi per generationem: hoc ergo sensu merito dicitur peccatum originale contrahi per generationem. 541. You will say: if this is so, why is original sin said to be produced or contracted through generation? I answer: "Original sin is not the sin of this person except insofar as this person receives nature from the first parent; hence it is also called sin of nature, according to Ephesians 2:3: 'We were by nature children of wrath.'" Now we do not receive nature from the first parent except through generation; therefore in this sense original sin is rightly said to be contracted through generation.

542. Dices: non videtur haec responsio sufficere. Nam S. Augustinus (cont. Julian. l. 5. c. 3.) ait: "Profecto aut utrumque (anima et corpus) vitiatum ex homine trahitur, aut alterum in altero tamquam in vase vitiato corrumpitur; ubi occulta justitia divinae legis includitur. Quid autem horum sit verum, libentius disco, quam dico, ne audeam docere quod nescio." Sed nullum vitium potest admitti in anima, quae a Deo creatur; ergo videtur esse aliquod vitium (morbida qualitas) in corpore, quod a parentibus generatur.

Resp. 1. Jam ostendimus (494. seq.) nullam admitti posse in corpore qualitatem malam, quae peccatum animae communicet. Addimus hic cum Bellarmino (de amiss. grat. et pecc. l. 4. c. 12.): "Non potest intelligi, quemadmodum caro, quae corpus est, animam inficiat, quae spiritus est. Deinde labes carnis proprie peccatum esse non potest, praesertim antequam anima rationalis accedat, quare tametsi caro animam inficeret, non tamen inficeret contagione peccati. Ad haec certum est, in Adamo vitium prius in anima, quam in carne fuisse, et ab anima ad carnem, non a carne ad animam transivisse: 'Ab anima' (inquit S. Augustinus lib. 5. in Julianum. c. 3.) "coepit elatio, et ad praeceptum transgrediendum inde consensio, tunc est caro facta peccati, etc.' Cur igitur in filiis Adami, ad quos haereditas peccati ejusdem devoluta est, non idem ordo servetur."

Resp. 2. cum eodem Bellarmino (l. cit. l. 5. c. 15.): "Recte dicitur anima in corpore tamquam in vase vitiato corrumpi, non quod sit in carne positiva qualitas, ex qua rursus in anima qualitas alia oriatur; sed quod anima non incipiat habere peccatum, nisi cum infunditur corpori, tunc enim primum incipit esse homo filius Adami. Siquidem anima; ut prius natura intelligitur creari a Deo, nihil habet cum Adamo, ac per hoc non communicat ejus peccato, sed cum in corpore generato ex Adamo incipit habitare, et cum ipso corpore unum suppositum facere, tunc (ut supra fusius explicuimus) peccatum originis contrahit. Dicitur autem corpus ex Adamo generatum, etiam ante animationem, vas corruptum, quia ex vi talis generationis debetur illi, ut sit morti, et variis passionibus obnoxium." 542. You will say: this answer does not seem sufficient. For St. Augustine (Against Julian, book 5, chapter 3) says: "Certainly either both (soul and body) are drawn vitiated from man, or one is corrupted in the other as in a vitiated vessel; where the hidden justice of the divine law is included. But which of these is true, I more gladly learn than say, lest I dare to teach what I do not know." But no vice can be admitted in the soul, which is created by God; therefore there seems to be some vice, a morbid quality, in the body, which is generated by the parents.

I answer, first: We have already shown (494ff.) that no evil quality can be admitted in the body which communicates the sin of the soul. We add here with Bellarmine (On the Loss of Grace and Sin, book 4, chapter 12): "It cannot be understood how flesh, which is body, infects the soul, which is spirit. Then the stain of the flesh cannot properly be sin, especially before the rational soul accedes; therefore, even if the flesh were to infect the soul, it would still not infect it with the contagion of sin. Besides, it is certain that in Adam vice was first in the soul rather than in the flesh, and passed from the soul to the flesh, not from the flesh to the soul: 'From the soul,' says St. Augustine, book 5 against Julian, chapter 3, 'elation began, and from there consent to transgressing the precept; then the flesh was made the flesh of sin, etc.' Why, therefore, in the children of Adam, to whom the inheritance of the same sin has devolved, should the same order not be preserved?"

I answer, second, with the same Bellarmine (cited place, book 5, chapter 15): "The soul is rightly said to be corrupted in the body as in a vitiated vessel, not because there is in the flesh a positive quality from which in turn another quality arises in the soul, but because the soul does not begin to have sin except when it is infused into the body; for then it first begins to be a human being, a child of Adam. Since the soul, as prior by nature, is understood to be created by God, it has nothing to do with Adam, and by this fact does not communicate in his sin; but when it begins to dwell in a body generated from Adam, and to make one supposit with that very body, then, as we have explained more fully above, it contracts the sin of origin. But the body generated from Adam, even before animation, is called a corrupt vessel because, by the force of such generation, there is owed to it that it be subject to death and to various passions."

543. Dices: Data explicatio non videtur esse ad mentem S. Augustini. Etenim S. Doctor saepissime docet non proprie concupiscentiam; sed libidinem, ardorem, et vitium concupiscentiae esse causam peccati originalis in nobis. Sic, ex. gr., (de nuptiis et concup. l. 1. c. 24. n. 27.), ait: "Cum ventum fuerit ad opus generandi, ipse ille licitus, honestusque concubitus non potest esse sine ardore libidinis. Ex hac carnis concupiscentia quaecumque nascitur proles, originali est alligata peccato." - Et (op. imperf. cont. Julian. l. 2. n. 42.): "Pudenda libido ... Ecce de qua trahitur originale peccatum."

Resp. 1. Nequit certe dici libidinem esse proprie causam propagandi peccati. Nam a) si quis ex nihilo crearetur, quales nos nascimur, quod posse fieri supra demonstratum est, is neque haberet, neque traduceret in posteros originale peccatum, ut Concilium Tridentinum statuit sess. 6. cap. 3. ubi dicit, eos solos peccatum originis trahere posse, qui ex Adami semine procreantur; at is non careret concupiscentia et ardore libidinis, ut notum est ex iis, quae supra docuimus; igitur non est proprie carnis vitium, quod animam inficit, et peccatum in posteros trajicit.

b) Praeterea si duo homines, vir et foemina, ex Adamo nati, singulari privilegio Dei, sine libidine generarent, peccatum nihilominus in filios suos transmitterent, quia filii horum parentum, vere filii essent Adami, et in eo peccassent, in quo omnes peccaverunt, Roman. 5. neque gratia personalis proximorum parentum in eos transfunderetur. Non igitur libido generantium originalis est causa peccati.

c) Accedat postremo, quod si libido esset causa peccati, ille majus peccatum traheret, qui cum majori libidine conciperetur. Quod est manifeste falsum, cum peccatum originis in omnibus hominibus sit aequale.

Resp. 2. Cum S. Augustinus tam saepe repetit, non generationem, sed libidinem esse, quae peccatum traducit, non vult significare, ipsam libidinem actualem esse veram causam originalis peccati, quod absurdum esse paulo ante demonstravimus; sed indicare voluit, causam peccati originalis non esse simpliciter propagationem, nam etiam in paradiso propagatio fuisset, ubi tamen peccatum non fuisset, sed propagationem ex natura corrupta, cujus argumentum certissimum est ardor libidinis, sine quo ardore, ne sanctissimi quidem conjuges generare solent. Ita Bellarminus (op. cit. l. 4. c. 12.) - Et D. Thomas fidelis interpres S. Augustini q. 4. de malo art. 6. docet: "libido actualis, quae est in coitu, est signum concupiscentiae habitualis, quae materialiter se habet in peccato originali ... Unde Augustinus cum dixit quod transmittit peccatum, posuit signum pro signato." 543. You will say: the given explanation does not seem to be according to the mind of St. Augustine. For the holy Doctor very often teaches that not concupiscence properly, but libido, ardor, and the vice of concupiscence is the cause of original sin in us. Thus, for example (On Marriage and Concupiscence, book 1, chapter 24, no. 27), he says: "When it comes to the work of generating, that lawful and honorable intercourse itself cannot be without the ardor of libido. From this concupiscence of the flesh, whatever offspring is born is bound to original sin." And (Unfinished Work against Julian, book 2, no. 42): "Shameful libido ... Behold from what original sin is drawn."

I answer, first: Certainly libido cannot be said to be properly the cause of propagating sin. For a) if someone were created from nothing such as we are born, which we showed above can happen, he would neither have original sin nor transmit it into descendants, as the Council of Trent establishes in session 6, chapter 3, where it says that only those who are begotten from the seed of Adam can draw the sin of origin. Yet such a one would not lack concupiscence and the ardor of libido, as is known from the things we taught above. Therefore it is not properly the vice of the flesh which infects the soul and casts sin into descendants.

b) Furthermore, if two human beings, a man and a woman born from Adam, by a singular privilege of God were to generate without libido, they would nevertheless transmit sin into their children, because the children of these parents would truly be children of Adam and would have sinned in him in whom all sinned, Romans 5; nor would the personal grace of the proximate parents be transmitted into them. Therefore the libido of those generating is not the cause of original sin.

c) Finally, add that if libido were the cause of sin, the one who was conceived with greater libido would draw greater sin. This is manifestly false, since the sin of origin is equal in all human beings.

I answer, second: When St. Augustine so often repeats that it is not generation but libido which transmits sin, he does not wish to signify that actual libido itself is the true cause of original sin, which we have shown a little earlier to be absurd;

rather, he wished to indicate that the cause of original sin is not propagation simply, for even in paradise there would have been propagation, where nevertheless there would not have been sin, but propagation from a corrupted nature, of which the most certain sign is the ardor of libido, without which ardor not even the holiest spouses are accustomed to generate. Thus Bellarmine (cited work, book 4, chapter 12). And St. Thomas, faithful interpreter of St. Augustine, in De Malo, question 4, article 6, teaches: "actual libido, which is in intercourse, is the sign of habitual concupiscence, which is related materially in original sin ... Hence when Augustine said that it transmits sin, he put the sign for the thing signified."

544. Dices: Si peccatum originale per generationem transfunderetur, saltem malum esset conjugium, quippe quod esset causa peccati.

Resp. Huic difficultati respondit S. Augustinus duobus libris "de nuptiis et concup."; ubi, inter caetera, cap. 26. dicit: "Nuptiae institutae sunt causa generandi, non peccandi; propter quod illa est a Deo benedictio nuptiarum: 'Crescite, et multiplicamini, et replete terram.' Peccatum autem, quod inde a nascentibus trahitur, non ad nuptias pertinet, sed ad malum, quod accidit hominibus, quorum conjunctione sunt nuptiae ... Non igitur (malum) ab earum institutione, quae benedicta est, ad eas venit; sed ab eo, quod ex uno homine peccatum intravit in mundum, etc." Quare hic recolendum est principium, juxta quod licet ponere causam in se bonam ad effectum bonum, etsi ex ea sequatur alius effectus malus, qui non intenditur. Unde S. Augustinus (l. 3. cont. Julianum c. 24.) eidem difficultati respondens, ait: "Potes hoc et ipsi Deo dicere, non dico quia creat homines trahentes originale peccatum, quia id tu negas sed quia nutrit et vestit innumerabiles impios, etiam quos novit in ipsa impietate mansuros." 544. You will say: If original sin were transmitted through generation, at least marriage would be evil, since it would be a cause of sin.

I answer: St. Augustine responded to this difficulty in the two books On Marriage and Concupiscence, where, among other things, in chapter 26 he says: "Marriage was instituted as a cause of generating, not of sinning; on account of which that is the blessing of marriages from God: 'Increase and multiply and fill the earth.' But the sin which is drawn from it by those being born does not pertain to marriage, but to the evil which befell human beings, by whose conjunction marriages exist ... Therefore the evil does not come to marriages from their institution, which is blessed, but from this, that through one man sin entered into the world, etc." Therefore here we must recall the principle according to which it is lawful to posit a cause good in itself for a good effect, even if from it there follows another evil effect which is not intended. Hence St. Augustine (Against Julian, book 3, chapter 24), responding to the same difficulty, says: "You can say this also to God himself, not because he creates human beings drawing original sin, since you deny that, but because he feeds and clothes innumerable impious people, even those whom he knows will remain in that very impiety."

545. Dices: Cum peccatum sit in anima, et anima sit immediate a Deo per creationem; si omnes nascerentur peccato infecti, nonne videretur Deus auctor peccati? Vid. (n. 184. Nota.)

Resp. Cum peccatum originale non sit aliquid positivum, sed privatio; non requirit ex parte Dei actionem ullam, qua veluti fiat in anima, quam creat. Quod autem Deus animam creando non infundat gratiam sanctificantem, causa, ut vidimus, est peccatum Adae, qui non servavit conditionem, sub qua Deus constituerat justitiam nobis communicandam. Penitiorem hujus difficultatis solutionem tradit D. Thomas 2. sent. dist. 32. q. 2. a. 1.: "Creatio et infusio licet simul sint, respectu animae tamen differunt: quia creatio dicitur secundum respectum ad principium, a quo est anima tantum; infusio vero dicitur secundum respectum ad duo, scilicet ad principium a quo procedit, et ad materiam quam perficit. Cum ergo dicitur, anima creatione maculatur; ablativus iste potest denotare habitudinem alicujus causae. Et sic falsa est, quia creatio animae non est causa, quod maculetur: nihil enim ex creatione anima habet, quod a Deo non sit. Vel potest denotare concomitantiam: et sic vera est, quia dum creatur, maculatur; ex quo tamen non sequitur, quod Deus auctor maculae sit. Cum vero dicitur, anima infusione maculatur; si ablativus concomitantiam designet, absolute vera est. Si autem denotet habitudinem causae, duplex est: quia vel

intelligitur infusio esse causa maculae ex parte principii, a quo; et sic est falsa. vel ex parte termini ad quem; et sic est vera." 545. You will say: Since sin is in the soul, and the soul is immediately from God through creation, if all were born infected with sin, would God not seem to be the author of sin? See no. 184, note.

I answer: Since original sin is not something positive, but a privation, it does not require on God's part any action by which it is, as it were, made in the soul which he creates. But the cause why God, when creating the soul, does not infuse sanctifying grace is, as we have seen, the sin of Adam, who did not preserve the condition under which God had established that justice was to be communicated to us. St. Thomas gives a deeper solution of this difficulty, 2 Sentences, distinction 32, question 2, article 1: "Although creation and infusion are simultaneous, nevertheless with respect to the soul they differ, because creation is spoken of according to respect to the principle from which the soul alone is; but infusion is spoken of according to respect to two things, namely to the principle from which it proceeds and to the matter which it perfects. Therefore when it is said, the soul is stained by creation, that ablative can denote the relation of some cause. And in this way it is false, because the creation of the soul is not the cause that it is stained; for the soul has nothing from creation which is not from God. Or it can denote concomitance; and in this way it is true, because while it is created, it is stained; from which, however, it does not follow that God is the author of the stain. But when it is said, the soul is stained by infusion, if the ablative designates concomitance, it is absolutely true. But if it denotes the relation of a cause, this is twofold: for either infusion is understood to be the cause of the stain on the part of the principle from which; and in this way it is false. Or on the part of the term to which; and in this way it is true."

546. Sed petes: an igitur anima creatur a Deo bona?

Resp. S. Bonaventura (2. sent. dist. 32.): "Cum quaeritur, qualem Deus fecerit animam, quantum ad bonitatem, et malitiam; hoc potest intelligi dupliciter. Aut quantum ad bonitatem naturae, aut quantum ad bonitatem moris. Si quantum ad bonitatem naturae: sic concedendum est, quod fecit animam bonam, et adhuc bona est. Si quantum ad bonitatem moris: sic dicendum est, quod Deus nec eam fecit bonam, nec malam. Bonam enim non fecit, quia bonitatem illam animae non dedit, obsistente infectione ex parte corporis, cui anima in eodem instanti unita fuit, in quo creata. Non fecit eam malam, quia quamvis anima ab instanti suae creationis mala sit; hoc tamen non est a Deo creante, sed a carne inficiente." 546. But you will ask: therefore is the soul created good by God?

I answer with St. Bonaventure (2 Sentences, distinction 32): "When it is asked what kind of soul God made with respect to goodness and malice, this can be understood in two ways: either with respect to goodness of nature, or with respect to goodness of morals. If with respect to goodness of nature, then it must be conceded that he made the soul good, and it is still good. If with respect to goodness of morals, then it must be said that God made it neither good nor evil. For he did not make it good, because he did not give that goodness to the soul, since infection stood in the way on the part of the body to which the soul was united in the same instant in which it was created. He did not make it evil, because although the soul is evil from the instant of its creation, this nevertheless is not from God creating, but from the flesh infecting."

Article 6. The Harmony of Reason with the Dogma Concerning the Propagation of Original Sin

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547. Post ea quae hactenus disputata sunt, possumus nos paucis ab hac quaestione expedire. Ac imprimis, cum, ex dictis constet apertissime dogma de peccato originali esse divinitus revelatum; hoc per se sufficit, ut certi simus nihil illud continere, quod rectae rationi repugnet. Etenim, ut docuit Conc. Vat. (Const. Dei Filius, cap. 4.) "etsi fides sit supra rationem, nulla

tamen unquam inter fidem et rationem vera dissensio esse potest: cum idem Deus, qui mysteria revelat et fidem infundit, animo humano rationis lumen indiderit; Deus autem negare se ipsum non possit, nec verum vero unquam contradicere." 547. After the things that have been disputed thus far, we can free ourselves from this question in a few words. And first of all, since from what has been said it is most openly evident that the dogma concerning original sin has been divinely revealed, this of itself suffices for us to be certain that it contains nothing which is contrary to right reason. For, as the Vatican Council taught (Dei Filius, chapter 4), "although faith is above reason, nevertheless there can never be any true dissension between faith and reason, since the same God who reveals mysteries and infuses faith has placed the light of reason in the human mind; but God cannot deny himself, nor can truth ever contradict truth."

548. Praeterea si omnes difficultates, contra dogma de originali peccato ex principiis rationis petitae, sufficienter solvuntur, nequit certe dici illud cum principiis rationis pugnare. Ex iis autem quae diximus tum de natura peccati originalis, tum de ratione ejus propagationis, difficultates praecipuas jam solvimus, et caeteris omnibus potest unusquisque satisfacere. 548. Moreover, if all the difficulties drawn from the principles of reason against the dogma concerning original sin are sufficiently solved, it certainly cannot be said to conflict with the principles of reason. But from the things which we have said both concerning the nature of original sin and concerning the manner of its propagation, we have already solved the principal difficulties, and each person can satisfy all the rest.

549. Asseruit tamen Wegscheider (Inst. Theol. §. 117.): "Nec benignitas Dei concedere potest, ut per unius hominis peccatum universa hominum natura corrumpatur et depravetur; nec sapientia pati, ut opus ab initio praestantissimis instructum dotibus, paullo post ob causam levissimam in plane aliam deterioremque conditionem transformetur; nec justitia Dei admittit, ut innocentes ob peccatum alienum eo puniantur, quod ipsis necessitas peccandi imponatur." 549. Nevertheless Wegscheider asserted (Institutions of Theology, §117): "Nor can the goodness of God grant that through the sin of one man the whole nature of human beings should be corrupted and depraved; nor can his wisdom allow that a work furnished from the beginning with the most excellent endowments should a little later, on account of a very slight cause, be transformed into an entirely other and worse condition; nor does the justice of God admit that innocents be punished on account of another's sin by this, that a necessity of sinning is imposed upon them."

550. Operae ergo pretium erit hic breviter ostendere, quod

PROP. XLII. Tantum abest ut dogma de peccato originali cum divinis attributis pugnet, ut cum iisdem apprime convenire ostendi possit.

Prob. I. Cum iis, qui revelationem respuunt, melius arguitur ex effectibus peccati originalis. Unde: si consideremus miserias tum animi tum corporis, quibus humanum genus subjacet, experientia omnes docet quod revelatio divina tradit: Job. 14. 1.: "Homo natus de muliere, brevi vivens tempore, repletur multis miseriis." - Eccli. 40. 1.: "Jugum grave super filios Adam a die exitus de ventre matris eorum usque in diem sepulturae." - Quaestio potest esse de causa horum malorum, sed non de eorundem existentia. Atqui explicatio hujus facti, quam revelatio exhibet in dogmate de peccato originali, apprime convenit cum divinis attributis; reliquae vero, quae extra et contra revelationem assignantur vel sunt omnino absurdae, vel minus perfectam (si dici fas est) divinorum attributorum ideam exhibent. Ergo.

Prob. min. a) Quod homo tot malis subjiciatur propter peccatum, nihil habet quod Dei justitiae, sanctitati etc. detrahat: hoc autem docet fides. Qui e contra extra revelationem causam malorum inquirere voluerunt, in absurdissimas abiere sententias. - Alii cum Platone censuerunt homines nunc puniri propter peccata ab eorum anima commissis antequam uniretur corpori. Alii cum Pythagora admiserunt transmigrationem animarum. - Manichaei cum Zoroastre hominem a principio

malo vel productum, vel saltem corruptum dixere. - Tullius ipse naturam accusavit, quam benignam caeterorum animantium matrem, hominis vero novercam dixit. - Inter recentiores, alii communem humanae naturae pronitatem ad malum a pravis exemplis aut a mala educatione repetunt. Kant eamdem universalem ad malum propensionem abusui libertatis uniuscujusque tribuit etc. Quae omnia falsa aut etiam absurda facile demonstrantur; ac proinde de his omnibus Philosophis dici potest quod S. Augustinus (l. 4. cont. Julian. c. 12.) de Tullio dixit: "Rem vidit, causam nescivit; latebat eum, cur esset grave jugum super filios Adami, quia Ss. Litteris non eruditus ignorabat peccatum originale."

b) Dicent fortasse haec omnia mala consequi ipsam limitatam humanae naturae conditionem. Atqui, subsumimus, si nihil est quod cum divinis attributis pugnet, in eo quod humana natura absque peccato tot miseriis sit obnoxia; a fortiori nihil erit contra divina attributa si iisdem subjiciatur propter peccatum, uti per se patet. Unde merito scripsit Muratori (l. 3. de ingen. moder. c. 1.): "Quidquid Pelagiani adferre possunt pro tuenda justitia ac bonitate divina in hypothesi sua, illud ad eandem tuendam in hypothesi Catholicorum inservit. Quidquid vero Catholici pro sua habent, non aeque a Pelagianis pro sua opinione usurpari potest. Facilius enim Catholici justitiam ac bonitatem Dei sartam nobis tectamque exhibent, tot humanae naturae miseriis non a primaeva institutione et voluntate Dei boni, sed a primorum parentum culpa derivatis, quam si talem, qualis nunc est, naturam ab initio creatam affirment. Et hoc sinceri sagacesque viri non intelligere nequeunt."

c) Hinc factum est, ut etiam Patres ad suadendum dogma de peccato originali usi sint argumento ex vitae miseriis ducto, quamvis seclusa revelatione nonnisi conjecturam praeberet. Vid. (n. 412.) Sic, ex. gr., S. Augustinus (l. 4. cont. Julian. c. 16.), ait: "Ecce circumstat sensus tuos miseria generis humani. Homo es, humani nihil abs te alienum puta: et in iis quae non pateris, compatere patientibus. Quamvis et ipse, quantalibet terrena felicitate praepollens, nullum sine bello intestino diem ducis, si tamen quod profiteris, implere conaris. Sed ... parvuli quot, et quanta mala patiuntur? In quibus vanitatibus, cruciatibus, erroribus, terroribus crescunt? Deinde jam grandes, etiam Deo servientes, tentat error ut decipiat, tentat maeror ut sternat, tentat typhus ut extollat. Et quis explicet omnia festinanter, quibus gravatur jugum super filios Adam? ... Quid igitur restat, nisi ut causa istorum malorum sit aut iniquitas, vel impotentia Dei, aut poena primi veterisque peccati? Sed quia nec injustus, nec impotens est Deus: restat, quod non vis, sed cogeris fateri, quod grave jugum super filios Adam a die exitus de ventre matris eorum usque in diem sepulturae in matrem omnium, non fuisset, nisi delicti originalis meritum praecessisset." Vid. de Rubeis (de pecc. orig. cc. 42-44.)

Prob. II. Quoad justitiam. Justitia Dei, inquiunt, non admittit ut innocentes ob peccatum alienum puniantur. At vero meminisse debemus, juxta doctrinam catholicam, peccatum actuale fuisse solius Adami: peccatum habituale inesse proprium unicuique nostrum. Vid. (pag. 511. obj. 3.) - Unum peccare, et omnes constitui peccatores, juxta doctrinam catholicam, significat caput committere actum peccati, omnia membra privari gratia sanctificante; et omnes puniri significat omnes subjici doloribus, infirmitati, morti, rebellioni concupiscentiae, etc.

Unde: si qua esset hac in re repugnantia cum divina justitia, repeti ea posset vel ex eo, quod Deus ea omnia dona contulit hominibus in Adamo sub conditione, ut hic illa servaret vel ex eo, quod conditione non servata, iisdem donis Deus spoliavit humanam naturam. Atqui ex neutro capite repeti potest ulla repugnantia cum justitia divina. Ergo.

Prob. min. quoad 1am partem. Probavimus in praecedente disputatione omnia illa dona esse humanae naturae indebita: ergo quemadmodum, salva justitia, poterat illa Deus conferre vel denegare humanae naturae; ita poterat eadem conferre sub conditione, quae ipsi placeret. Vid. (n. 403. seqq.)

Prob. min. quoad 2am partem. Dona, quae alteri gratuito conceduntur sub aliqua conditione servanda, justissime auferuntur, si conditio non servetur; atqui, Adamo peccante, jam servata non fuit conditio, sub qua dona illa erant nobis communicanda. Ergo.

Unde S. Anselmus (de cons. virg. et pecc. orig. c. 18.), ait: "Si quis vir et uxor ejus ad magnam quandam possessionem et dignitatem nullo suo merito, sed gratia solum provecti simul crimen grave inexcusabiliter committunt, et pro eo juste dejiciuntur et in servitutem rediguntur; quis dicet filios, quos post damnationem generant, non debere eidem subjacere servituti, sed potius ad bona, quae parentes juste perdiderunt, gratis debere restitui? - Tales sunt primi parentes et filii eorum, quos juste pro culpa sua de beatitudine in miseriam damnati in eodem generant exilio." Et D. Thomas (Comp. Theol. cap. 195.): "Quia ista poena non est, nisi

subtractio eorum, quae supernaturaliter primo homini divinitus sunt concessa, per ipsum in alios derivanda: unde aliis non debebantur, nisi quatenus per primum parentem in eos erant transitura. Sicut si Rex det feudum militi, transiturum per ipsum ad haeredes; si miles contra Regem peccat, et feudum mereatur amittere, non potest postmodum ad ejus haeredes devenire."

Prob. III. Quoad sapientiam. a) Si quid Dei sapientia postulat in operibus ad extra, illud est ut media accommodet fini, quem ipse praestituit: at quis unquam demonstravit permissionem peccati Adae cum effectibus, qui inde pro Adamo et tota ejus posteritate consequuntur, fini, quem sibi Deus praestituit, repugnare?

b) Quando Deus finem rebus convenientem assignat, et media subministrat ad illum consequendum, secundum rerum exigentiam; salva certe est divina Sapientia. Atqui admisso dogmate de peccato originali, haec omnia certe verificantur. Etenim Deus non modo praestituerat homini finem illi proportionatum, sed ex magna liberalitate, ejus naturam superantem - sufficientibus instruxerat mediis ad illum assequendum. Salvam reliquit hominis libertatem qua homo abutens, omnia perdidit: num divina Sapientia exigit ut auferatur ab homine libertas? aut ut talibus homo instruatur mediis ut certo et infallibiliter suum ultimum finem attingat? - Sed, aiunt, ob levissimam causam opus ab initio praestantissimum in pessimum est transformatum? Verum ratio ipsa docet offensam Dei, peccatum, esse gravissimum omnium malorum, imo unicum verum malum.

Prob. IV. Simili modo ratiocinandum est de divina bonitate, quam sicut libere Deus communicat ad extra, sic libere communicat eo gradu, quo vult. - Caeterum qui semel intellexerit, quam fides simul et ratio tradunt, doctrinam, quod nempe finis ultimus creationis non est creaturae intelligentis felicitas, sed gloria Dei extrinseca (vid. n. 104.); haud difficile sibi persuadebit, dogma de peccato originali non modo nihil continere, quod divinis attributis contradicat, verum etiam (attento praesertim praestantissimo Redemptionis opere) divina attributa, divinamque gloriam in clarissima luce collocare. Unde Ecclesia canere potuit: "O felix culpa!" 550. Therefore it will be worthwhile here to show briefly that:

PROPOSITION XLII. So far is the dogma concerning original sin from conflicting with the divine attributes, that it can be shown to agree with them very fittingly.

Proof I. With those who reject revelation, argument is better made from the effects of original sin. Hence, if we consider the miseries of both soul and body to which the human race is subject, experience teaches everyone what divine revelation hands down: Job 14:1: "Man born of woman, living for a brief time, is filled with many miseries." Ecclesiasticus 40:1: "A heavy yoke is upon the children of Adam from the day of their coming forth from their mother's womb until the day of burial." The question can be about the cause of these evils, but not about their existence. But the explanation of this fact which revelation presents in the dogma concerning original sin agrees very fittingly with the divine attributes; the other explanations, however, which are assigned outside and against revelation, are either altogether absurd, or present a less perfect idea, if it is lawful to say so, of the divine attributes. Therefore.

The minor is proved. a) That man is subject to so many evils on account of sin has nothing that detracts from God's justice, holiness, and so forth; but this is what faith teaches. Those who, on the contrary, wished to seek the cause of evils outside revelation, went off into the most absurd opinions. Some, with Plato, judged that human beings are now punished on account of sins committed by their souls before they were united to the body. Others, with Pythagoras, admitted the transmigration of souls. The Manichaeans, with Zoroaster, said that man was either produced or at least corrupted by an evil principle. Tullius himself accused nature, which he called the kindly mother of the other living beings but the stepmother of man. Among more recent writers, some derive the common proneness of human nature to evil from depraved examples or from bad education. Kant attributes the same universal propensity to evil to each person's abuse of liberty, and so forth. All these things are easily shown to be false or even absurd; and consequently it can be said of all these philosophers what St. Augustine said of Tullius (Against Julian, book 4, chapter 12): "He saw the thing, he did not know the cause; it was hidden from him why there was a heavy yoke upon the children of Adam, because, not instructed in the Sacred Scriptures, he was ignorant of original sin."

b) Perhaps they will say that all these evils follow upon the limited condition itself of human nature. But we subsume: if there is nothing that conflicts with the divine attributes in the fact that human nature without sin is subject to so many

miseries, a fortiori there will be nothing against the divine attributes if it is subjected to the same miseries on account of sin, as is evident of itself. Hence Muratori rightly wrote (On the Moderate Governance of Ingenuity, book 3, chapter 1): "Whatever the Pelagians can bring forward for defending divine justice and goodness in their hypothesis serves for defending the same in the hypothesis of the Catholics. But whatever the Catholics have for their own hypothesis cannot equally be used by the Pelagians for their opinion. For the Catholics more easily exhibit to us the justice and goodness of God safe and sound, with so many miseries of human nature derived not from the primeval institution and will of the good God, but from the fault of the first parents, than if they affirm that nature, such as it now is, was created from the beginning. And sincere and sagacious men cannot fail to understand this."

c) Hence it happened that even the Fathers, in persuading the dogma concerning original sin, used an argument drawn from the miseries of life, although apart from revelation it would offer only a conjecture. See no. 412. Thus, for example, St. Augustine (Against Julian, book 4, chapter 16) says: "Behold, the misery of the human race surrounds your senses. You are a man; think nothing human alien from you, and in those things which you do not suffer, have compassion for those who suffer. Although even you yourself, however much you excel in earthly happiness, lead no day without an internal war, if nevertheless you try to fulfill what you profess. But ... how many and how great evils do little children suffer? In what vanities, torments, errors, and terrors do they grow? Then, when already grown, even serving God, error tempts so that it may deceive, sorrow tempts so that it may cast down, pride tempts so that it may lift up. And who could quickly explain all the things by which the yoke upon the children of Adam is weighed down? ... What remains, then, except that the cause of these evils is either God's iniquity or impotence, or the punishment of the first and ancient sin? But because God is neither unjust nor impotent, there remains what you do not wish, but are compelled, to confess: that the heavy yoke upon the children of Adam from the day of their coming forth from their mother's womb until the day of burial into the mother of all would not have existed unless the merit of original fault had preceded." See de Rubeis (On Original Sin, chapters 42-44).

Proof II. With respect to justice. They say that the justice of God does not admit that innocents be punished on account of another's sin. But in truth we must remember that, according to Catholic doctrine, actual sin belonged to Adam alone; habitual sin is in each one of us as his own. See page 511, objection 3. According to Catholic doctrine, for one to sin and for all to be constituted sinners means that the head commits the act of sin and all the members are deprived of sanctifying grace; and for all to be punished means that all are subjected to sorrows, infirmity, death, the rebellion of concupiscence, and so forth.

Hence, if there were any repugnance in this matter with divine justice, it could be drawn either from the fact that God conferred all those gifts on human beings in Adam under the condition that Adam preserve them, or from the fact that, when the condition was not preserved, God stripped human nature of those same gifts. But from neither head can any repugnance with divine justice be drawn. Therefore.

The minor is proved with respect to the first part. We proved in the preceding disputation that all those gifts were not owed to human nature. Therefore, just as, with justice preserved, God could confer them upon human nature or deny them to it, so he could confer the same under whatever condition pleased him. See no. 403ff.

The minor is proved with respect to the second part. Gifts which are gratuitously granted to another under some condition to be preserved are most justly taken away if the condition is not preserved. But when Adam sinned, the condition under which those gifts were to be communicated to us was no longer preserved. Therefore.

Hence St. Anselm (On the Conception of the Virgin and Original Sin, chapter 18) says: "If some man and his wife, advanced to some great possession and dignity by no merit of their own but only by grace, together commit a grave crime inexcusably, and for it are justly cast down and reduced to servitude, who will say that the children whom they generate after condemnation ought not to be subject to the same servitude, but rather ought freely to be restored to the goods which the parents justly lost? Such are the first parents and their children, whom, justly condemned for their own fault from beatitude into misery, they generate in the same exile." And St. Thomas (Compendium of Theology, chapter 195): "Because this punishment is nothing except the withdrawal of those things which were divinely and

supernaturally granted to the first man, to be derived through him into others; hence they were not owed to others except insofar as they were going to pass into them through the first parent. It is as if a king gave a fief to a soldier, to pass through him to his heirs; if the soldier sins against the king and deserves to lose the fief, it cannot afterward come to his heirs."

Proof III. With respect to wisdom. a) If God's wisdom requires anything in works ad extra, it is that he accommodate means to the end which he himself has established. But who has ever demonstrated that the permission of Adam's sin, together with the effects which follow from it for Adam and all his posterity, conflicts with the end which God established for himself?

b) When God assigns a fitting end to things and supplies means for attaining it according to the exigency of things, divine Wisdom is certainly preserved. But once the dogma concerning original sin is admitted, all these things are certainly verified. For God not only established for man an end proportioned to him, but, from great liberality, one surpassing his nature; and he furnished him with sufficient means for attaining it. He left man's liberty preserved, and man, abusing it, lost everything. Does divine Wisdom require that liberty be taken away from man? Or that man be furnished with such means that he certainly and infallibly attain his ultimate end? But, they say, on account of a very slight cause a work most excellent from the beginning was transformed into the worst condition. Yet reason itself teaches that an offense against God, sin, is the gravest of all evils, indeed the only true evil.

Proof IV. One must reason in a similar way concerning divine goodness, which, just as God freely communicates ad extra, so he freely communicates in the degree that he wills. Besides, whoever once understands the doctrine which faith and reason together hand down, namely that the ultimate end of creation is not the happiness of the intelligent creature but God's extrinsic glory (see no. 104), will not have difficulty persuading himself that the dogma concerning original sin not only contains nothing that contradicts the divine attributes, but also, especially with attention to the most excellent work of Redemption, places the divine attributes and divine glory in the clearest light. Hence the Church could sing: "O happy fault!"

Article 7. On the Punishment of Original Sin in the Future Life

LatineEnglish

551. Plura de effectibus peccati originalis in altera vita disputari solent inter Theologos. Nos certa a probabilibus secernentes, illa auctoritate Ecclesiae statuemus, haec probatas communioresque sententias afferentes attingemus. 551. Many things concerning the effects of original sin in the other life are usually disputed among theologians. Distinguishing the certain from the probable, we shall establish the former by the authority of the Church, and touch upon the latter by bringing forward approved and more common opinions.

552. Ac imprimis non agitur hic de adultis, qui originali simul et actuali peccato inquinati ex hac vita decedunt. Agitur de parvulis, qui sine baptismo, antequam ad usum rationis pervenerint, moriuntur. Eadem autem est ratio de iis, qui parvulis comparantur, ex. gr., perpetuo amentes. 552. And first of all, the question here is not about adults who depart from this life stained at once by original and actual sin. It concerns little children who die without baptism before they have arrived at the use of reason. The same account applies to those who are compared to little children, for example, the perpetually insane.

553. De fide est parvulos, qui sine baptismo moriuntur excludi a vita aeterna, seu a felicitate supernaturali quae in visione intuitiva Dei consistit. Hoc non semel definivit Ecclesia. Sic Patres Synodi Carthaginensis et Milevitanae, anno 416., contrario errore profligato, Epistolam Synodicam dederunt Innocentio I., qui (in Ep. ad Milevit. n. 5.) anno 417. rescripsit: "Illud vero, quod eos vestra Fraternitas asserit praedicasse: parvulos aeternae vitae praemiis etiam sine

baptismatis gratia posse donari, perfatuum est ... Qui autem hanc (vitam aeternam) eis sine regeneratione defendunt, videntur mihi ipsum baptismum velle cassare; cum praedicant eos habere, quod in eos creditur nonnisi baptismate conferendum." - Conc. Trident. sess. 5. can. 4. "Si quis parvulos recentes ab uteris matrum baptizandos negat, etiamsi fuerint a baptizatis parentibus orti; aut dicit in remissionem quidem peccatorum eos baptizari, sed nihil ex Adam trahere originalis peccati, quod regenerationis lavacro necesse sit expiari ad vitam aeternam consequendam ... anathema sit." - Clarissima et generalissima est Christi Domini sententia Joan. 3.: "Nisi quis renatus fuerit ex aqua et Spiritu Sancto non potest introire in regnum Dei." - Certe parvuli omnes contrahunt peccatum originale, ac proinde privantur gratia sanctificante: sine gratia sanctificante, quae est vestis nuptialis, impossibile est admitti in regnum coelorum. Vid. Bellarm. (de amiss. gr. et stat. pecc. l. 6. c. 2.) 553. It is of faith that little children who die without baptism are excluded from eternal life, or from supernatural happiness, which consists in the intuitive vision of God. The Church has defined this more than once. Thus the Fathers of the Synod of Carthage and of Milevis, in the year 416, after the contrary error had been defeated, gave a Synodical Letter to Innocent I, who, in the year 417, wrote back (Letter to Milevis, no. 5): "But that which your Fraternity asserts they preached, that little children can be given the rewards of eternal life even without the grace of baptism, is utterly foolish ... But those who defend this (eternal life) for them without regeneration seem to me to wish to nullify baptism itself, since they proclaim that they have that which is believed to be conferred upon them only by baptism." The Council of Trent, session 5, canon 4: "If anyone denies that little children newly born from their mothers' wombs are to be baptized, even if they have been born from baptized parents; or says that they are indeed baptized for the remission of sins, but draw nothing of original sin from Adam which must be expiated by the laver of regeneration in order to obtain eternal life ... let him be anathema." Most clear and most general is the sentence of Christ the Lord in John 3: "Unless one is reborn of water and the Holy Spirit, he cannot enter the kingdom of God." Certainly all little children contract original sin, and consequently are deprived of sanctifying grace; without sanctifying grace, which is the wedding garment, it is impossible to be admitted into the kingdom of heaven. See Bellarmine (On the Loss of Grace and the State of Sin, book 6, chapter 2).

554. His in tuto positis, tres praecipue quaestiones agitari solent inter Theologos. Prima est: utrum parvuli puniantur poena sensus? - Altera: utrum parvuli dolorem et tristitiam patiantur de sua exclusione a beatitudine supernaturali? - Tertia: utrum parvuli mortui sine baptismo beatitudinem quamdam naturalem habeant.

§ I.

De poena sensus. 554. With these points placed safely, three principal questions are usually discussed among theologians. The first is whether little children are punished with the pain of sense. The second: whether little children suffer pain and sadness over their exclusion from supernatural beatitude. The third: whether little children who have died without baptism have a certain natural beatitude.

§ I.

On the pain of sense.

555. Quoad 1am quaestionem, plures inter Patres Latinos asseruisse videntur parvulos sine baptismo decedentes puniendos esse poena sensus, licet mitissima. Vid. de Rubeis (de peccato orig. c. 75.) Praesertim vero in hac fuit sententia S. Augustinus, qui tamen postea incertus de ea factus, scripsit (de lib. arbi. l. 3. c. 29.): "Respondetur ... superfluo quaeri de meritis ejus, qui nihil meruerit. (De parvulis res agitur.) Non enim metuendum est, ne vita esse potuerit media quaedam inter recte factum, atque peccatum: et sententia judicis media esse non possit inter praemium, atque supplicium." - E contra inter Patres Graecos communis fuit contraria sententia, quae tuto defendi posse ostenditur ex cens. 16. in Bulla Auctorem Fidei: "Doctrina, quae velut fabulam Pelagianam explodit locum illum inferorum (quem limbi puerorum nomine fideles passim designant), in quo animae decedentium cum sola originali culpa poena damni citra poenam ignis puniantur; perinde ac si hoc ipso quod, qui poenam ignis removent, inducerent locum illum et statum medium expertem culpae et poenae inter regnum Dei, et damnationem

aeternam, qualem fabulabantur Pelagiani; falsa, temeraria, in scholas catholicas injuriosa." 555. With respect to the first question, many among the Latin Fathers seem to have asserted that little children dying without baptism are to be punished with the pain of sense, although a very mild one. See de Rubeis (On Original Sin, chapter 75). Especially, however, St. Augustine was of this opinion, though later, having become uncertain about it, he wrote (On Free Choice, book 3, chapter 29): "The answer is ... that it is superfluous to ask about the merits of one who has merited nothing. The matter concerns little children. For one need not fear that there could have been a certain middle life between right deed and sin, and yet that the sentence of the judge cannot be middle between reward and punishment." On the contrary, among the Greek Fathers the contrary opinion was common, and that it can safely be defended is shown from censure 16 in the bull Auctorem Fidei: "The doctrine which rejects as a Pelagian fable that place of the lower regions, which the faithful everywhere designate by the name limbo of children, in which the souls of those departing with original fault alone are punished with the pain of loss apart from the punishment of fire; as if by this very fact those who remove the punishment of fire were introducing that place and a middle state free from fault and punishment between the kingdom of God and eternal damnation, such as the Pelagians used to imagine, is false, rash, injurious to Catholic schools."

556. Communissima deinde in scholis facta est sententia parvulos cum solo peccato originali decedentes non puniri poena sensus.

Prob. ex D. Thoma, quem caeteri sequuntur. a) Dicitur Apoc. 18. 7.: "Quantum glorificavit se et in deliciis fuit: tantum date illi tormentum et luctum." Ex quo arguit D. Thomas: "Acerbitas poenae sensibilis delectationi culpae respondet, Apocal. 18. Sed in peccato originali non est aliqua delectatio, sicut nec operatio: delectatio enim operationem sequitur. Ergo peccato originali non debetur poena sensibilis."

b) Juxta S. Augustinum, parvulorum poena est omnium mitissima. Ex quo D. Thomas: "Sed hoc non esset, si sensibili poena torquerentur: quia poena ignis inferni est gravissima." Ita 2. sent. dist. 23. q. 2. a. 1.

c) S. Bernardus (serm. 3. de Resur.), ait: "Quid enim odit, aut punit Deus praeter propriam voluntatem? Cesset voluntas propria et infernus non erit. In quem enim ignis ille desaeviet, nisi in propriam voluntatem?" - Ex quo D. Thomas: "Sed originale peccatum non est peccatum propriae voluntatis, immo consequitur ex voluntate aliena: ergo peccato, originali non debetur poena sensus." - Affert etiam auctoritatem Innocentii II. qui (Extra de Bapt. c. Majores) ait: "Praeterea poena originalis peccati est carentia visionis Dei: actualis vero poena peccati est gehennae perpetuae cruciatus." Ita q. 5. de malo a. 2.

d) "Hoc videtur esse rationabile, addit, propter tria. Quia persona quaelibet est alicujus naturae suppositum: et ideo ad ea quae sunt naturae, per se, et immediate ordinatur; ad ea vero quae sunt supra naturam, ordinatur mediante natura. Quod ergo detrimentum aliquod patiatur aliqua persona in his quae sunt supra naturam, potest contingere vel ex vitio naturae, vel ex vitio personae. Quod autem detrimentum patiatur in his quae sunt naturae, hoc non videtur posse contingere, nisi propter vitium aliquod personae. Peccatum originale est vitium naturae: peccatum actuale est vitium personae. Gratia autem, et visio divina sunt supra naturam. Et ideo privatio gratiae, et carentia visionis divinae debentur alicui personae non solum propter actuale peccatum, sed etiam propter originale. Poena autem sensus opponitur integritati naturae, et bonae ejus habitudini: et ideo poena sensus non debetur alicui, nisi propter peccatum actuale."

e) "Poena proportionatur culpae; et ideo peccato actuali mortali, in quo invenitur aversio ab incommutabili bono, et conversio ad bonum commutabile, debetur poena damni, scilicet carentia visionis divinae, respondens aversioni; et poena sensus, respondens conversioni. Sed in peccato originali non conversio, sed sola aversio, seu aliquid aversioni respondens invenitur: scilicet destitutio animae a justitia originali; (idest non aversio quaedam instar actus, sed sola originalis justitiae privatio instar cujusdam habitus). Et ideo peccato originali non debetur poena sensus, sed solum poena damni, scilicet carentia visionis divinae." Ita in 4. sent. dist. 47. q. 1. a. 3.

f) Ibidem S. Doctor tertiam affert rationem, quam sic exponit Bellarminus (op. cit. c. 4.): "Propter habitualem carentiam virtutum, et habitualem pronitatem ad vitia, nemo puniri solet poena positiva,

ac sensibili, sed solum propter culpam actualem, non enim suspenduntur a magistratu, qui carent habitu justitiae; vel qui proni sunt ad furta, sed qui re ipsa furantur: possunt tamen qui carent virtutibus, et e contrario proni sunt ad mala, rejici tamquam indigni ab aliqua dignitate adipiscenda: at peccatum originis est culpa solum habitualis; sunt enim infantes propter id peccatum habitualiter proni ad concupiscendum contra rationem; igitur rejici possunt tamquam indigni a coelesti beatitudine adeunda, non tamen puniri debent supplicio ignis, et sulphuris, quae sunt poenae sensibiles, ac positivae." 556. Thereafter the opinion became most common in the schools that little children departing with original sin alone are not punished with the pain of sense.

Proof from St. Thomas, whom the others follow. a) Revelation 18:7 says: "As much as she glorified herself and was in delights, so much torment and mourning give to her." From this St. Thomas argues: "The bitterness of sensible punishment corresponds to the delight of fault, Revelation 18. But in original sin there is no delight, just as there is no operation; for delight follows operation. Therefore sensible punishment is not owed to original sin."

b) According to St. Augustine, the punishment of little children is the mildest of all. From this St. Thomas says: "But this would not be so if they were tormented with sensible punishment, because the punishment of the fire of hell is most grave." Thus 2 Sentences, distinction 23, question 2, article 1.

c) St. Bernard (Sermon 3 on the Resurrection) says: "For what does God hate or punish except one's own will? Let one's own will cease and hell will not exist. Against what, then, will that fire rage except against one's own will?" From this St. Thomas says: "But original sin is not the sin of one's own will; rather, it follows from another's will. Therefore the pain of sense is not owed to original sin." He also brings forward the authority of Innocent II, who says (Extra, De Baptismo, chapter Majores): "Furthermore, the punishment of original sin is the lack of the vision of God; but the punishment of actual sin is the torment of perpetual Gehenna." Thus De Malo, question 5, article 2.

d) "This seems reasonable," he adds, "for three reasons. Because any person is the supposit of some nature; and therefore he is ordered to those things which belong to nature through himself and immediately, but to those things which are above nature through the mediation of nature. Therefore, that some person should suffer some detriment in those things which are above nature can happen either from a vice of nature or from a vice of the person. But that he should suffer detriment in those things which belong to nature does not seem able to happen except on account of some vice of the person. Original sin is a vice of nature; actual sin is a vice of the person. But grace and the divine vision are above nature. And therefore the privation of grace and the lack of the divine vision are owed to some person not only on account of actual sin, but also on account of original sin. But the pain of sense is opposed to the integrity of nature and to its good disposition; and therefore the pain of sense is not owed to anyone except on account of actual sin."

e) "Punishment is proportioned to fault; and therefore to mortal actual sin, in which there is aversion from the unchangeable good and conversion to a changeable good, there is owed the pain of loss, namely the lack of the divine vision, corresponding to aversion, and the pain of sense, corresponding to conversion. But in original sin there is not conversion, but only aversion, or something corresponding to aversion, namely the destitution of the soul from original justice, that is, not some aversion after the manner of an act, but only the privation of original justice after the manner of a certain habit. And therefore to original sin there is not owed the pain of sense, but only the pain of loss, namely the lack of the divine vision." Thus in 4 Sentences, distinction 47, question 1, article 3.

f) In the same place the holy Doctor brings forward a third reason, which Bellarmine explains thus (cited work, chapter 4): "On account of the habitual lack of virtues and habitual proneness to vices, no one is usually punished with a positive and sensible punishment, but only on account of actual fault. For those who lack the habit of justice, or who are prone to theft, are not hanged by the magistrate, but those who steal in actual fact are. Nevertheless those who lack virtues and, on the contrary, are prone to evils can be rejected as unworthy of attaining some dignity. But the sin of origin is only habitual fault; for infants, on account of that sin, are habitually prone to desiring against reason. Therefore they can be rejected as unworthy of attaining heavenly beatitude, but they ought not to be punished with the torment of fire and sulfur, which are sensible and positive

punishments."

557. Objicit sibi D. Thomas (2. sent. l. c.): "Gravius puniuntur peccata post hanc vitam, quam in ista vita: ubi est misericordiae locus. Sed in hac vita respondet originali peccato poena sensibilis, pueri enim qui solum originalem culpam habent, multas poenas sensibiles sustinent, nec injuste. Ergo et post hanc vitam poena sensibilis eis debetur."

Respondet tamen ad 3.: "Non est eadem ratio de poena sensibili ante mortem, et post mortem. Ante mortem poena sensibilis consequitur virtute naturae agentis: sive sit poena sensibilis interior, ut febris, vel aliquid hujusmodi: sive etiam poena sensibilis exterior, ut ustio, et aliquid hujusmodi. Sed post mortem nihil agit virtute naturae, sed secundum justitiae divinae ordinem tantum: sive in animam separatam, in quam constat quod ignis naturaliter agere non potest: sive etiam in corpus post resurrectionem: quia tunc omnis actio naturalis cessabit." 557. St. Thomas objects to himself (2 Sentences, same place): "Sins are punished more gravely after this life than in this life, where there is a place for mercy. But in this life sensible punishment corresponds to original sin, for children who have only original fault sustain many sensible punishments, and not unjustly. Therefore also after this life sensible punishment is owed to them."

Nevertheless he answers in reply 3: "The account of sensible punishment before death and after death is not the same. Before death sensible punishment follows by the power of acting nature, whether it is an interior sensible punishment, such as fever or something of this sort, or also an exterior sensible punishment, such as burning or something of this sort. But after death nothing acts by the power of nature, but only according to the order of divine justice, whether upon the separated soul, upon which it is clear that fire cannot act naturally, or also upon the body after the resurrection, because then every natural action will cease."

558. Quoad 2am quaestionem, non desunt graves Theologi, qui tenent parvulos passuros esse internum animi dolorem ex poena damni. Concedunt tamen hunc dolorem levissimum futurum. "Tum quod," inquit Bellarminus (l. c. cap. 6.), "dispositionem ad beatitudinem non nisi remotissimam habuerint; tum quod intelligent non propria negligentia, se tantum bonum amisisse, unde etiam verme conscientiae carebunt; tum quod delicias, neque coelestes, neque terrenas unquam gustaverint. Facile enim iis bonis caremus, quibus nunquam assuevimus; tum denique quod videbunt plurimos esse in eodem gehennae carcere se multo infeliciores, ad quorum sortem ipsi quoque pertinere potuissent, si diutius sibi vivere contigisset; quare S. Augustinus multis in locis affirmat, parvulos sine Baptismo decedentes in damnatione omnium mitissima futuros." 558. With respect to the second question, there are serious theologians who hold that little children will suffer an internal pain of soul from the pain of loss. Nevertheless they concede that this pain will be very slight. "Both because," says Bellarmine (same place, chapter 6), "they had only the most remote disposition to beatitude; and because they will understand that they lost so great a good not by their own negligence, whence they will also lack the worm of conscience; and because they never tasted delights, neither heavenly nor earthly. For we easily lack those goods to which we have never become accustomed; and finally because they will see that very many in the same prison of Gehenna are much more unhappy than they, to whose lot they themselves also could have belonged if it had happened that they lived longer. For this reason St. Augustine affirms in many places that little children dying without Baptism will be in the mildest damnation of all."

559. Valde tamen communior est inter Scholasticos cum D. Thoma, S. Bonaventura, Suarez, etc., sententia, quae nullam animi tristitiam parvulos ex privatione visionis intuitivae passuros esse statuit.

Prob. a) "Si pueri non baptizati, post mortem dolorem interiorem habeant: aut dolebunt de culpa, aut de poena. Si de culpa: cum a culpa illa ulterius emundari non possint, dolor ille erit in desperationem inducens. Sed talis dolor in damnatis est vermis conscientiae: ergo pueri vermem conscientiae habebunt; et sic non esset eorum poena

mitissima."

Si de poena: "Talis dolor parvus esse non potest de tanti boni amissione, et praecipue sine spe recuperationis: unde poena eorum non esset mitissima. Deinde eadem ratione, qua dolore sensibili, et exterius affligente non puniuntur, etiam dolorem interiorem non sentient. Quia dolor poenae delectationi culpae respondet: unde delectatione remota a culpa originali, omnis dolor ab ejus poena excluditur."

b) "Ratio recta non patitur, ut aliquis perturbetur de eo, quod in ipso non fuit ut vitaretur: propter quod Seneca probat, quod perturbatio in sapientem non cadit. Sed in pueris est recta ratio, nullo actuali peccato obliquata. Ergo non turbabuntur de hoc, quod talem poenam sustinent, quam vitare nullo modo potuerunt." Vid. etiam (n. 400. d).

Dices: Fuerunt pueri illi proportionati "ad vitam aeternam consequendam, quamvis non per actionem propriam, tamen per actionem aliorum, quia potuerunt ab aliis baptizari; sicut et multi pueri ejusdem conditionis baptizati, vitam aeternam consequuti sunt."

Resp. D. Thomas: "Hoc est superexcedentis gratiae, ut aliquis sine actu proprio praemietur: unde defectus talis gratiae non magis tristitiam causat pueris decedentibus non baptizatis, quam in sapientibus hoc quod in eis multae gratiae non fiunt, quae in aliis similibus factae sunt." Ita in 2. sent. dist. 33.

c) "Dicamus quod animae puerorum naturali quidem cognitione non carent, qualis debetur animae separatae secundum suam naturam; sed carent supernaturali cognitione, quae hic in nobis per fidem plantatur; eo quod neque hic fidem habuerunt actu, nec sacramentum fidei susceperunt ... Pertinet vero ad naturalem conditionem, quod anima sciat se propter beatitudinem creatam: et quod beatitudo consistit in adeptione boni perfecti. Sed quod illud perfectum bonum, ad quod homo factus est, sit illa gloria quam Sancti possident, est supra cognitionem naturalem. Unde Apostolus dicit: 'quod nec oculus vidit, nec auris audivit, nec in cor hominis ascendit, quae praeparavit Deus diligentibus se.' Et postea subdit: 'Nobis autem revelavit Deus per Spiritum suum' ... Et ideo (conclusio est Sancti Thomae) se privari tali bono, animae puerorum non cognoscunt: et propter hoc non dolent: sed hoc, quod per naturam habent, sine dolore possident." Ita q. 5. de malo, art. 3. ubi juverit etiam obj. cum respons. consulere.

d) Aliam affert rationem S. Bonaventura. "Scribit enim homines illos simul consideraturos beatitudinem, quam amiserunt; et poenas aliorum damnatorum, quas evaserunt; et quamquam prior consideratio dolorem, posterior gaudium adferre possit, tamen ita unam temperandam per aliam, ut consideratio amissae beatitudinis, impeditura sit gaudium de evasione poenarum, et consideratio evasionis poenarum, impeditura sit dolorem de privatione beatitudinis, atque ita futurum, ut illi neque tristentur unquam, neque laetentur."

§ III.

De bonis, quibus parvuli sine baptismo decedentes fruuntur. 559. Nevertheless, far more common among the Scholastics, with St. Thomas, St. Bonaventure, Suarez, and others, is the opinion which establishes that little children will suffer no sadness of soul from the privation of the intuitive vision.

Proof. a) "If children not baptized have interior pain after death, either they will grieve over fault or over punishment. If over fault, since they cannot be cleansed further from that fault, that pain will induce despair. But such pain in the damned is the worm of conscience. Therefore children will have the worm of conscience; and thus their punishment would not be the mildest."

If over punishment: "Such pain cannot be small over the loss of so great a good, and especially without hope of recovery; hence their punishment would not be the mildest. Then, by the same reason by which they are not punished by sensible pain afflicting them exteriorly, they will also not feel interior pain. For the pain of punishment corresponds to the delight of fault; hence, when delight has been removed from original fault, every pain is excluded from its punishment."

b) "Right reason does not allow that someone be disturbed over that which was not in him to avoid; for this reason Seneca proves that disturbance does not fall upon the wise man. But in children there is right reason, made oblique by no actual sin. Therefore they will not be disturbed over this, that they sustain such a punishment, which they could in no way avoid." See also no. 400.d.

You will say: Those children were proportioned "to attaining eternal life, although not through their own action, nevertheless through the action of others, because they could have been baptized by others; just as many children of the same condition, having been baptized, attained eternal life."

St. Thomas answers: "This belongs to superabounding grace, that someone be rewarded without his own act; hence the defect of such grace causes no more sadness in children

dying not baptized than, in the wise, the fact that many graces are not done in them which have been done in others similar to them." Thus in 2 Sentences, distinction 33.

c) "Let us say that the souls of children indeed do not lack natural cognition, such as is owed to the separated soul according to its nature; but they lack supernatural cognition, which here in us is planted through faith, because here they neither had faith in act nor received the sacrament of faith ... But it pertains to the natural condition that the soul know that it was created for beatitude, and that beatitude consists in the attainment of the perfect good. But that that perfect good for which man was made is that glory which the Saints possess is above natural cognition. Hence the Apostle says: 'what eye has not seen, nor ear heard, nor has it ascended into the heart of man, what things God has prepared for those who love him.' And afterward he adds: 'But God has revealed them to us through his Spirit' ... And therefore," and this is St. Thomas's conclusion, "the souls of children do not know that they are deprived of such a good; and on account of this they do not grieve; but that which they have through nature, they possess without pain." Thus De Malo, question 5, article 3, where it will also be useful to consult the objections with the replies.

d) St. Bonaventure brings forward another reason. "For he writes that those human beings will consider at the same time the beatitude which they lost and the punishments of the other damned which they escaped; and although the former consideration can bring pain, the latter joy, nevertheless one will be so tempered by the other that the consideration of lost beatitude will impede joy over escape from punishments, and the consideration of escape from punishments will impede pain over the privation of beatitude; and thus it will be that they will neither ever be saddened nor rejoice."

§ III.

On the goods which little children dying without baptism enjoy.

560. Ut inutiles quaestiones vitentur, aliqua imprimis adnotabimus, in quibus omnes convenire debent. Ac 1. Pelagiani attribuebant parvulis vitam beatam extra regnum caelorum, liberam a morte peccati: in hoc a S. Augustino damnantur. Theologi autem, qui naturalem beatitudinem parvulis tribuunt, non excludunt certe mortem peccati.

2. Pelagiani adstruentes statum quendam medium inter vitam aeternam et damnationem aeternam, tribuebant parvulis vitam aeternam extra regnum caelorum. Distinguebant autem vitam aeternam a regno coelorum in eo, ut videtur, quod in vita aeterna esset visio intuitiva Dei absque consortio Christi et Sanctorum; in regno caelorum haberetur eadem visio intuitiva cum Christo et Sanctis. Theologi tribuentes parvulis naturalem beatitudinem certe eos omnino excludunt a visione intuitiva Dei.

3. Certum est etiam parvulos destinatos fuisse ad finem supernaturalem, eorum etiam salutem sincere Deum voluisse, Christum etiam pro illis mortuum esse. In praesenti enim providentiae ordine dici nequit dari duos fines, naturalem et supernaturalem, ad quorum primum destinati sint parvuli cum solo originali peccato morientes, ad alterum vero adulti; sed omnes ad unum eumdemque supernaturalem finem destinati sunt. Hinc dici nequit quod parvuli decedentes sine baptismo assequuti sunt suum finem, - quod sunt in statu beatitudinis - debet potius dici eos esse in statu damnationis, sive quia sunt in statu peccati, sive quia a suo fine excluduntur.

4. Status igitur parvulorum nunc decedentium sine baptismo, si comparetur cum sorte parvulorum in pura natura, nequit certe dici esse formaliter idem. Quaestio ergo unice versatur in eo, utrum duo illi status sint materialiter idem; seu utrum parvuli, qui nunc decedunt cum solo peccato originali gaudeant bonis illis naturalibus, quibus parvuli gauderent in statu purae naturae. 560. In order that useless questions may be avoided, we shall first note some points on which all ought to agree. 1. The Pelagians attributed to little children a blessed life outside the kingdom of heaven, free from the death of sin; in this they are condemned by St. Augustine. But theologians who attribute natural beatitude to little children certainly do not exclude the death of sin.

2. The Pelagians, constructing a certain middle state between eternal life and eternal damnation, attributed to little children eternal life outside the kingdom of heaven. But they distinguished eternal life from the kingdom of heaven in this, as it seems, that in eternal life there would be the intuitive vision of God without the fellowship of Christ and the Saints; in the kingdom of heaven the

same intuitive vision would be had with Christ and the Saints. Theologians who attribute natural beatitude to little children certainly exclude them altogether from the intuitive vision of God.

3. It is also certain that little children were destined for the supernatural end, that God sincerely willed their salvation also, and that Christ died for them also. For in the present order of providence it cannot be said that there are two ends, natural and supernatural, to the first of which little children dying with original sin alone are destined, and to the other adults are destined; rather, all are destined to one and the same supernatural end. Hence it cannot be said that little children dying without baptism attained their end, or that they are in a state of beatitude. It must rather be said that they are in a state of damnation, either because they are in a state of sin or because they are excluded from their end.

4. Therefore the state of little children now dying without baptism, if it is compared with the lot of little children in pure nature, certainly cannot be said to be formally the same. Therefore the question turns only on this: whether those two states are materially the same; or whether little children who now die with original sin alone enjoy those natural goods which little children would enjoy in the state of pure nature.

561. Quamvis non pauci Theologi illud negent; alii tamen affirmant cum D. Thoma, Suarez, Lessio, etc. 561. Although not a few theologians deny this, nevertheless others affirm it with St. Thomas, Suarez, Lessius, and others.

562. Revera D. Thomas a) quoad animas parvulorum docet q. 5. de malo art. 3. ad 4.: "Quod pueri in originali decedentes, sunt quidem separati a Deo perpetuo, quantum ad amissionem gloriae quam ignorant; non quantum ad participationem naturalium bonorum, quae cognoscunt," - Et in 2. sent. dist. 33. q. 2. art. 2., ait: "Quamvis pueri non baptizati sint separati a Deo, quantum ad illam conjunctionem, quae est per gloriam; non tamen ab eo penitus separati sunt. Imo ipsi conjunguntur per participationem naturalium bonorum et ita etiam de ipso gaudere poterunt, naturali cognitione, et dilectione."

b) Quoad corpus parvulorum, in 2. sent. l. c. art. 1.: "Corpora puerorum non erunt impassibilia, defectu potentiae ad patiendum in ipsis; sed defectu exterioris agentis in ipsa; quia post resurrectionem nullum corpus erit agens in alterum, praecipue ad corruptionem inducendam per actionem naturae: sed erit actio tantum ad puniendum ex ordine divinae justitiae. Unde illa corpora poenam non patientur: quibus poena sensibilis ex divina justitia non debetur. Corpora autem Sanctorum erunt impassibilia, quia deficiet in eis potentia ad patiendum: et ideo impassibilitas erit in eis dos, non in pueris."

c) Est principium saepe a S. Doctore inculcatum, per peccatum originale spoliari seu privari hominem bonis gratuitis, sive supernaturalibus sive praeternaturalibus; non vero debitis, seu naturalibus. 562. In reality, St. Thomas a) with respect to the souls of little children teaches in De Malo, question 5, article 3, reply 4: "That children dying in original sin are indeed perpetually separated from God with respect to the loss of glory, of which they are ignorant, but not with respect to participation in natural goods, which they know." And in 2 Sentences, distinction 33, question 2, article 2, he says: "Although children not baptized are separated from God with respect to that conjunction which is through glory, nevertheless they are not altogether separated from him. Indeed, they are joined to him through participation in natural goods, and so they will also be able to rejoice in him by natural cognition and love."

b) With respect to the body of little children, in 2 Sentences, same place, article 1: "The bodies of children will not be impassible by a defect of potency for suffering in them, but by a defect of an exterior agent upon them, because after the resurrection no body will be an agent upon another, especially for inducing corruption by the action of nature. Rather, there will be action only for punishing according to the order of divine justice. Hence those bodies will not suffer punishment, since sensible punishment is not owed to them from divine justice. But the bodies of the Saints will be impassible because the potency for suffering will be lacking in them; and therefore impassibility will be a dowry in them, not in children."

c) It is a principle often inculcated by the holy Doctor that through original sin man is stripped or deprived of gratuitous goods,

whether supernatural or preternatural, but not of goods owed, or natural goods.

563. Suarez vero a) (de vitiis et pecc. disp. 9. sect. 2. n. 18.) docet peccatum originale in nobis esse simile peccato Adami, quatenus peccatum dicit aversionem a Deo; sed non quatenus peccatum dicit conversionem ad creaturas, quae fuit illi personalis.

b) Et n. 21. inquit: "Infero peccatum originale in essentia sua non includere aversionem a Deo fine ultimo naturae, sed solum ut est finis ultimus gratiae. Quod patet ex dictis, quia peccatum hoc non privat aliqua perfectione naturali; conversio autem ad Deum, ut finem naturae, naturalis est. Confirmatur, quia parvuli, qui decesserunt in solo peccato originali, sine dubio diligunt Deum super omnia, ut finem naturae; habent ergo illum pro ultimo fine."

c) Tandem, sect. 6. n. 6., ait: "Infero fore, ut illi parvuli tunc veram Dei cognitionem naturalem, et amorem ejus super omnia, atque adeo reliquas naturales virtutes, et corpora impassibilia, non per intrinsecam dispositionem, sed ex Providentia Dei, et ipsorum, quia debent esse aeterna. Unde non indigebunt cibo, neque potu, quia omnis alteratio tunc cessabit, Deo ita providente; itaque neque patientur rebellionem carnis, neque interiorem, neque exteriorem pugnam; quia etiam haec esset poena sensibilis, et omnia haec pertinent ad viam, illi vero sunt suo modo in termino; atque in his fere conveniunt Theologi." 563. Suarez, however, a) (On Vices and Sins, disputation 9, section 2, no. 18) teaches that original sin in us is similar to Adam's sin insofar as sin signifies aversion from God, but not insofar as sin signifies conversion to creatures, which was personal to him.

b) And in no. 21 he says: "I infer that original sin in its essence does not include aversion from God as the ultimate end of nature, but only as he is the ultimate end of grace. This is clear from what has been said, because this sin does not deprive one of any natural perfection; but conversion to God as the end of nature is natural. This is confirmed because little children who have died in original sin alone undoubtedly love God above all things as the end of nature; therefore they have him as ultimate end."

c) Finally, section 6, no. 6, he says: "I infer that those little children will then have true natural cognition of God, and love of him above all things, and therefore the remaining natural virtues, and impassible bodies, not through an intrinsic disposition, but from God's providence, and their own, because they ought to be eternal. Hence they will not need food or drink, because all alteration will then cease, with God so providing; and so they will suffer neither rebellion of the flesh, nor interior or exterior struggle, because this also would be sensible punishment, and all these things pertain to the way, whereas they are in their own way at the terminus; and in these things theologians almost agree."

564. Quare, quidquid aliqui dixerint, merito notat Petrus de Godoy, Oxomensis Episcopus (1. 2. q. 83. Tract. 4. disp. 38. §. 8.) hanc sententiam, de naturali beatitudine parvulorum nullam mereri censuram. "Moveor," inquit 1. "auctoritate Doctorum, qui praefatam sententiam tuentur, quibus alii Moderniores adhaerent: quos omnes contra fidem errasse, nonnisi urgentissimo fundamento licet asserere. 2. Quia omnia, quae in favorem verae sententiae (oppositae, quam ipse tenet) ex Scriptura, et Conciliis petuntur, si quis velit cum beatitudine naturali componere, et de sola carentia felicitatis supernaturalis perfectae explicare; non poterit evidenter convinci. Ergo illam defendentes sententiam, neque haeresis, neque erroris contra fidem possunt notari. Alias pro illa plurium Antiquorum, et Recentium stat auctoritas, nec rationes verisimiles desunt: ergo temeritatis nota nequeunt censeri. Denique non potest negari, esse valde probabile: infantes, sine baptismo morientes, Deum naturae auctorem perfecte cognoscituros, et naturali dilectione amaturos: cum id satis indicet divus Thomas, et concedant plures non ignobiles Theologi, nec alii impossibile censeant." - Qui plura cupit de tota hac quaestione, consulat De Rubeis (de pecc. orig. capp. 72-76.) 564. Therefore, whatever some may have said, Peter de Godoy, Bishop of Osma, rightly notes (I-II, question 83, tract 4, disputation 38, §8) that this opinion concerning the natural beatitude of little children merits no censure. "I am moved," he says, first, "by the authority of the Doctors who defend the aforesaid opinion, to whom other more modern writers adhere; it is lawful to assert

that all these erred against faith only on the most urgent foundation. Second, because all the things which are sought from Scripture and Councils in favor of the true opinion, the opposite one which he himself holds, if someone wishes to compose them with natural beatitude and to explain them only of the lack of perfected supernatural happiness, he will not be able to be evidently refuted. Therefore those defending that opinion cannot be marked either with heresy or error against faith. Besides, the authority of many ancients and recent writers stands for it, and plausible reasons are not lacking; therefore they cannot be judged with the note of rashness. Finally, it cannot be denied that it is very probable that infants dying without baptism will perfectly know God the author of nature and love him with natural love, since St. Thomas sufficiently indicates this, and several not undistinguished theologians concede it, nor do others judge it impossible." Whoever desires more on this whole question should consult de Rubeis (On Original Sin, chapters 72-76).

Article 8. On the Effects of Original Sin in This Life

LatineEnglish

565. In hoc articulo exponemus imprimis quae ad doctrinam catholicam pertinent, et ab omnibus sunt tenenda - breviter deinde attingemus quaestionem aliquam, quae inter catholicos agitari potest.

§ I.

Brevis notitia de effectibus peccati originalis in hac vita. 565. In this article we shall first set forth the things which pertain to Catholic doctrine and must be held by all; then we shall briefly touch upon some question which can be discussed among Catholics.

§ I.

A brief account of the effects of original sin in this life.

566. Pelagiani negantes, juxta sua principia (vid. n. 210. et 239.) propagationem peccati originalis, consequenter nequeunt agnoscere ullum ejus effectum. Cum ergo praesentis vitae mala considerant, alia, praecipue concupiscentiam carnis, inter naturae bona numerant; alia mala esse concedunt, sed naturae sequelam, non peccati poenam esse statuunt. Cum jam probatum sit hominem fuisse elevatum ad justitiae originalis statum, in quo ab hujus vitae doloribus, aerumnis, malis liber erat ab hoc statu excidisse per peccatum; satis Pelagiani, quoad rem praesentem, refutati sunt. 566. The Pelagians, denying according to their principles (see nos. 210 and 239) the propagation of original sin, consequently cannot acknowledge any effect of it. Therefore when they consider the evils of the present life, some, especially the concupiscence of the flesh, they number among the goods of nature; others they concede to be evils, but establish that they are the sequel of nature, not the punishment of sin. Since it has already been proved that man was elevated to the state of original justice, in which he was free from the pains, troubles, and evils of this life, and that he fell from this state through sin, the Pelagians, as regards the present matter, have been sufficiently refuted.

567. Novatores e contra, et qui eos sequuti sunt, statuentes dona justitiae originalis esse humanae naturae debita (vid. n. 211.), consequenter docent humanam naturam fuisse per peccatum intrinsece vitiatam, et corruptam; ita ut liberum arbitrium sit penitus extinctum - ut non possit homo non peccare - ut sine gratia Redemptoris nihil veri cognoscere, nihil boni agere, nec in naturali ordine possit, etc. - Perversum eorum principium refutatum est ubi probavimus dona justitiae originalis fuisse humanae naturae indebita; falsae autem illationes sunt singillatim refutandae in Tractatu de gratia. 567. On the contrary, the Innovators, and those who followed them, establishing that the gifts of original justice were owed to human nature (see no. 211), consequently teach that human nature was intrinsically vitiated and corrupted through sin, so that free choice is utterly extinguished; so that man cannot not sin; so that without the grace of the Redeemer he cannot know anything true, do anything good, not even in the natural order, and so forth. Their

perverse principle was refuted where we proved that the gifts of original justice were not owed to human nature; but the false inferences must be refuted one by one in the treatise on grace.

568. Quare hic solum tradere intendimus positivam et brevem expositionem doctrinae catholicae quoad effectus peccati originalis in hac vita. Ea vero continetur 1. in Conc. Arausicano II., quod docet can. 1. "per offensam praevaricationis Adae totum hominem, id est, secundum corpus, et animam in deterius fuisse commutatum;" can. 13.: "arbitrium voluntatis in primo homine infirmatum;" can. 25.: "liberum arbitrium attenuatum, et inclinatum esse." 2. In Conc. Trid., quod sess. 5. can. 1. inter caetera docet "totum Adam per illam praevaricationis offensam, secundum corpus et animam in deterius commutatum fuisse;" et sess. 6. cap. 1. docet per peccatum Adae "liberum arbitrium minime extinctum esse (in nobis) viribus licet attenuatum et inclinatum." - 3. Est axioma in scholis receptum "per peccatum Adae hominem spoliatum esse gratuitis, vulneratum in naturalibus." 568. Therefore here we intend only to hand down a positive and brief exposition of Catholic doctrine concerning the effects of original sin in this life. This is contained, first, in the Second Council of Orange, which teaches in canon 1 that "through the offense of Adam's prevarication the whole man, that is, according to body and soul, was changed for the worse"; in canon 13 that "the judgment of the will was weakened in the first man"; and in canon 25 that "free choice was attenuated and inclined." Second, in the Council of Trent, which in session 5, canon 1, among other things, teaches that "the whole Adam, through that offense of prevarication, was changed for the worse according to body and soul"; and in session 6, chapter 1, teaches that through Adam's sin "free choice was by no means extinguished in us, although weakened and inclined in its powers." Third, there is the axiom received in the schools: "through Adam's sin man was stripped of gratuitous things and wounded in natural things."

569. Notandum hic est 1. quod refert Card. Pallavicinus (Hist. Conc. Trid. l. 8. c. 13.) loquens de verbis decreti de justificatione: "In eis liberum arbitrium minime extinctum esse, viribus licet attenuatum et inclinatum." Dicebatur antea humanum arbitrium esse vulneratum: optabant aliqui, ut hoc deleretur: alii ut adderetur ad rem explicandam, subtractis donis gratuitis: nam in reliquum, aiebant illi, naturalem volendi nolendive libertatem aeque ac antea inesse homini. - Verumtamen a delectis Patribus responsum, docuisse Magistrum Sententiarum, hominem vulneratum esse in dotibus naturae debitis, et naturam superantibus spoliatum; et S. Augustinum inter originariae noxae detrimenta connumerasse difficultatem honeste agendi. - Postea pro voce vulneratum, repositae sunt attenuatum et inclinatum, quae aeque cunctis Scholasticorum sententiis aptari possunt."

2. Quod vix aliquid simile axiomati illi "homo spoliatus gratuitis, vulneratus in naturalibus" apud Patres invenitur. Ven. Beda, qui (in Luc. 10.) illud proposuit, loquitur de peccatis actualibus, non de peccato originali. Ut ergo assequamur verum sensum eorum verborum, quibus catholicam doctrinam de effectibus peccati originalis contineri diximus, Doctorum volumina consulenda sunt. 569. Here it must be noted, first, what Cardinal Pallavicino reports (History of the Council of Trent, book 8, chapter 13), speaking of the words of the decree on justification: "In them free choice was by no means extinguished, though weakened and inclined in its powers." Previously it was said that human choice was wounded. Some wished this to be deleted; others wished that, to explain the matter, there be added, "the gratuitous gifts having been withdrawn"; for in the rest, they said, the natural freedom of willing or not willing was present in man just as before. Nevertheless it was answered by selected Fathers that the Master of the Sentences had taught that man was wounded in endowments due to nature and stripped of those surpassing nature; and that St. Augustine had counted difficulty in acting honorably among the detriments of original guilt. Afterward, in place of the word "wounded," "attenuated" and "inclined" were inserted, words which can equally be adapted to all the opinions of the Scholastics.

Second, scarcely anything similar to that axiom, "man was stripped of gratuitous things and wounded in natural things," is found among the Fathers. Venerable Bede,

who proposed it on Luke 10, is speaking of actual sins, not of original sin. Therefore, in order that we may attain the true sense of those words in which we said Catholic doctrine concerning the effects of original sin is contained, the volumes of the Doctors must be consulted.

570. Itaque D. Thomas 1. 2. q. 85. a. 1. animadvertit: "Bonum naturae humanae potest tripliciter dici: primo ipsa principia naturae, ex quibus ipsa natura constituitur, et proprietates ex his causatae, sicut potentiae animae, et alia hujusmodi. Secundo quia homo a natura habet inclinationem ad virtutem, ut supra habitum est, q. 64. art. 1. Ipsa autem inclinatio ad virtutem est quoddam bonum naturae. Tertio modo potest dici bonum naturae, donum originalis justitiae, quod fuit in primo homine collatum toti humanae naturae. Primum igitur bonum naturae nec tollitur, nec diminuitur per peccatum. Tertium vero bonum naturae totaliter est ablatum per peccatum primi parentis. Sed medium bonum naturae, scilicet ipsa naturalis inclinatio ad virtutem, diminuitur per peccatum." 570. And so St. Thomas, I-II, question 85, article 1, observes: "The good of human nature can be spoken of in three ways: first, the very principles of nature, from which nature itself is constituted, and the properties caused from them, such as the powers of the soul and other things of this sort. Second, because man from nature has an inclination to virtue, as was held above, question 64, article 1; and this very inclination to virtue is a certain good of nature. In a third way, the gift of original justice, which was conferred in the first man upon the whole of human nature, can be called a good of nature. Therefore the first good of nature is neither taken away nor diminished by sin. But the third good of nature is totally taken away by the sin of the first parent. But the middle good of nature, namely the natural inclination itself to virtue, is diminished by sin."

571. Cum caetera sat aperta sint, hic solum explicanda est ratio, qua diminuta dicitur naturalis inclinatio ad virtutem. Illud vero explicat ipse D. Thomas art. 3., dicens: "Per justitiam originalem perfecte ratio continebat inferiores animae vires; et ipsa ratio a Deo perficiebatur ei subjecta. Haec autem originalis justitia subtracta est per peccatum primi parentis, sicut jam dictum est, q. 81. art. 2. Et ideo omnes vires animae remanent quodammodo destitutae proprio ordine, quo naturaliter ordinantur ad virtutem; et ipsa destitutio vulneratio naturae dicitur. Sunt autem quatuor potentiae animae quae possunt esse subjecta virtutum, ut supra dictum est, q. 74, scilicet ratio, in qua est prudentia; voluntas, in qua est justitia; irascibilis, in qua est fortitudo; concupiscibilis, in qua est temperantia. In quantum ergo ratio destituitur suo ordine ad verum, est vulnus ignorantiae: in quantum vero voluntas destituitur ordine ad bonum, est vulnus malitiae; in quantum vero irascibilis destituitur suo ordine ad arduum, est vulnus infirmitatis; in quantum vero concupiscentia destituitur ordine ad delectabile moderatum ratione, est vulnus concupiscentiae." - Posset addi quintum vulnus, quod consistit in infirmitatibus et morte corporis; sed de hoc nulla est difficultas. 571. Since the other points are sufficiently clear, here only the account must be explained by which the natural inclination to virtue is said to be diminished. St. Thomas himself explains this in article 3, saying: "Through original justice, reason perfectly contained the lower powers of the soul; and reason itself was perfected by God, being subject to him. But this original justice was withdrawn through the sin of the first parent, as was already said, question 81, article 2. And therefore all the powers of the soul remain in some way destitute of their proper order, by which they are naturally ordered to virtue; and this destitution itself is called the wounding of nature. Now there are four powers of the soul which can be subjects of virtues, as was said above, question 74: namely reason, in which there is prudence; the will, in which there is justice; the irascible power, in which there is fortitude; and the concupiscible power, in which there is temperance. Therefore insofar as reason is destitute of its order to the true, there is the wound of ignorance; insofar as the will is destitute of order to the good, there is the wound of malice; insofar as the irascible power is destitute of its order to the arduous, there is the wound of weakness; and insofar as concupiscence is destitute of order to the delightful moderated by reason, there is the wound of concupiscence." A fifth wound could be added, which consists in the infirmities and death of the body; but about this there is no difficulty.

572. Quaerenti autem quomodo inflicta sint haec vulnera humanae naturae, seu quomodo diminuta sit ejus inclinatio ad virtutem, respondet D. Thomas animadvertendo imprimis (saepe, sed Vid. 1. 2. q. 85. a. 2. ad 1.) quod intrinseca diminutio alicujus boni, seu virium alicujus rei, dupliciter fieri potest; vel per subtractionem alicujus perfectionis (sive sit totalis ablatio, sive remissio); vel per appositionem alicujus impedimenti. Docet deinde 1. 2. q. 82. a. 1. ad 3., quod "ex peccato originali sequitur aliqua inclinatio in actum inordinatum, non directe, sed indirecte, scilicet per remotionem prohibentis, idest originalis justitiae, quae prohibebat inordinatos motus." Quemadmodum igitur in statu justitiae originalis, gratia sanctificans, ordinans directe animam ad Deum finem supernaturalem, erat radix aliorum donorum, quibus ordo constituebatur in omnibus hominis partibus et facultatibus, et ideo perfecta inclinatio ad virtutem; ita amissa per peccatum gratia sanctificante, amissa sunt caetera dona justitiae, per quorum ablationem inducta dicitur inclinatio ad malum, seu diminuta inclinatio ad virtutem. Quemadmodum peccatum originale formaliter consistit in privatione gratiae sanctificantis; ita ejus effectus continentur privatione caeterorum justitiae originalis donorum. 572. To one asking how these wounds were inflicted on human nature, or how its inclination to virtue was diminished, St. Thomas answers by first observing, often, but see I-II, question 85, article 2, reply 1, that the intrinsic diminution of some good, or of the powers of some thing, can happen in two ways: either through the withdrawal of some perfection, whether total removal or remission, or through the addition of some impediment. Then he teaches, I-II, question 82, article 1, reply 3, that "from original sin there follows some inclination into an inordinate act, not directly, but indirectly, namely through the removal of what was prohibiting, that is, original justice, which was prohibiting inordinate motions." Therefore, just as in the state of original justice, sanctifying grace, directly ordering the soul to God as supernatural end, was the root of the other gifts by which order was constituted in all the parts and faculties of man, and therefore perfect inclination to virtue, so, when sanctifying grace was lost through sin, the other gifts of justice were lost; by their removal there is said to have been induced an inclination to evil, or a diminished inclination to virtue. Just as original sin formally consists in the privation of sanctifying grace, so its effects are contained in the privation of the other gifts of original justice.

573. Quaerenti iterum cur per subtractionem donorum justitiae originalis, quae sunt superaddita humanae naturae dicitur haec vulnerata; respondet ex D. Thoma, Suarez (Proleg. 4. de gratia c. 8. n. 19.): "Ratio metaphorae est clara ex dictis; nam justitia originalis pacem et unionem inter appetitus hominis constituebat, quae unio per peccatum dissoluta est, ablata justitia, et ita factum est vulnus in natura, sicut fit in corpore per dissolutionem continui." 573. To one asking again why through the withdrawal of the gifts of original justice, which are superadded to human nature, this nature is said to be wounded, Suarez answers from St. Thomas (Prolegomena 4 on grace, chapter 8, no. 19): "The account of the metaphor is clear from what has been said; for original justice constituted peace and union among man's appetites. This union was dissolved through sin when justice was removed, and thus a wound was made in nature, just as happens in the body through the dissolution of continuity."

574. Quaerenti insuper cur homo dicitur per peccatum vulneratus in naturalibus, cum dona justitiae originalis sint indebita; respondet Suarez (l. mox. cit.): "Fuit laesus homo in naturalibus, non quia donum amissum fuerat naturale, sed quia naturalem defectum auferebat, seu illi subveniebat." 574. To one asking further why man is said to have been wounded in natural things through sin, since the gifts of original justice were not owed, Suarez answers (the place just cited): "Man was injured in natural things, not because the gift lost had been natural, but because it was removing a natural defect or assisting it."

575. Quaerenti cur ergo illud in naturalibus opponitur gratuitis, dicitur enim homo "spoliatus gratuitis, vulneratus in naturalibus;" respondetur: ut distinguatur gratia sanctificans, quae est supernaturalis, a caeteris donis, quae sunt praeternaturalia: praeternaturale autem, prout supernaturali opponitur, dici potest naturale. Vid. (n. 238. sequitur 3.) Revera "illa consensione facultatum naturalium (quae in statu justitiae originalis obtinebatur per dona praeternaturalia) homo tantum expeditur ab imperfectionibus et difficultatibus, quae consecutionem finis naturalis et observationem legis naturalis impediunt; minime vero ita elevatur supra se, ut etiam in alium finem superiorem tendere possit actusque ei respondentes edat. Donis illis teguntur imperfectiones, quae ex humana natura tamquam ex mente et corpore composita oriuntur, quibusque proinde homo Angelis inferior est; gratia vero cum ipsis Angelis ad divinam quamdam dignitatem ordinemque evehitur. Illis solum inferiores humanae naturae partes, facultates, appetitiones supra modum naturalem suum rationi supremae conformantur; hac autem suprema rationis pars ipsa elevatur, ut divinae naturae consors divinaque virtute imbuta divine vivat, Deoque non tantum ut Creatori, sed etiam ut Patri uniatur, subjiciatur ac conformetur." Vid. etiam (n. 234.) 575. To one asking why, then, "in natural things" is opposed to "gratuitous things," for man is said to have been "stripped of gratuitous things, wounded in natural things," the answer is: so that sanctifying grace, which is supernatural, may be distinguished from the other gifts, which are preternatural. But the preternatural, insofar as it is opposed to the supernatural, can be called natural. See no. 238, third consequence. In reality, "by that agreement of the natural faculties, which in the state of original justice was obtained through the preternatural gifts, man is only freed from the imperfections and difficulties which impede the attainment of the natural end and the observation of natural law. He is by no means elevated above himself in such a way that he can also tend toward another higher end and produce acts corresponding to it. By those gifts are covered the imperfections which arise from human nature as composed of mind and body, and by which, consequently, man is inferior to the Angels; but by grace he is raised with the Angels themselves to a certain divine dignity and order. By those gifts only the lower parts, faculties, and appetitions of human nature are conformed to supreme reason beyond their own natural mode; but by grace the supreme part of reason itself is elevated, so that, made a sharer of the divine nature and imbued with divine virtue, it lives divinely, and is united, subjected, and conformed to God not only as Creator but also as Father." See also no. 234.

576. Quaerenti denique cur liberum arbitrium dicitur attenuatum, infirmatum, inclinatum; respondetur 1.: quemadmodum per originale peccatum homo privatus fuit gratia sanctificante, et jure ad finem supernaturalem, et consequenter amisit libertatem, seu potestatem edendi quodcumque supernaturale opus (praescindendo a gratia Salvatoris): ita spoliato homine donis praeternaturalibus per idem peccatum, ejus libertas, seu potestas edendi opera naturaliter bona imminuta fuit; orta est, enim, ex amissione horum donorum difficultas in virtutis naturalis exercitio.

Resp. 2. Recuperata autem gratia per redemptionem Christi, nobis non restituuntur caetera dona justitiae originalis; ac proinde quamvis possimus, gratia adjuti, opera supernaturalia facere non tamen absque difficultate et pugna. Unde "duplex secerni debet supernaturalis ad Deum subjectio; altera qua ratio inferior per superiorem ita Deo subjicitur, ut nihil sit in ratione, quod legi Dei repugnet ejusque observationem impediat; altera, qua ipsa ratio superior ita Deo subjiciatur, ut non solum ad ea opera, quae naturaliter appetere potest, ei obsequatur, sed etiam ad ea, ad quae per se tendere non potest, ita ut a Deo se sinat supra se ipsum elevari ejusque virtute in finem supernaturalem feratur. Duplex haec subjectio duplex item est libertas; prior est libertas pacis, qua liberamur ab impedimentis bonae operationis; altera libertas filiorum Dei, qua liberamur ex conditione servi, qua transferimur in unitatem et consortium ipsius Domini, eique jam tamquam filii obedimus." Haec quidem ad mentem D. Thomae in 2. dist. 20. q. 2. art. 3.; et de malo q. 5. a. 1. Unde merito inquit Suarez (Prol. 4. ad grat. c. 8. n. 15.): "Libertas voluntatis non aliter laesa est intrinsece circa boni operationem, nisi quia fuit privata charitate, et virtutibus inclinantibus ad bonum; ex

parte item intellectus diminuta est libertas, quasi in radice, quatenus mens hominis privata est sapientia et prudentia; ex accidenti autem laesa est libertas ex parte concupiscentiae, quae sibi relicta, et ablato freno justitiae, difficiliorem multo reddidit usum libertatis, ad resistendum malo et sequendum bonum." 576. Finally, to one asking why free choice is called attenuated, weakened, and inclined, the answer is first: just as through original sin man was deprived of sanctifying grace and of right to the supernatural end, and consequently lost freedom or the power of producing any supernatural work, prescinding from the grace of the Savior, so, when man was stripped of the preternatural gifts through the same sin, his freedom or power of producing naturally good works was diminished; for from the loss of these gifts there arose difficulty in the exercise of natural virtue.

Second answer. But once grace has been recovered through the redemption of Christ, the other gifts of original justice are not restored to us; and consequently, although, helped by grace, we can do supernatural works, nevertheless not without difficulty and struggle. Hence "a twofold supernatural subjection to God must be distinguished. One is that by which lower reason is so subject to God through higher reason that there is nothing in reason which conflicts with the law of God and impedes its observation. The other is that by which higher reason itself is so subject to God that it obeys him not only for those works which it can naturally desire, but also for those toward which it cannot tend of itself, so that it allows itself to be elevated by God above itself and by his virtue is borne toward a supernatural end. This twofold subjection is likewise a twofold freedom. The former is the freedom of peace, by which we are freed from impediments to good operation; the latter is the freedom of the sons of God, by which we are freed from the condition of a servant, by which we are transferred into the unity and fellowship of the Lord himself, and now obey him as sons." These things indeed are according to the mind of St. Thomas in 2 Sentences, distinction 20, question 2, article 3, and De Malo, question 5, article 1. Hence Suarez rightly says (Prolegomena 4 to the treatise on grace, chapter 8, no. 15): "The freedom of the will was not intrinsically injured in any other way concerning the operation of good, except because it was deprived of charity and of virtues inclining to good. Likewise on the part of the intellect freedom was diminished, as it were in its root, insofar as the mind of man was deprived of wisdom and prudence. But accidentally freedom was injured on the part of concupiscence, which, left to itself and with the bridle of justice removed, made the use of liberty much more difficult for resisting evil and following good."

577. Ex dictis in praecedente §. constat 1., quod per peccatum originis suborta est ignorantia in intellectu; malitia seu pronitas ad malum in voluntate; proclivitas in concupiscibili ad prosequenda bona sensibilia citra et contra ordinem rationis; infirmitas in irascibili ad ardua suscipienda, et difficultates superandas. Accuratam horum vulnerum descriptionem ex Patribus, vide apud Bellarminum (de amiss. gr. et stat. pecc. l. 6. capp. 9-15.) - 2. Quod haec vulnera inflicta certe sunt per subtractionem donorum justitiae originalis. - 3. Quod consequenter homo debilior est ad operandum bonum in statu naturae lapsae, quam fuisset in statu justitiae originalis, si Adam in eo perseverasset. 577. From the things said in the preceding section it is clear: 1. that through the sin of origin ignorance has arisen in the intellect; malice, or proneness to evil, in the will; proclivity in the concupiscible power toward pursuing sensible goods short of and against the order of reason; weakness in the irascible power for undertaking arduous things and overcoming difficulties. For an accurate description of these wounds from the Fathers, see Bellarmine (On the Loss of Grace and the State of Sin, book 6, chapters 9-15). 2. That these wounds certainly have been inflicted through the withdrawal of the gifts of original justice. 3. That consequently man is weaker for doing good in the state of fallen nature than he would have been in the state of original justice, if Adam had persevered in it.

578. Sed oritur hic quaestio, utrum homo debilior factus sit solum per subtractionem donorum justitiae originalis, vel etiam per laesionem eorum, quae debita sunt ejus naturae; et consequenter, utrum debilior sit in statu naturae lapsae, quam esset non solum in

statu justitiae originalis, sed etiam in statu purae naturae. 578. But here the question arises whether man has been made weaker only through the withdrawal of the gifts of original justice, or also through injury to those things which are owed to his nature; and consequently whether he is weaker in the state of fallen nature than he would be not only in the state of original justice, but also in the state of pure nature.

579. Duplici modo autem posset intelligi, quod homo factus sit debilior in exercitio virtutis per laesionem eorum, quae pertinent ad ejus naturam: intrinsece, vel extrinsece. Intrinsece, si perfectio propria virium seu facultatum naturalium, quae sunt homini intrinsecae, et quibus debet homo bonum operari, fuerit diminuta, vel si per peccatum inducta fuerit aliqua positiva qualitas homini intrinseca, qua magis inclinetur ad malum. Extrinsece vero per solam diminutionem extrinseci auxilii, aut subtractionem alicujus extrinsecae defensionis. Prior modus potest dupliciter adhuc considerari. Vel quoad concursum generalem divinum, quo indiget omnis causa secunda ad operandum: vel quoad specialem Dei providentiam et gubernationem, quae creaturae rationali maxime necessaria est. Etsi enim libera voluntas sit causa activa et proxima suorum actuum, debet tamen sub universali providentia, et gubernatione causarum, et praesertim primae, operari, et, quatenus est causa indifferens et libera, censetur peculiari modo indigere hoc auxilio, ut videbimus. Posterior autem modus esse etiam potest vel utilis, quia causa finita et libera potest multis rebus extrinsecis impediri, et ideo, si impedimenta extrinseca multiplicentur, vel minuantur causae removentes illa, potest ex hoc capite fieri homo debilior ad operandum, etiamsi internae vires ejus diminutae non sint." 579. Now it could be understood in two ways that man has been made weaker in the exercise of virtue through injury to those things which pertain to his nature: intrinsically or extrinsically. Intrinsically, if the proper perfection of the natural powers or faculties, which are intrinsic to man and by which man must do good, has been diminished, or if through sin some positive quality intrinsic to man has been induced by which he is more inclined to evil. But extrinsically, through the mere diminution of extrinsic help or the withdrawal of some extrinsic defense. The prior mode can still be considered in two ways: either with respect to the general divine concurrence which every secondary cause needs in order to act, or with respect to God's special providence and governance, which is especially necessary for the rational creature. For although free will is the active and proximate cause of its acts, nevertheless it must act under the universal providence and governance of causes, and especially of the first cause; and insofar as it is an indifferent and free cause, it is judged to need this help in a peculiar way, as we shall see. But the latter mode can also be useful, because a finite and free cause can be impeded by many extrinsic things; and therefore, if extrinsic impediments are multiplied, or if the causes removing them are diminished, from this head man can be made weaker for acting, even if his internal powers have not been diminished."

580. Quaeritur igitur utrum homo, sive intrinsece sive extrinsece, debilior sit in statu naturae lapsae, quam fuisset in statu purae naturae. Theologi scholae, quae dicitur Augustiniana, cum nonnullis Thomistis affirmant. "Communis tamen," inquit Suarez (l. c. c. 8. n. 5.), "et vera sententia est, naturales vires hominis vel liberi arbitrii, quoad gradum, seu perfectionem quam in statu purae naturae haberent, non fuisse diminutas in natura lapsa ex vi solius peccati originalis, sed solum quoad robur et integritatem quam a justitia originali accipiebant. Haec sine dubio est sententia D. Thomae, et communis antiquorum theologorum." Et haec certe est sententia Molinae, de Valentia, Bellarmini, et communis Theologis Societatis. 580. Therefore it is asked whether man, either intrinsically or extrinsically, is weaker in the state of fallen nature than he would have been in the state of pure nature. The theologians of the school called Augustinian, together with some Thomists, affirm this. "Nevertheless," says Suarez (same place, chapter 8, no. 5), "the common and true opinion is that the natural powers of man or of free choice, with respect to the degree or perfection which they would have had in the state of pure nature, have not been diminished in fallen nature

by the force of original sin alone, but only with respect to the strength and integrity which they received from original justice. This without doubt is the opinion of St. Thomas and the common opinion of the ancient theologians." And this certainly is the opinion of Molina, de Valentia, Bellarmine, and the common opinion of the theologians of the Society.

581. Cum his ergo sit:

PROP. XLIII. Homo nec 1. intrinsece, nec 2. extrinsece debilior est ad operandum bonum in statu naturae lapsae, quam fuisset in statu purae naturae.

Prob. 1ma pars. I. a) Patres docent hominem spoliatum per peccatum veste donorum supernaturalium, retinuisse tamen ea, quae ad ipsum, ut homo est, pertinent. Atqui in statu purae naturae nihil aliud habuisset homo praeter id, quod ad ejus naturam pertinet. Ergo homo non est factus intrinsece debilior in statu naturae lapsae, quam fuisset in statu purae naturae.

Prob. antec. S. Joan. Chrys. (hom. de Cruc.) exponens illud "Adam, ubi es?" ait: "Non quod ignorat Deus, sed quia post persuasionem diaboli, qui ei promiserat deitatem, et invenit nuditatem dicit ei, 'Ubi es?' Hoc est, de qua dignitate ad quale dedecus deductus es? Quia manducasti de ligno scientiae boni et mali, remansisti homo." - S. Prosper (cont. Cillat. c. 19.): "Natura humana," inquit, "in prima praevaricatione, nec substantiam amisit, nec voluntatem, sed lumen, et decorem virtutum quibus fraude invidentis exuta est." Alia PP. testimonia indicat Suarez.

b) D. Thomas saepe usurpat principium communiter admissum "post peccatum naturalia permanserunt integra." Sic, ex. gr., 1. p. q. 95. a. 1. ait: "Manifestum est autem quod illa subjectio corporis ad animam, et inferiorum virium ad rationem non erat naturalis; alioquin post peccatum mansisset, cum etiam in daemonibus data naturalia post peccatum permanserint, ut Dionysius dicit 14. c. de div. Nom. part. 4. lect. 19." Nec potest dici D. Thomam intellexisse per illud "naturalia mansisse integra" solum bonum primum, quod est esse, vivere, et intelligere, uti videtur explicare 1. 2. q. 85. a. 1. ad 1. Nam "in citato loco, prima parte, expresse loquitur de bono illo, quod consistebat in perfecta subjectione corporis ad animam, et inferioris appetitus ad superiorem, probatque non fuisse naturalem, quia alias permansisset post peccatum, juxta sententiam Dionysii: ergo intelligit illam de omni bono naturae. Idemque argumentum fieri potest de quocumque bono, in quo dicitur natura humana diminuta per peccatum, nimirum inferendo non esse naturae debitum; nam si fuisset, permansisset, juxta regulam Dionysii ... Et ita illud axioma intellexerunt, et secuti sunt Scholastici communiter. Et praeterea non est major ratio de vita ipsa et vi intelligendi, quam de quacumque alia vi naturaliter operandi." - D. Thomas docet etiam, ut vidimus, 1. 2. q. 82. a. 1. ad 3., quod "ex peccato originali sequitur inclinatio ad malum per remotionem prohibentis, idest justitiae originalis." - Et 1. 2. q. 87. a. 7. docet per peccatum originale hominem suae naturae fuisse relictum. Et 2. sent. dist. 31. q. 1. a. 1.: "Quia hoc (rectitudo per dona justitiae originalis) gratis collatum fuerat, ideo juste per ingratitudinem inobedientiae subtractum est. Unde factum est, ut primo homine peccante, natura humana, quae in ipso erat, sibi ipsi relinqueretur, ut consisteret secundum conditionem suorum principiorum."

Dices: D. Thomas 1. 2. q. 85. a. 1. dicit naturalem inclinationem hominis ad virtutem minui per peccatum. Ergo.

Resp. In illo articulo quaerit de peccato in genere, utrum diminuat bonum naturae: diminutionem autem secundi naturae boni, nempe inclinationis ad virtutem, statim explicat de peccato actuali, dicens "per actus enim humanos fit inclinatio ad similes actus." Sed agens de peccato originali, illam inclinationem ad malum explicat solum per remotionem prohibentis, seu per subtractionem donorum justitiae originalis. Unde agens de peccato originali 1. 2. q. 85. a. 3. ait: "ipsa destitutio (donorum justitiae originalis) vulneratio naturae dicitur."

Prob. II. Ex ratione. Intrinseca diminutio virtutis nequit fieri, nisi vel per intrinsecam diminutionem perfectionis facultatum, vel per additionem alicujus positivae qualitatis ad malum inclinantis. Atqui neutro modo facta est ulla diminutio virtutis per peccatum originale (si excipiatur, uti patet, subtractio justitiae originalis.) Ergo.

Prob. min. quoad 1am partem. Nec substantia animae, nec intellectus, nec voluntas, nec aliae facultates naturales per subtractionem diminui possunt in seipsis, quia indivisibiles sunt, et remitti non possunt. - Nec etiam fieri potest in aliqua forma intrinsece eis inhaerente, quia in puris naturalibus nulla talis forma est in substantia animae, vel ejus potentiis." Vid. Suarez (l. c. c. 8. n. 9.)

Prob. min. quoad 2am partem. Peccatum originale consistit in mera privatione;

ergo nequit efficere aliquam positivam qualitatem inclinantem ad malum. Unde exclusimus qualitatem illam morbidam.

Confir.: "Peccatum etiam mortale actuale, si nihil positivum post se relinqueret, non redderet difficiliorem operationem virtutis. Explicatur in exemplo supra posito, de homine creato in puris naturalibus, et postea semel tantum peccante mortaliter: nam si, transacto illo peccato, nullum habitum in voluntate vel in appetitu, nullamve pravam dispositionem positivam relinqueret, neque in intellectu vel phantasia aliquam speciem vel memoriam peccati praeteriti, quae posset postea affectum excitare, nullo modo per illud peccatum semel commissum, naturae bonum quoad vires operandi bonum naturale minueretur, vel difficilius redderetur, quia peccatum praeteritum, si nullam pravam dispositionem reliquit, non potest obstare aliquid neque impedimentum apponere." Suarez (l. c. n. 11. 13.)

Prob. 2da pars. "Si facultas intrinseca hominis lapsi et puri ad moralia opera eadem est, etiam ex parte Dei modus providentiae est aequalis, ac subinde facultas quasi proxima, et, ut subest providentiae Dei, erit aequalis. Posterior consequentia evidens est."

"Prior vero probatur, quia Deus non punit peccatum, etiam originale, negando homini providentiam naturalem. Nam illud axioma theologorum supra positum, naturalia mansisse integra post peccatum, non magis verum est de naturalibus intrinsecis ex parte hominis, quam de naturalibus seu connaturalibus ex parte divinae providentiae; quia haec servant inter se proportionem, neque Deus, propter peccatum, relinquit naturam sine concursu proportionato ac debito tali naturae. Et confirmatur primo: nam, licet peccatum de se sit dignum tali vel tali poena, tamen de facto non omnis naturae incommoditas possibilis est poena peccati, sed haec pendet ex lege Dei, ejusque voluntate libera, taxante talem vel talem poenam pro culpa. Posset enim Deus juste in nihilum redigere peccatorem, vel illum morte afficere statim ac peccat, vel privare usu rationis, vel habitu fidei, etiamsi peccatum non sit illi contrarium, sed tantum demeritorium ejus; et tamen, secundum legem ordinariam non sunt hae poenae correspondentes peccatis, quia Deus illas non taxavit." Suarez (Prol. 4. ad Tract. de gr. c. 9. nn. 6. 7.)

Confirm.: "Ea quae pendent ex libera Dei dispositione, et ex effectibus non possunt investigari, non possunt sine gravi auctoritate affirmari." Atqui nulla est auctoritas affirmandi hominem extrinsece debiliorem esse in statu naturae lapsae, quam fuisset in statu purae naturae. Nam unice arguunt 1. ex dictis Patrum, qui interpretantes parabolam de homine semivivo relicto, Luc. 10. illam explicant de homine post peccatum originale, seu in statu naturae lapsae - 2. ex eo, quod, ut vidimus, homo dicitur vulneratus in naturalibus: liberum arbitrium dicitur attenuatum etc. Atqui haec dicuntur de praesenti statu comparato cum statu justitiae originalis, non cum statu purae naturae. Ergo. 581. Therefore with these let it be:

PROPOSITION XLIII. Man is neither, 1. intrinsically, nor, 2. extrinsically, weaker for doing good in the state of fallen nature than he would have been in the state of pure nature.

Proof of the first part. I. a) The Fathers teach that man, stripped by sin of the garment of supernatural gifts, nevertheless retained those things which pertain to him as man. But in the state of pure nature man would have had nothing other than that which pertains to his nature. Therefore man has not been made intrinsically weaker in the state of fallen nature than he would have been in the state of pure nature.

The antecedent is proved. St. John Chrysostom, explaining the words "Adam, where are you?" in the homily on the Cross, says: "Not because God is ignorant, but because after the persuasion of the devil, who had promised him deity, and found nakedness, he says to him, 'Where are you?' That is, from what dignity to what disgrace have you been brought down? Because you ate of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, you remained man." St. Prosper (Against the Collator, chapter 19) says: "Human nature, in the first prevarication, lost neither substance nor will, but the light and beauty of the virtues of which it was stripped by the fraud of the envious one." Suarez indicates other testimonies of the Fathers.

b) St. Thomas often uses the commonly admitted principle, "after sin, natural things remained intact." Thus, for example, I, question 95, article 1, he says: "It is manifest that that subjection of the body to the soul and of the lower powers to reason was not natural; otherwise it would have remained after sin, since even in the demons the natural gifts remained after sin, as Dionysius says in chapter 14 of On the Divine Names, part 4, lecture 19." Nor can it be said that St. Thomas, by "natural things remained intact," understood only the first good, which is to be, to live, and to understand, as he seems to

explain in I-II, question 85, article 1, reply 1. For "in the cited place, in the First Part, he expressly speaks of that good which consisted in the perfect subjection of the body to the soul and of the lower appetite to the higher, and he proves that it was not natural because otherwise it would have remained after sin, according to the opinion of Dionysius. Therefore he understands that rule of every good of nature. And the same argument can be made concerning any good in which human nature is said to be diminished through sin, namely by inferring that it is not owed to nature; for if it had been owed, it would have remained, according to the rule of Dionysius ... And thus the Scholastics commonly understood and followed that axiom. And besides, there is not a greater reason concerning life itself and the power of understanding than concerning any other power of naturally operating." St. Thomas also teaches, as we saw, I-II, question 82, article 1, reply 3, that "from original sin there follows an inclination to evil through the removal of what was prohibiting, that is, of original justice." And I-II, question 87, article 7, he teaches that through original sin man was left to his own nature. And in 2 Sentences, distinction 31, question 1, article 1: "Because this, namely rectitude through the gifts of original justice, had been conferred gratuitously, therefore it was justly withdrawn through the ingratitude of disobedience. Hence it happened that, when the first man sinned, human nature, which was in him, was left to itself, so that it would consist according to the condition of its own principles."

You will say: St. Thomas, I-II, question 85, article 1, says that man's natural inclination to virtue is diminished by sin. Therefore.

I answer: In that article he asks concerning sin in general, whether it diminishes the good of nature. But he immediately explains the diminution of the second good of nature, namely inclination to virtue, concerning actual sin, saying, "for through human acts there is produced an inclination to similar acts." But when treating original sin, he explains that inclination to evil only through the removal of what was prohibiting, or through the withdrawal of the gifts of original justice. Hence, when treating original sin in I-II, question 85, article 3, he says: "the very destitution of the gifts of original justice is called the wounding of nature."

Proof II. From reason. Intrinsic diminution of virtue cannot occur except either through intrinsic diminution of the perfection of the faculties, or through the addition of some positive quality inclining to evil. But through original sin no diminution of virtue has occurred in either way, if the withdrawal of original justice is excepted, as is clear. Therefore.

The minor is proved with respect to the first part. Neither the substance of the soul, nor the intellect, nor the will, nor the other natural faculties can be diminished in themselves through withdrawal, because they are indivisible and cannot be remitted. Nor can this happen in some form intrinsically inhering in them, because in pure natural things there is no such form in the substance of the soul or in its potencies. See Suarez (same place, chapter 8, no. 9).

The minor is proved with respect to the second part. Original sin consists in mere privation; therefore it cannot effect some positive quality inclining to evil. Hence we excluded that morbid quality.

Confirmation: "Even actual mortal sin, if it left nothing positive after itself, would not make the operation of virtue more difficult. This is explained in the example posited above, of a man created in pure natural things and afterward sinning mortally only once. For if, after that sin had passed, it left no habit in the will or in the appetite, no evil positive disposition, nor in the intellect or imagination any species or memory of the past sin which could afterward excite affection, then in no way would the good of nature, with respect to the powers of operating natural good, be diminished or made more difficult through that sin once committed; because a past sin, if it has left no evil disposition, cannot stand in the way of anything or place an impediment." Suarez (same place, nos. 11 and 13).

Proof of the second part. "If the intrinsic faculty of fallen man and of pure man for moral works is the same, then also on God's part the mode of providence is equal, and consequently the faculty as if proximate, and as subject to God's providence, will be equal. The latter consequence is evident."

"But the former is proved because God does not punish sin, even original sin, by denying natural providence to man. For that axiom of the theologians placed above, that natural things remained intact after sin, is no more true of intrinsic natural things on the part of man than of natural or connatural things on the part of divine providence, because these preserve proportion among themselves; nor does God, on account of sin, leave nature without concurrence proportioned and owed to such a nature. And it is

confirmed first: for although sin of itself is worthy of such and such a punishment, nevertheless in fact not every possible inconvenience of nature is a punishment of sin, but this depends on the law of God and his free will, assigning such and such a punishment for fault. For God could justly reduce the sinner to nothing, or strike him with death as soon as he sins, or deprive him of the use of reason, or of the habit of faith, even if the sin is not contrary to it but only demeritorious of it; and nevertheless, according to the ordinary law, these are not punishments corresponding to sins, because God has not assigned them." Suarez (Prolegomena 4 to the treatise on grace, chapter 9, nos. 6 and 7).

Confirmation: "Those things which depend on God's free disposition and cannot be investigated from effects cannot be affirmed without weighty authority." But there is no authority for affirming that man is extrinsically weaker in the state of fallen nature than he would have been in the state of pure nature. For they argue only, first, from the sayings of the Fathers who, interpreting the parable of the man left half-alive in Luke 10, explain it of man after original sin, or in the state of fallen nature; second, from the fact that, as we saw, man is said to have been wounded in natural things, free choice is said to have been attenuated, and so forth. But these things are said of the present state compared with the state of original justice, not with the state of pure nature. Therefore.

582. Quare concludimus cum Suarez (l. c. c. 8. n. 20.): "Homo in statu purae naturae, eamdem carentiam indumenti justitiae, quam habet nunc homo lapsus, haberet, ac subinde eamdem nuditatem: quia vero in statu purae naturae illam semper habuisset, non diceretur nudatus, sed nudus, nunc autem dicitur nudatus, quia fuit aliquando vestitus. Et similiter nunc dicitur privatus, tum propter eamdem rationem, tum etiam quia censetur habere proximam capacitatem illius justitiae, juxta divinae providentiae institutionem: in pura vero natura solum dici posset carere, vel non habere justitiam, quasi per simplicem negationem, et remotam capacitatem. Sic etiam tunc eamdem quidem dissolutionem, seu divisionem inter appetitus haberet; illa vero non habuisset rationem vulneris, quia nunquam habuit contrariam unionem, et quasi copulationem: vulnus autem dicit proprie relationem ad precedentem unionem. Nam significat terminum vulnerationis, vulneratio autem non fit nisi per actionem, qua dissolvuntur, quae prius unita fuerant. Et eadem ratio est de metaphora semivivi. Nam propter vulnera dicitur homo sauciatus, et semivivus relictus, quia etiam vox illa relictus, declarat, prius habuisse hominem pleniorem et saniorem vitam, quam per culpam et subsequentia vulnera ita perdidit, ut semivivus relictus esse dicatur, quod non haberet locum in homine creato in puris naturalibus, quia nec in illo praecessisset illa vitae perfectio, neque peccatum ex vi illius status. Quod manifeste constat in corporis mortalitate, quae certe non est major in natura lapsa quam in pura, et tamen nunc habet rationem vulneris, et ratione illius potest dici homo semivivus relictus, etiam in corporali vita, quia, ut dixit Gregorius, vita, sub tali corruptionis onere, mors est potius dicenda quam vita: in pura autem natura, nec haberet rationem vulneris, nec dici posset homo, propter inflictas plagas, semivivus esse relictus, sed esse creatus semivivus, vel quid simile." Sed juverit in integrum legere cit. capp. 8. 9. 582. Therefore we conclude with Suarez (same place, chapter 8, no. 20): "Man in the state of pure nature would have had the same lack of the garment of justice which fallen man now has, and consequently the same nakedness. But because in the state of pure nature he would always have had it, he would not be called denuded, but nude; now, however, he is called denuded because he was once clothed. And similarly now he is said to be deprived, both for the same reason and also because he is judged to have a proximate capacity for that justice, according to the institution of divine providence. But in pure nature he could only be said to lack or not have justice, as if through simple negation and remote capacity. Thus also then he would indeed have the same dissolution or division among the appetites; but that would not have had the ratio of a wound, because he never had the contrary union and, as it were, coupling. But a wound properly implies relation to a preceding union. For it signifies the term of wounding, and wounding does not occur except through an action by which things that had previously been united are dissolved. And the same account holds for the metaphor of the half-alive man. For on account of wounds

man is called wounded and left half-alive, because that word 'left' also declares that man previously had a fuller and healthier life, which through fault and the subsequent wounds he so lost that he is said to have been left half-alive. This would have no place in a man created in pure natural things, because neither would that perfection of life have preceded in him, nor sin by force of that state. This is manifestly clear in the mortality of the body, which certainly is not greater in fallen nature than in pure nature, and nevertheless now has the ratio of a wound; and by reason of it man can be said to have been left half-alive, even in bodily life, because, as Gregory said, life under such a burden of corruption ought rather to be called death than life. But in pure nature it would neither have the ratio of a wound, nor could man be said, on account of inflicted blows, to have been left half-alive, but rather to have been created half-alive, or something similar." But it will be useful to read the cited chapters 8 and 9 in full.

Disputation V — On Man's Last Things

Article 1. Certain Notions Concerning Beatitude in General

LatineEnglish

583. Post hominis lapsum et totius humanae naturae ruinam, statuitur reparatio per Christum, cui succedit tractatio de gratia, quam Christus nobis meruit, quaeque per Sacramenta praesertim communicatur. In fine tandem agitur de fine, ad quem homines per Christi gratiam perveniunt; ubi et de miserrima eorum sorte, qui gratia Christi abutentes a fine deficiunt, instituitur sermo. 583. After the fall of man and the ruin of the whole of human nature, the reparation through Christ is set forth; after this follows the treatment of grace, which Christ merited for us and which is communicated especially through the Sacraments. Finally, at the end, there is discussion of the end to which men arrive through the grace of Christ; and there too discourse is instituted concerning the most miserable lot of those who, abusing the grace of Christ, fall short of the end.

584. Verum non desunt qui praedictum ordinem paululum immutant; atque ad quaestionem de humanae naturae elevatione ad statum supernaturalem deque ejus lapsu, statim adjiciunt quaestionem de hominis novissimis: ideo fortasse, ut totam de homine tractationem veluti sub uno oculi intuitu ponant. 584. Yet there are not lacking those who slightly alter the aforesaid order, and immediately add the question concerning the last things of man to the question concerning the elevation of human nature to the supernatural state and concerning its fall. Perhaps they do this in order to place the whole treatment concerning man, as it were, under one view of the eye.

585. Ut hos imitemur suadet praesens tractatuum distributio, juxta quam, si hic de Novissimis quaestio omitteretur, periculum esset ne unquam amplius rediret. 585. The present distribution of the treatises persuades us to imitate them, according to which, if the question concerning the Last Things were omitted here, there would be danger that it would never again return.

586. Plura sunt, quae ab aliquibus ad tractatum de Novissimis revocantur, quaeque tamen alii in aliis tractatibus exponunt. Quaestio, ex. gr., de visione intuitiva pertractari solet partim in tract. de Deo, ubi factum, tempus, inaequalitas asseritur; partim in tract. de hominis ad statum supernaturalem elevatione, ubi visionis intuitivae natura, possibilitas, supernaturalitas statuitur. Haec et similia silentio hic praeterimus, ne eadem bis discutiamus. 586. There are many things which are referred by some to the treatise on the Last Things, and yet others expound them in other treatises. The question, for example, concerning the intuitive vision is customarily treated partly in the treatise on God, where its fact, time, and inequality are asserted; partly in the treatise on man's elevation to the supernatural state, where the nature, possibility, and supernaturality of the intuitive vision are established. These and similar things we here pass over in silence, lest we discuss the same things twice.

587. Ea ipsa vero, quae hic disputanda suscipimus, ea solum ratione atingemus, quae tum temporis angustiis, tum caeteris hoc anno explicandis unice convenit.

ARTICULUS PRIMUS.

Notiones quaedam de beatitudine in genere. 587. But those very things which we undertake to discuss here, we shall touch only in that manner which uniquely suits both the narrowness of time and the other matters to be explained this year.

ARTICLE FIRST.

Certain notions concerning beatitude in general.

588. Traditis beatitudinis definitione et praecipuis divisionibus, pauca de objectiva et formali beatitudine delibabimus.

§ I.

Beatitudinis definitio et divisio. 588. After handing down the definition of beatitude and its principal divisions, we shall taste a few things concerning objective and formal beatitude.

§ I.

The definition and division of beatitude.

589. Nomen beatitudinis sumitur imprimis ad significandum statum, in quo possidetur plenitudo bonorum, et habetur complementum omnium desideriorum. Unde definitur a Boetio (de consol. phil. l. 3. pros. 2.): "status omnium bonorum aggregatione perfectus" - a S. Augustino (Enarr. in Ps. 2. n. 11.): "Bonorum omnium summa et cumulus" - a S. Gregorio Nysseno (l. de Beatid. in princ.): "comprehensio quaedam omnium earum rerum, quae in homine intelliguntur, a quo nihil abest eorum, quae pertinent ad bonorum desiderium, atque cupiditatem." Unde etiam illud Apoc. 7. 16.: "Non esurient, neque sitient amplius, nec cadet super illos sol, neque ullus aestus;" et 17.: "Et absterget Deus omnem lacrymam ab oculis eorum." 589. The name of beatitude is taken first of all to signify the state in which the fullness of goods is possessed and the completion of all desires is had. Hence it is defined by Boethius (On the Consolation of Philosophy, book 3, prose 2) as "a state perfected by the aggregation of all goods"; by St. Augustine (Exposition on Psalm 2, no. 11) as "the sum and accumulation of all goods"; and by St. Gregory of Nyssa (On the Beatitudes, at the beginning) as "a certain comprehension of all those things which are understood in man, from which nothing is absent of those things which pertain to the desire and longing for goods." Hence also that saying of Apocalypse 7:16: "They shall no longer hunger nor thirst, nor shall the sun fall upon them, nor any heat"; and verse 17: "And God shall wipe away every tear from their eyes."

590. Magis proprie autem beatitudo definitur: summum bonum appetitus rationalis adaequate satiativum; quod videtur D. Thomas significare, dum 1. 2. q. 2. a. 8. dicit beatitudinem esse "bonum perfectum quod totaliter quietat appetitum." 590. But more properly beatitude is defined as the highest good adequately satisfying the rational appetite. St. Thomas seems to signify this when, in I-II, question 2, article 8, he says that beatitude is "the perfect good which wholly quiets the appetite."

591. Ex qua definitione intelligitur 1. quod quamvis multa sint bona in beatitudine, et plures operationes, quibus illa possidentur: est tamen aliquod summum bonum, et aliqua perfectissima operatio, quibus caetera deserviunt - 2. quod licet unaquaeque res sit aliquo modo capax beatitudinis, quatenus potest habere collectionem bonorum perfectam juxta naturam suam; solum tamen creatura intelligentia aut ratione praedita, est capax verae beatitudinis, quae requirit conjunctionem cum bono vere summo, et consequenter cum fine simpliciter ultimo. Unde dicitur etiam beatitudo bonum satiativum appetitus rationalis - 3. quod beatitudo proprie accepta definiri etiam potest: ultimi finis consecutio. Beatitudo enim dicit terminum et quietem; quamdiu autem homo inquirit, non quiescit; quamdiu non pervenerit ad ultimum finem, adhuc inquirit "sequor si quo modo comprehendam." 591. From this definition it is understood: 1. that although there are many goods in beatitude, and several operations by which they are possessed, nevertheless there is some highest good and some most perfect operation to which the rest are subservient; 2. that although each thing is in some way capable of beatitude, insofar as it can have a collection of goods perfect according to its nature, still only a creature endowed with intelligence or reason is capable of true beatitude, which requires conjunction with the truly highest good and consequently with the last end simply. Hence beatitude is also called the good satisfying the rational appetite; 3. that beatitude,

properly accepted, can also be defined as the attainment of the last end. For beatitude denotes terminus and rest; but so long as man searches, he does not rest; so long as he has not arrived at the last end, he is still searching: "I follow, if in any way I may comprehend."

592. In beatitudine duo possunt considerari: objectum, quo beatificamur; et consecutio ejusdem: illud vocatur beatitudo objectiva; haec beatitudo formalis. Utraque tamen constituit unam veram beatitudinem, quia una sine altera beatificare non potest. "Advertendum tamen," inquit Lessius (de sum. bon. l. 1. c. 1. n. 2.), "eas dupliciter accipi, nempe pro ipsa re extrinseca, in qua consistit summum bonum: et pro ejus possessione seu unione, qua nobis conjungitur. Summum bonum et ultimus finis dicitur et res ipsa, cujus possessione et fruitione beati sumus; et ipsa hujus rei possessio et fruitio. Simili modo beatitudo accipitur pro ipsa re, cujus unione beati efficimur, et pro ipsa unione. Illa a Doctoribus vocatur beatitudo objectiva, haec formalis. Cum enim nulla res extrinseca nostrum bonum esse, aut nos beatos efficere possit, nisi nobis uniatur et nos quodammodo afficiat, utrumque necessario requiritur, nimirum ipsa res, et illius nobiscum unio, et utrumque nostra beatitudo et summum bonum nostrum dicitur. Quamvis magis proprie nomen summi boni in rem ipsam quadret, nomen beatitudinis in rei unionem et possessionem." 592. In beatitude two things can be considered: the object by which we are made blessed, and the attainment of the same. The former is called objective beatitude; the latter, formal beatitude. Yet both constitute one true beatitude, because one cannot beatify without the other. "Nevertheless it must be noted," says Lessius (On the Highest Good, book 1, chapter 1, no. 2), "that they are taken in two ways, namely for the extrinsic thing itself in which the highest good consists, and for its possession or union, by which it is joined to us. Both the thing itself, by whose possession and fruition we are blessed, and the possession and fruition itself of this thing are called the highest good and the last end. In a similar way, beatitude is taken for the thing itself by whose union we are made blessed, and for the union itself. The former is called by the Doctors objective beatitude, the latter formal beatitude. For since no extrinsic thing can be our good, or make us blessed, unless it is united to us and in some way affects us, both are necessarily required, namely the thing itself and its union with us; and both are called our beatitude and our highest good. Although the name of highest good more properly fits the thing itself, the name of beatitude fits the union and possession of the thing."

593. Dividitur beatitudo in essentialem et accidentalem; quae divisio coincidit cum iis, quae paulo ante diximus de beatitudine sumpta pro statu, et pro summo bono, etc. Nam licet ad statum perfectum beatitudinis multa concurrant, tamen necesse est, ut inter illa aliquid sit summum, ad quod caetera referantur, vel ex eo tamquam ex primo fonte dimanent, aut in eo eminenter contineantur: quia non potest esse aggregatio multorum perfecta, sine aliquo ordine multorum inter se: illud ergo, quod est summum et perfectum in eo statu, dicitur essentia beatitudinis, caetera vero sunt veluti proprietates, aut accidentia ejus. - Vel "quamvis multa bona reperiantur in beato, non tamen per omnia attingit suum supremum finem, aut illum consequitur: ergo non omnia aeque pertinent ad beatitudinem, neque ad rationem ultimi finis: ergo beatitudo significat perfectionem ultimam, ad quam caetera referuntur; merito essentia beatitudinis non dicitur consistere in tota illa collectione, sed in eo, quod est in illa supremum, et ultimum." 593. Beatitude is divided into essential and accidental. This division coincides with those things which we said a little earlier concerning beatitude taken for the state, and for the highest good, etc. For although many things concur for the perfect state of beatitude, nevertheless it is necessary that among them there be something highest to which the rest are referred, or from which they flow as from the first source, or in which they are eminently contained; because there cannot be a perfect aggregation of many things without some order of the many among themselves. Therefore that which is highest and perfect in that state is called the essence of beatitude; the rest are, as it were, its properties or accidents. Or: "although many goods are found in the blessed one, nevertheless not through all of them does he attain his supreme end, or attain it; therefore not all

things equally pertain to beatitude, nor to the ratio of the last end; therefore beatitude signifies the ultimate perfection to which the rest are referred. Deservedly, the essence of beatitude is not said to consist in that whole collection, but in that which is supreme and last within it."

594. Juverit tamen hic notare, quod inter ea, quae accidentia beatitudinis dicuntur, quaedam sunt maxime intrinseca et inseparabilia ab essentiali beatitudine; alia vero sunt magis extrinseca, uti, ex. gr. gloria corporis. Unde dici solet beatitudinem proprie consistere in anima, et non in corpore, et Sancti in solis animabus dicuntur simpliciter beati, quamvis nunc careant bonis, quae ad corpus pertinent. 594. Yet it will be helpful to note here that among those things which are called accidents of beatitude, some are maximally intrinsic and inseparable from essential beatitude, while others are more extrinsic, as, for example, the glory of the body. Hence it is customary to say that beatitude properly consists in the soul and not in the body, and that the Saints are said to be simply blessed in their souls alone, although they now lack the goods which pertain to the body.

595. Dividitur etiam beatitudo in naturalem et supernaturalem. Prima ea est, quae naturae rationali secundum se consideratae convenit, et quam solis naturae viribus ac naturali Dei auxilio creatura rationalis assequi potest. Altera vero ea est, quae naturae vires et exigentiam plane excedit, et nonnisi gratiae auxiliis comparari potest. Vid. Suarez (de ult. fin. hom. disp. 4. sect. 1. et 2.)

§ II.

Objectiva hominis beatitudo. 595. Beatitude is also divided into natural and supernatural. The first is that which belongs to rational nature considered according to itself, and which a rational creature can attain by the powers of nature alone and by the natural help of God. The other is that which plainly exceeds the powers and exigency of nature, and can be obtained only by the helps of grace. See Suarez (On the Ultimate End of Man, disputation 4, sections 1 and 2).

§ II.

The objective beatitude of man.

596. Refert S. Augustinus (de civ. Dei l. 19. c. 1.), quod "Marcus Varro in libro de Philosophia tam multam dogmatum varietatem diligenter, ac subtiliter scrutatus advertit; ut ad ducentas octoginta octo sectas, non quae jam essent, sed quae esse possent, adhibens quasdam differentias facillime perveniret." 596. St. Augustine reports (City of God, book 19, chapter 1) that "Marcus Varro, in the book on Philosophy, so diligently and subtly examined the great variety of dogmas that, by applying certain differences, he very easily arrived at two hundred eighty-eight sects - not those which already existed, but those which could exist."

597. Verum ipsa recta ratio docet Deum, et nihil praeter Deum, posse hominem facere vere beatum. Quod cum in philosophia demonstrari soleat, sufficiet hic paucis illud in mentem revocare. Vid. D. Thomam 1. 2. q. 2. - Lessium (de sum. bon. lib. 1.) 597. But right reason itself teaches that God, and nothing besides God, can make man truly blessed. Since this is usually demonstrated in philosophy, it will suffice here to recall it briefly to mind. See St. Thomas, I-II, question 2; Lessius (On the Highest Good, book 1).

598. Dicimus ergo imprimis: omnia bona creata simul sumpta non possunt sufficere ad beatificandum hominem sine Deo. Quod constat 1. Ex Scriptura. Objectum humanae beatitudinis debet habere rationem ultimi finis, et perfecte satiare hominis appetitum; atqui omnia creata bona sine Deo nequeunt haec praestare. Apoc. 1. 8.: "Ego sum alpha et omega, principium et finis." Ps. 72. 25. 26.: "Quid mihi est in coelo, et a te quid volui super terram? ... Deus cordis mei, et pars mea Deus in aeternum." Ps. 143. 15.: "Beatus populus cujus Dominus Deus ejus." Ps. 102. 5.: "Qui replet in bonis desiderium tuum." Ps. 16. 15.: "Satiabor cum apparuerit gloria tua."

2. Ex Patribus. S.

Augustinus (Conf. l. 13. c. 8.): "Satis ostendis quam magnam creaturam rationalem feceris, cui nullo modo sufficit ad beatam requiem quidquid te minus est" - Et (Serm. 150. 7.): "Jam constitutis ante oculos nostros tribus, Epicureo, Stoico, Christiano, interrogemus singulos. Dic Epicuree: quae res facit beatum? Respondet voluptas corporis. Dic Stoice: virtus animi. Dic Christiane: donum Dei." S. Greg. Nazianz. (Orat. 21. de laud. Athan.): "Intelligibilium omnium summus est vertex (Deus), in quo desiderium omne consistit, ac defigitur, nec supra eum usque fertur, nec enim quidpiam sublimius habet, aut habebit unquam mens ulla, quamvis philosophica, et ad altissima tendens, ac summe curiosa; hoc enim rerum omnium expectandarum extremum est, quo cum pervenerimus, conquiescit omnis speculatio."

3. Ex ratione. Beatitudo est summum bonum adaequate satiativum appetitus rationalis; atqui bonorum omnium creatorum complexus absque Deo, nequit appetitum nostrum satiare. Ergo.

Prob. min. a) Possessis (si fieri posset) omnibus creatis bonis, homo intelligeret ea non esse a se, sed a principio primo et necessario, quod adhuc cuperet intelligere et possidere. Ut enim homo hoc desiderio sollicitetur, duo requiruntur et sufficiunt, ut principium illud sit appetibile et proportionatum: atqui, cum illud sit summum bonum, est summe appetibile; cum sit illud, ad quod ordinatus est homo (n. 91. seqq.), debet esse proportionatum. Ergo.

Prob. min. b) ex D. Thoma 1. 2. q. 2. a. 8.: "Objectum voluntatis, quae est appetitus humanus, est universale bonum, sicut objectum intellectus est universale verum. Ex quo patet quod nihil potest quietare voluntatem hominis nisi bonum universale; quod non invenitur in aliquo creato, sed solum in Deo; quia omnis creatura habet bonitatem participatam." Quod argumentum defendens Suarez contra Cajetanum, observat: "cum voluntatis objectum sit bonum, et intellectus sit ens, plane comprehendunt Deum sub suis objectis, et ita sunt aliquo modo capaces Dei. Rursus Deus cum sit summum bonum, et summum ens, est praecipua pars, et praecipuum objectum harum potentiarum: ergo fieri non potest ut homo secundum has potentias fiat beatus in solis creaturis sine Deo, quia deest illi id, quod est supremum et optimum in capacitate sua." Vid. Suarez (l. c. disp. 5. sect. 1.) 598. Therefore we say first: all created goods taken together cannot suffice to beatify man without God. This is clear, 1. from Scripture. The object of human beatitude must have the ratio of the last end and must perfectly satisfy man's appetite; but all created goods without God cannot furnish these things. Apocalypse 1:8: "I am alpha and omega, the beginning and the end." Psalm 72:25-26: "What have I in heaven? and besides you what have I willed upon earth? ... God is the God of my heart, and God is my portion forever." Psalm 143:15: "Blessed is the people whose Lord is their God." Psalm 102:5: "Who fills your desire with good things." Psalm 16:15: "I shall be satisfied when your glory shall appear."

2. From the Fathers. St. Augustine (Confessions, book 13, chapter 8): "You sufficiently show how great you have made the rational creature, for whom nothing less than you suffices for blessed rest." And in Sermon 150, no. 7: "Now that three have been placed before our eyes, the Epicurean, the Stoic, and the Christian, let us ask each one. Say, Epicurean: what thing makes one blessed? He answers: pleasure of the body. Say, Stoic: virtue of the soul. Say, Christian: the gift of God." St. Gregory Nazianzen (Oration 21, in praise of Athanasius): "The highest summit of all intelligible things is God, in whom every desire rests and is fixed, nor is it carried further above him; for no mind, however philosophical and tending to the highest things and most curious, has or ever will have anything more sublime. For this is the extreme of all things to be awaited; when we have arrived at it, all speculation rests."

3. From reason. Beatitude is the highest good adequately satisfying the rational appetite; but the complex of all created goods without God cannot satisfy our appetite. Therefore.

The minor is proved. a) If all created goods were possessed, if this could happen, man would understand that they are not from himself, but from a first and necessary principle, which he would still desire to understand and possess. For in order that man be stirred by this desire, two things are required and suffice: that that principle be desirable and proportioned. But since it is the highest good, it is supremely desirable; and since it is that to which man is ordered (no. 91 and following), it must be proportioned. Therefore.

The minor is proved. b) From St. Thomas, I-II, question 2, article 8: "The object of the will, which is the human appetite, is universal good, just as the object of the intellect is universal truth. From this it is clear that nothing can quiet the will of man except universal good; and this is not found

in any created thing, but only in God, because every creature has participated goodness." Defending this argument against Cajetan, Suarez observes: "since the object of the will is good, and that of the intellect is being, they plainly comprehend God under their objects, and thus they are in some way capable of God. Again, since God is the highest good and highest being, he is the principal part and principal object of these powers; therefore it cannot happen that man according to these powers should be made blessed in creatures alone without God, because that which is supreme and best in his capacity is lacking to him." See Suarez (same place, disputation 5, section 1).

599. Ex his plane sequitur Deum esse objectum beatitudinis nostrae; cum enim caetera omnia praeter ipsum, beatos nos facere minime valeant, nisi velimus dicere beatitudinem esse nobis impossibilem, quod repugnat, ea in Deo constituenda est. Caeterum allata argumenta hoc etiam directe demonstrant. 599. From these things it plainly follows that God is the object of our beatitude; for since all other things besides him are in no way able to make us blessed, unless we wish to say that beatitude is impossible for us, which is repugnant, beatitude must be constituted in God. Moreover, the arguments brought forward also demonstrate this directly.

600. Sed dubium hic suboritur, utrum Deus solus, sine aliorum bonorum consortio, sit sufficiens beatitudinis nostrae objectum. Ratio dubitandi est, quia licet Deus sit supremum hominis bonum, non tamen est unicum ejus bonum, nam praeter Deum, indiget homo ut commode vivat, et bonis corporis, et aliis bonis animae praeter cognitionem Dei, quia omnia bona naturaliter appetit: ergo non satiatur appetitus hominis Deo; ergo solus Deus non est sufficiens objectum beatitudinis ejus." 600. But here a doubt arises, whether God alone, without the companionship of other goods, is the sufficient object of our beatitude. The reason for doubting is that although God is the supreme good of man, nevertheless he is not man's only good; for besides God, in order to live conveniently, man needs both goods of the body and other goods of the soul besides the knowledge of God, because he naturally desires all goods. Therefore the appetite of man is not satisfied by God; therefore God alone is not the sufficient object of his beatitude."

601. Qua in re notandum est, aliud esse loqui de proprio objecto bono, cujus consecutione beati sumus; aliud vero de his, quae vel cum illo objecto conjuncta sunt, vel ex parte nostra sunt necessaria ad consequendum illud objectum perfecte, et ut in nobis efficiat illos effectus omnes, quos perfecta beatitudo requirit: non enim omnia, quae hoc modo requiruntur, oportet ut sint proprie objecta beatitudinis essentialis; sicut non omnia, quae sunt necessaria ad introductionem vel conservationem formae, nec etiam quae illa consequuntur, pertinent ad essentiale compositum." 601. In this matter it must be noted that it is one thing to speak of the proper good object by whose attainment we are blessed, and another thing to speak of those things which either are joined with that object, or are necessary on our part for attaining that object perfectly and so that it may produce in us all those effects which perfect beatitude requires. For not all things which are required in this way must be properly objects of essential beatitude, just as not all things which are necessary for the introduction or conservation of a form, nor even those things which follow it, pertain to the essential composite."

602. His positis, dicimus: Solus Deus est objectum nostrae beatitudinis essentialis, et sine creaturarum consortio sufficit ad nostram beatitudinem. Quod patet 1. Quia "finis perfectus simpliciter est qui propter se semper et nunquam ob aliud est; talis autem est felicitas: sed solus Deus est perfectus finis, propter se amandus, et reliqua omnia propter ipsum: ergo solum ipse est objectiva beatitudo simpliciter humanae naturae,"

2. "Deus per se solum est summum bonum simpliciter et perfecta cum ipso conjunctio, seu illius adeptio est per se maxime expetibilis

et sufficiens ad perfectionem hominis, non solum quia in Deo continetur omne bonum eminenter, sed etiam quia secum affert quidquid ad beatitudinem hominis necessarium esse potest: ergo solus Deus est essentiale objectum nostrae beatitudinis."

3. "Solus Deus est primum hominis principium: ergo solus etiam est ultimus finis ejus; ergo in reditu ad ipsum, et consecutione ejus stat hominis beatitudo."

4. "Christus Dominus in via fuit absolute, et simpliciter beatus propter hanc visionem, et fruitionem, etiamsi affectus esset multis malis poenae, et simpliciter animae sanctae sunt absolute beatae, quamvis careant corporibus, et consequenter aliis bonis corporis."

Unde legitur Jer. 9. 23. 24.: "Non glorietur sapiens in sapientia sua, nec fortis in fortitudine sua, sed in hoc glorietur, scire et nosse me." - Et Ps. 143.: "Beatum dixerunt populum, cui haec sunt: beatus populus, cujus Dominus Deus ejus." - Et Jo. 17.: "Haec est vita aeterna, ut cognoscant te solum verum Deum etc." Vid. Suarez (de ultim. fin. hom. disp. 5. sect. 2.), ubi plena etiam invenies Patrum testimonia indicata. 602. These things having been posited, we say: God alone is the object of our essential beatitude, and without the companionship of creatures he suffices for our beatitude. This is clear: 1. because "the end perfect simply is that which is always for its own sake and never for another; but happiness is such; but God alone is the perfect end, to be loved for his own sake, and all other things for his sake; therefore he alone is objective beatitude simply of human nature."

2. "God by himself alone is the highest good simply, and perfect conjunction with him, or attainment of him, is of itself maximally desirable and sufficient for the perfection of man, not only because every good is contained eminently in God, but also because he brings with himself whatever can be necessary for man's beatitude; therefore God alone is the essential object of our beatitude."

3. "God alone is the first principle of man; therefore he alone is also his last end; therefore man's beatitude stands in return to him and attainment of him."

4. "Christ the Lord, while on the way, was absolutely and simply blessed because of this vision and fruition, even though he was affected by many evils of punishment; and simply holy souls are absolutely blessed, although they lack bodies and consequently other goods of the body."

Hence it is read in Jeremiah 9:23-24: "Let not the wise man glory in his wisdom, nor the strong in his strength, but let him glory in this, to know and understand me." And Psalm 143: "They have called the people blessed to whom these things belong; blessed is the people whose Lord is their God." And John 17: "This is eternal life, that they may know you, the only true God, etc." See Suarez (On the Ultimate End of Man, disputation 5, section 2), where you will also find the full testimonies of the Fathers indicated.

603. Benedictus XII., in Const. Benedictus Deus, ait: "Definimus, quod ... animae Sanctorum ... vident divinam essentiam ... quodque sic videntes, eadem divina essentia perfruuntur, nec non quod ex tali visione et fruitione, eorum animae, qui jam decesserunt, sunt vere beatae, et habent vitam et requiem aeternam." 603. Benedict XII, in the Constitution Benedictus Deus, says: "We define that ... the souls of the Saints ... see the divine essence ... and that, thus seeing, they enjoy that same divine essence; and also that from such vision and fruition the souls of those who have already departed are truly blessed and have eternal life and rest."

604. Ut certa ab incertis secernantur, aliqua adnotabimus. Agitur hic de beatitudine supernaturali. Jam diximus beatitudinem formalem esse ipsam consecutionem objecti beatificantis, Dei; vel, ut alii loquuntur, ipsam unionem cum Deo, objecto nostrae beatitudinis. Quaeritur ergo quid sit illa consecutio, in quo consistat illa unio. 604. In order that certain things may be separated from uncertain things, we shall note some points. Here the matter concerns supernatural beatitude. We have already said that formal beatitude is the very attainment of the beatifying object, God; or, as others speak, the very union with God, the object of our beatitude. Therefore it is asked what that attainment is, and in what that union consists.

605. Jamvero I. Aliqui antiqui Theologi posuerunt beatitudinem nostram formalem in visione Dei increata menti nostrae communicata et unita. Cum haec sententia jam obsoleta sit, et minus conformis praefatae definitioni Bened. XII., sufficit contra illam animadvertere, quod "si visio increata ita potest communicari animae; ut anima per illam formaliter fiat videns; etiam reliquae perfectiones divinae, ut potentia, sapientia, charitas, misericordia, justitia, imo et ipsa Deitas eidem communicari poterunt: ita ut anima sit omnipotens formaliter per omnipotentiam Dei, sapiens per sapientiam Dei, amans per charitatem Dei, misericors et justa per Dei misericordiam et justitiam: imo ut ipsa sit Deus per immediatam unionem Deitatis cum natura animae. Quae omnia sunt absurda. Sic enim creatura esset infinite sapiens, infinite amans, infinite misericors, infinite justa. Etsi enim in modo habendi istas perfectiones esset discrimen, eo quod Deus illas habeat per essentiam, anima per gratuitam donationem: tamen non esset discrimen in ipsis perfectionibus, ac utrobique essent prorsus eaedem, et consequenter haberent effectum formalem infinitum." Vid. Lessium (de sum. bon. l. 2. c. 2.) - D. Thomam 1. 2. q. 3. a. 1. - Et de ver. q. 20. a. 1. 605. Now, I. Some ancient Theologians placed our formal beatitude in the uncreated vision of God communicated and united to our mind. Since this opinion is now obsolete and less conformable to the aforesaid definition of Benedict XII, it is sufficient to observe against it that "if uncreated vision can be so communicated to the soul that the soul formally becomes seeing through it, then the other divine perfections also, such as power, wisdom, charity, mercy, justice, indeed even the Deity itself, will be able to be communicated to the same soul; so that the soul would be formally omnipotent through the omnipotence of God, wise through the wisdom of God, loving through the charity of God, merciful and just through the mercy and justice of God; indeed so that it itself would be God through the immediate union of Deity with the nature of the soul. All these things are absurd. For in this way the creature would be infinitely wise, infinitely loving, infinitely merciful, infinitely just. For although there would be a difference in the mode of having these perfections, because God has them through essence and the soul through gratuitous donation, nevertheless there would be no difference in the perfections themselves, and in both cases they would be entirely the same, and consequently would have an infinite formal effect." See Lessius (On the Highest Good, book 2, chapter 2), St. Thomas, I-II, question 3, article 1, and On Truth, question 20, article 1.

606. II. Alii constituebant formalem beatitudinem in quodam illapsu divinae essentiae in essentiam animae. Ponebant nempe primario "beatitudinem nostram in quodam illapsu, quo divina essentia ita illabatur in animam, ut ipsa tota transformetur in Deum, sic ut non videatur esse distincta a divinitate, sed esse quid unum cum illa: sicut ferrum transformatur in ignem, ita ut nihil appareat nisi ignis. Ex essentia vero animae volunt divinitatem derivari seu dimanare ad potentias, nimirum ad intellectum, ut clarius Deum videat; et voluntatem, ut ardentius amet: unde in visione et amore videtur solum secundario beatitudinem constituere."

Sed huic sententiae opponimus, a) quod illapsus ille non fit per aliquid increatum, sic enim haec reincideret in praecedentem sententiam jam rejectam. Nec fit per aliquod donum creatum in essentiam animae infusum. Etenim "beatis non infunditur novum aliquod donum in essentiam animae, quod non habuerint in via; sed solum lumen gloriae, quod non pertinet ad essentiam animae qua essentia est, sed qua intellectus est. Ergo non datur novus illapsus in essentiam qui prior sit quam illapsus in intellectum." - Et si gratia dicitur consummari in coelo, hoc non importat quod aliquid "ei addatur intrinsecus in ipsa animae essentia, ubi illa residere dicitur: sed quia assequitur finem suum ob quem ab initio collata fuit, qui finis est visio et amor beatificus; totum enim opus gratiae divinae completur et consummatur in visione, amore, ac gaudio."

b) Nec si admitteretur illud novum donum in ipsa essentia animae, posset in eo constitui essentia formalis beatitudinis. Nam beatitudo, ut infra melius patebit, "est aliquid vitale, utpote vitalis quidam sensus et gustus bonorum divinorum: atqui illapsus ille non est quid vitale, nec a nobis procedit, sed a solo Deo." Vid. Lessium (l. c. cap. 3.) <span

id="p606">606. II. Others constituted formal beatitude in a certain entering-in of the divine essence into the essence of the soul. Namely, they primarily placed "our beatitude in a certain entering-in, by which the divine essence would so enter into the soul that the soul itself would be wholly transformed into God, so that it would not seem to be distinct from the divinity, but to be something one with it; just as iron is transformed into fire, so that nothing appears except fire. But from the essence of the soul they wished the divinity to be derived or to flow down to the powers, namely to the intellect, so that it might see God more clearly, and to the will, so that it might love more ardently. Hence it seems to constitute beatitude only secondarily in vision and love."

But against this opinion we object: a) that that entering-in does not occur through something uncreated, for in that way this opinion would fall back into the preceding opinion already rejected. Nor does it occur through some created gift infused into the essence of the soul. For "there is not infused into the blessed some new gift in the essence of the soul which they did not have on the way, but only the light of glory, which does not pertain to the essence of the soul insofar as it is essence, but insofar as it is intellect. Therefore there is not given a new entering-in into the essence which is prior to the entering-in into the intellect." And if grace is said to be consummated in heaven, this does not mean that something "is added to it intrinsically in the very essence of the soul, where it is said to reside, but that it attains its end on account of which it was conferred from the beginning; this end is beatific vision and love. For the whole work of divine grace is completed and consummated in vision, love, and joy."

b) Nor, even if that new gift in the very essence of the soul were admitted, could the formal essence of beatitude be constituted in it. For beatitude, as will be clearer below, "is something vital, as being a certain vital sense and taste of divine goods; but that entering-in is not something vital, nor does it proceed from us, but from God alone." See Lessius (same place, chapter 3).

607. III. His ergo exclusis, superest ut formalis beatitudo constituatur vel 1. in habitu - vel 2. in actu - vel 3. in utroque. Quamvis autem non defuerint qui primum aut tertium asseruerint; communiter tamen jam admittitur cum D. Thoma beatitudinem formalem consistere in aliqua operatione. Nam, a) uti docet 1. 2. q. 3. a. 2. ad 1., beatitudo est vita: "Haec est autem vita aeterna:" sed non substantialis, prout dicit esse substantiale hominis, quia esse hominis non est sua beatitudo, cum hoc solius Dei sit proprium; ergo est vita accidentalis: sed vita accidentalis perfecta consistit in operatione. Ergo.

b) Uti docet idem S. Doctor in eodem art., beatitudo est ultima hominis perfectio in ipso existens; sed perfectio ultima est in actu, et non in habitu; habitus enim ordinatur ad actum, ut ad ultimam sui perfectionem. Ergo. Quoad hanc rationem bene notat Suarez: quidquid sit de philosophica quaestione, utrum actus sit perfectior habitu, vel viceversa; nihil refert ad rationem beatitudinis, quia non est de ratione beatitudinis ut sit perfectissima entitas, sed ut sit perfectissimum vinculum cum ultimo fine, atque adeo ut sit perfectus actus in modo actuandi, ita ut de se non relinquat potentialitatem ad ulteriorem actum in illo ordine. Vid. (de ult. fin. hom. disp. 6. sect. 2.) 607. III. Therefore, with these excluded, it remains that formal beatitude be constituted either 1. in a habit, or 2. in an act, or 3. in both. Although there have not been lacking those who affirmed the first or the third, nevertheless it is now commonly admitted with St. Thomas that formal beatitude consists in some operation. For, a) as he teaches in I-II, question 3, article 2, reply 1, beatitude is life: "But this is eternal life." Yet it is not substantial life, insofar as it denotes man's substantial being, because man's being is not his beatitude, since this belongs to God alone; therefore it is accidental life. But perfect accidental life consists in operation. Therefore.

b) As the same holy Doctor teaches in the same article, beatitude is the ultimate perfection of man existing in him; but ultimate perfection is in act and not in habit, for habit is ordered to act as to its ultimate perfection. Therefore. With respect to this argument Suarez rightly notes: whatever may be the case concerning the philosophical question whether act is more perfect than habit, or conversely, it makes no difference to the ratio of beatitude, because it does not belong to the ratio of beatitude that it be the most perfect entity, but that it be the most perfect bond with the last end, and therefore that it be a perfect act in the mode of acting, so that of itself it does not leave

potentiality for a further act in that order. See On the Ultimate End of Man, disputation 6, section 2.

608. IV. At vero in cujusnam potentiae operatione consistit beatitudo formalis? Ut verus quaestionis status intelligatur, notamus 1. quod formalis beatitudo nequit certo constitui in operatione alicujus facultatis sensitivae. "Nam," inquit D. Thomas 1. 2. q. 3. a. 3., "beatitudo hominis consistit essentialiter in conjunctione ipsius ad bonum increatum, quod est ultimus finis, ut supra ostensum est, art. 1. hujus quaest., cui homo conjungi non potest per sensus operationem."

2. Quod si agatur de iis, quae concurrunt, sive ad integrandum sive ad constituendum beatitudinem, actus tum intellectus tum voluntatis circa ipsum Deum, objectum essentialis beatitudinis, requiruntur ad beatitudinem formalem.

3. Quod hic tamen quaeritur, in quo actu consistat essentialiter beatitudo formalis. - Relictis sententiis minus probabilibus et minus communibus, tres praesertim hac de re sententiae existunt. Prima tenet beatitudinem formalem essentialiter consistere in sola visione, actu intellectus; altera docet eam consistere in visione et amore Dei, actibus intellectus et voluntatis; tertia requirit etiam gaudium ad essentiam beatitudinis.

Juxta primam sententiam, tota essentia beatitudinis formalis constituitur actu visionis intuitivae Dei; amor, et fruitio seu gaudium procedunt ab ipsa visione, sed non pertinent ad essentiam beatitudinis formalis; eo fere modo, quo facultates ab anima pullulant, quin tamen ad essentiam animae vel hominis pertineant. Si supponatur, quod amor et fruitio a visione separentur (quod tamen de potentia saltem ordinaria fieri nequit. Vid. Sylv. in 1. 2. q. 4. a. 1.) dicendum est statum beatitudinis non esse perfectum, sed perfectam esse essentiam beatitudinis. - Nec novum est, aiunt, quod aliquid sit essentialiter tale, non autem perfecte tale: sicut homo caecus, et puer est essentialiter homo, non tamen perfectus. Haec est sententia communis Thomistarum; eam docet D. Th. 1. 2. q. 3. a. 4.; eidem subscribunt Bellarminus, Becanus, Taparelli, etc.

Juxta sententiam vero, quam praecipue defendit Suarez, "essentia beatitudinis formalis primo et principaliter consistit in visione Dei clara, in qua quasi in fonte et radice tota perfectio beatitudinis continetur" - "amor charitatis et amicitiae divinae est simpliciter necessarius, ut homo sit supernaturaliter perfecte beatus: et absolute dicendus est de essentia ipsius beatitudinis" nec amor concupiscentiae, nec gaudium prout est actus distinctus ab amore amicitiae, sunt de essentia beatitudinis. (de ult. fin. hom. disp. 7. sect. 1. nn. 29. 31. 36. 42.)

Denique docet Lessius, et refert Molinam, Valentiam, etc., quod praeter visionem et amorem ad essentiam beatitudinis formalis requiritur etiam fruitio, quae complectitur amorem et gaudium. 608. IV. But in the operation of which power does formal beatitude consist? In order that the true state of the question may be understood, we note: 1. that formal beatitude certainly cannot be constituted in the operation of some sensitive faculty. "For," says St. Thomas, I-II, question 3, article 3, "the beatitude of man consists essentially in his conjunction with the uncreated good, which is the last end, as was shown above, article 1 of this question, to which man cannot be joined through the operation of sense."

2. If the matter concerns those things which concur either for integrating or for constituting beatitude, then acts both of the intellect and of the will concerning God himself, the object of essential beatitude, are required for formal beatitude.

3. Yet what is asked here is in which act formal beatitude essentially consists. Setting aside opinions less probable and less common, there are especially three opinions on this matter. The first holds that formal beatitude essentially consists in vision alone, an act of the intellect; the second teaches that it consists in the vision and love of God, acts of the intellect and will; the third requires joy also for the essence of beatitude.

According to the first opinion, the whole essence of formal beatitude is constituted by the act of intuitive vision of God; love and fruition or joy proceed from the vision itself, but do not pertain to the essence of formal beatitude, in nearly the way that faculties spring forth from the soul and yet do not pertain to the essence of the soul or of man. If it is supposed that love and fruition are separated from vision, which nevertheless cannot happen at least by ordinary power - see Sylvius on I-II, question 4, article 1 - it must be said that the state of beatitude is not perfect, but that the essence of beatitude is perfect. Nor is it new, they say, for something to be essentially

such but not perfectly such; just as a blind man and a child are essentially man, but not perfect. This is the common opinion of the Thomists; St. Thomas teaches it in I-II, question 3, article 4; Bellarmine, Becanus, Taparelli, and others subscribe to it.

But according to the opinion which Suarez especially defends, "the essence of formal beatitude first and principally consists in the clear vision of God, in which, as in source and root, the whole perfection of beatitude is contained"; "the love of charity and of divine friendship is simply necessary for man to be supernaturally perfectly blessed, and is absolutely to be said to belong to the essence of beatitude itself"; but neither the love of concupiscence, nor joy insofar as it is an act distinct from the love of friendship, belongs to the essence of beatitude. See On the Ultimate End of Man, disputation 7, section 1, nos. 29, 31, 36, 42.

Finally Lessius teaches, and reports Molina, Valentia, and others, that besides vision and love, fruition also is required for the essence of formal beatitude; this fruition includes love and joy.

609. His breviter expositis, statuemus imprimis quod certum est; dein vero indicabimus quae afferri possunt pro unaquaque ex tribus propositis sententiis.

§ IV.

De beatitudine formali - solvitur quaestio.

PROP. XLIV. Beatitudo formalis, saltem si spectetur quoad suam essentiam simul et integritatem, necessario postulat visionem, amorem et gaudium.

Recole cit. Const. Benedicti XII.

Prob. I. Ex Scriptura. a) Quoad visionem. Jo. 17.: "Haec est vita aeterna, ut cognoscant te solum Deum verum, et quem misisti Jesum Christum." Ps. 16.: "Satiabor cum apparuerit gloria tua:" et 35.: "In lumine tuo videbimus lumen." Psal. 83.: "Videbitur Deus Deorum in Sion:" 90.: "Ostendam illi salutare meum." Matth. 5.: "Beati mundo corde, quoniam ipsi Deum videbunt:" et cap. 18.: "Angeli eorum in coelis semper vident faciem Patris mei." Joan. 14.: "Qui diligit me, diligetur a Patre meo, et ego diligam eum, et manifestabo ei meipsum." 1. ad Corinth. 13.: "Videmus nunc per speculum in aenigmate, tunc autem facie ad faciem." 1. Joan. 3.: "Nunc filii Dei sumus, et nondum apparuit quid erimus. Scimus quoniam cum apparuerit, similes ei erimus, quoniam videbimus eum sicuti est."

b) Quoad amorem et gaudium. 1. Cor. 13.: "Charitas nunquam excidit ... major autem horum est charitas." Ps. 35.: "Inebriabuntur ab ubertate domus tuae, et torrente voluptatis tuae potabis eos:" Matth. 25.: "Intra in gaudium Domini tui:" Lucae 22.: "Ut edatis et bibatis super mensam meam in regno meo:" et Apoc. 2.: "Vincenti dabo edere de ligno vitae."

Prob. II. Ex Patribus, a) Quoad visionem. S. Irenaeus (l. 4. c. 37.) dicit de aeterna vita "quae unicuique evenit ex eo quod videat Deum, quemadmodum enim videntes lumen intra lumen sunt, et claritatem ejus percipiunt, sic et qui vident Deum, intra Deum sunt, percipientes ejus claritatem, et vivificat autem eos claritas; percipiunt ergo vitam qui vident Deum." - S. Cyrillus Alex. (l. 3. c. Julian.): "Nihil vera Dei contemplatione est pretiosius, quandoquidem nos summae beatitudinis haec facit participes:" et postea: "Hominum felicitas est, habere summam contemplationem." - S. Augustinus (l. 1. de Trin. c. 13.): "Illa visio Dei qua contemplabimur incommutabilem atque humanis oculis invisibilem Dei substantiam, quae solis sanctis promittitur, etc. Sola est summum bonum nostrum, cujus adipiscendi causa praecipimur agere quidquid recte agimus."

b) Quoad amorem et gaudium. S. Augustinus (de mor. Eccl. l. 1. c. 3.): "Beatus, quantum existimo, nec ille dici potest, qui non habet quod amat, qualecumque illud sit: nec qui habet quod amat, si noxium sit: nec qui non amat quod habet, etsi optimum sit." Et (de civ. Dei l. 8. c. 9.): "Nemo beatus est, qui eo quod amat, non fruitur, nam et hi qui res non amandas amant, non se beatos amando putant, sed fruendo. Quisquis ergo fruitur eo quod amat, utrumque et summum bonum amat, quis eam beatum nisi miserrimus neget?" - S. Greg. Nyssenus (l. de beatitud.): "Videre usu Scripturae idem significat quod habere; sicut illud, videas bona Jerusalem, idem est quod invenias. Et, tollatur impius ne videat gloriam Dei; per non videre non participem esse Prophetae significat. Ergo qui Deum videt, omne bonum, per hoc quod videt, adeptus est: vitam interminabilem, incorruptibilem, aeternam, beatitudinem immortalem, regnum sine fine, laetitiam continuam, verum lumen, gloriam inaccessam, perpetuam exultationem, omne denique bonum."

Prob. III. Ex ratione. Afferam hic aliqua ex argumentis, quae Lessius affert ad statuendam suam sententiam, et quae, sin minus illam vere demonstrant, certe probant thesim

nostram.

a) "Perfectio animi consistit in assimilatione cum Deo, ac proinde summa perfectio in summa assimilatione. Unde cum beatitudo sit summa perfectio, postulat summam assimilationem, juxta illud 1. Joan. 3. 'Scimus quoniam cum apparuerit, similes ei erimus: quoniam videbimus eum sicuti est.' Atqui sola nuda aridaque visio non facit animum perfecte similem Deo, sed solum ex parte quasi dimidia, nempe secundum intellectum, non secundum affectum. Ergo."

b) "Beatitudo consistit in perfecta unione vitali cum Deo: perfecta autem cum eo unio non solum postulat conjunctionem per intellectum, sed etiam per affectum: quia non minus voluntas immediate attingit Deum quam intellectus; sunt enim hae duae facultates instar duorum brachiorum, quibus animus Deum complectitur, eumque sibi astringit et tenet. Ergo." 609. With these things briefly explained, we shall first establish what is certain; then we shall indicate what can be brought forward for each of the three proposed opinions.

§ IV.

On formal beatitude - the question is solved.

PROPOSITION XLIV. Formal beatitude, at least if it is considered with respect to its essence and integrity together, necessarily demands vision, love, and joy.

Recall the cited Constitution of Benedict XII.

Proof I. From Scripture. a) With respect to vision. John 17: "This is eternal life, that they may know you, the only true God, and Jesus Christ whom you have sent." Psalm 16: "I shall be satisfied when your glory shall appear"; and Psalm 35: "In your light we shall see light." Psalm 83: "The God of gods shall be seen in Sion"; Psalm 90: "I shall show him my salvation." Matthew 5: "Blessed are the clean of heart, for they shall see God"; and chapter 18: "Their angels in heaven always see the face of my Father." John 14: "He who loves me will be loved by my Father, and I shall love him and manifest myself to him." 1 Corinthians 13: "Now we see through a mirror in an enigma, but then face to face." 1 John 3: "Now we are sons of God, and it has not yet appeared what we shall be. We know that when he shall appear, we shall be like him, because we shall see him as he is."

b) With respect to love and joy. 1 Corinthians 13: "Charity never falls away ... but the greater of these is charity." Psalm 35: "They shall be inebriated from the abundance of your house, and with the torrent of your pleasure you shall give them drink." Matthew 25: "Enter into the joy of your Lord." Luke 22: "That you may eat and drink at my table in my kingdom." And Apocalypse 2: "To him who conquers I shall give to eat of the tree of life."

Proof II. From the Fathers. a) With respect to vision. St. Irenaeus (book 4, chapter 37) says of eternal life "which happens to each one from the fact that he sees God; for just as those who see light are within light and perceive its brightness, so also those who see God are within God, perceiving his brightness; and the brightness gives them life; therefore those who see God perceive life." St. Cyril of Alexandria (book 3 against Julian): "Nothing is more precious than the true contemplation of God, since this makes us participants of the highest beatitude"; and afterward: "The happiness of men is to have the highest contemplation." St. Augustine (On the Trinity, book 1, chapter 13): "That vision of God by which we shall contemplate the immutable and, to human eyes, invisible substance of God, which is promised to the saints alone, etc., is alone our highest good, for the sake of attaining which we are commanded to do whatever we do rightly."

b) With respect to love and joy. St. Augustine (On the Morals of the Church, book 1, chapter 3): "So far as I judge, neither can he be called blessed who does not have what he loves, whatever it may be; nor he who has what he loves, if it is harmful; nor he who does not love what he has, even if it is best." And (City of God, book 8, chapter 9): "No one is blessed who does not enjoy that which he loves; for even those who love things not to be loved do not think themselves blessed by loving, but by enjoying. Therefore whoever enjoys that which he loves, and loves the true and highest good, who but the most miserable man would deny that he is blessed?" St. Gregory of Nyssa (On the Beatitudes): "In the usage of Scripture, to see signifies the same as to have; as that saying, may you see the goods of Jerusalem, is the same as may you find them. And, let the impious man be taken away lest he see the glory of God: by not seeing, the Prophet signifies not being a participant. Therefore he who sees God, through the fact that he sees, has obtained every good: life without end, incorruptible and eternal, immortal beatitude, a kingdom without end, continual gladness, true light, inaccessible glory, perpetual exultation, and finally every good."

Proof III. From reason. I shall

bring forward here some of the arguments which Lessius brings forward to establish his own opinion, and which, even if they do not truly demonstrate that opinion, certainly prove our thesis.

a) "The perfection of the soul consists in assimilation with God, and therefore the highest perfection consists in the highest assimilation. Hence, since beatitude is the highest perfection, it demands the highest assimilation, according to that saying of 1 John 3: 'We know that when he shall appear, we shall be like him, because we shall see him as he is.' But bare and dry vision alone does not make the soul perfectly similar to God, but only from a quasi-half part, namely according to the intellect, not according to affection. Therefore."

b) "Beatitude consists in perfect vital union with God; but perfect union with him demands not only conjunction through the intellect, but also through affection, because the will touches God immediately no less than the intellect. For these two faculties are like two arms by which the soul embraces God and binds and holds him to itself. Therefore."

610. Nunc quoad tres sententias superius relatas, dicimus 1. cum Suarez (l. c. disp. 7. sect. 1. n. 25.): "Non est verum quidquam in hoc (in Const. cit. Conc. Flor.) esse definitum, scilicet, an essentia beatitudinis in uno, vel pluribus actibus consistat: nam in priori loco sermo est contra Begard. et Beguin. qui asserebant hominem natura sua fieri beatum, et non indigere ad hoc lumine gloriae. Hoc ergo est quod Pontifex cum Concil. definit, indigere nos lumine gloriae, ut elevemur ad beatitudinem illam, et ut Deo fruamur: an vero beatitudo sit in visione, vel in fruitione, vel in utraque, impertinens est ad illam definitionem: in posteriori vero loco definitio est contra sententiam, quae asserebat animas non beatificari usque ad diem judicii; obiter vero dicitur ibi animas beatificari videndo, et fruendo, quod etiam simpliciter verum est, quia de facto utrumque est in beatis, et, qui utrumque habet necessario est beatus, sive utrumque sit de essentia, sive non."

2. Omnes sententiae videntur evadere posse vim probationum, quae petuntur ex Script. et PP., animadvertendo quod ubi asseritur visionem esse beatitudinem, subintelligi potest cum amore et gaudio, uti alia loca prae se ferunt; et ubi ponitur visio, amor, gaudium, potest intelligi quod de facto ea omnia requiruntur, sed fortasse non ad essentiam beatitudinis.

3. Praecipua ratio pro prima sententia videtur haec esse. Formalis beatitudo essentialiter consistit in adeptione ultimi finis, qui per illam fit proprius adipiscentis. Revera tendit homo in via quia non possidet; quiescit in termino, quia possidet. Atqui nullus est actus voluntatis, qui sit formaliter consecutio ultimi finis. Ergo nullus est actus voluntatis, qui pertineat ad essentiam beatitudinis formalis; quae proinde unice consistit in visione.

Prob. min. Actus voluntatis est vel aversionis a malo, vel prosecutivus boni: de primo hic certe non agitur. Actus vero prosecutionis vel tendit in bonum absens, et est desiderium; vel fertur in bonum praesens, et est gaudium; vel praescindit a praesentia et absentia; et est simpliciter amor, seu complacentia. Atqui nullus horum actuum est formaliter consecutio, adeptio finis. Ergo. - Revera desiderium excludit possessionem; gaudium supponit illam; complacentia nec excludit, nec necessario includit, sed praescindit.

Unde de desiderio et gaudio docet D. Thomas 1. 2. q. 3. a. 4.: "Manifestum est autem quod ipsum desiderium finis non est consecutio finis, sed est motus ad finem. Delectatio autem advenit voluntati ex hoc quod finis est praesens: non autem e converso ex hoc aliquid fit praesens, quia voluntas delectatur in ipso. Oportet igitur aliquid aliud esse quam actum voluntatis, per quod fit finis ipse praesens voluntati ... Nam a principio volumus consequi finem intelligibilem; consequimur autem ipsum per hoc quod fit praesens nobis per actum intellectus; et tunc voluntas delectata conquiescit in fine jam adepto." - De amore vero, seu complacentia, c. g. l. 3. c. 26., ait: "Amare etiam non potest esse ultimus finis; amatur enim bonum, non solum quando habetur, sed etiam quando non habetur; ex amore enim est quod non habitum desiderio quaeratur; et si amor jam habiti perfectior sit, hoc causatur ex hoc quod bonum amatum habetur; aliud est igitur habere bonum, quod est finis, quam amare, quod ante habere est imperfectum, post habere perfectum." Vid. pro hac sententia Sylvium (in cit. l. sum. Theol.); et Gotti (Tract. 1. de ult. fin., q. 2. dub. 4.)

4. Ratio, quam fere unice urget Suarez pro sua sententia, est "quia amor non concurrit, nec petitur in beatitudine, solum propter visionem, seu ut conditio ejus, nimirum ut ille sit in aliquo perfecto statu, sed per se, ut est perfecta quaedam connexio cum ultimo fine, ultima in suo ordine, et propter se

maxime appetibilis, et formaliter tribuens perfectionem aliquam respectu ultimi finis, quem immediate attingit, quam non confert visio, nec aliquis alius actus, et sine qua hominis ultima perfectio esset valde diminuta, et quasi dimidiata. Et haec est ratio, quae me cogit ut dicam, hunc amorem non solum esse necessarium, sed etiam esse de essentia hujus beatitudinis." Vid. (l. c. disp. 7. sect. 1.)

5. Aliquas ex rationibus, quas Lessius allegat pro sua sententia, superius dedimus: reliquas lege apud ipsum (de sum. bon. l. 2. c. 5.) 610. Now with respect to the three opinions related above, we say: 1. with Suarez (same place, disputation 7, section 1, no. 25): "It is not true that anything has been defined in this, namely, in the cited Constitution of the Council of Florence, concerning whether the essence of beatitude consists in one act or in several acts. For in the prior place the discourse is against the Beghards and Beguines, who asserted that man becomes blessed by his own nature and does not need the light of glory for this. Therefore this is what the Pontiff with the Council defines: that we need the light of glory in order that we may be elevated to that beatitude and may enjoy God. But whether beatitude is in vision, or in fruition, or in both, is irrelevant to that definition. In the later place, however, the definition is against the opinion which asserted that souls are not beatified until the day of judgment; but incidentally it is said there that souls are beatified by seeing and enjoying, which also is simply true, because in fact both are in the blessed, and he who has both is necessarily blessed, whether both belong to the essence or not."

2. All the opinions seem able to evade the force of the proofs which are sought from Scripture and the Fathers, by observing that where vision is asserted to be beatitude, it can be understood with love and joy, as other places bring forward; and where vision, love, and joy are posited, it can be understood that in fact all these are required, but perhaps not for the essence of beatitude.

3. The principal argument for the first opinion seems to be this. Formal beatitude essentially consists in the obtaining of the last end, which through it becomes proper to the one obtaining it. In reality man tends while on the way because he does not possess; he rests in the terminus because he possesses. But there is no act of the will which is formally the attainment of the last end. Therefore there is no act of the will which pertains to the essence of formal beatitude; and consequently it consists only in vision.

The minor is proved. An act of the will is either of aversion from evil, or prosecutive of good; here certainly there is no question of the first. But an act of prosecution either tends toward an absent good, and is desire; or is borne toward a present good, and is joy; or abstracts from presence and absence, and is simply love, or complacency. But none of these acts is formally attainment, the obtaining of the end. Therefore. In reality desire excludes possession; joy supposes it; complacency neither excludes nor necessarily includes it, but abstracts from it.

Hence concerning desire and joy St. Thomas teaches in I-II, question 3, article 4: "It is manifest that the very desire of the end is not the attainment of the end, but is motion toward the end. But delight comes to the will from the fact that the end is present; not, conversely, does something become present from the fact that the will delights in it. Therefore there must be something other than an act of the will through which the end itself becomes present to the will ... For from the beginning we will to attain the intelligible end; but we attain it through the fact that it becomes present to us through an act of the intellect; and then the will, delighted, rests in the end already obtained." But concerning love, or complacency, in Contra Gentiles, book 3, chapter 26, he says: "To love also cannot be the last end; for good is loved not only when it is had, but also when it is not had; for from love it is that the thing not had is sought by desire; and if love of a thing already had is more perfect, this is caused by the fact that the loved good is had. Therefore to have the good, which is the end, is one thing; to love is another, which before having is imperfect and after having is perfect." See for this opinion Sylvius, on the cited place of the Summa Theologiae, and Gotti (Treatise 1 on the last end, question 2, doubt 4).

4. The argument which Suarez almost solely presses for his own opinion is this: "because love does not concur, nor is it required in beatitude, only on account of vision, or as its condition, namely so that vision may be in some perfect state, but per se, as it is a certain perfect connection with the last end, ultimate in its own order, maximally desirable for its own sake, and formally bestowing some perfection with respect to the last end, which it immediately touches, which neither vision nor any other act confers, and without which man's

ultimate perfection would be greatly diminished and, as it were, halved. And this is the reason which compels me to say that this love is not only necessary, but also belongs to the essence of this beatitude." See the same place, disputation 7, section 1.

5. We gave above some of the arguments which Lessius alleges for his own opinion; read the rest in him (On the Highest Good, book 2, chapter 5).

Article 2. Whether Perpetuity Belongs to the Nature of Beatitude

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611. Imprimis, si de facto agatur, de fide est beatitudinem esse perpetuam; in Symbolo enim profitemur credere "vitam aeternam." Unde Matth. 25. 46. legitur: "Et ibunt hi in supplicium aeternum: justi autem in vitam aeternam." - Quamvis autem vox aeternum saepe significet in Sacris litteris solum diuturnam durationem; in citato tamen testimonio significare durationem sine fine, patet ex intelligentia Ecclesiae et Patrum - ex proprietate verbi saepe repetiti, et in re tanti momenti, quae continet praecipuam Dei promissionem - ex aliis Scripturae locis. Sic, ex. gr., Apoc. 3. dicitur: "Foras non egredietur amplius." - 1. Thess. 4.: "Sic semper cum Domino erimus." - 1. Pet. 1., dicitur haereditas illa (beatitudo) "incorruptibilis, incontaminata, immarcescibilis;" et 5. dicitur "immarcescibilis gloriae corona." 611. First, if the matter is considered as a fact, it is of faith that beatitude is perpetual; for in the Creed we profess that we believe "life eternal." Hence Matthew 25:46 reads: "And these shall go into eternal punishment, but the just into eternal life." Although the word eternal often signifies in Sacred Scripture only a long duration, nevertheless in the cited testimony it signifies duration without end. This is clear from the understanding of the Church and the Fathers, from the property of the word often repeated and in a matter of such importance, which contains the chief promise of God, and from other places of Scripture. Thus, for example, Apocalypse 3 says: "He shall not go out any more." 1 Thessalonians 4: "Thus we shall always be with the Lord." In 1 Peter 1, that inheritance, beatitude, is called "incorruptible, undefiled, unfading"; and in chapter 5 it is called "the unfading crown of glory."

612. Jamvero cum status beatitudinis plures comprehendat perfectiones, statuto facto de perpetuitate ejus durationis, quaeritur de modo, quo diversis illis perfectionibus perpetuitas sit tribuenda. Et dicimus 1. in beatitudine est perfectio quasi privativa, quae consistit in carentia omnis mali tam culpae, quam poenae: haec perpetuo durabit eodem modo absque ulla mutatione. Vid. Apoc. 7. 21. 29.

2. Est in beatitudine perfectio positiva, quae considerari potest vel in actu primo, vel in actu secundo. - In actu primo "perpetuo durabit eadem numero, et in individuo immutabilis, sic enim durabit gratia, lumen gloriae, et similes proprietates, quia in his maxime consistit perpetuitas hujus status, nec mutantur, nec amittuntur, nisi per peccatum. Item de perfectionibus corporum, quae consistunt veluti in actu primo, dicitur 1. ad Corinth. quod 'surgit corpus in incorruptionem;' ergo multo magis id verum est de perfectionibus animae."

3. Quoad actum secundum vero, distinguendae sunt essentiales beatitudinis perfectiones ab accidentalibus. - In actibus secundis, in quibus consistit essentialis beatitudo, vel qui cum illa habent intrinsecam connexionem "erit perpetuitas et immutabilitas in ipsismet actibus, etiam in individuo semper manentibus, absque ulla mutatione, quae in illis fiat: et hoc modo intelligenda est proprie aeternitas illius vitae, et sic dicuntur Angeli 'semper videre faciem Patris,' et de illo gaudio dicitur: 'Gaudium vestrum nemo tollet a vobis:' et supra, disp. 9., ostendi hos actus esse necessarios: ergo iidem numero semper perseverant, nec possunt augeri, vel diminui."

4. Perfectiones vero accidentales in actu secundo consideratae "suo quidem modo erunt perpetuae, non tamen ita, ut eaedem numero perseverent, quia nihil est, quod necessitet beatos ad habendos semper eosdem numero actus considerationis, aut gaudii circa bona creata: erit ergo in his perpetuitas quoad duo, primum, quia semper erit in potestate beati habere hujusmodi gaudia, et actus prout sibi placuerit, nam semper conservat principia illorum per modum actus primi, quo sua voluntate uti potest. Secundo quoad quandam perpetuam

vicissitudinem horum actuum, et gaudiorum, quia a cogitatione unius rei transibunt ad cogitationem alterius, etc." Vid. Suarez (de ult. fin. hom. disp. 14. sect. 1.) 612. Now since the state of beatitude comprehends several perfections, once the fact of the perpetuity of its duration has been established, the question is asked about the mode in which perpetuity is to be attributed to those different perfections. And we say: 1. in beatitude there is a quasi-privative perfection, which consists in the lack of every evil, both of fault and of punishment. This will endure perpetually in the same mode without any change. See Apocalypse 7, 21, 29.

2. There is in beatitude a positive perfection, which can be considered either in first act or in second act. In first act, "it will endure perpetually the same in number and immutable in the individual; for thus grace, the light of glory, and similar properties will endure, because in these especially consists the perpetuity of this state, and they are neither changed nor lost except through sin. Likewise concerning the perfections of bodies, which consist as it were in first act, it is said in 1 Corinthians that 'the body rises in incorruption'; therefore much more is this true concerning the perfections of the soul."

3. With respect to second act, however, the essential perfections of beatitude must be distinguished from the accidental perfections. "In the second acts in which essential beatitude consists, or which have an intrinsic connection with it, there will be perpetuity and immutability in the acts themselves, even as they always remain the same in number in the individual, without any change occurring in them. And in this way the eternity of that life is properly to be understood; and thus the Angels are said 'always to see the face of the Father,' and concerning that joy it is said, 'Your joy no one shall take from you.' And above, in disputation 9, I showed that these acts are necessary; therefore they always persevere the same in number and cannot be increased or diminished."

4. But accidental perfections considered in second act "will indeed be perpetual in their own way, yet not in such a way that the same acts in number persevere, because there is nothing which necessitates the blessed to have always the same acts in number of consideration or of joy concerning created goods. Therefore in these there will be perpetuity in two respects: first, because it will always be in the power of the blessed one to have joys and acts of this kind as it shall please him, for he always preserves the principles of them by way of first act, by which he can use his will; second, with respect to a certain perpetual succession of these acts and joys, because they will pass from the thought of one thing to the thought of another, etc." See Suarez (On the Ultimate End of Man, disputation 14, section 1).

613. Quaestio, quae superest, est de natura perpetuitatis, quae beatitudini tribuenda est: quaeritur nempe utrum beatitudo sit natura sua et ab intrinseco incorruptibilis, vel solum ex extrinseca et libera Dei providentia. 613. The question which remains concerns the nature of the perpetuity which is to be attributed to beatitude. Namely, it is asked whether beatitude is by its nature and intrinsically incorruptible, or only by the extrinsic and free providence of God.

614. Ut intelligatur status quaestionis, breviter notamus corruptibile et incorruptibile dici respectu causae, a qua aliquid corrumpi potest vel non. Triplex autem causa potest hic considerari: causa intrinseca, respectu cujus aliquid dicitur intrinsece corruptibile, si habeat in se ipso, in sua ipsa natura elementa dissolutionis et corruptionis. - Causa extrinseca creata, respectu cujus aliquid dicitur corruptibile, si ab aliquo naturali agente destrui aut corrumpi possit. - Causa denique increata, Deus. 614. In order that the state of the question may be understood, we briefly note that corruptible and incorruptible are said with respect to the cause by which something can or cannot be corrupted. Now a threefold cause can be considered here: an intrinsic cause, with respect to which something is called intrinsically corruptible if it has in itself, in its very nature, elements of dissolution and corruption; an extrinsic created cause, with respect to which something is called corruptible if it can be destroyed or corrupted by some natural agent; and finally the uncreated cause, God.

615. Jamvero quod dicitur natura sua perpetuum, ab intrinseco incorruptibile, excludit quamcumque causam corruptionis intrinsecam et quamlibet creatam causam, a qua corrumpi possit. Si vero comparetur ad causam increatam, Deum; distinguendum est inter potentiam Dei ordinariam et absolutam. Ut aliquid dicatur natura sua incorruptibile, requiritur ut a Deo, juxta suam potentiam ordinariam agente, corrumpi nequeat: incorruptibilitas enim certe excludit intrinsecam corruptionis causam; et Deus de potentia ordinaria agit secundum propriam rerum naturam et exigentiam. Si autem agatur de potentia Dei absoluta, nulla creatura dici potest incorruptibilis, quatenus nec de potentia Dei absoluta destrui aut annihilari potest: "hoc modo," inquit Suarez (de ult. fin. hom. disp. 14. sect. 2. n. 7.), "concedo posse lumen (gloriae) corrumpi, sicut posset etiam Deus corrumpere coelum, seu annihilare Angelum; id autem non satis est, ut res dicatur natura sua corruptibilis." Vid. etiam 1. p. q. 50. a. 5. ad 3.; et q. 75. a. 6. ad 2. 615. Now what is called perpetual by its nature, intrinsically incorruptible, excludes any intrinsic cause of corruption and any created cause by which it can be corrupted. But if it is compared to the uncreated cause, God, one must distinguish between God's ordinary and absolute power. In order that something be called incorruptible by its nature, it is required that it cannot be corrupted by God acting according to his ordinary power; for incorruptibility certainly excludes an intrinsic cause of corruption, and God by ordinary power acts according to the proper nature and exigency of things. But if the question concerns God's absolute power, no creature can be called incorruptible in the sense that it cannot be destroyed or annihilated even by God's absolute power. "In this way," says Suarez (On the Ultimate End of Man, disputation 14, section 2, no. 7), "I grant that the light of glory can be corrupted, just as God could also corrupt heaven or annihilate an Angel; but that is not sufficient for a thing to be called corruptible by its nature." See also I, question 50, article 5, reply 3, and question 75, article 6, reply 2.

616. Beatitudo igitur natura sua perpetua dicitur, quatenus nullam habet intrinsecam corruptionis causam - quatenus nulla est causa creata, a qua corrumpi possit - quatenus nec Deus de potentia ordinaria potest illam corrumpere - quamvis id possit de potentia absoluta. "Si beatitudo hominis vel Angeli," inquit Lessius (de sum. bon. l. 3. c. 9. n. 114.) "comparetur ad Deum, sic haud dubie natura sua est corruptibilis; sicut et omnis creatura, etiam coeli et Angeli. Talis enim est naturae ut a Deo corrumpi et destrui possit: estque haec corruptibilitas illi intrinseca. Hoc modo sancti Patres passim dicunt nullam creaturam natura sua esse incorruptibilem, sed sola Dei voluntate et gratia, qui dignatur illam conservare. Ratio est, quia cum sit ex nihilo, et ex se nihil, assidue pendet ex libero Dei influxu, quo dat illi totum suum esse, et illud assidue conservat: sicut pondus quod quis e terra sursum attraxit, et tenet in aere, assidue pendet a manu tenentis: et sicut imago in speculo pendet ab objecto." 616. Therefore beatitude is called perpetual by its nature insofar as it has no intrinsic cause of corruption; insofar as there is no created cause by which it can be corrupted; and insofar as not even God by ordinary power can corrupt it, although he could do so by absolute power. "If the beatitude of man or Angel," says Lessius (On the Highest Good, book 3, chapter 9, no. 114), "is compared to God, then undoubtedly by its nature it is corruptible, just as every creature is, even the heavens and Angels. For it is of such a nature that it can be corrupted and destroyed by God; and this corruptibility is intrinsic to it. In this way the holy Fathers everywhere say that no creature is incorruptible by its nature, but only by the will and grace of God, who deigns to preserve it. The reason is that, since it is from nothing and of itself nothing, it continually depends on the free influx of God, by which he gives it its whole being and continually preserves it, just as a weight which someone has drawn upward from the ground and holds in the air continually depends on the hand of the one holding it, and just as an image in a mirror depends on the object."

617. Duo ultimo notanda sunt. 1. Supposita divina ordinatione, qua Deus statuit beatitudinem fore sempiternam, et "nostro merito, ut nunc est; non posset Deus etiam de potentia absoluta privare beatum beatitudine et haec est certa securitas beatorum, quia sciunt

non posse Deum esse injustum, nec negare seipsum." Suarez (l. c. sect. 1. n. 6.)

2. Quamvis perpetuitas beatitudinis ab intrinseco magis directe probetur excludendo singulas corruptionis causas, quae, ex dictis, excludendae sunt ut aliquid dicatur natura sua incorruptibile; sufficit tamen ostendere beatitudinem talem esse natura sua, ut postulet perpetuam durationem: ex hoc enim facile deducitur, nec ullam habere intrinsecam corruptionis causam, nec ab ulla creata causa, aut a Deo ipso de potentia ordinaria destrui posse. 617. Two things are to be noted last. 1. Given the divine ordination by which God has established that beatitude will be eternal, and "given our merit, as it now stands, God could not even by absolute power deprive a blessed one of beatitude; and this is the certain security of the blessed, because they know that God cannot be unjust or deny himself." Suarez, same place, section 1, no. 6.

2. Although the perpetuity of beatitude from within is proved more directly by excluding the individual causes of corruption which, from what has been said, must be excluded in order that something be called incorruptible by its nature, nevertheless it suffices to show that beatitude is by its nature such that it demands perpetual duration. For from this it is easily deduced both that it has no intrinsic cause of corruption, and that it cannot be destroyed by any created cause or by God himself according to ordinary power.

618. His positis sciendum est, quod "quidam ausi sunt," inquit Suarez (l. c. sect. 2. n. 2.), "ita loqui, ut dicerent illam beatitudinem esse corruptibilem natura sua. Quae opinio improbabilis omnino est, nam in re nihil potest fere dicere diversum a caeteris auctoribus, et in modo loquendi aliena est a tota antiquitate, et a modo loquendi etiam Scripturae et Sanctorum." 618. These things having been posited, one must know that "some have dared," says Suarez (same place, section 2, no. 2), "to speak in such a way that they said that beatitude is corruptible by its nature. This opinion is altogether improbable, for in reality it can say almost nothing different from the other authors, and in its manner of speaking it is alien to the whole of antiquity and to the manner of speaking even of Scripture and of the Saints."

619. Unde dicimus:

PROP. XLV. Beatitudo perfecta est natura sua et ab intrinseco perpetua.

Prob. I. Argumento D. Thomae 1. 2. q. 5. a. 4., quod sic proponi potest. Beatitudo perfecta natura sua postulat durationem sine fine; ergo est ab intrinseco et natura sua perpetua.

Prob. antec. Beatitudo perfecta est natura sua bonum adaequate satiativum appetitus rationalis; atqui talis non esset natura sua, si natura sua non postularet durationem sine termino. Ergo.

Prob. min. Si natura sua non postularet durationem sine termino, bonum in quo ponitur beatitudo per se amitti posset; atqui si hoc amitti posset, jam beatitudo non esset bonum adaequate satiativum appetitus rationalis. Ergo.

Prob. haec minor. Si bonum illud amitti posset vel 1. Beatus id novit vel 2. ignorat et putat non posse amitti - vel 3. negative se habet, neutrum judicando.

Si 1um, "non potest esse beatus, quia semper erit anxius, et ingenti maerore afficietur, quod amissurus sit tantum bonum. Quo enim plus amat bonum suum quod possidet, eo plus dolet quando cogitat se illud amissurum: sicut patet in illis qui bonum suum collocant in rebus hujus vitae, qui magno moerore afficiuntur dum cogitant de morte, qua omnia ista perdent."

Si 2um, et sic etiam non est beatus; tum quia beatitudo omne malum excludere debet: error autem est malum intellectus; tum quia gaudium ejus principale falso nititur fundamento. "Praecipuum enim gaudium Beatorum nascitur ex eo, quod possessio boni credatur fore sempiterna; sicut praecipua afflictio damnatorum est, quod videant mala sua fore perpetua. Quare si hoc falsum est, fundamentum gaudii falsum est, ac proinde non potest hominem vere beatum efficere: error enim circa ipsum beatitudinis fundamentum maxime repugnat beatitudini."

Si 3um, "In primis id fieri non potest tanto tempore. Magnus enim esset stupor, numquam cogitari an possessio summi boni sit futura aeterna, an temporalis. Deinde eo etiam tempore, quo de neutro cogitaret, non esset perfecte beatus: tum quia non apprehenderet suum bonum ut aeternum, ex qua tamen apprehensione nascitur praecipuum gaudium: tum quia etiam si animus ejus actu non sit inquietus, eo quod non cogitet de amissione futura: tamen inquietudinis et maeroris radicem in se habet, quam simul atque animadvertit, necessario tristabitur, nempe

se posse suum bonum amittere."

Dices: "Ad rationem beatitudinis non requiritur exclusio omnis tristitiae, ut patet in Christo Domino: ergo etiam non requiritur, ut omnis moeror vel timor amittendae beatitudinis excludatur."

Resp. "Etsi ratio beatitudinis non postulet ut actu omnem maerorem excludat, tamen postulat ut bonum illud in quo consistit, ex se sit sufficiens excludere omnem maerorem, adeo ut reipsa id praestiturum sit, nisi divinitus impediatur. Tantum enim est illud bonum, ut carentia aliorum bonorum nihili aestimetur modo ipsum salvum remaneat. Visio vero Dei quae solum ad tempus est duratura, vel quam ipse videns timet amittere, non est sufficiens ut excludat omnem maerorem."

Prob. II. Licet in beatitudine sint visio, amor, gaudium; ita tamen se habent amor et gaudium respectu visionis, ut ab ea pendeant, et ea posita, necessario sequantur. - Visio autem pendet ab intellectu, a lumine gloriae, a divino influxu. - De intellectu, facultate spirituali, nulla hic potest esse quaestio; divinus influxus, de potentia ordinaria, datur secundum rei exigentiam: quaestio reducitur ad lumen gloriae. - Quare si probetur hoc esse ab intrinseco incorruptibile, hoc ipso probatur beatitudinem esse natura sua perpetuam. Unde:

Id dicendum est natura sua incorruptibile, quod nec habet principium intrinsecum corruptionis - nec extrinsecum creatum, seu contrarium - nec potest desinere per suspensionem divini influxus de potentia Dei ordinaria. Atqui tale est lumen gloriae. Ergo.

Prob. min. quoad 1am partem: nullum habet intrinsecum corruptionis principium. Nam a) lumen illud est spirituale, sicut subjectum in quo est (intellectus) est spirituale. - b) Lumen illud est suprema quaedam participatio et imago luminis increati, quo Deus seipsum videt. Unde si Angelicae substantiae, et anima rationalis, cum sint imago Dei, nullum habent intrinsecum corruptionis principium; a fortiori hoc dicendum est de illo lumine.

Prob. min. quoad 2am partem: non habet principium extrinsecum creatum, seu contrarium, a quo corrumpi possit. Nam a) "mens Deo conjuncta (per illud lumen)," inquit D. Th. art. cit., "super omnia alia elevatur; et sic ab hujusmodi conjunctione nullum aliud agens potest ipsam excludere." - b) Quod non habeat contrarium "patet," inquit Suarez (l. c. sect. 2. n. 4.), "quia hoc in universum commune est omni lumini in suo ordine perfecto." - c) Error qui aliquo modo ei repugnat, non potest obesse, quia mens eo ipso quod lumine gloriae illustratur, nullius erroris est capax; "visio enim illa sic perficit subjectum, ut reddat illud omnino incapax erroris sibi contrarii, nec versantur proprie circa idem subjectum, ut idem; quia error respicit subjectum quatenus naturaliter perfici potest aut deficere; visio autem elevat subjectum, et altiori modo perficit secundum capacitatem obedientialem ejus." - Suarez l. c. - d) Quod si loquamur de causa morali corruptionis, haec est solum peccatum: peccatum autem est impossibile in vidente Deum intuitive, ut deinde probabitur.

Prob. min. quoad 3am partem: non potest de potentia ordinaria desinere per suspensionem divini influxus. Influxus enim rerum naturae proportionatus, et hinc debitus nequit de potentia ordinaria auferri; atqui intellectus illustratus lumine gloriae in coelis, non habens ullum intrinsecum aut extrinsecum creatum corruptionis principium, exigit semper esse. Ergo.

Concludimus argumento S. Augustini, quod etiam secundo loco exponit D. Thomas l. c. "Quid enim," inquit (de civ. Dei l. 12. c. 20.), "illa beatitudine falsius, atque fallacius, ubi nos futuros miseros, aut in tanta veritatis luce nesciamus, aut in summa felicitatis arce timeamus? Si enim venturam ibi calamitatem ignoraturi sumus, peritior est hic nostra miseria, ubi venturam beatitudinem novimus. Si autem nos illic clades imminens non latebit, beatius tempora transigit anima misera, quibus transactis ad beatitudinem sublevetur, quam beata, quibus transactis, in miseriam resolvatur. Atque ita spes nostrae infelicitatis est felix, et felicitatis infelix. Unde fit, ut quia hic mala praesentia patimur, ibi metuimus imminentia; verius semper miseri, quam beati aliquando esse possimus."

Vid. Suarez (de ult. fin. hom. disp. 14.) - Lessium (de sum. bon. l. 3. c. 9.) - Sylvium (in cit. art. D. Thomae.) 619. Hence we say:

PROPOSITION XLV. Perfect beatitude is by its nature and intrinsically perpetual.

Proof I. From the argument of St. Thomas, I-II, question 5, article 4, which can be set forth thus. Perfect beatitude by its nature demands duration without end; therefore it is intrinsically and by its nature perpetual.

The antecedent is proved. Perfect beatitude is by its nature a good adequately satisfying the rational appetite; but it would not be such by its nature if by its nature it did not demand duration without terminus. Therefore.

The minor is proved. If by its nature it did not demand

duration without terminus, the good in which beatitude is placed could of itself be lost; but if this could be lost, beatitude would no longer be the good adequately satisfying the rational appetite. Therefore.

This minor is proved. If that good could be lost, either 1. the blessed one knows this, or 2. he is ignorant of it and thinks it cannot be lost, or 3. he stands negatively, judging neither.

If the first, "he cannot be blessed, because he will always be anxious and will be affected with great sorrow that he is going to lose so great a good. For the more he loves the good which he possesses, the more he grieves when he thinks that he is going to lose it, as is clear in those who place their good in the things of this life, who are affected with great sorrow when they think of death, by which they will lose all those things."

If the second, and thus he also is not blessed: both because beatitude must exclude every evil, and error is an evil of the intellect; and because his principal joy rests upon a false foundation. "For the chief joy of the blessed arises from this, that the possession of the good is believed to be eternal, just as the chief affliction of the damned is that they see that their evils will be perpetual. Therefore, if this is false, the foundation of joy is false, and accordingly it cannot make a man truly blessed; for error concerning the very foundation of beatitude is especially repugnant to beatitude."

If the third, "in the first place, this cannot happen for so long a time. For it would be great stupor never to think whether the possession of the highest good is going to be eternal or temporal. Then, even at the time when he would think of neither, he would not be perfectly blessed: both because he would not apprehend his good as eternal, from which apprehension, nevertheless, the principal joy arises; and because even if his soul were not actually restless, because he was not thinking about future loss, nevertheless he would have within himself the root of restlessness and sorrow, which, as soon as he noticed it, would necessarily make him sad, namely that he could lose his good."

You will say: "For the ratio of beatitude, the exclusion of every sadness is not required, as is clear in Christ the Lord; therefore neither is it required that every sorrow or fear of losing beatitude be excluded."

I answer: "Although the ratio of beatitude does not demand that it actually exclude every sorrow, nevertheless it demands that that good in which it consists be of itself sufficient to exclude every sorrow, so that in reality it will accomplish this unless it is divinely impeded. For that good is so great that the lack of other goods is esteemed as nothing, provided that it remains safe. But the vision of God which is going to last only for a time, or which the one seeing fears to lose, is not sufficient to exclude every sorrow."

Proof II. Although in beatitude there are vision, love, and joy, nevertheless love and joy are related to vision in such a way that they depend on it, and once it is posited, they necessarily follow. But vision depends on the intellect, on the light of glory, and on divine influx. Concerning the intellect, a spiritual faculty, there can be no question here; divine influx, by ordinary power, is given according to the exigency of the thing. The question is reduced to the light of glory. Therefore, if it is proved that this is intrinsically incorruptible, by that very fact it is proved that beatitude is by its nature perpetual. Hence:

That must be called incorruptible by its nature which neither has an intrinsic principle of corruption, nor a created extrinsic principle, or contrary, nor can cease through suspension of divine influx by God's ordinary power. But such is the light of glory. Therefore.

The minor is proved with respect to the first part: it has no intrinsic principle of corruption. For a) that light is spiritual, just as the subject in which it exists, the intellect, is spiritual. b) That light is a certain supreme participation and image of the uncreated light by which God sees himself. Hence if Angelic substances and the rational soul, since they are the image of God, have no intrinsic principle of corruption, this must be said a fortiori of that light.

The minor is proved with respect to the second part: it does not have a created extrinsic principle, or contrary, by which it can be corrupted. For a) "the mind joined to God through that light," says St. Thomas in the cited article, "is elevated above all other things; and thus no other agent can exclude it from such conjunction." b) That it has no contrary "is clear," says Suarez (same place, section 2, no. 4), "because this is universally common to every light perfect in its own order." c) Error, which is repugnant to it in some way, cannot harm it, because the mind, by the very fact that it is illumined by the light of glory, is capable of no error; "for that vision so perfects the subject that it renders it altogether incapable of error contrary to itself, nor are they properly concerned with the same subject as the same; because error regards the subject

insofar as it can be naturally perfected or fail, but vision elevates the subject and perfects it in a higher mode according to its obediential capacity." Suarez, same place. d) But if we speak of the moral cause of corruption, this is only sin; and sin is impossible in one seeing God intuitively, as will be proved below.

The minor is proved with respect to the third part: it cannot cease by ordinary power through suspension of divine influx. For an influx proportioned to the nature of things, and hence owed, cannot be taken away by ordinary power; but an intellect illumined by the light of glory in heaven, having no intrinsic or extrinsic created principle of corruption, demands always to be. Therefore.

We conclude with the argument of St. Augustine, which St. Thomas also expounds in the second place in the same article. "For what," he says (City of God, book 12, chapter 20), "could be more false and fallacious than that beatitude in which, in so great a light of truth, we either do not know that we shall be miserable, or in the height of happiness fear it? For if we are going to be ignorant there of the calamity to come, our misery here is more knowing, where we know the beatitude to come. But if the threatening disaster will not be hidden from us there, a miserable soul passes time more blessedly when, after those times have passed, it is lifted up to beatitude, than a blessed soul does when, after those times have passed, it is dissolved into misery. And thus the hope of our unhappiness is happy, and the hope of happiness unhappy. Hence it follows that, because here we suffer present evils, and there we fear imminent ones, we can more truly always be miserable than ever be blessed."

See Suarez (On the Ultimate End of Man, disputation 14), Lessius (On the Highest Good, book 3, chapter 9), and Sylvius on the cited article of St. Thomas.

Article 3. Whether, and by what Reason, the Blessed are Rendered Impeccable

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620. Doctrina catholica est, in beatis non posse esse culpam. "Firmissime tene," inquit S. Fulgentius (de fide ad Petrum), "et nullatenus dubites, omnem creaturam naturaliter mutabilem a Deo incommutabilem factam; nec tamen posse quemlibet sanctorum Angelorum in deterius mutari: quia sic acceperunt aeternam beatitudinem qua Deo stabiliter fruuntur, ut ea carere non possint." 620. It is Catholic doctrine that fault cannot exist in the blessed. "Hold most firmly," says St. Fulgentius (On Faith to Peter), "and in no way doubt that every creature, naturally mutable, was made immutable by God; and yet that no one of the holy Angels can be changed for the worse, because they received eternal beatitude, by which they stably enjoy God, in such a way that they cannot lack it."

621. Dupliciter autem contrarius error intelligi potest: primo, quod manente in Beatis beatitudine, possit in eis simul esse culpa. Secundo, quod possint quidem Beati peccare, ita tamen ut statim peccando beatitudinem amittant: et in hoc posteriori sensu videtur errasse Origenes." 621. But the contrary error can be understood in two ways: first, that while beatitude remains in the Blessed, fault could simultaneously exist in them; second, that the Blessed could indeed sin, yet in such a way that by sinning they would immediately lose beatitude. And in this latter sense Origen seems to have erred."

622. In primo sensu error facile refutatur. Nam a) Scriptura testatur neminem peccato inquinatum posse ingredi coelum; multo minus ergo postquam aliquis coelum ingressus est, si peccaverit, poterit ibi manere. Imo Scriptura directe peccatum quodcumque a beatitudine excludit. Ps. 14. vv. 1. 2.: "Domine quis habitabit in tabernaculo tuo, aut quis requiescet in monte sancto tuo?" Respondet v. 2. "Qui ingreditur sine macula, et operatur justitiam, etc." Hebr. 12. 14. "Pacem sequimini cum omnibus, et sanctimoniam, sine qua nemo videbit Deum." Apoc. 22. 3. 4.: "Et omne maledictum non erit amplius: sed sedes Dei, et Agni in illa erunt, et servi ejus servient ei; et videbunt faciem ejus." Ps. 139.: "Habitabunt recti cum vultu tuo." - b) "Beatitudo consummata est status omnium bonorum

aggregatione perfectus, et ideo ab illo excluditur omne malum, et praecipue culpae. Tandem culpa, si sit mortalis, privat amicitia divina: si vero venialis, privat perfecta dilectione actuali, efficitque dignum poena: haec autem omnia repugnant statui beatitudinis." 622. In the first sense the error is easily refuted. For a) Scripture testifies that no one stained by sin can enter heaven; much less, therefore, after someone has entered heaven, if he should sin, will he be able to remain there. Indeed Scripture directly excludes any sin whatever from beatitude. Psalm 14, verses 1 and 2: "Lord, who shall dwell in your tabernacle, or who shall rest on your holy mountain?" Verse 2 responds: "He who enters without stain and works justice, etc." Hebrews 12:14: "Follow peace with all, and holiness, without which no one will see God." Apocalypse 22:3-4: "And every curse shall be no more; but the throne of God and of the Lamb shall be in it, and his servants shall serve him, and they shall see his face." Psalm 139: "The upright shall dwell with your countenance." b) "Consummate beatitude is a state perfected by the aggregation of all goods, and therefore every evil, and especially the evil of fault, is excluded from it. Finally, fault, if it is mortal, deprives one of divine friendship; but if venial, deprives one of perfect actual love and makes one worthy of punishment. But all these things are repugnant to the state of beatitude."

623. Ut vero error in secundo sensu refutetur, et simul vera doctrina contraria plene et breviter exponatur, possumus hic distinguere tres quaestiones. Utrum de facto beati fiant impeccabiles, et ita numquam possint beatitudinem amittere. Utrum fiant impeccabiles ab intrinseco - quaenam sit vera radix hujus impeccabilitatis. 623. But in order that the error in the second sense be refuted, and at the same time the true contrary doctrine be fully and briefly explained, we can here distinguish three questions: whether in fact the blessed become impeccable, and thus can never lose beatitude; whether they become impeccable intrinsically; and what is the true root of this impeccability.

624. De prima quaestione vix necesse est aliquid dicere, cum jam probatum sit in art. praec., beatitudinem esse ab intrinseco perpetuam. Si quid autem utile additur, illud in solutione secundae quaestionis tradetur: si enim ibi ostenditur beatos esse ab intrinseco impeccabiles, hoc ipso ostenditur eos esse impeccabiles. 624. Concerning the first question, it is scarcely necessary to say anything, since it has already been proved in the preceding article that beatitude is intrinsically perpetual. But if anything useful is added, it will be handed down in the solution of the second question; for if it is shown there that the blessed are intrinsically impeccable, by that very fact it is shown that they are impeccable.

625. Quoad secundam igitur quaestionem, notandum est imprimis cum D. Thoma q. 24. de ver. a. 9., quod "aliquis potest confirmari in bono dupliciter. Uno modo simpliciter, ita scilicet, quod habeat in se sufficiens suae firmitatis principium, quod omnino peccare non possit; et sic Beati sunt confirmati in bono ratione prius dicta. Alio modo dicuntur aliqui confirmati in bono per hoc, quod eis datur aliquod munus gratiae, quo ita inclinantur in bonum, quod non de facili possunt a bono deficere; non tamen per hoc ita retrahuntur a malo, quin omnino peccare non possint, nisi divina providentia custodiente ... et hoc modo aliqui in statu viae possunt confirmari in bono, et non primo." 625. Therefore, with respect to the second question, it must first be noted with St. Thomas, On Truth, question 24, article 9, that "someone can be confirmed in good in two ways. In one way simply, namely so that he has in himself a sufficient principle of his firmness, by which he cannot sin at all; and thus the Blessed are confirmed in good by the reason stated earlier. In another way some are said to be confirmed in good through the fact that some gift of grace is given to them, by which they are so inclined toward good that they cannot easily fall away from good; yet through this they are not so withdrawn from evil that they cannot sin at all, except by divine

providence preserving them ... and in this way some in the state of the way can be confirmed in good, and not in the first way."

626. Sententia D. Thomae verior est, et communissima, non habet enim nisi paucos contradictores, quos refert Suarez (de ult. fin. hom. disp. 10. sect. 1. n. 4.) Principium autem firmitatis intrinsecum duplex distingui potest: principium quod, et quo. Primum est persona; et ratione talis principii Christus Dominus est impeccabilis ab intrinseco: nam cum ejus persona sit divina, non potest influere in operationem quae sit offensa Dei. Alterum est forma, qua operatur persona: anima rationalis (principium quo remotum); intellectus et voluntas (principium quo proximum). Ut ergo aliqua creatura fiat ab intrinseco impeccabilis secundum principium quo, oportet ut in alterutra, vel in utraque praedicta facultate intrinsece ponatur aliqua forma eas ita rectificans, ut non possint deficere peccando. Et hoc sensu dicuntur beati habere intrinsecum principium impeccabilitatis, et esse ab intrinseco impeccabiles. 626. The opinion of St. Thomas is truer and very common, for it has only a few contradictors, whom Suarez reports (On the Ultimate End of Man, disputation 10, section 1, no. 4). Now a twofold intrinsic principle of firmness can be distinguished: the principle which acts, and the principle by which it acts. The first is the person; and by reason of such a principle Christ the Lord is intrinsically impeccable, for since his person is divine, it cannot influence an operation which would be an offense against God. The other is the form by which the person operates: the rational soul, the remote principle by which, and the intellect and will, the proximate principle by which. Therefore, in order that some creature become intrinsically impeccable according to the principle by which, it is necessary that in one or the other, or in both, of the aforesaid faculties, some form be intrinsically placed, rectifying them in such a way that they cannot fail by sinning. And in this sense the blessed are said to have an intrinsic principle of impeccability and to be intrinsically impeccable.

627. Sed jam quaeritur, quaenam sit illa intrinseca forma addita intellectui vel voluntati beatorum, qua fiunt impeccabiles: est tertia proposita quaestio, de radice hujus impeccabilitatis. Qua in re sciendum est, quod juxta aliquos radix impeccabilitatis est visio intuitiva, non ut est visio solius Dei, sed quatenus per illam videt beatus in Verbo omnes res et actiones ad se pertinentes, et omnes circumstantias, quae possunt voluntatem rectam efficere, et ad malum inclinare. Alii autem dicunt visionem quidem Dei praecise quatenus summum bonum est, esse sufficientem ad hanc impeccabilitatem, non tamen immediate per seipsum, sed mediante amore: itaque visio necessitat ad amandum, et amor ad non peccandum, et hoc modo visio est tota radix hujus impeccabilitatis. - Alii denique tenent "ipsam visionem per se ratione sui objecti, nempe summae bonitatis divinae, esse sufficiens principium ad excludendum omne peccatum, et potestatem peccandi." Unde si contingat Deum suspendere concursum ad actum amoris manente visione, haec satis est ad necessario cavendum omne peccatum. 627. But now it is asked what that intrinsic form is, added to the intellect or will of the blessed, by which they become impeccable. This is the third proposed question, concerning the root of this impeccability. In this matter it must be known that according to some, the root of impeccability is the intuitive vision, not as it is the vision of God alone, but insofar as through it the blessed one sees in the Word all things and actions pertaining to himself, and all circumstances which can make the will right and incline it to evil. But others say that the vision of God precisely insofar as he is the highest good is indeed sufficient for this impeccability, yet not immediately through itself, but by means of love. Thus vision necessitates one to love, and love necessitates one not to sin, and in this way vision is the whole root of this impeccability. Finally, others hold that "the vision itself, by itself by reason of its object, namely of the highest divine goodness, is a sufficient principle for excluding every sin and the power of sinning." Hence if it should happen that God suspended concurrence for the act of love while vision remained, this vision is sufficient for necessarily avoiding every sin.

628. D. Thomas in diversis locis, quae accurate recenset Suarez, probans beatos esse impeccabiles, plures affert rationes, in quibus modo unam modo aliam ex praedictis tribus sententiis tradere videtur. - Ut ejus mens, quae verissima est, intelligatur; notamus quod unaquaeque ex tribus radicibus impeccabilitatis, juxta tres relatas sententias, potest assignari vel solum ut sufficiens, vel etiam ut excludens caeteras: primo modo defendi possunt illae sententiae; minime vero secundo modo. Si autem tum visio Dei prout est visio solius Dei, tum visio Dei prout est etiam visio eorum quae possunt rectam facere voluntatem, tum amor Dei assignantur ut intrinseca impeccabilitatis principia; patet, quod radix caeterorum sit visio Dei prout est visio solius Dei, ex ea enim oritur et visio aliorum objectorum, et amor Dei. Itaque D. Thomas assignat tres illas impeccabilitatis radices ut sufficientes, sed unam assignando non excludit alias, quamvis primariam esse dicat visionem Dei solius. 628. St. Thomas, in various places which Suarez accurately reviews, when proving that the blessed are impeccable, brings forward several reasons, in which he seems now to hand down one, now another, of the three aforesaid opinions. In order that his mind, which is very true, may be understood, we note that each of the three roots of impeccability, according to the three related opinions, can be assigned either only as sufficient, or also as excluding the others. In the first way those opinions can be defended, but by no means in the second way. But if both the vision of God insofar as it is the vision of God alone, and the vision of God insofar as it is also the vision of those things which can make the will right, and the love of God are assigned as intrinsic principles of impeccability, it is clear that the root of the others is the vision of God insofar as it is the vision of God alone; for from it arise both the vision of other objects and the love of God. Therefore St. Thomas assigns those three roots of impeccability as sufficient, but in assigning one he does not exclude the others, although he says that the vision of God alone is primary.

629. Ex argumentis, quae allaturi sumus pro thesi mox statuenda, dum diversae impeccabilitatis radices ostenduntur - ostenditur simul impeccabilitatem in Beatis esse ab intrinseco - et factum ipsum impeccabilitatis demonstratur. Quae omnia simul complectimur, ut necessariae brevitatis habeatur ratio. 629. From the arguments which we are going to bring forward for the thesis soon to be established, while the different roots of impeccability are shown, it is at the same time shown that impeccability in the Blessed is intrinsic, and the very fact of impeccability is demonstrated. We include all these things together, so that account may be taken of necessary brevity.

630. Dicimus igitur:

PROP. XLVI. Beati in coelis constituuntur ab intrinseco impeccabiles.

Prob. I. Visio, qua beati vident non solum Deum, sed in eo res, actiones et circumstantias ad se pertinentes, quae voluntatem rectificant, est quid intrinsecum beatis. Atqui hujusmodi visio facit beatos impeccabiles. Ergo.

Prob. min. Ex D. Thoma, qui (c. g. l. 4. c. 92.) ait: "peccatum in voluntate non accidit sine aliquali ignorantia intellectus; nihil enim volumus, nisi bonum verum, vel apparens. Propter quod dicitur Proverb. 14. 'Errant, qui operantur malum.' Et Philosophus 3. Ethicorum dicit, quod, 'omnis malus est ignorans:' sed anima, quae est vere beata, nullo modo potest esse ignorans, cum in Deo omnia videat, quae pertinent ad suam perfectionem; nullo igitur modo potest malam voluntatem habere, praecipue cum illa Dei visio semper sit in actu." - Et (de ver. q. 24. a. 8.): "divinam essentiam videntes cognoscent, ipsum Deum esse finem maxime amandum: cognoscent etiam omnia, quae ei uniunt, vel quae ab eo disjungunt in particulari, cognoscentes Deum non solum in se, sed ut est ratio aliorum. Et hac cognitionis claritate in tantum mens roborabitur, quod in inferioribus viribus nullus motus insurgere poterit, nisi secundum regulam rationis." Sed de vi hujus argumenti vid. Suarez (de ult. fin. hom. disp. 10. sect. 1. nn. 6-8.)

Prob. II. Amor charitatis, quo beati diligunt Deum, est illis intrinsecus. Atqui amor ille facit beatos impeccabiles. Ergo.

Prob. min. a) Ex Patribus. S. Greg. (Mor. l. 5. c. 27.), ait: "Ecce qui serviunt ei non sunt stabiles: Angelica natura ex semetipsa mutabilis est, quam mutabilitatem vincit per hoc, quod ei, qui semper idem est, vinculis amoris colligatur." S. Augustinus

(de Gen. ad litt. l. 2. c. 36.): "Sancti Angeli illam incommutabilitatis substantiam ita concipiunt, ut visione, atque amore eam praeponant omnibus, et secundum eam judicent de omnibus, et in eam dirigantur ut agantur, et ex ea dirigant quidquid agant." - Et (de civ. Dei l. 14. c. 9.): "Ubi amor boni immutabilis est, profecto si dici potest mali cavendi timor securus est." Alia Patrum testimonia indicat Suarez (l. c. n. 10.)

Prob. min. b) D. Thomas (c. g. l. 4. c. 70.) ait: "ex hoc voluntas immutabilis redditur quod totaliter impletur, ita quod non habet quo divertat ab eo in quo est firmata; impletio autem voluntatis non competit homini nisi ut finem ultimum attingenti." Quam rationem pluribus illustrat Lessius (de sum. bon. l. 2. c. 22.) Ita, ex. gr., n. 175. ait: "Bonum quo majus est, eo magis trahit voluntatem in sui amorem, si clare cognoscatur, ut experientia docet. Qui enim amat honores, longe aliter trahitur proposita dignitate regia, quam magistratu unius oppiduli: qui opes, longe aliter afficitur lucro centum millium, quam decem assium. Imo bonum terrenum, quando videtur ingens, ita mentem trahit, ut vix sui sit compos, nec possit se ab ejus amore cohibere. Si ergo bonum sit infinitum, in quo tota boni plenitudo contineatur, infinite illam trahet; ita ut nullo modo possit resistere, quantumvis sit perfecta et sublimis, sive (quod idem est) ut non possit impetum amoris, quo in illud fertur, cohibere." - Addit Suarez ex D. Thoma (c. g. l. 4. c. 92.): "Cuicumque sufficit quod habet, non quaerit aliquid extra illud: sed videnti Deum sufficit Deus, et hoc videtur per ipsam visionem alioqui per illam non fieret beatus: ergo nihil potest velle extra Deum, id est, quod non sit Deus, vel ad Deum non pertineat, ac sit referibile in ipsum. Ac fere in idem redit quod in tertia ratione ibidem ait, Deum necessario videri sub ratione boni completi, in quo appetitus conquiescit."

Prob. III. Visio Divinae essentiae, seu solius Dei, est beatis intrinseca. Atqui haec visio facit illos ab intrinseco impeccabiles. Ergo.

Prob. min. a) "Per illam visionem," inquit Suarez (l. c. n. 17.), "in tanta aestimatione et pretio habetur Deus, et bonitas ejus, ut judicetur esse bonum omnibus praeferendum, nihilque esse amandum, quod ab illo faciat quoquo modo avertere voluntatem, quodque non sit conforme et consentaneum illi: et hoc significavit Anselmus supra, dicens Angelos beatos non posse peccare, quia vident nihil plus velle posse, quam id, quod sunt adepti."

b) "Illud bonum adeptum divinum, et visio ejus, tanta efficacia convertere ad se totam animam, et attentionem ejus, ut ex vi illius numquam possint converti ad volendum aliquid, quod non sit prius regulatum ab eis cum divina bonitate, an sit illud consentaneum sibi, necne, quia ut dixit Augustinus, tractans illud psalm. 35.: 'Inebriabuntur ab ubertate domus tuae,' cum accepta fuerit illa ineffabilis visio, perit quodammodo humana mens, et fit divina: atque ita inebriatur ab ubertate domus Dei, et ideo in omnibus quae amat, respicit Deum ipsum, et confert quidquid amandum est cum bonitate ejus, ut illud tantum amet, quod est illi consentaneum."

Prob. IV. Ut melius innotescat visionem Dei non solum mediante charitate actuali esse radicem impeccabilitatis, sed etiam per seipsam, dicimus: licet daremus Deum alicui concedere lumen gloriae et visionem intuitivam, non vero amorem, quatenus, ex. gr., suspenderet influxum necessarium ad illum; non posset tamen concedere visionem sine exigentia amoris et necessarii ad illum influxus. Atqui posita visione cum hac exigentia, sed sine actuali charitate, adhuc Beati essent impeccabiles. Ergo.

Prob. maj. Nec de potentia absoluta potest Deus rem facere sine ejus essentia: nequit, ex. gr., hominem creare, quin ei det essentiam hominis. Atqui exigentia amoris Dei pertinet ad essentiam visionis intuitivae, sicut exigentia visionis intuitivae pertinet ad essentiam gratiae sanctificantis: eorum enim quae sunt alicui debita est aliqua exigentia, quae in eo non est quid realiter distinctum ab ipsa ejus essentia. Ergo.

Prob. min. Certum est apud omnes quod cum actuali amore Dei nequit consistere peccatum. Unde: quando subjectum exigit aliquid, si in eo inveniatur oppositum, hoc non ipsi, sed agenti extrinseco tribuitur; sicut si ignis, qui exigit calefacere, frigefaciat, hoc non tribuitur igni: et idem dicendum de iis omnibus, quae per miraculum contingunt, et quae tribuuntur Deo agenti praeter exigentiam naturae. Cum ergo in eo, qui habet lumen gloriae et visionem Dei intuitivam, sit exigentia amoris Dei actualis, si hic impediatur, et sic sequatur peccatum, peccatum est tribuendum ipsi Deo: quod omnino repugnat. Vid. Suarez (l. c. n. 21.) 630. Therefore we say:

PROPOSITION XLVI. The Blessed in heaven are constituted intrinsically impeccable.

Proof I. The vision by which the blessed see not only God, but in him the things, actions, and circumstances pertaining to themselves which rectify the will, is

something intrinsic to the blessed. But vision of this kind makes the blessed impeccable. Therefore.

The minor is proved from St. Thomas, who says (Contra Gentiles, book 4, chapter 92): "Sin in the will does not occur without some ignorance of the intellect; for we will nothing except true or apparent good. On account of this Proverbs 14 says, 'They err who work evil.' And the Philosopher says in book 3 of the Ethics that 'every evil man is ignorant.' But the soul which is truly blessed can in no way be ignorant, since it sees in God all things which pertain to its perfection. Therefore in no way can it have an evil will, especially since that vision of God is always in act." And in On Truth, question 24, article 8: "Those seeing the divine essence will know that God himself is the end to be loved most of all. They will also know in particular all things which unite to him or separate from him, knowing God not only in himself but as he is the ratio of other things. And by this clarity of knowledge the mind will be strengthened so greatly that in the lower powers no movement will be able to arise except according to the rule of reason." But on the force of this argument see Suarez (On the Ultimate End of Man, disputation 10, section 1, nos. 6-8).

Proof II. The love of charity by which the blessed love God is intrinsic to them. But that love makes the blessed impeccable. Therefore.

The minor is proved. a) From the Fathers. St. Gregory (Moralia, book 5, chapter 27) says: "Behold, those who serve him are not stable: Angelic nature is mutable from itself, and it conquers this mutability through the fact that it is bound by the bonds of love to him who is always the same." St. Augustine (On Genesis Literally, book 2, chapter 36): "The holy Angels so receive that substance of immutability by vision and love that they prefer it to all things, and according to it they judge concerning all things, and toward it they are directed so as to be acted, and from it they direct whatever they do." And (City of God, book 14, chapter 9): "Where the love of immutable good is, surely, if it can be so called, the fear of avoiding evil is secure." Suarez indicates other testimonies of the Fathers in the same place, no. 10.

The minor is proved. b) St. Thomas (Contra Gentiles, book 4, chapter 70) says: "From this the will is rendered immutable, that it is totally filled, so that it has nowhere to turn aside from that in which it has been made firm; but the filling of the will does not belong to man except as attaining the last end." Lessius illustrates this argument at greater length (On the Highest Good, book 2, chapter 22). Thus, for example, no. 175, he says: "The greater a good is, the more it draws the will into love of itself, if it is clearly known, as experience teaches. For one who loves honors is drawn very differently when a royal dignity is proposed than by the magistracy of one small town; one who loves wealth is affected very differently by a gain of one hundred thousand than by ten pennies. Indeed an earthly good, when it seems immense, so draws the mind that it is scarcely master of itself and cannot restrain itself from love of it. Therefore if the good is infinite, in which the whole fullness of good is contained, it will draw it infinitely, so that it can in no way resist, however perfect and sublime it may be; or, what is the same, so that it cannot restrain the impulse of love by which it is borne into it." Suarez adds from St. Thomas (Contra Gentiles, book 4, chapter 92): "Whoever is satisfied by what he has does not seek something outside it; but God suffices for one seeing God, and this is seen through the vision itself, otherwise he would not be made blessed through it. Therefore he can will nothing outside God, that is, nothing which is not God, or which does not pertain to God and is not referable to him. And almost to the same point returns what he says there in the third argument, that God is necessarily seen under the ratio of complete good, in which the appetite rests."

Proof III. The vision of the divine essence, or of God alone, is intrinsic to the blessed. But this vision makes them intrinsically impeccable. Therefore.

The minor is proved. a) "Through that vision," says Suarez (same place, no. 17), "God and his goodness are held in such great estimation and value that he is judged to be the good to be preferred to all things, and that nothing is to be loved which would in any way cause the will to be turned away from him, and which would not be conformed and fitting to him. And Anselm signified this above, saying that the blessed Angels cannot sin because they see that nothing more can be willed than that which they have attained."

b) "That divine good attained, and the vision of it, convert the whole soul and its attention to itself with such efficacy that, by force of it, they can never be turned toward willing something

which has not first been regulated by them with divine goodness, whether that thing is fitting to it or not. For, as Augustine said when treating that Psalm 35, 'They shall be inebriated from the abundance of your house,' when that ineffable vision has been received, the human mind in some way perishes and becomes divine; and thus it is inebriated from the abundance of the house of God, and therefore in all things which it loves, it looks to God himself and compares whatever is to be loved with his goodness, so that it loves only that which is fitting to him."

Proof IV. In order that it may be better known that the vision of God is the root of impeccability not only by means of actual charity, but also through itself, we say: even if we were to grant that God gives someone the light of glory and intuitive vision, but not love, insofar as, for example, he suspended the influx necessary for it, nevertheless he could not grant vision without the exigency of love and of the influx necessary for it. But with vision posited along with this exigency, yet without actual charity, the Blessed would still be impeccable. Therefore.

The major is proved. Not even by absolute power can God make a thing without its essence; for example, he cannot create a man without giving him the essence of man. But the exigency of the love of God pertains to the essence of intuitive vision, just as the exigency of intuitive vision pertains to the essence of sanctifying grace; for of those things which are owed to something, there is some exigency, which in it is not something really distinct from its very essence. Therefore.

The minor is proved. It is certain among all that sin cannot consist together with actual love of God. Hence, when a subject demands something, if the opposite is found in it, this is attributed not to the subject itself, but to an extrinsic agent; just as if fire, which demands to heat, should make cold, this is not attributed to fire. And the same must be said concerning all those things which happen through miracle and which are attributed to God acting beyond the exigency of nature. Therefore, since in one who has the light of glory and the intuitive vision of God there is the exigency of actual love of God, if this is impeded and sin thus follows, the sin must be attributed to God himself, which is altogether repugnant. See Suarez, same place, no. 21.

Article 4. On the Dowries of the Souls of the Blessed - on Accidental Beatitude - and on Aureoles

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631. Quaeritur 1. quid hic veniat nomine dotis. Metaphora hujus vocis (dos) interdum habet generalem et absolutam significationem, quomodo quaelibet perfectio, et ornamentum viae dicitur dos ejus: sic enim qui pollet ingenio, etc., dici solet ornatus magnis dotibus. Interdum vero sumitur haec vox ex speciali metaphora matrimonii, id enim quod datur sponsae in matrimonio ad sustentanda illius onera, solet dotis nomine appellari, et hinc translata est metaphora ad animam beatam, ut D. Thomas, in 4. dist. 49. art. 1., et ibi caeteri theologi, et habet fundamentum in Scriptura sacra, nam unio animae cum Deo per charitatem, et justitiam desponsatio dicitur, 2. Cor. 11.: "Despondi enim vos uni viro virginem castam exhibere Christo," et Ephes. 6.: "Sacramentum hoc magnum est, ego autem dico in Christo et Ecclesia." 631. It is asked, 1. what is meant here by the name of dowry. The metaphor of this word, dowry, sometimes has a general and absolute signification, in the way that any perfection and ornament of the way is called its dowry. Thus one who excels in talent, etc., is customarily said to be adorned with great endowments. But sometimes this word is taken from the special metaphor of marriage; for that which is given to the bride in marriage for sustaining its burdens is customarily called by the name of dowry. And from here the metaphor has been transferred to the blessed soul, as St. Thomas says in book 4, distinction 49, article 1, and the other theologians there; and it has its foundation in Sacred Scripture, for the union of the soul with God through charity and justice is called espousal, 2 Corinthians 11: "For I espoused you to one husband, to present you as a chaste virgin to Christ," and Ephesians 6: "This is a great sacrament, but I speak in Christ and in the Church."

632. Quamvis autem spirituale connubium animae cum Christo sponso contrahatur etiam in hac vita juxta illud Oseae 2. 20.: "Sponsabo te mihi in fide;" attamen "dotes," inquit D. Thomas sup. q. 95. a. 1. ad 4., "non consueverunt assignari sponsae, quando desponsatur, sed quando in domum sponsi traducitur, ut praesentialiter sponsum habeat. Quamdiu autem in hac vita sumus, peregrinamur a Domino; Corinth. 5. 6. Et ideo dona quae sanctis in hac vita conferuntur, non dicuntur dotes, sed illa quae conferuntur eis, quando transferuntur ad gloriam, in qua sponso praesentialiter perfruuntur."

Revera "spirituale matrimonium in statu viae, quantum est ex vi ejus non est omnino indissolubile, in patria vero fit omnino irrevocabile, et tunc proprie traducitur sponsa in domum sponsi. Et ideo theologi hanc metaphoram prosequentes addiderunt, tunc specialiter dotari, et ornari vel a Deo, ut a patre, vel a Christo, ut a sponso, non ad sustinenda onera illius matrimonii, quae nulla sunt, sed ut condigne fruatur illo statu, de quo Apocal. 21. dicitur: 'Vidi civitatem sanctam Jerusalem novam sicut sponsam ornatam viro suo.'" 632. Now although the spiritual marriage of the soul with Christ the bridegroom is contracted also in this life according to that saying of Hosea 2:20, "I shall espouse you to myself in faith," nevertheless, says St. Thomas above, question 95, article 1, reply 4, "dowries are not customarily assigned to the bride when she is espoused, but when she is brought into the house of the bridegroom, so that she may have the bridegroom presently. But as long as we are in this life, we are pilgrims from the Lord, 2 Corinthians 5:6. And therefore the gifts which are conferred on the saints in this life are not called dowries, but those which are conferred on them when they are transferred to glory, in which they enjoy the bridegroom presently."

In reality, "spiritual marriage in the state of the way, as far as its own force is concerned, is not altogether indissoluble; but in the fatherland it becomes altogether irrevocable, and then the bride is properly brought into the house of the bridegroom. And therefore theologians, following out this metaphor, have added that then she is specially dowered and adorned either by God as by father, or by Christ as by bridegroom, not for sustaining the burdens of that marriage, which are none, but so that she may fittingly enjoy that state concerning which Apocalypse 21 says: 'I saw the holy city, the new Jerusalem, like a bride adorned for her husband.'"

633. Quaer. 2. quid sint dotes in anima beata. Quamvis aliqui putaverint eas consistere in aliquibus operationibus (vid. Suarez l. c. disp. 11. sect. 1. nn. 3. 4.); retinenda tamen videtur sententia D. Thomae, qui (4. sent. dist. 49. q. 4. a. 2.) docet: Dicendum, quod beatitudo et dos etiam realiter differunt; ut beatitudo dicatur ipsa operatio perfecta, qua anima beata Deo conjungitur: sed dotes dicuntur habitus, vel dispositiones, vel quaecumque aliae qualitates, quae ordinantur ad hujusmodi perfectam operationem; ut sic dotes ordinentur ad beatitudinem magis, quam sint in beatitudine, ut partes ipsius." Et ibidem ad 2. "Dotes," inquit, "sunt dona disponentia ad hujusmodi conjunctionem."

Revera dos non "significat usum aliquem, sed facultatem ad utendum: ergo in anima beata dos non significat operationem, quae est per modum usus, sed dispositionem, vel facultatem, quae datur ad bonum usum: sicut etiam in corporibus gloriosis dicuntur futurae dotes, quae non sunt operationes, sed qualitates, vel facultates, quibus corpus illud est aptum ad operationem, vel in se recte dispositum." 633. Question 2: what are the dowries in the blessed soul? Although some have thought that they consist in certain operations - see Suarez, same place, disputation 11, section 1, nos. 3 and 4 - nevertheless the opinion of St. Thomas seems to be retained. He teaches in 4 Sentences, distinction 49, question 4, article 2: It must be said that beatitude and dowry differ even really, so that beatitude is called the perfect operation itself by which the blessed soul is joined to God, but the dowries are called habits, dispositions, or whatever other qualities are ordered to this kind of perfect operation; so that the dowries are ordered to beatitude more than they are in beatitude as parts of it." And in the same place, reply 2, he says: "Dowries are gifts disposing to this kind of conjunction."

In reality, dowry does not "signify some use, but the faculty for using; therefore in the blessed soul, dowry does not signify operation, which is by way of use, but a disposition or faculty which

is given for good use. So also in glorious bodies there are said to be future dowries, which are not operations, but qualities or faculties by which that body is apt for operation or rightly disposed in itself."

634. Quaer. 3. quot, et quaenam sint dotes animae beatae. "Omnes Theologi conveniunt in ternario numero, solum propter quamdam perfectionem et analogiam, quia hae dotes correspondent virtutibus Theologicis viae, quae sunt tres.

Licet autem inter Theologos, alii alias enumerent dotes; communior tamen sententia cum D. Thoma tenet eas esse visionem, comprehensionem, delectationem seu fruitionem. "Comprehensio largius sumitur," inquit 1. p. q. 12. a. 7. ad 1., "secundum quod comprehensio insecutioni opponitur: qui enim attingit aliquem, quando jam tenet ipsum, comprehendere eum dicitur. Et sic Deus comprehenditur a beatis, secundum illud Cant. 3. 4.: 'Tenui eum, nec dimittam,' et sic intelliguntur auctoritates Apostoli de comprehensione; et hoc modo comprehensio est una de tribus dotibus animae, quae respondet spei, sicut visio fidei, et fruitio charitati. Non enim apud nos omne quod videtur, jam tenetur vel habetur, quia videntur interdum distantia, vel quae non sunt in potestate nostra. Neque iterum omnibus quae habemus fruimur, vel quia non delectamur in eis, vel quia non sunt ultimus finis desiderii nostri, ut desiderium nostrum impleant, et quietent. Sed haec tria habent beati in Deo; quia et vident ipsum, et videndo tenent sibi praesentem, in potestate habentes semper eum videre, et fruuntur, sicut ultimo fine desiderium implente." 634. Question 3: how many, and what, are the dowries of the blessed soul? "All Theologians agree on the ternary number, only because of a certain perfection and analogy, because these dowries correspond to the Theological virtues of the way, which are three.

But although among Theologians some enumerate some dowries, others others, the more common opinion with St. Thomas holds that they are vision, comprehension, and delight or fruition. "Comprehension is taken more broadly," he says in I, question 12, article 7, reply 1, "insofar as comprehension is opposed to pursuit; for one who attains someone, when he already holds him, is said to comprehend him. And thus God is comprehended by the blessed, according to that saying of Canticles 3:4: 'I held him, and I will not let him go'; and thus are understood the authorities of the Apostle concerning comprehension. And in this way comprehension is one of the three dowries of the soul, which corresponds to hope, just as vision corresponds to faith, and fruition to charity. For among us, not everything that is seen is already held or possessed, because sometimes things are seen at a distance, or things which are not in our power. Nor again do we enjoy all things which we have, either because we are not delighted in them, or because they are not the last end of our desire, so as to fill and quiet our desire. But the blessed have these three things in God, because they both see him, and by seeing hold him present to themselves, having it always in their power to see him, and they enjoy him as the last end filling desire."

635. Ex his sequitur 1., quod dos visionis est lumen gloriae, prout fungitur munere disponendi et clarificandi intellectum, ut non sit capax ullius obscuritatis, sed evidentiae et claritatis - dos comprehensionis est ipsum lumen gloriae, prout est removens impedimenta, ex quibus efficiebatur, ut mens non posset Deo immediate uniri - dos fruitionis est vel idem lumen gloriae prout conjunctum est cum habitu charitatis, vel habitus charitatis prout conjunctus cum lumine gloriae disponit subjectum ad fruendum Deo.

Sequitur 2., quod alia dona collata Beatis, uti dona Spiritus Sancti, gratiae gratis datae, revelationes, etc. non habent rationem dotis: dos enim est aliquid veluti disponens et habilitans ad perfectum connubium; illa vero dona consequuntur connubium. - Nec gratia et charitas numerantur inter dotes, tum quia per se abstrahunt a statu viae, vel termini; tum quia in iis consistit substantiale vinculum spiritualis connubii animae cum Deo: perficitur enim vinculum matrimonii mutuo consensu.

Sequitur 3., quod etsi visio, comprehensio, delectatio sint, uti patet, in Christo et in Angelis; non habent tamen rationem dotis. Nam si in Christo consideretur unio naturarum, non habet proprie rationem desponsationis, quae solet esse inter personas distinctas, et ejusdem naturae specificae; si vero consideretur unio inter Verbum, et humanitatem, est etiam alterius ordinis, et non est etiam ibi similitudo in natura; atque eadem ratione non dicuntur Angeli proprie desponsari Deo ut Deo, neque Christo ut homini,

quia non sunt ejusdem naturae.

§ II.

De beatitudine actuali, et de aureolis. 635. From these things it follows, 1. that the dowry of vision is the light of glory insofar as it performs the office of disposing and clarifying the intellect, so that it is not capable of any obscurity, but of evidence and clarity; the dowry of comprehension is the light of glory itself insofar as it removes the impediments from which it had come about that the mind could not be immediately united to God; the dowry of fruition is either the same light of glory insofar as it is joined with the habit of charity, or the habit of charity insofar as, joined with the light of glory, it disposes the subject to enjoying God.

It follows, 2. that other gifts conferred upon the Blessed, such as the gifts of the Holy Spirit, graces gratuitously given, revelations, etc., do not have the ratio of dowry. For a dowry is something disposing and habilitating, as it were, for perfect marriage; but those gifts follow upon the marriage. Nor are grace and charity numbered among the dowries, both because of themselves they abstract from the state of the way or of the terminus, and because in them consists the substantial bond of the spiritual marriage of the soul with God. For the bond of marriage is perfected by mutual consent.

It follows, 3. that although vision, comprehension, and delight are, as is clear, in Christ and in the Angels, nevertheless they do not have the ratio of dowry. For if in Christ the union of natures is considered, it does not properly have the ratio of espousal, which is usually between distinct persons and persons of the same specific nature; but if the union between the Word and humanity is considered, it is also of another order, and there also there is no likeness in nature. And for the same reason the Angels are not said properly to be espoused to God as God, nor to Christ as man, because they are not of the same nature.

§ II.

On accidental beatitude and on aureoles.

636. Beatitudo accidentalis non ita appellatur, quia est accidens animae (ipsa enim essentialis beatitudo est accidens animae); sed quia accidit ipsi beatitudini essentiali. Si autem admittatur sententia D. Thomae, vel Suaresii de essentia beatitudinis formalis (n. 607. 3.), amor et gaudium, vel solum gaudium per se pertinent ad beatitudinem accidentalem. Communiter tamen non ita rem sumunt Theologi, qui definiunt beatitudinem accidentalem: "quaelibet perfectio beati, quae versatur extra objectum beatificum, quod est Deus, prout beatificum est, idest prout est clare visus." 636. Accidental beatitude is not so called because it is an accident of the soul, for essential beatitude itself is an accident of the soul, but because it accrues to essential beatitude itself. But if the opinion of St. Thomas or Suarez concerning the essence of formal beatitude is admitted, no. 607.3, then love and joy, or joy alone, pertain of themselves to accidental beatitude. Nevertheless Theologians commonly do not take the matter in this way; they define accidental beatitude as "any perfection of the blessed one which is concerned with something outside the beatific object, which is God, insofar as he is beatific, that is, insofar as he is clearly seen."

637. Ex qua definitione 1. excluditur a beatitudine accidentali amor Dei, et gaudium de Deo, prout hi actus intime connectuntur cum Deo clare viso. - 2. Excluditur etiam cognitio, amor, etc. de objecto creato, sed per medium increatum: sic visio creaturarum in Verbo non proprie pertinet ad beatitudinem accidentalem, quia realiter fit per ipsam beatitudinem essentialem, et per medium increatum. - 3. Sed includitur in beatitudine accidentali cognitio, amor, etc., de bono increato per medium creatum; uti esset, ex. gr., scientia infusa de Deo. Vid. Suarez (de ult. fin. hom. disp. 11. sect. 2. nn. 3. 4.) 637. From this definition, 1. the love of God and joy concerning God are excluded from accidental beatitude, insofar as these acts are intimately connected with God clearly seen. 2. Also excluded is cognition, love, etc., concerning a created object, but through an uncreated medium. Thus the vision of creatures in the Word does not properly pertain to accidental beatitude, because it really occurs through essential beatitude itself and through an uncreated medium. 3. But included in accidental beatitude is cognition, love, etc., concerning an uncreated good through a created medium, as would be, for example, infused knowledge concerning God.

See Suarez (On the Ultimate End of Man, disputation 11, section 2, nos. 3 and 4).

638. Inter ipsas vero perfectiones, quae proprie pertinent ad beatitudinem accidentalem, aliae sunt veluti intrinsecae beatitudini essentiali, quatenus consequuntur specificam ejus rationem, et consequenter inveniuntur in omnibus beatis: aliae sunt extrinsecae, et conceduntur aliquibus tantum ex speciali Dei privilegio. Quod ita declarat Suarez (l. c. n. 9.): "Sicut in aliis rebus praeter proprietates omnino intrinsecas, quae consequuntur specificam rationem essentialem, sunt quaedam accidentia intrinseca, quae reperiuntur in omnibus individuis cum aliqua varietate pro diversitate illorum; alia vero sunt accidentia magis extrinseca, et contingentia: ita in beatitudine praeter essentiam beatitudinis et gaudium beatificum sunt multae perfectiones accidentales quidem; tamen ita intrinsecae, ut vel ex natura rei, vel ex lege Dei consentanea ipsis rebus, semper sint conjunctae cum essentiali beatitudine, ut sunt perfectiones intellectuales supra enumeratae, et gaudia de bonis creatis paulo ante explicata: et ad hunc ordinem spectant quaedam bona extrinseca, de quibus postea dicemus, ut est mutua amicitia, et familiaritas justorum, honor mutuus, qui ab aliis exhibetur, habitatio in tali loco; et huc etiam pertinent omnes perfectiones corporis: quae omnia dicimus radicaliter contineri in essentiali beatitudine; aliae vero sunt perfectiones singulares datae quibusdam ratione propriorum meritorum: atque haec vocantur aureolae." 638. But among the perfections themselves which properly pertain to accidental beatitude, some are, as it were, intrinsic to essential beatitude, insofar as they follow upon its specific ratio, and consequently are found in all the blessed; others are extrinsic and are granted only to some by a special privilege of God. Suarez explains this as follows in the same place, no. 9: "Just as in other things, besides the altogether intrinsic properties which follow the essential specific ratio, there are certain intrinsic accidents which are found in all individuals with some variety according to their diversity, while others are more extrinsic and contingent accidents; so in beatitude, besides the essence of beatitude and beatific joy, there are many perfections which are indeed accidental, yet so intrinsic that either from the nature of the thing, or from the law of God fitting to the things themselves, they are always joined with essential beatitude. Such are the intellectual perfections enumerated above, and the joys concerning created goods explained a little earlier. And to this order belong certain extrinsic goods, concerning which we shall speak later, such as the mutual friendship and familiarity of the just, the mutual honor which is shown by others, and habitation in such a place; and here also belong all the perfections of the body. All these things we say are radically contained in essential beatitude. But other perfections are singular, given to certain persons by reason of their proper merits, and these are called aureoles."

639. Quod praeter beatitudinem essentialem detur etiam beatitudo accidentalis patet a) ex Scriptura: Dan. 12.: "Qui docti fuerint, fulgebunt quasi splendor firmamenti: et qui ad justitiam erudiunt multos, quasi stellae in perpetuas aeternitates." 1. Cor. 15.: "Stella differt a stella in claritate: sic et resurrectio mortuorum." - b) Ex Traditione SS. Patrum. 639. That, besides essential beatitude, there is also accidental beatitude is clear: a) from Scripture. Daniel 12: "Those who have been learned shall shine as the splendor of the firmament; and those who instruct many unto justice, as stars unto perpetual eternities." 1 Corinthians 15: "Star differs from star in brightness; so also is the resurrection of the dead." b) From the Tradition of the Holy Fathers.

640. Inter perfectiones accidentales beatitudinis eminet aureola, de qua aliqua declaranda sunt. 640. Among the accidental perfections of beatitude the aureole stands out; concerning it some things must be explained.

641. Quaer. 1. quid veniat nomine aureola. Juxta D. Thomam et antiquos Theologos duplex praemium respondet operibus meritoriis. Unum essentiale, quod

datur pro omnibus operibus bonis, et vocatur aurea. Aliud speciale correspondens operibus specialiter perfectis, et vocatur aureola, quia est aliquid additum aureae, seu beatitudini essentiali. Aurea comparatur ad aureolam, sicut totum ad partem, vel sicut majus ad minus, aut denique sicut essentiale ad accidentale. 641. Question 1: what is meant by the name aureole. According to St. Thomas and the ancient Theologians, a twofold reward corresponds to meritorious works. One is essential, which is given for all good works and is called the golden reward. The other is special, corresponding to specially perfect works, and is called the aureole, because it is something added to the golden reward, or to essential beatitude. The golden reward is compared to the aureole as the whole to the part, or as the greater to the lesser, or finally as the essential to the accidental.

642. Quaer. 2. quot sunt aureolae. Communiter Theologi tres admittunt, Doctorum, Virginum, Martyrum: earum distinctionem triplici ratione explicant. a) Per illas tres aureolas praemiantur tres speciales victoriae obtentae contra tres hostes: carnem, mundum, diabolum. "In pugna enim spirituali est praecipue pugna contra concupiscentias carnis, concupiscentias oculorum, et superbiam vitae" (1. Joan. 2.), quae etiam ad haec tria pertinent, scilicet ad carnem, mundum, diabolum (D. Th. l. c. art. 5. corollus). Virgines a delectabilibus venereis etiam in matrimonio licitis abstinentes, insignem victoriam contra carnem reportant: Martyres persecutionem usque ad mortem sustinentes insigniter de mundo triumphant: Doctores non solum a se, sed ab aliis per praedicationem et doctrinam diabolum arcentes, contra eumdem insignem victoriam obtinent.

b) Alii tres aureolas juxta tres praecipuas animi vires distinguunt. Potissimus rationalis naturae actus est veritatem fidei etiam in aliis diffundere: ei respondet aureola Doctoris. Potissimus actus irascibilis est mortem ipsam propter Christum superare: ei respondet aureola Martyrum. Potissimus actus concupiscibilis est a maximis delectabilibus etiam licitis abstinere: ei respondet aureola Virginum.

c) Alii aureolas explicant secundum triplicem specialem conformitatem cum Christo. Christus enim fuit Doctor, veritatem, quam a Patre accepit, mundo manifestans. Fuit Martyr, persecutionem usque ad mortem a mundo sustinens. Fuit Virgo, Virginumque amator. 642. Question 2: how many aureoles are there? Theologians commonly admit three: of Doctors, of Virgins, and of Martyrs. They explain their distinction by a threefold reason. a) Through those three aureoles three special victories are rewarded, obtained against the three enemies: the flesh, the world, and the devil. "For in spiritual combat there is especially combat against the concupiscences of the flesh, the concupiscences of the eyes, and the pride of life," 1 John 2, which also pertain to these three, namely to the flesh, the world, and the devil, St. Thomas in the cited place, article 5, corollary. Virgins, abstaining from venereal delights even those licit in marriage, win a distinguished victory against the flesh. Martyrs, sustaining persecution even to death, triumph distinguishedly over the world. Doctors, warding off the devil not only from themselves but from others through preaching and teaching, obtain a distinguished victory against the same.

b) Others distinguish the three aureoles according to the three principal powers of the soul. The chief act of rational nature is to diffuse the truth of faith also in others; to this corresponds the aureole of the Doctor. The chief act of the irascible power is to overcome death itself for Christ; to this corresponds the aureole of Martyrs. The chief act of the concupiscible power is to abstain from the greatest delights even when licit; to this corresponds the aureole of Virgins.

c) Others explain the aureoles according to a threefold special conformity with Christ. For Christ was a Doctor, manifesting to the world the truth which he received from the Father. He was a Martyr, sustaining persecution from the world even to death. He was a Virgin and lover of Virgins.

643. Quaer. 3. quid sunt aureolae. Juxta communem doctrinam, aureola est quaedam specialis perfectio in anima; unde animae beatae Virginum, Martyrum, Doctorum, etiam nunc sunt aureolis insignitae. Addit tamen D. Thomas l. c. a. 5.: "Sicut ex gaudio essentialis praemii, quod est aurea, redundat quidam decor in corpore, qui est gloria corporis: ita ex

gaudio aureolae resultat aliquis decor in corpore; ut sic aureola principaliter sit in mente, sed per quamdam redundantiam fulgeat etiam in carne."

Alii dicunt aureolam esse specialem quamdam dignitatem et eminentiam, quae tribus illis victoribus tribuetur; quatenus hi prae caeteris erunt conformes Christo, in quo perfectissime fuit totius virginitatis, et martyrii, et doctrinae excellentia et victoria. Quidam existimant, in animis beatis fore qualitates quasdam spiritales, repraesentantes illas victorias: et in his consistere rationem aureolae: imo in corporibus gloriosis easdem victorias ornamento speciali signandas, quae omnia sunt satis probabilia. Verum quia de his nihil certi habemus, non censui immorandum: nobis satis sit peculiarem quamdam dignitatem et honorem hisce victoribus Dei munere tribuendum; sicut in aulis Principum quamdam peculiarem dignitatem obtinent qui in bellis regem proxime sunt secuti, eique in omnibus periculis adfuerunt. 643. Question 3: what are aureoles? According to common doctrine, an aureole is a certain special perfection in the soul; hence the blessed souls of Virgins, Martyrs, and Doctors are even now marked with aureoles. Yet St. Thomas adds in the same place, article 5: "Just as from the joy of the essential reward, which is the golden reward, a certain beauty overflows into the body, which is the glory of the body, so from the joy of the aureole some beauty results in the body, so that the aureole is principally in the mind, but by a certain redundancy shines also in the flesh."

Others say that the aureole is a certain special dignity and eminence which will be attributed to those three victors, insofar as they above the rest will be conformed to Christ, in whom most perfectly was the excellence and victory of all virginity, martyrdom, and doctrine. Some think that in blessed souls there will be certain spiritual qualities representing those victories, and that the ratio of the aureole consists in these; indeed, that in glorious bodies the same victories are to be marked by a special ornament. All these things are sufficiently probable. But because we have nothing certain concerning these things, I have not judged that we should linger over them. Let it be enough for us that a certain peculiar dignity and honor is to be attributed to these victors by the gift of God, just as in the courts of Princes those obtain a certain peculiar dignity who have followed the king most closely in wars and have stood by him in all dangers.

Article 5. On the Existence and Eternity of the Punishments of Hell

LatineEnglish

644. Loquuti sumus de beata sorte animarum, quae in statu gratiae a corpore separantur, et perfecte purgatae ad beatitudinem perveniunt. Sed Deus, qui novit "in die obitus retribuere unicuique secundum vias suas," aeternas paravit poenas iis, qui in statu lethalis peccati ex hac vita decedunt. De perpetua earum duratione agimus in hoc articulo, imprimis ex principiis revelationis - deinde ex principiis rationis.

§ I.

Aeternitas poenarum inferni ex revelatione. 644. We have spoken of the blessed lot of souls which are separated from the body in the state of grace and, perfectly purified, arrive at beatitude. But God, who knows "on the day of death to render to each one according to his ways," has prepared eternal punishments for those who depart from this life in the state of lethal sin. In this article we treat of their perpetual duration, first from the principles of revelation, then from the principles of reason.

§ I.

The eternity of the punishments of hell from revelation.

645. Non defuerunt qui non modo aeternitatem poenarum, sed ipsas poenas post hanc mortalem vitam omnino negarent: unde aliqui ostendunt 1. existentiam poenarum - 2. earundem aeternitatem. Sed cum argumenta, quibus poenarum aeternitas comprobatur, certe earum existentiam demonstrent, non est opus de hac specialem instituere quaestionem. 645. There have not been lacking those who denied not only the eternity of punishments, but also the punishments themselves after this mortal life altogether. Hence some show 1. the existence of punishments, and 2. the eternity of the same. But since the

arguments by which the eternity of punishments is proved certainly demonstrate their existence, there is no need to institute a special question concerning this.

646. Profitemur in Symbolo Athanasiano: "Qui bona egerunt, ibunt in vitam aeternam: qui vero mala, in ignem aeternum. Haec est fides catholica; quam nisi quisque fideliter firmiterque crediderit, salvus esse non poterit." Eamdem veritatem definivit Ecclesia in Conc. Ecum. V. - Concil. Niceno II. Act. I. - Concil. Later. IV. - et, caeteris omissis, Conc. Trid. sess. 6. c. 5. 646. We profess in the Athanasian Creed: "Those who have done good will go into eternal life, but those who have done evil into eternal fire. This is the Catholic faith; unless each one has believed it faithfully and firmly, he will not be able to be saved." The Church defined the same truth in the Fifth Ecumenical Council, the Second Council of Nicaea, act 1, the Fourth Lateran Council, and, passing over the rest, the Council of Trent, session 6, chapter 5.

647. Attamen vel a primis Ecclesiae saeculis orta est haeresis poenarum aeternitatem negans, quae deinde saepius ad nostra usque tempora renovata est. - Non omnes vero eadem ratione permoti fuere. Alii enim ideo negarunt aeternitatem poenarum, quia docebant animas non esse immortales. Alii concedebant animae humanae immortalitatem, sed impiorum animas destruendas potius, quam perpetuo puniendas esse autumabant. - Alii nec mortales nec destruendas impiorum animas dicebant; sed tamen temporariis poenis purgandas, et tandem liberandas esse censebant. - Alii aeternitatem admiserunt pro Angelis, sed non pro hominibus. Alii pro infidelibus, sed non pro Christianis. Alii pro iis qui obstinati perseverant in propria iniquitate, non vero pro iis, qui poenitentiam agunt; putabant enim quod in inferno adhuc est locus poenitentiae. Merito exclamabat S. Joan. Chrys. (hom. 31. in Ep. ad Rom.): "O dementiam! O stultam et asinariam sententiam, O animam peccati et voluptatis amantem, atque ad nequitiam respicientem! Etenim a voluptatis amore haec dogmata omnia nascuntur, ita ut si ii, qui talia dicunt, virtutem amplecti vellent, cito de gehenna persuasi essent, omnique dubitatione exuerentur." 647. Nevertheless, even from the first centuries of the Church there arose a heresy denying the eternity of punishments, which afterward was renewed rather often even down to our own times. But not all were moved by the same reasoning. For some denied the eternity of punishments because they taught that souls are not immortal. Others conceded the immortality of the human soul, but judged that the souls of the impious were to be destroyed rather than punished perpetually. Others said that the souls of the impious are neither mortal nor to be destroyed, but still held that they were to be purged by temporal punishments and finally liberated. Others admitted eternity for Angels, but not for men. Others for unbelievers, but not for Christians. Others for those who obstinately persevere in their own iniquity, but not for those who do penance; for they thought that in hell there is still a place of penance. Deservedly St. John Chrysostom exclaimed (homily 31 on the Epistle to the Romans): "O madness! O foolish and asinine opinion! O soul loving sin and pleasure and looking toward wickedness! For all these dogmas are born from love of pleasure, so that if those who say such things wished to embrace virtue, they would quickly be persuaded concerning gehenna and would be stripped of every doubt."

648. Contra hos omnes itaque, dicimus:

PROP. XLVII. Ex fontibus revelationis luculentissime ostenditur damnatorum in inferno poenas esse aeternas.

Prob. Ex Scriptura. Ad tres praecipue classes revocamus testimonia S. Scripturae. Prima classis eorum est, quae poenas inferni directe appellant aeternas. Dan. 12. 2.: "Multi de his qui dormiunt in terrae pulvere, evigilabunt: alii in vitam aeternam, et alii in opprobrium ut videant semper." - Matth. 25. 41. 46.: "Discedite a me maledicti in ignem aeternum, qui paratus est diabolo et angelis ejus." - "Et ibunt hi in supplicium aeternum; justi autem in vitam aeternam." - Is. 33. 14.: "Quis habitare poterit de vobis cum igne devorante? quis habitabit ex vobis cum ardoribus sempiternis?" etc.

Ut hujus

argumenti vim infirment adversarii, observant vocem aeternum non raro adhiberi in S. Scriptura ad significandum solum diuturnam durationem.

Sed a) Ex eo quod aliqua vox habet duplicem significationem, propriam et minus propriam, certe deduci nequit semper adhiberi sensu minus proprio. Imo semper ac aliqua vox habet sensum proprium et metaphoricum, nisi aliqua evidens ratio contrarium suadeat, semper proprius est retinendus.

b) Testimonia, quae adversarii congerunt, et in quibus vox aeternum revera non adhibetur sensu proprio, obvia signa prae se ferunt, ut vox illa sumatur sensu minus proprio. At ubi agitur de aeternitate poenarum, nullum habetur hujusmodi fundamentum, imo habetur contrarium.

c) Revera si substratam materiam consideremus, agitur de Angelis, et hominibus puniendis. Angeli vero, et animae humanae sunt natura sua immortales et perpetuo duraturae. Quod si hominis corpus mortale est, scimus quod a mortuis resurget, et nihil obstat quominus illud in aeternum Deus conservet. Unde S. Gregorius (Mor. l. 15.): "Persolvit impius in tormento ea, quae hic illicite servavit desideria, et flammis ultricibus traditus semper moritur, quia semper in morte servatur. Non enim in morte consumetur, quia si consumeretur vita morientis, cum vita etiam poena finiretur. Sed ut sine fine crucietur, vivere sine fine in poena compellitur: ut cujus vita hic mortua fuit in culpa, illic ejus mors vivat in poena. Luet, quae fecit, omnia, nec tamen consumetur, quia cruciatur et non extinguitur; moritur et vivit; deficit et subsistit; finitur semper, et sine fine est."

d) Si consideremus contextum, quemadmodum damnatorum poena dicitur aeterna, ita aeternum dicitur justorum praemium: sed hoc, ipsis adversariis fatentibus, vere non habet finem. Ergo. Unde S. Augustinus (de civ. Dei l. 21. c. 23.): "Christus in uno eodemque loco, in una eademque sententia dixit: Ibunt isti in supplicium aeternum, justi autem in vitam aeternam. Si utrumque aeternum, profecto aut utrumque cum fine diuturnum, aut utrumque sine fine perpetuum debet intelligi. Par pari enim relata sunt, hinc supplicium aeternum, inde vita aeterna. Dicere autem in hoc uno eodemque sensu vita aeterna sine fine erit, supplicium aeternum finem habebit, multum absurdum est."

e) Si consideremus denique alia S. Scripturae loca, ea omnino exigunt ut, cum inferorum poenae dicuntur aeternae, vox illa aeternae sumatur pro duratione sine termino; uti ex statim dicendis patebit.

Secunda classis est eorum testimoniorum, quae expresse negant quemcumque finem in inferni poenis, quin adhibeant vocem aeternum. Matth. 3. 12.: "Congregabit triticum suum in horreum, paleas autem comburet igni inextinguibili." Is. 66. 24.: "Et vermis eorum non morietur, et ignis eorum non extinguetur: et erunt usque ad satietatem visionis omni carni." Marc. 9. ter Christus repetit: vermis eorum non moritur, et ignis non extinguitur, etc.

Ut vim horum testimoniorum effugiant adversarii, dicunt vel ignem non extingui quamdiu manebunt impii cruciandi; sed ex hoc non inferri eos semper esse mansuros - vel ignem quidem esse inextinguibilem, sed necesse non esse eo semper damnatos comburi.

Sed a) Ultima verba cit. testimonii ex Isaia "et erunt usque ad satietatem, etc.," aperte excludunt illas interpretationes.

b) Dicitur vermis eorum non moritur, et ignis non extinguitur; ergo sermo est de verme et igne prout poena sunt: prout poena sunt ergo sine fine sunt: sed quomodo poena, nisi adsint puniendi?

Unde S. Augustinus (de fid. et oper. c. 5.): "Neque illud dici potest, in quo nonnulli seipsos seducunt, ignem aeternum dictum, non ipsam combustionem aeternam. Per ignem quippe qui aeternus erit transituros arbitrantur eos, quibus propter fidem mortuam per ignem promittunt salutem, ut videlicet ipse ignis aeternus sit, combustio vero eorum, hoc est operatio ignis, non sit in eos aeterna, quum et hoc praevidens, Dominus sententiam suam conclusit ita dicens: Sic ibunt illi in combustionem aeternam, justi autem in vitam aeternam. Erit ergo aeterna combustio, sicut ignis, et eos in illam ituros veritas dicit, quorum non fidem, sed bona opera defuisse declaravit."

Tertia classis est eorum testimoniorum, in quibus praedicatur impossibilitas liberationis a poenis inferni; seu in quibus indicatur nullam expectandam esse liberationem, nisi sub conditione impossibili. Matth. 5. 26.: "Amen dico tibi, non exies inde, donec reddas novissimum quadrantem." - Et 18. 34.: "Et iratus Dominus ejus tradidit eum tortoribus, quoadusque redderet universum debitum." - Luc. 12. 59.: "Dico tibi, non exies inde, donec etiam novissimum minutum reddas." - Eccle. 9. 10.: "Quodcumque facere potest manus tua, instanter operare: quia nec opus, nec ratio, nec sapientia, nec scientia erunt apud inferos, quo tu properas." - Eccle. 11. 3.: "Si ceciderit lignum ad austrum, aut ad aquilonem, in quocumque loco ceciderit, ibi erit," etc.

Unde: Conditio ad liberationem

adjecta est ut qui inferni poenis puniuntur perfecte debitum solvant, quo erga Deum obstringuntur. Atqui hanc conditionem damnati numquam implere possunt, uti patet ex cit. testimoniis, et inferius melius patebit. Ergo.

Unde S. Cyprianus (ad Demetr. cc. 24. 25.): "Cremabit addictos ardens semper gehenna, et vivacibus flammis vorax poena; nec erit, unde habere tormenta vel requiem possint aliquando vel finem. Erit tunc sine fructu paenitentiae dolor poenae, inanis ploratio et inefficax deprecatio. In aeternam poenam sero credent, qui in vitam aeternam credere noluerunt. Quando istinc excessum fuerit, nullus jam poenitentiae locus est, nullus satisfactionis effectus."

Ut vim hujus argumenti enervent adversarii, dicunt 1. poenas privativas esse aeternas, non vero positivas: privativas autem aeternas esse, quia, cum animae damnatorum destruantur, numquam Deum visurae sunt.

Sed hoc supponit a) mortalitatem animarum, quod alibi ostenditur falsissimum. - b) Scriptura asserit durationem sine termino non modo de poena damni "Discedite a me maledicti;" sed etiam de poena sensus "in ignem aeternum" ut patet ex superius dictis.

Dicunt 2. Quamvis Deus minetur poenas aeternas, a quibus damnati liberandi non sunt nisi convertantur; inde tamen non sequitur poenas vere futuras esse aeternas. Quando enim Legislator comminatur aliquam poenam, nihil impedit quominus illam, quoad partem vel quoad totum condonet: ita agens, nihil facit contra jus aut fidelitatem.

Sed a) Legislator humanus, etiam facta comminatione absoluta poenae, potest mutando consilium condonare. Sed Deus est immutabilis, ideoque quamvis liberatio damnatorum per condonationem poenae non repugnet justitiae et fidelitati, repugnat tamen immutabilitati divinae.

b) Nec dici potest comminationem poenae in casu esse conditionatam. Etsi enim talis sit respectu hominum in hac vita degentium; absoluta tamen est respectu damnatorum in quos tulit sententiam "Discedite a me," quae jam est executioni mandata "Et ibunt hi in supplicium aeternum." - Praeterea satis in Scripturis manifestavit voluntatem suam non condonandi damnatorum poenas. Unde jure merito S. Augustinus (de civ. Dei l. 20. c. 24.) eos graviter redarguit "qui minaciter potius, quam veraciter" quae de aeternis poenis dicta sunt, interpretantur. "Eos," inquit, "Scriptura divina planissime, et plenissime redarguit et refellit."

NOTA. Testimonia Patrum collecta et debito ordine disposita invenies apud Knoll (Par. 5. sect. 3. a. 1.) Ibi etiam leges sententias de hac re apertissime catholicas eorum Patrum, qui ut adversarii dogmatis de aeternitate poenarum citabantur. Praecipuas objectiones ex Scriptura jam praeoccupavimus; reliquas, sicut et alias ex Patribus, vide vel apud cit. Auctorem, vel apud Perrone. 648. Therefore against all these we say:

PROPOSITION XLVII. From the sources of revelation it is shown most luminously that the punishments of the damned in hell are eternal.

Proof from Scripture. We reduce the testimonies of Sacred Scripture especially to three classes. The first class is of those which directly call the punishments of hell eternal. Daniel 12:2: "Many of those who sleep in the dust of the earth shall awake: some unto eternal life, and others unto reproach, that they may see forever." Matthew 25:41, 46: "Depart from me, accursed ones, into the eternal fire, which was prepared for the devil and his angels." "And these shall go into eternal punishment, but the just into eternal life." Isaiah 33:14: "Who of you will be able to dwell with devouring fire? who of you will dwell with everlasting burnings?" etc.

In order to weaken the force of this argument, the adversaries observe that the word eternal is not rarely used in Sacred Scripture to signify only a long duration.

But a) from the fact that some word has a twofold signification, proper and less proper, it certainly cannot be deduced that it is always used in the less proper sense. Indeed whenever some word has a proper and a metaphorical sense, unless some evident reason persuades the contrary, the proper sense must always be retained.

b) The testimonies which the adversaries heap together, and in which the word eternal is really not used in the proper sense, bear obvious signs that that word is taken in the less proper sense. But where the eternity of punishments is at issue, there is no foundation of this kind; indeed there is the contrary.

c) In reality, if we consider the underlying matter, the question concerns Angels and men to be punished. But Angels and human souls are by their nature immortal and will endure perpetually. But if the body of man is mortal, we know that it will rise from the dead, and nothing prevents God from preserving it eternally. Hence St. Gregory (Moralia, book 15): "The impious man pays in torment for the desires which he unlawfully kept here, and handed over

to avenging flames he always dies, because he is always preserved in death. For he will not be consumed in death, because if the life of the dying one were consumed, the punishment also would be ended with the life. But that he may be tortured without end, he is compelled to live without end in punishment, so that he whose life here was dead in fault, there his death may live in punishment. He will pay for all that he did, and yet he will not be consumed, because he is tortured and is not extinguished; he dies and lives; he fails and subsists; he is always ended, and is without end."

d) If we consider the context, just as the punishment of the damned is called eternal, so the reward of the just is called eternal; but this, as the adversaries themselves confess, truly has no end. Therefore. Hence St. Augustine (City of God, book 21, chapter 23): "Christ in one and the same place, in one and the same sentence, said: These shall go into eternal punishment, but the just into eternal life. If both are eternal, surely either both must be understood as long-lasting with an end, or both as perpetual without end. For they are related as equal to equal: on this side eternal punishment, on that eternal life. But to say in this one and the same sense that eternal life will be without end, while eternal punishment will have an end, is very absurd."

e) Finally, if we consider other places of Sacred Scripture, they altogether require that, when the punishments of hell are called eternal, that word eternal be taken for duration without terminus, as will be clear from what must immediately be said.

The second class is of those testimonies which expressly deny any end whatever in the punishments of hell, without using the word eternal. Matthew 3:12: "He will gather his wheat into the barn, but the chaff he will burn with unquenchable fire." Isaiah 66:24: "And their worm shall not die, and their fire shall not be extinguished; and they shall be even to satiety of sight to all flesh." Mark 9: Christ repeats three times: their worm does not die, and the fire is not extinguished, etc.

In order to escape the force of these testimonies, the adversaries say either that the fire is not extinguished as long as the impious remain to be tormented, but that from this it is not inferred that they will remain forever, or that the fire is indeed inextinguishable, but that it is not necessary that the damned always be burned by it.

But a) the final words of the cited testimony from Isaiah, "and they shall be even to satiety, etc.," openly exclude those interpretations.

b) It is said that their worm does not die and the fire is not extinguished; therefore the discourse concerns the worm and the fire insofar as they are punishment. Therefore, insofar as they are punishment, they are without end. But how is there punishment unless those to be punished are present?

Hence St. Augustine (On Faith and Works, chapter 5): "Nor can that be said by which some deceive themselves, namely that the fire is called eternal, not the burning itself eternal. For they think that those to whom they promise salvation through fire on account of dead faith will pass through the fire which will be eternal, so that indeed the fire itself is eternal, but their burning, that is, the operation of the fire, is not eternal upon them. Since the Lord, foreseeing even this, concluded his sentence by saying thus: So those shall go into eternal burning, but the just into eternal life. Therefore the burning will be eternal, just as the fire is, and Truth says that those will go into it whose lack not of faith but of good works he declared."

The third class is of those testimonies in which the impossibility of liberation from the punishments of hell is predicated, or in which it is indicated that no liberation is to be expected except under an impossible condition. Matthew 5:26: "Amen I say to you, you shall not go out from there until you pay the last farthing." And 18:34: "And his lord, angered, handed him over to the torturers until he should pay the whole debt." Luke 12:59: "I say to you, you shall not go out from there until you also pay the last mite." Ecclesiastes 9:10: "Whatever your hand can do, do earnestly, because there will be no work, nor reason, nor wisdom, nor knowledge in the underworld to which you hasten." Ecclesiastes 11:3: "If the tree falls to the south or to the north, in whatever place it falls, there it shall be," etc.

Hence: the condition attached to liberation is that those who are punished with the punishments of hell perfectly pay the debt by which they are bound toward God. But the damned can never fulfill this condition, as is clear from the cited testimonies and will be clearer below. Therefore.

Hence St. Cyprian (To Demetrianus, chapters 24 and 25): "Burning gehenna, always burning, will burn the condemned, and a devouring punishment with living flames; nor will there be any source from which torments could ever have rest or end. Then the pain of punishment will be without the fruit of penance, the weeping vain, and the

entreaty ineffective. They will believe late in eternal punishment who refused to believe in eternal life. When departure from here has occurred, there is no longer any place of penance, no effect of satisfaction."

In order to weaken the force of this argument, the adversaries say, 1. that privative punishments are eternal, but not positive punishments; and that privative punishments are eternal because, since the souls of the damned are destroyed, they will never see God.

But this supposes a) the mortality of souls, which elsewhere is shown to be most false; b) Scripture asserts duration without terminus not only concerning the pain of loss, "Depart from me, accursed ones," but also concerning the pain of sense, "into eternal fire," as is clear from what was said above.

They say, 2. although God threatens eternal punishments, from which the damned are not to be liberated unless they are converted, nevertheless it does not follow from this that the punishments will truly be eternal. For when a Legislator threatens some punishment, nothing prevents him from pardoning it, either in part or in whole; by acting thus, he does nothing against right or fidelity.

But a) a human legislator, even after an absolute threat of punishment has been made, can pardon by changing his counsel. But God is immutable, and therefore, although the liberation of the damned through pardon of punishment is not repugnant to justice and fidelity, nevertheless it is repugnant to divine immutability.

b) Nor can it be said that the threat of punishment in this case is conditional. For although it is such with respect to men living in this life, nevertheless it is absolute with respect to the damned against whom he has passed the sentence "Depart from me," which has already been entrusted to execution: "And these shall go into eternal punishment." Besides, in the Scriptures he has sufficiently manifested his will not to pardon the punishments of the damned. Hence deservedly St. Augustine (City of God, book 20, chapter 24) gravely rebukes those "who interpret the things said concerning eternal punishments as threatening rather than truthful." "Divine Scripture," he says, "most plainly and most fully rebukes and refutes them."

NOTE. You will find the testimonies of the Fathers collected and arranged in due order in Knoll, part 5, section 3, article 1. There you will also read the openly Catholic opinions concerning this matter of those Fathers who used to be cited as adversaries of the dogma concerning the eternity of punishments. We have already anticipated the principal objections from Scripture; the remaining ones, as also the others from the Fathers, see either in the cited Author or in Perrone.

649. Dogma de aeternitate poenarum plures, ut vidimus, nactum est adversarios inter eos ipsos, qui revelationem christianam haud respuere affectant; qui vero hanc aperte rejiciunt, ut ii qui saeculo elapso philosophi audiebant, et recentiores rationalistae omnes, idem dogma naturalis luminis principiis, divinisque attributis repugnare contendunt. 649. The dogma concerning the eternity of punishments, as we have seen, has obtained many adversaries even among those who affect not to reject Christian revelation. But those who openly reject it, such as those who in the past century were called philosophers, and all the more recent rationalists, contend that this same dogma is repugnant to the principles of natural light and to the divine attributes.

650. Fatemur aeternitatem poenarum solo rationis lumine non apodictice demonstrari; simul tamen contendimus, illud nihil in eo reprehendere, imo multis argumentis persuadere. 650. We confess that the eternity of punishments is not demonstrated apodictically by the light of reason alone; at the same time, however, we contend that reason finds nothing in it to reprehend, and indeed persuades it by many arguments.

651. Omittimus hic generales animadversiones, quibus veritates revelatas rationi minime contradicere communiter et invicte ostenditur (vid. nn. 547. seq.), ut ea solum breviter indicemus, quae hujus loci propria omnino sunt. 651. We omit here the general observations by which it is commonly

and invincibly shown that revealed truths in no way contradict reason (see nos. 547 and following), in order that we may briefly indicate only those things which are altogether proper to this place.

652. Itaque dicimus:

PROP. XLVIII. Bene consulta ratio non modo nihil absurdi deprehendit in dogmate de aeternitate poenarum, sed ea suppeditat argumenta, quae illud suadere apprime valeant.

Prob. I. Maxime convenit tum rectae rationis principiis, tum divinis attributis, ut proportio sit inter culpam et poenam; atqui hujusmodi proportio maxime elucet in aeterna damnatorum poena. Ergo.

Prob. min. Peccatum lethale quamdam habet infinitam malitiam; ergo maxime proportionatur ei poena, quae sit quodammodo infinita. Atqui talis est poena aeterna. Ergo.

Ut vera hujus argumenti vis intelligatur, notamus 1. cum D. Thoma 1. 2. q. 87. a. 4. c.: "In peccato autem duo sunt: quorum unum est aversio ab incommutabili bono, quod est infinitum, unde ex hac parte peccatum est infinitum; aliud quod est in peccato, est inordinata conversio ad commutabile bonum, et ex hac parte peccatum est finitum, tum quia ipsum bonum commutabile est finitum, tum etiam quia ipsa conversio est finita; non enim possunt esse actus creaturae infiniti."

3. Idem S. Doctor suppl. q. 99. a. 1., ait: "Per eam (culpam mortalem) contra Deum, qui est infinitus, peccatur. Unde cum non possit esse infinita poena per intensionem, quia creatura non est capax alicujus qualitatis infinitae, requiritur quod sit saltem duratione infinita."

Ne ullis sit locus cavillationibus contra hanc quamdam infinitatem culpae, notamus cum Lessio (de divin. perf. l. 13. c. 26. nn. 118. seqq.): "Malitia formalis peccati non solum consistit in recessu a regula rationis, sed etiam in quadam injuria quae irrogatur Deo, quae reperitur in omni peccato mortifero. Omnia enim peccata mortifera in eo conveniunt, quod includant quemdam contemptum Dei, alia majorem, alia minorem. In quibusdam enim magis directe contemnitur Deus, ut in odio Dei, in blasphemia et similibus, quae magis directe sunt contra Dei honorem: in aliis solum indirecte et interpretative, quatenus violatur et contemnitur lex divina in re gravi, et consequenter ipse legislator, ejusque amicitia et promissa omnia et minae omnes. Inde sequitur, peccatum mortiferum continere malitiam infinitam, non quidem absolute et omnino, sed respective. Ratio est, quia quo majestas quae contemnitur est major, eo offensio est gravior; atqui majestas Dei quae contemnitur peccato mortifero, est infinita; ergo offensio etiam quamdam infinitatem habet. Ratio vero, cur illo argumento non concludatur absoluta infinitas in ratione malitiae, est, quia objectum non attingitur adaequate, unde non adaequate influit in actum, nec tribuit ei plene sui infinitatem. Sicut enim Deus sine fine potest perfectius et perfectius amari, ita etiam per peccatum potest sine fine magis et magis odio haberi et contemni. Hoc ipso tamen, quod absolute censetur contemni, actus contrahit quamdam infinitatem malitiae, utpote superioris ordinis respectu omnium bonorum operum. Tanta enim est peccati mortiferi malignitas, ut posita in lance divinae justitiae praeponderet omnibus bonis operibus omnium Sanctorum, etiamsi ea millies plura et majora forent quam revera sunt: quae consideratio est valde terribilis. Neque hoc mirabile videri debet; quia omnia bona opera, quibus Deus honoratur a Sanctis, etsi in se considerata sint maximae aestimationis, et ipsi propterea sint digni vita aeterna, tamen respectu majestatis divinae sunt instar nihili: nulla enim gratia fit ei per ista omnia, cujus majestati et beneficiis omnia ista sunt debita, nec ista solum, sed infinities plura et majora. Itaque nihil magni omnia ista sunt Deo. At contemni a sua creatura, quae infinitis nominibus ipsi est obstricta, et quae infinitum amorem et honorem ei praestare deberet, si posset, hoc maximi aestimatur, utpote maxime repugnans ejus majestati et beneficiis. Unde pluris aestimatur a Deo in ratione mali, quam omnia opera bona in ratione boni, ac magis Deum affligeret, si capax esset doloris, quam omnia bona opera exhilararent. Hinc docent SS. Patres, nullam puram creaturam Deo potuisse satisfacere, ac proinde necessarium fuisse ad justam satisfactionem, ut Deus fieret homo. Ex his potest adferri ratio, cur peccatum mortiferum plectatur poena aeterna. Si enim tanta est ejus malignitas, ut nullis bonis operibus purae naturae potuerit ex aequo compensari, sed ad hoc necessarium fuit, Deum incarnari, ut condigna satisfactio divinae justitiae exhiberetur, mirum non est, si dicatur mereri poenam aeternam. Quod enim adeo malum est, ut nullis bonis quantumvis longo tempore continuatis compensari et exaequari possit, meretur poenam quovis tempore finito longiorem, ac proinde aeternam, idque per se et directe ratione malitiae quae est in actu, non autem quia

peccator non potest pro eo satisfacere, aut se in eo ordine, ex quo excidit reponere, aut vitam spiritualem reparare, aut maculam delere. Etsi enim haec omnia concurrant in peccato mortifero, ex his tamen non est petenda propria ratio cur ei debeatur poena aeterna, sed ex ipsa malitia actus, ex qua etiam ista impotentia sequitur, sicut in aliis peccatis mensura poenae statuenda ex mensura culpae, non ex impotentia satisfaciendi."

Prob. II. maxime convenit ut qui pro aeterno peccat, in aeternum puniatur; atqui qui lethale peccatum committit se avertendo a Deo, quantum in se est, pro aeterno peccat. Ergo.

Decl. ex D. Thoma suppl. l. c.: "Gregorius dicit in IV. Dialog. cap. 44. antec. med.: 'Ad magnam justitiam judicantis pertinet ut numquam careant supplicio qui in hac vita nunquam voluerunt carere peccato.' Et si objiciatur quod quidam peccantes mortaliter proponunt vitam suam in melius quandoque commutare, et ita secundum hoc non essent digni aeterno supplicio, ut videtur, dicendum est, secundum quosdam, quod Gregorius loquitur de voluntate quae manifestatur per opus. Qui enim in peccatum mortale labitur propria voluntate, se ponit in statu a quo erui non potest, nisi divinitus adjutus: unde ex hoc ipso quod vult peccare, consequenter vult in peccato manere perpetuo. Homo enim est spiritus vadens, scilicet in peccatum, et non rediens per seipsum: Psal. 77. 39. Sicut si aliquis se in foveam projiceret, unde exire non posset nisi adjutus, posset dici quod in aeternum ibi manere voluerit, quantumcumque aliud cogitaret. Vel potest dici, et melius, quod ex hoc ipso quod mortaliter peccat, finem suum in creatura constituit. Et quia ad finem vita tota ordinatur, ideo ex hoc ipso totam vitam suam ordinat ad illud peccatum; et vellet perpetuo in peccato manere, si hoc sibi esset impune. Et hoc est quod Gregorius in 34. lib. Moral. cap. 16. cir. med. super illud Job. 41.: 'Aestimabit abyssum quasi senescentem,' dicit: 'Iniqui ideo cum fine deliquerunt, quia cum fine vixerunt; voluissent quippe sine fine vivere, ut sine fine potuissent in suis iniquitatibus permanere; nam magis appetunt peccare quam vivere."

Prob. III. Maxime convenit ut Deus sanctionem de se sufficientem et valde efficacem statuat, ne ejus legem homines transgrediantur et ut quemadmodum absoluta oppositio est inter malum et bonum, ita non idem tandem sit finis eorum, qui virtutem coluerunt, vel vitio servierunt. Atqui haec praestat poena aeterna. Ergo.

Ad prob. min. et declar. totius argumenti, notamus 1. Ardua est virtutis semita - humanae mentes admodum sunt in vitia pronae - sensuum illecebris homines vehementer alliciuntur - assidua opus est animi contentione, ne officia violentur - atrocia aliquando supplicia sunt sustinenda, mors ipsa contemnenda ut in officio persistamus - sine magnis virtutibus societates pereunt, etc. - His bene perpensis, patet, quod et infideles viderunt (Lucr. de nat. deor. l. 108.), quod sublata aeternitate poenarum, vix efficax superesset motivum ad homines constanter sub lege Dei continendos.

2. Notamus cum S. Hierony. (in Jon. c. 3.): "Si longos post circuitus atque infinitis saeculis omnium rerum restitutio fiet, et una dignitas militantium, quae distantia erit inter virginem et prostibulum? Quae differentia erit inter matrem Domini et (quod dictu quoque scelus est,) victimas libidinum publicarum? Idemne erit Gabriel et diabolus? Idem apostoli et daemones? Idem prophetae et pseudoprophetae? Idem martyres et persecutores? Finge quot libet annos, et tempora duplica, et infinitas aetates congere cruciatibus, si finis omnium similis est, praeteritum omne pro nihilo est, quia non quaerimus, quid aliquando fuerimus; sed quid semper futuri sumus."

Prob. IV. Potest certe Deus, suis omnibus attributis salvis, praestituere tempus, ultra quod nulla sit spes reliqua veniae obtinendae et quo elapso semper perseverabit peccatum. Atqui aequum est, ut quamdiu peccatum perseverat, perseveret et poena. Ergo.

Ad prob. et decl. hujus argumenti notamus 1. Nec potest ostendi Deum vel semel obstringi ad veniam peccantibus elargiendam: cur ergo teneretur semper?

2. Notamus cum S. Augustino (de civ. Dei l. 21. c. 11.): "Cur iniquum sit, cum judices hujus mundi peccata multa gladio punientes, homines in aeternum ex societate vitae humanae exterminent, Dominum aeternae civitatis impios et hostes suos, qui indesinenter peccant, in aeternum ex civitate sua ejicere, et sub ira et maledictione ipsius et legis manere eos, qui impuri et injusti in Deum et proximum perpetuo malevoli sunt?"

3. Addit D. Thomas suppl. q. 99. a. 1.: "Quod autem poena, quam civitas mundana infligit perpetua non reputetur, hoc est per accidens, vel in quantum perpetuo homo non manet, vel in quantum etiam ipsa civitas deficit. Unde si homo in perpetuum viveret, poena exilii, vel servitutis, quae per legem humanam infertur, in eo perpetuo maneret."

4. Finis poenae praecipuus non est emendatio rei, sed reparatio ordinis; unde justum est poenam infligere quamdiu peccatum

durat, etiamsi reus emendari nequeat. "Impiorum poenae," inquit D. Thomas l. c. ad 4., "in perpetuum duraturae non erunt omnino inutiles. Sunt enim utiles ad duo: primo ad hoc quod in eis divina justitia conservetur, quae est Deo accepta propter seipsam; unde Gregorius 4. Dialog. cap. 44. circ. med.: 'Omnipotens Deus, quia pius est, miserorum cruciatu non pascitur; quia autem justus est, ab iniquorum ultione in perpetuum non sedatur.' Secundo ad hoc sunt utiles ut de his electi gaudeant, cum in his Dei justitiam contemplantur, et dum se evasisse eas cognoscunt."

5. "Voluntatem," ait D. Thomas c. g. l. 4. c. 93., "a peccato mutari in bonum, non contingit nisi per gratiam Dei." Jamvero Deus nulla lege tenetur gratiam suam etiam damnatis elargiri - praesertim cum tam dives fuerit, in misericordia ut ea homines vitarent cum Filium suum Unigenitum dederit, etc."

Dices I: Juxta immutabilem justitiae ordinem, poena non debet gravitatem culpae excedere; atqui hoc fieret, si poena esset aeterna; siquidem culpae brevi temporis spatio commissae responderet poena sine termino. Ergo.

Resp. 1. Debet quidem esse inter culpam et poenam proportio; sed haec exigit, ut probavimus, aeternam poenam. - Nec obstat brevitas temporis, quo culpa committitur; semel enim commissa, nisi ex Dei gratia remittatur, semper manet: quamdiu autem culpa manet, debita, ut vidimus, est poena.

2. Unde D. Thomas 1. 2. q. 87. a. 3. ad 1., ait: "Sicut Augustinus (de civ. Dei l. 21. c. 11.) dicit, in nullo judicio requiritur ut poena adaequetur culpae secundum durationem. Non enim quia adulterium vel homicidium in momento committitur, propter hoc momentanea poena punitur, sed quandoque quidem perpetuo carcere vel exilio, quandoque etiam morte; in qua non consideratur occisionis mora, sed potius quod in perpetuum auferatur a societate viventium: et sic repraesentat suo modo aeternitatem poenae inflictae divinitus."

Et Theodorus Abucarae Episcopus (Disput. 14. cont. Orig.): "Lex Dei hominumque leges, homicidam capitis damnantes, extremoque supplicio facinorosum aliquem afficientes, non unius in eum horae spatio animadvertunt; sed si morte quidem plectant, aeterno eum supplicio afficiunt, vel si verberent, diuturnum ei dolorem ex rebus inferunt. Quin tu quoque si adulterum quempiam cum uxore, filiave deprehenderes, non unius illum horae spatio puniendum, sed trucidandum censeres: quod quidem aeternum est hominum supplicium. Sed ipse quoque rerum naturae perinde se habent. Cum enim nobis ne frigidam, verbi gratia, bibamus aquam, neve quoque noxio cibi genere utamur, interdictum sit, in vetitum tamen nitamur, diuturnas nimirum poenas damus. Itaque saepe numero fit, ut ex frigidae potu, ignisve contactu, vel aceti usu, continuum morbum incurramus: atqui natura justissima est."

Dices II: Infinita est Dei bonitas, et infinita ejus misericordia; atqui cum his divinis attributis nequit poenarum aeternitas consistere: nam poenae aeternae Deum, earum auctorem, potius crudelem exhibent.

Resp. 1. Bonitas Dei relativa, seu benignitas, est sincera Dei voluntas communicandi felicitatem suis creaturis secundum earum naturam et consilia sapientiae suae. Eadem Dei sincera voluntas dicitur misericordia, quatenus tendit ad opitulandum creaturarum miseriae, eamque depellendam. Utrumque Dei attributum est infinitum in se; sed infinitum nequit esse in sui manifestatione in creaturis, siquidem effectus nequeunt esse nisi finiti. Quemadmodum autem Deus libere se manifestat ad extra, ita se libere manifestat eo gradu, quo vult. Unde Deus vere bonus et misericors est; omnium enim vult salutem, omnibus media ad eam necessaria subministrat, omnium miseriae in hac vita opitulatur; at si quis divinae bonitati et misericordiae resistens, mediis salutis abutitur, et seipsum constituit in perditionis statu; nequit certe Deo vitio verti quod ille in aeternum in perditionis statu perseveret, nisi aut divina benignitas uti caecus quidam affectus concipiatur, aut ipsa creatura jus habeat praescribendi gradum et modum, quo Deus illi suam bonitatem communicet. Quae quidem sunt absurdissima. Vid. etiam (n. 104. NOTA.)

2. Notamus cum S. Hieronymo (Comment. in c. 3. Jonae): "Scimus clementem esse Deum, nec qui peccatores sumus, crudelitate illius delectamur; sed legimus: 'Misericors et justus Dominus, et Deus noster miseretur.' Justitia Dei vallatur misericordia, et tali ad judicium ambitione procedit: sic parcit ut judicet, sic judicat ut misereatur. 'Misericordia et veritas obviaverunt sibi: justitia et pax osculatae sunt.'" Vid. etiam D. Thomam 1. 2. q. 87. a. 3. ad 3.; 2. 2. q. 157. a. 2. ad 1. 652. Therefore we say:

PROPOSITION XLVIII. Reason, well consulted, not only detects nothing absurd in the dogma concerning the eternity of punishments, but supplies arguments which are especially able to commend it.

Proof I. It is especially fitting both to

the principles of right reason and to the divine attributes that there be proportion between fault and punishment; but proportion of this kind shines forth especially in the eternal punishment of the damned. Therefore.

The minor is proved. Lethal sin has a certain infinite malice; therefore a punishment which is in some way infinite is especially proportioned to it. But eternal punishment is such. Therefore.

In order that the true force of this argument may be understood, we note, 1. with St. Thomas, I-II, question 87, article 4, body: "In sin there are two things: one of them is aversion from the immutable good, which is infinite, whence on this side sin is infinite; the other thing which is in sin is inordinate conversion to a mutable good, and on this side sin is finite, both because the mutable good itself is finite, and also because the conversion itself is finite; for acts of a creature cannot be infinite."

3. The same holy Doctor says in the Supplement, question 99, article 1: "Through it, namely mortal fault, one sins against God, who is infinite. Hence since punishment cannot be infinite in intensity, because a creature is not capable of any infinite quality, it is required that it be at least infinite in duration."

Lest there be any place for cavils against this certain infinity of fault, we note with Lessius (On the Divine Perfections, book 13, chapter 26, nos. 118 and following): "The formal malice of sin consists not only in withdrawal from the rule of reason, but also in a certain injury which is inflicted upon God, which is found in every deadly sin. For all deadly sins agree in this, that they include a certain contempt of God, some greater, some lesser. In some sins God is more directly contemned, as in hatred of God, blasphemy, and similar things, which are more directly against the honor of God; in others only indirectly and interpretatively, insofar as the divine law is violated and contemned in a grave matter, and consequently the legislator himself, his friendship, all his promises, and all his threats. From this it follows that deadly sin contains infinite malice, not indeed absolutely and altogether, but respectively. The reason is that the greater the majesty which is contemned, the graver the offense; but the majesty of God, which is contemned by deadly sin, is infinite; therefore the offense too has a certain infinity. But the reason why absolute infinity in the ratio of malice is not concluded by that argument is that the object is not attained adequately, whence it does not adequately flow into the act, nor does it fully bestow on it its own infinity. For just as God can without end be loved more and more perfectly, so also by sin he can without end be more and more hated and contemned. Yet by this very fact, that he is judged to be contemned absolutely, the act contracts a certain infinity of malice, as being of a higher order with respect to all good works. For the malignity of deadly sin is so great that, placed in the balance of divine justice, it would outweigh all the good works of all the Saints, even if these were a thousand times more numerous and greater than in reality they are. This consideration is very terrible. Nor should this seem wonderful, because all the good works by which God is honored by the Saints, although considered in themselves they are of the greatest estimation, and they themselves on account of them are worthy of eternal life, nevertheless with respect to the divine majesty are like nothing. For no favor is done to him through all these things, to whose majesty and benefits all these things are owed, and not these only, but infinitely more and greater things. Therefore all those things are nothing great to God. But to be contemned by his creature, who is bound to him by infinite titles, and who ought to render to him infinite love and honor if he could - this is esteemed greatest, as being maximally repugnant to his majesty and benefits. Hence it is esteemed by God as greater in the ratio of evil than all good works are in the ratio of good; and it would afflict God more, if he were capable of sorrow, than all good works would make him rejoice. Hence the holy Fathers teach that no pure creature could have satisfied God, and accordingly that it was necessary, for just satisfaction, that God become man. From these things a reason can be brought forward why deadly sin is punished with eternal punishment. For if its malignity is so great that it could not have been compensated and equaled from equality by any good works of pure nature, but for this it was necessary that God be incarnate so that a condign satisfaction might be exhibited to divine justice, it is not wonderful if it is said to merit eternal punishment. For that which is so evil that it cannot be compensated and equaled by any goods, however long continued in time, merits a punishment longer than any finite time, and therefore eternal; and this per se and directly by reason of the malice which is in the act, not because the sinner cannot make satisfaction for it, or restore himself in that order from which he has fallen, or repair

spiritual life, or remove the stain. For although all these things concur in deadly sin, nevertheless the proper reason why eternal punishment is owed to it must not be sought from these, but from the very malice of the act, from which that impotence also follows, just as in other sins the measure of punishment is to be established from the measure of fault, not from the impotence of making satisfaction."

Proof II. It is especially fitting that one who sins for eternity be punished for eternity; but one who commits lethal sin by turning himself away from God, as far as lies in him, sins for eternity. Therefore.

This is explained from St. Thomas in the Supplement, same place: "Gregory says in book 4 of the Dialogues, chapter 44, before the middle: 'It pertains to the great justice of the judge that those should never lack punishment who in this life never wished to lack sin.' And if it is objected that some who sin mortally propose sometimes to change their life for the better, and so according to this they would not seem worthy of eternal punishment, it must be said, according to some, that Gregory speaks of the will which is manifested by deed. For one who falls into mortal sin by his own will places himself in a state from which he cannot be rescued unless divinely helped. Hence from the very fact that he wills to sin, he consequently wills to remain perpetually in sin. For man is a spirit going, namely into sin, and not returning by himself, Psalm 77:39. Just as if someone threw himself into a pit from which he could not leave unless helped, it could be said that he had willed to remain there eternally, whatever else he might think. Or it can be said, and better, that from the very fact that he sins mortally, he constitutes his end in the creature. And because the whole of life is ordered to the end, therefore from this very fact he orders his whole life to that sin; and he would will to remain perpetually in sin if this were unpunished for him. And this is what Gregory says in book 34 of the Moralia, chapter 16, around the middle, on that saying of Job 41, 'He will esteem the abyss as growing old': 'The wicked sinned with an end because they lived with an end; for they would have wished to live without end so that they could have remained without end in their iniquities; for they desire to sin more than to live.'"

Proof III. It is especially fitting that God establish a sanction sufficient of itself and very efficacious, lest men transgress his law, and so that, just as there is an absolute opposition between evil and good, the same end should not finally belong to those who have cultivated virtue and those who have served vice. But eternal punishment accomplishes this. Therefore.

For proof of the minor and explanation of the whole argument, we note: 1. The path of virtue is arduous; human minds are very prone to vices; men are vehemently enticed by the allurements of the senses; constant exertion of soul is needed lest duties be violated; at times atrocious punishments must be sustained and death itself contemned so that we may persist in duty; without great virtues societies perish, etc. These things being well weighed, it is clear - and even unbelievers saw this (Lucr., On the Nature of the Gods, book 1, no. 108) - that if the eternity of punishments were removed, scarcely any efficacious motive would remain for holding men constantly under the law of God.

2. We note with St. Jerome on Jonah, chapter 3: "If after long circuits and infinite ages there will be the restoration of all things, and one dignity of those who serve as soldiers, what distance will there be between a virgin and a prostitute? What difference will there be between the Mother of the Lord and, what is even a crime to say, victims of public lusts? Will Gabriel and the devil be the same? The Apostles and demons the same? The prophets and pseudo-prophets the same? Martyrs and persecutors the same? Imagine as many years as you like, double the times, and heap up infinite ages with torments: if the end of all is similar, everything past is as nothing, because we do not ask what we once were, but what we are always going to be."

Proof IV. God certainly can, with all his attributes preserved, set beforehand a time beyond which no remaining hope of obtaining pardon exists, and after which sin will always persevere. But it is equitable that as long as sin perseveres, punishment also should persevere. Therefore.

For proof and explanation of this argument we note: 1. Nor can it be shown that God is bound even once to bestow pardon on sinners; why then would he be bound always?

2. We note with St. Augustine (City of God, book 21, chapter 11): "Why should it be unjust, when the judges of this world, punishing many crimes by the sword, remove men forever from the society of human life, for the Lord of the eternal city to cast out forever from his city the impious and his enemies, who sin unceasingly, and for those who are impure and unjust toward God and neighbor and perpetually malevolent

to remain under his wrath and curse and that of the law?"

3. St. Thomas adds in the Supplement, question 99, article 1: "But that the punishment which a worldly city inflicts is not reckoned perpetual happens accidentally, either insofar as man does not remain perpetually, or insofar as even the city itself fails. Hence if man were to live forever, the punishment of exile or servitude which is inflicted by human law would remain perpetually in him."

4. The chief end of punishment is not the amendment of the guilty party, but the reparation of order; hence it is just to inflict punishment as long as sin endures, even if the guilty one cannot be amended. "The punishments of the impious," says St. Thomas in the same place, reply 4, "which will endure forever will not be altogether useless. For they are useful for two things: first, that divine justice be preserved in them, which is acceptable to God for its own sake. Hence Gregory, Dialogues, book 4, chapter 44, around the middle: 'Almighty God, because he is kind, is not fed by the torment of the wretched; but because he is just, he is not forever quieted from the vengeance of the wicked.' Second, they are useful so that the elect may rejoice over them, when they contemplate God's justice in them and when they know that they have escaped them."

5. "That the will be changed from sin to good," says St. Thomas, Contra Gentiles, book 4, chapter 93, "does not happen except through the grace of God." Now God is held by no law to bestow his grace even on the damned, especially since he was so rich in mercy that, in order that men might avoid these punishments, he gave his Only-Begotten Son, etc."

You will say I: According to the immutable order of justice, punishment ought not exceed the gravity of fault; but this would happen if punishment were eternal, since to fault committed in a brief space of time there would correspond punishment without terminus. Therefore.

I answer: 1. There must indeed be proportion between fault and punishment; but this, as we have proved, requires eternal punishment. Nor does the briefness of the time in which the fault is committed stand in the way; for once committed, unless it is remitted by God's grace, it always remains. But as long as fault remains, punishment is owed, as we have seen.

2. Hence St. Thomas says in I-II, question 87, article 3, reply 1: "As Augustine says in City of God, book 21, chapter 11, in no judgment is it required that punishment be equal to fault according to duration. For it is not because adultery or homicide is committed in a moment that it is punished with a momentary punishment, but sometimes with perpetual imprisonment or exile, sometimes even with death; in death one does not consider the delay of the killing, but rather that one is forever taken away from the society of the living. And thus in its own way it represents the eternity of punishment inflicted divinely."

And Theodore Abu Qurrah the Bishop, disputation 14 against Origen: "The law of God and the laws of men, condemning a murderer to death and afflicting some criminal with the final punishment, do not punish him for the space of one hour; but if they punish by death, they afflict him with an eternal punishment, or if they beat him, they bring a long-lasting pain upon him from things. Indeed you too, if you found some adulterer with your wife or daughter, would judge that he should not be punished for the space of one hour, but should be killed; and this indeed is the eternal punishment of men. But the very things of nature also stand in the same way. For when it has been forbidden to us, for example, to drink cold water, or to use some harmful kind of food, and nevertheless we strive toward the forbidden thing, we certainly pay long-lasting penalties. And so it often happens that from drinking cold water, or contact with fire, or use of vinegar, we incur a continual illness. But nature is most just."

You will say II: The goodness of God is infinite, and his mercy is infinite; but the eternity of punishments cannot consist with these divine attributes, for eternal punishments exhibit God, their author, rather as cruel.

I answer: 1. The relative goodness of God, or benignity, is God's sincere will of communicating happiness to his creatures according to their nature and the counsels of his wisdom. The same sincere will of God is called mercy insofar as it tends to assist the misery of creatures and to drive it away. Both attributes of God are infinite in themselves, but the infinite cannot be infinite in its manifestation in creatures, since effects can only be finite. But just as God freely manifests himself outwardly, so he freely manifests himself in the degree in which he wills. Hence God is truly good and merciful; for he wills the salvation of all, supplies to all the means necessary for it, and assists the misery of all in this life. But if someone, resisting divine goodness and mercy, abuses the means of salvation and establishes himself in a

state of perdition, it certainly cannot be charged as a fault to God that he perseveres eternally in the state of perdition, unless either divine benignity is conceived as a certain blind affection, or the creature itself has a right to prescribe the degree and mode in which God communicates his goodness to it. These things are indeed most absurd. See also no. 104, Note.

2. We note with St. Jerome, commentary on Jonah, chapter 3: "We know that God is merciful, and we who are sinners do not delight in his cruelty; but we read: 'The Lord is merciful and just, and our God shows mercy.' The justice of God is surrounded by mercy, and proceeds to judgment with such ambition: he so spares that he judges, he so judges that he has mercy. 'Mercy and truth have met each other; justice and peace have kissed.'" See also St. Thomas, I-II, question 87, article 3, reply 3; II-II, question 157, article 2, reply 1.

Article 6. On the Nature of the Punishments of Hell

LatineEnglish

653. Quaedam sunt in hac quaestione, quae vix ullam prae se ferunt difficultatem: eadem paucis indicabimus - attingemus deinde quaestionem de natura ignis inferni.

§ I.

Quaedam exponuntur. 653. There are certain things in this question which present scarcely any difficulty. We shall indicate these briefly, and then we shall touch upon the question concerning the nature of the fire of hell.

§ I.

Certain things are explained.

654. Nomine inferni communiter hic intelligitur locus ille et status, in quo daemones, et homines in peccato lethali mortui atrocibus suppliciis in aeternum punientur. Consuevit etiam infernus appellari gehenna, quo nomine Christus Dominus in Evangelio non semel usus est. - En hujus nominis origo. Nominabatur gehenna quaedam prope Jerusalem vallis, in qua locus excelsus erat aedificatus, cui nomen Topheth. In eo Judaei in idololatriam prolapsi immolabant filios et filias idolo Moloch, eos comburendo. Pius rex Josias (2. Reg. 23. 11.) ut locum pollueret, projecit illuc cadavera, fimum, stercora; quod et deinde continuatum est, ita ut non amplius locus ille fuerit idololatriae consecratus. Imo continuus ibi ignis fuit ad comburendum cadavera. Unde ex horrore loci, cruciatibus, igne semper accenso locus tormentorum pro damnatis gehenna vocari coepit; quod nomen commune erat tempore D. N. J. Christi, ut ex antiquissimis Judaeorum libris patet. 654. By the name hell there is commonly understood here that place and state in which demons and men who have died in lethal sin will be punished forever with atrocious torments. Hell is also customarily called gehenna, a name which Christ the Lord used more than once in the Gospel. Behold the origin of this name. There was called gehenna a certain valley near Jerusalem, in which a high place had been built, whose name was Topheth. There the Jews, having fallen into idolatry, sacrificed sons and daughters to the idol Moloch by burning them. The pious king Josiah, in order to pollute the place, threw corpses, dung, and filth there; and this was continued afterward, so that that place was no longer consecrated to idolatry. Indeed, a continual fire was there for burning corpses. Hence, from the horror of the place, from the tortures, and from the fire always burning, the place of torments for the damned began to be called gehenna; and this name was common at the time of our Lord Jesus Christ, as is clear from the most ancient books of the Jews.

655. Quod infernus sit locus quidam realis, est communis Catholicorum doctrina, contra Calvinum et alios, qui putabant infernum esse nomen solum confusionis et perditionis. Si autem quaeratur, ubi sit infernus; non una fuit apud omnes opinio. Attamen jam communis videtur quam D. Thomas in 4. sent. dist. 44. q. 3. a. 2., docuit sententia, quod infernus est in loco quodam inferiori, in visceribus terrae. Hoc nomen ipsum inferni (in inferiores partes terrae) indicat - hoc conforme est modo loquendi Ecclesiae, quae saepe dixit perversos homines in infernum descendere. Vid. Const. Benedicti XII. Benedictus Deus; et Conc. Flor. in Decr. unionis. <span

id="p655">655. That hell is a certain real place is the common doctrine of Catholics, against Calvin and others, who thought that hell is only the name of confusion and perdition. But if it is asked where hell is, there has not been one opinion among all. Nevertheless that opinion which St. Thomas taught in 4 Sentences, distinction 44, question 3, article 2, now seems common: that hell is in a certain lower place, in the bowels of the earth. The very name hell indicates this, namely, into the lower parts of the earth; and this is conformable to the manner of speaking of the Church, which has often said that perverse men descend into hell. See the Constitution Benedictus Deus of Benedict XII, and the Council of Florence in the Decree of Union.

656. Multiplices esse inferni poenas patet ex iis, quae sive in Scripturis sive apud Patres leguntur. Status enim damnatorum vocatur "perditio, supplicium aeternum, ignis aeternus, gehenna ignis, caminus ignis, locus ubi vermis eorum non moritur, et ignis non extinguitur, locus tormentorum, flamma ignis dantis vindictam, stagnum ignis, stagnum ardens igne et sulphure, quod est mors secunda, tenebrae exteriores, ubi erit fletus, et stridor dentium." 656. That the punishments of hell are multiple is clear from those things which are read either in the Scriptures or among the Fathers. For the state of the damned is called "perdition, eternal punishment, eternal fire, gehenna of fire, furnace of fire, the place where their worm does not die and the fire is not extinguished, place of torments, flame of fire giving vengeance, lake of fire, lake burning with fire and sulfur, which is the second death, exterior darkness, where there will be weeping and gnashing of teeth."

657. Duplex tamen poenae genus communiter distinguitur, ad quod poenae omnes inferni reducuntur: poena damni, et poena sensus. - Poena damni, correspondens ut superius audivimus a D. Thoma, aversioni a Deo, quae in lethali peccato continetur, consistit in privatione aeternae beatitudinis, nempe visionis beatificae et omnium bonorum, quae illam consequuntur, quaeque Deus electis suis praeparavit. De hac poena intelligitur illud Luc. 13. 27.: "Nescio vos unde sitis: discedite a me omnes operarii iniquitatis." - Matth. 25. 10.: "Amen dico vobis: nescio vos." - 1. Cor. 6. 9-10.: "An nescitis quia iniqui regnum Dei non possidebunt? Nolite errare: neque fornicarii, neque idolis servientes, neque adulteri, neque molles, neque masculorum concubitores, neque fures, neque avari, neque ebriosi, neque maledici, neque rapaces, regnum Dei possidebunt." - Apoc. 22. 15.: "Foris canes, et venefici, et impudici, et homicidae, et idolis servientes, et omnis qui amat et facit mendacium," etc. Ex privatione autem aeternae beatitudinis, summa afflictio sequitur in damnatis. 657. Nevertheless a twofold genus of punishment is commonly distinguished, to which all the punishments of hell are reduced: pain of loss and pain of sense. The pain of loss, corresponding, as we heard above from St. Thomas, to aversion from God, which is contained in lethal sin, consists in the privation of eternal beatitude, namely of the beatific vision and of all goods which follow it and which God has prepared for his elect. Concerning this punishment is understood that saying of Luke 13:27: "I do not know whence you are; depart from me, all workers of iniquity." Matthew 25:10: "Amen I say to you: I do not know you." 1 Corinthians 6:9-10: "Do you not know that the unjust will not possess the kingdom of God? Do not err: neither fornicators, nor idol-servers, nor adulterers, nor the effeminate, nor men who lie with males, nor thieves, nor the greedy, nor drunkards, nor revilers, nor the rapacious will possess the kingdom of God." Apocalypse 22:15: "Outside are dogs, and sorcerers, and the impure, and murderers, and idol-servers, and everyone who loves and makes a lie," etc. From the privation of eternal beatitude, however, the greatest affliction follows in the damned.

658. Poena vero sensus, correspondens conversioni ad creaturas, dicitur illa, quae directe malum physicum, molestiam, dolorem infligit damnatis. Has quidem gravissimas esse tradunt Scriptura et Patres. S. Jo. Chrys., ex. gr., (Hom. 9. in Ep. 2. Cor. n. 4.) ait: "Pone, si ita lubet, ignem et ferrum et belluas, ac si quid his acerbius est: haec tamen pro tormentis illis

(infernalibus) ne umbrae quidem sunt ... Annon hos lictores conspicis, qui praefectis administram operam navant, quomodo trahant, quomodo vinciant, quomodo flagris afficiant, quomodo latera perfodiant, quomodo faces in tormentis admoveant, quomodo secent? Atqui haec cuncta mere ludus, ac risus sunt, si cum illis suppliciis comparentur." 658. But the pain of sense, corresponding to conversion toward creatures, is called that which directly inflicts physical evil, distress, and pain on the damned. Scripture and the Fathers teach that these are indeed most grave. St. John Chrysostom, for example, in homily 9 on 2 Corinthians, no. 4, says: "Set forth, if you please, fire and iron and beasts, and if there is anything more bitter than these; nevertheless these are not even shadows in comparison with those infernal torments ... Do you not see those lictors who render service to the prefects, how they drag, how they bind, how they strike with whips, how they pierce the sides, how they apply torches in tortures, how they cut? Yet all these things are mere play and laughter if they are compared with those punishments."

659. Longe tamen gravior est poena damni. Unde idem S. Doctor (Hom. 23. in Matth. n. 9.), ait: "Intolerabilis quidem res est gehenna, quis nesciat? et supplicium illud horribile. Tamen si quis mille ponat gehennas, nihil tale dicturus est quale est, ex beata illa gloria excidere, Christo exosum esse, et audire ab illo: 'Non novi vos.'" - Et (Hom. 23. in Ep. ad Hebr.): "Si ejus, qui est e patria ejectus, omnes miserentur, et qui amisit haereditatem, videtur omnibus miserabilis; qui a coelo excidit et a bonis, quae illic sunt reposita, quam multis plorari debet lacrymis? imo vero nec plorari. Ploratur enim quispiam, quando aliquid ei acciderit, cujus ipse non est causa; quando autem libero suo arbitrio seipsum vitio dediderit, non lacrymis, sed lamentationibus, atque luctu tunc erit dignus ... Innumerabilibus revera ejulatibus, innumerabilibus lamentationibus digni sumus. Si universus orbis terrae, et lapides, et ligni, et arbores, et ferae, et aves, et, ut semel dicam, totius orbis terrae voce accepta nos defleat, quia bonis illis excidimus, nihil ut par est, deflebit, vel lamentabitur." Vid. etiam D. Th. opusc. 2. c. 174. 659. Yet the pain of loss is much graver. Hence the same holy Doctor, homily 23 on Matthew, no. 9, says: "Gehenna is indeed an intolerable thing - who does not know it? - and that punishment is horrible. Yet if someone were to posit a thousand gehennas, he would say nothing such as what it is to fall away from that blessed glory, to be hated by Christ, and to hear from him: 'I do not know you.'" And in homily 23 on the Epistle to the Hebrews: "If all pity the one who is cast out from his homeland, and he who has lost an inheritance seems miserable to all, with how many tears ought he to be wept for who has fallen away from heaven and from the goods which are stored up there? Indeed, truly, he should not even be wept for. For someone is wept for when something happens to him of which he himself is not the cause; but when by his free choice he has given himself over to vice, then he will be worthy not of tears, but of lamentations and mourning ... We are truly worthy of innumerable cries, of innumerable lamentations. If the whole world, and stones, and wood, and trees, and wild beasts, and birds, and, to say it once, if the whole world received a voice and wept for us because we have fallen away from those goods, it would not weep or lament as is fitting." See also St. Thomas, opusculum 2, chapter 174.

660. Praecipua inter poenas sensus, et quam saepius commemorat Scriptura, est poena ignis. De hac specialis controversia instituenda est. Quaeritur ergo utrum ignis inferni sit realis et corporeus; vel solum metaphoricus: utrum per realem actionem, quam ut Dei vindicis instrumentum exercet; vel solum per apprehensionem cruciet.

Ratio dubitandi est quod ignis ille non modo cruciabit corpora hominum damnatorum, sed et eorum animas, quemadmodum et daemones: ignis autem corporeus non videtur posse in spiritus agere. Vide Suarez (de Angelis l. 8. c. 12. n. 8.) 660. Chief among the pains of sense, and the one which Scripture mentions most often, is the pain of fire. A special controversy must be instituted concerning this. Therefore it is asked whether the fire of hell is real and corporeal, or only metaphorical; whether it torments through a real action which it exercises as the instrument of God the

avenger, or only through apprehension.

The reason for doubting is that that fire will torment not only the bodies of damned men, but also their souls, just as it will torment demons; but corporeal fire does not seem able to act upon spirits. See Suarez (On Angels, book 8, chapter 12, no. 8).

661. Tropice Calvinus cum aliis ignem illum intelligendum esse censuit, nec defuerunt pauci quidam inter Catholicos qui vel idem docuerint, vel saltem de natura illius dubitaverint. Quamvis nulla sit Ecclesiae definitio de hac re; attamen universae Ecclesiae consensus satis ostendit quid unicuique tenendum sit. Sententia Catharini, qui negabat ignem inferni esse realem et corporeum, statim ab omnibus Theologis rejecta est; et "alii," inquit Patuzzi, "haereticam, alii haeresi proximam, universim autem saltem erroneam, ac admodum temerariam appellant." Et Suarez (l. c. n. 9.), inquit: "Certa et Catholica sententia est, ignem inferni, qui paratus est diabolo et angelis ejus, ut in illo crucientur, verum ac proprium ignem corporeum esse. Hic est communis consensus scholasticorum omnium, ut in discursu sequentium capitum videbimus, imo est communis sensus Ecclesiae et catholicorum, ut experientia notum est." 661. Calvin, with others, judged that that fire must be understood tropically, nor were there lacking a few among Catholics who either taught the same or at least doubted concerning its nature. Although there is no definition of the Church concerning this matter, nevertheless the consensus of the universal Church sufficiently shows what must be held by each person. The opinion of Catharinus, who denied that the fire of hell is real and corporeal, was immediately rejected by all Theologians; and, says Patuzzi, "some call it heretical, others proximate to heresy, but universally at least erroneous and exceedingly rash." And Suarez, same place, no. 9, says: "The certain and Catholic opinion is that the fire of hell, which has been prepared for the devil and his angels, so that they may be tormented in it, is true and proper corporeal fire. This is the common consensus of all the scholastics, as we shall see in the course of the following chapters; indeed, it is the common sense of the Church and of Catholics, as is known by experience."

662. Antequam vero hanc catholicam doctrinam tueamur, pauca, claritatis gratia, praenotamus. Atque 1. Quamvis ignis inferni similis sit igni, quo in praesenti vita utimur, non uno tamen modo ab eodem differt. Etenim "principalis efficiens causa ignis praesentis vitae Deus est naturae auctor, et gubernator: at ignis inferni, Deus est peccatorum judex et ultor. - Chimicis operationibus et succenditur et fovetur praesens ignis: at ignis infernus flatu Domini cietur, et conservatur. Praesens ignis nonnisi mediis corporibus in animas agit: at ignis infernus illas immediate torquet et cruciat. Praesens ignis tandem extinguitur: at infernus ignis perpetuum durabit. - Ille lucet, hic tenebras parit exteriores: ille inflammando dissolvit et consumit, hic angit et urit, neque tamen destruit: ille et imminui et extingui humana arte potest, hic conatus omnes eludit, et Dei virtute sustentatur."

2. Distinguendum est inter ignem ipsum, et dolorem vel cruciatum quem daemones vel animae damnatorum (de corporibus enim nulla potest esse quaestio) ex igne experiuntur. Ignis ab omnibus adstruitur materialis et corporeus; cruciatus vero, prout in spiritu recipitur, spiritualis dici potest. "Quia omne quod recipitur," inquit Suarez (de Angelis l. 8. c. 14. n. 43.), "ad modum recipientis recipitur; ideo dolor receptus in spiritu spiritualis est." Et ita facile explicantur quaedam SS. Patrum dicta, quae prima fronte difficultatem facere videntur.

3. Distinguendus est insuper ignis ipse a modo, quo ab eo tamquam Dei instrumento (concedunt enim omnes non posse spiritum naturaliter a corpore pati) spiritus torquentur. Omnes conveniunt in eo quod ignis est realis et materialis, atque realiter spiritus cruciat; plures autem sunt Theologorum sententiae quoad modum illum explicandum.

D. Thomas in 4. sent. dist. 44. q. 3. a. 3., aliorum opinionibus relatis, concludit "quod hoc superadditur igni corporeo in quantum est instrumentum divinae justitiae vindicantis, quod sic detinet Spiritum; et ita efficitur ei poenalis, retardans eum ab executione propriae voluntatis, ne scilicet possit operari ubi vult, et secundum quod vult." - Et c. g. l. 4. c. 90. ait: "Si poena afflictiva peccato debetur, quam dicimus poenam sensus, ut in tertio lib. (cap. 145.) ostensum est, oportet quod ex illo haec poena proveniat quod potest afflictionem inferre. Nihil autem afflictionem infert,

nisi in quantum est contrarium voluntati ... Est autem contrarium naturali voluntati spiritualis substantiae ut corpori subdatur, a quo secundum ordinem suae naturae libera esse debet. Conveniens igitur est ut substantia spiritualis per corporalia puniatur."

Suarez vero (l. mox cit. n. 41.), ait: "Superest ergo quarta opinio dicens, terminum productum a gehennali igne in daemone, seu spiritu separato, esse qualitatem quamdam spiritualem, in suo ordine doloriferam, dolore utique pure spirituali, ac proinde tanto majore, quando spiritualia superant materialia." Deinde, difficultati, quam sibi proponit: "instrumentum non agit aliquid virtute agentis superioris, nisi praevia sua actione naturali, per quam possit prius attingere subjectum, in quod acturum est instrumentaliter;" inter caetera respondet (n. 43.): si actio praevia dicatur, ipsamet productio talis qualitatis spectata secundum communem rationem productionis qualitatis, abstrahendo a tali specifico termino et subjecto: sic etiam ignis ille dicetur habere actionem praeviam, quatenus vim naturalem habet ad qualitatem aliquam efficiendam; sicut etiam dici potest, habere praevium contactum, non quantitatis, sed intimae praesentiae, in quantum intra se potest spiritum continere, et instrumentalem virtutem habere dici potest, non additam intrinsece, sed juvantem, nec omnino naturalem, sed obedientialem, et consequenter non completam, sed inchoatam, quae per solam excellentiorem, et naturae non debitam cooperationem divinam, ad agendum completur: ergo ex hoc capite nulla probatur repugnantia."

4. At quamvis ratio non possit assignare modum positivum, quo spiritus ab igne materiali torquentur (nobis quidem satius videtur repetere cum S. Augustino "ignis cruciat spiritus veris licet miris modis") - nequit tamen ostendere illud repugnare: "demus," inquit idem S. Doctor, "Deum aliquid posse, quod nos fatemur investigare non posse."

Sunt quidem plures modi, quibus facile conceditur non posse spiritus ab igne pati. Ita a) D. Thomas c. g. l. 4. c. 90., ait: "Non igitur sic aestimandum est quod substantiae incorporeae ab igne corporeo pati possint, quod earum natura corrumpatur per ignem, vel alteretur, aut qualitercumque aliter transmutetur, sicut nunc nostra corpora corruptibilia patiuntur ab igne."

b) "Neque etiam potest dici, quod patiantur ab igne corporeo afflictionem alicujus contrarietatis, sicut corpora post resurrectionem patientur; quia substantiae incorporeae organa sensuum non habeant, neque potentiis sensitivis utuntur."

c) Suarez (l. mox cit. nn. 26-33.) concedit ignem non torquere daemones calorem corporeum inducendo - nec causare posse in daemone tristitiam, qualem causat in animam, cum corpus ei unitum uritur - nec animae separatae dolorem ab igne esse ejusdem rationis cum dolore conjunctae etc.

Sed ex eo, quod his aut aliis modis repugnat spiritum ab igne corporeo pati, non sequitur nullum esse modum possibilem, quo divina omnipotentia fieri illud possit.

5. Imo ratio potest hujusmodi possibilitatem aliquo pacto suadere. Nam licet mala, quae a corporum actione nobis inferuntur, proprie sentiat et patiatur totum compositum ex anima et corpore; certum est tamen, quod anima ipsa, quae hujus compositi est pars et sensum corpori communicat, aliquo modo et ipsa patitur. Hoc quidem non explicat positive modum, quo spiritus ab igne patitur, siquidem igni non unitur uti forma; sed saltem ostendit non repugnare naturae spiritus, ut sit aliquis modus, quo a corpore patiatur. Unde S. Augustinus (de civ. Dei l. 14. c. 15.) ait: "Dolores, qui dicuntur carnis, animae sunt in carne, et ex carne, nam dolor carnis offensio est animae ex carne, et quaedam ab ejus passione dissensio: sicut animae dolor, qui tristitia nuncupatur, dissensio est ab his rebus, quae nobis nolentibus accidunt," et lib. 12. cap. 3. inquit: "Si consideremus diligentius dolorem, qui dicitur corporis, magis ad animam pertinet." 662. But before we defend this Catholic doctrine, we note a few things beforehand for the sake of clarity. And 1. Although the fire of hell is similar to the fire which we use in the present life, nevertheless it differs from it in more than one way. For "the principal efficient cause of the fire of the present life is God as author and governor of nature; but of the fire of hell, God is the judge and avenger of sinners. The present fire is both kindled and fostered by chemical operations; but the fire of hell is stirred and preserved by the breath of the Lord. The present fire acts upon souls only through the mediation of bodies; but the fire of hell immediately torments and tortures them. The present fire is finally extinguished; but the infernal fire will endure perpetually. The former gives light; the latter produces exterior darkness. The former, by inflaming, dissolves and consumes; the latter constricts and burns, and yet does not destroy. The former can be lessened and extinguished by human art; the latter eludes every attempt and is

sustained by the power of God."

2. One must distinguish between the fire itself and the pain or torment which demons or the souls of the damned experience from the fire, for concerning bodies there can be no question. The fire is asserted by all to be material and corporeal; but the torment, insofar as it is received in a spirit, can be called spiritual. "Because everything that is received," says Suarez (On Angels, book 8, chapter 14, no. 43), "is received according to the mode of the receiver; therefore pain received in a spirit is spiritual." And thus certain sayings of the holy Fathers, which at first sight seem to make difficulty, are easily explained.

3. Further, the fire itself must be distinguished from the mode by which spirits are tormented by it as by an instrument of God, for all concede that a spirit cannot naturally suffer from a body. All agree in this: that the fire is real and material and really tortures spirits. But there are several opinions of Theologians concerning the explanation of that mode.

St. Thomas, in 4 Sentences, distinction 44, question 3, article 3, after relating the opinions of others, concludes "that this is superadded to corporeal fire insofar as it is an instrument of divine justice avenging: that it thus detains the spirit; and thus it is made penal for it, restraining it from the execution of its own will, namely so that it cannot operate where it wills and according as it wills." And in Contra Gentiles, book 4, chapter 90, he says: "If an afflictive punishment is owed to sin, which we call the pain of sense, as was shown in the third book, chapter 145, it must be that this punishment comes from that which can bring affliction. But nothing brings affliction except insofar as it is contrary to the will ... But it is contrary to the natural will of a spiritual substance to be subjected to a body, from which according to the order of its nature it ought to be free. Therefore it is fitting that a spiritual substance be punished through corporeal things."

But Suarez, in the place just cited, no. 41, says: "Therefore there remains the fourth opinion, saying that the terminus produced by gehenna fire in a demon, or separated spirit, is a certain spiritual quality, pain-bearing in its own order, by a purely spiritual pain, and therefore so much greater as spiritual things surpass material things." Then, to the difficulty which he proposes to himself, "an instrument does not act anything by the power of a superior agent unless by its own prior natural action, through which it can first attain the subject upon which it is going to act instrumentally," among other things he answers, no. 43: if the prior action is said to be the very production of such a quality, considered according to the common ratio of production of a quality, abstracting from such a specific terminus and subject, then that fire also will be said to have a prior action insofar as it has the natural power for producing some quality. Likewise it can be said to have a prior contact, not of quantity, but of intimate presence, insofar as it can contain a spirit within itself; and it can be said to have instrumental power, not added intrinsically, but assisting, and not altogether natural, but obediential, and consequently not complete, but begun, which is completed for acting only through a more excellent and, to nature, not owed divine cooperation. Therefore from this head no repugnance is proved.

4. But although reason cannot assign the positive mode by which spirits are tormented by material fire - indeed it seems safer to us to repeat with St. Augustine, "fire torments spirits in true though wondrous ways" - nevertheless it cannot show that this is repugnant. "Let us grant," says the same holy Doctor, "that God can do something which we confess that we cannot investigate."

There are indeed several modes in which it is easily granted that spirits cannot suffer from fire. Thus a) St. Thomas, Contra Gentiles, book 4, chapter 90, says: "Therefore it must not be judged that incorporeal substances can suffer from corporeal fire in such a way that their nature is corrupted by fire, or altered, or in any other way transmuted, as now our corruptible bodies suffer from fire."

b) "Nor can it be said that they suffer from corporeal fire the affliction of some contrariety, as bodies will suffer after the resurrection, because incorporeal substances do not have organs of the senses, nor do they use sensitive powers."

c) Suarez, in the place just cited, nos. 26-33, grants that fire does not torment demons by inducing corporeal heat, nor can it cause in a demon sadness of the sort which it causes in the soul when the body united to it is burned, nor is the pain of a separated soul from fire of the same ratio as the pain of a soul joined to a body, etc.

But from the fact that it is repugnant for a spirit to suffer from corporeal fire in these or other modes, it does not follow that there is no possible mode by which divine omnipotence can bring this about.

5. Indeed reason can commend the possibility of this in some way. For although

the evils which are inflicted upon us by the action of bodies are properly felt and suffered by the whole composite of soul and body, nevertheless it is certain that the soul itself, which is part of this composite and communicates sensation to the body, also in some way itself suffers. This indeed does not positively explain the mode by which a spirit suffers from fire, since it is not united to fire as form; but it at least shows that it is not repugnant to the nature of a spirit that there be some mode by which it suffers from a body. Hence St. Augustine (City of God, book 14, chapter 15) says: "The pains which are called pains of the flesh belong to the soul in the flesh and from the flesh; for pain of the flesh is an offense of the soul from the flesh, and a certain dissent from its passion, just as pain of the soul, which is called sadness, is dissent from those things which happen to us unwillingly." And book 12, chapter 3, he says: "If we consider more carefully the pain which is called bodily, it pertains more to the soul."

Corrected Latin

663. His praestitutis,

§ II.

Statuitur catholica sententia de natura ignis inferni.

PROP. XLIX. Ex revelationis fontibus apertissime constat ignem infernum corporeum et realem esse, non metaphoricum.

Prob. I. Ex Scriptura. Saepissime in Scriptura tum V. tum N. T. fit mentio de igne inferni. - Ex V. T. Ps. 10. 7.: "Pluet super peccatores laqueos: ignis et sulphur, et spiritus procellarum, pars calicis eorum." Ps. 20. 10.: "Pones eos ut clibanum ignis ... Dominus in ira sua conturbabit eos, et devorabit eos ignis." Job. 20. 26.: "Omnes tenebrae absconditae sunt in oculis ejus: devorabit eum ignis, qui non succenditur." - Isa. 66. 15. 16.: "Ecce Dominus in igne veniet, et quasi turbo quadrigae ejus: reddere in indignatione furorem suum, et increpationem suam in flamma ignis: quia in igne Dominus dijudicabit, et in gladio suo ad omnem carnem." - Ibid. 24.: "Vermis eorum non morietur, et ignis eorum non extinguetur." - Malach. 4. 1.: "Ecce enim dies veniet succensa quasi caminus: et erunt omnes superbi, et omnes facientes impietatem, stipula, et inflammabit eos dies veniens." - Ps. 139. 11.: "Cadent super eos carbones, in ignem dejicies eos, in miseriis non subsistent." - Jerem. 15. 14.: "Ignis succensus est in furore meo, super vos ardebit." - Eccl. 7. 19.: "Vindicta carnis impii, ignis et vermis," etc.

Ex N. T. Matth. 13. 42.: "in caminum ignis" - Apoc. 19. 20.: "in stagnum ignis ardentis sulphure." - Apoc. 20. 10.: "in stagnum ignis et sulphuris." - Matth. 25. 41.: "in ignem aeternum." - II. Thess. 1. 8.: "flammam ignis dantis vindictam iis, qui Deum non noverunt," etc.

Unde: ignis inferni, de quo saepe loquitur Scriptura, sumendus est sensu proprio et non metaphorico. Ergo.

Prob. antec. Ponendus certe est aliquis modus interpretationibus metaphoricis, ut ipse communis sensus ostendit: secus nihil supererit in bibliis certum. - Modus ponendus praecipue hic est, ut interpretationes metaphoricae non debeant praesumi, sed perspicuis argumentis probari: humana enim consuetudo non patitur, ut semper metaphorice loquamur; imo communis oratio propria, metaphorica rarior, et quae detegi facile possit, esse debet. Atqui nullum est argumentum probans ignem infernum, de quo loquitur Scriptura, intelligendum esse metaphorice; omnia e contra in id conspirant, ut sensu proprio illum sumendum demonstrent. Ergo.

Prob. min. a) Si quae est occasio, in qua a metaphoricis locutionibus abstinendum est, ea potissimum est quum leges feruntur, sanctio statuitur, sententia dicitur. Atqui quum de his agitur, ut patet ex cit. testimoniis, Scriptura commemorat ignem inferni. Ergo.

b) Utrum ignis infernus, de quo agit Scriptura, sit sumendus sensu metaphorico vel proprio, nequit melius colligi, quam ex proprietatibus et effectibus, quos Scriptura ipsa igni illi tribuit. Atqui hujusmodi proprietates et effectus tales sunt, ut conveniant igni reali, et non metaphorico. Revera Scriptura agens, ut vidimus, de igne inferni, commemorat caminum, fumum, stagnum, flammam, adustionem; commemorat ignem qui adurit, qui in flammam excrescit, qui devorat, qui non extinguitur, et quo reprobi instar stipulae succenduntur. Quae omnia nonnisi igni reali convenire possunt.

c) Nec dici potest hos effectus et proprietates sumendos esse metaphorice sicut ipsa vox ignis. Etenim 1. juxta usum S. Scripturae, si aliquod doctrinae caput interdum metaphorice traditur, frequentius vel saltem aliquando propriis terminis effertur: nihil autem hujusmodi accidit in casu. - 2. Scriptura in re gravissima, saepissime commemorat ignem, eidem tribuens effectus et proprietates ignis realis; nullibi aut diserte et explicite, aut

subobscure et implicite innuit sensum metaphoricum: exinde communissima, ut vidimus, in Ecclesia sententia de igne reali et corporeo, et non metaphorico. Si ignis ille esset metaphoricus, nonne communissimus error videretur ipsi Deo tribuendus? Siquidem nullus alius erat modus clarius naturam ignis describendi.

d) Confirmatur ex analogia Scripturarum. Non semel enim hominum peccata a Deo fuerunt igne punita. Gen. 19. 24.: "Igitur Dominus pluit super Sodomam et Gomorrham sulphur et ignem a Domino de coelo." - Lev. 10. 2.: "Egressusque ignis a Domino, devoravit eos, et mortui sunt coram Domino." - Reg. 1. 14.: "Ecce descendit ignis de coelo, et devoravit duos principes quinquagenarios ... et quinquagenos, qui cum eis erant." - Petrus vero contestatur II. Pet. 3. 10., quod "adveniet dies Domini, ut fur, in quo caeli magno impetu transient, elementa vero calore solventur, terra autem et quae in ipsa sunt opera, exurentur." In his omnibus locis, quibus Deus praefertur igne tamquam instrumento uti ad puniendos peccatores, certum est agi de igne reali et corporeo: cur ergo sumeretur sensu metaphorico ignis, quo Deus puniet reprobos in inferno, illos detrudens in caminum ignis?

e) Nec potest dici in casu obstare substratam materiam, quominus ignis sumatur sensu proprio; agitur enim de spiritibus cruciandis. Etenim 1. Tunc obstaret propriae interpretationi substrata materia, si ratio evidenter ostenderet repugnantiam in eo, ut spiritus igne corporeo ullo modo torqueantur; atqui illud, ut vidimus, ratio non demonstrat, imo contrarium suadet. - 2. Non obstat substrata materia, quominus ignis, ad quem Christus Judex in ultimo judicio damnabit homines reprobos, sit ignis realis et corporeus; siquidem saltem eorum corpora poterunt ab igne illo cruciari. Atqui idem est ignis, quo torquentur daemones; nam dicitur paratus diabolo et Angelis ejus. Ergo.

Prob. II. Ex Patribus. Ex Conc. Trid. Sacra Scriptura interpretanda est juxta unanimem SS. Patrum consensum: ergo si quod dubium superesse posset utrum ignis inferni sit materialis et realis prout in Scripturis exhibetur; illud ex constanti Patrum traditione evanesceret. Etenim a) Constanter Patres eodem modo loquuntur de igne inferno, ac ipsa Scriptura, eosdemque illi tribuunt effectus et proprietates; ergo iisdem argumentis, quibus probatum est Scripturam loqui de igne reali, et non metaphorico probatur etiam eumdem esse sensum Patrum.

b) Imo explicite et diserte Patres asserunt ignem inferni esse corporeum et realem. Ita S. Augustinus (de civ. Dei l. 20. c. 22.) exponens locum: "Vermis eorum non moritur, et ignis non extinguitur," ait: credibilius esse, ignem proprie ad corpus, vermen vero tropice ad animam referri. Lib. 21. c. 10 inquit: "Cur non dicamus, quamvis miris, tamen veris modis etiam spiritus incorporeos posse poena corporalis ignis affligi, si spiritus hominum, etiam ipsi profecto incorporei et nunc potuerunt includi in corporalibus membris, et tunc poterunt corporum suorum vinculis insolubiliter alligari? Adhaerebunt ergo, si eis nulla sunt corpora, spiritus daemonum, imo spiritus daemones, licet incorporei, corporeis ignibus cruciandi." S. Gregorius (l. 4. Dialog. c. 28.): "Sicut electos beatitudo laetificat, ita credi necesse est, quod a die exitus sui, ignis reprobos exurat." Petrus vero interrogat: "Et qua ratione credendum est, quod rem incorpoream tenere ignis corporeus possit," quod cap. 29. prosequitur. Et tandem diserte interrogat: "An ignis inferni corporeus sit," et respondet: "Corporeum esse non ambigo." - S. Hieronymus (Ep. 59. ad Avitum), inter errores cavendos in libris Origenis, hunc ponit: "Quod ignis inferni non punit in suppliciis, sed in conscientia peccatorum." Et in id ad Ephes. 5.: "Nemo vos seducat," vel ut ipse legit, "decipiat inanibus verbis," inter haec verba inania ponit eorum opinionem: "Qui dicunt non futura pro peccatis esse supplicia, nec extrinsecus adhibenda tormenta, sed ipsum peccatum, et conscientiam delicti esse pro poena, dum vermis in corde non moritur, et ignis in animo accenditur." - Hugo Eterianus (de Regressu anim. c. 12.): "Nec est in dubitationis parte locandum, ignem illius modi esse corporeum, in quo certum est spiritus cruciari." - Hugo de S. Victore (l. 2. de Sacr. p. 16. c. 3.): "Verissime auctoritate sacri eloquii, et catholicae veritatis probatur testimonio, corporali, et materiali igne, animas etiam nunc ante susceptionem corporum cruciari."

c) Patres comparant ignem inferni, cum igne, quo hic utimur, et quo Deus in hac vita aliquando punivit peccata. Ita S. Gregorius Nyss. (in orat. magna catech. c. 40.): "Sed etsi aliquod ex iis, quae illic sunt, tormentis, nominatum fuerit nominibus, quae hic sunt cognita, non est tamen parvum discrimen. Nam cum ignem audis, didicisti aliquem ab illo diversum intelligere ex eo, quod igni illi aliquid sit additum, quod non est in hoc; nam ille quidem non extinguitur, hunc autem multa inventa sunt, quae extinguant: magna est autem differentia inter eum qui extinguitur, et eum qui nullam admittit extinctionem."

- S. Joan. Chrysost. (Hom. 4. in Ep. ad Rom. n. 3.): "Si gehennam audiens rides, et incredulus es, recordare ignis illius Sodomorum. Vidimus enim, vidimus et in praesenti vita gehennae imaginem." - S. Augustinus (serm. 80. de temp.): "Ignis hic, qui in praesenti est vita, absumit cuncta, quae recipit; ille vero, quos suscepit, semper cruciat, et poenae suae integros servat ... Potentiam autem illius ignis nulla vox exponere, nullus poterit sermo explanare."

d) Nulla facta distinctione, loquuntur Patres de igne cruciante corpora damnatorum post resurrectionem, et de igne cruciante daemones et animas. Ita Lactantius (Inst. l. 7. c. 21.): "Docent nos SS. Litterae, quemadmodum poenas impii sint laturi. Nam quia peccata in corporibus contraxerunt, rursus carne induentur, ut in corporibus piaculum solvant ... cruciatibus et igne sempiterno, cujus natura diversa est ab hoc nostro, quo ad vitae necessaria utimur, qui nisi alicujus materiae fomite alatur, extinguitur. At ille divinus per se ipsum semper vivit, ac viget sine ullis alimentis, nec admixtum habet fumum, sed est purus, ac liquidus, et in aquae modum fluidus." - S. Isidorus Hispal. (de sum. bono l. 1. c. 3.): "Duplex damnatorum poena est in gehenna: quorum et mentem urit tristia, et corpus flamma justa vicissitudine, ut qui mente tractaverant quod perficerent corpore, simul et animo puniantur et corpore." - S. Bernardus (de dom. intern. c. 38.): "Tormenta erunt sine intervallo, et sine temperamento. Timor conturbabit te, cum terra aperietur coram te, et tu rues et cades in stagnum sulphuris ardentis et foetentis. Ignis exterius carnem tuam consumet, vermis interius conscientiam corrodet."

e) Ut defenderent ignem infernum, quem pagani deridebant, non dixerunt illum metaphoricum, sed ad eorum traditiones appellantes, illum realem et corporeum adstruere. Ita Minutius Felix (in Octav. n. 35.): "Admonentur homines doctissimorum libris, et carminibus Poetarum illius ignei fluminis, et de stygia palude saepius ambientis ardoris, quae cruciatibus aeternis praeparata, et daemonum indiciis et oraculis Prophetarum cognita tradiderunt. Nec tormentis modus ullus, aut terminus. Illic sapiens ignis membra urit et reficit, carpit et nutrit. Sicut ignes fulminum corpora tangunt, nec absumunt; sicut ignes Aetnae, et Vesuvii, et ardentium ubique terrarum flagrant, nec erogantur; ita poenale illud incendium non damnis ardentium pascitur, sed in exesa corporum laceratione nutritur." - Arnobius (l. 2.): "Audetis ridere nos, cum gehennas dicimus, et inextinguibiles quosdam ignes, in quos animas dejici ... cognovimus, quid? Plato idem vester in eo volumine, quod de animae immortalitate composuit, non Acherontem, non Stygem ... nominat, in quibus animas, asseverat volvi, mergi, exuri? ... Quamvis vir lenis et benevolae voluntatis inhumanum esse crediderit capitali animas sententia condemnare, non est tamen absone suspicatus, jaci eas in flumina torrentia flammarum globis?" Cf. Petavium (de Angelis l. 3. c. 5.) - Suarez (de Angelis l. 8. c. 12. nn. 11-15) - Pro objectionibus vero cf. eumdem Suarez (l. c. nn. 20-40). 663. These things having been set down beforehand,

§ II.

The Catholic teaching concerning the nature of the fire of hell is established.

PROPOSITION XLIX. From the sources of revelation it is most openly evident that the infernal fire is corporeal and real, not metaphorical.

Proof I. From Scripture. Very often in Scripture, both in the Old and in the New Testament, mention is made of the fire of hell. - From the Old Testament. Psalm 10:7: "He shall rain snares upon sinners: fire and sulfur, and the spirit of storms, the portion of their cup." Psalm 20:10: "You shall make them like a furnace of fire ... The Lord in his wrath shall trouble them, and fire shall devour them." Job 20:26: "All darkness is hidden in his eyes: a fire which is not kindled shall devour him." - Isaiah 66:15-16: "Behold the Lord shall come in fire, and his chariots like a whirlwind: to render his fury in indignation, and his rebuke in a flame of fire: because the Lord shall judge by fire, and by his sword unto all flesh." - Ibid. 24: "Their worm shall not die, and their fire shall not be extinguished." - Malachi 4:1: "For behold, the day shall come kindled as a furnace: and all the proud, and all who do impiety, shall be stubble, and the day that comes shall inflame them." - Psalm 139:11: "Coals shall fall upon them; you shall cast them down into fire; in miseries they shall not subsist." - Jeremiah 15:14: "A fire has been kindled in my fury; it shall burn over you." - Ecclesiasticus 7:19: "The vengeance of the flesh of the impious is fire and worms," etc.

From the New Testament. Matthew 13:42: "into the furnace of fire" - Apocalypse 19:20: "into the lake of fire burning with sulfur." - Apocalypse 20:10: "into the lake of fire and sulfur." - Matthew 25:41: "into eternal fire." - 2 Thessalonians 1:8: "the flame of fire taking vengeance

on those who do not know God," etc.

Hence: the fire of hell, of which Scripture often speaks, must be taken in the proper and not in the metaphorical sense. Therefore.

Proof of the antecedent. Certainly some limit must be set to metaphorical interpretations, as common sense itself shows; otherwise nothing certain will remain in the Bible. - The limit to be set especially here is this: metaphorical interpretations ought not to be presumed, but must be proved by clear arguments. For human custom does not allow that we always speak metaphorically; rather common speech ought to be proper, metaphorical speech rarer, and such as can easily be detected. But there is no argument proving that the infernal fire of which Scripture speaks must be understood metaphorically; on the contrary, all things concur to show that it must be taken in the proper sense. Therefore.

Proof of the minor. a) If there is any occasion on which metaphorical expressions must be abstained from, it is especially that in which laws are issued, a sanction is established, and sentence is pronounced. But when these things are in question, as is evident from the cited testimonies, Scripture commemorates the fire of hell. Therefore.

b) Whether the infernal fire of which Scripture treats must be taken in a metaphorical or proper sense cannot be gathered better than from the properties and effects which Scripture itself attributes to that fire. But properties and effects of this sort are such that they agree with real fire and not with metaphorical fire. In fact Scripture, treating, as we have seen, of the fire of hell, commemorates furnace, smoke, lake, flame, burning; it commemorates fire which burns, which grows into flame, which devours, which is not extinguished, and by which the reprobate are kindled like stubble. All these can agree only with real fire.

c) Nor can it be said that these effects and properties must be taken metaphorically just as the word fire itself is. For 1. according to the use of Sacred Scripture, if some head of doctrine is at times handed down metaphorically, more frequently, or at least sometimes, it is expressed in proper terms; but nothing of this kind occurs in the present case. - 2. Scripture, in a matter of the utmost seriousness, very often commemorates fire, attributing to it the effects and properties of real fire; nowhere, either expressly and explicitly, or obscurely and implicitly, does it hint at a metaphorical sense. Hence, as we have seen, there is the most common opinion in the Church concerning a real and corporeal fire, and not a metaphorical one. If that fire were metaphorical, would not a most common error seem to have to be attributed to God himself? For there was no other way of describing more clearly the nature of the fire.

d) It is confirmed from the analogy of the Scriptures. For not once only have the sins of men been punished by God with fire. Genesis 19:24: "Therefore the Lord rained upon Sodom and Gomorrah sulfur and fire from the Lord out of heaven." - Leviticus 10:2: "And fire went forth from the Lord and devoured them, and they died before the Lord." - Kings 1:14: "Behold fire came down from heaven and devoured the two captains of fifty ... and the fifties who were with them." - But Peter testifies in 2 Peter 3:10 that "the day of the Lord shall come as a thief, in which the heavens shall pass away with great violence, but the elements shall be dissolved with heat, and the earth and the works which are in it shall be burned up." In all these places, in which God is represented as using fire as an instrument for punishing sinners, it is certain that real and corporeal fire is in question. Why then would the fire by which God will punish the reprobate in hell, thrusting them into the furnace of fire, be taken in a metaphorical sense?

e) Nor can it be said in the present case that the underlying matter prevents fire from being taken in the proper sense; for it is a question of spirits to be tormented. For 1. the underlying matter would then prevent the proper interpretation if reason clearly showed repugnance in this, that spirits should in any way be tormented by corporeal fire; but reason, as we have seen, does not demonstrate that, indeed it suggests the contrary. - 2. The underlying matter does not prevent the fire to which Christ the Judge at the last judgment will condemn reprobate men from being real and corporeal fire; since at least their bodies will be able to be tortured by that fire. But it is the same fire by which demons are tormented; for it is said to have been prepared for the devil and his angels. Therefore.

Proof II. From the Fathers. According to the Council of Trent, Sacred Scripture must be interpreted according to the unanimous consensus of the holy Fathers. Therefore, if any doubt could remain as to whether the fire of hell is material and real as it is presented in the Scriptures, that doubt would vanish from the constant tradition of the Fathers. For a) the Fathers constantly speak in the same way concerning the infernal fire as Scripture itself does, and attribute to it the same effects and properties; therefore by the same

arguments by which it has been proved that Scripture speaks of real and not metaphorical fire, it is also proved that this is the same sense of the Fathers.

b) Indeed, explicitly and expressly the Fathers assert that the fire of hell is corporeal and real. Thus St. Augustine, in The City of God, book 20, chapter 22, explaining the place, "Their worm does not die, and the fire is not extinguished," says that it is more credible that the fire is properly referred to the body, but the worm tropically to the soul. In book 21, chapter 10, he says: "Why should we not say that, although in wondrous, yet true ways, even incorporeal spirits can be afflicted by the punishment of corporeal fire, if the spirits of men, certainly themselves incorporeal, both now could be enclosed in bodily members, and then will be able to be bound inseparably by the bonds of their bodies? Therefore, if they have no bodies, the spirits of demons, or rather spirit-demons, although incorporeal, will adhere to corporeal fires in order to be tormented." St. Gregory, in Dialogues, book 4, chapter 28: "As beatitude gladdens the elect, so it is necessary to believe that, from the day of their departure, fire burns the reprobate." Peter then asks: "And by what reason must it be believed that corporeal fire can hold an incorporeal thing?" which he pursues in chapter 29. And at last he expressly asks: "Whether the fire of hell is corporeal," and answers: "I do not doubt that it is corporeal." - St. Jerome, Letter 59 to Avitus, among the errors to be avoided in the books of Origen, puts this one: "That the fire of hell does not punish in torments, but in the conscience of sinners." And on Ephesians 5, "Let no one seduce you," or, as he himself reads, "deceive you with empty words," among these empty words he places the opinion of those "who say that there will be no punishments for sins, nor torments applied from without, but that sin itself and the conscience of fault are instead of punishment, while the worm does not die in the heart and fire is kindled in the mind." - Hugh Etherianus, On the Return of the Soul, chapter 12: "Nor must it be placed among doubtful matters that the fire of that kind is corporeal, in which it is certain that spirits are tormented." - Hugh of St. Victor, On the Sacraments, book 2, part 16, chapter 3: "It is most truly proved by the authority of sacred speech and by the testimony of Catholic truth that souls, even now before the reception of bodies, are tormented by bodily and material fire."

c) The Fathers compare the fire of hell with the fire which we use here and by which God in this life has sometimes punished sins. Thus St. Gregory of Nyssa, in the Great Catechetical Oration, chapter 40: "But even if some one of the things which are there among the torments has been named by names which are known here, nevertheless the difference is not slight. For when you hear fire, you have learned to understand one different from this one from the fact that something has been added to that fire which is not in this one; for that one is not extinguished, whereas many things have been discovered which extinguish this one: but the difference is great between that which is extinguished and that which admits no extinction." - St. John Chrysostom, homily 4 on the Epistle to the Romans, no. 3: "If on hearing gehenna you laugh and are unbelieving, recall that fire of Sodom. For we have seen, we have seen even in the present life an image of gehenna." - St. Augustine, sermon 80 on time: "This fire, which is in the present life, consumes all things which it receives; but that one always torments those whom it has received, and preserves them whole for its punishment ... No voice can set forth the power of that fire; no discourse will be able to explain it."

d) Without making any distinction, the Fathers speak of the fire tormenting the bodies of the damned after the resurrection and of the fire tormenting demons and souls. Thus Lactantius, Institutes, book 7, chapter 21: "The sacred writings teach us in what manner the impious are to suffer punishments. For because they contracted sins in bodies, they will again be clothed with flesh, so that they may pay the penalty in bodies ... by torments and everlasting fire, whose nature is different from this fire of ours, which we use for the necessities of life, and which, unless it is fed by the fuel of some matter, is extinguished. But that divine fire lives and flourishes always by itself, without any nourishment, nor does it have smoke mixed in, but it is pure and liquid, and fluid after the manner of water." - St. Isidore of Seville, On the Highest Good, book 1, chapter 3: "The punishment of the damned in gehenna is twofold: sadness burns their mind, and flame their body by a just return, so that those who had treated in the mind what they would accomplish by the body may be punished at once in soul and in body." - St. Bernard, On the Interior House, chapter 38: "The torments will be without interval and without

moderation. Fear will trouble you when the earth is opened before you, and you will rush and fall into the lake of burning and fetid sulfur. Fire from without will consume your flesh; the worm from within will gnaw your conscience."

e) In order to defend the infernal fire, which the pagans mocked, the Fathers did not say that it was metaphorical, but, appealing to the pagans' own traditions, asserted that it was real and corporeal. Thus Minucius Felix, in Octavius, no. 35: "Men are reminded by the books and songs of the most learned poets of that fiery river and of the stygian marsh, often surrounding with heat, which things, prepared for eternal torments and known by the indications of demons and the oracles of the Prophets, they have handed down. Nor is there any measure or end to the torments. There a wise fire burns and repairs the members, consumes and nourishes them. As the fires of thunderbolts touch bodies and do not consume them; as the fires of Etna and Vesuvius and of burning lands everywhere blaze and are not spent; so that penal conflagration is not fed by the losses of those who burn, but is nourished in the gnawed laceration of bodies." - Arnobius, book 2: "Do you dare to laugh at us, when we say gehennae and certain inextinguishable fires, into which we have learned that souls are cast ... what then? Does not that Plato of yours, in the volume which he composed on the immortality of the soul, name Acheron, Styx ... in which he asserts that souls are rolled, plunged, burned? ... Although, as a gentle man and of benevolent will, he believed it inhuman to condemn souls by a capital sentence, nevertheless he did not absurdly suspect that they are cast into rivers rushing with globes of flames." Compare Petavius, On Angels, book 3, chapter 5; Suarez, On Angels, book 8, chapter 12, nos. 11-15. For the objections, however, compare the same Suarez, same place, nos. 20-40.

Article 7. On the Obstinacy of the Damned, and the Mitigation of Punishment

LatineEnglish

Corrected Latin

664. Ad pleniorem damnatorum status notitiam, pauca hic subjicimus de eorum obstinatione in malo et de mitigatione poenae.

§ I.

De obstinatione damnatorum in malo. 664. For a fuller knowledge of the state of the damned, we add here a few things concerning their obstination in evil and concerning the mitigation of punishment.

§ I.

On the obstination of the damned in evil.

665. Obstinatio voluntatis damnatorum in malo duo importat. 1. Ut numquam possint salutarem poenitentiam agere, et semper permaneant in peccato, propter quod damnationem incurrerunt. - 2. Ut numquam habeant actum moraliter bonum, nec umquam possint carere omni actu malo. 665. The obstination of the will of the damned in evil imports two things. 1. That they can never exercise salutary repentance, and always remain in the sin on account of which they incurred damnation. - 2. That they never have an act morally good, nor can they ever be without every evil act.

666. Et quidem 1us obstinationis effectus aperte traditur a) in Scripturis. Ita Ps. 87. 12. seq. legitur: "Numquid narrabit aliquis in sepulchro misericordiam tuam, et veritatem tuam in perditione? Numquid cognoscentur in tenebris mirabilia tua, et justitia tua in terra oblivionis?" - Ps. 113. 26.: "Non mortui laudabunt te, Domine, neque omnes qui descendunt in infernum." - Is. 38. 18.: "Quia non infernus confitebitur tibi, neque mors laudabit te: non expectabunt qui descendunt in lacum, veritatem tuam." Luc. 13. 24. 25.: "Contendite intrare per angustam portam, quia multi, dico vobis, quaerent intrare et non poterunt. Cum autem intraverit paterfamilias, et clauserit ostium, incipietis foras stare, et pulsare ostium dicentes: Domine, aperi nobis; et respondens dicet vobis: nescio vos unde sitis, etc."

b) Traditur etiam a Patribus. S. Clemens Romanus (Ep. 2. ad Cor. n. 8.) ait: "Poenitentiam agamus, quamdiu in hoc mundo sumus, et poenitendi tempus habemus; nam si ex hac vita migraverimus,

neque confessio, neque poenitentia locum habet." S. Pacianus (in paraenesi et poenit.): "Mementote, fratres, quia apud inferos exhomologesis non est, nec poenitentia tunc tribui poterit, consumpto tempore poenitendi." - S. Cyrillus Hierosol. (Catech. 18.): "Poenitentiae et remissionis peccatorum tantum in hac vita praescriptum tempus habemus." - S. Hieronymus (cont. Elvidium n. 3.): "Si dixerimus Elvidius, antequam poenitentiam ageret, morte praeventus est, non sequitur, ipsum post mortem poenitentiam egisse, cum non sit ibi poenitentiae locus." - S. Augustinus (l. de haeres. n. 43.): "Quis enim catholicus Christianus vel doctus vel indoctus, non vehementer exhorreat, eam, quam dicit purgationem malorum (Origenes), id est, etiam eos, qui hanc vitam in flagitiis et facinoribus et sacrilegiis atque impietatibus quantumlibet maximis finierunt, ipsum etiam postremo diabolum ac angelos ejus, quamvis post longissima tempora, purgatos, atque liberatos regno Dei lucique restitui? ... De qua vanissima impietate adversus philosophos, a quibus ista didicit Origenes, in libris de Civitate Dei (l. 21. c. 24.) diligentissime disputavi."

c) Caeterum plane constat ex iis, quae diximus de poenarum aeternitate. 666. And indeed the first effect of obstination is openly handed down a) in the Scriptures. Thus Psalm 87:12 and following reads: "Will anyone recount your mercy in the sepulcher, and your truth in perdition? Will your wonders be known in darkness, and your justice in the land of forgetfulness?" - Psalm 113:26: "The dead shall not praise you, O Lord, nor all who descend into hell." - Isaiah 38:18: "For hell shall not confess you, nor death praise you: those who descend into the pit shall not expect your truth." Luke 13:24-25: "Strive to enter through the narrow gate, because many, I say to you, will seek to enter and will not be able. But when the master of the house has entered and has shut the door, you will begin to stand outside and to knock at the door, saying: Lord, open to us; and answering he will say to you: I do not know whence you are, etc."

b) It is also handed down by the Fathers. St. Clement of Rome, 2nd Epistle to the Corinthians, no. 8, says: "Let us do repentance while we are in this world and have the time for repenting; for if we shall have departed from this life, neither confession nor repentance has a place." St. Pacian, in Paraenesis and Penance: "Remember, brethren, that among those below there is no exomologesis, nor will repentance then be able to be granted, when the time for repenting has been consumed." - St. Cyril of Jerusalem, Catechesis 18: "Only in this life do we have the prescribed time of repentance and remission of sins." - St. Jerome, against Helvidius, no. 3: "If we shall have said that Helvidius, before he did repentance, was overtaken by death, it does not follow that he did repentance after death, since there is not there a place for repentance." - St. Augustine, book on heresies, no. 43: "For what Catholic Christian, learned or unlearned, would not vehemently shudder at that which Origen calls the purgation of the wicked, that is, that even those who finished this life in vices and crimes and sacrileges and impieties however great, even finally the devil himself and his angels, although after very long times, are purged and liberated and restored to the kingdom of God and the light? ... Concerning this most vain impiety against the philosophers, from whom Origen learned these things, I disputed most diligently in the books of The City of God, book 21, chapter 24."

c) Moreover, it is plainly evident from those things which we have said concerning the eternity of punishments.

667. 2us vero obstinationis effectus constat ex unanimi Theologorum consensu. "In damnatis," ait D. Thomas suppl. q. 98. a. 1. c., "potest duplex voluntas considerari, scilicet voluntas deliberativa, et voluntas naturalis. Naturalis quidem non est eis ex se ipsis, sed ex auctore naturae, qui in natura hanc inclinationem posuit, quae naturalis voluntas dicitur. Unde cum natura in eis remaneat, secundum hoc bona poterit in eis esse voluntas naturalis. Sed voluntas deliberativa est eis ex seipsis, secundum quod in potestate est eorum inclinari per affectum ad hoc vel illud; et talis voluntas est in eis solum mala: et hoc ideo, quia sunt perfecte aversi a fine ultimo rectae voluntatis, neque aliqua voluntas potest esse bona nisi per ordinem ad finem praedictum. Unde etiam etsi aliquod bonum velint, non tamen bene volunt illud, ut ex hoc voluntas eorum bona dici possit." 667. But the second effect of obstination is evident from the unanimous consensus of Theologians. "In the damned," says St. Thomas, Supplement, question 98, article 1,

corpus, "a twofold will can be considered, namely deliberative will and natural will. The natural will indeed is not in them from themselves, but from the author of nature, who placed in nature this inclination which is called natural will. Hence, since nature remains in them, according to this there will be able to be in them a good natural will. But the deliberative will is in them from themselves, according as it is in their power to be inclined by affection to this or that; and such a will is in them only evil: and this is so because they are perfectly turned away from the last end of right will, nor can any will be good except through order to the aforesaid end. Hence even if they will some good, nevertheless they do not will it well, so that from this their will could be called good."

668. At vero quaenam est causa obstinationis damnatorum in malo? a) Conveniunt omnes quod primus obstinationis effectus est ex Deo ipso. "Ex Deo quidem," inquit D. Thomas de ver. q. 24. a. 10., "non sicut faciente vel conservante malitiam, sed sicut non largiente gratiam. Justum est enim, ut qui bene velle dum possent noluerunt, ad hanc miseriam deducantur, ut bene velle omnino non possint."

b) Conveniunt pariter omnes quod obstinationis non est unica causa Deus non largiens gratiam.

c) Sed non aeque conveniunt quoad aliam obstinationis causam assignandam. Etenim D. Thomas de ver. q. 24. a. 10., docet 1. de angelis: "In Angelo peccatum ex passione esse non potest, quia passio non est nisi in sensibili parte animae, quam angeli non habent. Unde in peccato angeli sola duo concurrunt; scilicet inclinatio habitualis in peccatum, et falsa aestimatio virtutis cognoscitivae de particulari eligibili. Cum autem in angelis non sit multitudo appetitivarum potentiarum, sicut est in hominibus, quando appetitus eorum tendit in aliquid, totaliter inclinatur in illud, ut non sit ei aliqua inclinatio inducens in contrarium. Quia vero rationem non habent, sed intellectum: quidquid aestimant, per modum intelligibilem accipiunt. Quod autem accipitur intelligibiliter, accipitur irreversibiliter, ut cum quis accipit, omne totum esse majus sua parte. Unde angeli aestimationem, quam semel accipiunt, deponere non possunt, sive sit vera, sive falsa."

2. Existimat conditionem animae separatae similem fore conditioni Angelorum. Unde l. c. a. 11., ait: "Quod aliquis homo," inquit, "in statu viae non possit esse ita obstinatus in malo, quin ad suam liberationem cooperari possit, ratio patet: quia et passio solvitur et reprimitur, et habitus non totaliter animam corrumpit, et ratio non ita pertinaciter falso adhaeret, quin per contrariam rationem possit abduci. Sed post statum viae anima separata non intelligit accipiendo a sensibus, nec erit in actu potentiarum appetitivarum sensibilium, et sic anima separata angelo conformatur et quantum ad modum intelligendi, et quantum ad indivisibilitatem appetitus, quae erant causae obstinationis in angelo peccante: unde per eamdem rationem in anima separata obstinatio erit. In resurrectione autem corpus sequetur animae conditionem; et ideo non redibit anima ad statum, in quo modo est, in quo a corpore necesse habet accipere, quamvis corporeis instrumentis utatur; et ita tum eadem obstinationis causa manebit." Vid. etiam c. g. l. 4. c. 95.

Suarez e contra (de Angelis l. 8. c. 11.), censet obstinationem daemonum, et damnatorum omnium oriri ex misera conditione status, juncta naturali conditione, et fragilitate voluntatis creatae, suis tantum viribus relictae, sine ullo gratuito, vel morali (ut sic dicam) Dei juvamine, cum sola generali influentia, quasi physica Dei ad operandum.

Quod ut explicet, et confirmet, notat 1., quod damnati semper habent in intellectu aliquos actus, de objectis sibi valde disconvenientibus, et de se tristitiam, ac dolorem vehementem excitantibus.

2. Quod semper habent memoriam praeteritorum malorum, propter quae puniuntur, vel praeteritorum bonorum, quibus propter peccata perpetuo privati sunt.

3. Quod eadem conditio cernitur in perpetua cognitione, et quasi sensatione illius poenalis actionis ignis, cui perpetuo subjecti sunt, ut postea videbimus. Coguntur itaque ut semper actu considerent, et (ut sic dicam) vitaliter sentiant, ac percipiant poenam illam, simulque ac eadem necessitate vident turpitudinem suam tam culpae, propter quam sic puniuntur, quam poenae, ac deformitatis, quam ab igne patiuntur.

4. Quod damnati semper, ac necessario habent aliquos actus voluntatis, quibus maxime affliguntur: unus est tristitia de bonis amissis, et praecipue de beatitudine perdita, et praeterea dolor ille quasi sensibilis resultans ex perceptione illius mali, quod ab igne patiuntur.

5. Quod alius actus quo maxime affligitur spiritus damnatus, est desperatio evadendi poenas illas, aut illarum diminutionem

obtinendi. Quia, ut Bernardus dixit, "Damnatus in aeternum non obtinebit, quod vult, et quod non vult, in aeternum nihilominus sustinebit."

6. Quod ex acerbitate doloris, et tristitiae cum desperatione, impatientia cum magna mentis perturbatione oritur.

7. Quod sicut ex visione Dei sequitur in beatis confirmatissimus ipsius amor, ita in damnatis ex consideratione suae miseriae sequitur obstinatissimum odium Dei, quo velut hostem eum perpetuo prosequuntur; quia damnati solum apprehendunt Deum in effectibus suae justitiae, quos in se experiuntur; nimirum, quia relegati a regno perpetuis cruciatibus in exilio torquentur. Unde fit, ut illum cogitent sub ratione cruciantis, et summum malum inferentis, ideoque obstinatissimo eum odio habeant.

8. Unde concludit: Ex hac ergo prava dispositione perpetua intellectus, et voluntatis daemonis, necessitate quadam naturali fit, ut in omnibus aliis actibus suis prave operetur." Cf. integrum citat. caput. 668. But what, then, is the cause of the obstination of the damned in evil? a) All agree that the first effect of obstination is from God himself. "From God indeed," says St. Thomas, De veritate, question 24, article 10, "not as making or conserving malice, but as not bestowing grace. For it is just that those who refused to will well while they were able should be led down to this misery, that they cannot will well at all."

b) Likewise all agree that God not bestowing grace is not the only cause of obstination.

c) But they do not equally agree with regard to assigning another cause of obstination. For St. Thomas, De veritate, question 24, article 10, teaches 1. concerning the angels: "In an angel sin cannot be from passion, because passion exists only in the sensible part of the soul, which angels do not have. Hence in the sin of an angel only two things concur: namely a habitual inclination into sin, and a false estimation of the cognitive power concerning the particular object of choice. But since in angels there is not a multitude of appetitive powers, as there is in men, when their appetite tends toward something, it is totally inclined into it, so that there is not in it any inclination inducing toward the contrary. But because they do not have reason, but intellect, whatever they judge, they receive by an intelligible mode. But what is received intelligibly is received irreversibly, as when someone receives that every whole is greater than its part. Hence angels cannot lay aside the estimation which they once receive, whether it is true or false."

2. He thinks that the condition of the separated soul will be similar to the condition of the Angels. Hence in the same place, article 11, he says: "That some man," he says, "in the state of the way cannot be so obstinate in evil that he cannot cooperate toward his liberation, the reason is clear: because passion is both dissolved and repressed, and habit does not totally corrupt the soul, and reason does not cling to the false so pertinaciously that it cannot be led away by contrary reason. But after the state of the way the separated soul does not understand by receiving from the senses, nor will it be in the act of sensible appetitive powers, and thus the separated soul is conformed to an angel both as to the mode of understanding and as to the indivisibility of appetite, which were the causes of obstination in the sinning angel; hence by the same reason there will be obstination in the separated soul. But in the resurrection the body will follow the condition of the soul; and therefore the soul will not return to the state in which it now is, in which it necessarily receives from the body, although it uses bodily instruments; and so then the same cause of obstination will remain." See also Contra Gentiles, book 4, chapter 95.

Suarez, on the contrary, in On Angels, book 8, chapter 11, judges that the obstination of demons and of all the damned arises from the miserable condition of the state, joined with the natural condition and fragility of the created will, left only to its own powers, without any gratuitous or moral help, as I may say, of God, with only the general, quasi-physical influence of God for operating.

In order to explain and confirm this, he notes 1. that the damned always have in the intellect some acts concerning objects very disagreeable to them, and of themselves exciting vehement sadness and pain.

2. That they always have memory of past evils for which they are punished, or of past goods of which because of sins they are perpetually deprived.

3. That the same condition is discerned in the perpetual cognition and, as it were, sensation of that penal action of the fire to which they are perpetually subjected, as we shall see later. And so they are compelled always actually to consider and, as I may say, vitally to feel and perceive that punishment, and at the same time by the same necessity they see their own

baseness, both of fault, because of which they are thus punished, and of punishment and deformity, which they suffer from the fire.

4. That the damned always and necessarily have some acts of will by which they are especially afflicted: one is sadness concerning goods lost, and especially concerning lost beatitude; and besides this, that quasi-sensible pain resulting from the perception of that evil which they suffer from the fire.

5. That another act by which the damned spirit is especially afflicted is despair of escaping those punishments or obtaining a diminution of them. Because, as Bernard said, "The damned man for eternity will not obtain what he wills, and what he does not will, he will nevertheless endure for eternity."

6. That from the bitterness of pain and sadness together with desperation, impatience with great disturbance of mind arises.

7. That just as from the vision of God there follows in the blessed a most confirmed love of him, so in the damned from the consideration of their misery there follows a most obstinate hatred of God, by which they pursue him perpetually as an enemy; because the damned apprehend God only in the effects of his justice which they experience in themselves, namely because, exiled from the kingdom, they are tormented in exile by perpetual tortures. Hence it happens that they think of him under the aspect of one who torments and inflicts the highest evil, and therefore they hold him in most obstinate hatred.

8. Hence he concludes: "Therefore from this perpetual depraved disposition of the intellect and will of the demon, by a certain natural necessity it happens that in all his other acts he operates perversely." Compare the whole cited chapter.

669. Dices I.: Non videtur omnis damnatorum voluntas esse mala; nam de divite dicitur Luc. 16., quod orabat pro fratribus suis, ne venirent in locum tormentorum: sed haec voluntas videtur esse bona. Ergo.

Resp. D. Thomas suppl. q. 98. a. 4. ad 1.: "Tanta erit invidia in damnatis quod etiam propinquorum gloriae invidebunt, cum ipsi sint in summa miseria, cum etiam in hac vita hoc accidat, crescente invidia. Sed tamen minus invidebunt propinquis quam aliis, et major esset eorum poena, si omnes propinqui damnarentur et alii salvarentur. Et exinde fuit quod dives petiit fratres suos a damnatione eripi. Sciebat enim quod aliqui eriperentur; maluisset tamen fratres suos cum omnibus aliis damnari." 669. You will say I: Not every will of the damned seems to be evil; for it is said of the rich man in Luke 16 that he prayed for his brothers, lest they come into the place of torments; but this will seems to be good. Therefore.

I answer with St. Thomas, Supplement, question 98, article 4, reply to 1: "There will be so much envy in the damned that they will envy even the glory of relatives, since they themselves are in the greatest misery, as this also happens in this life when envy increases. Yet nevertheless they will envy relatives less than others, and their punishment would be greater if all their relatives were damned and others were saved. And from this it was that the rich man asked that his brothers be snatched from damnation. For he knew that some would be snatched away; nevertheless he would have preferred his brothers to be damned with all the others."

670. Dices II.: Saltem non videntur damnati peccare per suam voluntatem constanter malam; ex dictis enim videntur esse in impotentia operandi bonum: nemo autem peccat in eo quod vitare nullo modo potest.

Resp. cum D. Thoma, qui postquam statuerit damnatorum voluntatem esse immobiliter aversam ab ultimo fine, addit (c. g. l. 4. c. 95.): "Ex ultimo autem fine dependet tota bonitas, vel malitia voluntatis; quia bona quaecumque aliquis vult in ordine ad bonum finem, bene vult; mala autem quaecumque in ordine ad malum finem. Non est igitur voluntas animae separatae mutabilis de bono in malum, licet sit mutabilis de uno volito in aliud volitum, servato tamen ordine ad eumdem ultimum finem. Ex quo apparet quod talis immobilitas voluntatis libero arbitrio non repugnat, cujus actus est eligere. Electio enim est eorum quae sunt ad finem non autem ultimi finis. Sicut igitur non repugnat libero arbitrio quod immobili voluntate desideramus beatitudinem, et miseriam fugimus in communi; ita non erit contrarium libero arbitrio quod voluntas immobiliter fertur in aliquod determinatum sicut in ultimum finem: quia sicut nunc immobiliter nobis inhaeret natura communis; per quam beatitudinem appetimus in communi ita etiam immobiliter manebit illa specialis dispositio per quam hoc vel illud

desideratur ut ultimus finis." 670. You will say II: At least the damned do not seem to sin through their constantly evil will; for from what has been said they seem to be in an inability of doing good. But no one sins in that which he can in no way avoid.

I answer with St. Thomas, who, after he had stated that the will of the damned is immovably turned away from the last end, adds in Contra Gentiles, book 4, chapter 95: "On the last end depends the whole goodness or malice of the will; because whatever goods someone wills in order to a good end, he wills well; but whatever evils he wills in order to an evil end, he wills evilly. Therefore the will of the separated soul is not changeable from good to evil, although it is changeable from one thing willed to another thing willed, with the order to the same last end nevertheless preserved. From this it appears that such immobility of the will is not repugnant to free choice, whose act is to choose. For choice concerns those things which are toward the end, not the last end. Therefore, just as it is not repugnant to free choice that by an immovable will we desire beatitude and flee misery in common, so it will not be contrary to free choice that the will is immovably borne toward something determinate as toward the last end; because just as now the common nature, through which we desire beatitude in common, immovably inheres in us, so also that special disposition through which this or that is desired as the last end will remain immovably."

671. Quamvis autem damnati constanter peccent, non tamen demerentur, juxta communissimam DD. sententiam; non sunt enim in statu viae. Vid. D. Th. suppl. q. 88. a. 6.

§ II.

De mitigatione poenae damnatorum. 671. Although, however, the damned constantly sin, nevertheless they do not demerit, according to the very common opinion of the Doctors; for they are not in the state of the way. See St. Thomas, Supplement, question 88, article 6.

§ II.

On the mitigation of the punishment of the damned.

672. Quaestio fieri potest de poena essentiali et de poena accidentali. - Mitigatio poenae essentialis potest dupliciter intelligi vel quatenus constituuntur aliquae veluti feriae, in quibus damnati requiem habent, et sic est intermissio et interruptio in eorum poena; vel quatenus licet numquam interrumpantur poenae, in acerbitate et intensione quandoque minuuntur. 672. The question can be raised concerning essential punishment and concerning accidental punishment. - The mitigation of essential punishment can be understood in two ways: either insofar as there are established certain times, like holidays, in which the damned have rest, and thus there is intermission and interruption in their punishment; or insofar as, although the punishments are never interrupted, they are at some time lessened in bitterness and intensity.

673. Jamvero est doctrina communis Theologorum, quam nonnulli etiam dicunt fidei proximam, in damnatis nullam esse intermissionem aut diminutionem poenae essentialis. Quod patet

a) Ex Scriptura. Apoc. 14. 11. dicitur: "Et fumus tormentorum eorum ascendet in saecula saeculorum: nec habent requiem die ac nocte qui adoraverunt bestiam." Luc. 16. 25. seq.: "Pater Abraham, miserere mei, et mitte Lazarum, ut intingat extremum digiti sui in aquam, ut refrigeret linguam meam, quia crucior in hac flamma. Et dixit illi Abraham: Fili recordare quia recepisti bona in vita tua, et Lazarus similiter mala: nunc autem hic consolatur, tu vero cruciaris." - Marc. 9. damnatos "non habere requiem die ac nocte."

b) Ex Patribus. S. Cyprianus (in Ep. ad Demetr.) de poenis damnatorum ait: "Nec erit, unde habere tormenta vel requiem possint aliquando, vel finem." - S. Bernardus (l. 1. de anim. ad Ugon.): "Procul a beata Paradisi patria exulati cruciabuntur in gehenna perpetua, numquam lucem visuri, numquam refrigerium adepturi ... ubi nec qui torquet fatigatur, nec qui torquetur, aliquando moritur." - Unde communiter docent non esse orandum pro damnatis.

c) Ex ratione. In damnatis nihil umquam diminuetur de culpa; ergo nihil umquam dimittetur de poena: Deus enim nihil relinquit inordinatum. Vid. D. Thomam in 4. sent. dist. 45. q. 2. a. 2. <span

id="p673">673. Now it is the common doctrine of Theologians, which some even call proximate to faith, that among the damned there is no intermission or diminution of essential punishment. This is evident

a) From Scripture. Apocalypse 14:11 says: "And the smoke of their torments shall ascend forever and ever: nor do those who have adored the beast have rest day and night." Luke 16:25 and following: "Father Abraham, have mercy on me, and send Lazarus, that he may dip the tip of his finger in water, that he may cool my tongue, because I am tormented in this flame. And Abraham said to him: Son, remember that you received good things in your life, and Lazarus likewise evil things; but now he is consoled here, while you are tormented." - Mark 9 says that the damned "do not have rest day and night."

b) From the Fathers. St. Cyprian, in the Epistle to Demetrianus, says concerning the punishments of the damned: "Nor will there be anything by which the torments can ever have either rest or end." - St. Bernard, book 1, On the Soul to Hugh: "Exiled far from the blessed homeland of Paradise, they will be tormented in perpetual gehenna, never to see light, never to obtain refreshment ... where neither he who torments grows weary, nor he who is tormented ever dies." - Hence they commonly teach that one must not pray for the damned.

c) From reason. In the damned nothing will ever be diminished of fault; therefore nothing will ever be remitted of punishment: for God leaves nothing disordered. See St. Thomas, on book 4 of the Sentences, distinction 45, question 2, article 2.

674. Quoad poenam vero accidentalem, conveniunt omnes aliquam poenam accidentalem posse mitigari, augeri, aut removeri usque ad diem judicii. Sed difficultas est 1. quoad poenam peccatis venialibus debitam - 2. quoad poenam debitam peccatis jam remissis. 674. But with regard to accidental punishment, all agree that some accidental punishment can be mitigated, increased, or removed until the day of judgment. But the difficulty is 1. with regard to the punishment owed to venial sins; 2. with regard to the punishment owed to sins already remitted.

675. Quoad 1am. Fieri certe potest, ut damnati simul cum peccato lethali habeant peccatum veniale: poena autem huic debita non est aeterna. Diminueturne ergo damnatorum poena, quatenus post temporis intervallum non amplius patientur poenam peccatis venialibus debitam?

Affirmat Scotus: sed negat D. Thomas (q. 7. de malo) qui docet poenam peccati venialis in damnatis fore aeternam per accidens; quamvis enim poena per se debita peccato veniali sit temporalis; ratione tamen status in damnatis erit aeterna. Quod sic probat: Tamdiu durabit poena, quamdiu durabit culpa; atqui culpa venialis semper durabit in damnatis. Ergo. - Prob. min. Remissio culpae in praesenti providentia nequit fieri, nisi per applicationem meritorum Christi; atqui damnatis, qui non sunt membra Christi, nequeunt ejus merita applicari. Ergo. 675. With regard to the first. It can certainly happen that the damned, together with lethal sin, have venial sin; but the punishment owed to this is not eternal. Therefore is the punishment of the damned diminished, insofar as after an interval of time they will no longer suffer the punishment owed to venial sins?

Scotus affirms this; but St. Thomas denies it, in question 7 On Evil, and teaches that the punishment of venial sin in the damned will be eternal by accident. For although the punishment owed in itself to venial sin is temporal, nevertheless by reason of the state in the damned it will be eternal. He proves this as follows: punishment will last as long as fault lasts; but venial fault will always last in the damned. Therefore. - Proof of the minor. The remission of fault in the present providence cannot take place except through the application of the merits of Christ; but to the damned, who are not members of Christ, his merits cannot be applied. Therefore.

676. Quoad 2am. D. Thomas (in 4. dist. 22. q. 1. a. 4. ad 5.) ait: "Veniale ideo in inferno aeternaliter punitur, quia semper manet: cum non sit ibi aliquid quod culpam delere possit: sed poena ex hoc ipso quod solvitur, expiatur. Et ideo alii dicunt: quod poena cujus est aliquis debitor post culpam remissam, in inferno punietur temporaliter. Nec propter hoc sequitur quod sit in

inferno redemptio: quia poena quae solvitur non redimitur. Non est inconveniens quod quantum ad aliquid accidentale, poena inferni minuatur usque ad diem judicii, sicut etiam augetur." 676. With regard to the second. St. Thomas, on book 4, distinction 22, question 1, article 4, reply to 5, says: "The venial is punished eternally in hell for this reason, that it always remains, since there is nothing there which can wipe away fault; but punishment is expiated from the very fact that it is paid. And therefore others say that the punishment of which someone is a debtor after fault has been remitted will be punished temporally in hell. Nor does it follow on account of this that there is redemption in hell, because punishment which is paid is not redeemed. It is not unfitting that as to something accidental, the punishment of hell is diminished until the day of judgment, just as it is also increased."

677. Quaeri hic ultimo potest, utrum orandum sit pro damnatis.

Petavius (de Angelis l. 3. c. 8.) animadvertit aliquos Patres in affirmantem ivisse sententiam, sed nonnisi forte S. Joan. Chrysost. et Prudentius videntur illi favisse; S. Augustinus enim non asserit, sed permittit. Unde cit. Auctor concludit praedictam sententiam non tamquam absurdam explodendam esse, quamvis a communi sensu catholicorum alienam esse concedat.

Verumtamen, juxta communem Patrum et Theologorum auctoritatem, tenendum omnino est suffragia pro defunctis non prodesse damnatis. Etenim

a) Suffragia vivorum eatenus possunt mortuis prodesse, quatenus sunt membra ejusdem corporis Christi mystici, et proinde capacia percipiendi misericordiam per Christi merita. Atqui damnati nullo modo pertinent ad corpus Christi mysticum. Ergo.

b) Unde S. Augustinus (de civ. Dei l. 21. c. 24.): "Haec igitur causa est, qua fit, ut nunc Ecclesia non oret pro malis angelis, quos suos esse novit inimicos, eadem ipsa causa est, qua fiet, ut in illo tunc judicio, etiam pro hominibus aeterno igne cruciandis, quamvis perfecta sit sanctitate, non oret." - S. Gregorius (Mor. apud D. Th.): "Sancti in hac vita ideo pro inimicis exorant, ut convertantur ad Deum, cum adhuc converti possunt. Si enim esset nobis notum, quod essent praesciti ad mortem, non magis pro eis, quam pro daemonibus oraremus. Et quia post hanc vitam decedentibus sine gratia tempus conversionis non erit, nulla pro eis fiet oratio, nec ab Ecclesia militante, nec a triumphante."

c) Et D. Thomas (in 4. sent. dist. 45. q. 2. a. 2.): "Est nihilominus praedicta opinio (quod suffragia prosunt damnatis) praesumptuosa, utpote Sanctorum dictis contraria, nulla auctoritate fulta et nihilominus irrationalis, tum quia damnati in inferno sunt extra vinculum caritatis, secundum quam opera vivorum continuantur defunctis, tum quia totaliter ad viae terminum pervenerunt, recipientes ultimam pro meritis retributionem, sicut et Sancti, qui sunt in patria." - Sed vid. Gotti (Tract. 16. de judic. univ. dub. 3.) 677. Here lastly it can be asked whether one must pray for the damned.

Petavius, On Angels, book 3, chapter 8, observes that some Fathers went into the affirmative opinion, but only perhaps St. John Chrysostom and Prudentius seem to have favored it; for St. Augustine does not assert it, but permits it. Hence the cited Author concludes that the aforesaid opinion should not be rejected as absurd, although he grants that it is foreign to the common sense of Catholics.

Nevertheless, according to the common authority of the Fathers and Theologians, it must altogether be held that suffrages for the dead do not profit the damned. For

a) The suffrages of the living can profit the dead to the extent that they are members of the same mystical body of Christ, and therefore capable of receiving mercy through the merits of Christ. But the damned in no way belong to the mystical body of Christ. Therefore.

b) Hence St. Augustine, The City of God, book 21, chapter 24: "This therefore is the cause by which it happens that now the Church does not pray for the evil angels, whom she knows to be her enemies; the very same cause is that by which it will happen that in that judgment then, even for men to be tormented with eternal fire, although she is perfected in sanctity, she will not pray." - St. Gregory, Moralia, as cited by St. Thomas: "The saints in this life intercede for enemies for this reason, that they may be converted to God, while they still can be converted. For if it were known to us that they were foreknown unto death, we would not pray for them any more than for demons. And because after this life, for those departing without grace, there will be

no time of conversion, no prayer will be made for them, either by the Church militant or by the Church triumphant."

c) And St. Thomas, on book 4 of the Sentences, distinction 45, question 2, article 2: "The aforesaid opinion, nevertheless, that suffrages profit the damned, is presumptuous, as contrary to the sayings of the Saints, supported by no authority, and nevertheless irrational: both because the damned in hell are outside the bond of charity, according to which the works of the living are continued to the dead, and because they have totally arrived at the terminus of the way, receiving their final retribution according to merits, just like the Saints who are in the fatherland." - But see Gotti, tractate 16, on universal judgment, doubt 3.

Article 8. Whether Purgatory Exists

LatineEnglish

Corrected Latin

678. Duo docet catholica fides de purgatorio, videlicet "purgatorium esse - animasque ibi detentas fidelium suffragiis, potissimum vero acceptabili altaris sacrificio juvari." - De suffragiis agi solet in tractatu de poenitentia: quaestionem solum de purgatorii existentia expediemus.

§ I.

Proponitur status quaestionis. 678. The Catholic faith teaches two things concerning purgatory, namely that "purgatory exists, and that the souls detained there are helped by the suffrages of the faithful, but especially by the acceptable sacrifice of the altar." - The subject of suffrages is usually treated in the treatise on penance; we shall dispatch only the question concerning the existence of purgatory.

§ I.

The state of the question is proposed.

679. Purgatorii nomine intelligitur locus quidam, in quo post mortem, eorum fidelium animae, quae vel obstrictae adhuc reatu alicujus temporalis poenae, vel etiam aliquibus peccatis venialibus, ex corpore migraverunt, secundum divinae justitiae rationem cruciantur, quoad penitus ab ejusmodi peccatis expiatae beatitudinem coelestem consequi valeant. 679. By the name purgatory there is understood a certain place in which, after death, the souls of those faithful who have departed from the body either still bound by the debt of some temporal punishment, or even by some venial sins, are tormented according to the rule of divine justice, until, being entirely expiated from sins of this sort, they are able to attain heavenly beatitude.

680. Jam a saeculo IV Aerius dogma de purgatorio impugnasse perhibetur, quamvis non certo constet, utrum purgatorii existentiam, an solummodo suffragiorum utilitatem negaverit. - Medio aevo doctrinam de purgatorio Petrobrusiani, Albigenses, Waldenses, atque Hussitae rejecerunt. - Novatores saeculi XVI idem dogma impugnarunt. Lutherus enim, qui ab initio solum asseruit doctrinam de purgatorio ad fidem non pertinere, sed posse pro libito admitti vel negari; mox eamdem cum magna vehementia rejecit. Admisso enim principio, quod justificatio non tollit peccatum, sed solum facit ut per merita Christi non imputetur ad poenam; consequenter negabat haeresiarcha ille post remissionem peccati remanere ullam poenam, sive in hac vita sive in purgatorio solvendam: quemadmodum admisso principio, quod bona opera nostra sunt inania, consequenter negabat suffragiorum utilitatem. Unde (in Articulis Smalcaldicis P. 2. c. 2. § 9.) ait: "Quapropter purgatorium et quidquid ei solemnitatis, cultus, et quaestus adhaeret, mera diaboli larva est. Pugnat enim cum primo articulo, qui docet, Christum solum, et non hominum opera, animas liberare." - Pariter Calvinus: "Ubi," inquit, "peccatorum expiatio alibi quam in Christi sanguine quaeritur, ubi satisfactio alio transfertur, periculosissimum silentium. Clamandum ergo non modo vocis, sed gutturis ac laterum contentione, purgatorium exitiale satanae esse commentum, quod Christi crucem evacuat, quod contumeliam Dei misericordiae non ferendum irrogat, quod fidem nostram labefacit et evertit." Vid. Bellarm. (de Purg. l. 1. c. 2.) <span

id="p680">680. Already from the fourth century Aerius is said to have attacked the dogma concerning purgatory, although it is not certainly established whether he denied the existence of purgatory or only the usefulness of suffrages. - In the Middle Ages the Petrobrusians, Albigensians, Waldensians, and Hussites rejected the doctrine concerning purgatory. - The Innovators of the sixteenth century attacked the same dogma. For Luther, who at the beginning only asserted that the doctrine concerning purgatory did not pertain to faith, but could be admitted or denied at will, soon rejected it with great vehemence. For once the principle had been admitted that justification does not take away sin, but only causes it not to be imputed unto punishment through the merits of Christ, that heresiarch consequently denied that after the remission of sin any punishment remains to be paid, whether in this life or in purgatory. Likewise, once the principle had been admitted that our good works are empty, he consequently denied the usefulness of suffrages. Hence, in the Smalcald Articles, part 2, chapter 2, § 9, he says: "Therefore purgatory and whatever solemnity, worship, and gain adheres to it is a mere mask of the devil. For it fights against the first article, which teaches that Christ alone, and not the works of men, liberates souls." - Likewise Calvin says: "Where the expiation of sins is sought elsewhere than in the blood of Christ, where satisfaction is transferred elsewhere, silence is most dangerous. Therefore it must be shouted not only with the effort of the voice, but of the throat and lungs, that purgatory is a deadly invention of Satan, which empties the cross of Christ, which inflicts an intolerable insult upon the mercy of God, which shakes and overturns our faith." See Bellarmine, On Purgatory, book 1, chapter 2.

681. Non pauci vero inter recentiores Protestantes doctrinam patrum suorum mitigari conati sunt. Ita admittunt quemdam purgationis statum post hanc vitam, atque orationes etiam pro defunctis fieri posse; sed monent aliqui tales orationes privatim, non publice esse faciendas; alii etiam publicas preces concedunt, sed non plus quam semel aut bis, ne videantur more catholicorum, aiunt, vim Deo inferre; alii publicas pluries repetitas preces admittunt, sed non quia illis defunctorum animae juvantur, sed quia solatio sunt ipsis fidelibus orantibus etc. 681. But not a few among more recent Protestants have tried to soften the doctrine of their fathers. Thus they admit a certain state of purgation after this life, and even that prayers can be made for the dead; but some warn that such prayers are to be made privately, not publicly; others also concede public prayers, but not more than once or twice, lest, as they say, they seem after the manner of Catholics to use force upon God; others admit public prayers repeated more than once, but not because the souls of the dead are helped by them, but because they are a consolation to the faithful themselves who are praying, etc.

682. Catholica de hac re doctrina pluries ab Ecclesia definita est: praesertim in Conc. Florent., in decreto unionis Graecorum, ubi legitur: "Definimus, si vere poenitentes in Dei caritate decesserint, antequam dignis poenitentiae fructibus de commissis satisfecerint et omissis, eorum animas poenis purgatoriis post mortem purgari, et ut a poenis hujusmodi releventur, prodesse eis fidelium vivorum suffragia, Missarum scilicet sacrificia, orationes, et eleemosynas, et alia pietatis officia, quae a fidelibus pro aliis fidelibus fieri consueverunt secundum Ecclesiae instituta." Et Conc. Trid. sess. 6. can. 30.: "Si quis dixerit post acceptam justificationis gratiam cuilibet peccatori poenitenti ita culpam remitti et reatum poenae aeternae delere dixerit, ut nullus remaneat reatus poenae temporalis exsolvendus, vel in hoc saeculo, vel in futuro in purgatorio, antequam ad regna coelorum aditus patere possit; anathema sit." Vid. Bellarminum (de Purgator. l. 1. c. 9.) 682. Catholic doctrine on this matter has several times been defined by the Church, especially in the Council of Florence, in the decree of union with the Greeks, where it is read: "We define that, if those truly penitent have departed in the charity of God before they have made satisfaction by worthy fruits of repentance for things committed and omitted, their souls are purged after death by purgatorial punishments, and that, in order that they may be relieved from punishments of this sort, the suffrages of the living faithful profit them, namely the sacrifices of Masses, prayers, alms, and other

offices of piety, which are accustomed to be done by the faithful for other faithful according to the institutes of the Church." And the Council of Trent, session 6, canon 30: "If anyone shall say that after the grace of justification has been received, guilt is so remitted to any penitent sinner and the debt of eternal punishment so blotted out, that there remains no debt of temporal punishment to be discharged, either in this age or in the future in purgatory, before the entrance to the kingdoms of heaven can lie open, let him be anathema." See Bellarmine, On Purgatory, book 1, chapter 9.

683. Ad has Ecclesiae definitiones intelligendas, pauca adnotabimus. Atque imprimis, anima, dum a corpore separatur per mortem, potest in triplici conditione inveniri. Vel est in statu gratiae et perfecte purgata; et coelum statim ingreditur - vel est in statu peccati lethalis; et in inferno detruditur - vel est quidem in statu gratiae, sed nondum plene purgata; et detinetur in purgatorio, donec perfecte purgata recipiatur in coelo, quo nihil coinquinatum ingreditur. Jamvero purgatio potest esse 1. a peccatis venialibus - 2. a poena debita his, vel peccatis lethalibus remissis quoad reatum culpae et poenae aeternae - vel 3. a pravis habitibus. 683. In order to understand these definitions of the Church, we shall note a few things. And first of all, when the soul is separated from the body through death, it can be found in a threefold condition. Either it is in the state of grace and perfectly purged, and immediately enters heaven; or it is in the state of lethal sin, and is thrust down into hell; or it is indeed in the state of grace, but not yet fully purged, and is detained in purgatory until, perfectly purged, it is received into heaven, which nothing defiled enters. Now purgation can be 1. from venial sins; 2. from the punishment owed to these, or to lethal sins remitted as to the debt of guilt and eternal punishment; or 3. from depraved habits.

684. Quoad 1um notamus a) Certum est aliquem posse mortis momento esse in statu gratiae, et simul habere peccatum veniale, cum quo nequit ingredi coelum.

b) Certum est etiam peccatum veniale non semper quoad culpam remitti in ipsa morte. Etenim peccatum veniale remitti nequit sine poenitentia saltem virtuali (Vid. D. Thomam 3. p. q. 87. a. 1. et Sylv. h. l.) Atqui non semper homo in veniali existens poenitentiam de eo habet ante mortem. Ergo. - Prob. min. Non pauci etiam pii et justi rapiuntur ex hac vita vel somno oppressi, vel vi morbi in delirium lapsi, qui prius habebant affectum ad aliquod peccatum veniale, quem certe in morte nequeunt poenitentia retractare. Unde Ecclesia non solum orat pro defunctis, ut a cunctis reatibus absolvantur; quod de peccato quoad poenam est accipiendum; sed etiam, ut sacrificiis purgati, et a peccatis expediti, indulgentiam pariter et requiem capiant sempiternam. Item, ut quae per fragilitatem carnis humana conversatione commiserunt, Deus venia misericordissimae pietatis abstergat. Ista vero de peccatorum maculis esse intelligenda, certum videtur; cum illae solae purgari possint et abstergi." Vid. Sylvium (in l. c. quaer. 1.)

c) Si quis autem quaerat, quomodo peccatum veniale post mortem remittitur; respondet D. Thomas (de malo articulus 11. ad 9.): "culpam non remitti per poenam neque secundum quod actu sustinetur, quia non est meritoria: neque secundum quod recogitatur, non enim esset motus charitatis quod aliquid detestaretur peccatum veniale propter poenam, sed magis esset motus timoris servilis, vel naturalis. Remittitur ergo in purgatorio veniale, quantum ad culpam, virtute gratiae, non solum secundum quod est in habitu, quia sic compatitur veniale peccatum; sed prout exit in actum charitatis, detestantis veniale peccatum."

d) Si quis deinde quaerat, quando peccatum veniale remittitur; respondetur, quod quamvis disputetur de tempore; probabile tamen est culpas veniales deleri, non diu postquam anima est e corpore egressa: quia cum statim ab egressu perfecte cognoscat suum statum, ac omnes culpas quibus adhuc est maculata; probabile est quod statim concipiat amorem Dei, et detestationem omnium eorum quae Deum offendunt ipsamque retardant ab ejus fruitione: quia nihil eam impedit a tali actu; nec habebit postea plus gratiae quam tum habeat. Deinde, quando est aliquod magnum bonum quod differtur, et magnum malum quod imminet, tunc excitatur intensum desiderium ad consequendum illud bonum, et evadendum istud malum: sed ei animae separatae, quae purgatorio est obnoxia, imminet magnum malum, imo potius jam est in magno malo, scilicet in acerba purgatorii poena, et differtur a maximo bono, scilicet a vita aeterna: ergo statim excitatur in ea fervens

desiderium. Quae ratio, ait B. Th. ad 16. dicti art. 11. "non concludit quod peccatum veniale in purgatorio non remittatur, sed quod statim ibi remittatur: (haec est enim vera lectio quam habent veteres codices) et hoc satis videtur probabile." Addit vero: "Quia tamen post hanc vitam non est status merendi, ille dilectionis motus in eis tollit quidem impedimentum venialis culpae, non tamen meretur absolutionem vel diminutionem poenae, sicut in hac vita." Vid. Bellarminum (de Purgat. l. 1. c. 14. sexta ratio); Suarez (in 3. p. q. 87. a. 7. disp. 11. sect. 1. n. 4.) 684. With regard to the first we note a) It is certain that someone can at the moment of death be in the state of grace and at the same time have venial sin, with which he cannot enter heaven.

b) It is also certain that venial sin is not always remitted as to guilt in death itself. For venial sin cannot be remitted without at least virtual repentance. See St. Thomas, III, question 87, article 1, and Sylvius on this place. But not always does a man existing in venial sin have repentance concerning it before death. Therefore. - Proof of the minor. Not a few even pious and just persons are snatched from this life either oppressed by sleep, or fallen through the force of illness into delirium, who previously had affection toward some venial sin, which certainly in death they cannot retract by repentance. Hence the Church not only prays for the dead, that they may be absolved from all debts, which must be understood concerning sin as to punishment; but also that, being purged by sacrifices and freed from sins, they may receive at once pardon and eternal rest. Likewise, that whatever they committed through the frailty of the flesh in human conversation, God may wipe away by the pardon of his most merciful piety. These things seem certainly to have to be understood concerning the stains of sins, since those alone can be purged and wiped away. See Sylvius, on the cited place, question 1.

c) But if someone asks how venial sin is remitted after death, St. Thomas answers, On Evil, article 11, reply to 9: "Guilt is not remitted by punishment either according as it is actually endured, because it is not meritorious, or according as it is reflected upon; for it would not be a movement of charity that someone should detest venial sin because of punishment, but rather a movement of servile or natural fear. Therefore the venial is remitted in purgatory, as to guilt, by the power of grace, not only according as it is in habit, because in this way it coexists with venial sin, but as it goes forth into an act of charity detesting venial sin."

d) If someone then asks when venial sin is remitted, the answer is that although there is dispute concerning the time, nevertheless it is probable that venial faults are blotted out not long after the soul has gone out from the body. For since immediately after departure it perfectly knows its state and all the faults by which it is still stained, it is probable that it immediately conceives love of God and detestation of all those things which offend God and delay it from the fruition of him, because nothing impedes it from such an act, nor will it afterward have more grace than it then has. Next, when there is some great good which is delayed, and a great evil which threatens, then an intense desire is stirred up for obtaining that good and escaping that evil. But for that separated soul which is liable to purgatory, a great evil threatens, or rather it is already in a great evil, namely in the bitter punishment of purgatory, and it is kept back from the greatest good, namely from eternal life. Therefore a fervent desire is immediately stirred up in it. This reasoning, says Blessed Thomas in reply to 16 of the said article 11, "does not conclude that venial sin is not remitted in purgatory, but that it is remitted there immediately; for this is the true reading which the ancient codices have, and this seems probable enough." But he adds: "Because, however, after this life there is not a state of meriting, that movement of love in them indeed removes the impediment of venial fault, yet it does not merit absolution or diminution of punishment, as in this life." See Bellarmine, On Purgatory, book 1, chapter 14, sixth reason; Suarez, on III, question 87, article 7, disputation 11, section 1, no. 4.

685. Quoad 2um, notamus a) Quod, uti ostenditur in tractatu de poenitentia, remissa culpa non semper remittitur totus reatus poenae; et divina justitia exigit, ut exsolvatur antequam quis admittatur in regnum Dei.

b) Falso asseruerunt Novatores ipsa mortis amaritudine exsolvi quemcumque poenae reatum. Nam mors non habet hanc vim ex opere operato nec homini datur semper in eo articulo vis ad satisfaciendum perfecte pro omnibus debitis hujusmodi: ubi enim est de hac re facta promissio? Praecipue cum repentinae mortes saepe veniant, in quibus

nullius bonae operationis, nedum tantae satisfactionis locus datur. "Mors per se non est poena actualium peccatorum, sed secundum se est quaedam conditio naturae: secundum autem praesentem providentiam est poenalitas originalis peccati. Item nulla ratio patitur, ut secundum ordinariam et communem legem eadem poena purgentur, qui parum, et qui multum debent, praesertim cum acerbiores mortes saepe sustineant, qui justiores sunt. Deinde ubi est privilegium martyrii, si hoc omni morti commune est? ad quid etiam sunt necessaria suffragia pro defunctis, si mors omnia purgat? Denique eadem ratio persuadet, non omni homini morienti dari in ipsa morte auxilium efficax, ut possit per suum actum plene satisfacere pro omni praeterita negligentia, cur enim Deus hac universali lege faveret hominum negligentiae satisfaciendi dum viverent, securi de plena remissione in morte, si saltem absque culpa mortali invenirentur? Eademque ratio probat non esse admittendam talem satisfactionem post mortem, alioqui timor futurae vindictae non cohiberet homines in hac vita, sed in futuram satisfactionem reservaret." Vide Suarez (de Poenit. disp. 45. de purgator. sect. 1. nn. 35. 37.)

c) Temporalis autem poena post mortem non exsolvitur merendo (nullus enim, juxta catholicam doctrinam, est merendi locus post mortem) - nec proprie satisfaciendo, sed satispatiendo. "Hoc erit manifestum," inquit Suarez (l. c. disp. 47. sect. 2. n. 7.), "si termini propositi explicentur, quod erit facile supposita doctrina supra tradita de satisfactione. Ex peccato enim remisso primo et per se relinquitur reatus poenae ignis et afflictionis Purgatorii, et hanc sustinere possunt animae Purgatorii, et quia illa poena temporalis est, per sufficientem durationem illius dicuntur posse satispati juxta qualitatem, seu quantitatem reatus ad quod illis sufficit esse in statu gratiae. Rursus vero concessum est hominibus justis, et viatoribus, ut possint quodammodo mereri remissionem illius poenae per alias poenas voluntarias hujus vitae moraliter aequivalentes, juxta divinam legem, et justam institutionem: et haec vocatur propria satisfactio. Hanc ergo dicimus exhibere non posse animas Purgatorii, quia sicut tempus merendi fuit tantum in hac vita, ita etiam status satisfaciendi per voluntarias poenas, vel afflictiones." Vid. etiam Bellarminum (l. c. c. 14.) 685. With regard to the second, we note a) That, as is shown in the treatise on penance, when guilt has been remitted, the whole debt of punishment is not always remitted; and divine justice requires that it be paid before one is admitted into the kingdom of God.

b) The Innovators falsely asserted that by the bitterness of death itself any debt whatsoever of punishment is paid. For death does not have this force ex opere operato, nor is there always given to a man in that article the power to make satisfaction perfectly for all debts of this sort. For where has a promise been made concerning this matter? Especially since sudden deaths often come, in which no place is given for any good operation, much less for so great a satisfaction. "Death in itself is not a punishment of actual sins, but according to itself is a certain condition of nature; but according to the present providence it is the penality of original sin. Likewise, no reason allows that according to the ordinary and common law, those who owe little and those who owe much should be purged by the same punishment, especially since those who are more just often endure more bitter deaths. Next, where is the privilege of martyrdom, if this is common to every death? For what purpose also are suffrages for the dead necessary, if death purges all things? Finally, the same reason persuades that effective help is not given in death itself to every man dying, so that by his act he could fully satisfy for all past negligence. For why would God by this universal law favor the negligence of men in making satisfaction while they lived, secure about full remission in death, if only they were found without mortal guilt? And the same reason proves that such satisfaction after death is not to be admitted; otherwise fear of future vengeance would not restrain men in this life, but would reserve them for future satisfaction." See Suarez, On Penance, disputation 45, on purgatory, section 1, nos. 35 and 37.

c) But temporal punishment after death is not paid by meriting, for according to Catholic doctrine there is no place for meriting after death, nor properly by making satisfaction, but by suffering satisfaction. "This will be manifest," says Suarez, same place, disputation 47, section 2, no. 7, "if the terms proposed are explained, which will be easy once the doctrine handed down above concerning satisfaction has been supposed. For from sin remitted there remains first and in itself the debt of the punishment of the fire and affliction of purgatory, and the souls of purgatory can endure this; and because that punishment is temporal, through a sufficient duration of it they are said to be able to suffer sufficiently

according to the quality or quantity of the debt, for which it is enough for them to be in the state of grace. Again, however, it has been granted to just men and wayfarers that they can in some manner merit the remission of that punishment through other voluntary punishments of this life morally equivalent, according to divine law and just institution; and this is called proper satisfaction. Therefore we say that the souls of purgatory cannot exhibit this, because just as the time for meriting was only in this life, so also was the state of satisfying through voluntary punishments or afflictions." See also Bellarmine, same place, chapter 14.

686. Quoad 3um, breviter notamus cum Suarez (l. c. disp. 47. sect. 1. n. 5.): "Dicet vero aliquis: Ad beatitudinem obtinendam non satis est carere omni culpa, et reatu poenae, sed etiam pravis habitibus, et inclinationibus. Respondeo, propter hanc causam non oportere fingere detentionem aliquam: nam quidquid hujusmodi est in appetitu sentiente, in ipsa morte deponitur, simul cum corpore, in quo est appetitus: habitus vero existentes in voluntate, vel in ipso instanti mortis auferuntur, aut per actus contrarios divina virtute factos, aut per abstractionem divini influxus conservantis; aut certe in primo ingressu gloriae ratione status infunduntur per accidens omnes virtutes etiam naturales, quae habitus repugnantes expellunt, sicut infunduntur etiam scientiae generales, quae omnem expellunt ignorantiam." 686. With regard to the third, we note briefly with Suarez, same place, disputation 47, section 1, no. 5: "But someone will say: for obtaining beatitude it is not enough to be without every fault and debt of punishment, but also without depraved habits and inclinations. I answer that on account of this cause it is not necessary to invent some detention. For whatever of this sort is in the sentient appetite is laid aside in death itself, together with the body in which the appetite is; but habits existing in the will are either taken away in the very instant of death, either through contrary acts made by divine power, or through the withdrawal of the conserving divine influx; or certainly in the first entrance into glory, by reason of the state, all virtues, even natural ones, are infused by accident, which expel repugnant habits, just as general sciences are also infused, which expel all ignorance."

687. Ex his intelligitur a) quo sensu animae in Purgatorio habent gratiam consummatam. Dupliciter, "docet Suarez (l. c. disp. 47. sect. 2. n. 4. 5.) "dici posse gratiam consummatam: primo, quia jam est actualiter conjuncta suo fini, quod est esse consummatam per operationem, et hoc modo animae illae non habent gratiam consummatam, quia non conjunguntur Deo per visionem claram, nec illum possident, ut supponimus ex supra dictis de loco Purgatorii, unde adhuc per solam fidem illum cognoscunt. Alio vero modo potest dici gratia consummata quoad intensionem, quam in tali subjecto habere potest, aut debet: sicut dicitur calor in summo, quando habet omnes gradus suae intensionis, et in hoc sensu dicendum est habere animas illas gratiam consummatam. Quia in intensione numquam crescere potest in tali subjecto: nam in instanti mortis habuit omnes gradus, quos in hac vita aliquo titulo homo promeruit, postea vero nec mereri potest, nec intensius operari, quam ipsi habitus connaturali modo operari valeant."

Intelligitur b) quo sensu charitas animarum in Purgatorio sit perfecta, vel imperfecta. "Potest enim charitas dici imperfecta essentialiter: et hoc modo nulla charitas est imperfecta, si est vera, juxta illud 1. Joan. 2. 'Qui servat verbum ejus, vere in hoc charitas Dei perfecta est.' Omnis enim charitas unit Deo animam, ut ultimo fini supernaturali, estque essentialiter virtus et forma virtutum, et hoc modo imperfectio essentialis ei repugnat. Potest autem esse imperfecta accidentaliter, idque, dupliciter. Primo quoad statum, et hoc modo dicitur charitas imperfecta eo ipso, quod non est conjuncta actualiter et immobiliter suo ultimo fini: et hoc modo verum est charitatem animarum Purgatorii esse imperfectam, id est, non consummatam, sicut de gratia dictum est. De qua imperfectione videtur loquutus Paulus ad Philippenses 3. dicens, 'Non quod jam perfectus sim:' nam subdit: 'Sequor autem si quo modo comprehendam.' Non tamen inde fit posse augeri, quia est in supposito, quod jam est extra statum merendi. Unde alio modo potest charitas esse imperfecta, quia non habet totam intensionem, quam in tali subjecto habere potest, et debet: et sic charitas illarum animarum imperfecta non est, sed perfecta, sicut de gratia dictum est: eadem enim est

utriusque ratio."

Intelligitur c) an animae illae dicendae sint esse in termino vel in via. "Simpliciter enim non sunt in termino, quem nondum possident, et quoad hanc negationem sunt in via, et quoad aptitudinem solvendi debitum alicujus poenae per satispassionem, item quoad statum fidei: absolute tamen non sunt in via, sicut nos sumus, scilicet, quoad omnes conditiones, et effectus viatorum: sunt ergo veluti in statu medio. Dicique possunt esse in termino gratiae, nondum vero in termino gloriae."

Intelligitur d) quo sensu sit accipiendum illud Eccle. 11. 3.: "Si ceciderit lignum ad austrum aut ad aquilonem, in quocumque loco ceciderit, ibi erit," et alia similia ex Sacra Scriptura. Haec vera sunt de sorte definitiva; quoad hanc enim non datur medium inter paradisum et infernum, nec ullus est locus augendi post mortem gratiam, siquidem nullus amplius est locus merito; sed inde non excluditur status poenalis purgationis temporariae. Sane textus citatus desumitur ex V. T.; at in V. T., uti ipsi Protestantes agnoscunt, tertius locus extitit, videlicet limbus Patrum, in quo justi ad tempus detinebantur.

Intelligitur e) quomodo sint accipienda quaedam effata Patrum. Cum enim aliqui asserunt nullam dari in altera vita remissionem peccatorum, nullumque esse poenitentiae locum; agunt de peccatis mortalibus, et de remissione poenae aeternae. (Vid. S. Joan. Chrys. hom. 2. de Lazaro.) - Cum dicunt peccata remissa non obesse post mortem, significant non obesse ad beatitudinem ultimo consequendam, quin tamen excludant eam posse differri. Quod si aliqui, ut S. Augustinus (Enchirid. cap. 79.) videntur ancipites esse de futuris purgatorii poenis, loquuntur potius de earum natura et indole; ipsam enim existentiam alicujus poenae temporalis pro aliquibus post mortem, apertissime iidem Patres, uti S. Augustinus (de Civitate Dei lib. 21. c. 13.) docent. 687. From these things it is understood a) in what sense souls in purgatory have consummated grace. "Grace can be called consummated in two ways," Suarez teaches, same place, disputation 47, section 2, nos. 4 and 5: "first, because it is now actually joined to its end, which is to be consummated through operation; and in this way those souls do not have consummated grace, because they are not joined to God through clear vision, nor do they possess him, as we suppose from what has been said above concerning the place of purgatory; hence they still know him through faith alone. But in another way grace can be called consummated as to the intensity which it can or ought to have in such a subject; as heat is said to be at its highest when it has all the degrees of its intensity, and in this sense it must be said that those souls have consummated grace. For it can never grow in intensity in such a subject; for in the instant of death it had all the degrees which a man in this life merited by some title, but afterward he can neither merit nor operate more intensely than the habits themselves are able to operate in a connatural mode."

It is understood b) in what sense the charity of souls in purgatory is perfect or imperfect. "For charity can be called imperfect essentially, and in this way no charity is imperfect if it is true, according to that saying of 1 John 2, 'He who keeps his word, truly in him the charity of God is perfected.' For all charity unites the soul to God as to the supernatural last end, and is essentially virtue and the form of the virtues, and in this way essential imperfection is repugnant to it. But it can be imperfect accidentally, and that in two ways. First as to state; and in this way charity is called imperfect by the very fact that it is not actually and immovably joined to its last end; and in this way it is true that the charity of the souls of purgatory is imperfect, that is, not consummated, as was said concerning grace. Paul seems to speak of this imperfection to the Philippians, chapter 3, saying, 'Not that I am already perfect,' for he adds, 'But I follow after, if by any means I may comprehend.' Yet from this it does not follow that it can be increased, because it is in a subject which is already outside the state of meriting. Hence in another way charity can be imperfect because it does not have the whole intensity which it can and ought to have in such a subject; and thus the charity of those souls is not imperfect, but perfect, as was said concerning grace, for the same account belongs to both."

It is understood c) whether those souls are to be said to be in the terminus or on the way. "For simply they are not in the terminus, which they do not yet possess; and as to this negation they are on the way, and as to aptitude for paying the debt of some punishment through satisfaction-suffering, likewise as to the state of faith. Yet absolutely they are not on the way, as we are, namely as to all the conditions and effects of wayfarers. Therefore they are, as it were, in a middle state. And they can be said to be in the terminus of grace, but not yet in the terminus of glory."

It is understood d) in what sense

that saying of Ecclesiastes 11:3 must be taken: "If the tree falls to the south or to the north, in whatever place it falls, there it will be," and other similar sayings from Sacred Scripture. These are true concerning definitive lot; for as to this there is no middle between paradise and hell, nor is there any place for increasing grace after death, since there is no further place for merit. But from this a penal state of temporary purgation is not excluded. Certainly the cited text is taken from the Old Testament; but in the Old Testament, as the Protestants themselves acknowledge, a third place existed, namely the limbo of the Fathers, in which the just were detained for a time.

It is understood e) how certain sayings of the Fathers are to be taken. For when some assert that no remission of sins is given in the other life and that there is no place for repentance, they are treating of mortal sins and of the remission of eternal punishment. See St. John Chrysostom, homily 2 on Lazarus. - When they say that remitted sins do not harm after death, they mean that they do not harm with respect to finally attaining beatitude, without thereby excluding that it can be delayed. But if some, such as St. Augustine in the Enchiridion, chapter 79, seem uncertain about future punishments of purgatory, they are speaking rather about their nature and character; for the same Fathers, such as St. Augustine in The City of God, book 21, chapter 13, most openly teach the very existence of some temporal punishment after death for some persons.

688. His ergo positis. 688. Therefore, these things having been posited.

Article 9. On the Character of the Punishments of Purgatory and on the State of Souls Dwelling There

LatineEnglish

Corrected Latin

689. De poena damni. Poena damni vocatur privatio divinae visionis totiusque aeternae beatitudinis. - Quod animae purgatorii pro eo tempore quo ibi detinentur, careant visione beata, manifestum est ex dictis disp. praeced.; ideo enim ibi detinentur, quia non sunt expeditae et aptae ad videndum Deum. Item quia si viderent, non essent capaces alicujus poenae, quia visio, cum sit essentialis beatitudo, omne malum excludit, juxta illud: "Absterget Deus omnem lacrymam ab oculis Sanctorum, et jam non erit amplius neque luctus, neque clamor neque ullus dolor." Vid. Suarez (tom. 3. in 3. p. disp. 46. sect. 1. nn. 1-3.) 689. On the pain of loss. The pain of loss is called the privation of the divine vision and of the whole of eternal beatitude. - That the souls of purgatory, for that time during which they are detained there, lack the blessed vision, is manifest from what was said in the preceding disputation; for they are detained there precisely because they are not free and ready for seeing God. Likewise, because if they saw, they would not be capable of any punishment, since vision, since it is essential beatitude, excludes every evil, according to that saying: "God shall wipe away every tear from the eyes of the Saints, and now there shall be no more mourning, nor crying, nor any pain." See Suarez, volume 3, on the third part, disputation 46, section 1, nos. 1-3.

690. Hanc poenam pulchre exponit Lessius (op. 13. c. 17.), ubi inter caetera, scribit: "Animae justorum, quum se a gloria parata, eo momento, quo conferenda erat, vident repelli, et in teterrimum exilium ablegari donec pro antiquis culpis integre satisfaciant, incredibili sauciantur dolore. Quantus enim ille sit dolor, ex eo conjici potest, quod ex quadruplici consideratione nascatur. Primo, quod videant, se tanto privari bono, idque eo tempore, quo illo fruendum erat. Apprehendunt acerrime illius boni immensitatem, et simul illud ardentissime desiderant. Secundo, quod videant, id fieri ob suam culpam. Tertio, quod neglexerint pro illa culpa suo tempore satisfacere, quum facillimo negotio redimi

poterat, et tantas nunc cogantur sustinere calamitates; id enim non parum incendit doloris acerbitatem. Quarto, quod ingentes aeternorum bonorum thesauros et caelestis gloriae gradus, quos facile consequi potuissent, sua culpa et tempore neglexerint. Haec omnia vivacissimo modo apprehensa ingentem dolorem excitant, ut etiam in damnis humanis experimur, quum ista quatuor concurrunt." 690. Lessius beautifully explains this punishment, work 13, chapter 17, where, among other things, he writes: "The souls of the just, when they see themselves repelled from the glory prepared for them, at the very moment at which it was to be conferred, and banished into a most foul exile until they make full satisfaction for old faults, are wounded with incredible pain. How great that pain is can be conjectured from the fact that it is born from a fourfold consideration. First, that they see themselves deprived of so great a good, and that at the time when it was to be enjoyed. They most keenly apprehend the immensity of that good, and at the same time desire it most ardently. Second, that they see this happening because of their own fault. Third, that they neglected to satisfy for that fault in its own time, when it could have been redeemed with the easiest business, and now are compelled to endure such great calamities; for this inflames the bitterness of pain not a little. Fourth, that through their own fault and tepidity they neglected immense treasures of eternal goods and degrees of heavenly glory, which they could easily have attained. All these things, apprehended in the most vivid way, excite immense pain, as we also experience in human losses when those four things concur."

691. De poena sensus. Poena sensus consistit in aliquo dolore proveniente aliunde, quam ex carentia visionis Dei. - Certum est praeter poenam damni dari in Purgatorio etiam poenam sensus. Sicut enim peccatum quodcumque personale continet etiam conversionem inordinatam ad creaturas, ita puniri debet non solum privatione summi boni, sed etiam afflictione inflicta ab aliquo creato objecto. - Quod autem praecipua poena sensus sit poena ignis, patet tum ex illo 1. Cor. 3. "Salvus erit quasi per ignem," tum ex constanti traditione Patrum, qui ignem appellant Purgatorii poenam. 691. On the pain of sense. The pain of sense consists in some pain coming from elsewhere than from the lack of the vision of God. - It is certain that besides the pain of loss there is also given in purgatory a pain of sense. For just as any personal sin contains also a disordered conversion toward creatures, so it must be punished not only by privation of the highest good, but also by an affliction inflicted by some created object. - But that the chief pain of sense is the pain of fire is evident both from that saying of 1 Corinthians 3, "He shall be saved, yet as through fire," and from the constant tradition of the Fathers, who call fire the punishment of purgatory.

692. At vero, ignis ille estne realis et corporeus, an solum metaphoricus? Nihil est de fide in hac re quia nusquam ab Ecclesia definitum est. Imo in Conc. Florentino Graeci aperte professi fuerant, se non ponere ignem in Purgatorio, et tamen in definitione facta sessione ult. definitur, Purgatorium esse, nulla mentione ignis habita. 692. But is that fire real and corporeal, or only metaphorical? Nothing is of faith in this matter, because it has nowhere been defined by the Church. Indeed, in the Council of Florence the Greeks had openly professed that they did not posit fire in purgatory, and yet in the definition made in the last session it is defined that purgatory exists, with no mention of fire made.

693. Attamen sententia tenenda est, quod ignis ille sit proprius et verus. "Primo, propter consensum Scholasticorum, qui non potest nisi temere contemni. Secundo, propter Gregorii auctoritatem, lib. 4. Dialogor. cap. 29. ubi diserte asserit, ignem, quo puniuntur animae, esse corporeum. Neque obstat, quod lib. 15. cap. 14. moralium, dicit, ignem gehennae esse incorporeum; est enim mendum scriptorum, qui posuerunt incorporeum pro corporeum, ut patet ex sequentibus, dicit enim statim corporaliter urere. Tertio propter Augustinum, qui in eandem sententiam propendet, lib. 21. cap. 10. de civit. Dei. Quarto, quia in Scriptura passim poena impiorum vocatur ignis; et regula Theologorum est, ut verba Scripturarum accipiantur proprie, quando nihil absurdi sequitur. Quinto,

quia corpora damnatorum punientur igne post resurrectionem, ut patet Matth. 25. 'Ite in ignem aeternum;' at corpora non possunt uri, nisi igne corporeo. Est autem idem ignis corporum damnatorum, et spirituum corpore vacantium: nam ibidem dicitur: 'Qui paratus est diabolo, et angelis ejus.' Sexto, quia Sapient. 11. dicitur: Per quae peccat quis, per haec et torquetur; sed homines peccant saepe sensibilia oblectamenta inordinate cupiendo: ergo puniri debent sensibilibus objectis, ignis igitur quo puniuntur, sensibilis est." Vid. Bellarminum (de Purg. l. 2. c. 11.); Suarez (l. c. disp. 46. sect. 2.) 693. Nevertheless the opinion to be held is that that fire is proper and true. "First, because of the consensus of the Scholastics, which cannot be despised except rashly. Second, because of the authority of Gregory, book 4 of the Dialogues, chapter 29, where he expressly asserts that the fire by which souls are punished is corporeal. Nor is it an obstacle that in book 15, chapter 14 of the Moralia, he says that the fire of gehenna is incorporeal; for it is an error of copyists, who put incorporeal for corporeal, as is clear from what follows, for he immediately says that it burns corporeally. Third, because of Augustine, who inclines to the same opinion in book 21, chapter 10 of The City of God. Fourth, because in Scripture the punishment of the impious is everywhere called fire; and it is a rule of Theologians that the words of the Scriptures are to be taken properly when nothing absurd follows. Fifth, because the bodies of the damned will be punished by fire after the resurrection, as is clear from Matthew 25, 'Go into eternal fire'; but bodies cannot be burned except by corporeal fire. But the fire of the bodies of the damned and of spirits lacking bodies is the same, for in the same place it is said, 'which has been prepared for the devil and his angels.' Sixth, because in Wisdom 11 it is said: By the things by which someone sins, by these also he is tormented; but men often sin by desiring sensible delights inordinately; therefore they must be punished by sensible objects, and therefore the fire by which they are punished is sensible." See Bellarmine, On Purgatory, book 2, chapter 11; Suarez, same place, disputation 46, section 2.

694. Dices contra utramque poenam: si animae illae diligunt Deum, erunt conformes voluntati ejus; ergo erit eis voluntaria illa carentia et detentio, quam ex divina ordinatione et providentia non ignorant provenire; ergo non possunt de illa tristari, nam tristitia est de his quae nobis nolentibus accidunt.

Respondetur, hoc argumento probari, nullam tristitiam esse posse in illis animabus, quia nihil patiuntur quod non voluntarie sustineant, quatenus ex divina justitia provenit. Negatur ergo consequentia, quia quod una ratione voluntarium est, potest alia ratione esse involuntarium, et ut sic magnam tristitiam afferre. Illa ergo carentia voluntaria est ex suppositione, quod Deus illam vult, quodque ad satisfaciendum perfecte pro peccatis necessaria est. Est autem involuntaria, quatenus est contra inclinationem charitatis et naturale desiderium beatitudinis, et ut sic valde contristatur. Adde ipsummet Deum ex se (ut ita dicam) seu voluntate antecedente non velle illam carentiam, sed potius cupere, ut homo justus sine ulla mora illum videat; sed ex suppositione nostrae malitiae et negligentiae, voluntate consequente vult illam detentionem; sic ergo animae, respiciendo posteriorem Dei voluntatem, illi conformantur; considerando autem priorem, valde tristantur, eo quod illam non expleverint, quodque per eas steterit, ut voluntas illa Dei, quae antecedens fuit, non transierit in consequentem, et hac ratione tristantur de illa carentia; et consequenter dolent maxime de causa illius quae ab ipsis et non a Deo exorta fuit. Suarez (l. c. disp. 46. sect. 1. n. 4.) Similia habet S. Catharina Januensis in suo opusc. de Purgatorio. 694. You will say against both punishments: if those souls love God, they will be conformed to his will; therefore that lack and detention will be voluntary for them, which they are not ignorant comes from divine ordination and providence; therefore they cannot be saddened about it, for sadness is concerning those things which happen to us unwillingly.

The answer is that by this argument it would be proved that there can be no sadness in those souls, because they suffer nothing which they do not sustain voluntarily, insofar as it comes from divine justice. Therefore the consequence is denied, because what is voluntary under one aspect can be involuntary under another aspect, and as such bring great sadness. Therefore that lack is voluntary on the supposition that God wills it, and that

it is necessary for satisfying perfectly for sins. But it is involuntary insofar as it is against the inclination of charity and the natural desire of beatitude, and as such it is greatly saddening. Add that God himself of himself, so to speak, or by antecedent will, does not will that lack, but rather desires that the just man should see him without any delay; but on the supposition of our malice and negligence, by consequent will he wills that detention. Thus, therefore, the souls, looking to the later will of God, are conformed to it; but considering the former, they are greatly saddened because they did not fulfill it, and because it stood through them that that will of God, which was antecedent, did not pass into the consequent; and for this reason they are saddened about that lack, and consequently they grieve especially over the cause of it, which arose from themselves and not from God. Suarez, same place, disputation 46, section 1, no. 4. St. Catherine of Genoa has similar things in her little work on purgatory.

695. De gravitate poenae. Poenas Purgatorii esse atrocissimas, et cum illis nullas poenas hujus vitae comparandas docent constanter Patres. Augustinus, in Psalm. 37. "Quamvis," inquit, "salvi per ignem, gravior tamen erit ille ignis, quam quidquid potest homo pati in hac vita." Gregorius in Psalm. 3. poenitentialem: "Illum," inquit, "transitorium ignem omni tribulatione praesenti existimo intolerabiliorem." Ita etiam Beda, S. Anselmus, S. Bernardus. 695. On the gravity of the punishment. The Fathers constantly teach that the punishments of purgatory are most atrocious, and that no punishments of this life are to be compared with them. Augustine, on Psalm 37, says: "Although saved through fire, nevertheless that fire will be graver than whatever a man can suffer in this life." Gregory, on Psalm 3 penitential, says: "I judge that transitory fire to be more intolerable than every present tribulation." So also Bede, St. Anselm, St. Bernard.

696. At quamvis haec certa sint, quaestio tamen est utrum minima purgatorii poena excedat maximam poenam hujus vitae. - D. Thomas (suppl. q. 100. a. 3.) affirmat; et sic probat

Quoad poenam damni: "quanto enim aliquid magis desideratur, tanto ejus absentia est molestior. Et quia affectus quo desideratur summum bonum post hanc vitam, in animabus sanctis est intensissimus, quia non retardatur affectus mole corporis, et etiam quia terminus fruendi summo bono jam advenisset, nisi aliquid impediret; ideo de retardatione maxime dolent."

Quod argumentum ita illustrat Lessius (l. c.): "itaque credibile est, illum animi dolorem longe majorem, quam homines in hac vita ex damnis temporalibus concipere possint: quia bonum illud longe est excellentius, et apprehensio acrior, et desiderium ardentius, et haec omnia assidua, nunquam interpellata, noctes diesque urgentia. In doloribus hujus vitae crebra interruptio per somnum, per colloquia amicorum, per varias mentis distractiones. Accedit, quod divina justitia de industria faciat, ut damna sua etiam acrius apprehendant, quam per se facerent, ut majore dolore urantur. Ideo enim fit haec dilatio, et hoc tempore exilium, ut ejus dolore purgentur et poenas pristinarum culparum luant. Secus erat in Patribus antiquis limbo detentis: non enim ob culpam personalem ibi detinebantur gloriae exsortes, sed ob conditionem naturae, pro cujus debito pretium nondum erat exhibitum."

Quoad poenam sensus, docet l. c. D. Thomas: "Similiter etiam cum dolor non sit laesio, sed laesionis sensus, tanto aliquid magis dolet de aliquo laesivo, quanto magis est sensitivum. Unde laesiones quae fiunt in locis maxime sensibilibus, sunt maximum dolorem causantes. Et quia totus sensus corporis est ab anima, ideo si in ipsam animam aliquid laesivum agat, de necessitate oportet quod maxime affligatur. Quod autem anima ab igne corporali patiatur, hoc ad praesens supponimus." 696. But although these things are certain, nevertheless the question is whether the least punishment of purgatory exceeds the greatest punishment of this life. - St. Thomas, Supplement, question 100, article 3, affirms this, and proves it thus:

With regard to the pain of loss: "For the more something is desired, the more troublesome is its absence. And because the affection by which the highest good is desired after this life is most intense in holy souls, because the affection is not delayed by the bulk of the body, and also because the terminus of enjoying the highest good would already have arrived unless something impeded it, therefore they grieve most of all over the

delay."

Lessius illustrates that argument in this way, same place: "And so it is credible that that pain of soul is far greater than men in this life can conceive from temporal losses, because that good is far more excellent, and the apprehension sharper, and the desire more ardent, and all these things continuous, never interrupted, pressing night and day. In the pains of this life there is frequent interruption through sleep, through the conversations of friends, through various distractions of the mind. Add that divine justice purposely causes them to apprehend their losses even more sharply than they would of themselves, so that they may be burned with greater pain. For this delay and this exile for a time take place so that by its pain they may be purged and may pay the punishments of former faults. It was otherwise with the ancient Fathers detained in limbo; for they were not detained there deprived of glory because of personal fault, but because of the condition of nature, for whose debt the price had not yet been exhibited."

With regard to the pain of sense, St. Thomas teaches in the same place: "Likewise also, since pain is not lesion, but the sense of lesion, something grieves the more over some harmful thing the more sensitive it is. Hence lesions which occur in the most sensitive places cause the greatest pain. And because the whole sense of the body is from the soul, therefore if something harmful acts upon the soul itself, it must of necessity be most afflicted. But that the soul suffers from corporeal fire, we suppose for the present."

697. Sed S. Bonaventura (in 4. dist. 20. a. 1. q. 2.) docet 1. poenam damni in Purgatorio non esse majorem omni poena. "Quae sententia," inquit Bellarminus (de Purg. l. 2. c. 14.) "mihi placet; nam licet absentia summi boni ex se generet in mente summam tristitiam, tamen in Purgatorio mitigatur haec tristitia, et levatur magna ex parte propter certam spem illius boni acquirendi; ista enim certissima spes affert incredibile gaudium, et quo magis propinquat finis illius exilii, tanto magis gaudium crescit."

Docet 2. Purgatorii poenas esse majores poenis hujus vitae, solum hoc sensu, quod maxima poena Purgatorii est major maxima poena hujus vitae; licet aliqua sit Purgatorii poena minor aliqua poena hujus vitae. Quod confirmat Bellarminus (l. c.)

a) Quia ex certis revelationibus constat, aliquorum poenam esse tam exiguam, ut nihil pati videantur, quales sunt illi, qui albis vestibus induti, visi sunt in locis amoenis et lucidis, apud Bedam lib. 5. historiar. cap. 13.

b) Quia licet sit quaestio: An poenae Purgatorii semper crucient aeque graviter, ab initio usque ad finem purgationis; an vero paulatim minuantur, donec finem accipiant, tamen probabilior sententia est, paulatim remitti; hinc autem sequitur, non quamlibet Purgatorii poenam esse majorem maxima poena hujus vitae; nam poena illa Purgatorii, quae est prope finem debet esse adeo remissa, ut amplius remitti non possit, hic autem poenae inveniuntur intensissimae, quae plurimum, remitti possunt. Quod autem poenae Purgatorii paulatim remittantur, probatur; nam S. Bernardus in vita S. Malachiae scribit, oranti Malachiae pro sorore defuncta, ipsam defunctam ter apparuisse. Primo, in veste nigra, et extra Ecclesiam. Secundo, in veste subfusca, et intra limen Ecclesiae. Tertio, in veste alba, et ad ipsum altare cum caeteris Sanctis. Ex quibus ipse intellexit, animam sororis paulatim remittentibus se poenis ad finem purgationis venisse. Et similes multae visiones adferri possent.

Sed "persistendum est," inquit Valentia (tom. 4. disp. 11. q. 1. p. 3.) "in sententia Theologorum. Nam ex ejusmodi revelationibus non satis certo colligitur, quid fiat communiter cum omnibus secundum legem ordinariam, sed quid fiat quandoque extraordinarie occulto aliquo Dei judicio." Vid. etiam Suarez (l. c. disp. 46. sect. 1. nn. 5-12.; et sect. 3. nn. 1-7.) 697. But St. Bonaventure, on book 4, distinction 20, article 1, question 2, teaches 1. that the pain of loss in purgatory is not greater than every punishment. "This opinion," says Bellarmine, On Purgatory, book 2, chapter 14, "pleases me; for although the absence of the highest good of itself generates the greatest sadness in the mind, nevertheless in purgatory this sadness is mitigated and lightened in great part because of the certain hope of acquiring that good; for that most certain hope brings incredible joy, and the more the end of that exile approaches, the more the joy increases."

He teaches 2. that the punishments of purgatory are greater than the punishments of this life only in this sense: that the greatest punishment of purgatory is greater than the greatest punishment of this life, although some punishment of purgatory is less than some punishment of this life. Bellarmine

confirms this, same place,

a) because from certain revelations it is established that the punishment of some is so slight that they seem to suffer nothing, such as those who, clothed in white garments, were seen in pleasant and bright places, according to Bede, book 5 of the History, chapter 13.

b) Because although there is a question whether the punishments of purgatory always torment equally gravely from the beginning even to the end of purgation, or whether they are gradually diminished until they receive an end, nevertheless the more probable opinion is that they are gradually remitted. From this, however, it follows that not every punishment of purgatory is greater than the greatest punishment of this life; for that punishment of purgatory which is near the end ought to be so remitted that it cannot be remitted further, while here there are found most intense punishments which can be very much remitted. But that the punishments of purgatory are gradually remitted is proved; for St. Bernard, in the life of St. Malachy, writes that, while Malachy was praying for his deceased sister, the deceased woman appeared to him three times. First, in a black garment and outside the Church. Second, in a dusky garment and inside the threshold of the Church. Third, in a white garment and at the altar itself with the rest of the Saints. From these things he understood that the soul of his sister, her punishments gradually remitting themselves, had come to the end of purgation. And many similar visions could be brought forward.

But "one must persist," says Valentia, volume 4, disputation 11, question 1, part 3, "in the opinion of the Theologians. For from revelations of this sort it is not gathered certainly enough what commonly happens with all according to the ordinary law, but what sometimes happens extraordinarily by some hidden judgment of God." See also Suarez, same place, disputation 46, section 1, nos. 5-12; and section 3, nos. 1-7.

698. De duratione Purgatorii. Quamvis determinate non constet, quamdiu animae puniantur in Purgatorio, tamen duo circa diuturnitatem illarum poenarum, sunt certa apud Theologos: nempe primo, solere aliquas animas satis longo tempore in Purgatorio cruciari. Secundo, nullas animas ultra diem extremi judicii in Purgatorio detentas et cruciatas iri, atque adeo post judicii diem nullum futurum usum Purgatorii, sed omnes animas, vel in Coelo, vel in loco damnationis, hoc est, in Inferno, aut in Limbo fore.

Primum probatur ex Ecclesiae consuetudine, quae obtinuit, ut in anniversariis defunctorum oretur et sacrificium offeratur pro iis, qui ante aliquot etiam centurias annorum diem obierunt. Per quam Ecclesiae consuetudinem, quae sine insolentissima insania, juxta Augustinum epist. 118. ad Januarium, contemni nequit, contraria sententia redarguitur.

Secundum autem probatur a) ex sententia quam Dominus in judicio proferet. Nam ex omnibus, quos juxta propria illorum opera judicaturus est (id est ex omnibus omnino adultis) duos tantum ordines constituet. Alterum eorum quibus dicet: "percipite regnum, etc." Alterum eorum quos amandabit in Infernum, inquiens: "ite maledicti, etc." Matthaei vigesimo quinto. Parvulos autem, qui sine Baptismo decesserunt, satis constat non futuros in Purgatorio.

b) Ex luculento testimonio S. Augustini lib. 21. de civitate cap. 17. "Quisquis," inquit, "cupit poenas evadere sempiternas, etc. Purgatorias poenas nullas futuras opinetur nisi ante illud ultimum extremumque judicium." Vide Bellar. (l. c. cap. 9.) 698. On the duration of purgatory. Although it is not determinately established how long souls are punished in purgatory, nevertheless two things concerning the length of those punishments are certain among Theologians: first, namely, that some souls are accustomed to be tormented in purgatory for a rather long time. Second, that no souls will be detained and tormented in purgatory beyond the day of the last judgment, and therefore after the day of judgment there will be no use of purgatory, but all souls will be either in heaven, or in the place of damnation, that is, in hell, or in limbo.

The first is proved from the custom of the Church, which has prevailed, that on the anniversaries of the dead prayer and sacrifice are offered for those who departed even some centuries of years before. Through this custom of the Church, which, according to Augustine, epistle 118 to Januarius, cannot be despised without most insolent insanity, the contrary opinion is refuted.

The second is proved a) from the sentence which the Lord will pronounce in judgment. For from all those whom he is going to judge according to their proper works, that is, from absolutely all adults, he will constitute only two orders: one of those to whom he will say,

"receive the kingdom, etc."; another of those whom he will send away into hell, saying, "go, accursed ones, etc.," Matthew 25. But it is sufficiently established that little children who departed without Baptism will not be in purgatory.

b) From the clear testimony of St. Augustine, book 21 of The City, chapter 17. "Whoever," he says, "desires to escape eternal punishments, etc., should think that there will be no purgatorial punishments except before that final and last judgment." See Bellarmine, same place, chapter 9.

699. De loco Purgatorii. Constituunt Scholastici communi consensu intra terram quatuor sinus, sive unum in quatuor partes divisum, unum pro damnatis, alterum pro purgandis, tertium pro infantibus sine Baptismo obeuntibus, quartum pro justis, qui moriebantur ante Christi passionem, qui nunc vacuus remanet. 699. On the place of purgatory. The Scholastics establish by common consensus four recesses within the earth, or one divided into four parts: one for the damned, another for those to be purged, a third for infants dying without Baptism, a fourth for the just who died before the passion of Christ, which now remains empty.

700. Jamvero quod Purgatorium sit certus quidam ac determinatus locus - sub terra - et inferno damnatorum vicinus, probatur primo ex illis Actor. 2.: Solutis doloribus inferni, quae intelliguntur ab Augustino epist. 99. de poenis Purgatorii, unde etiam Ecclesia in Missa de defunctis dicit: "Libera animas defunctorum de poenis inferni, et de profundo lacu." Secundo, id confirmatur ex visione, quam refert Beda lib. 5. cap. 13. historiae, ubi aperte visum est Purgatorium inferno damnatorum contiguum. Denique, Theologi fere omnes docent eodem in loco esse, et eodem igne torqueri damnatos, et animas Purgatorii. 700. Now that purgatory is a certain and determinate place, under the earth and near the hell of the damned, is proved first from those words of Acts 2: "the pains of hell having been loosed," which are understood by Augustine, epistle 99, concerning the punishments of purgatory; hence also the Church in the Mass for the dead says: "Deliver the souls of the departed from the punishments of hell and from the deep pit." Second, this is confirmed from the vision which Bede relates in book 5, chapter 13 of the History, where purgatory was clearly seen to be contiguous to the hell of the damned. Finally, nearly all Theologians teach that the damned and the souls of purgatory are in the same place and are tormented by the same fire.

701. Addit tamen D. Thomas (suppl. q. 100. a. 2.): "probabiliter, et secundum quod consonat magis sanctorum dictis, et revelationi factae multis, locus purgatorii est duplex. Unus secundum legem communem; et hic locus purgatorii est locus inferior, inferno conjunctus: ita quod idem sit ignis qui damnatos cruciat in inferno, et qui justos in purgatorio purgat, quamvis damnati, secundum quod sunt inferiores merito, et loco inferiores ordinandi sint. Alius est locus purgatorii secundum dispensationem; et sic quandoque in diversis locis aliqui puniti leguntur, vel ad vivorum instructionem, vel ad mortuorum subventionem, ut viventibus eorum poena innotescens per suffragia Ecclesiae mitigaretur." Vid. Bellarm. (l. c. cap. 6.); Suarez (l. c. disp. 45. sect. 2.) 701. Nevertheless St. Thomas adds, Supplement, question 100, article 2: "Probably, and according as it agrees more with the sayings of the saints and with revelation made to many, the place of purgatory is twofold. One is according to the common law; and this place of purgatory is the lower place, joined to hell, so that the fire which torments the damned in hell is the same as that which purges the just in purgatory, although the damned, according as they are lower in merit, must be ordered lower also in place. The other is the place of purgatory according to dispensation; and thus sometimes some are read to have been punished in diverse places, either for the instruction of the living, or for the assistance of the dead, so that their punishment, becoming known to the living, might be mitigated through the suffrages of the Church." See Bellarmine, same place, chapter 6; Suarez, same place, disputation

45, section 2.

702. De certitudine salutis in animabus Purgatorii. Quod omnes animae in Purgatorio certae sint omnino de sua salute, est sententia certa apud Theologos post condemnationem articulorum Lutheri, in quorum 38. sic ille scripsit: "Animae in purgatorio non sunt securae de sua salute, saltem omnes."

Revera certo norunt illae omnes animae, salutem esse consecuturos eos omnes, qui sunt in purgatorio: ac simul certe etiam sciunt, se esse in purgatorio. Igitur per evidentem et certam consequentiam norunt se salutem consecuturas.

Prior pars antecedentis probatur. Nam id est certum fide, juxta illud 1. ad Corinth. 3. "Ipse autem salvus erit; sic tamen quasi per ignem," et alia quae attulimus paulo ante. Retinent autem animae in purgatorio hanc ipsam fidem, quam dum viverent, habuerunt.

Posterior item antecedentis pars probatur multipliciter. Primo, quoniam ex Christi sententia in particulari judicio, quod, juxta dicta paulo ante animae subierunt, sciunt ad quem locum delatae sint. Secundo, quoniam ipsaemet etiam, licet simul quoque ductu Angelico, ad purgatorii locum contenderunt, et sciunt quoque se necdum inde emigrasse. Quomodo igitur se esse ignorarent? Tertio, quoniam sciunt se neque in caelo, neque in inferno, neque in Limbo, neque alibi esse, etc. Ergo in purgatorio. Quarto, quoniam idipsum credibile est, eas quoque discere ex Angelis, ipsas consolantibus in illis poenis, etc. 702. On the certainty of salvation in the souls of purgatory. That all souls in purgatory are entirely certain concerning their salvation is a certain opinion among Theologians after the condemnation of the articles of Luther, in the thirty-eighth of which he wrote thus: "Souls in purgatory are not secure concerning their salvation, at least not all."

In reality all those souls know certainly that all who are in purgatory are going to attain salvation; and at the same time they certainly also know that they themselves are in purgatory. Therefore by an evident and certain consequence they know that they themselves are going to attain salvation.

The prior part of the antecedent is proved. For this is certain by faith, according to that saying of 1 Corinthians 3, "But he himself shall be saved, yet as through fire," and other things which we brought forward a little before. But the souls in purgatory retain this very faith which they had while they were living.

The posterior part of the antecedent is likewise proved in several ways. First, because from the sentence of Christ in the particular judgment which, according to what was said a little before, the souls underwent, they know to what place they have been brought. Second, because they themselves also, although at the same time also by angelic guidance, went to the place of purgatory, and they likewise know that they have not yet migrated from there. How therefore would they be ignorant that they are there? Third, because they know that they are neither in heaven, nor in hell, nor in limbo, nor elsewhere, etc. Therefore they are in purgatory. Fourth, because it is credible that they also learn this very thing from the Angels consoling them in those punishments, etc.

703. De animarum purgatorii confirmatione in gratia. Uti merito observat Suarez (l. c. disp. 47. sect. 3. n. 5.) ut animae Purgatorii certae sint de sua aeterna salute duo necesse est cognoscere: se esse in statu gratiae - se non posse amplius peccare. Quare, cum animae illae certae sint de propria salute, in gratia confirmatae dicendae sunt. 703. On the confirmation of the souls of purgatory in grace. As Suarez rightly observes, same place, disputation 47, section 3, no. 5, in order that the souls of purgatory may be certain concerning their eternal salvation, it is necessary to know two things: that they are in the state of grace, and that they can no longer sin. Therefore, since those souls are certain concerning their own salvation, they must be said to be confirmed in grace.

704. Quaeri hic solum potest, unde habeant illae animae talem confirmationem in bono. Respondetur "non habere illam ab intrinseco ex aliqua interna perfectione actuali, habituali, vel naturali; quia non vident Deum, ut inde confirmentur in bono, nec soli habitus possunt tantam perseverantiam, et immutabilitatem conferre; nec anima separata natura sua est

impeccabilis, potius quam Angelus. Divina ergo gratia, et protectio est, quae illas animas in bono confirmat ratione illius status, ad quem duo spectant: unum est, ut poena illa temporalis tantum esse possit; aliud est, ut inde sit transitus infallibilis ad gloriam; ad utrumque autem necessaria est confirmatio in bono, et carentia omnis peccati: nam per mortale amitteretur gratia; per veniale posset poena illa semper magis ac magis protrahi. Est autem facile Deo hanc confirmationem tribuere, sicut illam tribuit animabus sanctorum Patrum in sinu Abrahae, et alicui viatori interdum illam contulit. Denique, si animae quae in peccato mortali decedunt, statim per divinam desertionem confirmantur in malo, juxta illud Matth. 25.: 'Clausa est janua,' et alia supra adducta, et communem Ecclesiae sensum ac traditionem, quid mirum est, quod animae decedentes in gratia statim confirmentur in bono, vel per beatitudinem, vel per specialem Dei favorem ac protectionem?" Suarez (l. c. disp. 47. sect. 1. nn. 6-8.) 704. Here only it can be asked whence those souls have such confirmation in good. The answer is that "they do not have it intrinsically from some internal perfection, actual, habitual, or natural; because they do not see God so that they might be confirmed in good from that, nor can habits alone confer such great perseverance and immutability, nor is the separated soul by its nature impeccable any more than an Angel. Therefore it is divine grace and protection which confirms those souls in good by reason of that state, to which two things pertain: one is that that punishment can be only temporal; the other is that from there there is an infallible passage to glory. But for each of these, confirmation in good and the absence of every sin are necessary; for through mortal sin grace would be lost; through venial sin that punishment could always be drawn out more and more. But it is easy for God to bestow this confirmation, just as he bestowed it on the souls of the holy Fathers in the bosom of Abraham, and sometimes bestowed it on some wayfarer. Finally, if souls which depart in mortal sin are immediately confirmed in evil through divine desertion, according to that saying of Matthew 25, 'The door was closed,' and the other things brought forward above, and according to the common sense and tradition of the Church, what wonder is it that souls departing in grace are immediately confirmed in good, either through beatitude, or through a special favor and protection of God?" Suarez, same place, disputation 47, section 1, nos. 6-8.

Article 10. On the Resurrection of the Dead

LatineEnglish

Corrected Latin

705. Quanti momenti sit dogma de resurrectione, declarat ipse Apostolus dicens: "Si resurrectio mortuorum non est, neque Christus resurrexit. Si autem Christus non resurrexit, inanis est ergo praedicatio nostra, inanis est et fides vestra." 1. Cor. 15. Unde S. Augustinus (Enarr. in Ps. 101.), ait: "Resurrectionem aufer, illico Christianismum evertis." - Veram imprimis resurrectionis notionem exhibebimus - ejus deinde veritatem et existentiam ostendemus.

§ I.

Exponuntur errores - resurrectionis definitio traditur. 705. Of how great importance the dogma concerning the resurrection is, the Apostle himself declares, saying: "If there is no resurrection of the dead, neither has Christ risen. But if Christ has not risen, then our preaching is empty, and your faith also is empty." 1 Corinthians 15. Hence St. Augustine, on Psalm 101, says: "Take away the resurrection, and immediately you overturn Christianity." - First we shall present the true notion of the resurrection; then we shall show its truth and existence.

§ I.

Errors are explained; the definition of resurrection is handed down.

706. Dogma catholicum de resurrectione mortuorum quovis tempore vehementer impugnatum fuit, ita ut S. Augustinus Enarrat. in Psalmo 58. dicat: "In nulla re sic contradicitur fidei christianae, sicut de carnis resurrectione." - Certe si agatur de gentilibus Philosophis, Tertullianus (de Praescrip. c. 7.), inquit: "Ut carnis resurrectio negetur, de una omnium

philosophorum schola sumitur." - Et Paulo in Areopago loquente Act. 17. 32.: "Cum audissent resurrectionem mortuorum, quidam quidem irridebant quidam vero dixerunt: Audiemus te de hoc iterum." - Inter Judaeos ipsos, aliqui negarunt resurrectionis dogma, uti colligitur ex Matth. 22. 23. ubi dicitur: "In illo die accesserunt ad eum (Christum) Sadducaei, qui dicunt non esse resurrectionem." Ejusdem erroris arguuntur Samaritani ab Origene, et a S. Epiphanio. - Inter ipsos Christianos tempore Apostolorum Paulus 1. Cor. 15. 12. graviter expostulat quosdam, qui resurrectionem negabant. Idem Apostolus epist. ad Timoth. impietatis arguit: "Hymenaeum et Philetum, qui a veritate exciderunt dicentes, resurrectionem esse jam factam, et subverterunt quorundam fidem," videlicet, ut explicat S. Thomas putantes, omnia quae in Scripturis de resurrectione dicuntur "esse resurrectionem animorum, quae jam facta est," per resurrectionem Christi juxta illud Apostoli: "Si consurrexistis cum Christo, quae sursum sunt quaerite, etc." - Post Apostolorum tempora latius haec haeresis propagata fuit, uti referunt Tertullianus, S. Epiphanius, S. Hieronymus, S. Augustinus. Et recentiori aevo eumdem errorem tenuerunt Anabaptistae, Sociniani, Arminiani. His adjiciendi sunt aetatis nostrae Pseudo-Philosophi, Athei, Pantheistae, Rationalistae. 706. The Catholic dogma concerning the resurrection of the dead has at every time been vehemently attacked, so that St. Augustine, on Psalm 58, says: "In no matter is Christian faith so contradicted as concerning the resurrection of the flesh." - Certainly if pagan Philosophers are in question, Tertullian, On Prescription, chapter 7, says: "That the resurrection of the flesh may be denied is taken from the one school of all the philosophers." - And when Paul was speaking in the Areopagus, Acts 17:32: "When they had heard of the resurrection of the dead, some indeed mocked, but others said: We will hear you again concerning this." - Among the Jews themselves, some denied the dogma of the resurrection, as is gathered from Matthew 22:23, where it is said: "On that day the Sadducees, who say there is no resurrection, came to him," Christ. The Samaritans are accused of the same error by Origen and St. Epiphanius. - Among Christians themselves in the time of the Apostles, Paul in 1 Corinthians 15:12 gravely reproaches certain persons who denied the resurrection. The same Apostle, in the epistle to Timothy, accuses Hymenaeus and Philetus of impiety, "who fell away from the truth, saying that the resurrection has already taken place, and they overturned the faith of some," namely, as St. Thomas explains, thinking that all things which are said in the Scriptures concerning resurrection "are the resurrection of souls, which has already taken place" through the resurrection of Christ, according to that saying of the Apostle: "If you have risen with Christ, seek the things that are above, etc." - After the times of the Apostles, this heresy was propagated more widely, as Tertullian, St. Epiphanius, St. Jerome, and St. Augustine report. And in the more recent age, the Anabaptists, Socinians, and Arminians held the same error. To these must be added the pseudo-philosophers, atheists, pantheists, and rationalists of our age.

707. Ecclesia e contra quovis tempore in suis Symbolis resurrectionem mortuorum professa est. Jam in Symbolo Apostolico exstat articulus fidei: "Credo ... carnis resurrectionem." - In symbolo Nicaeno-Constantinopolitano dicimus: "Expecto resurrectionem mortuorum." - In Symbolo Athanasiano: "Omnes homines resurgere habent cum corporibus suis." - Eadem veritas definita fuit in Conc. Toletan. IV. et XI. - In Conc. Later. IV. cap. Firmiter. In synodo Hierosolym. anno 1672. c. 18., Graecis schismaticis consentientibus. 707. On the contrary, the Church at every time has professed the resurrection of the dead in her Creeds. Already in the Apostles' Creed there stands the article of faith: "I believe ... the resurrection of the flesh." - In the Nicene-Constantinopolitan Creed we say: "I expect the resurrection of the dead." - In the Athanasian Creed: "All men have to rise again with their bodies." - The same truth was defined in the Fourth and Eleventh Councils of Toledo; in Lateran IV, chapter Firmiter; and in the Synod of Jerusalem in the year 1672, chapter 18, with the schismatic Greeks consenting.

708. Resurrectionis vox non tam latina est quam Ecclesiastica; apud Latinos enim veteres non reperitur vox resurrectionis, praesertim in vera significatione. Quod mirum non est: nam cum veteres illi rem non agnoverint, nec nomen ei indiderunt. 708. The word resurrection is not so much Latin as ecclesiastical; for among the ancient Latins the word resurrection is not found, especially in its true signification. This is not surprising, for since those ancients did not know the reality, they did not give it a name.

709. Resurrectio sumi potest passive et active. Active sumpta melius dicitur resuscitatio, et est opus externum, quo Deus homines mortuos omnipotenti virtute sua revocaturus est ad vitam, restituendo singulis corpora sua quae aliquando habebant, rursusque animabus uniendo. - Passive vero sumpta est corporis per mortem amissi restitutio, et animae cum eodem unio iterata. Vel, ut inquit Suarez (de Myst. vitae Christi, disp. 44. sect. 1. n. 1.), resurrectio "est mutatio substantialis, qua id quod prius extiterat et corruptum erat, idemmet iterum producitur." 709. Resurrection can be taken passively and actively. Taken actively, it is better called resuscitation, and it is an external work by which God, by his omnipotent power, is going to recall dead men to life, restoring to each one the bodies which they once had and uniting them again to their souls. - Taken passively, it is the restoration of the body lost through death, and the repeated union of the soul with the same. Or, as Suarez says in On the Mysteries of the Life of Christ, disputation 44, section 1, no. 1, resurrection "is a substantial change by which that which had previously existed and had been corrupted, the very same thing is produced again."

710. Dicitur 1. resurrectio esse mutatio in quo a creatione, seu potius a recreatione distinguitur. Si enim Deus Angelum vel hominem semel productum in nihilum redigeret, rursumque illum postea produceret, esset illa recreatio seu restitutio ejusdem rei quae antea fuerat, in quo cum resurrectione conveniret; non tamen foret resurrectio prout nunc loquimur, quia non esset mutatio, sed simplex effectio ex nihilo. Est ergo de ratione resurrectionis, ut sit propria mutatio, atque adeo ut fiat ex praesupposita materia seu subjecto; in hoc enim differt propria mutatio a simplici effectione, quae mutationem non includit. 710. It is said, 1. that resurrection is a change, in which it is distinguished from creation, or rather from recreation. For if God should reduce to nothing an Angel or a man once produced, and afterward again produce him, that would be a recreation or restoration of the same thing which had existed before, in which it would agree with resurrection; nevertheless it would not be resurrection as we now speak, because it would not be a change, but a simple effecting from nothing. Therefore it belongs to the account of resurrection that it be a proper change, and thus that it be made from presupposed matter or a subject; for in this a proper change differs from simple effecting, which does not include change.

711. Dicitur 2. substantialis; nam fieri potest, ut in eodem subjecto idem numero accidens, quod destructum fuerat, iterum producatur per mutationem ex subjecto, resurrectioni similem, quod mutationis genus etiam in spiritualibus rebus reperiri potest, ut constat; tamen, sicut esse et productio accidentis non sunt tales simpliciter, sed secundum quid, ita restauratio ejusdem accidentis non est simpliciter reparatio, sed secundum quid, et ideo non significatur absolute nomine resurrectionis. Igitur resurrectio simpliciter dicta mutationem substantialem significat (ut dixi), ac propterea solum habet locum in substantiis materia formaque compositis." 711. It is said, 2. substantial; for it can happen that in the same subject the same accident numerically, which had been destroyed, is produced again through a change from the subject similar to resurrection; this kind of change can also be found in spiritual things, as is clear. Nevertheless, just as the being and production of an accident are not such simply, but in a qualified respect, so the restoration of the same accident is not simply reparation, but in a qualified respect; and therefore it is

not signified absolutely by the name of resurrection. Therefore resurrection, simply so called, signifies a substantial change, as I said, and for that reason has a place only in substances composed of matter and form."

712. Dicitur 3. quod prius extiterat et corruptum erat. Etenim in corruptibilibus tantum resurrectio locum habet. "Primo quidem, quia productio ex praesupposito subjecto proprie non habet locum nisi in re generabili et corruptibili; ergo nec reproductio. Deinde quia oportet ut haec mutatio tendat ad producendam rem quae prius extiterat, corruptaque fuerat. Quia, nisi esset destructa, non esset capax reproductionis; et nisi destructa fuisset per corruptionem, non mansisset subjectum ex quo iterum produci posset. Necesse ergo est ut corruptio seu mors resurrectionem antecedat; sicut ergo corruptio non habet locum nisi in re corruptibili, ita neque resurrectio." 712. It is said, 3. that which had previously existed and had been corrupted. For resurrection has a place only in corruptible things. "First indeed, because production from a presupposed subject properly has a place only in a generable and corruptible thing; therefore neither does reproduction. Next, because this change must tend to producing a thing which had previously existed and had been corrupted. For unless it had been destroyed, it would not be capable of reproduction; and unless it had been destroyed by corruption, the subject from which it could again be produced would not have remained. Therefore it is necessary that corruption or death precede resurrection; therefore, just as corruption has no place except in a corruptible thing, so neither does resurrection."

713. Dicitur 4. idemmet iterum producitur. Oportet enim ut per resurrectionem idem homo fiat qui antea desierat esse. Nam si esset alius, jam non esset resurrectio, sed multiplicatio hominum, novaque generatio."

§ II.

De identitate resurgentium. 713. It is said, 4. the very same thing is produced again. For through resurrection it is necessary that the same man be made who had previously ceased to be. For if it were another, it would no longer be resurrection, but a multiplication of men and a new generation."

§ II.

On the identity of those rising again.

714. Praecipua difficultas in explicando dogmate de resurrectione oritur ex identitate, quae requiritur in resurgentibus. De hac igitur quae satis sunt paucis exponemus. 714. The chief difficulty in explaining the dogma concerning resurrection arises from the identity which is required in those rising again. Therefore we shall explain briefly what is sufficient concerning this.

715. Duplex identitas potest hic considerari, videlicet specifica et numerica. Identitas specifica nullam patitur difficultatem ex parte formae quae, cum sit ipsa anima intellectiva et spiritualis, quemadmodum non perit, ita eadem in corporum resurrectione erit in unoquoque homine. Quod autem etiam materia debeat esse specifice eadem in resurrectione, facile patet; ut enim bene notat Suarez (l. c. sect. 2. n. 2.) "cum haec species materiae, scilicet rerum generabilium et corruptibilium, sit de essentia corporis humani, et consequenter de essentia hominis, si materia corporis resurgentis non esset ejusdem speciei, compositum ex illa non solum non esset idem homo qui antea fuerat, verum etiam neque esset homo. Non esset ergo illa resurrectio, sed nova productio cujusdam novi monstri." - Nec difficile est hanc specificam identitatem materiae explicare in sententia D. Thomae et Suaresii (nn. 197. seqq.): si enim verum est quod materia speciem a forma habet, et quod in homine nulla alia est substantialis forma, praeter animam intellectivam; cum in resurrectione materia iterum uniatur animae intellectivae, hoc ipso recipit eamdem speciem. 715. A twofold identity can be considered here, namely specific and numerical. Specific identity suffers no difficulty on the part of the form, which, since it is the intellective and spiritual soul itself, just as it does not perish, so it will be the same in the resurrection of bodies in each man. But that the matter also ought to be specifically

the same in the resurrection is easily clear; for as Suarez well notes, same place, section 2, no. 2, "since this species of matter, namely of generable and corruptible things, belongs to the essence of the human body, and consequently to the essence of man, if the matter of the rising body were not of the same species, the composite from it would not only not be the same man who had existed before, but indeed would not even be a man. Therefore that would not be resurrection, but the new production of a certain new monster." - Nor is it difficult to explain this specific identity of matter in the opinion of St. Thomas and Suarez, nos. 197 and following: for if it is true that matter has species from form, and that in man there is no other substantial form besides the intellective soul, then when in the resurrection matter is again united to the intellective soul, by this very fact it receives the same species.

716. Tota ergo quaestio est de identitate numerica. Qua in re notandum est imprimis cum Suarez (l. c. n. 5.) "quod cum resurrectio sit mutatio quaedam in qua subjectum et terminus reperitur, interdum potest denominari subjectum, quomodo dicimus resurgere corpus quod mortuum erat; corpus enim illud subjectum est, non terminus resurrectionis. Interdum vero potest denominare terminum, quomodo dicimus resurrexisse hominem, ut Lazarum, verbi gratia; animam vero proprie non denominat, quia illa non ceciderat, sed viva permanserat, quamvis denominari possit reunita corpori per resurrectionem." 716. Therefore the whole question concerns numerical identity. In this matter one must first note with Suarez, same place, no. 5, "that since resurrection is a certain change in which subject and terminus are found, it can sometimes be denominated from the subject, in which way we say that the body which was dead rises again; for that body is the subject, not the terminus of resurrection. But sometimes it can denominate the terminus, in which way we say that a man has risen, as Lazarus, for example. But properly it does not denominate the soul, because the soul had not fallen, but had remained alive, although it can be denominated as reunited to the body through resurrection."

717. Jamvero identitatem numericam tum ex parte subjecti (corporis), tum ex parte termini (hominis) admittendam esse in resurrectione, facile patet. Etenim Job. 19. dicit: "Rursum circumdabor pelle mea, et in carne mea," quam nunc habeo, "videbo Deum meum." - Paulus Rom. 8. 11. scribit: "Qui suscitavit Jesum Christum a mortuis, vivificabit et mortalia corpora vestra propter inhabitantem Spiritum ejus in vobis," id est vivificabit corpora, quae nunc vestra sunt, et in quibus modo per gratiam habitat Spiritus Sanctus. - Et 1. Cor. 15. 53.: "Oportet corruptibile hoc induere incorruptionem, et mortale hoc induere immortalitatem:" quo in loco pronomen hoc ostendit, quod non nova accipiemus, sed eadem quae modo habemus. - Idem tradunt Patres. Tertullianus (c. Marcion. l. 5. c. 9.) ait: "Si resurrectio mortui est ejusdem restitutio, mortuum autem non aliud est, quam corpus, corporis est resurrectio. Sic et resurrectionis vocabulum non aliam rem vindicat, quam quae cecidit." - S. Ambrosius (serm. de fid. resurrect. c. 87.): "Haec est resurrectio, sicut ipsius verbi sono exprimitur, ut quod cecidit, resurgat, quod mortuum fuerat, reviviscat." - S. Hieronymus (advers. Joan. Hierosol. n. 28.): "Quomodo Dominus post resurrectionem fixuras clavorum ostendit in manibus, vulnus lanceae monstravit in latere ... sic et nos post resurrectionem eadem habebimus membra, quibus nunc utimur, easdem carnes et sanguinem et ossa, quorum in Scripturis Sanctis opera, non natura damnantur." - Et D. Thomas (4. sent. dist. 44. q. 1. a. 1.): "Non enim," inquit, "resurrectio dici potest, nisi anima ad idem corpus redeat, quia resurrectio est iterata surrectio, ejusdem autem est resurgere, et cadere; unde resurrectio magis respicit corpus, quod post mortem cadit, quam animam quae post mortem vivit; et ita, si non est idem corpus, quod anima resumit, non dicetur resurrectio, sed magis est novi corporis assumptio." Vid. Suarez (l. c.); et Catechismum Romanum (P. 1. cap. 12. n. 2.) 717. Now that numerical identity, both on the part of the subject, the body, and on the part of the terminus, the man, must be admitted in the resurrection is easily clear. For Job 19 says: "Again I shall be surrounded with my skin, and in my flesh," which I now have, "I shall see my God." - Paul writes in Romans 8:11: "He who raised Jesus Christ from the dead will also give life to your mortal bodies because of his Spirit dwelling in you," that is, he will

give life to the bodies which are now yours, and in which the Holy Spirit now dwells through grace. - And 1 Corinthians 15:53: "This corruptible must put on incorruption, and this mortal must put on immortality"; in this place the pronoun "this" shows that we shall not receive new bodies, but the same which we now have. - The Fathers hand down the same. Tertullian, against Marcion, book 5, chapter 9, says: "If resurrection is the restoration of the dead thing itself, but the dead thing is nothing other than the body, resurrection belongs to the body. Thus also the word resurrection claims no other thing than that which fell." - St. Ambrose, sermon on the faith of the resurrection, chapter 87: "This is resurrection, as is expressed by the sound of the word itself: that what fell should rise again, what had been dead should live again." - St. Jerome, against John of Jerusalem, no. 28: "Just as the Lord after the resurrection showed the fastenings of the nails in his hands and showed the wound of the lance in his side ... so also after the resurrection we shall have the same members which we now use, the same flesh and blood and bones, whose works, not nature, are condemned in the Holy Scriptures." - And St. Thomas, on book 4 of the Sentences, distinction 44, question 1, article 1: "For it cannot be called resurrection unless the soul returns to the same body, because resurrection is a repeated rising, and it belongs to the same thing to rise and to fall; hence resurrection regards more the body, which falls after death, than the soul, which lives after death; and so, if it is not the same body which the soul resumes, it will not be called resurrection, but rather the assumption of a new body." See Suarez, same place; and the Roman Catechism, part 1, chapter 12, no. 2.

718. Agitur nunc de hac numerica identitate explicanda. Et quidem si agatur de identitate numerica ejusdem hominis animadvertendum est, cum Valentia (tom. 4. disp. 11. q. 3. p. 3.) non aliter oportere intelligi et defendi, quod idem homo numero, qui antea vixit, resurrecturus et revicturus post mortem sit, quam constat jam, unumquemque hominem dum hanc vitam degit, in alia licet, et in alia sui aetate, et aliis quantumlibet, atque aliis accidentibus affectum, esse eundem numero. Est autem quoad haec et alia in uno et eodem homine dum vivit magna varietas. Nam unus et idem homo aliter se habet cum est puer; aliter cum est juvenis, vir, et senex; aliter cum aegrotat; aliter cum firmior et vegetior est; aliter cum ex suis omnibus partibus et membris integre constat; aliter cum aliquo membro aut parte orbatus est, etc. Ac praeterea etiam non semper retinet easdem partes primae materiae, cum hae per nutritionem continuo fluant et refluant, ex sententia Aristotelis lib. de Generatione tex. 35. et seq. recepta a D. Thoma hic. q. 80. art. 5. et a praecipuis aliis Philosophis. Et tamen non obstante hac omni varietate unus et idem homo est quisque per totam vitam, hoc ipso nimirum quod retinet, et eamdem numero animam, et eamdem praeterea determinatam rationem unius et ejusdem corporis humani, connexam nimirum cum eodem temperamento nativo qualitatum et accidentium, quo continentur dispositiones ultimae ad hanc numero animam, atque adeo etiam peculiaris habitudo materiae ad illam, qualescumque tandem sint partes hujus materiae." 718. We now deal with explaining this numerical identity. And indeed, if there is question of the numerical identity of the same man, it must be observed with Valentia, volume 4, disputation 11, question 3, part 3, that it is not necessary to understand and defend that the same man numerically who lived before is going to rise and live again after death in any other way than it is already established that each man, while he spends this life, although in one and another age of himself, and affected by however many and different accidents, is the same numerically. But with regard to these and other things in one and the same man while he lives there is great variety. For one and the same man has himself differently when he is a boy, differently when he is a youth, a man, and an old man; differently when he is sick; differently when he is stronger and more vigorous; differently when he consists whole from all his parts and members; differently when he is deprived of some member or part, etc. And besides, he does not always retain the same parts of prime matter, since these continuously flow and flow back through nutrition, according to the opinion of Aristotle in the book On Generation, text 35 and following, received by St. Thomas here, question 80, article 5, and by the principal other Philosophers. And nevertheless, notwithstanding all this variety, each one is one and the same man through his whole life, precisely because he retains both the same soul numerically and, besides, the same

determinate account of one and the same human body, joined namely with the same native temperament of qualities and accidents, in which are contained the ultimate dispositions toward this numerically same soul, and therefore also the peculiar relation of matter to it, whatever finally the parts of this matter may be."

719. Quod et exemplo illustravit D. Thomas (suppl. q. 80. a. 4. c.): "ita etiam intelligamus contingere in partibus unius hominis, sicut contingit in tota multitudine civitatis, quia singuli subtrahuntur a multitudine per mortem, aliis in locum eorum succedentibus: unde partes multitudinis fluunt et refluunt materialiter, sed formaliter manent; quia ad eadem officia et ordines constituuntur alii, a quibus priores substrahebantur: unde respublica una numero remanere dicitur. Et similiter etiam dum quibusdam partibus fluentibus aliae reparantur in eadem figura et in eodem situ, omnes partes fluunt et refluunt secundum materiam, sed manent secundum speciem; manet nihilominus homo idem numero." Vid. etiam (c. g. l. 4. cap. 81. ad quartum.) 719. St. Thomas illustrated this also by an example, Supplement, question 80, article 4, corpus: "So also let us understand this to happen in the parts of one man as happens in the whole multitude of a city, because individuals are removed from the multitude by death, others succeeding into their place; hence the parts of the multitude flow and flow back materially, but formally remain, because others are constituted for the same offices and orders from which the former ones were withdrawn; hence a commonwealth is said to remain one numerically. And similarly also while some parts flow and others are repaired in the same shape and in the same situation, all parts flow and flow back according to matter, but remain according to species; nevertheless the man remains the same numerically." See also Contra Gentiles, book 4, chapter 81, reply to the fourth.

720. Quoad explicandum vero identitatem in resurrectione ex parte subjecti, praecipua difficultas est haec: Notum est, aiunt, et fuisse olim, et adhuc nunc esse homines anthropophagos, qui nempe carnibus vescuntur humanis: cum itaque eadem caro in pluribus hominibus fuerit, fieri non potest, ut singuli cum propria carne resurgant. Crescit difficultas, si perpendatur, omnes omnino homines anthropophagos esse. Vix enim terrae cadavera mandata sunt, illico resolvuntur in sua principia; his nutriuntur vegetabilia, quibus aluntur animantia; nosque, dum vegetabilibus et animantibus vescimur, in nostram rursus convertimus substantiam ea ipsa principia primigenia, quae substantiam constituerunt illorum hominum, qui superioribus saeculis vixerunt, et ita deinceps quoad futuras generationes, adeo ut perpetua sit ejusdem substantiae commeatio, seu fluxus, quae ex uno in aliud corpus transit. Cum igitur eadem substantia ad tot corpora pertinuerit, in resurrectione futura cuinam restituetur? Impossibile prorsus est, ut omnia prorsus corpora cum sua substantia resuscitentur. Hanc difficultatem, quam tanti nunc faciunt tanquam novum inventum recentioris scientiae, jam solverat S. Augustinus (de Civ. Dei l. 22. cc. 12. 19.), et post illum D. Thomas, qui (c. g. l. 4. c. 80.) ita illam breviter et perspicue proponit: "Contingens est quandoque aliquos homines carnibus humanis vesci, et solum tali nutrimento nutriri, et sic nutritos filios generare. Caro igitur eadem in pluribus hominibus invenitur. Non est autem possibile quod in pluribus resurgat: nec aliter videtur esse universalis resurrectio, et integra, si unicuique non restituatur quod hic habuit. Videtur igitur impossibile quod sit hominum resurrectio futura." 720. But with regard to explaining identity in the resurrection on the part of the subject, the chief difficulty is this: It is known, they say, that there have once been, and still now are, anthropophagous men, who, namely, feed on human flesh; and so, since the same flesh has been in several men, it cannot happen that each should rise again with his own flesh. The difficulty grows if it is considered that absolutely all men are anthropophagous. For scarcely have corpses been committed to the earth when they are immediately resolved into their principles; by these plants are nourished, by which living things are fed; and we, while we eat plants and living things, again convert into our substance the very same primitive principles which constituted the substance of those men who lived in preceding ages, and so in succession as to future generations, so that there is a perpetual passing around, or flux, of the same substance,

which passes from one body into another. Therefore, since the same substance has belonged to so many bodies, to whom will it be restored in the future resurrection? It is altogether impossible that absolutely all bodies be raised with their own substance. St. Augustine had already solved this difficulty, which they now make so much of as though it were a new invention of more recent science, in The City of God, book 22, chapters 12 and 19, and after him St. Thomas, who in Contra Gentiles, book 4, chapter 80, proposes it briefly and clearly in this way: "It is contingent that sometimes some men feed on human flesh, and are nourished only by such nourishment, and generate children so nourished. Therefore the same flesh is found in several men. But it is not possible that it rise again in several; nor otherwise does there seem to be a universal and complete resurrection if there is not restored to each one what he had here. Therefore it seems impossible that there will be a future resurrection of men."

721. Ut solvatur haec difficultas, simulque explicetur quomodo identitas ex parte subjecti sit intelligenda, sequentia notamus:

a) Ut tueamur possibilitatem resurrectionis quoad identitatem numericam ex parte subjecti, debemus illam sumere non prout ab adversariis fingitur, sed prout ab Ecclesia intelligitur: ut vero sensui Ecclesiae adhaereamus, sufficit eam intelligere prout a probatissimis Theologis, Ecclesia haud contradicente, exponitur. Jamvero

b) Communiter Theologi (in 4. sent. dist. 44.) docent unumquemque resurrecturum in juvenili aetate. Qua in re secuti sunt S. Augustinum, qui explicans illud Apostoli Eph. 4.: "Donec occuramus omnes in virum perfectum in mensuram aetatis plenitudinis Christi," (de Civ. Dei l. 22. c. 15.) inquit: "Restat ut suam quisque recipiat mensuram, quam vel habuit in juventute, etiamsi senex est mortuus, vel fuerat habiturus si antea est defunctus." Et paulo post: "Si hoc," inquit, "(quod jam retulimus ex Apostolo) de resurrectione corporum dictum est; sic accipiamus dictum, ut nec ultra nec infra juvenilem formam resurgant corpora mortuorum, sed in ea aetate et robore usque ad quem Christum hic pervenisse cognovimus. Circa triginta quippe annos definierunt esse etiam saeculi hujus doctissimi homines juventutem, quae cum fuerit spatio proprio terminata, inde jam hominem in detrimenta vergere gravioris ac senilis aetatis." Ex quo plane sequitur in iis, qui in infantia moriuntur, aliquam materiae partem esse supplendam; atque hoc supplementum non obstare identitati corporis resurgentis. Vid. D. Thomam (suppl. q. 81. a. 1.)

c) Communiter docent Theologi, quod et naturales scientiae confirmant: "non omnes partes materiae semper manent in corpore, sed fluunt et refluunt." - Ex quo plane sequitur non totam materiam, quam unusquisque habuit toto vitae tempore, resumendam esse in resurrectione. "Illa ergo materia," inquit Suarez (de myst. vitae Christi disp. 44. sect. 2. n. 8.), quae sufficiens fuerit ad hujusmodi corpus componendum, resumetur, et satis erit ad veram resurrectionem." Vid. etiam D. Thomam (suppl. q. 80. a. 5.)

d) Animadvertit merito Suarez (l. c. n. 6.): "dicendum videtur, sine speciali miraculo (quod fingendum non est sine fundamento) non posse evenire, ut duo homines in toto vitae decursu eamdem omnino materiam habeant. Quia nullus est qui solis humanis carnibus nutriatur; imo pauci sunt qui aliquando eis utantur in cibum, ac deinde tot sunt rerum transmutationes, ut naturaliter accidere non possit eamdem omnino materiae partem, tam in generatione, quam in nutritione et augmento a duobus hominibus participari." Similiter certum est herbas et plantas, ut etiam demus quod adversarii autumant, praeter nutritionem, quam ex defunctorum corporum principiis adsciscunt, alia multa in proprium alimentum, seu succum convertere, imo illorum partem minimam esse, quam ex cadaveribus attrahunt, quod propterea dici pariter debet de animantibus, ac de hominibus, qui tum terrae fructibus, tum animantibus vescuntur.

e) At vero, si fortasse in aliquibus partibus materiae duo homines communicent, et non sufficiant ad utrumque corpus efformandum integrum; tum cuinam restituuntur partes illae materiae, et in quonam supplentur? Respondet D. Thomas (c. g. l. 4. c. 81.): "Hoc enim in resurrectione servabitur, quod si aliquid materialiter fuit in pluribus hominibus, resurget in eo ad cujus perfectionem magis pertinebat: unde si fuit in uno ut radicale semen, ex quo est generatus, in alio vero sicut superveniens nutrimentum, resurget in eo qui generatus ex hoc est sicut ex semine. Si vero in uno fuit ut pertinens ad perfectionem individui, in alio autem ut deputatum ad perfectionem speciei, resurget in eo ad quem pertinebat secundum perfectionem individui: unde semen resurget in genito, et costa Adae resurget in

Eva, non in Adam, in quo fuit sicut in naturae principio. Si autem secundum eumdem perfectionis modum fuit in utroque, resurget in eo in quo primitus fuit."

De qua solutione dicit Suarez (l. c. n. 6.): "Illud solum difficultatis occurrit, quia solum attendit rationem physicam, non moralem. Videtur autem etiam esse habenda meritorum ratio ... juxta ordinem divinae providentiae et justitiae, vel dividetur illa materia, vel alteri tota dabitur pro ratione meritorum utriusque; ita ut quoad fieri possit servetur justitia distributiva, et homo accipiat praemium vel poenam, etiam in ea parte corporis quae ad bene vel male operandum magis illi cooperata est; alia vero pars materiae supplebitur aliunde." Vid. etiam Perrone.

§ III.

Absolvitur expositio, et statuitur veritas resurrectionis. 721. In order that this difficulty be solved, and at the same time that it be explained how identity on the part of the subject must be understood, we note the following:

a) In order to defend the possibility of resurrection with regard to numerical identity on the part of the subject, we must take it not as it is imagined by adversaries, but as it is understood by the Church; and in order to adhere to the sense of the Church, it is enough to understand it as it is explained by the most approved Theologians, the Church not contradicting it. Now then,

b) Theologians commonly teach, on book 4 of the Sentences, distinction 44, that each one will rise again in youthful age. In this matter they have followed St. Augustine, who, explaining that saying of the Apostle in Ephesians 4, "Until we all meet into a perfect man, into the measure of the age of the fullness of Christ," says in The City of God, book 22, chapter 15: "It remains that each one receive his measure, which he either had in youth, even if he died as an old man, or would have had if he died before." And a little after: "If this," he says, "which we have already reported from the Apostle, was said concerning the resurrection of bodies, let us take it as said so that the bodies of the dead rise again neither beyond nor below youthful form, but in that age and strength up to which we know Christ arrived here. For even the most learned men of this age have defined youth to be around thirty years; and when it has been bounded by its proper span, from there the man already begins to incline toward the impairments of a heavier and senile age." From this it plainly follows that in those who die in infancy, some part of matter must be supplied, and that this supplement does not obstruct the identity of the rising body. See St. Thomas, Supplement, question 81, article 1.

c) Theologians commonly teach, and the natural sciences also confirm, that "not all parts of matter always remain in the body, but flow and flow back." - From this it plainly follows that not all the matter which each one had during the whole time of life is to be resumed in the resurrection. "Therefore that matter," says Suarez, On the Mysteries of the Life of Christ, disputation 44, section 2, no. 8, "which will have been sufficient for composing a body of this sort will be resumed, and it will be enough for true resurrection." See also St. Thomas, Supplement, question 80, article 5.

d) Suarez rightly observes, same place, no. 6: "It seems it must be said that without a special miracle, which must not be invented without foundation, it cannot happen that two men have entirely the same matter through the whole course of life. For there is no one who is nourished by human flesh alone; indeed there are few who ever use it for food, and then there are so many transmutations of things that it cannot naturally happen that entirely the same part of matter be shared by two men, both in generation and in nutrition and growth." Similarly, it is certain that herbs and plants, even if we grant what the adversaries suppose, besides the nutrition which they draw from the principles of dead bodies, convert many other things into their own nourishment or sap; indeed that what they draw from corpses is the smallest part of them, which therefore must likewise be said of living things and of men, who feed both on the fruits of the earth and on living things.

e) But if perhaps in some parts of matter two men share, and those parts do not suffice for forming each body whole, then to whom are those parts of matter restored, and in whom are they supplied? St. Thomas answers, Contra Gentiles, book 4, chapter 81: "For this will be preserved in the resurrection, that if something was materially in several men, it will rise again in him to whose perfection it belonged more; hence if it was in one as radical seed from which he was generated, but in another as supervening nourishment, it will rise again in him who was generated from this as from seed. But if in one it was as belonging to the perfection of the individual, but in another as deputed to the perfection of the species, it will rise again in him to whom it belonged according to the perfection of the

individual; hence seed will rise again in the begotten, and the rib of Adam will rise again in Eve, not in Adam, in whom it was as in a principle of nature. But if it was in each according to the same mode of perfection, it will rise again in him in whom it first was."

Concerning this solution Suarez says, same place, no. 6: "This alone of difficulty occurs, that it attends only to the physical reason, not the moral one. But it seems that the account of merits also must be had ... according to the order of divine providence and justice, either that matter will be divided, or it will be given whole to one according to the account of the merits of each; so that, as far as can be, distributive justice is preserved, and a man receives reward or punishment even in that part of the body which cooperated more with him in acting well or badly; but another part of matter will be supplied from elsewhere." See also Perrone.

§ III.

The exposition is completed, and the truth of the resurrection is established.

722. Resurrectio jam explicata, juxta doctrinam catholicam, dicitur esse futura - universalis - et ex divina potentia. 722. The resurrection now explained, according to Catholic doctrine, is said to be future, universal, and from divine power.

723. Futuritio resurrectionis, attenta lege generali, est apertissima veritas fidei. Nam Job dixit: "In novissimo die de terra surrecturus sum," Eamdem fidem ostendit Martha de Lazaro mortuo, dicens: "Scio, quia resurget in resurrectione in novissimo die." Christus ipse de justo, qui meretur vitam aeternam dicit: "Ego resuscitabo eum in novissimo die." Et 1. Cor. 15. 52. legitur: "In momento, in ictu oculi, in novissima tuba, canet enim tuba et mortui resurgent." 723. The futurity of the resurrection, with attention to the general law, is a most open truth of faith. For Job said: "On the last day I shall rise from the earth." Martha showed the same faith concerning Lazarus dead, saying: "I know that he will rise in the resurrection on the last day." Christ himself says concerning the just man who merits eternal life: "I will raise him up on the last day." And in 1 Corinthians 15:52 it is read: "In a moment, in the blink of an eye, at the last trumpet, for the trumpet will sound and the dead will rise."

724. At haec lex generalis patitur certe exceptionem in Beatissima Virgine Maria, cujus animam simul cum corpore assumptam esse in caelum pie credit Ecclesia, omniumque Theologorum ita firmat consensus, ut oppositum nefas sit asserere. Decuit enim, uti docet Damascenus (Orat. 2. de Assumpt.), ut Dominus gloriae, qui etiam post partum incorruptam servavit ejus Virginitatem, ipsius postquam migravit immaculatum corpus incorruptum servatum, translatione honoraret ante communem et universalem resurrectionem. Vid. Baronium (ad ann. Christi. 48.) 724. But this general law certainly admits an exception in the Most Blessed Virgin Mary, whose soul together with the body the Church piously believes to have been assumed into heaven, and the consensus of all Theologians so confirms this that to assert the opposite would be wicked. For it was fitting, as Damascene teaches, oration 2 on the Assumption, that the Lord of glory, who even after birth preserved her virginity incorrupt, should honor by translation, before the common and universal resurrection, her immaculate body preserved incorrupt after she departed. See Baronius, at the year of Christ 48.

725. Quidam putarunt, hoc privilegium resurrectionis et assumptionis in caelum fuisse iis sanctis concessum, quorum corpora tempore mortis Christi resurrexerunt, et qui "exeuntes de monumentis post resurrectionem ejus, venerunt in sanctam civitatem, et apparuerunt multis." Matth. 27. 53. Huic sententiae olim adhaeserat D. Thomas (suppl. q. 77. a. 1. ad 3.) Sed eam retractasse videtur 3. p. q. 53. a. 3., ubi ait: "De illis, qui resurrexerunt cum Christo, duplex est opinio: quidam enim asserunt quod redierunt ad vitam tamquam non iterum morituri ... Sed S. Augustinus in Epistola ad Evodium, 99., ante med., hanc opinionem commemorans, dicit (refert textum S. Doctoris) ... Sic ergo Augustinus sentire videtur quod resurrexerint iterum morituri. Ad quod etiam videtur pertinere quod

Hieronymus dicit super Matth., loc. sup. cit., quod 'Sicut Lazarus resurrexit, sic et multa corpora sanctorum resurrexerunt, ut Dominum ostenderent resurgentem.' Quamvis hoc in sermone de Assumptione sub dubio relinquat, rationes tamen Augustini multo efficaciores videntur." 725. Some have thought that this privilege of resurrection and assumption into heaven was granted to those saints whose bodies rose again at the time of the death of Christ and who, "going out from the tombs after his resurrection, came into the holy city and appeared to many," Matthew 27:53. St. Thomas formerly adhered to this opinion, Supplement, question 77, article 1, reply to 3. But he seems to have retracted it in III, question 53, article 3, where he says: "Concerning those who rose with Christ there is a twofold opinion. For some assert that they returned to life as not going to die again ... But St. Augustine, in the Epistle to Evodius, 99, before the middle, recalling this opinion, says," he reports the text of the holy Doctor, "... Thus therefore Augustine seems to think that they rose again to die again. To this also seems to pertain what Jerome says on Matthew in the place cited above: that 'just as Lazarus rose again, so also many bodies of the saints rose again, that they might show the Lord rising.' Although in the sermon on the Assumption he leaves this under doubt, nevertheless the reasons of Augustine seem much more effective."

726. Universalitas vero resurrectionis potest dupliciter intelligi: vel 1. quatenus omnes, qui moriuntur, resurgent, sive boni sive mali, illi ad praemium, isti ad poenam - vel 2. quatenus omnes, nemine excepto, moriuntur, et ita resurgent. 726. But the universality of the resurrection can be understood in two ways: either 1. insofar as all who die will rise again, whether good or evil, the former to reward, the latter to punishment; or 2. insofar as all, with no one excepted, die and thus rise again.

727. Primo sensu accepta universalitas resurrectionis ad fidem pertinet, uti patebit ex thesi mox statuenda, et ex Ecclesiae definitionibus superius traditis. Quoad alterum vero sensum, fuit quorumdam opinio aliquos in fine mundi, non esse morituros, sed adstante jam die judicii, sine morte et consequenter absque resurrectione, simul cum aliis judicandos esse. Quae opinio nitebatur praesertim verbis Symboli "Dominus venturus est judicare vivos et mortuos." 727. The universality of the resurrection taken in the first sense pertains to faith, as will be clear from the thesis soon to be established and from the definitions of the Church handed down above. But with regard to the other sense, there was an opinion of certain persons that some at the end of the world are not going to die, but, when the day of judgment is already present, without death and consequently without resurrection, are to be judged together with the others. This opinion rested especially on the words of the Creed: "The Lord is going to come to judge the living and the dead."

728. At vero, docet D. Thomas (suppl. q. 78. a. 1. c.) "Securior est haec et communior opinio, quod omnes morientur, et a morte resurgent, et hoc propter tria: primo quia magis concordat divinae justitiae, quae humanam naturam pro peccato primi parentis damnavit, ut qui per actum naturae ab eo originem ducerent, infectionem originalis peccati contraherent, et per consequens morti debitores essent; secundo quia magis concordat divinae Scripturae, quae omnium futuram resurrectionem praedicit. Resurrectio autem proprie non est nisi 'ejus quod cecidit, et dissolutum est,' etc." - Ad verba autem Symboli (ad 1.) respondet: "distinctio illa mortuorum et vivorum non est referenda ad ipsum judicii tempus, neque ad totum tempus praeteritum, quia omnes judicandi aliquo tempore fuerunt vivi, et aliquo tempore mortui; sed ad illud tempus determinatum quod immediate judicium praecedet, quando scilicet judicii signa incipient apparere." 728. But St. Thomas teaches, Supplement, question 78, article 1, corpus: "This opinion is safer and more common: that all will die and rise again from death, and this for three

reasons: first, because it agrees more with divine justice, which condemned human nature for the sin of the first parent, so that those who drew origin from him through an act of nature contracted the infection of original sin and consequently were debtors to death; second, because it agrees more with divine Scripture, which foretells the future resurrection of all. But resurrection properly belongs only to 'that which fell and was dissolved,' etc." - But to the words of the Creed he replies, reply to 1: "That distinction of the dead and the living is not to be referred to the very time of judgment, nor to the whole past time, because all who are to be judged at some time were living and at some time dead, but to that determinate time which will immediately precede the judgment, namely when the signs of judgment begin to appear."

729. Diximus ultimo loco resurrectionem fieri ex divina potentia: quae verba tum ostendunt resurrectionem esse opus miraculosum tum consequenter non posse ullo pacto naturae viribus perfici. 729. We said in the last place that the resurrection takes place from divine power. These words show both that resurrection is a miraculous work and, consequently, that it cannot in any way be accomplished by the powers of nature.

730. Certe Patres, ut possibilitatem resurrectionis contra incredulos tuerentur, constanter ad divinam omnipotentiam confugerunt. Ita, ex. gr., Lactantius (Instit. div. l. 7. c. 23.), ait: "Quod si non modo Prophetae, sed etiam vates et poetae et philosophi anastasim mortuorum futuram esse consentiunt, nemo quaerat a nobis, quemadmodum fieri possit; nec enim divinorum operum reddi potest ratio. Sed si a principio Deus hominem, nescio quo inenarrabili modo, instituit, credamus ab eodem veterem restitui posse, qui novum fecit." - S. Gregorius M. (Hom. 20. in Ezech.): "Da potentiae Creatoris tui, quod comprehendere non vales de teipso, et ne de carnis tuae resurrectione desperes! perpende prudenter, quia minus est Deo reparare quod erat, quam fecisse quod non erat. Si non potes resurrectionis effectum ratione comprehendere, perpende quod multa sunt, quae non intelligis qualiter sunt, et tamen non esse dubitas." 730. Certainly the Fathers, in order to defend the possibility of resurrection against unbelievers, constantly took refuge in divine omnipotence. Thus, for example, Lactantius, Divine Institutes, book 7, chapter 23, says: "But if not only the Prophets, but also seers and poets and philosophers agree that the resurrection of the dead is going to be, let no one ask from us how it can happen; for an account of divine works cannot be rendered. But if in the beginning God formed man in some ineffable manner, let us believe that the old can be restored by the same one who made the new." - St. Gregory the Great, homily 20 on Ezekiel: "Grant to the power of your Creator what you are not able to comprehend concerning yourself, and do not despair concerning the resurrection of your flesh! Consider prudently that it is less for God to repair what was than to have made what was not. If you cannot comprehend the effect of resurrection by reason, consider that there are many things which you do not understand how they are, and yet you do not doubt that they are."

731. Nihilominus Bonnetus imaginatus est quamdam palingenesiam seu renascentiam, secundum ortum, instaurationem introducendam, vi cujus homines quasi papiliones ex nympha, chrysalide aut brucho tandem prodire debeant ex germine quodam praeformato, etiam post obitum, animae inseparabiliter inhaerente. Quae hypothesis arridere videtur Wegscheider, Lavater etc. At vero, praeter dicta, sequentia praesertim ei obstant. a) Talis germinis animae inseparabiliter inhaerentis existentia neque ex revelatione, neque ex ratione probari potest; quod ergo gratis asseritur, gratis negatur.

b) Dein hoc germen, si est aliquid materiale, ad corpus spectat, quod in morte ab anima deseritur: si est aliquid spirituale, rem materialem, seu carnem naturaliter producere nequit.

c) Absona etiam est comparatio resurrectionis cum renascentia papilionis ex nympha; nam si haec conteratur, dissecetur, et dispergatur, ille non prodit. Sed vid. Perrone (in NOTA); et Muzzarelli (del buon uso della Logica, opusc. 22.) <span

id="p731">731. Nevertheless Bonnet imagined a certain palingenesis or rebirth, an instauration to be introduced according to origin, by force of which men, like butterflies from a nymph, chrysalis, or grub, ought finally to come forth from a certain preformed germ, even after death inseparably inhering in the soul. This hypothesis seems to please Wegscheider, Lavater, etc. But, besides what has been said, the following things especially stand against it. a) The existence of such a germ inseparably inhering in the soul can be proved neither from revelation nor from reason; therefore what is asserted gratuitously is denied gratuitously.

b) Next, this germ, if it is something material, belongs to the body, which in death is deserted by the soul; if it is something spiritual, it cannot naturally produce a material thing, or flesh.

c) The comparison of resurrection with the rebirth of a butterfly from a nymph is also absurd; for if the latter is crushed, cut apart, and scattered, the former does not come forth. But see Perrone, in the note, and Muzzarelli, On the Good Use of Logic, opusculum 22.

Corrected Latin

732. His itaque praestitutis, dicimus:

PROP. LI. Fides docet - ratio non contradicit - imo suadet futuram esse universalem mortuorum resurrectionem, qua omnes homines resurgent cum corporibus suis quae nunc gestant.

Prob. I. Ex Script. V. T. Job. 19, 25. seqq. legitur: "Scio enim quod Redemptor meus vivit, et in novissimo die de terra resurrecturus sum: et rursum circumdabor pelle mea, et in carne mea videbo Deum meum. Quem visurus sum ego ipse, et oculi mei conspecturi sunt, et non alius: reposita est haec spes in sinu meo."

Cum verba haec maxima perspicuitate adstruant dogma de resurrectione, nihil fidei inimici intentatum reliquerunt, ut eadem in alium sensum detorquerent. Praesertim vero totum hunc locum exponere nituntur de spe, quam, aiunt, alebat Job de recuperanda sanitate, et de restitutione sua in pristinum felicem statum. At haec spuria interpretatio excluditur.

a) Ex magnifico praemio, quod Job verbis suis praemittit: ait enim vv. 23. et 24.: "Quis mihi tribuat, ut scribantur sermones mei? quis mihi det, ut exarentur in libro, stylo ferreo et plumbi lamina, vel celte sculpantur in silice?" Restitutio autem sanitatis, et fortunae temporalis tanti profecto momenti non erat, ut tam solemni ratione memoriam ejus ad posteros transmittere oporteat.

b) Job de laetitiae objecto, de quo loquitur, certam fidem, et firmissimam spem habuit, quod commonstrant ejus verba: "Scio ... quod ... de terra surrecturus sum," etc., "reposita est haec spes mea in sinu meo." Ast de recuperanda sanitate corporali tam certam notitiam, ac adeo firmam spem non habuit, sed de illa jam penitus desperaverat; nam cap. 7. v. 16. dixit: "Desperavi, nequaquam ultra jam vivam! parce mihi nihil enim sunt dies mei:" cap. 17. v. 1.; "Spiritus meus attenuabitur; dies mei breviabuntur, et solum mihi superest sepulchrum," etc.

c) Eliphaz jam c. 5. v. 18. et seq. Jobum per spem recuperandae sanitatis et prosperae fortunae consolari conatus est; at Job cap. 6. solatium istud rejecit, et moriendi desiderium manifestavit dicens vv. 8. etc.: "Quis det, ut veniat petitio mea, et quod expecto tribuat mihi Deus? Et qui coepit, ipse me conterat; solvat manum suam, et succidat me!" Cap. 10. 1.: "Taedet animam meam vitae meae." Non ergo in hac vita restaurationem sanitatis et fortunae desideravit et expectavit, sed mortem desideravit, et praemium in altera expectavit: unde non dixit: post modicum tempus sed in novissimo die, non de sterquilinio aut lecto sed de terra surrecturus sum.

d) Hunc sensum postulat contextus. Baldad enim Jobum occultis delictis contaminatum putans c. 18. graphice describit mortem peccatoris pessimam, et concludit (v. 21.): "Haec sunt ergo tabernacula iniqui, et iste locus ejus, qui ignorat Deum." Ad istam criminationem respondet Job dicendo, se mortem non timere, sibi Deum in altera vita non iratum vindicem, sed benignum Redemptorem fore, seque gloriosam tandem resurrectionem, et beatam Dei visionem pleno jure expectare.

e) Unde S. Cyprianus, S. Augustinus, S. Cyrillus Hier., etc., de resurrectione carnis eadem verba intellexerunt. Et S. Hieronymus (Ep. ad Paulin. n. 8.) dicere non dubitavit: "Resurrectionem corporum sic prophetat, ut nullus de ea vel manifestius, vel cautius scripserit." - Consentiunt etiam plures Interpretes Protestantes. Vid. Perrone (in NOTA.)

Possent etiam plura alia loca ex V. T. afferri; ut Ezech. 37. - Dan. 12. - Isa. 26. - Ose. 7., etc. - Hinc nihil mirum, si communis et firma fuit apud Judaeos fides de resurrectione. Ita 2. Machab. 7. 9. legitur: "Tu quidem, scelestissime, in

praesenti vita nos perdis; sed Rex mundi defunctos nos pro suis legibus in aeternae vitae resurrectione suscitabit." Et 14. "Potius est ab hominibus morti datos spem expectare a Deo, iterum ab ipso resucitandos; tibi enim resurrectio ad vitam non erit." - Jo. 11. 24.: "Scio, quia resurget frater meus in resurrectione in novissimo die."

Prob. II. Ex N. T. Matth. 22. 28. seqq.: "Erratis nescientes Scripturas, neque virtutem Dei; in resurrectione enim neque nubent, neque nubentur, sed erunt sicut Angeli Dei in coelo." 31.: "De resurrectione autem mortuorum non legistis, quod dictum est a Deo dicente vobis: Ego sum Deus Abraham et Deus Isaac et Deus Jacob? Non est Deus mortuorum, sed viventium: omnes enim vivunt ei." In quem locum notant S. Irenaeus, S. Jo. Chrysostomus, Theophilactus, Euthimius, per Abraham, Isaac, Jacob non significari solum eorum animas, sed totos homines. Act. 24. 14. seq.: "Sic deservio Patri et Deo meo, credens omnibus, quae in lege et Prophetis scripta sunt; spem habens in Deum, quam et hi ipsi expectant, resurrectionem futuram justorum et iniquorum." - Sed Apostolus frequentissime hanc veritatem praedicavit.

Prob. III. Ex Patribus. Eorum testimonia videri possunt apud Knoll (Pars 5. sect. 3. a. 2. § 824.). Tantus autem est Patrum consensus, ut Beausobrius (Hist. Man. tom. 2. l. 8. c. 5.), qui voluit illum inficiari, solum Origenem et S. Gregorium Nyssenum in contrarium citet. At etiamsi daremus duos repugnare, unanimis Patrum consensus non infirmaretur. - Quoad Origenem non pauci concedunt saltem incaute de hac re locutum fuisse; quamvis alii conentur eum benigne interpretari, cum in aliis locis expresse dogma de resurrectione tradiderit. Quoad S. Greg. Nyssenum, certe saepius in suis operibus catholicam de resurrectione doctrinam exponit, et propugnat. Quod vero a corpore Christi excludere videatur figuram, extensionem, et affirmet nihil corporeum reperiri in Christo; recte cum Zaccagnio, qui primus Antirrheticum ex bibliotheca Vaticana vulgavit, ea intelligunt non de humani corporis proprietatibus specificis, sed accidentalibus, quorum corpus Christi gloriosum erat expers.

Prob. IV. Ex ratione. 1. Quod dogma resurrectionis non repugnet rationi patet ex iis, quae in §§ praecedentibus praestituimus. Patres autem pluribus rem illustrant. Sic S. Ambrosius (de fid. resurrect. n. 53.) inquit: resurrectionis fides usus est mundi rerumque status omnium, generationum series, successionum vices, obitus ortusque signorum, diei et noctis occasus, eorumque quotidie tamquam rediviva successio ... Quid de fructibus loquar? Nonne tibi videntur occidere, cum decidunt, resurgere cum reviviscunt? quod satum est, resurgit; quod mortuum est, resurgit et in eadem genera, et in easdem species reformatur. Hos terra primum reddidit fructus, in his primum natura nostra speciem resurrectionis imitata est." Vid. etiam Tertullian. - Et S. Augustinus (serm. 19. de verbis Apostoli), ait: "Te appello, quicumque infideli animo de resurrectione dubitas, et putas non posse mortuos resuscitari! Quid est amplius ex nihilo homines facere, qui vivant, aut eos, qui facti sunt et vixerunt, reparare post mortem? Utique plus est facere quod nunquam fuit. Quomodo ergo impossibile esse dicis, ut Deus, qui hominem formavit ex nihilo, reformet? Quomodo nos suscitare non potest conversos in pulverem, qui etiamsi in nihilum rediremus, facere poterat ut essemus, sicut effecit nos esse, cum antea nunquam fuissemus?"

2. Ratio vero sibi relicta necessitatem, aut factum resurrectionis non potest demonstrare, uti ostendimus (nn. 307. seqq.)

3. Multipliciter tamen ostendit convenientiam resurrectionis. Ita, ex. gr.: a) animae hominum sunt immortales; remanent igitur, inquit D. Thomas (c. g. l. 4. c. 79.), "post corpora a corporibus absolutae. Manifestum est etiam ex his quae in secundo (cap. 83. et 84.) dicta sunt quod anima corpori naturaliter unitur, est enim secundum suam essentiam corporis forma. Est igitur contra naturam animae absque corpore esse. Nihil autem quod est contra naturam, potest esse perpetuum. Non igitur perpetuo erit anima absque corpore. Quum igitur perpetuo maneat, oportet eam corpori iterato conjungi: quod est resurgere. Immortalitas igitur animarum exigere videtur resurrectionem corporum futuram."

b) "Ex divina providentia peccantibus poena debetur, et bene agentibus praemium. In hac autem vita homines ex anima et corpore compositi peccant, vel recte agunt. Debetur igitur hominibus et secundum animam, et secundum corpus praemium, vel poena. Manifestum est autem quod in hac vita praemium ultimae felicitatis consequi non possunt, ex his quae in tertio sunt ostensa: multoties etiam peccata in hac vita non puniuntur; quinimo, ut dicitur Job. 21. 7.: 'Hic impii vivunt, confortati sunt, sublimatique divitiis.' Necessarium igitur est ponere iteratam animae ad corpus conjunctionem, ut homo in corpore et anima praemiari et puniri possit."

His, et similibus argumentis etiam Patres usi sunt, ut

dogma resurrectionis non quidem demonstrarent, sed suaderent. Objectiones ex ratione praeoccupatae sunt; quae autem ex Scriptura objici solent, facilis solutionis sunt, et videri possunt apud Perrone. 732. And so, these things having been set down beforehand, we say:

PROPOSITION LI. Faith teaches, reason does not contradict, indeed it recommends, that there will be a universal resurrection of the dead, by which all men will rise again with the bodies which they now bear.

Proof I. From Scripture, Old Testament. Job 19:25 and following reads: "For I know that my Redeemer lives, and on the last day I shall rise from the earth; and again I shall be surrounded with my skin, and in my flesh I shall see my God. I myself shall see him, and my eyes shall behold him, and not another: this hope has been laid up in my bosom."

Since these words establish the dogma concerning resurrection with the greatest clarity, the enemies of faith have left nothing unattempted in order to twist them into another sense. Especially they strive to explain this whole place concerning the hope which, they say, Job cherished of recovering health and of his restoration into his former happy state. But this spurious interpretation is excluded.

a) From the magnificent preface which Job sets before his words; for he says in verses 23 and 24: "Who will grant me that my words may be written? Who will give me that they may be inscribed in a book, with an iron stylus and a sheet of lead, or carved with a chisel in flint?" But the restoration of health and temporal fortune was certainly not of such great importance that it would be necessary to transmit its memory to posterity by so solemn a manner.

b) Job had certain faith and a most firm hope concerning the object of joy about which he speaks; his words show this: "I know ... that ... I shall rise from the earth," etc.; "this hope of mine has been laid up in my bosom." But concerning the recovery of bodily health he did not have such certain knowledge or so firm a hope; rather he had already entirely despaired of it. For in chapter 7, verse 16, he said: "I have despaired; I shall now no longer live! spare me, for my days are nothing"; chapter 17, verse 1: "My spirit will be weakened; my days will be shortened, and only the grave remains for me," etc.

c) Eliphaz already in chapter 5, verse 18 and following had tried to console Job by the hope of recovering health and prosperous fortune; but Job in chapter 6 rejected that consolation and manifested a desire of dying, saying in verse 8 and following: "Who will grant that my petition may come, and that God may give me what I expect? And he who began, let him crush me; let him loose his hand and cut me off!" Chapter 10, verse 1: "My soul is weary of my life." Therefore he did not desire and expect in this life the restoration of health and fortune, but he desired death and expected reward in the other life. Hence he did not say: after a little time, but on the last day; not from the dunghill or bed, but from the earth, I shall rise.

d) The context demands this sense. For Bildad, thinking Job stained with hidden crimes, graphically describes in chapter 18 the most wretched death of the sinner and concludes, verse 21: "These therefore are the tabernacles of the wicked, and this is the place of him who does not know God." To that accusation Job responds by saying that he does not fear death, that in the other life God will be for him not an angry avenger but a benign Redeemer, and that he awaits by full right at last a glorious resurrection and the blessed vision of God.

e) Hence St. Cyprian, St. Augustine, St. Cyril of Jerusalem, etc., understood the same words concerning the resurrection of the flesh. And St. Jerome, in the Epistle to Paulinus, no. 8, did not hesitate to say: "He prophesies the resurrection of bodies in such a way that no one has written of it either more manifestly or more cautiously." - Several Protestant interpreters also agree. See Perrone, in the note.

Several other places from the Old Testament could also be brought forward, such as Ezekiel 37, Daniel 12, Isaiah 26, Hosea 7, etc. Hence it is no wonder if there was a common and firm faith among the Jews concerning resurrection. Thus in 2 Maccabees 7:9 it is read: "You indeed, most wicked one, destroy us in the present life; but the King of the world will raise us, the dead for his laws, in the resurrection of eternal life." And verse 14: "It is better for those handed over to death by men to await hope from God, to be raised again by him; for there will not be for you a resurrection unto life." - John 11:24: "I know that my brother will rise again in the resurrection on the last day."

Proof II. From the New Testament. Matthew 22:28 and following: "You err, not knowing the Scriptures nor the power of God; for in the resurrection they will neither marry nor be given in marriage, but will be like the Angels of God in heaven." Verse 31: "But concerning the resurrection of the

dead, have you not read what was spoken by God, saying to you: I am the God of Abraham and the God of Isaac and the God of Jacob? He is not God of the dead, but of the living: for all live to him." On this place St. Irenaeus, St. John Chrysostom, Theophylact, and Euthymius note that by Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob not only their souls are signified, but the whole men. Acts 24:14 and following: "Thus I serve my Father and my God, believing all things which are written in the Law and the Prophets; having hope in God, which these themselves also expect, the future resurrection of the just and the unjust." - But the Apostle preached this truth most frequently.

Proof III. From the Fathers. Their testimonies can be seen in Knoll, part 5, section 3, article 2, § 824. But the consensus of the Fathers is so great that Beausobre, History of Manichaeism, volume 2, book 8, chapter 5, who wished to deny it, cites only Origen and St. Gregory of Nyssa to the contrary. But even if we granted that two opposed it, the unanimous consensus of the Fathers would not be weakened. - With regard to Origen, not a few concede that he at least spoke incautiously on this matter, although others try to interpret him favorably, since in other places he expressly handed down the dogma concerning resurrection. With regard to St. Gregory of Nyssa, he certainly more than once in his works explains and defends the Catholic doctrine concerning resurrection. But as to the fact that he seems to exclude figure and extension from the body of Christ and affirms that nothing corporeal is found in Christ, rightly with Zaccagni, who first published the Antirrheticus from the Vatican library, they understand these things not of the specific properties of the human body, but of accidental properties, of which the glorious body of Christ was free.

Proof IV. From reason. 1. That the dogma of resurrection is not repugnant to reason is clear from those things which we have set down beforehand in the preceding sections. The Fathers, moreover, illustrate the matter by many things. Thus St. Ambrose, On Faith in the Resurrection, no. 53, says that the faith of resurrection is shown by the usage of the world and the state of all things, the series of generations, the changes of successions, the settings and risings of the heavenly signs, the setting of day and night and their daily succession as though brought back to life. "What shall I say of fruits? Do they not seem to you to die when they fall, to rise when they revive? What is sown rises; what is dead rises and is formed again into the same genera and the same species. The earth first gave back these fruits; in these nature first imitated the species of our resurrection." See also Tertullian. - And St. Augustine, sermon 19 on the words of the Apostle, says: "I appeal to you, whoever with an unbelieving mind doubts concerning the resurrection and thinks that the dead cannot be raised. Which is greater: to make from nothing men who live, or to repair after death those who have been made and have lived? Surely it is greater to make what never was. How therefore do you say that it is impossible for God, who formed man from nothing, to form him again? How can he not raise us when we have been turned into dust, he who, even if we returned into nothing, was able to make us exist, just as he caused us to exist when before we had never been?"

2. But reason left to itself cannot demonstrate the necessity or the fact of the resurrection, as we showed above, nos. 307 and following.

3. Nevertheless it shows in several ways the fittingness of resurrection. Thus, for example: a) the souls of men are immortal; therefore they remain, says St. Thomas, Contra Gentiles, book 4, chapter 79, "after the bodies, released from the bodies. It is also manifest from those things which were said in the second book, chapters 83 and 84, that the soul is naturally united to the body, for according to its essence it is the form of the body. Therefore it is against the nature of the soul to be without the body. But nothing which is against nature can be perpetual. Therefore the soul will not be without the body perpetually. Since therefore it remains perpetually, it must be joined again to the body, which is to rise again. Therefore the immortality of souls seems to require the future resurrection of bodies."

b) "By divine providence punishment is owed to those who sin, and reward to those acting well. But in this life men, composed of soul and body, sin or act rightly. Therefore reward or punishment is owed to men both according to soul and according to body. But it is manifest that in this life they cannot attain the reward of ultimate felicity, from those things which have been shown in the third book; often also sins are not punished in this life. Indeed, as Job 21:7 says: 'Here the impious live, they have been strengthened and exalted with riches.' Therefore it is necessary to posit a repeated conjunction of the soul to the body, so that man can be rewarded and punished in body and soul."

The Fathers also used

these and similar arguments, not indeed to demonstrate the dogma of resurrection, but to recommend it. The objections from reason have been anticipated; those, however, which are usually objected from Scripture are of easy solution and can be seen in Perrone.

Article 11. On the Dowries of the Bodies of the Blessed

LatineEnglish

Corrected Latin

733. Certum est quod Christus Dominus est causa exemplaris resurrectionis nostrae. Sed notat D. Thomas (suppl. q. 76. a. 1. ad 4.) "quod resurrectio omnium hominum habebit aliquid de similitudine resurrectionis Christi, scilicet quantum ad illud quod pertinet ad vitam naturae, secundum quam omnes Christo fuerunt conformes: et ideo omnes resurgent in vitam immortalem. Sed in sanctis, qui fuerunt Christo conformes per gratiam, erit conformitas quantum ad ea quae sunt gloriae." Vid. Suarez (de Myst. vitae Christi disp. 50. sect. 5.) 733. It is certain that Christ the Lord is the exemplary cause of our resurrection. But St. Thomas notes, Supplement, question 76, article 1, reply to 4, "that the resurrection of all men will have something of the likeness of the resurrection of Christ, namely as to that which pertains to the life of nature, according to which all were conformed to Christ; and therefore all will rise again into immortal life. But in the saints, who were conformed to Christ through grace, there will be conformity as to those things which belong to glory." See Suarez, On the Mysteries of the Life of Christ, disputation 50, section 5.

734. Erunt autem in corpore beatorum, sicut et in glorioso corpore Christi post resurrectionem, quatuor supernaturales dotes, quarum meminit Apostolus 1. Cor. 15.: "Seminatur in corruptione, surget in incorruptione: seminatur in ignobilitate, surget in gloria: seminatur in infirmitate, surget in virtute: seminatur corpus animale, surget corpus spiritale." 734. But in the body of the blessed, as also in the glorious body of Christ after the resurrection, there will be four supernatural dowries, of which the Apostle makes mention in 1 Corinthians 15: "It is sown in corruption, it shall rise in incorruption; it is sown in ignobility, it shall rise in glory; it is sown in infirmity, it shall rise in power; it is sown an animal body, it shall rise a spiritual body."

735. "Ut autem horum donorum," inquit Valentia (tom. 4. disp. 12. q. 5. p. 1.) "ratio et differentia, juxta sententiam veriorem et communiorem, quae fere est D. Thomae, facilius intelligatur; sciendum in primis est, ex gloria sive beatitudine animae, ad corpus quoque redundatum, quandam praestantissimam qualitatem divini et supernaturalis ordinis, per quam illud etiam reddetur beatum et gloriosum. Quamquam modum quidem illum singularem beatitudini animi proportionatum et simul aptum corpori, quo per eam qualitatem beabuntur corpora, nunc quidem exacte cognoscere non possumus: juxta illud Apostoli 1. ad Cor. 2. 'Oculus non vidit, nec auris audivit, nec in cor hominis ascendit, quae praeparavit Deus his qui diligunt illum:' nisi quod notitiis quibusdam generalibus, revelante Deo per spiritum suum, ut ibidem subdit Apostolus; scimus, expectare nos cumulatissimam gloriam, quoad animam et corpus. 735. "But in order," says Valentia, volume 4, disputation 12, question 5, part 1, "that the account and difference of these gifts, according to the truer and more common opinion, which is almost that of St. Thomas, may be more easily understood, it must be known first that from the glory or beatitude of the soul there will also overflow to the body a certain most excellent quality of the divine and supernatural order, through which it also will be rendered blessed and glorious. Although indeed we cannot now exactly know that singular mode proportioned to the beatitude of the mind and at the same time suited to the body, by which through that quality bodies will be made blessed; according to that saying

of the Apostle in 1 Corinthians 2, 'Eye has not seen, nor ear heard, nor has it ascended into the heart of man, what things God has prepared for those who love him'; except that by certain general notices, God revealing through his Spirit, as the Apostle adds in the same place, we know that most abundant glory awaits us as to soul and body.

736. Redundare autem dotes illae dicuntur ex beatitudine animae ad corpus, non quasi a beatitudine animae effective producantur in corpore; sed quatenus apte et congruenter beatitudini animae, producuntur a Deo in corpore beatae animae unito. 736. But those dowries are said to overflow from the beatitude of the soul to the body, not as if they are effectively produced in the body by the beatitude of the soul, but insofar as, suitably and congruently to the beatitude of the soul, they are produced by God in the body united to the blessed soul.

737. Porro dotes istae perfecte disponunt corpus in ordine ad animam, ut corpus tali qualitate affectum penitus reddatur subjectum animae, idque secundum triplicem animae considerationem: nimirum, et ut est anima forma corporis; et ut est motrix illius per varias suas facultates; et ut denique praedita arbitrio et voluntate, ne scilicet aliquid extra nutum animae fiat in corpore vel circa corpus. Ita docet D. Thomas hic q. 84. art. 1. cum ait, per ejusmodi qualitatem seu perfectionem effluentem ab anima glorificata, reddi corpus habile ad hanc subjectionem. "Nam," ut ait S. Augustinus (de Gen. ad lit. l. 12. c. 35.): "si tale sit corpus cujus sit difficilis et gravis administratio, avertetur mens ab illa visione summi coeli, et ideo oportet ut corpus fiat spirituale, ut anima Angelis coaequata perfectum habeat naturae suae modum, obediens et imperans tam ineffabili facilitate, ut sit ei gloriae quod sarcinae fuit." 737. Moreover these dowries perfectly dispose the body in order to the soul, so that the body affected by such a quality is rendered entirely subject to the soul, and this according to a threefold consideration of the soul: namely, both as the soul is the form of the body; and as it is the mover of it through its various faculties; and finally as endowed with choice and will, namely so that nothing may take place in the body or around the body outside the nod of the soul. Thus St. Thomas teaches here, question 84, article 1, when he says that through a quality or perfection of this sort flowing from the glorified soul, the body is rendered apt for this subjection. "For," as St. Augustine says, On Genesis Literally, book 12, chapter 35: "if the body is such that its administration is difficult and burdensome, the mind will be turned away from that vision of the highest heaven; and therefore it is fitting that the body become spiritual, so that the soul, made equal to the Angels, may have the perfect mode of its nature, obeying and commanding with such ineffable ease that what was a burden may be glory to it."

738. De impassibilitate. Prima dos est impassibilitas, quam insinuat Apostolus, cum dicit: "Seminatur in corruptione, surget in incorruptione ... Oportet enim corruptibile hoc induere incorruptionem." 738. On impassibility. The first dowry is impassibility, which the Apostle insinuates when he says: "It is sown in corruption, it shall rise in incorruption ... For this corruptible must put on incorruption."

739. Hujus autem dotis hanc rationem reddit D. Thomas (c. g. l. 4. c. 85.): "Sicut autem anima (post resurrectionem) Deo fruens habebit desiderium adimpletum quantum ad omnis boni adeptionem: ita etiam ejus desiderium impletum erit quantum ad remotionem omnis mali; quia cum summo bono locum non habet aliquod malum; et corpus igitur perfectum per animam proportionaliter animae immune erit ab omni malo, et quantum ad actum, et quantum ad potentiam. Quantum ad actum quidem; quia nulla in eis erit corruptio, nulla deformitas, nullius defectus. Quantum ad potentiam vero; quia non poterunt aliquid pati, quod eis sit molestum, et propter hoc impassibilia erunt." 739. But St.

Thomas gives this account of this dowry, Contra Gentiles, book 4, chapter 85: "As the soul, enjoying God after the resurrection, will have its desire fulfilled as to the attainment of every good, so also its desire will be fulfilled as to the removal of every evil, because with the highest good no evil has a place. And therefore the body perfected by the soul, proportionally to the soul, will be immune from every evil, both as to act and as to potency. As to act indeed, because there will be in them no corruption, no deformity, no defect. But as to potency, because they will not be able to suffer anything which would be troublesome to them, and on account of this they will be impassible."

740. Quoad ejusdem vero dotis naturam, notandum est loca Scripturae ubi de immortalitate Sanctorum agitur, intelligenda esse de immortalitate perfecta, quae non solum dissolutionem substantiae excludit, sed etiam omnem impressionem et perpessionem molestam, quae ab ulla causa extrinseca inferri queat: adeo ut neque ferro, neque igne, neque alia vi creata laedi, aut dolore vel molestia affici possint. Et hoc modo non convenit corporibus damnatorum, sed est dos propria Beatorum. Etsi enim corpora damnatorum sint futura immortalia quoad hoc ut non dissolvantur: tamen erunt subjecta gravissimis causarum externarum impressionibus et doloribus, qui mortem inferrent, nisi Deus illa sua potentia ad aeternitatem poenarum conservaret. Unde non sunt immortalia nisi imperfecte: ita enim semper vivunt, ut semper moriantur; mors enim pastor eorum; vel ut noster Interpres, "mors depascit eos." Quare recte Doctores hanc dotem vocant impassibilitatem: quia non solum facit ut corpora non possint mori, sed etiam ut non possint laedi, aut ullo dolore affici. Eadem dos insinuatur multis aliis Scripturae locis. Isaiae 49. "Non esurient, neque sitient, neque percutiet eos aestus." Idem iisdem verbis habetur Apocal. 7. rursus Apocal. 21. "Et absterget Deus omnem lacrymam ab oculis eorum, et mors ultra non erit, neque luctus, neque clamor, neque dolor erit ultra: quia prima abierunt." Quasi dicat, quia mala illa ad prius saeculum pertinent, quod jam praeteriit. Vid. Lessium (de sum. bono l. 3. c. 3. et 4.); D. Thomam (suppl. q. 82.) 740. But with regard to the nature of the same dowry, it must be noted that the places of Scripture where the immortality of the Saints is treated must be understood of perfect immortality, which excludes not only the dissolution of substance, but also every troublesome impression and suffering which could be inflicted by any extrinsic cause, so that they can be harmed neither by iron, nor by fire, nor by any other created force, nor be affected by pain or trouble. And in this way it does not belong to the bodies of the damned, but is the proper dowry of the Blessed. For although the bodies of the damned will be immortal as to this, that they are not dissolved, nevertheless they will be subject to most grave impressions and pains from external causes, which would bring death if God did not preserve them by his power for the eternity of punishments. Hence they are immortal only imperfectly: for they always live in such a way that they always die; for "death is their shepherd," or as our Interpreter has it, "death feeds upon them." Therefore the Doctors rightly call this dowry impassibility, because it causes not only that bodies cannot die, but also that they cannot be harmed or affected by any pain. The same dowry is insinuated in many other places of Scripture. Isaiah 49: "They shall not hunger, nor thirst, nor shall heat strike them." The same is had in the same words in Apocalypse 7; again Apocalypse 21: "And God shall wipe away every tear from their eyes, and death shall be no more, nor mourning, nor crying, nor pain anymore, because the former things have passed away." As if he should say, because those evils belong to the former age, which has now passed. See Lessius, On the Highest Good, book 3, chapters 3 and 4; St. Thomas, Supplement, question 82.

741. De subtilitate. Altera corporis gloriosi dos est subtilitas, quam indicat Apostolus, dicens: "seminatur corpus animale, surget corpus spiritale." - Quo sensu autem corpus dicatur spiritale, explicat S. Augustinus (de civ. Dei. l. 13. c. 20.), dicens: "Sicut enim spiritus carne serviens non incongrue carnalis; ita caro spiritui serviens recte appellabitur spiritalis: non quia in spiritum convertetur, sicut nonnulli putant ex eo, quod scriptum est: Seminatur corpus animale, resurget corpus spiritale; sed quia spiritui summa, et mirabili obtemperandi facilitate subdetur." Quibus conformiter scribit D. Thomas (c. g. l. c.): "Seminatur corpus animale, surget corpus spiritale;" ait: "Spirituale quidem

corpus resurgentis erit: non quia fit spiritus, ut quidam male intellexerunt, sive per spiritum intelligatur spiritualis substantia, sive aer, aut ventus: sed quia erit omnino subjectum spiritui. Sicut et nunc dicitur corpus animale, non quia sit animal; sed quia animalibus passionibus subjacet, et alimonia indiget." 741. On subtlety. The second dowry of the glorious body is subtlety, which the Apostle indicates, saying: "It is sown an animal body, it shall rise a spiritual body." - But in what sense the body is called spiritual, St. Augustine explains, The City of God, book 13, chapter 20, saying: "For just as a spirit serving the flesh is not unfittingly called carnal, so flesh serving the spirit will rightly be called spiritual; not because it will be converted into spirit, as some think from the fact that it is written: It is sown an animal body, it shall rise a spiritual body; but because it will be subjected to the spirit with the highest and wondrous facility of obeying." Conformably to these things, St. Thomas writes, same place in Contra Gentiles: "It is sown an animal body, it shall rise a spiritual body"; he says: "Indeed the body of the one rising will be spiritual, not because it becomes spirit, as some have badly understood, whether by spirit there is understood a spiritual substance, or air, or wind, but because it will be entirely subject to the spirit. Just as now it is called an animal body, not because it is an animal, but because it lies under animal passions and needs nourishment."

742. "Ut autem spiritui sit conveniens corpus, inter caetera requiritur, ut in motu et celeritate ei non obstet: unde opus est quadam facultate penetrandi alia corpora una cum spiritu, absque ulla sui vel alterius laesione, aut figurae mutatione ... Unde Damascenus (de fide l. 4. c. ult.), ait: 'Seminatur corpus animale, id est, crassum, et mortale: suscitatur corpus spiritale, immutabile, impassibile, subtile hoc enim designat spiritale, quale Domini corpus post resurrectionem clausis portis ingrediens, infatigabile, cibo, somno, potu non indigens.'" 742. "But in order that the body may be fitting to the spirit, among other things it is required that it not obstruct the spirit in motion and speed; hence there is need of a certain faculty of penetrating other bodies together with the spirit, without any injury to itself or to the other, or change of figure ... Hence Damascene, On the Faith, book 4, last chapter, says: 'It is sown an animal body, that is, thick and mortal; it is raised a spiritual body, immutable, impassible, subtle - for this is what spiritual designates - such as the Lord's body after the resurrection, entering when the doors were closed, tireless, needing neither food, nor sleep, nor drink.'"

743. Duo autem hic notanda sunt cum D. Thoma. Primum est, quod penetrabilitas illa non est effectus physice proveniens a dote subtilitatis: sed moraliter, quatenus Deus in signum et manifestationem hujus dotis, illam concedit. "Subtilitas," inquit (in 4. dist. 44. q. 2. a. 2. quaestiunc. 2.), "a corpore glorioso dimensionem non aufert. Unde nullo modo aufert sibi praedictam necessitatem distinctionis situs ab alio corpore: et ita corpus gloriosum non habebit ratione suae subtilitatis, quod possit esse cum alio corpore: sed poterit esse simul cum alio corpore ex operatione virtutis divinae. Sicut etiam corpus Petri non habuit ex aliqua proprietate indita, quod ad adventionem ejus sanarentur infirmi; sed hoc fiebat virtute divina ad aedificationem fidei: ita faciet virtus divina, ut corpus gloriosum possit esse simul cum alio corpore ad perfectionem gloriae." 743. But two things must be noted here with St. Thomas. The first is that that penetrability is not an effect physically proceeding from the dowry of subtlety, but morally, insofar as God grants it as a sign and manifestation of this dowry. "Subtlety," he says, on book 4, distinction 44, question 2, article 2, little question 2, "does not remove dimension from the glorious body. Hence in no way does it remove from it the aforesaid necessity of distinction of place from another body; and so a glorious body will not have by reason of its subtlety that it can be with another body, but it will be able to be together with another body by the operation of divine power. Just as also the body of Peter did not have from some property placed in it that the sick were healed at his coming, but this happened by divine power for the building up of faith; so divine power will cause a glorious body to be able to be together with another body

for the perfection of glory."

744. Alterum est, quod licet vi subtilitatis possit etiam unum corpus gloriosum cum alio corpore glorioso penetrari "tamen non est conveniens quod unum corpus gloriosum sit simul cum alio corpore glorioso. Tum quia in eis servabitur debitus ordo, qui distinctionem requirit. Tum etiam, quia unum corpus gloriosum non se apponet alteri, et sic nunquam duo corpora gloriosa erunt simul. Vid. (suppl. q. 83.) 744. The other is that although by the force of subtlety one glorious body could even penetrate another glorious body, "nevertheless it is not fitting that one glorious body be together with another glorious body. Both because due order will be preserved in them, which requires distinction; and also because one glorious body will not put itself against another, and thus two glorious bodies will never be together." See Supplement, question 83.

745. De Agilitate. Hanc dotem ita exponit D. Thomas (c. g. l. c.): "Quia ex desiderio animae movetur corpus, consequens erit, quod corpus omnino spiritui ad motum obediet. Unde corpora resurgentium Beatorum futura erunt agilia: et hoc est, quod Apostolus dicit ibidem (1. Cor. 15. v. 43.) Seminatur in infirmitate, surget in virtute. Infirmitatem enim experimur in corpore; quia invalidum invenitur ad satisfaciendum desiderio animae in motibus, et actionibus, quas anima imperat: quae infirmitas totaliter tunc tolletur virtute redundante in corpus ex anima Deo conjuncta. Propter quod Sap. 3. v. 7. dicitur de justis, quod tanquam scintillae in arundineto discurrent: non quod motus sit in eis propter necessitatem, quum nullo indigeant, qui Deum habent; sed ad virtutis demonstrationem."

Unde S. Augustinus (de civ. Dei l. 13. c. 18.), inquit: "Si Angeli possunt sine labore rapere corpora animalium, et constituere ubi voluerint: cur Sanctorum spiritus sine ulla difficultate posse ferre quo voluerint, et sistere corpora sua non credamus?" - S. Anselmus (lib. de similitud. c. 51.): "Ipsis Angelis Dei aeque celeres erimus, qui dicto citius de coelo ad terras, et e converso delabuntur." 745. On agility. St. Thomas explains this dowry thus, same place in Contra Gentiles: "Because the body is moved from the desire of the soul, the consequence will be that the body will obey the spirit entirely as to motion. Hence the bodies of the blessed rising again will be agile; and this is what the Apostle says in the same place, 1 Corinthians 15:43: It is sown in infirmity, it shall rise in power. For we experience infirmity in the body because it is found insufficient for satisfying the desire of the soul in the movements and actions which the soul commands; this infirmity will then be totally taken away by power overflowing into the body from the soul joined to God. On account of this, Wisdom 3:7 says of the just that they will run about like sparks among reeds, not because motion is in them because of necessity, since those who have God need nothing, but for the demonstration of power."

Hence St. Augustine, The City of God, book 13, chapter 18, says: "If Angels can without labor seize the bodies of animals and place them where they wish, why should we not believe that the spirits of the Saints can without any difficulty carry their bodies where they wish and station them?" - St. Anselm, book on similitudes, chapter 51: "We shall be equally swift with the very Angels of God, who descend more quickly than speech from heaven to earth, and conversely."

746. Duo etiam hic adnotabimus. Primo, quod Beati non solum sua corpora summa celeritate movere poterunt, sed etiam aliena. Erunt enim non imbecilles ut in hac vita, sed robustissimi instar naturae Angelicae; cum Angelis sint futuri aequales: quod indicat Apostolus, cum ait: "surget in virtute," id est, in magno robore et potentia. Unde sicut Angeli possunt impetu suo evertere arbores, dissipare turres, et ingentes moles transferre: ita etiam Sancti possunt tam nunc, quam postea resumptis corporibus, ut docet S. Anselmus cap. 52. cujus rei habemus exempla in Historiis Sanctorum. Addit Anselmus: "In futuro Justus sic fortis erit, ut si velit terram commovere possit." 746. We shall also note two things here. First,

that the Blessed will be able not only to move their own bodies with the greatest speed, but also others. For they will not be weak as in this life, but most robust after the likeness of Angelic nature, since they are going to be equal to the Angels. The Apostle indicates this when he says: "it shall rise in power," that is, in great strength and potency. Hence just as Angels can by their force overturn trees, scatter towers, and transfer huge masses, so also the Saints can do both now and afterward when their bodies have been resumed, as St. Anselm teaches, chapter 52. We have examples of this matter in the histories of the Saints. Anselm adds: "In the future the Just man will be so strong that, if he wishes, he will be able to move the earth."

747. Secundo, quod dos agilitatis non tollit a corporibus gloriosis pondus, et gravitatem, quae propria sunt corporis mixti et terreni: sed faciet, ut anima pro suo libito impedire possit usum, et actum illius gravitatis, et ponderis, ne obstet motui, ad quem corpus movet. Nec tamen omnem actum gravitatis impediet, sed eum solum, qui sit onerosus Beato et contra ejus voluntatem. Quare si voluerit ascendere, sicut ascendit Christus, totaliter usum gravitatis impediet: si autem voluerit descendere, illum vel temperabit, vel etiam addet; ut magis, vel minus velociter descendat, si voluerit simplici motu, et non organico deferri. Vid. (suppl. q. 84.) 747. Second, that the dowry of agility does not take away from glorious bodies weight and gravity, which are proper to a mixed and earthly body; but it will cause the soul, according to its pleasure, to be able to impede the use and act of that gravity and weight, lest it obstruct the motion to which the body moves. Nor yet will it impede every act of gravity, but only that which would be burdensome to the Blessed one and against his will. Therefore, if he wishes to ascend, as Christ ascended, he will totally impede the use of gravity; but if he wishes to descend, he will either temper it or even add it, so that he may descend more or less swiftly if he wishes to be carried by simple and not organic motion. See Supplement, question 84.

748. De claritate. "Sicut anima," inquit D. Thomas (c. g. l. c.), "divina visione fruens quadam spirituali claritate replebitur: ita per quamdam redundantiam ex anima in corpus, ipsum corpus suo modo claritatis gloria induetur. Unde dicit Apostolus 1. Cor. 15. v. 43. Seminatur corpus in ignobilitate, surget in gloria: quia corpus nostrum nunc est opacum, tunc autem erit clarum, secundum illud Matth. 13. v. 43. Fulgebunt justi sicut sol in Regno Patris mei." 748. On clarity. "Just as the soul," says St. Thomas, same place in Contra Gentiles, "enjoying the divine vision will be filled with a certain spiritual clarity, so through a certain overflowing from the soul into the body, the body itself in its own mode will be clothed with the glory of clarity. Hence the Apostle says in 1 Corinthians 15:43: The body is sown in ignobility, it shall rise in glory; because our body is now opaque, but then it will be clear, according to that saying of Matthew 13:43: The just will shine like the sun in the kingdom of my Father."

749. Notandum est 1. quod licet aliqui Doctores, uti Durandus, censuerint dotem claritatis inesse corporibus beatis solum secundum superficiem; sententia tamen D. Thomae, quae communior est, tenet ipsis inesse etiam secundum profunditatem. Quae est etiam sententia S. Gregorii (Mor. l. 18. c. 48.) quem referens D. Thomas (4. sent. dist. 44. q. 2. a. 4.), ait: "Gregorius comparat corpora gloriosa auro, et vitro: auro propter claritatem, vitro propter hoc, quod translucebunt: unde videtur, quod erunt simul clara et pervia." - Et S. Augustinus (de civ. Dei l. 22. c. 30.), ait: "Omnes quippe illi, de quibus jam sum locutus, qui nunc latent, harmoniae corporales numeri, non latebunt intrinsecus, et extrinsecus per corporis cuncta dispositi."

2. Oculus tamen corporis gloriosi non erit necessitatus ad omnes partes alterius corporis simul videndas; sed erit in potestate ejus, ut occultet corpus, quod est post se, et ab eo non immutetur, vel non occultet; ut docet D. Thomas in 4. sent. quaestiuncula 3. ad 2.

3. Docet D. Thomas l. c., et est communior sententia, quod "claritas gloriae erit alterius generis, quam claritas naturae quantum ad causam, sed non quantum ad speciem. Unde sicut claritas naturae ratione suae speciei est proportionata visui, ita claritas gloriosa." <div

class="pl-en">749. It must be noted 1. that although some Doctors, such as Durandus, judged that the dowry of clarity is in blessed bodies only according to the surface, nevertheless the opinion of St. Thomas, which is more common, holds that it is in them also according to depth. This is also the opinion of St. Gregory, Moralia, book 18, chapter 48, whom St. Thomas, reporting him on book 4 of the Sentences, distinction 44, question 2, article 4, says: "Gregory compares glorious bodies to gold and glass: to gold because of clarity, to glass because of this, that they will shine through; hence it seems that they will be at once clear and transparent." - And St. Augustine, The City of God, book 22, chapter 30, says: "All those bodily numbers of harmony, about which I have now spoken and which now lie hidden, will not lie hidden within, but will be disposed throughout all things of the body both within and without."

2. Nevertheless the eye of the glorious body will not be necessitated to see all parts of another body at once; but it will be in its power either to conceal the body which is behind it and not be changed by it, or not to conceal it, as St. Thomas teaches on book 4 of the Sentences, little question 3, reply to 2.

3. St. Thomas teaches in the same place, and it is the more common opinion, that "the clarity of glory will be of another genus than the clarity of nature as to cause, but not as to species. Hence, just as the clarity of nature by reason of its species is proportioned to sight, so also glorious clarity."

750. Quare, ad grati nostri animi sensus erga Dei munificentiam excitandos, animadvertimus cum Lessio (l. c. c. 1.): "homo aliquid habebit amplius, et quodammodo erit beatior spiritibus. Par enim illis erit impassibilitate, celeritate, vi penetrandi, potentia movendi, visione, amore, et fruitione beata, et cognitione rerum omnium, tam spiritualium, quam corporalium. Et praeter haec habebit gloriam corporis et multiplices in corpore et per corporis sensus voluptates, quibus Angeli carent. Unde homo erit beatior extensive: quae ejus beatitudo non continebit se in anima, sed effundet se in corpus, juxta sententiam S. Augustini Epist. 56. 'Tam potenti natura Deus fecit animam, ut ex ejus plenissima beatitudine, quae in fine temporum Sanctis promittitur, redundet etiam in inferiorem naturam, quod est corpus: non beatitudo quae fruentis et intelligentis est propria, sed plenitudo sanitatis, id est incorruptionis vigor.'" 750. Therefore, to stir up the grateful senses of our mind toward the munificence of God, we observe with Lessius, same place, chapter 1: "man will have something more, and in a certain way will be more blessed than spirits. For he will be equal to them in impassibility, speed, power of penetrating, power of moving, vision, love, and blessed fruition, and knowledge of all things, both spiritual and corporeal. And besides these, he will have the glory of the body and manifold pleasures in the body and through the senses of the body, which Angels lack. Hence man will be more blessed extensively; this beatitude of his will not contain itself in the soul, but will pour itself out into the body, according to the sentence of St. Augustine, Epistle 56: 'God made the soul of so powerful a nature that from its fullest beatitude, which is promised to the Saints at the end of times, there overflows also into the lower nature, which is the body: not the beatitude which is proper to the one enjoying and understanding, but the fullness of health, that is, the vigor of incorruption.'"

Disputation VI — On Angels

Article 1. Whether Angels Exist

LatineEnglish

Corrected Latin

751. Solent Theologi, post D. Thomam, quaestionibus de creatione generatim, immediate subjicere tractationem de Angelis; ut qui praestantissimae sunt creaturarum, primum etiam locum, post Deum eorum Creatorem, in sacra scientia teneant. 751. Theologians, after St. Thomas, are accustomed immediately to join the treatment of Angels to the questions concerning creation in general, so that those who are the most excellent of creatures may also hold the first place, after God their Creator, in sacred science.

752. Nobis tamen non licuit hunc ordinem sequi. Quamvis enim multa pie, utiliter et jucunde de Angelis quaeri possint; pauca tamen sunt quae de iis ex revelatione cum certitudine haurimus. Haec quidem pertractandi tempus non defuturum ratum nobis ab initio fuit; at simul periculum erat, ne, si caetera statim persequeremur, tempus deesset majoris momenti quaestiones explicandi. 752. Nevertheless it has not been permitted to us to follow this order. For although many things can be asked piously, usefully, and pleasantly concerning Angels, nevertheless few things are drawn with certainty concerning them from revelation. Indeed, from the beginning we judged that time would not be lacking for treating these; but at the same time there was a danger that, if we immediately pursued the remaining things, time would be lacking for explaining questions of greater importance.

753. His jam in tuto positis in praecedentibus disputationibus, nunc de Angelis dicere aggredimur. Sed temporis angustia pressi, nonnisi praecipua delibabimus.

ARTICULUS PRIMUS.

Utrum existant Angeli. 753. These things now having been placed in safety in the preceding disputations, we now undertake to speak about Angels. But pressed by the narrowness of time, we shall merely touch upon the chief things.

ARTICLE FIRST.

Whether Angels exist.

754. Concilium Vaticanum Const. Dei Filius, cap. 1. Concilii Later. IV. verba repetens et confirmans, ait: "Solus verus Deus ... simul ab initio temporis utramque de nihilo condidit creaturam, spiritualem et corporalem, angelicam videlicet et mundanam, ac deinde humanam quasi communem ex spiritu et corpore constitutam." Vid. (n. 27.) 754. The Vatican Council, Constitution Dei Filius, chapter 1, repeating and confirming the words of Lateran IV, says: "The one true God ... at once from the beginning of time founded each creature from nothing, the spiritual and the corporeal, namely the angelic and the worldly, and then the human as constituted in common from spirit and body." See no. 27.

755. Ad explicandam hanc, quoad Angelos, Ecclesiae definitionem, notamus imprimis cum S. Augustino (in Ps. 103. serm. 1. n. 13.): "Spiritus Angeli sunt, et cum spiritus sunt, non sunt angeli; cum mittuntur fiunt angeli, angelus enim officii nomen est, non naturae. Quaeris nomen hujus naturae, spiritus est; quaeris officium, angelus est. Ex eo quod est, spiritus est; ex eo quod agit, angelus est." 755. To explain this definition of the Church with regard to Angels, we note first with St. Augustine, on Psalm 103,

sermon 1, no. 13: "Angels are spirits, and when they are spirits, they are not angels; when they are sent, they become angels, for angel is the name of an office, not of a nature. You ask the name of this nature: it is spirit. You ask the office: it is angel. From that which it is, it is spirit; from that which it does, it is angel."

756. At licet nomen Angeli vi sua nativa non significet spiritum; ex usu tamen Bibliorum, Patrum et Ecclesiae substantiis spiritualibus veluti proprium factum est. Imo duplici sensu, nomen illud usurpatur ad spiritus significandos: latiori nempe, cum importat quamcumque substantiam spiritualem completam Deo inferiorem, cujuscumque demum sit ordinis et Hierarchiae - strictiori vero, cum significat solos spiritus, qui infimo ordine continentur. - Nunc secundum latiorem significationem Angeli nomen usurpamus. 756. But although the name Angel by its native force does not signify spirit, nevertheless from the usage of the Bible, the Fathers, and the Church, it has become as it were proper to spiritual substances. Indeed, that name is used in a twofold sense to signify spirits: in a broader sense, namely, when it imports any complete spiritual substance inferior to God, of whatever order and Hierarchy it may be; but in a stricter sense, when it signifies only those spirits who are contained in the lowest order. - Now we use the name Angel according to the broader signification.

757. Sadducaei perhibentur primi negasse Angelorum existentiam, juxta illud Act. 23. 8.: "Sadducaei dicunt, non esse resurrectionem, neque Angelum neque Spiritum." De eodem errore accusantur etiam Samaritani. Alii vero licet nomen concesserint, rem tamen inficiati sunt. Hinc, ut recte statuatur thesis, et contrarii errores simul refutentur, dicimus: "per Angelos non significamus, nisi quasdam substantias spirituales Deo inferiores, ab hominibus distinctas, iisdemque superiores." 757. The Sadducees are said to have been the first to deny the existence of Angels, according to that saying of Acts 23:8: "The Sadducees say that there is no resurrection, nor Angel nor Spirit." The Samaritans also are accused of the same error. Others, although they conceded the name, nevertheless denied the reality. Hence, in order that the thesis may be rightly established and contrary errors at the same time refuted, we say: by Angels we signify only certain spiritual substances inferior to God, distinct from men and superior to them.

758. Dicimus a) substantias, ad excludendum errorem eorum, qui nomine Angelorum in Scripturis significari autumabant inspirationem divinam, vel energiam, potestatem divinam, qua miri producuntur effectus. Teste Kemnitio, Anabaptistae saeculo XVI. statuerunt "Angelos non esse peculiares creaturas, quae vocentur Angeli; sed siquando Deus exserat suam potentiam ad nocendum, vel puniendum, hoc vocari malum angelum, et contra bonum appellari, si quando Deus nos custodiat et conservet."

Dicimus b) Intellectuales seu Spirituales, sive ut jam innuamus Angelorum naturam inferius explicandam; sive ut indirecte saltem refutentur Materialistae, qui nunc temporis praeter materiam nullam aliam substantiam agnoscunt.

Dicimus c) Deo inferiores. Quibus verbis tum vitatur Manichaeorum error qui unum tantum Spiritum, Deum, modo suo, admittebant; tum rejiciuntur Pantheistarum recentiorum commenta. Hi enim omnia unum esse dicunt, et hoc Unum - Deum appellant, qui solummodo in mente humana sui conscius fit: ex hoc ipso principio aliorum spirituum existentiam negare coguntur; ideo jam Spinoza Angelos negavit, eorundemque existentiam etiam schola Hegelii admittere recusat.

Dicimus d) ab hominibus distinctas, iisdemque superiores, ut excludamus errorem eorum, qui Scripturas nomine tenus admittentes, quae in illis de Angelis dicuntur, de hominibus interpretantur: siquidem, aiunt, homines prout specialem aliquando a Deo missionem habent, (mittuntur) nuntii (Angeli) vocantur. 758. We say a) substances, to exclude the error of those who thought that by the name of Angels in the Scriptures there is signified divine inspiration, or energy, the divine power

by which wondrous effects are produced. According to Chemnitz, the Anabaptists in the sixteenth century held that "Angels are not peculiar creatures which are called Angels; but if at some time God puts forth his power to harm or punish, this is called an evil angel, and, on the contrary, is called good if at some time God guards and preserves us."

We say b) intellectual or spiritual, either so that we may already hint at the nature of Angels to be explained below, or so that at least indirectly the Materialists may be refuted, who at the present time acknowledge no substance other than matter.

We say c) inferior to God. By these words both the error of the Manichaeans is avoided, who admitted only one Spirit, God, in their own manner, and the fictions of more recent Pantheists are rejected. For these say that all things are one, and this One they call God, who becomes conscious of himself only in the human mind. From this principle itself they are compelled to deny the existence of other spirits; for this reason Spinoza already denied Angels, and the school of Hegel also refuses to admit their existence.

We say d) distinct from men and superior to them, so that we may exclude the error of those who, admitting the Scriptures in name, interpret those things which are said in them concerning Angels as concerning men. For, they say, men, insofar as they sometimes have a special mission from God and are sent, are called messengers, Angels.

759. Posita autem hac explicatione nominis Angeli, sequitur 1. quod, si probemus Angelos existere, hoc ipso constabit eos non esse a se, sed esse a Deo conditos. Etenim ens a se non potest esse nisi unum - qui necessitatem essendi habet, debet infinitae perfectionis esse: angeli vero sunt Deo inferiores - omnia, quae extra Deum sunt, nonnisi per creationem a Deo esse possunt, uti ostendimus in prima disputatione. Unde Dan. 3., postquam pueri dixerunt: "Benedicite omnia opera Domini Domino etc.," addiderunt: "Benedicite Angeli Domini Domino."

2. Imo si Angelorum existentia semel probetur, hoc ipso constabit eos esse immediate a Deo per creationem. Substantiae enim intellectuales nequeunt aliter produci. Vid. (nn. 169. seqq.) Unde Apostolus Coloss. 1. 16. ait: "In ipso condita sunt universa in caelis et in terra, visibilia et invisibilia, sive throni, sive dominationes, sive principatus, sive potestates, omnia per ipsum et in ipso creata sunt." Merito igitur Conc. Bracarense (an. 563.) can. 5. ait: "Si quis animas humanas vel angelos ex Dei credit substantia exstitisse, sicut Manichaei et Priscillianistae docent, anathema sit." Et Conc. Vat. (l. c. can. 4.): "Si quis dixerit, res finitas tum corporeas tum spirituales, aut saltem spirituales e divina substantia emanasse; anathema sit."

Sequitur 3. Deum liberrimo suae voluntatis consilio, ut loquitur Conc. Vaticanum, Angelos creasse. Necessitas enim nec ex natura et conditione ipsius causae effectricis Angelorum, nec ex natura ipsorum Angelorum oriri potest, et ideo nulla ratione esse potest. Prior pars antecedentis probatur, quia repugnat Deo aliquid agere extra se ex necessitate naturae, tum quia intellectualis est in summa perfectione, ac proinde maxime liber, tum etiam quia nulla re extra se indiget, et ideo nihil extra se ita amat, ut necessario illud esse, aut facere velit, tum etiam quia cum sit omnipotens, et infinitae efficacitatis, nihil determinatum agere posset, nisi per liberam voluntatem id determinaret. Nam si ex necessitate naturae ageret, cur potius hos Angelos, quam alios possibiles, vel cur tot potius, quam plures creasset? Unde facile demonstratur pars altera, scilicet, hujusmodi necessitatem non posse ex peculiari conditione angelicae naturae provenire: tum quia cum sit finitae bonitatis, et non sit finis Dei, nec illi aliquid conferat, non potest voluntatem ejus ad se amandum, vel efficiendum ex necessitate determinare, tum etiam quia cum infiniti Angeli possibiles sint, cur magis illi, qui facti sunt, hanc in Deum necessitatem invexissent, quam infiniti alii, qui facti non sunt? Vid. (nn. 105. seqq.) 759. But once this explanation of the name Angel has been posited, it follows 1. that, if we prove that Angels exist, by this very fact it will be established that they are not from themselves, but have been founded by God. For a being from itself can only be one; that which has necessity of being must be of infinite perfection; but angels are inferior to God; all things which are outside God can be only through creation from God, as we showed in the first disputation. Hence in Daniel 3, after the young men had said, "Bless the Lord, all works of the Lord, etc.," they added: "Bless the Lord, Angels of the Lord."

2. Indeed, if the existence of Angels is once proved, by this very fact it will be established that they are immediately from God through creation. For

intellectual substances cannot be produced otherwise. See nos. 169 and following. Hence the Apostle says in Colossians 1:16: "In him all things were founded in heaven and on earth, visible and invisible, whether thrones, or dominations, or principalities, or powers; all things were created through him and in him." Therefore deservedly the Council of Braga, in the year 563, canon 5, says: "If anyone believes that human souls or angels existed from the substance of God, as the Manichaeans and Priscillianists teach, let him be anathema." And the Vatican Council, same place, canon 4: "If anyone shall say that finite things, both corporeal and spiritual, or at least spiritual, have emanated from the divine substance, let him be anathema."

It follows 3. that God created Angels by the most free counsel of his will, as the Vatican Council says. For necessity can arise neither from the nature and condition of the efficient cause itself of Angels, nor from the nature of the Angels themselves, and therefore in no way can it exist. The prior part of the antecedent is proved, because it is repugnant to God to act outside himself from necessity of nature: both because he is intellectual in the highest perfection, and therefore supremely free; and also because he needs nothing outside himself, and therefore loves nothing outside himself in such a way that he necessarily wills it to be or to make it; and also because, since he is omnipotent and of infinite efficacy, he could act on nothing determinate unless he determined it by free will. For if he acted from necessity of nature, why would he have created these Angels rather than other possible ones, or why so many rather than more? Hence the other part is easily demonstrated, namely, that necessity of this sort cannot come from the peculiar condition of angelic nature: both because, since it is of finite goodness, and is not the end of God, nor contributes anything to him, it cannot determine his will by necessity to loving or effecting itself; and also because, since infinite Angels are possible, why would those who have been made have brought upon God this necessity rather than infinitely many others who have not been made? See nos. 105 and following.

760. Quod si de tempore quaeratur, quo Angeli creati fuere; a) certum est Angelos non fuisse ab aeterno, uti docet Ecclesia in cit. definitionibus. - Pariter certum est, eos fuisse creatos ante hominem, et non post absolutam totius universi dispositionem. Adducuntur enim ipsi angeli in libro Job ut praesentes in molitione et dispositione rerum. Ita scilicet Dominus loquitur ad Job: "Ubi eras, quando ponebam fundamenta terrae? Indica mihi, si habes intelligentiam. Quis posuit mensuras ejus si nosti? vel quis tetendit super eam lineam? Super quo bases ejus solidatae sunt, aut quis dimisit lapidem angularem ejus: cum me laudarent astra matutina, jubilarent omnes filii Dei?" Nomine filiorum Dei intelliguntur angeli, qui Deum quum terram disponeret laudabant, et ejus opera admirabantur.

b) Quamvis non pauci Patres, praesertim Graeci, docuerint Angelos creatos fuisse ante mundum corporeum et visibilem; communior tamen et vera sententia tenet eos simul cum ipso creatos esse. Quod patet praecipue ex Prov. 8. 22. seqq.: "Dominus possedit me in initio viarum suarum, antequam quidquam faceret a principio. Ab aeterno ordinata sum, et ex antiquis antequam terra fieret. Nondum erant abyssi, et ego jam concepta eram." - Huic sententiae maximum pondus accessit ex recitatis Ecclesiae definitionibus, ubi dicitur Deus simul ab initio temporis condidisse naturam angelicam et mundanam, ac deinde humanam.

Hinc non defuerunt Theologi, qui censerent hanc veritatem ad fidem pertinere. Communius tamen hoc negant. "Et ratio est," inquit Suarez (de Ang. l. 1. c. 3. n. 14.), "quia Concilium (Later.) non ex instituto ad id definiendum, sed obiter, et quasi aliud agens id dixit. Non enim in eo capite intendebat Concilium, nova dogmata definire, sed antiqua profiteri, et ita illud explicuit D. Thomas in dicto opusc. 23. et ita etiam est communi sensu Ecclesiae receptum." - Addit tamen (n. 15.) "ex illis verbis Concilii non parum auctoritatis accessisse huic sententiae, atque adeo non carere temeritate contra illam nunc sentire ... quia modus ille loquendi Concilii ostendit sensum Ecclesiae valde communem, cui postea concors sententia Scholasticorum, et posteriorum Patrum accessit, et ideo merito temeritatis argueretur, qui nunc oppositum doceret. Neque per hoc fit injuria antiquioribus Patribus, quia illis temporibus res erat magis controversa, minusque declarata. Potestque uno tempore propositio aliqua non esse temeraria, et postea esse, interveniente Ecclesiae auctoritate, et communi conspiratione, ac consensu." <span

id="p760">760. But if it is asked concerning the time at which Angels were created: a) it is certain that Angels were not from eternity, as the Church teaches in the cited definitions. - It is likewise certain that they were created before man, and not after the completion of the whole disposition of the universe. For the angels themselves are brought forward in the book of Job as present in the construction and arrangement of things. Thus the Lord speaks to Job: "Where were you when I was laying the foundations of the earth? Tell me, if you have understanding. Who set its measures, if you know? Or who stretched the line upon it? Upon what have its bases been made solid, or who laid its cornerstone, when the morning stars praised me, and all the sons of God shouted for joy?" By the name sons of God Angels are understood, who were praising God when he was arranging the earth and admiring his works.

b) Although not a few Fathers, especially Greek Fathers, taught that Angels were created before the corporeal and visible world, nevertheless the more common and true opinion holds that they were created together with it. This is especially clear from Proverbs 8:22 and following: "The Lord possessed me in the beginning of his ways, before he made anything from the beginning. From eternity I was ordained, and from ancient times before the earth was made. The depths were not yet, and I was already conceived." - The greatest weight has come to this opinion from the cited definitions of the Church, where it is said that God at once from the beginning of time founded the angelic and worldly nature, and then the human.

Hence there have not been lacking Theologians who judged that this truth pertains to faith. Nevertheless more commonly they deny this. "And the reason is," says Suarez, On Angels, book 1, chapter 3, no. 14, "because the Council, Lateran, did not say this from its purpose of defining it, but incidentally and as though doing something else. For in that chapter the Council did not intend to define new dogmas, but to profess old ones; and St. Thomas explained it thus in the said opusculum 23, and thus also it has been received by the common sense of the Church." - Yet he adds, no. 15, "that from those words of the Council no small authority has come to this opinion, and therefore that to think against it now is not free from rashness ... because that mode of speaking of the Council shows the very common sense of the Church, to which afterward the concordant opinion of the Scholastics and of later Fathers has been added; and therefore he who now taught the opposite would deservedly be accused of rashness. Nor through this is injury done to the older Fathers, because in those times the matter was more controversial and less declared. And it can happen that at one time some proposition is not rash, and afterward is rash, with the authority of the Church and the common concurrence and consensus intervening."

761. Juverit hic demum animadvertere, quod illis verbis Gen. "In principio creavit Deus caelum et terram" alii dicunt Moysen non descripsisse Angelorum originem, quia id a suo scopo alienum erat, quo generis humani originem et eorum, quae cum hominum statu connexa, et horum aspectui subjecta erant, creationem describendam susceperat. Ita S. Hier., Cyr. Alex., S. Jo. Chrys., qui (Hom. 2. in Gen.) ait: "Moyses nihil de invisibilibus virtutibus disserit, neque dicit: in principio fecit Deus Angelos vel Archangelos ... Judaeis enim loquebatur, qui toti rebus praesentibus inhiabant, neque spirituale quidquam comprehendere valebant. Itaque eos a sensibilibus ad cognoscendum universi opificem inducit." - Alii cum Origene et S. Augustino contendunt, Angelos non omnino fuisse praetermissos in mosaica creationis narratione, sed nominibus rerum corporalium, coeli scilicet, aut lucis, fuisse significatos: "Et hoc ideo," ait S. Thomas, "quia Moyses rudi populo loquebatur, qui nondum capere poterat incorpoream naturam; et si eis (initio Genesis) fuisset expressum, aliquas res esse super omnem naturam corpoream, fuisset eis occasio idololatriae, ad quam proni erant, et a qua Moyses eos praecipue revocare intendebat." 761. It will be useful here finally to observe that concerning those words of Genesis, "In the beginning God created heaven and earth," some say that Moses did not describe the origin of Angels, because that was foreign to his scope, by which he had undertaken to describe the origin of the human race and the creation of those things which were connected with the state of men and subject to their sight. Thus St. Jerome, Cyril of Alexandria, and St. John Chrysostom, who in homily 2 on Genesis says: "Moses discusses nothing concerning the invisible

powers, nor does he say: in the beginning God made Angels or Archangels ... For he was speaking to Jews, who wholly gaped after present things and were not able to comprehend anything spiritual. And so he leads them from sensible things to knowing the maker of the universe." - Others with Origen and St. Augustine contend that Angels were not altogether passed over in the Mosaic narration of creation, but were signified by the names of corporeal things, namely heaven or light. "And this," says St. Thomas, "because Moses was speaking to a rude people, who could not yet grasp incorporeal nature; and if it had been expressed to them, at the beginning of Genesis, that some things exist above every corporeal nature, it would have been an occasion of idolatry for them, to which they were prone, and from which Moses chiefly intended to recall them."

762. His itaque declaratis, dicimus:

PROP. LII. Praeter hanc rerum adspectabilium universitatem creavit Deus etiam Angelos, seu existunt Angeli.

Prob. I. Ex Scriptura. Saepissime in Scriptura mentio fit de Angelis; atqui nomine Angelorum in Scripturis veniunt 1. substantiae spirituales - 2. ab hominibus diversae, iisque superiores - 3. Deo tamen inferiores. Ergo.

Prob. min. quoad 1um. Nam Scriptura illas proprietates, et actiones Angelis tribuit, quae non nisi in creaturam intellectualem cadunt. Una est videre Deum, Matth. 18. "Angeli eorum in caelis semper vident faciem Patris mei, qui in coelis est." Alia est benedicere, et laudare Deum, quod passim in Scriptura Angelis tribuitur. Tertia est custodire homines Psalm. 90. Matth. 4. Ad quem etiam pertinet dirigere defendere, illuminare, docere, instruere, et loqui, ut Zachar. 1. "Et dixit Angelus, qui loquebatur in me," quae omnia et similia, quae in Prophetis et alibi saepe leguntur, sine intellectu cogitari non possunt, ut per se notum est. Quarta sit peccare, et fieri poena dignum. 2. Petr. 2. "Angelis peccantibus non pepercit Deus." Ex quo etiam evidenter colligitur, Angelos esse liberi arbitrii, sine quo nec male agitur, nec recte vivitur. Et inde evidenter concluditur eorum intellectualis natura, quia libertas arbitrii in ratione fundatur. Hinc Bernard. dicto lib. 5. de considerat. cap. 4. dixit, "Angelos intellectu capimus, quia non possunt hujus expertes, Dei simul participes esse."

Prob. min. quoad 2um. a) Ps. 8. dicitur: "Minuisti eum paulo minus ab Angelis": ubi Psalmista de homine loquitur, quem dicit fuisse minoratum ab angelis, utique in natura, et ideo paulo minus, nam gratia, et gloria prae angelis honoratur. Paulus vero ad Hebr. 2. nos docuit haec verba licet de tota humana specie dicta sint, per antonomasiam de Christo scripta esse, qui ratione humanae naturae ab angelis minoratus est. - b) Hebr. 2. 16. legitur: "Nusquam enim Angelos apprehendit sed semen Abraham apprehendit." - c) 2. Pet. 2. Angeli dicuntur fortitudine, et virtute esse majores homine: loquitur autem de malis angelis, unde nonnisi de perfectione naturae loquitur. Et Job. 41. de Satana dicitur: "Non est super terram potestas, quae comparetur ei." Sicut ergo potestate ita etiam naturae perfectione homines excellit.

Prob. min. quoad 3um. a) Hebr. 1. Apostolus ostendit superioritatem Christi respectu Angelorum; quia Angeli sunt ministri, Christus vero Filius Dei. - Unde usurpat illud Ps. 96.: "Et adorent eum omnes Angeli ejus." Vide vv. 1-8. - b) Ut vidimus, Coloss. 1. 16. Angeli dicuntur a Deo creati.

Prob. II. Ex Patribus. Quorum testimonia vide praesertim apud Petavium.

Prob. III. Ex ratione. a) Ratio a priori, ut omnes conveniunt, nequit demonstrare Angelorum existentiam; ostendit tamen maximam ejus convenientiam. Inter rationes autem convenientiae praecipuum locum tenet ea, quam tradit D. Thomas 1. p. q. 50. a. 1. c., et multis illustrari solet. Sic autem se habet: "Id quod praecipue in rebus creatis Deus intendit, est bonum, quod consistit in assimilatione ad Deum. Perfecta autem assimilatio effectus ad causam attenditur, quando effectus imitatur causam secundum illud per quod causa producit effectum, sicut calidum facit calidum. Deus autem creaturam producit per intellectum et voluntatem, ut supra dictum est, qu. 14. art. 8. et qu. 19. art. 4. Unde ad perfectionem universi requiritur quod sint aliquae creaturae intellectuales. Intelligere autem non potest esse actus corporis, nec alicujus virtutis corporeae: quia omne corpus determinatur ad hic et nunc. Unde necesse est ponere, ad hoc quod universum sit perfectum, quod sit aliqua incorporea creatura."

b) A posteriori. "Fideles," inquit Suarez (l. c. c. 1. nn. 7. 8.), "etiam nunc aliquos effectus daemonum in obsessis ab illis, seu energumenis, et arreptiis experiuntur, quae plane ostendunt et majorem perspicaciam daemonum in

intelligendo, et majorem potentiam in operando, quam in homine sit. Quod etiam apertissime cernitur in magorum incantationibus, et falsis miraculis ministrorum daemonis quae signa profecto ostendunt esse in mundo quasdam invisibiles substantias virtute, ac perfectione naturali homines superantes quas angelos vocamus. - Neque enim illi effectus soli Deo tribui possunt, tum quia non est ad causam primam recurrendum, cum possunt effectus in causas secundas reduci; tum etiam quia tales effectus saepe sunt pravi, et ad malum, et perniciem hominum; imo in odium, et injuriam ipsius Dei facti, ut ipsimet daemones saepissime manifestant: tum denique in ipso modo operandi saepe ostenditur vel malitia moralis, et impotentia quaedam operantis; quia non per imperium, et supremam potestatem, sed veluti arte aliqua applicando activa passivis hujusmodi opera faciunt. Neque etiam hi effectus possunt tribui animabus separatis aliquorum hominum, qui ex hac vita decesserunt, quia juxta veram Philosophiam anima separata non plus potest circa praejacentem materiam operari, quam posset conjuncta, imo minus, quia corpori conjuncta saltem per illud poterat alia corpora immutare, quamvis limitato, et ordinario modo: separata vero nihil potest."

c) Addi posset populorum consensus. Vid. Perrone, etiam pro objectionibus. 762. And so, these things having been declared, we say:

PROPOSITION LII. Besides this universe of visible things, God also created Angels; or, Angels exist.

Proof I. From Scripture. Very often in Scripture mention is made of Angels; but by the name of Angels in the Scriptures there come 1. spiritual substances, 2. diverse from men and superior to them, 3. nevertheless inferior to God. Therefore.

Proof of the minor with regard to the first. For Scripture attributes to Angels those properties and actions which fall only in an intellectual creature. One is to see God, Matthew 18: "Their Angels in heaven always see the face of my Father, who is in heaven." Another is to bless and praise God, which is everywhere attributed to Angels in Scripture. A third is to guard men, Psalm 90, Matthew 4. To this also belongs directing, defending, illuminating, teaching, instructing, and speaking, as Zechariah 1: "And the Angel who was speaking in me said," all of which and similar things, which are often read in the Prophets and elsewhere, cannot be thought without intellect, as is known of itself. A fourth is to sin and become worthy of punishment. 2 Peter 2: "God did not spare Angels sinning." From this also it is evidently gathered that Angels are of free choice, without which there is neither acting badly nor living rightly. And from this their intellectual nature is evidently concluded, because freedom of choice is founded in reason. Hence Bernard, in the said book 5 of On Consideration, chapter 4, said: "We grasp Angels by intellect, because they cannot be without this and at the same time be sharers of God."

Proof of the minor with regard to the second. a) In Psalm 8 it is said: "You have made him a little less than the Angels"; here the Psalmist speaks of man, whom he says has been made less than the angels, certainly in nature, and therefore a little less, for in grace and glory he is honored above angels. But Paul in Hebrews 2 taught us that these words, although said of the whole human species, were written by antonomasia of Christ, who by reason of human nature was made less than the angels. - b) Hebrews 2:16 reads: "For nowhere does he take hold of Angels, but he takes hold of the seed of Abraham." - c) In 2 Peter 2 Angels are said to be greater than man in strength and power; but he is speaking of evil angels, whence he speaks only of the perfection of nature. And in Job 41 it is said of Satan: "There is no power upon earth which can be compared to him." Therefore just as he excels men in power, so also in perfection of nature.

Proof of the minor with regard to the third. a) In Hebrews 1 the Apostle shows the superiority of Christ with respect to Angels, because Angels are ministers, but Christ is the Son of God. - Hence he uses that saying of Psalm 96: "And let all his Angels adore him." See verses 1-8. - b) As we have seen, in Colossians 1:16 Angels are said to have been created by God.

Proof II. From the Fathers. For their testimonies, see especially Petavius.

Proof III. From reason. a) A reason a priori, as all agree, cannot demonstrate the existence of Angels; nevertheless it shows its very great fittingness. But among the reasons of fittingness, the chief place is held by that which St. Thomas hands down, I, question 50, article 1, corpus, and which is usually illustrated by many things. Thus it stands: "That which God chiefly intends in created things is good, which consists in assimilation to God. But perfect assimilation of an effect to a cause is attended to when the effect imitates the cause according to that by

which the cause produces the effect, as the hot makes hot. But God produces a creature through intellect and will, as was said above, question 14, article 8, and question 19, article 4. Hence for the perfection of the universe it is required that there be some intellectual creatures. But to understand cannot be an act of a body, nor of any corporeal power, because every body is determined to here and now. Hence it is necessary to posit, in order that the universe be perfect, that there be some incorporeal creature."

b) A posteriori. "The faithful," says Suarez, same place, chapter 1, nos. 7 and 8, "even now experience certain effects of demons in those possessed by them, or energumens and the seized, which plainly show both greater perspicacity of demons in understanding and greater power in operating than there is in man. This is also most openly perceived in the incantations of magicians and the false miracles of the ministers of the demon; these signs certainly show that there are in the world certain invisible substances surpassing men in power and natural perfection, which we call angels. - Nor can those effects be attributed to God alone, both because one must not have recourse to the first cause when effects can be reduced to secondary causes, and also because such effects are often depraved, and toward evil and the destruction of men; indeed, they are done in hatred and injury of God himself, as the demons themselves very often manifest. Finally, also because in the very mode of operating there is often shown either moral malice and a certain impotence of the operator, because they do works of this sort not through command and supreme power, but as if by some art, applying active things to passive things. Nor can these effects be attributed to the separated souls of certain men who have departed from this life, because according to true Philosophy the separated soul can do no more about preexisting matter than it could do when joined, indeed less, because when joined to the body it could at least through that body change other bodies, although in a limited and ordinary mode; but separated, it can do nothing."

c) The consensus of peoples could be added. See Perrone, also for the objections.

Article 2. Whether Angels are Pure Spirits

LatineEnglish

Corrected Latin

763. Nomen spiritus aequivocum est, et diversas habet acceptiones. Nam sumitur 1. pro re tenuissima, ac subtilissima, sive sit accidens, sive substantia. Sic species, seu imagines, quae ab objectis immittuntur ad sensus, spirituales, seu intentionales dicuntur. Sic tenuissimae, ac puriores sanguinis partes, per quas vegetandi, sentiendique vis manat in reliquas, spiritus vocantur. - 2. Accipitur pro vento, aere, et puriori exhalatione; unde spirare, respirare, idem est, ac aerem trahere; et ventus nimio impetu irruens Spiritus procellarum vocatur Psalm. 148. v. 8. - 3. Pro substantia incorporea, non quomodocumque, sed ut opponitur corpori crasso ex carne, et ossibus constante, quomodo illud Christi Lucae 24. v. 39. "Palpate, et videte, quia spiritus carnem, et ossa non habet." - 4. Pro ente nulla materia, quamvis tenuissima, concreto, materiam excedente, ab eaque independente - seu, pro ente simplici, corpus et materiam excedente, et vivente vita intellectiva: talis est anima humana. - 5. Quod si ens aliquid non modo excludit a se omnem materiam et dependentiam a materia; sed etiam omnem ordinem naturalem et conjunctionem ad corpus, ut ad subjectum, quod perficiat, et cum quo faciat unam completam substantiam: tunc habetur spiritus, qui dicitur purus. Igitur spiritus purus est substantia simplex, materiam excedens, nulli corpori naturaliter unita, ac proinde per se faciens completam naturam. Vid. Valentia (tom. 1. disp. 4. q. 1. punct. 2.) 763. The name spirit is equivocal and has diverse acceptations. For it is taken 1. for a very fine and very subtle thing, whether it is an accident or a substance. Thus species, or images, which are sent from objects to the senses, are called spiritual or intentional. Thus the very fine and purer parts of the blood, through which the power of vegetating and sensing flows into the rest, are called spirits. - 2. It is taken for wind, air, and a purer exhalation; hence to breathe and to respire are the same as to draw air; and wind rushing in with too great an

impulse is called the Spirit of storms, Psalm 148:8. - 3. For an incorporeal substance, not in any way whatever, but as it is opposed to a thick body consisting of flesh and bones, as that saying of Christ in Luke 24:39: "Handle and see, because a spirit does not have flesh and bones." - 4. For a being concreted with no matter, however subtle, exceeding matter and independent from it, or for a simple being, exceeding body and matter, and living with intellective life; such is the human soul. - 5. But if some being not only excludes from itself all matter and dependence upon matter, but also every natural order and conjunction to a body as to a subject which it perfects and with which it makes one complete substance, then there is had a spirit which is called pure. Therefore a pure spirit is a simple substance, exceeding matter, naturally united to no body, and accordingly making by itself a complete nature. See Valentia, volume 1, disputation 4, question 1, point 2.

764. Diximus autem spiritum purum nulli corpori esse naturaliter unitum, etc.; quia licet spiritus purus non habeat corpus proprium, cum quo faciat unam naturam completam; potest tamen corpus assumere. Nam a) Scriptura saepe commemorat Angelos (qui, ut videbimus, sunt puri spiritus) apparuisse, ut viderentur a pluribus. "Quidam dixerunt," inquit D. Thomas 1. p. q. 51. a. 2. c. "Angelos nunquam corpora assumere, sed omnia quae in Scripturis divinis leguntur de apparitionibus Angelorum, contigisse in visione prophetiae, hoc est, secundum imaginationem. Sed hoc repugnat intentioni Scripturae. Illud enim quod imaginaria visione videtur, est in sola imaginatione videntis. Unde non videtur indifferenter ab omnibus. Scriptura autem divina sic introducit interdum Angelos apparentes, ut communiter ab omnibus viderentur; sicut Angeli apparentes Abrahae visi sunt ab eo, et tota familia ejus, et a Loth, et a civibus Sodomorum; similiter Angelus qui apparuit Tobiae, ab omnibus videbatur. Ex quo manifestum fit hujusmodi contigisse secundum corpoream visionem, qua videtur id quod positum est extra videntem, unde ab omnibus videri potest. Tali autem visione non videtur nisi corpus." - b) Unde S. Augustinus (de civ. Dei l. 15. c. 23.) scribit: "Apparuisse hominibus Angelos in talibus corporibus, quae non solum videri, verum etiam tangi possent, verissima Scriptura testatur." 764. But we said that a pure spirit is naturally united to no body, etc., because although a pure spirit does not have a proper body with which it makes one complete nature, nevertheless it can assume a body. For a) Scripture often commemorates Angels, who, as we shall see, are pure spirits, as having appeared so that they were seen by many. "Some have said," says St. Thomas, I, question 51, article 2, corpus, "that Angels never assume bodies, but that all things which are read in the divine Scriptures concerning the apparitions of Angels happened in prophetic vision, that is, according to imagination. But this is repugnant to the intention of Scripture. For that which is seen by imaginary vision is in the imagination alone of the one seeing. Hence it is not seen indifferently by all. But divine Scripture sometimes introduces Angels appearing in such a way that they were seen commonly by all; as the Angels appearing to Abraham were seen by him and by his whole family, and by Lot and by the citizens of Sodom; similarly the Angel who appeared to Tobias was seen by all. From this it becomes manifest that things of this sort happened according to bodily vision, by which that which is placed outside the one seeing is seen, whence it can be seen by all. But by such vision nothing is seen except a body." - b) Hence St. Augustine, The City of God, book 15, chapter 23, writes: "Most true Scripture testifies that Angels appeared to men in such bodies as could not only be seen, but also touched."

765. Porro Angelus dicitur corpus assumere hoc ipso quod unitur corpori tamquam motor mobili, in quo et repraesentetur ipse aliquo modo, et etiam moveatur per accidens secundum illius motum. Vid. etiam D. Thomam l. c. a. 2. et 3. 765. Moreover, an Angel is said to assume a body by this very fact that he is united to a body as mover to movable, in which he both is represented in some way, and is also moved accidentally according to its motion. See also St. Thomas, same place, articles 2 and 3.

766. His positis, sciendum est quod etsi unanimi consensu in Ecclesia semper tributa fuerit Angelis natura vere spiritualis; non defuerunt tamen inter antiquos Patres, qui negarent Angelos esse puros spiritus, seu omnino incorporeos; illos enim corporibus non crassis, sed subtilissimis naturaliter uniri censebant. - Putandum tamen non est omnes Patres, qui pro hac sententia citantur, pro ea vere stetisse. Nam a) multi loquuntur de corporibus non propriis, sed assumptis et adscititiis, quae interdum induerunt Angeli, cum hominibus apparuerunt. - b) Nonnulli Angelos corporeos dixerunt, non quod eos materiali corpore praeditos arbitrarentur, sed quod hypostases veras germanasque esse propugnarent; corpus quippe veteribus Patribus idem erat ac substantia, quo in sensu Tertullianus Deum ipsum corporeum dixerat, ut notat S. Augustinus. - c) Alii Angelos corporeos dixerunt, non absolute, sed comparate ad Deum, qui solus ita incorporeus est, ut sit infinitus, incircumscriptus et omnis compositionis expers: hoc in sensu interdum locuti sunt S. Basilius, S. Gregorius Naz., Cassianus, Gregorius M., etc. - d) Nonnulli denique negantes Angelos esse omnino incorporeos addebant, ut Origenes ipse (de Angelis l. 1. c. 2.) "tametsi id ex nullius auctoritate Scripturae constet." 766. These things having been posited, it must be known that although by unanimous consensus in the Church a truly spiritual nature has always been attributed to Angels, nevertheless there were not lacking among the ancient Fathers some who denied that Angels are pure spirits, or altogether incorporeal; for they thought that they were naturally united to bodies, not thick ones, but very subtle ones. - Yet it must not be thought that all the Fathers who are cited for this opinion truly stood for it. For a) many speak of bodies not proper, but assumed and adscititious, which Angels sometimes put on when they appeared to men. - b) Some said that Angels were corporeal, not because they thought them endowed with a material body, but because they defended that they were true and genuine hypostases; for among the older Fathers body was the same as substance, in which sense Tertullian had called God himself corporeal, as St. Augustine notes. - c) Others said that Angels were corporeal, not absolutely, but comparatively to God, who alone is incorporeal in such a way that he is infinite, uncircumscribed, and free from every composition. In this sense St. Basil, St. Gregory Nazianzen, Cassian, Gregory the Great, etc., sometimes spoke. - d) Finally, some denying that Angels are altogether incorporeal added, as Origen himself did, On Angels, book 1, chapter 2, "although this is established from the authority of no Scripture."

767. Saeculo adhuc XII., teste S. Bernardo (serm. 5. in Cant.) res non erat extra dubitationis aleam. Attamen post Conc. Later. IV. doctrina de natura pure spirituali Angelorum est omnino tenenda. Si quis autem quaerat quam certa sit; respondetur juxta commune Theologorum judicium: 1. non esse de fide; non enim id ex instituto definitur a Concilio, sed obiter dicitur, ut illud quod ex professo definiendum fuit assereretur, nempe, res omnes initio temporis fuisse a Deo creatas. Id autem solum in Conciliis tamquam ex fide certum asseritur, quod ex instituto in illis definitur. - 2. Esse tamen ita certum, ut contrarium asserere sit erroneum et temerarium: est enim contra communem Theologorum sententiam - quae est communi Ecclesiae sensu recepta. 767. Even in the twelfth century, according to St. Bernard, sermon 5 on the Canticle, the matter was not outside the hazard of doubt. Nevertheless after Lateran IV, the doctrine concerning the purely spiritual nature of Angels must be held altogether. But if someone asks how certain it is, the answer is given according to the common judgment of Theologians: 1. that it is not of faith; for this is not defined by the Council from its purpose, but is said incidentally, so that what had to be defined expressly might be asserted, namely that all things were created by God at the beginning of time. But only that is asserted in Councils as certain from faith which is defined in them from their purpose. - 2. Yet it is so certain that to assert the contrary is erroneous and rash; for it is against the common opinion of Theologians, which has been received by the common sense of the Church.

768. His itaque praestitutis, dicimus:

PROP. LIII. Angeli sunt puri spiritus, cujusvis omnino corporis

expertes.

Prob. I. Veram notionem Angelicae naturae debemus ex revelatione colligere; integrum enim erat Deo praeter humanos spiritus, alios creare, qui essent ab omni corpore soluti. Atqui ex revelatione nullo pacto colligitur ullum corpus proprium esse Angelis tribuendum. Ergo. Hoc est argumentum, quod vocant negativum.

Decl. et prob. min. Quoad Patres nulla potest esse quaestio post ea quae diximus. Scriptura vero, semper nomen et proprietates spiritus Angelis tribuit: at numquam significat eos habere corpus sibi naturaliter unitum, quemadmodum mentio fit de corpore hominis, in quo est et spiritus. Numquam, uti animadvertit S. Augustinus (Retr. l. 1. c. 11.) memorantur in Scripturis animae Angelorum; spiritus autem naturaliter corpori unitus, est anima, nam vivificat illud. Licet anima rationalis appelletur spiritus; vocatur tamen simul spiritus hominis, spiritus noster, spiritus qui in homine est Rom. 8. 16.; 1. Cor. 2. 11.: cum Angeli appellentur simpliciter spiritus, nulla habitudine significata ad aliud, cujus sit pars.

Prob. II. In Scripturis saepe appellantur Angeli simpliciter spiritus. Ps. 103. 4.: "Qui facis Angelos tuos spiritus." Hebr. 1. 14.: "Nonne omnes sunt administratorii spiritus?" - Apoc. 1. 4.: "Et a septem spiritibus, qui in conspectu throni ejus sunt." - Matth. 8. 16.: "Ejiciebat spiritus," etc. Atqui haec appellatio 1. per se; 2. ex usu Scripturae excludit quodvis corpus proprium. Ergo.

Prob. min. quoad 1um. Haec appellatio Angelorum essentiam indicat; atqui essentia resultans ex spiritu et corpore nequit appellari simpliciter spiritus: quemadmodum homo nequit vocari simpliciter spiritus. Ergo.

Prob. min. quoad 2um. Nomen spiritus cum tribuitur rei intelligenti, cujusmodi est Angelus, significare solet in eadem Scriptura rem incorpoream. - Nam a) Christus Samaritanae interroganti de loco corporeo in quo Deus adorari posset, respondet in omni loco adorari posse, modo id recte fiat, quoniam spiritus, inquit, est Deus, etc., quasi dicat, nihil interesse in quo loco corporeo adoretur, cum ipse non sit corpus, sed spiritus ubique praesens. - b) Eph. 6. Paulus de malis Angelis loquens ita illos nominat spiritus, ut plane videatur spiritualem eorum naturam distinguere contra corpus. Dicit enim "non esse nobis colluctationem adversus carnem et sanguinem, sed adversus spiritualia nequitiae in coelestibus, etc." - c) Angeli in Scripturis ita dicuntur spiritus, ut opponantur hominibus, qui spiritu et corpore constant. Ita Luc. 11. 24-26. dicitur; "Cum immundus spiritus exierit de homine, ambulat per loca inaquosa, quaerens requiem: et non inveniens dicit: Revertar in domum meam unde exivi. Et cum venerit, invenit eam scopis mundatam et ornatam. Tunc vadit, et assumit septem alios spiritus secum, nequiores se, et ingressi habitant ibi. Et fiunt novissima hominis illius pejora prioribus." - Et 10, 19. 20.: "Ecce dedi vobis potestatem calcandi supra serpentes, et scorpiones, et super omnem virtutem inimici: et nihil vobis nocebit. Verumtamen in hoc nolite gaudere, quia spiritus vobis subjiciuntur: gaudete autem, quod nomina vestra scripta sunt in coelis."

Prob. III. Testimonia Patrum videri possunt apud Petavium. - Subjicimus rationem congruentiae, quam tradit D. Thomas 1. p. q. 51. a. 1. Quod aliqua creatura intellectualis uniatur tamquam forma corpori naturaliter, per accidens convenit illi; quia nimirum est imperfecta in genere intellectualium, et eget acquisitione specierum ministerio phantasmatum, et sensus corporei. Sed in omni genere, in quo est aliquid imperfectum, debet etiam esse aliquid perfectum. Ergo in genere intellectualium, oportet etiam esse aliquas creaturas intellectuales omnino completas in sua specie, quae non egeant tali ministerio sensuum, ac proinde nec corpore. Huc accedit quod si tales creaturae intellectuales sint; erunt aliqui Dei effectus, qui inter caeteros perfectius assimilentur Deo, ut est ipse intellectualis, et per intellectum agens. Sicut D. Thomas etiam quaestione praecedenti, artic. 1. ratiocinatur. 768. These things having been set down beforehand, we say:

PROPOSITION LIII. Angels are pure spirits, altogether lacking any body whatever.

Proof I. We must gather the true notion of angelic nature from revelation; for it was open to God, besides human spirits, to create others who were free from every body. But from revelation it is in no way gathered that any proper body must be attributed to Angels. Therefore. This is the argument which they call negative.

Declaration and proof of the minor. As to the Fathers, there can be no question after those things which we have said. But Scripture always attributes the name and properties of spirit to Angels, yet never signifies that they have a body naturally united to them, in the way mention is made of the body of man, in whom there is also spirit. As St. Augustine observes, Retractations, book 1, chapter 11, the souls of Angels are never mentioned in the Scriptures; but

a spirit naturally united to a body is a soul, for it vivifies that body. Although the rational soul is called spirit, nevertheless it is at the same time called the spirit of man, our spirit, the spirit which is in man, Romans 8:16; 1 Corinthians 2:11; while Angels are called simply spirits, with no relation signified to another thing of which it is a part.

Proof II. In the Scriptures Angels are often called simply spirits. Psalm 103:4: "Who makes your Angels spirits." Hebrews 1:14: "Are they not all ministering spirits?" - Apocalypse 1:4: "And from the seven spirits who are in the sight of his throne." - Matthew 8:16: "He cast out spirits," etc. But this appellation excludes any proper body, both 1. of itself and 2. from the usage of Scripture. Therefore.

Proof of the minor with regard to the first. This appellation indicates the essence of Angels; but an essence resulting from spirit and body cannot be called simply spirit, just as man cannot be called simply spirit. Therefore.

Proof of the minor with regard to the second. The name spirit, when it is attributed to an intelligent thing such as an Angel is, is accustomed in the same Scripture to signify an incorporeal thing. - For a) Christ, when the Samaritan woman asked about the bodily place in which God could be adored, answers that he can be adored in every place, provided that this is rightly done, because, he says, God is spirit, etc., as if to say that it makes no difference in what bodily place he is adored, since he is not a body, but a spirit present everywhere. - b) In Ephesians 6, Paul, speaking of evil Angels, names them spirits in such a way that he plainly seems to distinguish their spiritual nature against body. For he says that "we do not have wrestling against flesh and blood, but against spiritual things of wickedness in the heavens, etc." - c) Angels are called spirits in the Scriptures in such a way that they are opposed to men, who consist of spirit and body. Thus in Luke 11:24-26 it is said: "When an unclean spirit has gone out from a man, he walks through waterless places, seeking rest; and not finding it he says: I will return to my house whence I came out. And when he has come, he finds it swept clean and adorned. Then he goes and takes with him seven other spirits worse than himself, and entering they dwell there. And the last things of that man become worse than the first." - And 10:19-20: "Behold, I have given you power to tread upon serpents and scorpions, and over every power of the enemy; and nothing shall harm you. Nevertheless do not rejoice in this, that spirits are subject to you; but rejoice that your names are written in heaven."

Proof III. The testimonies of the Fathers can be seen in Petavius. - We add the reason of congruence which St. Thomas hands down, I, question 51, article 1. That some intellectual creature is naturally united to a body as form belongs to it by accident, because, namely, it is imperfect in the genus of intellectual things and needs the acquisition of species by the ministry of phantasms and bodily sense. But in every genus in which there is something imperfect, there must also be something perfect. Therefore in the genus of intellectual things there must also be some intellectual creatures altogether complete in their species, which do not need such ministry of the senses, and therefore not a body either. To this is added that if there are such intellectual creatures, they will be some effects of God which among the rest are more perfectly assimilated to God, as he himself is intellectual and acting through intellect. Thus St. Thomas reasons also in the preceding question, article 1.

769. Dices I. Legitur Gen. 6. 2.: "Videntes Filii Dei filias hominum, quod essent pulchrae, acceperunt sibi uxores;" et ex his gigantes progenuerunt; id vero sine corpore fieri non potuit; et nomine filiorum Dei juxta aliquos Patres veniunt Angeli.

Resp. 1. Argumentum istud nimis probat; ex eo enim sequeretur Angelos habere corpus humanum et crassum, quod certo nullus Patrum, neque adversarii ipsi admittunt. - 2. Respondetur cum D. Chrysostomo homil. 22. in Genes. et Athanasio quaest. 98. ad Antiochum, et August. libr. 15. de civit. Dei, cap. 22. et 23. et cum aliis Patribus communiter, per filios Dei non debere intelligi eo loco Angelos, sed homines, puta filios Seth, qui filii Dei vocabantur, propterea quod Deum singulari studio colebant; cum contra, alii homines terrenis rebus perperam addicti essent, qui propterea filii, vel filiae hominum dicebantur. 769. You will say I. Genesis 6:2 reads: "The sons of God, seeing that the daughters of men were beautiful, took wives for themselves"; and from these they begot giants; but this could not happen without a body; and by the name sons of God, according to some Fathers, Angels are

meant.

I answer 1. That argument proves too much; for from it would follow that Angels have a human and thick body, which certainly none of the Fathers, nor even the adversaries themselves, admit. - 2. The answer is given with St. Chrysostom, homily 22 on Genesis, and Athanasius, question 98 to Antiochus, and Augustine, book 15 of The City of God, chapters 22 and 23, and commonly with other Fathers, that by sons of God in that place Angels must not be understood, but men, namely the sons of Seth, who were called sons of God because they cultivated God with singular zeal; while on the contrary other men were wrongly addicted to earthly things, and for that reason were called sons or daughters of men.

770. Dices II. In Conc. Nicaeno II. lectus est dialogus Joannis Episcopi Thessalonicensis cum Gentili disputantis, quo in dialogo inter alia haec habet: "De Angelis et Archangelis catholica Ecclesia sic sentit, esse quidem intelligibiles, sed non omnino corporis expertes et invisibiles." Quibus lectis Tarasius Patriarcha CPtanus et Concilii Praeses sic locutus est: "Ostendit Pater (Joannes) etiam Angelos oportere pingi, quoniam circumscripti sunt et hominum specie multis apparuerunt." Responditque statim universa Synodus: "Etiam Domine!" qua acclamatione doctrinam Joannis de Angelorum corporeitate approbavit.

Resp. Concilium non approbavit sententiam Joannis, qua Angelos corporeos asseruit, sed solum conclusionem, qua intulit, Angelos merito pingi posse. Id patet a) ex scopo Concilii, quod convenerat ad usum sacrarum imaginum contra Iconomachos vindicandum: est autem consuetudo conciliorum, ea tantum, quae ad materiam spectant, de qua controversia agitur, de fide definiendi, non autem ea, quae incidenter dicuntur et materiam controversam directe non afficiunt. - b) Praeterea Concilium id tantum approbavit, quod ex dialogo Joannis excerpsit et proposuit Tarasius: hic vero prudenter praetermisso errore de Angelorum corporeitate (de qua tunc non erat quaestio), proposuit tantum Angelos posse depingi juxta sententiam Joannis, eo quod in specie humana apparuerunt: "Ostendit," inquit, "Pater etiam Angelos oportere pingi, quoniam circumscripti sunt et hominum specie multis apparuerunt." Quibus auditis statim subjecit Synodus: "Etiam Domine." Approbatio ergo Concilii cadit tantum in istud, nempe Angelos posse depingi quia sunt circumscripti. - c) Denique Concilium (Act. 4.) refert et approbat sententiam S. Athanasii asserentis, Angelos esse incorporeos, et in professione fidei dicit: "Veneramur imagines Sanctorum et incorporeorum Angelorum," etc., quibus verbis satis clare sententiam Joannis rejicit.

Reliquae objectiones fere omnes praeoccupatae sunt: caeterum legi possunt apud Perrone. 770. You will say II. In the Second Council of Nicaea there was read the dialogue of John, Bishop of Thessalonica, disputing with a Gentile, in which dialogue, among other things, he has this: "Concerning Angels and Archangels the Catholic Church thinks thus, that they are indeed intelligible, but not altogether lacking body and invisible." When these words had been read, Tarasius, Patriarch of Constantinople and President of the Council, spoke thus: "The Father, John, has shown that Angels also ought to be painted, because they are circumscribed and have appeared to many in the form of men." And the whole Synod immediately answered: "Yes, Lord!" By this acclamation it approved the doctrine of John concerning the corporeity of Angels.

I answer. The Council did not approve the opinion of John by which he asserted that Angels are corporeal, but only the conclusion by which he inferred that Angels can rightly be painted. This is clear a) from the purpose of the Council, which had assembled to vindicate the use of sacred images against the Iconomachi. But it is the custom of councils to define from faith only those things which pertain to the matter concerning which the controversy is being conducted, not those things which are said incidentally and do not directly affect the controversial matter. - b) Furthermore, the Council approved only that which Tarasius extracted from the dialogue of John and proposed; but he, prudently passing over the error concerning the corporeity of Angels, about which there was then no question, proposed only that Angels can be painted according to the opinion of John, because they appeared in human form: "The Father," he says, "has also shown that Angels ought to be painted, because they are circumscribed and have appeared to many in the form of men." When these words had been heard, the Synod immediately added: "Yes, Lord." Therefore the approval of the Council

falls only on this, namely that Angels can be painted because they are circumscribed. - c) Finally, the Council, act 4, reports and approves the opinion of St. Athanasius asserting that Angels are incorporeal, and in the profession of faith says: "We venerate the images of the Saints and of the incorporeal Angels," etc.; by these words it rejects the opinion of John clearly enough.

Nearly all the remaining objections have been anticipated; moreover they can be read in Perrone.

Article 3. On Angelic Cognition in General

LatineEnglish

Articulus Tertius
De cognitione angelica generatim Third Article

771. Multa a Theologis disputari solent de cognitione angelorum, scitu quidem utilia et jucunda; sed quae necessaria omnino sunt, revocantur praesertim ad duas quaestiones, utrum nempe Angeli cognoscant secreta cordium - utrum cognoscant futura libera. Ut autem haec intelligantur, quaedam de cognitione angelica generatim praesupponuntur, quae prae angustia temporis nos non tam disputando, quam exponendo breviter attingimus. 771. Many things are customarily disputed by theologians concerning the cognition of the angels, things indeed useful and pleasant to know; but those things which are altogether necessary are reduced especially to two questions, namely whether the angels know the secrets of hearts, and whether they know future free things. But in order that these things may be understood, certain matters concerning angelic cognition in general are presupposed; these, because of the narrowness of time, we touch upon briefly, not so much by disputing as by setting them forth.

§ I. De Intellectu Angelorum § I. On the Intellect of the Angels

772. Angelos esse substantias spirituales et intellectivas, ex iis quae diximus in duobus articulis praecedentibus abunde patet; ac consequenter in ipsis esse tum principalem tum proximam intelligendi facultatem nulla amplius demonstratione indiget. De natura igitur hujus facultatis. 772. That angels are spiritual and intellective substances is abundantly clear from what we said in the two preceding articles; and consequently that in them there is both the principal and the proximate faculty of understanding needs no further demonstration. Therefore, concerning the nature of this faculty:

773. Quaeritur 1. utrum intellectus Angeli sit idem quod ejus substantia? Qua in re notamus a) hanc quaestionem fieri posse de possibilitate, et de facto: quaeri nempe potest utrum in aliqua creatura, et hinc in Angelo, intellectus possit esse idem quod ejus substantia - et utrum de facto sit idem. - Notamus b) cum de ratione potentiae intellectivae, et cujuscumque alterius operativae facultatis sit, esse immediatum principium operationis; idem esse, quaerere, utrum Angeli substantia, vel alicujus creaturae, sit, aut esse possit re idem quod potentia, intellectiva vel operativa; et quaerere, an sit vel esse possit immediatum principium intellectionis vel alterius operationis. 773. It is asked, first, whether the intellect of an angel is the same as his substance. In this matter we note a) that this question can be raised with respect to possibility and with respect to fact: namely, it can be asked whether in some creature, and hence in an angel, the intellect can be the same as his substance, and whether in fact it is the same. - We note b) that, since it belongs to the nature of an intellective potency, and of any other operative faculty, to be the immediate principle of operation, it is the same thing to ask whether the substance of an angel, or of some creature, is, or can be really the same as an intellective or operative potency, and to ask whether it is, or can be, the immediate principle of intellection or of another operation.

774. Unde quoad quaestionem de facto, dicimus: praeter substantiam datur in Angelis intellectus, qui est potentia a substantia distincta. Est communissima DD. sententia. - Est etiam magis consentanea sententiae Patrum qui passim indicant se intelligere, potentias ejusmodi distingui a creaturae substantia. Ut Dion. cap. 11. cael. hierar. cum distinguit in Angelis essentiam et operationem et virtutem. Et D. Augustinus lib. 15. de Trinit. cap. 7. qui dicit, "Mentem non esse animam, sed id quod excellit in illa." Et D. Anselmus libr. de concordia praescientiae et liberi arbitrii, capite ultimo, ubi sic ait: "Est ratio in anima, qua sicut suo instrumento utitur ad ratiocinandum; et voluntas, qua utitur ad volendum." 774. Hence, with respect to the question of fact, we say: besides substance there is in angels an intellect, which is a potency distinct from substance. This is the very common opinion of the Doctors. - It is also more consonant with the opinion of the Fathers, who everywhere indicate that they understand powers of this kind to be distinguished from the substance of the creature. Thus Dionysius, chapter 11 of the Celestial Hierarchy, when he distinguishes in the angels essence and operation and power. And St. Augustine, book 15 On the Trinity, chapter 7, who says that "the mind is not the soul, but that which excels in it." And St. Anselm, in the book On the Concord of Foreknowledge and Free Will, in the last chapter, where he speaks thus: "There is reason in the soul, which it uses as its instrument for reasoning; and the will, which it uses for willing."

775. Quoad quaestionem vero de possibilitate, distinguendum est inter potentiam Dei absolutam et ordinariam. Disputant Theologi et Philosophi utrum de potentia Dei absoluta dari possit aliqua creatura, in qua potentia sit ejus substantia. Sed communissime hoc negant de potentia Dei ordinaria. Quod hic probare sufficit argumento Suarez (de Angelis l. 2. c. 1. n. 2.), qui recitatis auctoritatibus Patrum et Theologorum pro quaestione de facto, ait: "Unde mihi semper persuasum habui, necessitatem hujus potentiae a substantia distinctae oriri ex limitatione substantiae creatae, et ideo in omni spiritu creato, quantumcumque perfecto, illam distinctionem ponimus. Atque hinc merito Cajetanus id extendit ad omnem etiam spiritum creabilem, quia si creabilis esset Angelus, qui connaturali modo intelligere posset sine intellectu distincto a sua substantia, nulla probabili ratione divinare possemus, talem Angelum non esse factum, imo credibilius esset vel omnes, vel plures Angelos creatos hujusmodi esse."

785. Quaer. 2. Utrum intellectio, seu actus intelligendi in Angelo sit idem quod ejus substantia? - Negativa est communis Theologorum sententia. Etenim operationes Angeli partim sunt naturales, partim supernaturales. Sed nec supernaturales, nec naturales sunt idem quod substantia Angeli: Ergo nullae omnino.

Prob. min. de supernaturalibus; nam si illae essent Angeli substantia, hoc ipso essent naturales Angelo quoad suam entitatem, et non supernaturales. Atque idipsum patet ex Conc. Viennensi (n. 374.), ubi definitur operationem beatificam nulli creaturae esse naturalem.

Prob. min. de naturalibus. Nam imprimis quod ad malas operationes malorum Angelorum attinet; certum est, non esse idem quod illorum substantiam. Tunc enim eorum substantia quoad entitatem suam ut esset quidem operatio esset mala, quod est contra sacras literas. Genesis 1. "Vidit Deus cuncta quae fecerat, et erant valde bona." De aliis autem naturalibus operationibus eadem ratio est, cum eodem modo se habeat Angelus in operando, seu bene, seu male operetur, quod attinet quidem ad entitatem ipsius operationis.

Haec late etiam prosequitur S. Augustinus (de civ. Dei. l. 11. c. 10.), ubi inter caetera scribit: "sicut vas aliquem liquorem habet aut corpus colorem, aut aer lucem, sive fervorem, aut anima sapientiam. Nihil enim horum est id, quod habet; nam neque vas liquor est, nec corpus color, nec aer lux, sive fervor, neque anima sapientia est." Ex quo infert, quod omnia praefata privari possunt eo, quod habent, et in alios habitus, et qualitates verti, atque mutari; "ut vas evacuetur humore, quo plenum est, et corpus decoloretur, et aer tenebretur, et anima desipiat." Vid. 1. p. q. 54; et Suarez (de Angelis l. 2. c. 1.). 775. But with respect to the question of possibility, a distinction must be made between the absolute and the ordinary power of God. Theologians and philosophers dispute whether, by the absolute power of God, there could be some creature in which potency is its substance. But

very commonly they deny this with respect to the ordinary power of God. Here it is sufficient to prove this by the argument of Suarez (On Angels, book 2, chapter 1, n. 2), who, after citing the authorities of the Fathers and theologians for the question of fact, says: "Hence I have always been persuaded that the necessity of this potency distinct from substance arises from the limitation of created substance, and therefore in every created spirit, however perfect, we posit that distinction. And hence Cajetan rightly extends this even to every creatable spirit, because if an angel were creatable who, in a connatural mode, could understand without an intellect distinct from his substance, we could by no probable reason divine that such an angel was not made; indeed, it would be more credible that either all angels, or many created angels, are of this kind."

785. Question 2. Whether intellection, or the act of understanding, in an angel is the same as his substance. - The negative is the common opinion of the theologians. For the operations of an angel are partly natural, partly supernatural. But neither the supernatural nor the natural operations are the same as the substance of the angel. Therefore none at all are.

The minor is proved concerning supernatural operations; for if they were the substance of the angel, by that very fact they would be natural to the angel with respect to their entity, and not supernatural. And the same thing is clear from the Council of Vienne (n. 374), where it is defined that the beatific operation is natural to no creature.

The minor is proved concerning natural operations. For first, as regards the evil operations of evil angels, it is certain that they are not the same as their substance. For then their substance, as regards its entity, precisely insofar as it was an operation, would be evil, which is contrary to Sacred Scripture. Genesis 1: "God saw all the things that he had made, and they were very good." But concerning other natural operations the same reason holds, since the angel has himself in the same way in operating, whether he operates well or badly, as regards the entity of the operation itself.

St. Augustine also pursues these matters at length (City of God, book 11, chapter 10), where among other things he writes: "as a vessel has some liquid, or a body color, or air light or heat, or a soul wisdom. For none of these things is that which it has; for neither is the vessel the liquid, nor the body color, nor the air light or heat, nor is the soul wisdom." From this he infers that all the aforesaid things can be deprived of that which they have, and be turned and changed into other habits and qualities; "as a vessel is emptied of the liquid with which it is full, and a body is discolored, and the air is darkened, and the soul becomes foolish." See I, q. 54; and Suarez (On Angels, book 2, chapter 1).

§ II. De medio cognitionis Angelorum § II. On the Medium of the Cognition of the Angels

776. Quaeritur 1. utrum Angeli indigeant specie intelligibili ut actu intelligant? - Supponimus a) aliquam speciem intelligibilem, quaecumque demum ea sit, certo in Angelo requiri. Angelus enim, ex dictis, non est suum intelligere, ideoque est in potentia ad intelligendum; ergo ad hoc debet determinari; atqui determinatio haec fit per speciem intelligibilem; ergo. Vid. (n. 349.) - b) Unde verus sensus propositae quaestionis est, utrum Angelus indigeat specie intelligibili proprie dicta, vel intelligat per suam essentiam, quae speciei intelligibilis munere fungitur. c) Si agatur de cognitione, qua Angelus cognoscit seipsum, concedit D. Thomas, et multi cum illo (Valentia tom. 1. disp. 4. q. 6. p. 1.) Angelum seipsum cognoscere per suam essentiam. Quaeritur itaque, utrum Angeli indigeant speciebus intelligibilibus superadditis ad intelligendum objecta distincta a sua substantia? 776. It is asked, first, whether angels need an intelligible species in order actually to understand. - We suppose a) that some intelligible species, whatever at last it may be, is certainly required in an angel. For an angel, from what has been said, is not his own act of understanding, and therefore is in potency to understanding; therefore he must be determined to this; but this determination is made through an intelligible species; therefore. See n. 349. - b) Hence the true sense of the proposed question is whether an angel needs an intelligible species properly so called, or whether he understands through his own essence, which performs the office of an intelligible species. c) If the matter

concerns the cognition by which an angel knows himself, St. Thomas, and many with him, concede that an angel knows himself through his own essence (Valentia, tome 1, disputation 4, question 6, point 1). Thus it is asked whether angels need superadded intelligible species for understanding objects distinct from their substance.

777. Responsio communissima est affirmativa. Etenim nulla forma potest complere potentiam alicujus subjecti, nisi contineat ea, ad quae se extendit tale subjectum; sed essentia Angeli non continet omnia, ad quae se extendit intellectus Angeli; ergo per ipsam non potest omnia intelligere, ac proinde indiget Angelus speciebus superadditis. Prob. min. Intellectus Angeli est in potentia ad intelligendum totum ens, et omnia entia distincte; et ejus essentia, cum sit certae speciei et generis, non continet entitatem omnem. Ergo.

Quod argumentum ita potest declarari et confirmari ex Valentia (tom. 1. disp. 4. q. 6. p. 1.): Causa cur essentia divina Deo ipsi et beatis sit vice specierum intelligibilium, non habet locum in essentia Angeli; neque aliunde suppetit idonea ratio cur putemus Angelo esse vice specierum omnium suam ipsius essentiam. Ergo minime id est putandum. Antecedens probatur, quoniam essentiae divinae id tribuimus ob infinitam illius perfectionem, quae idcirco longe melius quam ulla species, potest ipsa intelligibiliter res repraesentare, et concurrere ad illarum cognitionem. Neque vero aliunde ex perfectione Angeli quantumvis magna, licet intelligere, ipsum non indigere additis speciebus. Non enim quaevis magna perfectio sufficit ad quemvis effectum, nisi infinita sit: si autem sit finita, cujusmodi est perfectio Angeli, fieri potest, ut etsi magna sit, et ad aliquem praestantem effectum sufficiens, tamen non sit talis, ut sufficiat etiam ad quendam alium effectum licet minus perfectum. Ut perfectio, verbi gratia, leonis sufficit ad producendum leonem, neque ideo tamen sufficit ad producendum murem, qui est effectus imperfectior. 777. The most common response is affirmative. For no form can complete the potency of some subject unless it contains those things to which such a subject extends itself; but the essence of an angel does not contain all things to which the intellect of an angel extends itself; therefore through it he cannot understand all things, and consequently an angel needs superadded species. The minor is proved. The intellect of an angel is in potency to understanding all being, and all beings distinctly; and his essence, since it is of a determinate species and genus, does not contain every entity. Therefore.

That argument can be explained and confirmed in this way from Valentia (tome 1, disputation 4, question 6, point 1): the reason why the divine essence is in place of intelligible species for God himself and for the blessed has no place in the essence of an angel; nor from another source does a suitable reason present itself why we should think that an angel's own essence is for him in place of all species. Therefore this is by no means to be thought. The antecedent is proved, since we attribute this to the divine essence on account of its infinite perfection, which therefore, far better than any species, can itself intelligibly represent things and concur in the cognition of them. Nor indeed from the perfection of an angel, however great, is it permitted from another source to understand that he does not need added species. For not just any great perfection suffices for any effect whatever, unless it is infinite; but if it is finite, of which kind is the perfection of an angel, it can happen that, although it is great and sufficient for some eminent effect, nevertheless it is not such that it suffices also for some other effect, even though less perfect. Thus the perfection, for example, of a lion suffices for producing a lion; yet on that account it does not suffice for producing a mouse, which is a more imperfect effect.

778. Quaeritur 2. utrum Angeli intelligant per species universales? - Notamus a) Cum speciei intelligibilis sit aliquo modo repraesentare objectum, species dicitur universalis quia multa repraesentat. Hoc autem dupliciter contingere potest. Vel quia repraesentat sub ratione communi tantum, quae est repraesentatio solum confusa singularium sub ea contentorum: vel quia ita repraesentat rationem communem, ut etiam clare, et distincte repraesentet inferiora sub ea contenta. Titulus ergo quaestionis intelligendus hoc ultimo modo. - b) Tenendum est cum communissima DD. sententia dari posse hujusmodi species universales. Quod sic suaderi potest. Divina essentia cum sit simplicissima, repraesentat distincte et expresse omnes res creabiles; ergo nihil vetat, quod aliqua species creata, prout est

participatio divinae essentiae, participet hanc eminentiam, quod una cum sit, repraesentet plures ac diversas entitates. Species intelligibiles in Angelis sunt immediate a Deo infusae, ut statim dicemus; ideoque sunt quaedam participationes exemplarium, seu idearum divinarum. Unde dicimus: 778. It is asked, secondly, whether angels understand through universal species. - We note a) Since it belongs to an intelligible species in some way to represent the object, a species is called universal because it represents many things. But this can occur in two ways. Either because it represents only under a common aspect, which is only a confused representation of the singulars contained under it; or because it so represents the common aspect that it also clearly and distinctly represents the inferiors contained under it. Therefore the title of the question is to be understood in this latter way. - b) It must be held, with the very common opinion of the Doctors, that species of this kind can exist. This can be argued thus. Since the divine essence is most simple, it distinctly and expressly represents all creatable things; therefore nothing prevents some created species, insofar as it is a participation of the divine essence, from participating in this eminence, namely that, though it is one, it represents several and diverse entities. Intelligible species in angels are infused immediately by God, as we shall presently say; and therefore they are certain participations of the exemplars, or divine ideas. Hence we say:

779. Angeli intelligunt per species universales. Prob. species hujusmodi universales sunt possibiles, et possunt esse connaturales, ut patet, alicui creaturae. Ergo de facto connaturales sunt Angelis.

Prob. consequentia a) Angeli sunt in supremo gradu substantiarum intellectualium, et in illo habent magnam intelligendi efficaciam, et virtutem; ergo verisimile est, habere vim intelligendi superiorem, et quae per unum principium plura valeat intelligere, quia virtus quo perfectior est, eo est simplicior, et magis unita.

b) Quod homines singula individua per singulas species cognoscant, provenit ex imperfectione, et ex modo acquirendi species per sensus; ergo cum Angeli sint superioris ordinis, et habeant altiorem modum obtinendi species, et possint facile universales species recipere, hoc est naturali eorum perfectioni ac excellentiae sui luminis magis consentaneum: nam quae in inferioribus divisa sunt, in superioribus inveniuntur unita. 779. Angels understand through universal species. The proof is that universal species of this kind are possible, and can be connatural, as is clear, to some creature. Therefore in fact they are connatural to angels.

The consequence is proved a) Angels are in the highest grade of intellectual substances, and in that grade they have great efficacy and power of understanding; therefore it is likely that they have a superior power of understanding, one which through a single principle can understand many things, because the more perfect a power is, the simpler and more united it is.

b) That men know individual things through individual species arises from imperfection and from the mode of acquiring species through the senses; therefore, since angels are of a higher order, and have a higher mode of obtaining species, and can easily receive universal species, this is more consonant with their natural perfection and with the excellence of their light: for the things which in lower beings are divided are found united in higher beings.

780. Ex quo plane sequitur superiores Angelos per universaliores species intelligere. Etenim Angeli quo sunt perfectiores in natura intellectuali, eo sunt similiores Deo in intelligendo; sed Deus hoc maxime, in intelligendo, excellit, quod per unicam scientiam suam cognoscit res omnes; ergo Angeli quo perfectiores erunt, eo magis unite intelligent, atque adeo per universaliores et pauciores species. 780. From this it plainly follows that higher angels understand through more universal species. For the more perfect angels are in intellectual nature, the more similar they are to God in understanding; but God excels most in understanding in this, that through his single knowledge he knows all things; therefore the more perfect the angels are, the more unitedly they will understand, and consequently through more universal and fewer species.

781. Quaeritur 3., utrum species fuerint Angelis cum natura a Deo infusae?

Sententia communior et verior Theologorum est, Angelos intelligere res per species naturaliter sibi ab initio suae conditionis inditas, non autem a se acquisitas. Probatur assertio a) Ex illo Ezechiel. 28. ubi in persona Regis Tyri dicitur Angelo qui cecidit: "Tu signaculum similitudinis, plenus sapientia et decore." Et infra: "Perfectus in viis tuis fuisti a die conditionis tuae." Non autem fuisset perfectus et plenus sapientia a die conditionis suae, si speciebus intelligibilibus initio caruisset, ac opus habuisset eas acquirere.

b) Ex S. Dionysio qui capite 7. de divin. nominib. affirmat, Angelos res cognoscere "propria," ut inquit, "ad Dei imaginem effictae mentis virtute atque natura," id est, speciebus naturaliter sibi inditis, neque cognitionem "ex ipsis rebus haurire." Item ex Augustino qui lib. 2. super Gen. ad liter. c. 8. propterea dicit res a Deo ita conditas esse, "ut prius fuerint conditae in ipsa cognitione Angelorum," nimirum secundum earum similitudines; atque species intelligibiles, deinde "in suo genere."

c) "Substantiae spirituales inferiores, inquit D. Thomas (1. p. q. 55. a. 2.), scilicet animae, habent esse affine corpori, in quantum sunt corporum formae; et ideo ex ipso modo essendi competit eis ut a corporibus et per corpora suam perfectionem intelligibilem consequantur; alioquin frustra corporibus unirentur. Substantiae vero superiores, id est, Angeli, sunt a corporibus totaliter absolutae, immaterialiter et in esse intelligibili subsistentes; et ideo suam perfectionem intelligibilem consequuntur per intelligibilem effluxum, quo a Deo species rerum cognitarum acceperunt simul cum intellectuali natura." - Vid. totam hanc quaest.; et Suarez (l. 2. cc. 3. 7. 8. 14. 15.). 781. It is asked, thirdly, whether species were infused by God into angels together with their nature.

The more common and truer opinion of the theologians is that angels understand things through species naturally implanted in them from the beginning of their condition, not species acquired by themselves. The assertion is proved a) From Ezekiel 28, where, in the person of the King of Tyre, it is said to the angel who fell: "You were the seal of likeness, full of wisdom and beauty." And below: "You were perfect in your ways from the day of your condition." But he would not have been perfect and full of wisdom from the day of his condition if at the beginning he had lacked intelligible species and had needed to acquire them.

b) From St. Dionysius, who in chapter 7 of The Divine Names affirms that angels know things "by the proper power and nature," as he says, "of a mind fashioned after the image of God," that is, by species naturally implanted in them, and that they do not "draw" cognition "from the things themselves." Likewise from Augustine, who in book 2 On Genesis according to the Letter, chapter 8, says for this reason that things were so created by God "that they were first created in the very cognition of the angels," namely according to their likenesses; and afterward the intelligible species were in their own genus.

c) "Lower spiritual substances," says St. Thomas (I, q. 55, a. 2), "namely souls, have being akin to a body, insofar as they are forms of bodies; and therefore from their very mode of being it belongs to them to obtain their intelligible perfection from bodies and through bodies; otherwise they would be united to bodies in vain. But higher substances, that is, angels, are totally free from bodies, subsisting immaterially and in intelligible being; and therefore they obtain their intelligible perfection through an intelligible outflow, by which they received from God the species of known things together with their intellectual nature." - See this whole question; and Suarez (book 2, chapters 3, 7, 8, 14, 15).

§ III. De modo et objecto cognitionis angelicae § III. On the Mode and Object of Angelic Cognition

782. Quoad modum cognitionis angelicae, quaeritur utrum Angelus cognoscat discurrendo. - Notamus a) in cognitione duplicem posse contingere discursum; unum secundum successionem tantum; alterum etiam secundum causalitatem. Prior dicit tantum successionem actuum absque illatione, ut quando intelligimus hoc, deinde hoc; seu, ut ait D. Thomas, "cum postquam intelligimus aliquid in actu, convertimus nos ad intelligendum aliud." Posterior non solum

successionem, sed etiam causalitatem inter actus importat, ita ut prior causet, et inferat posteriorem: "sicut cum per principia" cognita "pervenimus in cognitionem conclusionum." Priorem discursum de facto reperiri in Angelis exploratum est. Cum enim non unico actu, sicut Deus, intelligant omnia, consequens est, ut ad rerum cognitionem successione actuum indigeant. De posteriori ergo, qui proprie nomine discursus venit, procedit quaestio.

b) Ad verum autem, et proprium discursum duae necessario requiruntur conditiones: una, distinctio actuum, et quidem realis, si discursus sit formalis. Altera, quod sit illatio, et vera causalitas inter actus, ut prior realiter inferat, et causet posteriorem; seu ut unum prius cognitum (prioritate sive durationis, sive naturae) pariat, et inferat cognitionem posterioris. Quare ad verum et formalem discursum non sufficit, ut unum ex parte objecti sit ratio cognoscendi aliud: essentia enim divina, tam Deo, quam Beatis est ratio cognoscendi omnia; et tamen in Deo nullus est discursus, nec Beati in visione beata discurrunt. Requirit igitur discursus duos actus ex parte subjecti, quorum uno cognoscatur causa, altero vero ex priori illato, quo ex causa cognita procedatur ad cognitionem effectus.

c) Propterea valde differunt haec tria, nempe "videre aliquid in alio - videre post alium - et videre ex alio." Deus enim omnia videt in seipso, non tamen post aliud visum, aut ex alio viso. Angeli vident unum post aliud, non tamen unum ex alio, ut dicemus. Homines vero vident unum post aliud, et insuper vident unum ex alio. 782. As regards the mode of angelic cognition, it is asked whether an angel knows by discursive reasoning. - We note a) that in cognition a twofold discourse can occur: one according to succession only; the other also according to causality. The former means only a succession of acts without inference, as when we understand this and then this; or, as St. Thomas says, "when, after we understand something in act, we turn ourselves to understanding something else." The latter implies not only succession, but also causality between acts, so that the prior act causes and infers the posterior: "as when through known principles we arrive at the cognition of conclusions." It is well established that the former discourse is in fact found in angels. For since they do not understand all things by one single act, as God does, it follows that for cognition of things they need a succession of acts. Therefore the question concerns the latter discourse, which properly comes under the name of discourse.

b) But for true and proper discourse two conditions are necessarily required: one, a distinction of acts, and indeed a real distinction, if the discourse is formal. The other, that there be inference and true causality between the acts, so that the prior act really infers and causes the posterior; or that one thing previously known, by priority either of duration or of nature, produce and infer the cognition of the posterior. Hence for true and formal discourse it is not sufficient that one thing, on the part of the object, be the reason for knowing another: for the divine essence is the reason for knowing all things both for God and for the blessed, and nevertheless in God there is no discourse, nor do the blessed reason discursively in the blessed vision. Therefore discourse requires two acts on the part of the subject, by one of which the cause is known, and by another, inferred from the prior act, one proceeds from the known cause to cognition of the effect.

c) Therefore these three differ greatly: "to see something in another," "to see after another," and "to see from another." For God sees all things in himself, but not after something else seen, nor from something else seen. Angels see one thing after another, but not one thing from another, as we shall say. Men, however, see one thing after another and, further, see one thing from another.

783. His positis cum D. Thoma dicimus: Angeli intelligunt sine discursu. Nam quod nos alia notitia cognoscamus subjectum: et alia conclusiones ex principiis, nempe, discurrendo; accidit nobis ob intellectus nostri imperfectionem. At Angeli longe perfectiori lumine intellectuali praediti sunt, cum sint, ut Dionysius cap. 4. de divinis nominibus, dicit, "Speculum quoddam purissimum et clarissimum." Ergo merito existimare possumus, illos sine discursu, ea quae intelligunt intelligere, cum neque aliunde etiam suppetat nobis idonea ratio, cur hanc praestantiam illorum intellectui negamus. Vid. Toletum; et Valentia (tom. 1. disp. 4. q. 9. p. 2.); D. Th. 1. p. q. 58. a. 3. 783. These things being posited, with St. Thomas we say: angels understand without discourse. For that we know the subject by one cognition

and conclusions from principles by another, namely by reasoning discursively, happens to us because of the imperfection of our intellect. But angels are endowed with a far more perfect intellectual light, since they are, as Dionysius says in chapter 4 of The Divine Names, "a certain most pure and most clear mirror." Therefore we can rightly judge that they understand without discourse the things which they understand, since neither from another source is there supplied to us a suitable reason why we should deny this excellence to their intellect. See Toletus; and Valentia (tome 1, disputation 4, question 9, point 2); St. Thomas, I, q. 58, a. 3.

784. Ex his facile deducitur Angelos non cognoscere componendo et dividendo, hoc est, simplici quodam intuitu cognoscere tum subjectum, tum ea quae subjecto conveniunt. Vid. D. Th. l. c. a. 4. 784. From these things it is easily deduced that angels do not know by composing and dividing, that is, they know by a certain simple intuition both the subject and the things which belong to the subject. See St. Thomas, loc. cit., a. 4.

785. Quoad objectum vero intellectus angelici, animadvertendum est imprimis nos hic non quaerere de objecto in specie seu in particulari, sed de objecto proprio et adaequato, quod sub se contineat singula objecta, ad quae intellectus Angelorum se porrigere potest. Suarez (de Angelis l. 2. c. 2. n. 1.). 785. But as regards the object of the angelic intellect, first it must be observed that here we are not asking about the object in species or in particular, but about the proper and adequate object, which contains under itself the individual objects to which the intellect of angels can extend itself. Suarez (On Angels, book 2, chapter 2, n. 1).

786. Hoc autem objectum vel potest unum, et idem respectu omnium Angelorum assignari, vel unicuique proprium, et aliis diversum. Et utrumque secundum diversas rationes necessarium videtur. Cum enim omnes Angeli in una communi ratione substantiae intellectualis conveniant, necesse est, ut aliquod unum adaequatum objectum intelligibile commune habeant: et cum in particularibus, et propriis intellectibus differant, consequenter etiam videtur necessarium, ut in propriis objectis adaequatis aliquam diversitatem habeant. Suarez (l. c. n. 5.). 786. Now this object can either be assigned as one and the same with respect to all angels, or as proper to each one and different from the others. And both seem necessary according to different reasons. For since all angels agree in one common account of intellectual substance, it is necessary that they have some one adequate intelligible object in common; and since they differ in their particular and proper intellects, consequently it also seems necessary that they have some diversity in their proper adequate objects. Suarez (loc. cit., n. 5).

787. Ut haec explicemus, advertere oportet, duobus modis posse objectum adaequatum potentiae assignari, videlicet, aut in esse rei, seu secundum convenientiam realem, aut in esse objecti, seu in aliqua ratione formali, sub qua totum illud objectum attingitur. Quod aliis verbis solet hoc objectum in materiale, et formale distingui, seu in objectum materiale, quod potentia attingit, et rationem formalem, sub qua illud attingit. 787. To explain these things, it must be observed that an adequate object of a potency can be assigned in two ways: namely, either in the being of the thing, or according to real agreement; or in the being of an object, that is, in some formal account under which that whole object is attained. In other words, this object is usually distinguished into material and formal: that is, into the material object which the potency attains, and the formal account under which it attains that object.

788. His positis, nulli dubium adaequatum materiale objectum intellectus angelici esse ens, simpliciter, et in tota sua latitudine sumptum, quatenus verum est. Haec assertio in omni intellectu, etiam humano locum habet: Vid. (n. 370.). <div

class="pl-en">788. These things being posited, no one doubts that the adequate material object of the angelic intellect is being, simply and taken in its whole breadth, insofar as it is true. This assertion has place in every intellect, even the human intellect. See n. 370.

789. At praeter objectum materiale, assignari debet etiam objectum formale, intellectus angelici, quod dici etiam solet ratio sub qua materiale objectum attingitur - motivum, etc. Supponimus enim non omnes Angelos esse ejusdem speciei. Unde: in Angelis specie differentibus, intellectus etiam specifice differant necesse est; tanta enim est distinctio inter proprietates consequentes naturam, quanta est in ipsa natura. Atqui differentia potentiarum ex formali etiam objecto desumenda est. Ergo. - Min. supponitur probata ex Metaphysica, et sufficit hic exemplo illam declarare. Voluntas et intellectus distinguuntur ex objectis, non quia in re sit distinctum objectum, quod ab eis attingitur (nam idem ens cognoscitur, et amatur) sed quia sub diversis rationibus ab illis potentiis attingitur, quae rationes non sunt denominationes a potentiis, sed sunt aptitudines objectivae, ut hoc, vel illo modo attingantur: ita ergo in eodem ente intelligibili possunt distingui diversae aptitudines, ut hoc vel illo modo repraesententur, et secundum illas possunt plures intellectus distingui. Suarez (l. c. n. 24.; vid. etiam nn. 20. seqq.) 789. But besides the material object, a formal object of the angelic intellect must also be assigned, which is also usually called the aspect under which the material object is attained, the motive, and so forth. For we suppose that not all angels are of the same species. Hence, in angels differing in species, the intellects too must differ specifically; for there is as much distinction among properties consequent upon nature as there is in the nature itself. But the difference of potencies must also be taken from the formal object. Therefore. - The minor is supposed to have been proved from metaphysics, and here it is sufficient to explain it by an example. Will and intellect are distinguished from their objects, not because in reality there is a distinct object which is attained by them, for the same being is known and loved, but because it is attained by those potencies under diverse aspects. These aspects are not denominations from the potencies, but objective aptitudes, so that the object may be attained in this or that way. Thus, therefore, in the same intelligible being there can be distinguished diverse aptitudes, so that it may be represented in this or that way, and according to these several intellects can be distinguished. Suarez (loc. cit., n. 24; see also nn. 20 ff.).

790. Intellecta autem necessitate assignandi diversum formale objectum pro diversae speciei Angelis, si quaeratur, quodnam illud sit, respondemus: operationes sequuntur esse - operationes intellectuales specie differunt ex universaliori et immaterialiori modo cognoscendi - modus cognoscendi determinatur etiam ex objecto, seu ex ratione sub qua objectum attingitur - proinde haec ratio objectiva debet esse proportionata immaterialitati essendi Angelorum diversae speciei.

Quemadmodum enim intellectus humanus, quia natura sua inest animae petenti conjunctionem cum corpore, ideo omnia intelligit cum aliqua proportione ad materialia, supponit in objectis aliquam aptitudinem ut hoc modo cognoscantur; ita intellectus Angelicus, res cognoscit cum proportione ad suum modum essendi, et consequenter supponit in rebus aptitudinem ut hoc modo ei repraesententur. Suarez (l. c. n. 25.) 790. Once the necessity of assigning a diverse formal object for angels of diverse species has been understood, if it is asked what that object is, we respond: operations follow being; intellectual operations differ in species from a more universal and more immaterial mode of knowing; the mode of knowing is also determined from the object, or from the aspect under which the object is attained; therefore this objective aspect ought to be proportioned to the immateriality of being of angels of diverse species.

For just as the human intellect, because by its nature it belongs to a soul seeking conjunction with a body, therefore understands all things with some proportion to material things and supposes in objects some aptitude that they be known in this way; so the angelic intellect knows things with proportion to its own mode of being, and consequently supposes in things an aptitude that they be represented to it in this way. Suarez (loc. cit., n. 25).

791. Hanc doctrinam optime, ex D. Thoma 1. p. q. 12. a. 4., illustrat Suarez (l. c. n. 23.), dicens: "Tres gradus intellectuum, supremum, infimum et medium ponit (D. Thomas) id est divinum, humanum et angelicum, eosque ex objectis maxime proportionatis, et motivis singulorum distinguit. Nam intellectus divinus a sola sua essentia, quae est suum esse subsistens, quasi connaturaliter movetur ad intelligendum, et per illam solam omnia cognoscit. Humano vero intellectui connaturale est moveri ad cognoscendum a rebus existentibus, licet abstractiori, et immaterialiori modo illas cognoscat, quam in se sint, et per illas ad immaterialia ascendit. Angelicus vero intellectus per se primo intelligit naturas immateriales creatas, quae sunt mediae inter Deum, et res materiales, et per illas ad Deum ascendit; materialia vero objecta quasi ex abundantia virtutis suae altiori modo, quam homo cognoscit. Potestque hic modus distinctionis ad varias species intellectuum in illo medio gradu contentas applicari. Nam in supremo gradu propter summam ejus perfectionem nulla est multiplicatio; in tertio vero propter infimam conditionem non est multiplicatio specifica, licet sit numerica; in medio vero gradu distinctio specifica reperitur, quae per directa motiva intrinseca et maxime connaturalia cum proportione declarari potest. Unusquisque enim intellectus angelicus connaturaliter postulat suam propriam substantiam, a qua manat, intime intueri, et illi immediate conjungi, ac proinde ab illa per se primo ad intelligendum seipsum moveri, et excitari, et ideo unusquisque intellectus angelicus in sua specifica, et essentiali perfectione est commensuratus essentiae, a qua dimanat, et modo intelligendi quasi adaequatur suae substantiae tamquam primo objecto intelligibili, ideoque ab illo accipit differentiam specificam." 791. Suarez (loc. cit., n. 23) excellently illustrates this doctrine from St. Thomas, I, q. 12, a. 4, saying: "He posits three grades of intellects, the highest, the lowest, and the middle, that is, the divine, the human, and the angelic, and distinguishes them from the objects most proportioned and motive to each. For the divine intellect is moved, as though connaturally, to understanding by its essence alone, which is its subsistent being, and through that alone knows all things. But it is connatural to the human intellect to be moved to knowing by existing things, although it knows them in a more abstract and immaterial mode than they are in themselves, and through them ascends to immaterial things. But the angelic intellect first of itself understands created immaterial natures, which are middle between God and material things, and through them ascends to God; but material objects it knows as if from an abundance of its power, in a higher mode than man knows. And this mode of distinction can be applied to the various species of intellects contained in that middle grade. For in the highest grade, because of its supreme perfection, there is no multiplication; but in the third grade, because of its lowest condition, there is no specific multiplication, although there is numerical multiplication; but in the middle grade specific distinction is found, which can be declared proportionately through direct, intrinsic, and most connatural motives. For each angelic intellect connaturally demands to behold intimately its own proper substance, from which it flows, and to be joined to it immediately, and consequently to be moved and stirred by it, first of itself, to understanding itself; and therefore each angelic intellect, in its specific and essential perfection, is commensurate with the essence from which it flows, and in its mode of understanding it is, as it were, made adequate to its own substance as to its first intelligible object, and therefore from that object it receives its specific difference."

Article 4. Whether Angels Know Future Things - and the Secrets of Hearts

LatineEnglish

Articulus Quartus
Utrum Angeli cognoscant futura - et secreta cordium Fourth Article

792. Ex iis quae de objecto cognitionis angelicae in specie disputari solent, ea tantummodo, ut ab initio proposuimus, attingemus, quae futura libera - et secreta cordium respiciunt. 792. Of

those things which are customarily disputed in particular concerning the object of angelic cognition, we shall touch upon only those, as we proposed from the beginning, which concern future free things and the secrets of hearts.

§ I. Status quaestionis § I. State of the Question

793. Pro quaestionis intelligentia, aliqua imprimis notanda sunt quoad cognitionem futurorum. Atque a) distinguendus est duplex modus cognoscendi futurum. Unus est, cognoscendo illud in alio, scilicet, in causa, vel in signo causae, quomodo cognoscitur eclipsis futura in motibus caelorum, et pluvia futura in signis caeli, ut in colore nubium, vel vento, etc. Alius modus cognoscendi futura, est in seipsis immediate et directe ipsam veritatem futuram in se intuendo, sicut videtur res praesens et actu existens: quomodo intelligimus Deum cognoscere, et videre res futuras.

b) Distinguere oportet futura: nam quaedam sunt quae naturali necessitate eveniunt, ut, ex. gr., temporum mutationes; alia quae contingenter.

c) Contingentia autem in quibusdam provenit ex solo concursu, seu occursu plurium causarum naturalium sese impedientium, sine interventu alicujus causae libere agentis; in aliis vero contingentia provenit ex aliqua causa libera, quae effectum promovere, vel impedire pro suo arbitrio potest. - Si de primis sermo sit, ea contingentia dici possunt respectu causae proximae, vel aliquarum causarum; non vero respectu complexus omnium causarum; respectu hujus complexus necessaria dicenda sunt. Vid. D. Th. de Verit. q. 8. a. 12.

d) Cognitio futurorum potest esse naturalis, vel supernaturalis. Item certa, vel solum conjecturalis. 793. For understanding the question, certain things must first be noted concerning the cognition of future things. And a) a twofold mode of knowing a future thing must be distinguished. One is by knowing it in another, namely in its cause, or in a sign of the cause, in the way a future eclipse is known in the motions of the heavens, and future rain in signs of the sky, as in the color of clouds, or the wind, etc. The other mode of knowing future things is in themselves, immediately and directly, by intuiting in itself the very future truth, just as a present and actually existing thing is seen. In this way we understand God to know and see future things.

b) Future things must be distinguished: for some are those which happen by natural necessity, as, for example, changes of seasons; others are those which happen contingently.

c) Contingency in some things comes from the concurrence or encounter of several natural causes impeding one another, without the intervention of any cause acting freely; but in others contingency comes from some free cause, which can promote or impede the effect according to its own choice. - If the discussion concerns the first kind, they can be called contingent with respect to the proximate cause, or with respect to some causes; but not with respect to the whole complex of all causes. With respect to this complex they must be called necessary. See St. Thomas, De Veritate, q. 8, a. 12.

d) Cognition of future things can be natural or supernatural. Likewise it can be certain, or only conjectural.

794. Quibus positis, concedunt omnes posse Angelos naturaliter certo cognoscere futura necessaria in causa vel causis eorum - posse etiam aliquam conjecturam de futuris liberis naturaliter habere - posse haec eadem cum certitudine supernaturaliter cognoscere. Quaestio solum est de cognitione certa naturali futurorum liberorum. 794. These things being posited, all concede that angels can naturally and certainly know necessary future things in their cause or causes; that they can also naturally have some conjecture about future free things; and that they can know these same things supernaturally with certainty. The question is only about certain natural cognition of future free things.

795. Quoad secreta cordium, notamus a) cum D. Thoma 1. p. q. 57. a. 4.: "Cogitatio cordis dupliciter potest cognosci. Uno modo in suo effectu; et sic non

solum ab Angelo, sed etiam ab homine cognosci potest, et tanto subtilius, quanto effectus hujusmodi fuerit magis occultus. Cognoscitur enim cogitatio interdum non solum per actum exteriorem, sed etiam per immutationem; et etiam medici aliquas affectiones animi per pulsum cognoscere possunt, et multo magis Angeli, vel etiam daemones, quanto subtilius hujusmodi immutationes occultas corporales perpendunt ... Alio modo possunt cognosci cogitationes, prout sunt in intellectu, et affectiones, prout sunt in voluntate."

b) Non omnes autem cordis cogitationes producunt tales immutationes externas, ut ex iis possint cum certitudine determinate cognosci: tunc ergo non poterunt certo et determinate cognosci, nisi in seipsis; et haec dicimus secreta cordium.

c) Actus hujusmodi sunt tum voluntatis, tum intellectus. Quamvis autem quaestio fieri possit de actibus omnibus, sive necessariis, sive liberis; eam tamen restringimus praesertim ad actus liberos voluntatis internos, et ad internas cogitationes mentis, quae pendent a libera applicatione voluntatis. Agitur denique de cognitione certa et naturali. 795. As regards the secrets of hearts, we note a) with St. Thomas, I, q. 57, a. 4: "The thought of the heart can be known in two ways. In one way, in its effect; and thus it can be known not only by an angel, but even by a man, and so much the more subtly as an effect of this kind has been more hidden. For thought is sometimes known not only through an exterior act, but also through an alteration; and even physicians can know some affections of the soul through the pulse, and much more angels, or even demons, insofar as they consider such hidden bodily alterations more subtly ... In another way thoughts can be known insofar as they are in the intellect, and affections insofar as they are in the will."

b) But not all thoughts of the heart produce such external alterations that from them they can be known with certainty and determinately. Therefore then they cannot be known certainly and determinately, except in themselves; and these we call the secrets of hearts.

c) Acts of this kind are acts both of the will and of the intellect. Although the question can be raised concerning all acts, whether necessary or free, nevertheless we restrict it especially to internal free acts of the will, and to internal thoughts of the mind which depend on the free application of the will. Finally, the matter concerns certain and natural cognition.

796. His igitur declaratis,

PROP. LIV. Etsi Angeli sicut natura, ita intelligendi facultate hominibus antecellant; non possunt tamen sive 1. futura libera - sive 2. secreta cordium naturaliter cognoscere.

Prob. 1ma pars. I. Ex Scriptura. Is. 41. 23. legitur: "Annuntiate, quae ventura sunt in futurum, et sciemus, quia dii estis vos." - 46. 9. seq.: "Ego sum Deus, et non est ultra Deus, nec est similis mei. Annuntians ab exordio novissima, et ab initio, quae necdum facta sunt." - Et hinc prophetia, per quam haec futura praedicuntur, est signum certissimum, imo et evidens divinae veritatis et revelationis, ut ex 1. Corinth. 14. sumitur: non esset autem sufficiens signum divinae veritatis, nisi solus Deus posset illa futura cognoscere, ut recte docuit Origen. lib. 6. cont. Celsum, Chrysostom. homil. 32. in 1. ad Corinth. et D. Thom. 3. cont. gent. capit. 154. et sumitur ex illo 2. Petr. 1. "Habemus firmiorem propheticum sermonem."

Prob. II. Ex Patribus. Tertullianus (Apolog. c. 23.): "Idoneum opinor testimonium divinitatis veritas divinationis." - S. Hilarius (de Trin. l. 9.): "Quid est tam proprium Dei, quam futurorum cognitio." - S. Jo. Chrys. (Hom. 18. in Jo.): "Certa praedictio futurorum immortalis Dei duntaxat opus est." S. Augustinus (de civ. Dei l. 5. c. 9.): "Qui non est praescius omnium futurorum, non est utique Deus." - S. Cyrillus (l. 4. in Jo.): "Nulli alii, quam uni ac soli naturali Deo futura nosse convenit."

Prob. III. Ex ratione. Futura non possunt cognosci nisi vel in suis causis, vel in seipsis; atqui neutro modo possunt ab ulla creatura cum certitudine naturaliter cognosci futura libera. Ergo.

Prob. min. quoad 1am partem. Futura libera non sunt certo et immutabiliter determinata in suis causis; ergo nequeunt in ipsis cum certitudine cognosci.

Prob. min. quoad 2am partem. Ille modus attingendi futura in seipsis, et per modum existentium pro suis temporibus antequam in reipsa sint, est proprius divinae intellectionis propter immutabilitatem, et aeternitatem suam, ratione cujus semper, ac simul habet omnia praesentia, non per realem coexistentiam aeternam rerum cognitarum, sed propter praesentiam objectivam respectu divini intuitus simplicissimi, et infinitae comprehensionis. Nam ad cognoscendi modum

adeo sublimem, et perfectum requiritur vis intelligendi infinita: sed Angeli non habent vim intelligendi infinitam, nec simplicem, et immutabilem intuitum, quo omnes differentias temporis attingant, ergo non possunt futura illo modo cognoscere. - Hinc videtur in animis hominum etiam infidelium insedisse, ut cognoscere futura infallibiliter, sit divinitatis proprium: nam inde illorum praedictio divinatio dicta est tamquam divina actio. Potestque aliter hoc explicari ex magna difficultate, quam e converso habent Theologi in explicando, quomodo Deus veritates talium futurorum certissime videat.

Quare merito concludit Suarez (de Angelis l. 2. c. 10. n. 10.): "Si alterum ex his duobus, scilicet, cur Deus haec futura cognoscat, vel cur Angelus illa naturaliter non cognoscat, supra humanam rationem esse dicendum sit, potius certe de priori, quam de posteriori affirmari hoc posset. Aut si primum ita esse sufficienter probatur ex ipsa excellentia Dei, etiamsi modus cognoscendi ratione comparari, aut explicari non possit: profecto etiam ex eo, quod Angelus infinitam illam eminentiam Dei non habet, satis concluditur, non habere hanc scientiam naturalem."

Prob. 2da pars I. Ex Scriptura. 2. Paralip. 6. 30. legitur: "Tu solus nosti corda filiorum hominum." - Jerem. 17. seqq.: "Pravum est cor hominum et inscrutabile, quis cognoscet illud? ... Ego Dominus scrutans cor, et probans renes." - 3. Reg. 8. 39.: "Tu nosti solus cor omnium filiorum hominum:" - Hebr. 4. 12.: Apostolus Verbo Dei tanquam singularem characterem tribuit, quod sit pertingens usque ad divisionem animae, ac spiritus, compagum quoque ac medullarum, et discretor cogitationum et intentionum cordis.

Prob. II. Ex Patribus. Origenes (Hom. 7. in Gen.): "Propositum habeo martyrium, non ex hoc dicere ad me Angelus poterit, quia nunc cognovi, quod tu times Deum. Deo enim soli cognitum est propositum mentis. Si vero accessero ad agones, protulero bonam confessionem, quae inferuntur cunctanter suscepero: tunc potest dicere Angelus velut confirmans me et corroborans: nunc cognovi, quod tu times Deum." - S. Hilarius (in Ps. 59.): "Cogitationes nosse non nostrum est, sed ejus, de quo dictum est: 'scrutans corda, et renes Deus;' ejus quoque qui dixit: 'Quid cogitatis mala in cordibus vestris?'" - S. Ambrosius (in Luc. l. 5. c. 3.): "Dominus volens salvos facere peccatores, occultorum cognitione Deum se esse demonstrat." - S. Jo. Chrys. (Hom. 4. in Matth.) ad illa verba: "Haec eo cogitante Angelus in somno apparuit Joseph," sic loquitur: "Hoc signum fuit certissimum, illum a Deo missum fuisse Angelum, quippe cum solius Dei sit, arcana cordium nosse." S. Augustinus (Serm. 234. de temp.) haec de S. Job habet: "Colebat Deum, faciebat eleemosynas, et quo corde fiebat, nemo sciebat, nec ipse diabolus, sed Deus noverat."

Prob. III. Ex ratione. Fatetur Suarez (de Angelis l. 2. c. 23. n. 1.) difficile esse hoc assumptum ex ratione ostendere: "In hoc puncto," inquit, "valde laborant theologi, quia revera difficile est. Attamen 1. D. Thomas, dat hanc rationem: Praestantia mentis ejusmodi est, ut soli Deo subdatur naturaliter tam quam causae efficienti et finali ultimae. Unde est consentaneum, ut cogitationes et affectiones, quae pendent solum ex ipsius libero arbitrio, non nisi soli Deo pateant; aliis autem creaturis rationalibus eatenus, quatenus ipsa mens humana velit ab illis eas cognosci: ita scilicet, ut haec voluntas sit velut conditio quaedam, sine qua non possit cogitatio vel affectio interna mentis humanae repraesentari intellectui Angelico, vel humano per intelligibilem speciem.

2. Suarez addit aliud argumentum. Angeli ex natura sua non sunt sufficienter constituti in actu primo ad cognoscendum secreta cordium; ergo non possunt ea naturaliter cognoscere. - Prob. antec. Actus primus duo requirit, nempe lumen seu potentiam, et species: ex parte luminis, seu potentiae activae fatemur nihil deesse, ut patet manifeste in cognitione horum actuum post consensum habentium illos: nam per illum consensum non crescit lumen, vel virtus activa potentiae angelicae, ergo ex illa parte Angeli erant antea sufficienter constituti in actu primo ad illam cognitionem. At vero alterum requisitum ad completum actum primum, scilicet species, in Angelis deest. Ergo.

Prob. min. a) "Angelus in his actibus voluntatis non solum se gerit ut agens naturale, seu physicum, sed maxime ut agens morale, et ideo non debentur illi species talium actuum nisi ut accommodatae ordini morali: ad rectum autem moralem ordinem non fuisset conveniens, ut omnis creatura intellectualis haberet concreatas species omnium actuum liberorum aliarum voluntatum. Sic enim omnes liberi actus singulorum caeteris omnibus noti essent, quod est contra bonum ordinem multitudinis, et societatis personarum rationalium, quam naturaliter postulant, quia inde orirentur odia, et contentiones, ac similia: et specialiter daemones acrius possent in homines saevire, si eorum affectus intime cognoscerent, ut

revera possent, si eorum species haberent, ergo talis natura non postulat tales species."

b) Rationalis creatura naturaliter appetit occultare actus suos intimos, qui maxime sunt sua decreta libera, ergo non potest connaturaliter postulare id, quod talium actuum occultationi repugnat: sed hujusmodi est, habere species concreatas talium actuum, ut ostensum est, ergo non postulat concreationem illarum ut sibi connaturalem.

c) Quando natura habet proprium, et intrinsecum modum obtinendi aliquam perfectionem, non postulat illam immediate ab auctore naturae per infusionem, seu concreationem; sed natura rationalis aliter postulat communicationem propriarum cogitationum, et affectionum per mutuam locutionem; ergo non postulat specierum concreationem, per quam talis locutio vel impossibilis, vel inutilis fieret.

NOTA I. Iis, quae diximus de cognitione futurorum non obstat, quod Angelus habet species infusas singularium ab initio, ut articulo praecedenti diximus. Nam ut illis Angelus in cognoscendo certo singularia possit actu uti, praeterea requiritur tamquam conditio sine qua non, ut ejusmodi singularia vel coexistant Angelo jam praesentia, vel certe prius ei aliquando coextiterint. Qua conditione non opus habet Deus, cum non habeat facultatem finitam et limitatam ad cognoscendum, qui proinde futura certo cognoscit aeque ac praesentia et praeterita. - Hanc difficultatem fuse pertractat Suarez (l. 2. c. 11.)

NOTA II. Neque obstat, quod interdum daemones quaedam futura contingentia vera praenunciant. Id enim non faciunt, quia naturaliter certo illa cognoscant; sed quia vel, Deo ita disponente, ea discunt ab Angelis bonis, (qui ea norunt in divino Verbo, aut per peculiarem revelationem) ut Augustinus notavit lib. 2. ad Simplic. q. 3. et lib. 2. super Genes. ad lit. cap. 17. - Vel quia ea cognoscunt ex revelationibus factis aliquibus Sanctis, quas vel audiunt, vel scriptas animadvertunt cum sciant omnia quae usquam geruntur, ut notat Tertullianus in Apolog. cap. 22. - Vel quia ea praedicunt quae ipsi facere constituerunt, ut notat idem Augustinus libro de divinatione daemonum, cap. 5. et lib. 2. super Genes. ad literam, cap. 17. - Vel denique quia illa per probabilem conjecturam assequuntur multo melius quam solent homines, ut notat Augustinus eodem libro, capite sexto, et explicat fuse D. Thomas 3. c. g. cap. 154.

De his omnibus vid. D. Thomam 1. p. q. 57. aa. 3. 4. - Suarez (de Angelis l. 2. cc. 9. 10. 11. - 21. 22. 23. 24. 25.) 796. These things, therefore, having been declared:

PROP. LIV. Although angels surpass men in the faculty of understanding, just as they surpass them in nature, nevertheless they cannot naturally know either, first, future free things, or, secondly, the secrets of hearts.

The first part is proved. I. From Scripture. Isaiah 41:23 says: "Announce the things which are to come in the future, and we shall know that you are gods." - 46:9 ff.: "I am God, and there is no God beyond me, nor is there any like me, announcing from the beginning the last things, and from the start the things which have not yet been done." - And hence prophecy, through which these future things are foretold, is a most certain and indeed evident sign of divine truth and revelation, as is taken from 1 Corinthians 14. But it would not be a sufficient sign of divine truth unless God alone could know those future things, as Origen rightly taught in book 6 against Celsus, Chrysostom, homily 32 on First Corinthians, and St. Thomas, book 3 Contra Gentiles, chapter 154; and as is taken from 2 Peter 1: "We have the more firm prophetic word."

Proof II. From the Fathers. Tertullian (Apology, c. 23): "The truth of divination is, I think, a suitable testimony of divinity." - St. Hilary (On the Trinity, book 9): "What is so proper to God as cognition of future things?" - St. John Chrysostom (Homily 18 on John): "Certain prediction of future things is the work only of the immortal God." St. Augustine (City of God, book 5, chapter 9): "He who is not foreknowing of all future things is certainly not God." - St. Cyril (book 4 on John): "To know future things belongs to no other than to the one and only natural God."

Proof III. From reason. Future things cannot be known except either in their causes or in themselves; but in neither way can future free things be naturally known with certainty by any creature. Therefore.

The minor is proved with respect to the first part. Future free things are not certainly and immutably determined in their causes; therefore they cannot be known in those causes with certainty.

The minor is proved with respect to the second part. That mode of reaching future things in themselves, and after the manner of things existing for their own times before they are in reality, is proper to divine intellection because of its immutability and eternity, by reason of which it always and

simultaneously has all things present, not through a real eternal coexistence of the things known, but because of their objective presence with respect to the most simple divine intuition and infinite comprehension. For for a mode of knowing so sublime and perfect an infinite power of understanding is required; but angels do not have an infinite power of understanding, nor a simple and immutable intuition by which they reach all differences of time. Therefore they cannot know future things in that mode. - Hence it seems to have settled even in the minds of unbelieving men that to know future things infallibly is proper to divinity; for from this their prediction was called divination, as though a divine action. And this can be explained in another way from the great difficulty which, conversely, theologians have in explaining how God most certainly sees the truths of such future things.

Therefore Suarez rightly concludes (On Angels, book 2, chapter 10, n. 10): "If one of these two things must be said to be above human reason, namely why God knows these future things or why an angel does not know them naturally, certainly this could be affirmed rather of the former than of the latter. Or if the first is sufficiently proved to be so from the excellence of God himself, even if the mode of knowing cannot be compared or explained by reason, then indeed from the fact that an angel does not have that infinite eminence of God, it is sufficiently concluded that he does not have this natural knowledge."

The second part is proved. I. From Scripture. 2 Chronicles 6:30 says: "You alone know the hearts of the sons of men." - Jeremiah 17 ff.: "The heart of men is depraved and inscrutable; who will know it? ... I the Lord, searching the heart and proving the reins." - 3 Kings 8:39: "You alone know the heart of all the sons of men." - Hebrews 4:12: the Apostle attributes to the Word of God as a singular characteristic that it reaches even to the division of soul and spirit, of joints also and marrow, and is a discerner of the thoughts and intentions of the heart.

Proof II. From the Fathers. Origen (Homily 7 on Genesis): "I have the purpose of martyrdom; not from this will an angel be able to say to me, 'Now I know that you fear God.' For to God alone is the purpose of the mind known. But if I come to the contests, if I bring forth a good confession, if I accept hesitatingly the things which are brought upon me, then an angel can say, as though confirming and strengthening me: 'Now I know that you fear God.'" - St. Hilary (on Psalm 59): "To know thoughts is not ours, but his of whom it was said: 'God searching hearts and reins'; and also his who said: 'Why do you think evil things in your hearts?'" - St. Ambrose (on Luke, book 5, chapter 3): "The Lord, wishing to make sinners saved, shows himself to be God by knowledge of hidden things." - St. John Chrysostom (Homily 4 on Matthew), on those words, "While he was thinking these things, an angel appeared to Joseph in sleep," speaks thus: "This was a most certain sign that the angel had been sent by God, since it belongs to God alone to know the secrets of hearts." St. Augustine (Sermon 234 On Time) has these things about St. Job: "He worshiped God, he gave alms, and with what heart it was done no one knew, not even the devil himself, but God knew."

Proof III. From reason. Suarez admits (On Angels, book 2, chapter 23, n. 1) that it is difficult to show this assumption from reason: "On this point," he says, "the theologians labor greatly, because it is truly difficult. Nevertheless, 1. St. Thomas gives this reason: the excellence of a mind of this kind is such that it is naturally subject to God alone as to the efficient and ultimate final cause. Hence it is fitting that thoughts and affections which depend only on its own free choice are open only to God; but to other rational creatures only insofar as the human mind itself wishes them to be known by them: that is, so that this will is, as it were, a certain condition without which the thought or internal affection of the human mind cannot be represented to an angelic or human intellect through an intelligible species.

2. Suarez adds another argument. Angels by their nature are not sufficiently constituted in first act for knowing the secrets of hearts; therefore they cannot know them naturally. - The antecedent is proved. First act requires two things, namely light or potency, and species. On the part of light, or active potency, we admit that nothing is lacking, as is manifestly clear in the cognition of these acts after the consent of those having them; for by that consent the light or active power of the angelic potency does not increase. Therefore on that side angels were already sufficiently constituted in first act for that cognition. But the other requisite for complete first act, namely species, is lacking in angels. Therefore.

The minor is proved a) "In these acts of the will an angel acts not only as a natural or physical agent, but especially as a moral agent; and therefore species of such acts are not due to him except

as accommodated to the moral order. But it would not have been fitting to the right moral order that every intellectual creature should have concreated species of all free acts of other wills. For thus all the free acts of each would be known to all the rest, which is contrary to the good order of the multitude and society of rational persons, which they naturally demand, because from that hatreds, contentions, and similar things would arise. And especially demons could rage more fiercely against men if they knew their affections intimately, as indeed they could if they had species of them. Therefore such a nature does not demand such species."

b) A rational creature naturally desires to hide its intimate acts, which are especially its free decrees; therefore it cannot connaturally demand that which is opposed to the concealment of such acts. But such a thing is to have concreated species of such acts, as has been shown; therefore it does not demand their concreation as connatural to itself.

c) When a nature has a proper and intrinsic mode of obtaining some perfection, it does not demand that perfection immediately from the author of nature through infusion or concreation. But rational nature otherwise demands the communication of its own thoughts and affections through mutual speech. Therefore it does not demand the concreation of species, through which such speech would become either impossible or useless.

NOTE I. What we have said concerning the cognition of future things is not opposed by the fact that an angel has infused species of singulars from the beginning, as we said in the preceding article. For in order that the angel be able actually to use them in certainly knowing singular things, it is further required, as a condition without which not, that singulars of this kind either coexist with the angel as already present, or at least at some earlier time once coexisted with him. God does not need this condition, since he does not have a finite and limited faculty for knowing; and therefore he certainly knows future things equally as present and past things. - Suarez treats this difficulty at length (book 2, chapter 11).

NOTE II. Nor is it an objection that demons sometimes announce certain true contingent future things beforehand. For they do not do this because they naturally know those things certainly, but either because, God so disposing, they learn them from good angels, who know them in the divine Word or through a special revelation, as Augustine noted in book 2 To Simplicianus, q. 3, and book 2 On Genesis according to the Letter, chapter 17; or because they know them from revelations made to some saints, which they either hear or notice in writing, since they know all things that are being done anywhere, as Tertullian notes in the Apology, chapter 22; or because they predict those things which they themselves have determined to do, as the same Augustine notes in the book On the Divination of Demons, chapter 5, and book 2 On Genesis according to the Letter, chapter 17; or finally because they attain them by probable conjecture much better than men usually do, as Augustine notes in the same book, chapter 6, and St. Thomas explains at length in Contra Gentiles III, chapter 154.

On all these matters, see St. Thomas I, q. 57, aa. 3-4; Suarez (On Angels, book 2, chapters 9, 10, 11, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25).

Article 5. On the Hierarchies and Choirs of Angels

LatineEnglish

Articulus Quintus
De Angelorum Hierarchiis, et choris Fifth Article
On the Hierarchies and Choirs of the Angels

797. "Quomodo se habeat," inquit S. Augustinus (Enchir. c. 58.) "beatissima illa et superna societas, quae ibi sint differentiae personarum, etc., dicant qui possunt, si tamen possunt probare quod dicunt: ego me ista ignorare confiteor." - Nihilominus non omnis de Hierarchia et ordinibus Angelorum doctrina ut inutilis rejicienda est. "Ad quid enim," ait S. Bernardus (de Cons. l. 5. c. 4.), "caelestium nomina innotuerunt, si ne opinari quidem salva fide aliquid licet de rebus quarum nomina sunt?" 797. "How that most blessed and supernal society has itself," says St. Augustine (Enchiridion, c. 58), "what

differences of persons there are there, etc., let those say who can, if nevertheless they can prove what they say: I confess that I am ignorant of these things." - Nevertheless, not every doctrine concerning the hierarchy and orders of angels is to be rejected as useless. "For to what end," says St. Bernard (On Consideration, book 5, c. 4), "have the names of heavenly beings become known, if it is not even permitted, with faith preserved, to form an opinion about the things whose names they are?"

798. Itaque nomen Hierarchiae et Angelis, et hominibus commune est; significat enim juxta Graeci nominis etymologiam idem, quod sacer principatus, id est, collectionem personarum aliquo modo sacrarum sub aliquo Principe. Unde nec in rebus irrationabilibus inveniri potest, quia non sunt capaces principatus proprii, aut dignitatis sacrae; nec etiam Deo propter trinitatem personarum attribui potest, cum inter illas, nec sit principatus, nec ordo dignitatum, ut recte D. Thomas q. 108. a. 1. notavit cum Dionysio (de caelesti Hier. c. 3.) dicente: "Deum extra, et supra omnem esse Hierarchiam: nam omnis Hierarchia ad illius imitationem, et similitudinem existit." - Proprie igitur duplex solum distinguitur Hierarchia: caelestis, de qua hic agimus; et terrestris, quam Christus instituit in Ecclesia. - Nomine autem chori, seu ordinis significatur multitudo seu collectio magis specialis et intra Hierarchiam contenta personarum sacrarum peculiarem similitudinem inter se habentium. In quo vero consistat haec peculiaris similitudo paulo inferius dicetur. 798. Therefore the name hierarchy is common both to angels and to men. For according to the etymology of the Greek name it signifies the same thing as sacred principality, that is, a collection of persons in some way sacred under some Prince. Hence it cannot be found among irrational things, because they are not capable of proper principality or of sacred dignity; nor can it be attributed to God because of the trinity of persons, since among them there is neither principality nor an order of dignities, as St. Thomas rightly noted, q. 108, a. 1, with Dionysius (On the Celestial Hierarchy, c. 3), who says that "God is outside and above every hierarchy; for every hierarchy exists in imitation and likeness of him." - Properly, therefore, only a twofold hierarchy is distinguished: the heavenly, with which we are dealing here; and the earthly, which Christ instituted in the Church. - But by the name choir, or order, is signified a multitude or collection, more special and contained within a hierarchy, of sacred persons having among themselves a peculiar likeness. In what this peculiar likeness consists will be said a little below.

799. Hoc posito, est imprimis statuendum, esse in Angelis ordinem inferiorum et superiorum secundum varios dignitatum gradus, qui gradus, et in tribus Hierarchiis prima, secunda et tertia constituuntur, et ita novem sunt ordines, qui Angeli, Archangeli, Principatus, Potestates, Dominationes, Virtutes, Throni, Cherubini, ac Seraphini nominantur. Hoc fundamentum in communi sumptum abstrahendo a modo distinguendi, et ordinandi praedictos ordines certum fide est. Unde S. Augustinus (cont. Priscill. c. 11.) inquit: "Esse itaque sedes, Dominationes, Principatus, et Potestates in caelestibus apparatibus firmissime credo, et differre inter se aliquid, indubitata fide teneo: sed quaenam ista sint, et quid inter se differant, nescio." 799. This being posited, it must first be established that in angels there is an order of lower and higher according to various grades of dignities; these grades are constituted in three hierarchies, first, second, and third, and thus there are nine orders, which are named Angels, Archangels, Principalities, Powers, Dominations, Virtues, Thrones, Cherubim, and Seraphim. This foundation, taken in common and abstracting from the mode of distinguishing and ordering the aforesaid orders, is certain by faith. Hence St. Augustine (Against Priscillian, c. 11) says: "I most firmly believe that there are Seats, Dominations, Principalities, and Powers in the heavenly apparatuses, and I hold with undoubted faith that they differ among themselves in some way; but what these are, and what they differ in among themselves, I do not know."

800. Revera de Seraphim habemus Isai. 6. "Seraphim stabant super illud:" et aliquando post, "Volavit ad me unus de Seraphim." - De Cherubim Gen. 3. "Collocavit ante paradisum voluptatis Cherubim:" et Ezech. 10. "Cherubim stabant a dexteris domus." De Thronis, Dominationibus, Principatibus, et Potestatibus, ad Coloss. 1. "Sive Throni, sive Dominationes, sive Principatus, sive Potestates, omnia per ipsum et in ipso creata sunt." - De Virtutibus ad Ephes. 1. ubi etiam expressa mentio est quorundam aliorum ordinum, "Constituens ad dexteram suam in caelestibus supra omnem Principatum, et Potestatem, et Virtutem, et Dominationem." Et ne quis putet Apostolum voluisse hoc numero quaternario complecti totam multitudinem caelestium spirituum; addit: "Et omne nomen quod nominatur non solum in hoc saeculo, sed etiam in futuro." Quamquam etsi hoc ibi non adderet, sufficere posset quod alios alibi exprimat. - Archangeli nomen habemus 1. ad Thess. 4. "In jussu et in voce Archangeli," ac etiam in Epistola B. Judae.

De Angelis ad Rom. 8. "Neque Angeli, neque Principatus, neque virtutes." Matth. 18. "Angeli eorum in caelis." Joan. 5. "Angelus Domini descendebat secundum tempus in piscinam," et alibi saepe.

Porro etsi ex his Scripturis non sit prorsus evidens ordines istis vocabulis significatos, omnes inter se distingui: quia tamen eis accedit tum Ecclesiae, tum Sanctorum Patrum consensus; non sine magna temeritate posset quispiam id negare, et numerum praedictum vel imminuere vel augere. Ecclesia in Cantico "Te Deum," Angelos, Cherubim, et Seraphim ut distinctos recenset; similiterque in diversis praefationibus Canonis Missae Angelos, Archangelos, Dominationes, Virtutes, Potestates, Thronos, Cherubim, et Seraphim. In Antiphona ad primas Vesperas festi omnium Sanctorum, singulos velut distinctos simul commemorat. 800. Indeed, concerning the Seraphim we have Isaiah 6: "Seraphim were standing above it"; and a little afterward, "One of the Seraphim flew to me." - Concerning the Cherubim, Genesis 3: "He placed Cherubim before the paradise of pleasure"; and Ezekiel 10: "The Cherubim stood at the right side of the house." Concerning Thrones, Dominations, Principalities, and Powers, in Colossians 1: "Whether Thrones, or Dominations, or Principalities, or Powers, all things were created through him and in him." - Concerning Virtues, in Ephesians 1, where explicit mention is also made of certain other orders: "Setting him at his right hand in the heavenly places, above every Principality and Power and Virtue and Domination." And lest anyone think the Apostle wished by this fourfold number to embrace the whole multitude of heavenly spirits, he adds: "And every name that is named not only in this age, but also in the future one." Although even if he had not added this there, it could suffice that he names others elsewhere. - We have the name Archangel in 1 Thessalonians 4: "In command and in the voice of an Archangel," and also in the Epistle of Blessed Jude.

Concerning Angels, Romans 8 says: "Neither Angels, nor Principalities, nor Virtues." Matthew 18: "Their angels in heaven." John 5: "An angel of the Lord descended at a certain time into the pool," and often elsewhere.

Moreover, although from these Scriptures it is not altogether evident that the orders signified by these terms are all distinguished among themselves, nevertheless, because there is added to them the consensus both of the Church and of the holy Fathers, one could not deny this, nor diminish or increase the aforesaid number, without great temerity. The Church in the canticle Te Deum enumerates Angels, Cherubim, and Seraphim as distinct; and likewise in the various prefaces of the Canon of the Mass it enumerates Angels, Archangels, Dominations, Virtues, Powers, Thrones, Cherubim, and Seraphim. In the antiphon at First Vespers of the feast of All Saints, it commemorates each of them together as distinct.

801. Tres igitur assignantur angelicae Hierarchiae - et in unaquaque, tres Angelorum ordines seu chori. In suprema hierarchia sunt Seraphim, Cherubim, Throni. In media, Dominationes, Virtutes, Potestates. - In infima Principatus, Archangeli, Angeli. Ita ex S. Dionysio (cc. 7-9.) 801. Therefore three angelic hierarchies are assigned, and in each one, three orders or choirs of angels. In the supreme hierarchy are Seraphim, Cherubim, Thrones. In the middle are Dominations, Virtues, Powers. In the lowest are Principalities, Archangels, Angels. Thus from St. Dionysius, chapters 7-9.

802. Haec autem nomina sumpta sunt ex eorum proprietatibus. Angeli nomen a munere omnibus Angelis commune sumptum est. Tamen quia illud ministerium generatim sumptum minimam in Angelis perfectionem indicat, nam quilibet gradus illius generis ad illam sufficit; ideo appropriatum est nomen illud infimo ordini, eo nimirum modo, quo nomen generis solet speciei minus perfectae accommodari.

Archangeli, dicuntur quasi principes Angeli, qui respectu Angelorum sunt Principes, respectu vero Principatuum sunt Angeli: vel etiam, qui principantur soli ordini Angelorum, quasi summa prae ipsis annuntiantes.

Principatus ita vocantur, quia omnibus Angelis et Archangelis praesunt in his, quae ad salutem omnium hominum tam privatorum, quam Principum, et tam singularum personarum, quam communitatum pertinent, tum instruendo, et illuminando, tum movendo, et praecipiendo juxta dispositionem divinae voluntatis sibi manifestatam.

Potestates, partim quia ordinant ea quae ab inferioribus agenda sunt: partim quia ministerio suo cohibent potestates infernales ne noceant quantum vellent.

Virtutes, quia quandam excellentiam habent in fortitudine, et per eos fiunt miracula.

Dominationes, quatenus Angeli hujus ordinis non sunt destinati ad aliqua circa mundi vel hominum gubernationem, per se exequenda, sed spirituali et excelso modo Principatus, Potestates, et Virtutes transcendunt, eosque ad sibi obediendum subjectos habent; ad quos proinde velut ad Dominos omne aliorum officium refertur.

Tertia Hierarchia, quo altior et elevatior est, eo minus nobis innotescit, et ideo pauca possumus de illa dicere, quia vix rationem distinguendi tres illos ordines declarare possumus. - Patres vero summa concordia docent, in illa Seraphim, Cherubim, et Thronos collocari, et incipiendo a perfectioribus, ita numerandos esse. - Docent etiam omnibus commune esse divinae majestati assistere, et in ejus laudibus perpetuo occupari, ita ut operibus divinae providentiae non intendant, nec ordinarie ad illa mittantur. Ideoque praesertim per diversas habitudines ad Deum, et majorem, vel minorem perfectionem, vel in actibus, quos circa ipsum exercent, vel in modo, quo illi uniuntur, aut immediatam influentiam ab illo recipiunt, distinguuntur.

Seraphim ergo perfectissimi censentur, quia ardentissimo amore in eum feruntur. - Cherubim vero in medio ordine collocantur, quia perfectione divinae scientiae eminent. - Throni sunt veluti sedes Dei, in quibus tamquam in excelsis Thronis Majestati divinae proportionatis sedet, et inhabitat. 802. These names, however, are taken from their properties. The name Angel is taken from the office common to all angels. Nevertheless, because that ministry, taken generally, indicates the least perfection in angels, for any grade of that genus suffices for it, that name is therefore appropriated to the lowest order, namely in the way in which the name of a genus is usually accommodated to the less perfect species.

Archangels are so called as if they are princely Angels, who with respect to Angels are Principalities, but with respect to Principalities are Angels; or also, those who rule only the order of Angels, as though announcing the highest things before them.

Principalities are so called because they preside over all Angels and Archangels in those things which pertain to the salvation of all men, both private persons and princes, and both individual persons and communities, by instructing and illuminating, and by moving and commanding according to the disposition of the divine will manifested to them.

Powers are so called partly because they order those things which are to be done by inferiors, partly because by their ministry they restrain the infernal powers lest they do as much harm as they would wish.

Virtues are so called because they have a certain excellence in strength, and through them miracles are performed.

Dominations are so called insofar as angels of this order are not destined of themselves to execute certain things concerning the governance of the world or of men, but in a spiritual and lofty mode they transcend Principalities, Powers, and Virtues, and have them subject to obeying themselves; and therefore, as to Lords, every office of the others is referred to them.

The third hierarchy, the higher and more elevated it is, is so much the less known to us; and therefore we can say little about it, because we can scarcely declare the reason for distinguishing those three orders. - But the Fathers, with the greatest concord, teach that Seraphim, Cherubim, and Thrones are placed in it, and that, beginning from the more perfect, they are to be numbered in this way. - They also teach that it is common to all of them to stand before the divine majesty and to be perpetually occupied in its praises, so that they do not attend to

the works of divine providence, nor are they ordinarily sent to those works. Therefore they are distinguished especially by diverse relations to God and by greater or lesser perfection either in the acts which they exercise concerning him, or in the mode by which they are united to him, or by which they receive immediate influence from him.

Therefore the Seraphim are judged most perfect because they are borne toward him by most ardent love. - But Cherubim are placed in the middle order because they excel in the perfection of divine knowledge. - Thrones are, as it were, the seats of God, in which, as in lofty Thrones proportioned to the divine Majesty, he sits and dwells.

803. Si quis autem quaerat de radice, seu ratione, qua diversi Angelorum ordines distinguuntur; dicendum est cum D. Th.: a) completive distinguuntur secundum dona gratiae. Nam "ordo gubernationis, qui est ordo multitudinis sub principatu existentis, attenditur per respectum ad finem. Finis autem consistit in visione divinae essentiae, qui est in immobili fruitione bonitatis ipsius; ad quem finem pertingere non possunt nisi per gratiam; unde secundum respectum ad hunc finem ordines distinguuntur in Angelis completive quidem secundum dona gratuita."

b) Dispositive distinguuntur secundum dona naturalia; "quia Angelis data sunt dona gratuita secundum capacitatem naturalium; quod non est in hominibus, ut supra dictum est, q. 62. a. 2. et 3."

c) Cum autem dona gratiae, sint gratiae gratum facientis, vel gratis datae; principaliter distinguuntur ordines Angelici secundum prima, quibus magis vel minus perfecte Deo adhaerent; secundario vero secundum altera. "Nomina autem," notat Suarez (de Angelis l. 1. c. 14. n. 15.) "ex his donis vel ministeriis sumpta sunt vel per ordinem ad Deum, vel per habitudinem ad homines: nam Angeli sunt quasi medii inter Deum et homines, nam per se, et quasi ab intrinseco in Deum tendunt, eique adhaerent; ex Dei autem providentia ad humanam salutem procurandam destinantur. Et quia prior habitudo praecipua est, inde primi etiam ordines Angelorum sua nomina sumunt, reliqui vero ex secunda."

d) Attamen etiam Chori supremae Hierarchiae distinguuntur non solum per ordinem ad Deum, sed etiam per influxum in inferiores ordines, et in nos, quem inde participant. Et sic Seraphim dicuntur non solum ut in se ardentes, sed etiam ut alios incendentes; Cherubim item non tantum ut scientes, sed etiam ut alios illuminantes. Et sic etiam Angeli tertii ordinis dicuntur Throni, quia Deus habitando in illis, tamquam in Thronis sedet, tum ut suam majestatem ostendat, tum ut alios ad reverentiam, et adorationem sui excitet, vel etiam ut illos gubernet, et judicet. 803. But if someone asks concerning the root or reason by which the diverse orders of angels are distinguished, it must be said with St. Thomas: a) they are distinguished completively according to the gifts of grace. For "the order of governance, which is the order of a multitude existing under principality, is considered with respect to the end. But the end consists in the vision of the divine essence, which is in the immovable fruition of goodness itself; and they cannot arrive at this end except through grace. Hence, with respect to this end, orders are distinguished among angels completively indeed according to gratuitous gifts."

b) They are distinguished dispositively according to natural gifts, "because gratuitous gifts were given to angels according to the capacity of their natural gifts; which is not so in men, as was said above, q. 62, aa. 2 and 3."

c) But since gifts of grace are either of grace making pleasing or of grace freely given, the angelic orders are principally distinguished according to the former, by which they adhere to God more or less perfectly; secondarily, however, according to the latter. "But the names," Suarez notes (On Angels, book 1, chapter 14, n. 15), "are taken from these gifts or ministries either in order to God or by relation to men; for angels are as it were intermediates between God and men, for of themselves and as if from within they tend toward God and adhere to him; but from the providence of God they are destined for procuring human salvation. And because the former relation is principal, the first orders of angels also take their names from it; but the remaining orders take theirs from the second."

d) Nevertheless even the choirs of the supreme hierarchy are distinguished not only by order to God, but also by an influence into the lower orders and into us, which they participate from there. And thus Seraphim are called such not only as burning in themselves, but also as kindling others; likewise Cherubim not only as knowing, but also as illuminating others. And thus

also angels of the third order are called Thrones, because God, by dwelling in them, sits as on Thrones, both so that he may show his majesty and so that he may stir others to reverence and adoration of himself, or also so that he may govern and judge them.

804. Ex his haud difficile erit quasdam quaestiones solvere. Quaeritur itaque 1. an distinctio Hierarchiarum et ordinum Angelorum duratura sit etiam post diem judicii?

Respondetur, quoad naturalem distinctionem in essentiali perfectione quoad varia genera, et species perpetuo esse duraturam, quia ipsi Angeli perpetuo durabunt, et in essentiali convenientia, vel differentia mutari non possunt. - Et eadem ratione perpetuo manebit quoad varios gradus perfectionis tam in essentiali gloria, quam in omnibus dotibus, aut perfectionibus gloriae accidentalis, quae quasi habituales, et permanentes sunt. - Poterit etiam manere illa distinctio quatenus per ordinem ad ministeria sit, vel sumpta denominatione ab statu, vel officio quasi permanente, vel ab usu ejus praeterito, vel certe a proportione, seu proxima capacitate ad tale ministerium, quam unusquisque ordo angelicus ex se, vel ratione sui status ad tale ministerium habet. - Cessabunt autem post diem judicii distinctiones illae quoad actualia ministeria; vel fortasse etiam quoad novas illuminationes, et revelationes, quia illae non erunt pro illo statu necessariae, ut D. Thomas dicta q. 108. art. 7. docet. 804. From these things it will not be difficult to solve certain questions. Therefore it is asked, first, whether the distinction of the hierarchies and orders of angels will endure even after the day of judgment.

The response is that, as regards the natural distinction in essential perfection according to various genera and species, it will endure perpetually, because the angels themselves will endure perpetually and cannot be changed in essential agreement or difference. - And for the same reason it will remain perpetually with respect to the various grades of perfection, both in essential glory and in all dowries or perfections of accidental glory, which are, as it were, habitual and permanent. - That distinction will also be able to remain insofar as it is by order to ministries, either with the denomination taken from a state or office as if permanent, or from its past use, or certainly from a proportion or proximate capacity for such ministry, which each angelic order has of itself, or by reason of its state, for such ministry. - But after the day of judgment those distinctions will cease with respect to actual ministries; or perhaps even with respect to new illuminations and revelations, because they will not be necessary for that state, as St. Thomas teaches in the cited q. 108, a. 7.

805. Quaeritur 2. Utrum inter daemones ordo hierarchicus inveniatur?

Respondetur: Ordo Hierarchicus (sacer principatus) proprie, seu completive non invenitur inter daemones, cum in illis nullum sit gratiae donum. - Est tamen aliquis inter illos ordo, quo alii aliis praesunt. Etenim actio sequitur naturam: sed daemonum quidam naturali ordine constituuntur sub aliis, inferiores nimirum sub superioribus: ergo etiam actiones eorum sunt sub actionibus superiorum; hoc autem est, alios praeesse aliis. - Peccatum non tollit naturam: ergo illi qui secundum gradum naturae sunt superiores, naturaliter praesunt inferioribus. Ordo enim divinae gubernationis habet, ut superiores praesint inferioribus. - Hinc Matth. 12. Beelzebub vocatur princeps daemoniorum: et cap. 25. ignis paratus dicitur diabolo et Angelis ejus: ergo diabolus habet daemones sibi subjectos.

Nec obstat, quod Job. 10. de inferno dicitur quod ibi "nullus ordo sed sempiternus horror inhabitat." - Nam potest horum verborum sensus esse, quod in inferno nullus sit ordo, quo post tenebras lux recurrat; vel quo post afflictiones et miserias quies redeat, sed sempiternus horror et tenebrarum et afflictionum inhabitet. Unde 70. sic habent, "ubi non est lux, neque est videri vitam hominum." Vid. etiam D. Thomam in 2. q. 6. a. 4. ad. 1. 805. It is asked, secondly, whether a hierarchical order is found among demons.

The response is: a hierarchical order, that is, sacred principality, properly or completively is not found among demons, since in them there is no gift of grace. - Nevertheless there is among them some order by which some preside over others. For action follows nature; but some demons are constituted under others by natural order, the lower, namely, under the higher; therefore their actions also are under the actions of the higher. But this is for some to preside over others. - Sin does not

destroy nature; therefore those who according to the grade of nature are higher naturally preside over inferiors. For the order of divine governance has it that higher beings preside over lower. - Hence in Matthew 12 Beelzebub is called the prince of demons; and in chapter 25 the fire is said to be prepared for the devil and his angels. Therefore the devil has demons subject to himself.

Nor is it an objection that in Job 10 it is said concerning hell that there "no order but everlasting horror inhabits." - For the sense of these words can be that in hell there is no order by which, after darkness, light returns; or by which, after afflictions and miseries, rest returns; but everlasting horror both of darkness and of afflictions inhabits. Hence the Seventy have it thus: "where there is no light, nor is it to see the life of men." See also St. Thomas, II, q. 6, a. 4, ad 1.

806. Quaeritur 3., an homines praedestinati assumantur ad ordines Angelorum?

Respondetur: a) secundum perfectionem naturalem non possunt homines ad ordines Angelorum ascendere; manebit enim semper naturarum distinctio. - Unde ipsum Verbum Incarnatum dicitur paulo minoratum ab Angelis. - b) Nec assumentur homines ad choros Angelorum, quoad ministeria, quae circa homines, et Ecclesiam exercent, quia animae humanae non sunt ex spiritibus administratoriis, qui in ministerium mittuntur secundum communem legem. c) Quaestio procedit solum secundum gratiam et gloriam.

Dicendum igitur est secundum gratiam et gloriam homines assumi ad ordines Angelorum. Etenim S. Augustinus (de civ. Dei l. 12. c. 1.) scribit quod non erunt duae societates hominum et Angelorum, sed una: et B. Gregorius hom. 34. in Evangelia, "Superna," inquit, "illa civitas ex Angelis et hominibus constat." Et postea, "distinctae conversationes hominum, singulorum angelorum ordinibus congruunt, ut in eorum sortem per conversationis similitudinem deputentur." - Apostolus quoque ad Hebraeos 12. unam agnoscit civitatem Dei viventis, unamque Ecclesiam Angelorum et hominum qui conscripti sunt in caelis. Deinde, ruinae Angelorum reparantur ex hominibus, quemadmodum tradunt sancti Patres, Aug. Enchir. c. 29. et 62. Greg. hom. 21. et 34. in Evangelia, Bern. serm. 1. de adventu: atqui ex omni ordine Angelorum aliquos cecidisse verisimilius est, ut ex q. 63. art. 9. potest intelligi: ergo ad omnes Angelorum ordines aliqui assumuntur.

Addi potest, quod aliqua persona humana etiam creata, supra omnes Angelorum choros ascendit, scilicet Virgo sanctissima. An praeter illam, aliqui homines futuri sint omnibus Angelis beatiores, incertum est, neque cum fundamento affirmari potest, licet neque possit etiam cum majori fundamento negari. Imo si verum est, Luciferum fuisse perfectissimum omnium Angelorum in natura, et consequenter futurum fuisse supremum in gloria, si perseverasset, quia in majori etiam gratia creatus fuit; probabilissime sequitur, aliquem hominum sedem illam occupaturum esse juxta doctrinam Sanctorum supra traditam. Vid. 1. p. qq. 108. 109.; Suarez (de Angelis l. 1. cc. 13. 14.) 806. It is asked, thirdly, whether predestined men are assumed to the orders of angels.

The response is: a) according to natural perfection men cannot ascend to the orders of angels; for the distinction of natures will always remain. - Hence the Incarnate Word himself is said to have been made a little lower than the angels. - b) Nor will men be assumed to the choirs of angels with respect to the ministries which they exercise concerning men and the Church, because human souls are not from the ministering spirits who are sent into ministry according to the common law. c) The question proceeds only according to grace and glory.

Therefore it must be said that according to grace and glory men are assumed to the orders of angels. For St. Augustine (City of God, book 12, chapter 1) writes that there will not be two societies of men and angels, but one; and Blessed Gregory, homily 34 on the Gospels, says, "That supernal city consists of angels and men." And afterward, "the distinct ways of life of men correspond to the orders of individual angels, so that they may be deputed into their lot through likeness of manner of life." - The Apostle also, in Hebrews 12, acknowledges one city of the living God, and one Church of angels and men who are enrolled in the heavens. Next, the ruins of the angels are repaired from men, as the holy Fathers teach: Augustine, Enchiridion, chapters 29 and 62; Gregory, homilies 21 and 34 on the Gospels; Bernard, sermon 1 on Advent. But it is more likely that some fell from every order of angels, as can be understood from q. 63, a. 9. Therefore some are assumed to

all orders of angels.

It can be added that one human person, even created, ascended above all the choirs of angels, namely the Most Holy Virgin. Whether, besides her, any men will be more blessed than all the angels is uncertain and cannot be affirmed with foundation, although neither can it be denied with greater foundation. Indeed, if it is true that Lucifer was the most perfect of all angels in nature, and consequently would have been supreme in glory if he had persevered, because he was created also in greater grace, it follows most probably, according to the doctrine of the Saints handed down above, that some man will occupy that seat. See I, qq. 108, 109; Suarez (On Angels, book 1, chapters 13, 14).

Article 6. On the Grace of Angels

LatineEnglish

Articulus Sextus
De Angelorum gratia Sixth Article
On the Grace of the Angels

807. Gratia considerari potest vel prout habetur in termino consummata; vel prout habetur in via - quoad hanc fieri potest quaestio, utrum Angeli habuerint gratiam; et quandonam illa ornati fuerint. 807. Grace can be considered either as it is had in the consummated term, or as it is had on the way. With respect to the latter, the question can be raised whether the angels had grace, and when they were adorned with it.

808. Unde, certum est imprimis Angelos malos non habuisse gratiam consummatam, seu non fuisse creatos in supernaturali beatitudine. Etenim beatus peccare non potest: sed angeli mali peccaverunt postquam creati sunt, ut est de fide certum, et infra ostendemus, ergo non fuerunt beati a principio creationis. Majorem supponimus: tum quia visio Dei clara ita necessario conjungit voluntatem Deo, ut reddat illam impeccabilem: tum etiam, quia de ratione beatitudinis est rectitudo voluntatis. (Vid. nn. 611. seqq.) 808. Hence, it is first certain that the evil angels did not have consummated grace, or were not created in supernatural beatitude. For a blessed one cannot sin; but the evil angels sinned after they were created, as is certain by faith and as we shall show below. Therefore they were not blessed from the beginning of creation. We suppose the major: both because the clear vision of God so necessarily joins the will to God that it renders it impeccable; and also because rectitude of will belongs to the nature of beatitude. See nn. 611 ff.

809. Neque Angeli boni in Beatitudine supernaturali creati fuerunt. Ut enim ad hanc pervenirent debuerunt imprimis certare. Revera lex Dei "non coronabitur nisi qui legitime certaverit," non solum pro hominibus, sed etiam pro angelis lata est: tum quia ad perfectionem divinae providentiae ita expedit, quia opera ejus sunt misericordia et veritas, tum etiam quia in majorem sanctorum angelorum redundat etiam honorem. Tum etiam quia teste Paulo, etiam angeli judicandi sunt: judicium autem tam de praemio bonorum, quam de poena malorum est futurum. Unde communiter Patres docent a) Angelos bonos peccare potuisse. Ita, ex. gr., S. Gregorius (in Ezech. hom. 7.), ait: "Natura angelica quando creata est liberum accepit, utrum vellet in humilitate persistere, et in Omnipotentis Dei conspectu permanere, an ad superbiam laberetur, et a beatitudine caderet: seu quia cadentibus aliis, sancti angeli in sua beatitudine perstiterunt, hoc acceperunt in munere, ut jam cadere omnino non possent." - Docent b) Angelos bonos beatitudinem meruisse, ut statim videbimus. 809. Nor were the good angels created in supernatural beatitude. For in order that they might arrive at it, they first had to contend. Indeed the law of God, "he will not be crowned unless he has contended lawfully," was laid down not only for men, but also for angels: both because this is fitting for the perfection of divine providence, since his works are mercy and truth, and also because it

redounds to the greater honor of the holy angels. And also because, with Paul as witness, even angels are to be judged; but judgment will be concerning both the reward of the good and the punishment of the evil. Hence the Fathers commonly teach a) that the good angels were able to sin. Thus, for example, St. Gregory (on Ezekiel, homily 7) says: "When the angelic nature was created, it received freedom whether it wished to persist in humility and remain in the sight of Almighty God, or to slide into pride and fall from beatitude; or because, when others fell, the holy angels persisted in their beatitude, they received this as a gift, that now they could not fall at all." - They teach b) that the good angels merited beatitude, as we shall see at once.

810. Angeli boni certe habuerunt gratiam sanctificantem, antequam beatitudinem consequerentur. Etenim nemo potest gloriam vere mereri, nisi sit in statu gratiae, uti in tractatu de merito traditur. Atqui Angeli boni meruerunt gloriam. Ergo.

Prob. min. ex Patribus. S. Augustinus (de correp. et grat. c. 10.) docet, sicut mali Angeli per liberum arbitrium beatitudinem amiserunt "ita sanctos Angelos per liberum arbitrium (adjutum gratia) stetisse, et hujus mansionis debitam mercedem meruisse. Tantam scilicet plenitudinem beatitudinis, qua illis certissimum sit semper se in illa esse mansuros." - S. Isidorus (l. 1. sent. c. 10.): "Post Angelorum ruinam hi qui permanserunt, firmitatem meruerunt aeternae perseverantiae et beatitudinis." - Gelasius (disput. cont. Pelag.): "Angelos ad profectum conditos promerendae salutis aeternae, illa res indicat, quoniam si sic facti essent, ut ulterius nihil egerent, nulla pars eorum ullum posuisset defectum. Non enim in eis diversam naturam fuisse dicendum est." 810. The good angels certainly had sanctifying grace before they attained beatitude. For no one can truly merit glory unless he is in the state of grace, as is handed down in the treatise on merit. But the good angels merited glory. Therefore.

The minor is proved from the Fathers. St. Augustine (On Rebuke and Grace, c. 10) teaches that just as the evil angels lost beatitude through free choice, "so the holy angels stood through free choice, aided by grace, and merited the due reward of this abiding, namely such a fullness of beatitude by which it would be most certain for them that they would always remain in it." - St. Isidore (book 1, Sentences, c. 10): "After the ruin of the angels, those who remained merited the firmness of eternal perseverance and beatitude." - Gelasius (Disputation against the Pelagians): "That matter indicates that the angels were made for advancement in meriting eternal salvation, since if they had been made in such a way that they needed nothing further, no part of them would have placed any defect. For it must not be said that there was a diverse nature in them."

811. Angeli omnes, seu etiam illi qui deinde defecerunt, fuerunt antea gratia sanctificante ornati. Quod ostenditur 1. Ex Scripturis. Ezech. 28. legitur: "Tu signaculum similitudinis, plenus sapientia et decore, in deliciis paradisi fuisti ... Tu Cherub extentus, et protegens, et posui te in monte sancto Dei ... Perfectus in viis tuis a die conditionis tuae, donec inventa est iniquitas in te." - Quae verba etsi litteraliter intelligantur de Rege Tyri; sensu tamen mystico, a Spiritu Sancto etiam intento, intelligenda sunt etiam de Angelis, qui gratiam a Deo acceptam, per peccatum amiserunt. Ita ex SS. Patrum interpretatione. Joan. 8. Dominus de diabolo dicit: "Ille in veritate non stetit." Quae verba etsi ab aliquibus recentioribus intelligantur de veracitate; ex doctrina tamen Patrum debent intelligi de sanctitate. Additur quidem "quia non est veritas in eo, cum loquitur mendacium, etc." Sed bene notat Maldonatus, quod diabolus non dicitur, non stetisse in veritate, quia prius veritatem dixerit, a qua postea recessit, nihil enim tale de illo legitur, sed qua prius in virtute veritatis stetit, quando innocens fuit, et cum veritate alias etiam virtutes incorruptas habuit. Quod maxime de virtutibus infusis, et gratia intelligendum est, quia sine gratia nulla est apud Deum vera virtus.

2. Ex Patribus. S. Leo M. (de quadrag. l. 10. c. 2.): "Quia ipse (diabolus) in veritate non stetit, totamque naturae suae gloriam, dum superbit, amisit, dolet hominem Dei misericordia reparari, et in bona, quae ipse perdidit, introduci." - S. Cyril. Alex. (in Jo. l. 9. c. 6.): "Quia prolapsus est a veritate, nec manere voluit in suae sanctitatis origine, factus enim fuerat ad imaginem et similitudinem Dei, sed superbiendo retinuit quidem imaginem, amisit tamen veritatem similitudinis, quia ex justo et bono

Angelo diabolus injustus et malus factus est." - Unde Catechismus Romanus (P. 1. c. 2. q. 17.) docet: "Spiritualem naturam, innumerabilesque Angelos, qui Deo ministrarent, atque assisterent, ipse ex nihilo creavit, quos deinde admirabili gratiae suae et potestatis munere auxit, atque ornavit. Nam cum illud sit in divinis litteris diabolum in veritate non stetisse, perspicuum est, eum reliquosque desertores Angelos ab ortus sui initio gratia praeditos fuisse." 811. All the angels, or even those who afterward failed, were previously adorned with sanctifying grace. This is shown first from the Scriptures. Ezekiel 28 says: "You were the seal of likeness, full of wisdom and beauty; you were in the delights of paradise ... You were an extended and protecting Cherub, and I placed you on the holy mountain of God ... You were perfect in your ways from the day of your condition, until iniquity was found in you." - Although these words are understood literally of the King of Tyre, nevertheless, in the mystical sense also intended by the Holy Spirit, they must also be understood of the angels, who lost, through sin, the grace accepted from God. Thus from the interpretation of the holy Fathers. In John 8 the Lord says of the devil: "He did not stand in the truth." Although these words are understood by some more recent authors of veracity, nevertheless from the doctrine of the Fathers they must be understood of sanctity. Indeed it is added, "because there is no truth in him, when he speaks a lie," etc. But Maldonatus rightly notes that the devil is not said not to have stood in the truth because he first spoke truth, from which afterward he departed; for nothing of this kind is read about him. Rather, he had previously stood in the power of truth, when he was innocent, and with truth he also had other virtues incorrupt. This is especially to be understood of infused virtues and grace, because without grace there is no true virtue before God.

2. From the Fathers. St. Leo the Great (On Lent, book 10, c. 2): "Because he himself, the devil, did not stand in the truth, he lost the whole glory of his nature while he was proud, and he grieves that man is repaired by the mercy of God and introduced into the goods which he himself lost." - St. Cyril of Alexandria (on John, book 9, c. 6): "Because he fell away from the truth, and did not wish to remain in the origin of his sanctity; for he had been made to the image and likeness of God, but by being proud he indeed retained the image, yet lost the truth of likeness, because from a just and good angel the devil became unjust and evil." - Hence the Roman Catechism (Part 1, c. 2, q. 17) teaches: "He himself created from nothing the spiritual nature, and innumerable angels, who would minister to God and stand before him; afterward he increased and adorned them by the admirable gift of his grace and power. For since it is in the divine writings that the devil did not stand in the truth, it is clear that he and the other deserter angels were endowed with grace from the beginning of their origin."

812. Si vero quaeratur, quandonam Angeli gratiam receperunt; licet ad fidem non pertineat, doctrina jam in Scholis communis est eos in primo creationis instanti gratiam habuisse. Quod tradunt 1. communius Patres. Ita, ex. gr., S. Basilius (in Ps. 32. 4.): "Quod Angeli sunt, ab opifice Verbo universorum conditore habent; eis vero sanctitatem Spiritus sanctus impertivit;" et iterum "in prima constitutione, ac velut massa substantiae eorum una insitam habuere sanctitatem." - S. Augustinus (de civ. Dei, l. 12. c. 9.): "Bonam voluntatem quis fecit in Angelis, nisi ille qui eos cum bona voluntate, idest cum amore casto, quo illi adhaererent, creavit, simul in eis et condens naturam, et largens gratiam, unde sine bona voluntate, hoc est Dei amore, numquam sanctos Angelos fuisse credendum est."

2. Ratione autem suaderi potest. Nam Deus a principio condidit Angelos omnes ad finem supernaturalem, et sub convenientissima providentia ad consequendum illum: sed optima providentia postulabat, ut eos conderet in eo statu, cui supernaturalis gloria deberetur, quae est status gratiae, ac filiorum Dei. Nec fuit ulla ratio differendi gratiam, cum angeli, (ut ait Basilius) non fuerint creati infantes, id est, non indigeant temporis decursu, ad sanctificationem, et illuminationem recipiendam, ergo credibilius est Deum non distulisse Angelorum sanctificationem. - Vid. de his omnibus D. Thomam 1. p. q. 62.; Suarez (de Angelis l. 5. cc. 1-4.) 812. But if it is asked when the angels received grace, although it does not pertain to faith, the doctrine now common in the Schools is that they had grace in the first instant of creation. This, first, the Fathers more commonly hand

down. Thus, for example, St. Basil (on Psalm 32:4): "That they are angels, they have from the craftsman Word, the creator of all things; but the Holy Spirit imparted sanctity to them"; and again, "in the first constitution, and as it were in the very mass of their substance, they had sanctity implanted together." - St. Augustine (City of God, book 12, c. 9): "Who made the good will in the angels, except he who created them with a good will, that is, with chaste love by which they would adhere to him, at the same time both founding nature in them and bestowing grace; whence it must be believed that the holy angels were never without good will, that is, the love of God."

2. It can also be argued by reason. For from the beginning God established all angels for a supernatural end and under a most fitting providence for attaining it. But the best providence required that he establish them in that state to which supernatural glory would be due, which is the state of grace and of the sons of God. Nor was there any reason for delaying grace, since the angels, as Basil says, were not created infants; that is, they did not need the passage of time for receiving sanctification and illumination. Therefore it is more credible that God did not delay the sanctification of the angels. - See on all these matters St. Thomas I, q. 62; Suarez (On Angels, book 5, chapters 1-4).

Article 7. On the Fall of Angels

LatineEnglish

Articulus Septimus
De Angelorum lapsu Seventh Article
On the Fall of the Angels

813. Omnes quidem Angeli in gratia creati fuere, sed non omnes in gratia perseveraverunt. Aliqui enim, tempore probationis, sua libertate abusi, a justitia exciderunt, et in malo obdurati, a caelo expulsi, aeternis poenis addicti sunt. Juxta doctrinam catholicam igitur a tota antiquitate traditam, et in Scripturis clare contentam, dantur Angeli mali. - His in sacris litteris varia nomina tribuuntur. Vocantur enim daemonia, daemones, spiritus nequam, spiritus immundi, mundi rectores tenebrarum harum, spiritualia nequitiae, Angeli ejus, i. e. diaboli. Unus enim ex illis tanquam eorundem dux et caput, in S. Bibliis specialibus nominibus insigniri solet: hic nominatur princeps hujus mundi, deus hujus saeculi, princeps daemoniorum, Beelzebub, mendax, et homicida, Satan, Diabolus, Belial, draco magnus, serpens antiquus, Lucifer. Unde Conc. Lat. IV. cap. Firmiter, docet: "Diabolus a Deo quidem natura est bonus, sed ipse per se factus est malus." Eadem habet Conc. Carthag. IV.; et Conc. Bracarense I. can. 7. 813. All angels indeed were created in grace, but not all persevered in grace. For some, in the time of probation, abusing their freedom, fell away from justice, and, hardened in evil, expelled from heaven, were assigned to eternal punishments. Therefore, according to Catholic doctrine handed down from all antiquity and clearly contained in Scripture, there are evil angels. - In Sacred Scripture various names are given to them. For they are called demons, spirits wicked, unclean spirits, rulers of the world of this darkness, spiritual things of wickedness, his angels, that is, the devil's. For one of them, as their leader and head, is customarily marked in the Holy Bible by special names: he is named prince of this world, god of this age, prince of demons, Beelzebub, liar and murderer, Satan, Devil, Belial, great dragon, ancient serpent, Lucifer. Hence Lateran IV, chapter Firmiter, teaches: "The devil by nature is indeed good from God, but he by himself became evil." The same is held by the Fourth Council of Carthage and the First Council of Braga, canon 7.

814. Contra hanc doctrinam Catholicam, non pauci praesertim recentiores insurrexerunt. Ita quidem, ut observat Comes Leop. de Stolberg, daemon per plura saecula homines ad vanissimas superstitiones incitans, ad tantum denique incredulitatis barathrum adduxit, ut ipsam diaboli existentiam negarent. Inter eos vero, qui in hunc errorem inciderunt, alii, ut

Voltaire, aperte Scripturam irridentes, quae in ea de Angelis malis narrantur, fabulis ex Aegyptiorum, Chaldaeorum, Persarum figmentis confictis, accensenda judicant. - Alii per spiritus malos, nonnisi animas hominum impiorum intelligendas esse docuerunt. - Alii nomine daemonis non personam aliquam, sed mala sive moralia sive physica venire autumant. - Philosophi critici, duce Kant, blasphemando asserunt, quod quemadmodum in Christo ideale moralitatis et virtutis exhibetur; ita diabolus ideale malitiae exprimit; adeoque hujus existentiam non physicam, sed moralem, ut aiunt, admittunt. 814. Against this Catholic doctrine not a few, especially more recent authors, have risen up. Thus indeed, as Count Leopold de Stolberg observes, the demon, by inciting men for many ages to the vainest superstitions, finally led them to such an abyss of unbelief that they denied the very existence of the devil. Among those who fell into this error, some, like Voltaire, openly mocking Scripture, judge that the things narrated in it concerning evil angels should be counted among fables composed from the inventions of the Egyptians, Chaldeans, and Persians. - Others have taught that by evil spirits nothing is to be understood except the souls of impious men. - Others think that by the name demon there comes not some person, but evils, whether moral or physical. - The critical philosophers, with Kant as leader, blasphemously assert that, just as in Christ the ideal of morality and virtue is exhibited, so the devil expresses the ideal of malice; and so they admit his existence not as physical, but as moral, as they say.

815. Quod autem aliqui Angeli, secundum naturam boni, et insuper justitia et sanctitate aucti, mali facti sint, non potuit aliter contingere, nisi per propriam culpam; quod et revelatio apertissime docet. - Quare aeque contra doctrinam catholicam est error Origenistarum, a Waltero Lothardo, e secta fratricellorum, saeculo XIV. renovatus: docebant Luciferum cum daemonibus suis caelo injuria pulsum esse, ac beatitudini cum suis fore denique restituendum. His adnumerari possunt impiissimi homines, qui nunc temporis, daemonem rehabilitare, ut aiunt, nituntur. 815. But that some angels, good according to nature and moreover increased with justice and sanctity, became evil could not have happened otherwise than through their own fault; and revelation teaches this most openly. - Therefore equally contrary to Catholic doctrine is the error of the Origenists, renewed in the fourteenth century by Walter Lollard, from the sect of the Fraticelli: they taught that Lucifer with his demons was driven from heaven unjustly, and that he with his own would finally be restored to beatitude. To these can be added the most impious men who in the present time strive, as they say, to rehabilitate the demon.

816. Antequam vero doctrinam catholicam de Angelorum peccato, et existentia Angelorum malorum adstruamus, juverit pauca adnotare. Atque 1. Frustra aliqui contendunt peccatum impossibile fuisse in Angelis, attenta eorum naturae perfectione, et copia donorum gratiae, quibus cumulati fuerunt. Imprimis enim, contra factum, eorum argumenta nihil valent; ac deinde, quaelibet limitata libertas, utut perfecta, de se deficere potest. Unde D. Thomas 1. p. q. 63. a. 1. ait: "Peccare nihil aliud est quam declinare a rectitudine actus, quam debet habere ... Solum autem illum actum a rectitudine declinare non contingit cujus regula est virtus agentis. Si enim manus artificis esset ipsa regula incisionis, nunquam posset artifex nisi recte lignum incidere; sed si rectitudo incisionis sit ab alia regula, contingit incisionem esse rectam, et non rectam. Divina autem voluntas sola est regula sui actus, quia non ad superiorem finem ordinatur; omnis autem voluntas cujuslibet creaturae rectitudinem in suo actu non habet, nisi secundum quod regulatur a voluntate divina, ad quam pertinet ultimus finis; sicut quaelibet voluntas inferioris debet regulari secundum voluntatem ducis exercitus. Sic igitur in sola voluntate divina peccatum esse non potest; in qualibet autem voluntate creaturae potest esse peccatum secundum ordinem suae naturae." 816. Before, however, we establish the Catholic doctrine concerning the sin of the angels and the existence of evil angels, it will be helpful to note a few things. And first: in vain do some contend that sin was impossible in the angels, considering the perfection of their nature and the abundance of gifts of grace with which they were heaped. For first, against fact, their arguments have no force; and then, any limited freedom, however perfect, can fail

of itself. Hence St. Thomas, I, q. 63, a. 1, says: "To sin is nothing other than to decline from the rectitude of an act which it ought to have ... But only that act cannot decline from rectitude whose rule is the power of the agent. For if the hand of the craftsman were the very rule of cutting, the craftsman could never cut the wood except rightly; but if the rectitude of cutting is from another rule, it happens that the cutting is right and not right. But the divine will alone is the rule of its own act, because it is not ordered to a higher end; but every will of any creature has rectitude in its act only insofar as it is regulated by the divine will, to which the ultimate end belongs; just as any will of an inferior ought to be regulated according to the will of the commander of an army. Thus, therefore, in the divine will alone sin cannot be; but in any will of a creature there can be sin according to the order of its nature."

817. Notandum est 2. quod licet de fide sit existentia Angelorum malorum, eosque vere peccasse; quae tamen ad naturam hujus peccati spectant, non habent eamdem certitudinem. Attamen certum est a) peccatum Angelorum non fuisse peccatum luxuriae, ut aliqui asseruere; puri enim spiritus tali culpa sunt incapaces. - Certum est b) diabolum commisisse etiam peccatum invidiae, juxta illud Sap. 2. 24. "Invidia diaboli mors intravit in orbem terrarum." Sed, uti notat S. Augustinus (de Gen. ad litt. l. 11. c. 11): "Nonnulli dicunt, hunc diabolo fuisse casum a supernis sedibus, quod inviderit homini facto ad imaginem Dei, sed invidia sequitur superbiam, non praecedit. Non enim causa superbiendi est invidia, sed causa invidendi superbia." - Certum est c) juxta Gen. 3. 4.; Jo. 8. 44., diabolum mendacium protulisse; sed Patres et Theologi communiter docent hoc mendacium fuisse effectum superbiae et invidiae, non autem primum Angelorum peccatum. Unde d) juxta doctrinam communissimam Patrum et Theologorum, Angeli primo peccaverunt peccato superbiae. Vide testimonia PP. apud Petav. et Suarez. 817. It must be noted, secondly, that although the existence of evil angels and that they truly sinned are of faith, nevertheless those things which concern the nature of this sin do not have the same certainty. Yet it is certain a) that the sin of the angels was not the sin of lust, as some have asserted; for pure spirits are incapable of such fault. - It is certain b) that the devil also committed the sin of envy, according to Wisdom 2:24: "By the envy of the devil death entered into the world." But, as St. Augustine notes (On Genesis according to the Letter, book 11, c. 11): "Some say that this was the devil's fall from the supernal seats, that he envied man made to the image of God; but envy follows pride, it does not precede it. For envy is not the cause of being proud, but pride is the cause of envying." - It is certain c) according to Genesis 3:4 and John 8:44 that the devil uttered a lie; but the Fathers and theologians commonly teach that this lie was the effect of pride and envy, not the first sin of the angels. Hence d) according to the very common doctrine of the Fathers and theologians, the angels first sinned by the sin of pride. See the testimonies of the Fathers in Petavius and Suarez.

818. Notandum est 3. quod non conveniunt Theologi in explicando hoc peccato superbiae. Caeteris relictis, ex sententia D. Thomae 1. p. q. 63. a. 3. quem communius sequuntur, dicendum: "Diabolus in hoc appetiit indebite esse similis Deo, quia appetiit uti finem ultimum beatitudinis id ad quod virtute suae naturae poterat pervenire, avertens suum appetitum a beatitudine supernaturali, quae est gratia Dei. Vel si appetiit ut ultimum finem illam Dei similitudinem quae datur ex gratia, voluit hoc habere per virtutem suae naturae, non ex divino auxilio secundum Dei dispositionem." 818. It must be noted, thirdly, that theologians do not agree in explaining this sin of pride. Leaving the other opinions aside, according to the opinion of St. Thomas, I, q. 63, a. 3, whom they more commonly follow, it must be said: "The devil in this improperly desired to be like God, because he desired as the ultimate end of beatitude that to which he could arrive by the power of his own nature, turning his appetite away from supernatural beatitude, which is from the grace of God. Or if he desired as ultimate end that likeness of God which is given from grace, he wished to have this by the power of his own nature, not from divine help according to the disposition of God."

819. His positis dicimus:

PROP. LV. Doctrina catholica est aliquos Angelos peccavisse, et per peccatum a caelesti beatitudine exclusos aeternis affici poenis - seu existunt Angeli mali.

Prob. I. Ex Scriptura. Omissis locis V. T., quae innumera sunt, aliqua exhibemus ex N. T. - 2. Petr. 2. 4., legitur: "Deus Angelis peccantibus non pepercit, sed rudentibus inferni detractos in tartarum tradidit cruciandos." - Ep. Jud. v. 6.: "Angelos, qui non servaverunt suum principatum, sed dereliquerunt suum domicilium, in judicium magni diei, vinculis aeternis sub caligine reservavit." - Jo. I. Ep. 3. 8.: "Qui facit peccatum ex diabolo est, quoniam ab initio diabolus peccat." - Apoc. 12. 7. seqq.: "Factum est praelium magnum in caelo: Michael, et Angeli ejus praeliabantur cum dracone, et draco pugnabat, et angeli ejus. Et non valuerunt, neque locus inventus est eorum amplius in caelo: et projectus est draco ille magnus, qui vocatur diabolus, et Satanas, qui seducit universum orbem; et projectus est in terram, et angeli ejus missi sunt."

Prob. II. Ex Patribus. Athenagoras (Legat. n. 24.): "Sicut," ait, "homines libertate donati aut virtutem, aut vitium eligunt; ita etiam inter angelos contigit, ut aliqui liberi, et in iis, quae a Deo acceperunt, fideles manserint; alii vero conditione suae naturae abusi fuerint;" et "isti e caelo expulsi sunt - neque amplius in caelum se extollere possunt." - S. Chrysost. (Hom. de patient. Job.): "Diabolus non naturae nomen, sed praesumptionis est ... non enim diabolus factus est a principio, sed Angelus creatus est." - S. Ambrosius (Ep. 55. ad Demetriam): "Diabolum, qui quoniam sua, quam a Creatore suo acceperat, potentia, dignitate sibi placuit, cum his Angelis, quos in consensum suae impietatis traxerat, a caelesti sublimitate dejectum esse." - S. Augustinus (de nupt. et concup.): "Diabolus spiritus immundus est, et utique quoniam spiritus est natura, immundus est de vitio, bonum, quod spiritus, et malum quod immundus: quorum duorum illud a Deo, hoc ab ipso." - S. Jo. Damascenus (de fid. orth. l. 2. c. 4.): "Principem malorum Angelorum adversus opificem suum Deum se extulisse, et rebellare contra eum in animum induxisse." - et inferius subdit: "una cum eo avulsa est, eique commitem se adjunxit, simulque corruit innumerabilis subjectorum sibi Angelorum multitudo." - Vid. Petavium (de Angelis l. 3. praesertim cc. 1-3.) D. Thomam 1. p. q. 63. - Vid. etiam aliam probationem (n. 762. Prob. III.) 819. These things being posited, we say:

PROP. LV. It is Catholic doctrine that some angels sinned and, through sin, were excluded from heavenly beatitude and are afflicted with eternal punishments - or, that evil angels exist.

Proof I. From Scripture. Omitting the passages of the Old Testament, which are innumerable, we set forth some from the New Testament. - In 2 Peter 2:4 it is read: "God did not spare the angels when they sinned, but, drawn down by the cords of hell into Tartarus, delivered them to be tormented." - Jude v. 6: "The angels who did not preserve their principality, but abandoned their dwelling, he has reserved under darkness in eternal chains for the judgment of the great day." - 1 John 3:8: "He who commits sin is of the devil, because the devil sins from the beginning." - Apocalypse 12:7 ff.: "A great battle was made in heaven: Michael and his angels fought with the dragon, and the dragon fought, and his angels. And they did not prevail, nor was their place found any more in heaven; and that great dragon was cast out, who is called the devil and Satan, who seduces the whole world; and he was cast onto the earth, and his angels were sent."

Proof II. From the Fathers. Athenagoras (Legation, n. 24) says: "Just as men, endowed with freedom, choose either virtue or vice, so also among the angels it happened that some, free and faithful in those things which they received from God, remained; but others abused the condition of their nature;" and "these were expelled from heaven, nor can they any longer lift themselves up into heaven." - St. Chrysostom (Homily on the patience of Job): "Devil is not a name of nature, but of presumption ... for the devil was not made from the beginning, but was created an angel." - St. Ambrose (Ep. 55 to Demetrias): "The devil, because he was pleased with his own power and dignity, which he had received from his Creator, was cast down from heavenly sublimity with those angels whom he had drawn into the consent of his impiety." - St. Augustine (On Marriage and Concupiscence): "The devil is an unclean spirit, and certainly, insofar as he is spirit, he is nature; insofar as he is unclean, he is from vice: the good, that he is spirit, and the evil, that he is unclean; of these two, the former is from God, the latter from himself." - St. John Damascene (On the Orthodox Faith, book 2, c. 4): "The prince of the evil

angels lifted himself up against God his maker, and brought into his mind to rebel against him." And below he adds: "together with him there was torn away and joined itself as his companion, and fell together, an innumerable multitude of angels subject to him." - See Petavius (On Angels, book 3, especially chapters 1-3), St. Thomas I, q. 63. - See also another proof at n. 762, Proof III.

Article 8. On the Ministries of the Good Angels

LatineEnglish

Articulus Octavus
De bonorum Angelorum ministeriis Eighth Article

820. Necesse est imprimis quaedam exponere sive ut doctrina Ecclesiae, hac de re, intelligatur, sive ut certa ab incertis secernantur - tum quae omnino tenenda sunt argumentis confirmabimus. 820. First it is necessary to set forth certain things, both so that the doctrine of the Church on this matter may be understood, and so that certain things may be separated from uncertain things; then we shall confirm by arguments the things which must altogether be held.

§ I. Quaedam praestituuntur § I. Certain Things Are Set Down Beforehand

821. Considerari possunt Angelorum officia erga Deum - erga Christum - erga homines. - Certum est enim Deum, qui universa propter semetipsum operatus est, etiam Angelos ad hunc finem ordinasse. Unde Ps. 96. 7. legitur: "Adorate eum omnes Angeli ejus." Dan. 3. 58.: "Benedicite Angeli Domini Domino, laudate et superexaltate eum in saecula." - Officium hoc laudandi Deum Angeli exequuntur. Unde Job. 38. 7.: "Ubi eras ... cum me laudarent simul astra matutina, et jubilarent omnes filii Dei?" - Is. 6. 3.: "Seraphim ... clamabant alter ad alterum: Sanctus, Sanctus, Sanctus Dominus Deus exercituum, plena est omnis terra gloria ejus." - Amorem suum erga Deum Angeli demonstrant ei serviendo. Unde Dan. 7. 10.: "Millia millium ministrabant ei." Ps. 102. 20. seq. "Potentes virtute, facientes verbum illius ad audiendam vocem sermonum ejus ... ministri ejus, qui facitis voluntatem ejus." 821. The offices of angels can be considered toward God, toward Christ, and toward men. - For it is certain that God, who has worked all things for his own sake, also ordered the angels to this end. Hence Psalm 96:7 says: "Adore him, all his angels." Daniel 3:58: "Bless the Lord, angels of the Lord, praise and superexalt him forever." - The angels carry out this office of praising God. Hence Job 38:7: "Where were you ... when the morning stars praised me together, and all the sons of God rejoiced?" - Isaiah 6:3: "The Seraphim ... cried one to another: Holy, Holy, Holy, Lord God of hosts; the whole earth is full of his glory." - The angels demonstrate their love toward God by serving him. Hence Daniel 7:10: "Thousands of thousands ministered to him." Psalm 102:20 ff.: "Mighty in strength, doing his word, to hear the voice of his words ... his ministers, who do his will."

822. Quamvis autem Filius Dei humanam naturam Angelica inferiorem assumpserit, certe tamen Angeli Verbum Incarnatum adorare, eique servire obligantur. Hebr. 1. 6.: "Cum iterum introducit primogenitum in orbem terrae dicit: et adorent eum omnes Angeli Dei. In nomine Jesu omne genu flectatur caelestium, terrestrium et infernorum." - Unde in ejus nativitate, ut dicitur Luc. 2. 13. 14.: "Subito facta est cum Angelo multitudo militiae caelestis laudantium Deum et dicentium: Gloria in altissimis Deo, et in terra pax hominibus bonae voluntatis." - Et iis omissis, quae post superatam tentationem in deserto, in resurrectionis et ascensionis gloria propaganda Angeli praestiterunt; sufficit in mentem revocare quae leguntur Apoc. 5. 11. 12.: "Vidi, et audivi vocem Angelorum multorum in circuitu throni ... et erat numerus eorum millia millium dicentium voce magna: Dignus est

Agnus, qui occisus est, accipere virtutem, et divinitatem et sapientiam, et fortitudinem, et honorem, et gloriam, et benedictionem." 822. Although the Son of God assumed a human nature lower than the angelic nature, nevertheless certainly angels are bound to adore the Incarnate Word and serve him. Hebrews 1:6: "When again he brings the firstborn into the world, he says: and let all the angels of God adore him. In the name of Jesus every knee should bend, of those in heaven, on earth, and under the earth." - Hence at his nativity, as is said in Luke 2:13-14: "Suddenly there was with the angel a multitude of the heavenly army praising God and saying: Glory to God in the highest, and on earth peace to men of good will." - And omitting those things which the angels performed after the temptation in the desert had been overcome, and in spreading the glory of the resurrection and ascension, it suffices to recall to mind what is read in Apocalypse 5:11-12: "I saw and heard the voice of many angels around the throne ... and their number was thousands of thousands, saying with a loud voice: Worthy is the Lamb who was slain to receive power and divinity and wisdom and strength and honor and glory and blessing."

823. At vero nos hic agimus de bonorum Angelorum ministeriis circa homines, seu de Angelorum custodia. "Est Dei providentia," inquit Catechismus Romanus (P. 4. c. 2. n. 4.), "datum hoc negotium angelis, ut custodiant humanum genus, singulisque hominibus praesto sint, ne gravius aliquod detrimentum accipiant. Nam ut parentes, si infesta et periculosa via filiis iter faciendum sit, custodes adhibent, et periculorum adjutores; sic caelestis Parens in hoc itinere quo ad caelestem patriam contendimus, singulos nobis praeposuit angelos, quorum ope ac diligentia tecti, furtim paratos ab hostibus laqueos vitaremus, et factos in nos horribiles impetus repelleremus, iisque ducibus rectum iter teneremus, ne objectus aliquis error a fallaci adversario nos de via posset deducere, quae ducit in caelum." 823. But here we are dealing with the ministries of the good angels concerning men, or with the guardianship of angels. "By the providence of God," says the Roman Catechism (Part 4, c. 2, n. 4), "this task has been given to angels, that they guard the human race and be present to individual men, lest they receive some more serious harm. For just as parents, if a hostile and dangerous road must be traveled by their children, employ guardians and helpers against dangers, so the heavenly Parent, in this journey by which we strive toward the heavenly fatherland, has set over us individual angels. Covered by their help and diligence, we may avoid snares secretly prepared by enemies, repel horrible attacks made against us, and with them as guides hold the right way, lest some error set before us by the deceitful adversary be able to lead us away from the road which leads to heaven."

824. Non defuerunt qui et hoc catholicae doctrinae caput inficiarentur. "Cur quaerunt nonnulli cum Kant, cur Angeli tutelares nunc tam parum se produnt? cur nullae amplius dantur apparitiones Angelorum? Et si isti ad nostram custodiam dati sunt, cur a nobis tot non arcent calamitates, quibus torquemur? - Cur nos a patrandis sceleribus non removent? Ipsa ergo experientia Angelorum custodiam dubiam reddit, et merito dicitur, opinionem de Angelorum tutela ex Ethnicorum fabulis de geniis cuilibet homini assistentibus originem sumpsisse." 824. There have not been lacking those who would deny this head also of Catholic doctrine. "Why," some ask with Kant, "do guardian angels now reveal themselves so little? Why are no apparitions of angels given any longer? And if they have been given for our guardianship, why do they not ward off from us so many calamities by which we are tormented? Why do they not remove us from committing crimes? Therefore experience itself renders doubtful the guardianship of angels, and rightly it is said that the opinion concerning the guardianship of angels took its origin from the fables of the heathen concerning geniuses assisting each man."

825. Verum ne frustra tempus teramus in hujusmodi impietatibus evidenter absurdis directe refutandis; paucis potius catholicam doctrinam

exponemus. Ac imprimis plura hic distinguenda sunt. Quod generatim Angeli hominum tutelae praeficiantur de fide est, ut Theologi unanimiter docent. - Non aeque tamen certum est singulis hominibus, singulos Angelos tutelares concedi. Et quidem si sermo sit de electis, justis, atque etiam fidelibus, sententia affirmans adeo certa est ex Patrum consensu, ut sine temeritate haud negari posse videatur. 825. But lest we spend time fruitlessly in directly refuting impieties of this sort, which are evidently absurd, we shall rather set forth Catholic doctrine in a few words. And first, several things must here be distinguished. That angels are generally placed over the guardianship of men is of faith, as theologians unanimously teach. - Yet it is not equally certain that individual guardian angels are granted to individual men. And indeed, if the discussion concerns the elect, the just, and even the faithful, the affirmative opinion is so certain from the consensus of the Fathers that it seems it cannot be denied without temerity.

826. Si vero sermo sit praesertim de non praedestinatis, quidam, uti refert Origenes (in Joan. tract. 5.) negaverunt eis Angelos in custodiam deputari. - Quam sententiam confirmare videbantur ex illo Hebr. "Omnes sunt administratorii spiritus, in ministerium missi propter eos, qui haereditatem capiunt salutis."

Sed haec sententia communiter jam a Theologis rejicitur. Etenim a) custodia angelica in latitudine auxilii sufficientis ad salutem continetur: sed auxilium sufficiens commune est reprobis, ergo etiam angelica custodia. - b) Custodia haec in reprobis, licet non habeat effectum meriti vitae aeternae, nihilominus per illam retrahentur a multis, et majoribus malis, vel praecaventur. Addo etiam posse habere effectum meriti vitae aeternae pro aliquo tempore. c) Hoc modo divina providentia justior, et universalior ostenditur: declaratur a contrario, quia Deus permittit praedestinatos habere daemones ad eorum perniciem destinatos, ergo et reprobis angelicam custodiam non denegat.

Reproborum autem custodia etiam in bonum praedestinatorum redundat: nam per illam arcentur daemones instigantes reprobos homines, ne noceant electis, quantum cupiunt. Et hoc modo potest sufficienter responderi ad verba Pauli, sic enim ministeria angelorum circa reprobos in bonum redundant eorum, qui haereditatem capiunt salutis. Sicut de se dicit idem Paul. 2. Tim. 2. "Omnia sustineo propter electos," quamvis omnibus indifferenter inserviret, et pro omnibus laboraret. Significare ergo voluit Paulus illis verbis, finem ministerii angelici in universum esse hominum salutem, et ideo circa omnes exerceri, licet fructus illorum maxime in his compleatur, qui cum effectu salvantur. 826. But if the discussion especially concerns the non-predestined, certain authors, as Origen reports (on John, tractate 5), denied that angels are deputed to them in guardianship. - They seemed to confirm this opinion from that passage of Hebrews: "Are they not all ministering spirits, sent into ministry for the sake of those who receive the inheritance of salvation?"

But this opinion is now commonly rejected by theologians. For a) angelic guardianship is contained in the breadth of sufficient help for salvation; but sufficient help is common to the reprobate; therefore so also is angelic guardianship. - b) This guardianship among the reprobate, although it does not have the effect of the merit of eternal life, nevertheless through it they are withdrawn from many and greater evils, or are guarded beforehand. I add also that it can have the effect of the merit of eternal life for some time. c) In this way divine providence is shown to be more just and more universal; it is declared from the contrary, because God permits the predestined to have demons assigned for their destruction; therefore he also does not deny angelic guardianship to the reprobate.

But the guardianship of the reprobate also redounds to the good of the predestined; for through it demons who instigate reprobate men are restrained, lest they harm the elect as much as they desire. And in this way one can sufficiently answer the words of Paul, for thus the ministries of angels concerning the reprobate redound to the good of those who receive the inheritance of salvation. Just as the same Paul says of himself in 2 Timothy 2: "I endure all things for the sake of the elect," although he served all indifferently and labored for all. Therefore Paul wished to signify by those words that the end of angelic ministry in general is the salvation of men, and that therefore it is exercised concerning all, although its fruit is completed chiefly in those who are saved with

effect.

827. Imo communior est opinio, Patrum sententiis innixa, non tantum singulis hominibus, sed et nationibus, regnis, provinciis Angelos praefici.

Ita ex Dan. 10. 13.: "Princeps regni Persarum restitit mihi viginti et uno diebus: et ecce Michael, unus de Principibus primis venit in adjutorium meum, et ego remansi ibi juxta regem Persarum." - Et S. Basilius (c. Eunom. l. 3. n. 1.) de Angelis dicit: "Ex iis alii quidem praefecti sunt Gentibus, alii vero cuique fideli adjuncti comites sunt." - Theodoretus (quaes. 3. in Gen.): "Cuique genti proprium Angelum praeesse affirmat Scriptura." - S. Hieronymus (in c. 7. Dan.): "Quatuor ventos caeli, quatuor arbitror angelicas Potestates, quibus principalia regna commissa sunt juxta illud, quod Deut. 32. legimus: "Quando dividebat Altissimus terram juxta numerum Angelorum Dei." Similia habent et alii Patres. 827. Indeed the more common opinion, resting on the opinions of the Fathers, is that angels are placed not only over individual men, but also over nations, kingdoms, and provinces.

Thus from Daniel 10:13: "The prince of the kingdom of the Persians resisted me for twenty-one days; and behold Michael, one of the first Princes, came to my help, and I remained there near the king of the Persians." - And St. Basil (Against Eunomius, book 3, n. 1) says of the angels: "Of these, some indeed have been appointed over nations, while others have been joined as companions to each faithful person." - Theodoret (Question 3 on Genesis): "Scripture affirms that a proper angel presides over each nation." - St. Jerome (on Daniel, chapter 7): "The four winds of heaven I think are four angelic Powers, to whom the principal kingdoms have been entrusted, according to what we read in Deuteronomy 32: 'When the Most High divided the earth according to the number of the angels of God.'" Similar things are held also by other Fathers.

828. Ex his vero colligunt Theologi, Ecclesiis, Religiosis communitatibus, personis publicis pro hac qualitate, Angelos custodes concedi. Vide Suarez (de Angelis l. 6. c. 17. nn. 22. seqq.) - Haec quidem de amplitudine ministerii Angelorum circa homines. 828. From these things theologians gather that guardian angels are granted to churches, religious communities, and public persons according to this quality. See Suarez (On Angels, book 6, chapter 17, nn. 22 ff.). - These things, then, concern the breadth of the ministry of angels around men.

829. Nunc si quaeras, quales Angeli ad hominum custodiam deputantur; D. Thomas innixus auctoritati Dionysii ac S. Gregorii M., docet, tres ordines primae Hierarchiae, et primum secundae Hierarchiae nunquam mitti, quoniam isti quatuor ordines solum ad Deum colendum et laudandum destinantur, missionem ergo tantum ad quinque inferiores choros pertinere: idem sentiunt S. Bonaventura, Richardus a S. Victore etc. Distinguunt missionem ad aliquod exterius ministerium immediatam, in qua missus per se ipsum opus exequitur, et mediatam, vi cujus quis imperio suo movet alium ad opus exequendum: illam Angelis quinque inferiorum ordinum; hanc vero Angelis superiorum Ordinum adscribunt, et sic loca S. Scripturae citata declarant, in quibus, e. g., Seraphino adscribitur, quod hic per inferiorem Angelum fecit. Alii vero, nulla facta distinctione, Angelos uniuscumque ordinis mitti adstruunt, praecipue ex illo Hebr. 1. 14. "Omnes sunt administratorii spiritus in ministerium missi." Vide Suarez (de Angelis l. 6. c. 18.) 829. Now if you ask what sort of angels are deputed to the guardianship of men, St. Thomas, relying on the authority of Dionysius and St. Gregory the Great, teaches that the three orders of the first hierarchy and the first of the second hierarchy are never sent, since those four orders are destined only for worshiping and praising God; therefore mission pertains only to the five lower choirs. St. Bonaventure, Richard of St. Victor, and others think the same. They distinguish an immediate mission to some external ministry, in which the one sent executes the work through himself, and a mediate mission, by force of which one moves another by his command to executing a work. They ascribe the former to the angels of the five lower orders, but the latter to

the angels of the higher orders; and thus they explain the cited passages of Sacred Scripture in which, for example, something is ascribed to a Seraph which he did through a lower angel. Others, however, with no distinction made, maintain that angels of any order are sent, chiefly from Hebrews 1:14: "They are all ministering spirits sent into ministry." See Suarez (On Angels, book 6, chapter 18).

830. Si denique de officiis in specie quaeras, quae hominibus Angeli praestant, ea ad quatuor facile reduci possunt. 1. Ut Angeli ab eis, quos custodiunt avertant damna exteriora, ipsosque cum in illa inciderint, ab iis eripiant. Gen. 48. "Angelus qui eruit me de cunctis malis." Vide 1. 4. Regum cap. 6. et 19. Tob. 6. Judith. 13. et alibi saepe.

2. Ut arceant daemones ne hominibus noceant; vel, non tantum, nec tam frequenter quam vellent, sive in peccatum eos inducendo, sive aliter Tob. 6. et 8.

3. Ut sanctas cogitationes suggerant, ad bonum excitent, boni faciendi occasiones subministrent, corripiant, hortentur, et doceant. Gen. 16. et 18. Exodi 23. Judith. 13. Tobiae 6. 11. 12. Actor. 5. 8. 10. Matth. 1.

4. Ut Deo preces nostras offerant. Unde S. Augustinus (Ep. 120. c. 29.) ad haec verba Raphaelis, "Ego obtuli memoriam orationis vestrae" (ita enim ipse legit Tob. 12.) non (inquit) ut tunc Deus noverit quid velimus, vel quo indigeamus; novit enim Pater vester ait Dominus, quid vobis necessarium sit prius quam petatis ab eo, sed quia necesse habet rationalis creatura obtemperans Deo temporales causas ad aeternam veritatem referre, sive petendo quid erga se fiat, sive consulendo quod faciat: qui pius mentis affectus est; ut ipsa construatur, non ut Deus instruatur." Vid. Suarez (l. c. c. 19.) 830. Finally, if you ask concerning the offices in particular which angels perform for men, they can easily be reduced to four. 1. That angels turn away external harms from those whom they guard, and rescue them from those harms when they have fallen into them. Genesis 48: "The angel who rescued me from all evils." See 4 Kings, chapters 6 and 19; Tobit 6; Judith 13; and often elsewhere.

2. That they restrain demons lest they harm men, or lest they do so as much and as often as they would wish, whether by leading them into sin, or otherwise. Tobit 6 and 8.

3. That they suggest holy thoughts, stir up to good, supply occasions of doing good, correct, exhort, and teach. Genesis 16 and 18; Exodus 23; Judith 13; Tobit 6, 11, 12; Acts 5, 8, 10; Matthew 1.

4. That they offer our prayers to God. Hence St. Augustine (Ep. 120, c. 29), on these words of Raphael, "I offered the memory of your prayer" - for thus he himself reads Tobit 12 - says: not that God then knew what we wish or what we need, for "your Father knows," says the Lord, "what is necessary for you before you ask him"; but because a rational creature obeying God needs to refer temporal causes to eternal truth, whether by asking what should be done concerning itself or by consulting what it should do: this is a pious affection of the mind, so that it itself may be built up, not that God may be instructed. See Suarez, loc. cit., chapter 19.

831. His ergo positis:

PROP. LVI. 1. Doctrina catholica est Angelos ad hominum custodiam deputari. 2. Tanta autem hujus divini beneficii amplitudo esse videtur, ut singulis hominibus singuli Angeli praeficiantur.

Prob. 1ma pars I. Ex Scriptura. Ps. 90. 11-13. legitur: "Angelis suis mandavit de te, ut custodiant te in omnibus viis tuis: in manibus portabunt te, ne unquam offendas ad lapidem pedem tuum." Quamquam plures Patres hunc Psalmum de Christo exponant, plures tamen docent principaliter quidem de eo esse intelligendum, sed non excludi quod ibi sermo sit etiam de aliis hominibus. Ita enim a principio Psalmi generaliter dicitur, "Qui habitat in adjutorio Altissimi in protectione Dei caeli commorabitur," et eodem tenore usque ad finem Psalmi David prosequitur; et in particulari illa verba de omnibus hominibus exposuerunt communiter Patres. - Ps. 33. "Immittet Angelus Dei in circuitu timentium eum, et eripiet eos."

Unde Gen. 48. 16. Jacob Angeli subsidio a multis periculis liberatus fuit, quod ipse fatetur, dicens: "Angelus eruit me de cunctis malis." - Act. 7. 53. Angelorum ministerio Israelitis lex data dicitur; ait S. Stephanus: "Accepistis legem in dispositione Angelorum." - Exod. 23. 20. Eidem populo per desertum itineranti Deus Angelum tamquam ducem et protectorem dedit, dicens: "Ecce ego mittam Angelum meum, qui praecedat te, et custodiat in via, et introducat in locum, quem paravi," etc. - In N. autem T. Angelus Josepho dubiis agitato, revelat mysterium

incarnationis; eundem monet, ut cum Jesu et Maria in Aegyptum fugeret, et ut, defunctis persecutoribus, in patriam rediret. Angeli animas justorum a corpore solutas ad caelum deducunt, dicente Christo: "Factum est autem, ut moreretur mendicus, et portaretur ab Angelis in sinum Abrahae." In consummatione saeculi "Exibunt Angeli, et separabunt malos de medio justorum. etc."

Prob. II. Ex Patribus. S. Cyprianus (Ep. 78.): "Angelos in omnibus actionibus nostris fautores habemus." - S. Basilius (in Ps. 3. n. 11.) de Angelis loquens, docet "Sanctas virtutes spirituales in caelesti loco diversantes alias dici oculos, quod concreditum sit eis munus nos inspiciendi, alias aures, quod nostras preces excipiant." - S. Ambrosius (in Ps. 118. serm. I n. 9.): "Mittit Angelos suos Dominus ad defensionem eorum, qui haeredes futuri sunt promissionem caelestium." - S. Augustinus (Enarr. in Ps. 63.): "Angeli beati sunt, et de tanta beatitudine, quia in illa sunt civitate Jerusalem caelesti, unde nos modo peregrinamur, attendunt nos et miserantur nos; et jussu Domini auxiliantur nobis, ut ad illam patriam communem aliquando redeamus, et ibi cum illis fonte Dominico veritatis et aeternitatis aliquando saturemur." etc.

Prob. 2da pars I. Ex Scriptura. Matth. 18. 10.: "Videte, ne contemnatis unum ex his pusillis, dico enim vobis, quia Angeli eorum semper vident faciem Patris mei, qui in caelis est;" ideo ergo Christus parvulos nec contemnendos, nec seducendos esse docet, quia comites et custodes habent Angelos, qui non dicerentur Angeli eorum, nisi peculiariter pro ipsorum custodia deputati essent. - Dari Angelos custodes, hominibus peculiariter deputatos, jam aevo Apostolico creditum est. Cum enim liberatus e carcere Petrus ad domum ubi fideles erant congregati, pulsaret, et ancilla nuntiaret, adesse Petrum, fideles "dicebant: Angelus ejus est," quod iis in mentem venire nisi ex communi fide non potuit.

Prob. II. Ex Patribus. Origenes (Hom. 20. in Num. n. 3.): "Adest unicuique nostrum, etiam minimis, qui sunt in Ecclesia Dei, Angelus bonus, Angelus Domini, qui regat, qui moveat, qui gubernet, qui pro actibus nostris corrigendis et miserationibus exposcendis quotidie videat faciem Patris, qui in caelis est." Eusebius Caes. (Prep. evang. l. 13.) e Scriptura didicisse nos ait: "Angelum unicuique ad custodiam divinitus datum." - S. Basilius (Hom. in Ps. 48.): ad haec verba: "Et dominabuntur eorum recti in matutino," inquit: "Unicuique fidelium affixus est Angelus, dignus, qui Patrem, qui in caelis est videat." S. Hieronymus (in Matth. l. 3.): "Magna dignitas animarum, ut unaquaeque habeat ab ortu nativitatis in custodiam sui Angelum delegatum." - S. Jo. Damasc. citat Methodium, qui asserit ex S. Scripturis constare, "unumquemque curatoribus Angelis committi." - S. Anselmus (Elucid. l. 2. c. 37.): "Unaquaeque anima, dum in corpus mittitur, Angelo committitur." S. Bernardus (de Consid. l. 5. c. 4. n. 8.): "Putemus, Angelos dici, qui singuli singulis hominibus dati sunt."

Vid. 1. p. q. 103. - Suarez (de Angelis l. 6. cc. 17-19.)

NOTA. Quaeri hic solet a Theologis, utrum inter Angelos custodes detur dissensio. Ratio dubitandi petitur tum ex eo, quod unius regni bonum nequit quandoque obtineri sine alterius detrimento (quilibet autem Angelus regno sibi commisso opem ferre studet); tum ex Dan. 10., ubi dicitur Angelus princeps Persarum restitisse Angelo custodienti populum Dei. Vid. Suarez (c. 19. n. 13.)

Brevis tamen resolutio est non esse inter Angelos discordiam voluntatum absolute, et simpliciter, sed in petitionibus posse esse oppositionem, petendo contraria, quamdiu de voluntate Dei illis non constat: nam illa cognita omnes in illa conveniunt. Et quia priusquam illam cognoscant, semper sub illa conditione postulant, "si Deo magis placuerit:" vel alia simili, expressa, vel tacite subintellecta; ideo licet contraria interdum petant, absolute non sunt inter se contrarii in voluntatibus, et desideriis, sed tantum materialiter; quae contrarietas per subintellectam conditionem formaliter tollitur.

Atque haec sunt, quae de Deo mundi, hominum, Angelorumque Creatore, divina adjuvante gratia, hoc anno tradere potuimus. Vehementer cupimus ut omnia in Ejus laudem cedant, qui universa propter semetipsum operatus est, et cui soli debetur honor et gloria in saecula saeculorum.

FINIS. 831. These things, therefore, being posited:

PROP. LVI. 1. It is Catholic doctrine that angels are deputed to the guardianship of men. 2. And the breadth of this divine benefit seems to be so great that individual angels are set over individual men.

The first part is proved. I. From Scripture. Psalm 90:11-13 says: "He has commanded his angels concerning you, that they guard you in all your ways: in their hands they will bear you up, lest at any time you strike your foot against a stone." Although several Fathers explain this Psalm concerning Christ, nevertheless several teach that it is

principally indeed to be understood of him, but that it is not excluded that there is also speech there concerning other men. For thus from the beginning of the Psalm it is said generally, "He who dwells in the help of the Most High will abide in the protection of the God of heaven," and David continues in the same tenor up to the end of the Psalm; and in particular the Fathers commonly explained those words of all men. - Psalm 33: "The angel of God will encamp around those who fear him, and will rescue them."

Hence in Genesis 48:16 Jacob was freed from many dangers by the aid of an angel, which he himself acknowledges, saying: "The angel rescued me from all evils." - In Acts 7:53 the law is said to have been given to the Israelites through the ministry of angels; St. Stephen says: "You received the law in the disposition of angels." - Exodus 23:20: to the same people journeying through the desert God gave an angel as leader and protector, saying: "Behold, I will send my angel, who will go before you, and guard you on the way, and bring you into the place which I have prepared," etc. - In the New Testament, however, an angel reveals the mystery of the Incarnation to Joseph, who was troubled by doubts; he warns the same Joseph to flee into Egypt with Jesus and Mary, and, when the persecutors had died, to return to his homeland. Angels lead the souls of the just, freed from the body, to heaven, Christ saying: "And it came to pass that the beggar died and was carried by angels into the bosom of Abraham." At the consummation of the age, "The angels will go forth and separate the evil from the midst of the just," etc.

Proof II. From the Fathers. St. Cyprian (Ep. 78): "We have angels as helpers in all our actions." - St. Basil (on Psalm 3, n. 11), speaking of angels, teaches that "the holy spiritual powers dwelling in a heavenly place are called eyes, because the office of inspecting us has been entrusted to them; others are called ears, because they receive our prayers." - St. Ambrose (on Psalm 118, sermon I, n. 9): "The Lord sends his angels for the defense of those who are to be heirs of the promise of heavenly things." - St. Augustine (Exposition on Psalm 63): "The angels are blessed, and from such great beatitude, because they are in that city, heavenly Jerusalem, from which we now are pilgrims, they attend to us and have pity on us; and by the command of the Lord they help us, so that we may someday return to that common fatherland, and there with them may someday be satisfied from the Lord's fountain of truth and eternity," etc.

The second part is proved. I. From Scripture. Matthew 18:10: "See that you do not despise one of these little ones; for I say to you that their angels always see the face of my Father, who is in heaven." Therefore Christ teaches that little ones are neither to be despised nor seduced, because they have angels as companions and guardians, who would not be called "their angels" unless they had been deputed peculiarly for their guardianship. - That guardian angels, peculiarly deputed to men, are given was already believed in the apostolic age. For when Peter, freed from prison, knocked at the house where the faithful were gathered, and the maid announced that Peter was present, the faithful "were saying: It is his angel"; this could not have come to their mind except from common faith.

Proof II. From the Fathers. Origen (Homily 20 on Numbers, n. 3): "There is present to each one of us, even to the least who are in the Church of God, a good angel, an angel of the Lord, who rules, who moves, who governs, who daily sees the face of the Father who is in heaven, for correcting our acts and obtaining mercies." Eusebius of Caesarea (Preparation for the Gospel, book 13) says that we have learned from Scripture that "an angel has been divinely given to each one for guardianship." - St. Basil (Homily on Psalm 48), on these words, "And the upright shall rule over them in the morning," says: "To each of the faithful is attached an angel, worthy to see the Father who is in heaven." St. Jerome (on Matthew, book 3): "Great is the dignity of souls, that each one has from the beginning of birth an angel delegated for his guardianship." - St. John Damascene cites Methodius, who asserts that it is clear from Sacred Scripture that "each one is entrusted to angelic guardians." - St. Anselm (Elucidarium, book 2, c. 37): "Each soul, when it is sent into the body, is entrusted to an angel." St. Bernard (On Consideration, book 5, c. 4, n. 8): "Let us think that those are called angels who have been given singly to individual men."

See I, q. 103; Suarez (On Angels, book 6, chapters 17-19).

NOTE. Theologians usually ask here whether there is dissension among guardian angels. The reason for doubting is taken both from the fact that the good of one kingdom sometimes cannot be obtained without detriment to another, while each angel strives to bring help to the kingdom committed to

himself; and from Daniel 10, where the angel prince of the Persians is said to have resisted the angel guarding the people of God. See Suarez, chapter 19, n. 13.

The brief resolution, however, is that there is not among angels a discord of wills absolutely and simply, but that there can be opposition in petitions, by asking for contrary things, as long as the will of God is not known to them. For when it is known, all agree in it. And because before they know it they always ask under this condition, "if it shall have pleased God more," or under another similar condition, expressed or tacitly understood, therefore although they sometimes ask contrary things, absolutely they are not contrary among themselves in wills and desires, but only materially; this contrariety is formally removed through the condition understood underneath.

And these are the things which, with divine grace helping, we have been able this year to hand down concerning God as Creator of the world, of men, and of angels. We earnestly desire that all things may fall to his praise, who has worked all things for his own sake, and to whom alone honor and glory are due forever and ever.

END.

The Errata Leaf

Ditto marks in the printed page column have been expanded for clarity.

| Printed page | Line | Printed erroneously | Correct to | | --- | ---: | --- | --- | | 5 | 3 | a. 1. 3. | a. 1. ad 3. | | 32 | 31 | χόημον | κόσμον | | 38 | 25 | ratio est fides | ratio et fides | | 40 | 27 | quin | quis | | 40 | 31 | illum | illam | | 52 | 6 | requiretur | requireretur | | 56 | 13 | in | ita | | 63 | 30 | ad quem | ad quam | | 87 | 3 | tamen (2) quia | tamen quia | | 87 | 8 | lib. 83. | lib. 82. | | 93 | 2 | Si | Sic | | 126 | 10 | primum | primam | | 147 | 5 | praececisse | praecessisse | | 152 | 25 | tenatur | teneatur | | 167 | 23 | c) | e) | | 182 | 32 | producretur | produceretur | | 184 | 28 | perminantiae | permanentiae | | 186 | 3 | quaqueversas | quaquaversus | | 136 | 12 | civita | civitas | | 207 | 21 | statis | satis | | 218 | 27 | acceduntur | accenduntur | | 219 | 6 | qua | quae | | 229 | 32 | apposita | opposita | | 255 | 9 | solo | sola | | 255 | 19 | propriae | propria | | 267 | 4 | enim | eum | | 295 | 12 | acceseri | accenseri | | 300 | 8 | ex | et | | 303 | 9 | ab | ob | | 317 | 3 | ad imaginem et similitudinem | ad imaginem | | 344 | 6 | 285 | 285 bis. | | 350 | 16 | art. 5. | art. 4. | | 352 | 2 | discuntur | dicuntur | | 356 | 6 | 197 | 297 | | 375 | 3 | primo | prima | | 376 | 14 | 115 | 315 | | 397 | 4 | providerat | praeviderat | | 399 | 33 | es | est | | 400 | 8 | ait | art. | | 400 | 11 | illis | illis Deus | | 412 | 29 | hane | hanc | | 414 | 29 | multus | multum | | 419 | 24 | se | sed | | 421 | 25 | fienda | facienda | | 427 | 10 | intelliva | intellectiva | | 438 | 26 | crea | creati | | 439 | 29 | videntum | videntur | | 448 | 2 | ad | ut ad | | 451 | 31 | esu | seu | | 459 | 30 | sapientia dirigens | sapientia ut dirigens | | 466 | 4 | eae | ex | | 474 | 20 | cum legem | legem cum | | 500 | 29 | se | sed | | 505 | 23 | redemit | redimit | | 512 | 6 | dicernit | discernit | | 513 | 23 | antiquum | antequam | | 523 | 11 | injustitiam | justitiam | | 535 | 6 | haberi | habere | | 535 | 32 | contio | conditio | | 543 | 12 | celebra | celebrat | | 553 | 33 | eo | ea | | 557 | 10 | facie | facile | | 561 | 6 | sublimitati | sublimitate | | 563 | 26 | de qua | de quo | | 576 | 30 | preserverantem | perseverantem | | 598 | 10 | nostrorum | nostrarum | | 599 | 14 | fueri | fuerit | | 605 | 8 | vitiata | vitiato | | 655 | 25 | vult | volunt | | 659 | 4 | Valentia | Valentiam | | 661 | 9 | Prophetae | Propheta | | 674 | 5 | incommutabili | incommutabilem | | 686 | 10 | actuali | accidentali | | 688 | 3 | e | et | | 692 | 10 | malo | mala | | 694 | 10 | aeternitatem | aeternitate | | 700 | 30 | simibus | similibus | | 704 | 14 | Luer. | Lucr. | | 711 | 9 | infligunt | infligit | | 738 | 28 | quo | quod | | 748 | 7 | fit | sit | | 752 | 24 | tepore | tempore | | 760 | 54 | consecturas | consecuturas | | 777 | 25 | ranascentium | renascentium | | 784 | 1 | articulus decimus | articulus undecimus | | 786 | 4 | in corruptionem | incorruptionem | | 808 | 12 | adversus spirituales nequitia | contra spiritualia nequitiae | | 835 | 15 | primos | primas | | 843 | 3 | rarbitrium | arbitrium |