Mgr Constantin Gutberlet

THE THEODICY

Die Theodicee

From the German of the second edition (Münster, 1890)

English translation

Contributed to Mind of the Church by a friend of the library who wishes to remain anonymous

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About this translation

Translated from Constantin Gutberlet, *Lehrbuch der Philosophie. I. Die Theodicee*, second edition (Münster: Theissing, 1890). The pages of that edition are given in the text as (p. N) where each begins, and the author's cross-references and table of contents refer to them. The author's footnotes, numbered by the page in the original, are numbered here within each section; notes added by the translator are marked [Tr.].

Translator’s Note

Translator’s Note

This is a close, literal translation of Constantin Gutberlet, *Lehrbuch der Philosophie. I. Die Theodicee*, second edition (Münster: Druck und Verlag der Theissing’schen Buchhandlung, 1890; XII + 222 pages; Imprimatur, Münster, 8 October 1889). The book is in the public domain (Gutberlet, 1837–1928). The whole book is translated: title page, the two prefaces, the table of contents, the Introduction and Chapters One to Five.

The translation follows the original wording and sentence structure as far as English grammar allows. Gutberlet’s long periods, his “we,” his Latin school terms and his frequent “So” / “Also” (“Therefore”) at the head of the syllogisms have been kept. Latin is left in Latin, with an English rendering in square brackets; Greek likewise. Section numbering (§§; I., II.; 1., 2.; 1°, 2°; a), b); α), β); αα), ββ)) and headings follow the original.

The author’s footnotes are reproduced as footnotes. In the original they are numbered page by page; here they are numbered continuously through the whole book. Notes added by the translator are marked **[Tr.]**. Page numbers of the original edition are given in the text in the form *(p. 8)* at the point where a new page begins. The Table of Contents below is the author’s own, translated; its page numbers, like all cross-references in the text (“above, p. 76”), are those of the original edition and can be found by these page markers. Gutberlet’s references to “Metaph.,” “Naturphil.,” “Erkenntnißtheorie,” “Psychologie,” “Ethik” and “Logik” are to the other volumes of his *Lehrbuch der Philosophie*.

Terminology follows standard Thomistic/scholastic English usage. The principal equivalences are:

| German | English | | --- | --- | | *Allgegenwart* | omnipresence | | *Art* | species | | *Aseität, Durchsichsein* | aseity, being-through-itself (*esse a se*) | | *Begehrungsvermögen* | appetitive faculty | | *bestimmbar* | determinable | | *Bestimmung* | determination | | *Bewegung* | motion | | *Dasein, Existenz* | existence (“Dasein Gottes” = “the existence of God”) | | *Dauer* | duration | | *Differenz* | difference | | *durchsichseiend* | self-existent | | *durchsichseiendes Wesen* | being through itself (*ens a se*) | | *Ehre* | glory (honour) | | *Eigenschaft* | attribute | | *Einfachheit* | simplicity | | *Erhaltung* | conservation | | *Erkennen, Erkenntniß* | knowing; knowledge (or cognition) | | *Erkenntnißprincip* | principle of knowledge | | *Ewigkeit* | eternity | | *Existiren* | existing | | *Gattung* | genus | | *Gegenwart* | presence | | *gemischte Vollkommenheit* | mixed perfection (*perfectio mixta*) | | *Glückseligkeit* | beatitude (happiness) | | *Gottesbeweis* | proof of God’s existence | | *Güte* | goodness | | *Gütigkeit* | kindness (beneficence) | | *Hauptursache* | principal cause | | *Idee* | idea | | *Kraft* | force (in the physical passages: energy) | | *lautere Vollkommenheit* | pure perfection (*perfectio simplex*) | | *lebendige Kraft* | vis viva (kinetic energy) | | *Mitwirkung* (*concursus*) | concurrence | | *Nachahmbarkeit* | imitability | | *nothwendig / contingent* | necessary / contingent | | *Obersatz / Untersatz* | major premise / minor premise | | *Ordnung* | order | | *Potenzialität* | potentiality | | *Realität* | reality | | *Schönheit* | beauty | | *Schöpfung / Erschaffung* | creation | | *Sein* | being | | *Selbstzweck* | end in itself | | *Seligkeit* | beatitude | | *Stoff* | matter | | *Tauglichkeit* | fitness (suitability) | | *Theil* | part | | *Übel* | evil | | *Unendlichkeit* | infinity | | *Unermeßlichkeit* | immensity | | *Unterscheidung / Distinction* | distinction | | *Urideal* | primordial exemplar | | *Ursache* | cause | | *Veränderung* | change | | *Verherrlichung* | glorification | | *Vernunft* | intellect (reason) | | *Verstand* | understanding, intellect | | *Vollkommenheit* | perfection | | *Vorherwissen* | foreknowledge | | *Vorsehung* | providence | | *Wahlfreiheit* | freedom of choice | | *Weltregierung* | government of the world | | *Weltseele* | world-soul | | *Werkzeug* | instrument | | *Wesen* | being, or essence where the sense requires (as in “Wesen Gottes” = “essence of God”) | | *Wesenheit* | essence | | *Wille* | will | | *Willkür* | arbitrary choice, caprice | | *Wirklichkeit* | actuality | | *Wissen* | knowledge (in the wide sense) | | *Wissenschaft* | science (in the strict sense) | | *Wollen* | willing | | *Ziel* | end | | *Zulassung* | permission | | *Zusammensetzung* | composition | | *Zweck* | end,

purpose | | *Zweckmäßigkeit* | purposiveness (finality) | | *scientia simplicis intelligentiae, scientia visionis, scientia media* | kept in Latin |

[Title Page]

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(p. II)

Textbook of Philosophy.

By

Dr. Constantin Gutberlet.

The Theodicy.

Second Edition.

Münster 1890.

Printed and published by the Theissing Bookshop.

(p. III)

The Theodicy.

By

Dr. Constantin Gutberlet.

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Münster 1890.

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(p. IV)

Imprimatur.

Monasterii, die 8. Octobris 1889. [Münster, 8 October 1889.]

Dr. Giese, Vic. Capitularis. [Dr. Giese, Capitular Vicar.]

Preface to the First Edition

Preface to the First Edition

(p. V)

In view of the numerous textbooks of philosophy, already proven by their general diffusion, it is difficult still to demonstrate a need for a new one. Therefore I see myself, in giving the motives for the publication of the present work, referred rather to subjective circumstances and needs, which, however, may not be lacking in all objective moments. First of all, it is well-known general and personal circumstances which scarcely any longer permit me to work something for the honor of God and the salvation of souls otherwise than in this way. The great difficulty which reading causes me compelled me to suspend my biblical labors for a time, and in their place to treat a subject which in and of itself requires less reading, which through fifteen years of teaching activity has become more familiar to me, and for which I had already begun the preparatory work many years ago. For the loving assistance which I had to claim in the revision and the correction I here express my heartfelt thanks; but may the kind reader most graciously have indulgence, from the point of view indicated, with the incorrectnesses still remaining.[1]

From subjective needs also sprang, no doubt, the various modifications which we had to apply to traditional proofs for the sake of our own firmer conviction, as well as, from individual circumstances of life, a more extended use of mathematical and natural-scientific aids than has hitherto been usually the case in speculative philosophy. And in this we believe we must recognize a moment of objective significance. For truth is indeed one, and reason also is the same in all men, but the course of education, the bent of mind, the intellectual needs are so manifold that every textbook which brings the philosophical individuality of its author to faithful and consistent expression can always count upon a definite *(p. VI)* class of readers of like intellectual disposition, direction and endowment, and so meets a true need. But as regards that particular direction of ours, we believe that one often meets the more recent scientific achievements with too much mistrust, and thereby deprives oneself of an important support of speculation itself. Let us not make ourselves guilty of the same injustice as our opponents, who are so full of prejudices against Christian, especially the older, philosophy only because they do not know it! It was my sincere endeavor to make use of every little spark of truth wherever I found it; and as I therefore, without narrow-mindedness, borrowed the facts from the moderns, who have accomplished astonishing things in observation and calculation, so I have sought as much as possible to exploit the deep and unsurpassable treasures of properly Christian speculation. Among the so-called German philosophers I have, in spite of eager searching, found only little that could in speculative respects measure itself even to some degree with those older achievements; most of all some of our expositions may coincide with Leibnizian views.

Of course, in a textbook the discussions could not always be pursued as far as the importance of the matter, the objections of our opponents and the thoroughness of our masters made it appear desirable; therefore we intend to let more detailed expositions on individual points run alongside in separate writings; we have already made a beginning with the publication on the infinite,[2] to which, however, the following ones are not to be equal in extent. After the account of my particular circumstances of life, there is hardly need any longer of a special justification for our publishing the Theodicy first; moreover, this part of philosophy has such an independent significance and importance that it could, if need be, well form a work of its own. The remaining parts of metaphysics, however, will, with God’s help, quickly follow in the order which their importance demands.

Würzburg, on the Feast of the Most Holy Trinity 1878.

The Author.

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[1] **[Tr.]** The “well-known general … circumstances” are those of the Kulturkampf: the seminary at Fulda, where Gutberlet taught, had been closed by the Prussian government in 1873/74, and the preface is accordingly dated from Würzburg. The “great difficulty which reading causes me” refers to a personal affliction which the author does not further specify here.

[2] **[Tr.]** Gutberlet, *Das Unendliche, metaphysisch und mathematisch betrachtet* (Mainz, 1878).

Preface to the Second Edition

Preface to the Second Edition

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This new edition of the Theodicy has not had to undergo essential changes, in view of its predominantly speculative character. The most important change may be the inclusion of Kant's objections against the proofs of God's existence. Since these are of a purely epistemological nature, they could be regarded as sufficiently refuted in the Logic and Epistemology. But since precisely in the most recent time so much fuss is again being made about Kant, I believed I ought to take them into particular consideration here. On other points of the Theodicy we have had occasion to express ourselves at length in the "Philosophisches Jahrbuch" 1889, in the article: "Proof of God's Existence or Proofs of God's Existence?"[1]

Fulda, in January 1890.

The Author.

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[1] **[Tr.]** "Gottesbeweis oder Gottesbeweise?", *Philosophisches Jahrbuch der Görres-Gesellschaft* 2 (1889). Gutberlet was the founding editor of this journal.

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[1] **[Tr.]** § 7 begins on p. 220 of the text.

Introduction

Introduction

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§ 1. Name and Division of the Theodicy.

1. Everything which natural reason can know of God and of his relation to the world, without revelation, from his works, and can present scientifically, forms that part of philosophy which one is accustomed to call natural theology. We prefer for it the name *Theodicy*, introduced by Leibniz, not merely because usage restricts theology almost exclusively to the scientific presentation of the content of revelation, but because in fact our entire philosophical doctrine of God is only a justification of God, or rather of our purely spontaneous consciousness of God. For if it can in general not be the task of philosophy first to create certainty, but rather to ground, to deepen and to extend natural certainty, then this science in particular must content itself, not with wishing first to awaken the idea of God, which is in a certain sense implanted (ἔμφυτος [inborn, implanted]), innate, natural (see § 2) to man, but with demonstrating its legitimacy, setting forth its content more precisely, and securing it against opponents and false conceptions.

2. We distribute the whole material over the following sections: I. Existence of God, II. Essence of God, III. Life of God, IV. Attributes of God, V. (External) Works of God.

Under the section “Essence of God” we treat some divine attributes, simplicity and immutability, which are otherwise usually reckoned among the attributes of God; but because they serve us for a closer determination of the essence of God, rather than being derived from it as its determinations, like the attributes in the narrower sense — goodness, wisdom, immensity, etc. — we have *(p. 2)* separated them from the latter. Moreover, in the division less systematic arrangement than the endeavor to give many thoughts with the greatest possible brevity has been decisive. Therefore also those attributes of God are not specially listed and treated at all which can be sufficiently discussed under other headings, as wisdom under the knowledge of God, omnipotence under creation, etc.

§ 2. Is Atheism Possible?

I. No one can have a firm conviction of the non-existence of God.

1. The question whether anyone can be convinced of the non-existence of God, i.e., can be a positive atheist, is not to be confused with the other, whether all men overcome negative atheism (ignorance of God), i.e., can be convinced of the existence of God or at least can know it. The first is to be answered quite unconditionally in the negative. For since the subjective compulsion of the intellect is achieved only through evident objective necessity, one can form a firm conviction only if the matter is evident. But that God does not exist is, to say the least, in any case not evident. Whoever declares that he is convinced of atheism either utters a formal lie or confuses a stubborn clinging to favorite opinions with conviction, and thus does not know what he is saying.

2. The contrary assurances, if they are ventured at all, are also without any value for this reason, that with the admission of non-conviction the most terrible sentence of condemnation would be pronounced. For since the gravest and most important consequences for life and striving depend on the existence of God, he who acts as if there were no God makes himself guilty of the most wanton levity and exposes himself to the greatest danger for his whole being, for eternity. This circumstance forces him to feign that conviction before others and before himself. Conscience, indeed, lets nothing be palmed off on it, but demands reasons. Therefore he is driven further to keep the reasons which prove the existence of God as far as possible away from himself

or to disparage them, and on the other hand to cling convulsively to the alleged reasons for the non-existence of God. Now since, admittedly, not insignificant difficulties are opposed to the proofs of God's existence, and since the essence and the activity of God also present many difficulties to our *(p. 3)* representations, it is, given the narrowness of our consciousness and the limitation of our thinking, quite possible that for some time, especially during the actual consideration of the counter-reasons, an apparent conviction should form itself. For even with a firm conviction of the existence of God one can, through the actual representation of the opposing reasons, come to doubt.

3. And in this lies the moral value of belief in God, that one holds fast with freedom to the conviction once gained even in those moments of obscuration. But likewise there lies a high degree of guilt in this, that, suppressing all the reasons for the existence of God, which deserve at least as much attention as the counter-reasons, one clings to the latter. By this, however, we by no means wish to have passed judgment on any individual man; his conscience, and in any case He who sees through hearts, will determine in the individual case the measure of guilt, or rather the excusability on account of peculiar mental endowment and external influence.

II. All men who live in conditions in accordance with nature can become certain of the existence of God.

The other question, whether everyone can be convinced of God's existence, is to be divided into two for two quite different presuppositions: 1. Can anyone who examines the reasons and counter-reasons for the existence of God remain in doubt, without being able to form a firm conviction? 2. Can anyone remain unacquainted with the existence of God because, e.g., he never thinks of weighing reasons and counter-reasons, or because not even the thought of a God comes into his mind?

1. The former we hold to be very difficult, in view of the ease and clarity of at least one or another proof of God's existence, but, given the mysterious unfathomableness of the human heart, we do not venture to declare it absolutely impossible.

2. The same answer we have to give also to the second question, but here we must already make more concessions. For idiots, half-idiots with their numerous gradations, the wholly stunted in mind, raw and wholly uncivilized men, will form a concept of God just as little as of other abstract and supersensible *(p. 4)* objects. But that the knowledge of God is natural to all men, and consequently must also come to consciousness in all who are men and live as men in human conditions, is not difficult to show. For this it is only necessary that one should carry out, more or less reflexively, the following syllogism: Every ordered work requires an intelligent author. In the world there is the most wonderful order. Therefore it is from a higher intelligence, which is called God.

The major premise every man has present actually or at least habitually. The truth of this proposition forces itself involuntarily upon everyone through his own and others' experience, from which its universality is easily raised by analogy and induction. At every step we are reminded that order comes into our works only if we bring it into them with deliberation; therefore in human intercourse we continually judge the existence, the degree and the momentary exercise of the intelligence of others according to their ordered works, and conversely. Thereby even the most uneducated becomes certain of the universal truth of that proposition, even if he perhaps has no inkling at all of the reasons for its inner necessity. Even if the derivation from experience did not in and of itself exclude all misgivings (which we deny), the uneducated man nevertheless cannot have those misgivings and can therefore ground on that proposition a firm conviction of the existence of God. Here the point is not to show that he thinks and concludes rightly in this way, but that he must conclude and think in this way. That he concludes rightly, philosophy proves in the development of the teleological proof of God's existence.

To the order and purposive activity in nature, which the minor premise expresses, not even the most obtuse can close himself.

But must he also join this minor premise with the major premise? For it is this joining that first makes up the syllogism; without it one has merely two truths standing independently side by side. Certainly; for rational nature drives man to that joining, in that at the sight of this wonderful order, but especially at extraordinary and grandiose phenomena, he must ask after the cause. Man is distinguished essentially from the animal by this, that the latter takes the facts as it experiences them; but man must ask: Whence? To what end? According to Aristotle, *(p. 5)* wonder (asking after the unknown cause) is the beginning of all philosophy, and Fortlage finds questioning so essential for rational knowledge that he places the nature of the soul in the question.

The answer to the question, Whence the order?, is given him by the major premise, and with that the syllogistic process is completed and a higher intelligence, God, is known.

3. It may be that this proof still has manifold difficulties for a philosopher; but that, as remarked, need not concern us here: for the thinker the difficulties are solved, and to the less brooding they do not occur. Not the truth, but the natural carrying-out of this demonstration must be proved, so that one may say: No one can remain unacquainted with the existence of God. Admittedly, in order to show that no one can remain in doubt, we must show that the difficulties against that proof are so palpably absurd and void that they can make no impression whatever on a naturally disposed man, or that the proof itself is so evident that it excludes all possibility of doubt. This, however, cannot be shown so easily as the former. If by the natural disposition is understood not merely a human development of thinking, but also an honest striving of the will, freedom from prejudices, then it is impossible that with such a disposition no certainty should be attainable in the long run. That with less honest striving doubt, culpable doubt, can persist is not to be denied.

§ 3. Whether the Existence of God Can and Must Be Proved.

I. The existence of God can be proved.

If one denies the possibility of proofs of God's existence, one can allege for it either an objective ground, the insufficiency of God's revelation in the world, or a subjective moment, the incapacity of reason. In the former case one points especially to the finitude of the world, from which an infinite being could not be known.

1. But in this one does not consider:

(p. 6) 1°. That in order to prove the existence of God one need not at once apprehend God as an infinite being. One needs at first only to demonstrate from the contingent finite world the existence of a being through itself, from whose nature its infinity afterwards results. Nor do we wish, as Locke supposes, to gain the concept of God as the Infinite by piling up infinitely many perfections of creatures; rather, already by denying the limits which are found in finite perfections, the infinite can be thought. Therefore, too, the concept of the infinite need not, as others believe, precede the concept of the finite, which is supposed to be measured according to the former.

2°. It can be demonstrated that the world originally entered into existence through creation. Creation, however, requires infinite power.

3°. We also gain from the existence of the finite world the representation of a supersensible order, of the realm of the possible, which on the one hand must likewise have its ground in God, but on the other hand by its infinity immediately demonstrates the existence of an infinite God.

2. The incapacity of reason with respect to the knowledge of God is exaggerated in more recent times especially by the Traditionalists. According to them, reason of itself is supposed to be able to attain either no supersensible ideas at all, or at least no definite religious and moral ones, and in any case not independently of revelation. With the refutation of this system[1] this special assertion too is disposed of, and it is moreover refuted in a particular manner, in fact, by the exposition of the proofs of God's existence. For that we first drew these proofs from revelation, or first learned to see them through revelation, cannot seriously be maintained. Of Kant's critique of the proofs of God's existence we shall treat specially below.

II. The existence of God must be proved.

1. That the existence of God stands in need of proof is denied by the defenders of innate ideas, among which they place the idea of God at the head (Thomassin, Staudenmaier and others); by the Ontologists, who maintain the vision of God already in this life (Malebranche, Gioberti); *(p. 7)* by the disciples of Günther, who would have the infinite grasped immediately as the contraposition to the finite; by Jacobi, who would have God immediately present through religious feeling, because reason is incapable of the proof. According to Herbart the idea of God rests upon itself, upon its inner beauty and practical truth. Belief in it needs no proofs; they would not produce it even if they were found; at most they can confirm it, as the teleological proof does. Proofs proper would play here the same role as the theory of parallels in mathematics.

2. That the existence of God requires a proof is shown by the manifest fact that many deny it, even if they only pretend, through self-deception or dissimulation, to be convinced of the non-existence of God.

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[1] Epistemology p. 240, Psychology p. 148 f.

§ 4. Selection of the Proofs for the Existence of God.

Manifold proofs are brought forward for the existence of God; we follow the selection and order which St. Thomas[1] observes, in that he demonstrates God I. from motion as the unmovable mover, II. as the first cause of all causes, III. from the contingent as the self-existent, necessary being, IV. from the grades of perfection as the most perfect and cause of all perfection, V. from the order of the world as its intelligent author. By combining the II. and III., we obtain four mutually independent proofs, to which we add only, as a fifth, the historical proof from the agreement of all peoples in the idea of God, which indeed was already put forward in antiquity, but only now, through the extension of our ethnological and historical knowledge, has received an irrefutable foundation.

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[1] *Summa th.* p. 1, q. 2, a. 3.

Chapter One. Exposition of the Proofs for God's Existence.

Chapter One. Exposition of the Proofs for God's Existence.

(p. 8)

§ 1. From the Motion in the World Follows the Existence of God as the Unmovable Mover.

According to ordinary usage, *motion* designates change of *place*; according to philosophical usage, which derives from Aristotle, every *change*. In this more general sense we chiefly understand motion in our demonstration, but we also take account of the more special meaning, since, particularly in more recent times, this proof has received a new support through the establishment of the law of the conservation of force[1] and of the transformation of motion. Already for this reason we believe we ought to bestow on this so beautiful proof for God's existence, which is declared by St. Thomas to be the clearest, again more attention than is done in more recent times. We can set it forth briefly thus:

1. Everything that undergoes a change must be changed by *another*.

But not *everything* can be changed by *another*.

Therefore there must be a being which, in causing change, is not changed.

The changing unchangeable is God. Therefore . . . . .

The major premise is demonstrated by us a priori and a posteriori in the Metaphysics,[2] and defended against the misgivings of some philosophers through a more precise determination of it.

That not *everything* can be changed by *another*, as the minor premise asserts, is obvious, since outside *all* beings no other exists or can exist.

(p. 9) The consequence of the conclusion is compelling, but can be made still more evident by the following consideration.

Every change in the world is from another. This other either remains, in changing, itself unchanged, or it is thereby changed. If it remains unchanged, then we have the *movens immobile* [unmoved mover], which we wish to demonstrate. But if the changing thing is changed along with the change which it causes, then it must again be changed by another, and this other is either again an unchangeable thing — then we have what we are seeking — or a changeable thing, and then we must go further again. If, therefore, one does not arrive at the unchangeable and stop there, one can never stop at all; for the changeable always demands a going-further again. And yet one must stop at some point, because otherwise one would never obtain a ground for the actual motion, and would thus leave an effect without a cause.

Therefore only the unchangeable can be the sufficient final ground of motion.

There would now still remain to be shown the last inference, that the *movens immobile* is God in the sense of a personal spirit. For this purpose we demonstrate that change in the world began in time. This follows

1°. From the impossibility of an eternal change, which we prove in another place.[3]

2°. Present-day science shows that in fact the motion of the world is not from eternity.

All natural processes, namely, are made possible through the conversion of potential energy into actual energy and vice versa, thus of force of tension into actual motion and vice versa, or of one form of motion into another. According to the calculations of Clausius, however, which take heat as their first point of departure, a complete reconversion of force once transformed is not possible. Therefore the store of living

force[4] in the world must at some point be exhausted, and in particular all difference of intensity of motion must be abolished in the final equal heat-motion of all atoms, unless the store of force were an infinite one. This, however, is neither actual nor possible; and if it were actual, then the unchangeable cause of motion, from which all force in nature results, would have had to develop an infinite force at the first impulse, and thus itself be infinite, i.e., God. But an infinite store of force is neither possible nor actual in the material world. For since all its force *(p. 10)* depends on the mass and velocity of its motion, an infinite store of force presupposes an infinitely great mass or an infinitely great velocity. Now, however, evidently the mass of the universe, the number of atoms, is not infinite, since the empty spaces show the possibility of greater masses; and the velocity of masses, even in the strongest excitation that we know, in the heat of the sun, is a finite one, and must be so, since a body of infinite velocity would have to traverse any finite space whatever in an instant, i.e., without time,[5] which is absurd. If, therefore, the world-process has a finite duration, it will not only run down after a finite time, but has also *begun* a *finite time ago*.[6]

From this, then, it follows:

1°. that the unmovable cause of the first motion of the world is not matter but a *spirit*. For no matter can *begin* to initiate a motion which it did not cause before, without having first been set in motion by another; it cannot move unmoved.

2°. This spirit initiated the motion with *freedom*, and thus *consciously*. For since the motion could have begun from eternity in infinitely many different moments, and the actual beginning in a *determinate* moment cannot be left to chance, the mover of the world had to select the instant and freely determine it. The motion of the world could, moreover, have had infinitely many forms, directions, speeds. Therefore the spirit had to select one.

3°. This free spirit is *infinite*. For nothing finite can, without change of itself, develop a causality which it did not develop before. Only the infinite can be a cause already by the fact that it is. For only an act of infinite efficacy needs to unfold no *new* force in order to effect something that was not there before; whereas the finite being, in order to become a cause, must unfold an activity which was not yet given with its being.

Now, however, we call the unmovable *spirit* which initiated the world- *(p. 11)* process, still more, which did this with freedom, and in any case the infinite spirit, God. Therefore . . .

2. Either the mover of the world set infinitely many atoms in motion, or a finite number. If he excited infinitely many, this happened either simultaneously or through the impulse of a number from which gradually all came into motion at some point. In the former case he has infinite force; in the second case he is free, because out of all the movable ones he selected some.

If he moved a finite number, then these finitely many are either all, or only a part, of those actually existing. If they are all, then the world-process does not last eternally, and has therefore begun in time with freedom. If the mover first moved only a part of the atoms, then he freely selected them. For none of them has any advantage over another with respect to movability. None has of itself a particular relation to the mover of the world. The latter is of himself no nearer to or more turned toward the one than the other. If he were, e.g., united with some matters, then the union would have to have been brought about by a higher one; of themselves matters have no necessary relation to a mover, nor has he to determinate matters.

To this is added that the mover of the world must be a pure spirit, which stands in no dependence whatever on any matter. For he must be a *movens immobile*. Matter, however, can only move as moved. The same holds of a soul adhering to matter, as vegetative and sensitive life shows. Indeed, if it is bound to matter in existence and activity, it cannot be active, cannot move, without the co-operation of matter; it participates in the inertia of matter, which can be determined to motion only by external influence.

Therefore a free spirit is the cause of the motion of the world. But because he initiates the motion without change, he is infinite.

3. Let us, for the sake of clarity, take up the same consideration once more from another side. All matter must, on account of the inertia essential to it, have its actual motion from another.[7] The first cause of motion in the material *(p. 12)* world can therefore be sought only outside it, namely in a being which is not again, like matter, of itself wholly indifferent to rest and motion. This being must therefore be capable of determining itself, or at least of moving itself, in order then to be able to set matter also in motion. But in self-motion, which indeed does not necessarily exclude external influences, lies the perfection proper to living beings. A living being, therefore, can alone have given the first impulse to motion in lifeless nature. Now, however, neither vegetative nor sensitive life can in the last instance, i.e., without being again excited by another, be the cause of the motion of the world. For since both kinds of life are bound to matter, they share with matter the dependence of their activity on external stimulations (stimuli). Therefore only a purely spiritual life can be the first cause of the motion of the world.

But spirit is active in a twofold way: 1°. *per modum naturae* [by way of nature], i.e., with natural necessity, unconsciously, by virtue of an immanent impulse; and 2°. *per modum voluntatis* [by way of will], i.e., with freedom and consciousness. In the former way it cannot have begun the motion of the world, since this was determined by it in time, as has already been demonstrated. For had it begun it with natural necessity, the motion would have had to be since its existence, thus from eternity. But if it moves with freedom, then it is stimulated by the knowledge of the true and the love of the good. The true and the good, the ideal world, is indeed the unchangeable that changes everything, that with its laws, the metaphysical principles, rules spirits and nature without being itself moved thereby. But of itself it is nevertheless incapable of exercising any real influence whatever. For the good as a proposed goal does not yet exist at all when it moves; and the true, which determines our knowledge, has as such no real but a merely ideal, possible being, which in the world of reality can assert real influences no more than nothing. There must therefore exist a real being which through the true and good changes everything and moves the whole world. But a being to which the eternal, unchangeable, infinite domain of the true and good is subservient must itself be infinite, eternal, unchangeable.

But since we have already found a spirit as the last real cause of the motion of the world, we now know that this must be an infinite spirit. And certainly a being can rule the world of spirits and *(p. 13)* of bodies through those laws only by having thought them beforehand and imposed them on things, and by moving things toward a goal intended by it.

4. Against our demonstration it could be objected that the motion in the world can be explained by the mutual influence of two or more beings, just as in fact universal gravity moves all heavenly bodies through mutual attraction, and therefore no unmovable center is required.

To this it is to be replied that original mutual change without an unmovable cause above the changed beings includes a double absurdity. For if A is to be moved by B, then B (if it is not an unmovable) must already have been set in motion by A; the latter must thus already have moved before it itself was set in motion. For it is not supposed to be a *movens immobile*, but moves only after it has itself been moved. This absurdity returns if B is to be moved by A.

In fact universal gravitation is unable to explain the motion presently existing. For even granting, *per absurdum* [for the sake of argument, though absurd], its original activity through mutual influence, the attracted (smaller) body would still have had to receive a lateral impulse (in the direction of the tangent), in order that it might circle around the larger and not unite with it for eternal rest.

Furthermore, the forces of attraction are either essential to bodies or accidental and implanted. In the former case the motion would have had to be as eternal as the essence of things, which conflicts with the temporal

beginning of the world-process. If the essence does not demand the forces, then they are caused from outside, and with them their effect too, the motion, is from another, which finally must at some point change unchanged.

According to the more recent mechanical conception of nature, one must take forces as the result of mass and velocity.[8] But velocity and motion no body has of itself, but from another; and it is a manifest contradiction that an attracting body should, through its (rotational) motion, set another into the motion which must already have caused the rotational motion of the first.

(p. 14)

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[1] **[Tr.]** *Erhaltung der Kraft*, i.e., the conservation of energy, as the law was usually called in German in the nineteenth century (Helmholtz, 1847). Gutberlet's *Kraft* in the physical passages corresponds to "energy"; *lebendige Kraft* (vis viva) to kinetic energy; *Spannkraft* to potential energy.

[2] Metaph. p. 86 ff.

[3] Metaph. p. 213 ff.

[4] **[Tr.]** *Lebendige Kraft*: vis viva, kinetic energy.

[5] The velocity v is equal to the ratio of space to time, $v = s/t$. If, therefore, v is to be infinite, then either, with a finite time (t) of the motion, the space traversed must be infinitely great, or, with a finite space, the time must be infinitely small. For only ∞/t or $s/0$ is $= \infty$.

[6] Cf. Naturphil. p. 46 ff.

[7] That motion cannot belong to matter "originally" lies clearly in its essence, but is moreover specially proved by us in the Metaphysics, p. 87 ff., in the proposition that change cannot be the original nature of any being.

[8] Cf. Secchi, *Einheit d. Naturkr.* [The Unity of the Physical Forces], especially II, p. 325 ff.

§ 2. There Exists A. a Necessary, Self-Existent, Uncreated Being and a Last Cause; B. This Is Not Matter, but C. God.

The first three marks by which we here determine the concept of God can be used for more or less different proofs; but they also hang together in themselves so closely that with the one the other two are given. For a being that is not produced must be through itself; this, however, is not to mean that it has produced itself, which would include an absurdity, but that by virtue of its essence it exists with absolute necessity. Likewise absolute necessity of existence comes only from an essential demand in a being not produced; for if one wished to say that it was produced by another with necessity, then the necessity of the producing rests on a necessity of existence, which finally at some point is conditioned by an essence of a being through itself. Still more easily does being-through-itself lead to the two other determinations.

A. 1. *There exists a necessary being.*

Something exists. This is either necessary or contingent. If it is necessary, then we have a necessary being; if it is contingent, then it presupposes a necessary being. For the contingent is of itself indifferent to existence and non-existence, and thus needs, in order that it may exist, another which determines it to existence. This other is now either necessary or again contingent. If it is necessary, then a necessary being exists. If it is contingent, then it needs another in order to exist; and this other is again contingent or necessary, and so on. Now, however, one must at some point make a halt in this grounding, because otherwise that which actually exists would be without ground; for that which exists demands a ground which is actual, i.e., without condition. With the contingent, however, one cannot stop in the grounding, because it always points back to another. Therefore the last ground of the contingent is the necessary.

2. *There exists a self-existent, unproduced being.* Not everything can have been produced by another. For outside everything there is nothing, and thus also no other that could *(p. 15)* produce. But neither can anything be produced by itself, since it cannot produce sooner than it exists. Since now everything produced must be produced either by itself or by another, not everything can be produced. But a being which exists and

is not produced must exist of itself. Therefore there exists a self-existent, unproduced being.

The self-existent being, however, must not be taken, with some who wish to declare the concept self-contradictory, as *causa sui* [cause of itself]. For that something cannot be the cause of itself is obvious.

Two things are contained in the concept of the *ens a se* [being from itself]: 1°. it is not from another; 2°. it has the ground of its being in itself. If one also expresses the latter by designating existing as an exigency of the essence of the *ens a se*, this must naturally not be misunderstood as if the essence craved for existence — as long as the essence does not yet exist, it can of course not crave for existence; the sense of that exigency of the essence is rather this, that the essence of the *ens a se* necessarily demands existence, so that the latter cannot be separated from the essence at all, as this is indeed possible in the contingent being, whose essence can be purely ideal, without existence.

If, then, one asks which essence of the *ens a se* demands existence, the ideal or the real, we answer in the sense of the question: Neither of the two; not the ideal, for it is not and thus can demand nothing; not the real, for it already has existence. Rather one must say: the real essence has existence as necessarily as each of its constituents; it belongs to its concept as, say, being round belongs to the concept of the circle. The demand of the essence is thus only the absolute requirement and necessity of being existent.

3. In the contingent being, which of itself is only possible and can become actual through another, possibility precedes actuality in time or at least in nature. Absolutely speaking, however, actuality must precede possibility; for if nothing were actual, nothing would be possible, because something can be made only through the actual. But if everything were contingent, then possibility would precede actuality absolutely. Therefore there is a necessary being.

(p. 16) 4. Not even an eternal cycle, an infinite series of generations, or more generally of productions, puts contingent beings in a position to be able to dispense with a necessary being as cause. For

a) if the individual members of the series are contingent, then so is the whole series, be it small or great, be it even infinite. There are indeed determinations which belong to the individual parts but not to the whole, and conversely, namely those which are proper to the part as such by itself, or to the whole as a sum; but determinations which belong to the parts by virtue of their independent essence, which they cannot lose even in combination, must also be predicated of the whole. Contingency, however, belongs to the innermost essence of things, and therefore belongs to them just as well in a sum, even if it were infinite. But if the whole infinite series is contingent, then it needs another in order that it may exist, and so we must postulate a necessary being for it again, just as without an infinite series.

b) Whether an infinite series of existing things is possible is very doubtful, but an infinite series of dependent causes without an uncaused cause is evidently absurd. The logical process of the grounding of the one through the other can indeed be continued to infinity, through the whole of eternity, by anyone who pleases. But because the first effect to be explained already exists, its sufficient cause must also already exist, and thus must not be left continually conditioned, as happens in the logical progression without end. One must therefore at some point stop at a cause no longer conditioned, i.e., at an uncaused cause.

c) However the matter may stand with the possibility of an infinite number, an infinite number of changes is contradictory. Cf. Metaph. p. 213 ff.

d) In the conditional syllogism one can obtain a categorical conclusion only if the minor premise is categorical, i.e., affirms the one condition of the major premise or denies the *conditionatum* [that which is conditioned]. In the former case the conclusion categorically affirms the *conditionatum*; in the other it categorically denies the condition. Now the relation of dependence of causes can be expressed through a conditional proposition. Let an effect now existing be called A, its cause B, whose cause C, and so on. Thus one has:

(p. 17)

> *A exists, if B exists, B exists, if C exists, C exists, if D exists, and so on.*

If now not even one minor premise says categorically, “There exists a Z,” then it can never be said, “Therefore A exists”; and yet this logical procedure is supposed to demonstrate the justification of the statement of the existence of A.

Or let one say:

> *A does not exist, if B does not exist, B does not exist, if C does not exist, C does not exist, if D does not exist, and so on.*

If, then, it is not even once said categorically, “But now Z exists,” then it can never be said, “Therefore A exists.”

Moreover, there is really no need of a lengthy proof that a necessary, unconditioned being exists; only the greatest thoughtlessness can hold everything to be conditioned without something conditioning; the deniers of God gladly concede this, but declare matter or other beings to be the necessary. Therefore it is far more important to prove the contingency of matter and of the beings of the world. When later the infinity, simplicity, unity, etc. are inferred from the necessity of the divine being, then the palpable impossibility of identifying matter, or the world in general, with the necessary (divine) being is also thereby demonstrated.

B. From the consideration of matter itself, however, a direct proof for the existence of a creative spirit can also be gained.

1. Matter is essentially inert, i.e., of itself incapable of determining itself to motion and rest. This property is also called the power of persistence [inertia], inasmuch as matter, when it is in motion, persists in it until an external cause determines it to rest, and when it is at rest, must persist in it until an external cause sets it in motion. From this it now follows that matter has no necessary existence, no existence of itself. For to be of itself means: to exist by virtue of its essence; if, then, matter were of itself, the essence would determine it to existence, or the essence would demand existence. But matter must exist either at rest or in motion. If, then, the essence of matter demands its existence, it must demand either an existence at rest or in motion.

(p. 18) But it cannot demand an existence at rest, because the essence of matter is as indifferent to rest as to motion; and had the essence determined it to an existence at rest, then rest would belong to the essence of matter, and it could not be disturbed without destroying its essence. Likewise the essence cannot demand an existence in motion, because it is indifferent to this; and if it demanded motion, then it would be essential to the body to move. Matter, therefore, had to be produced by an external cause, which put it into existence at its pleasure at rest or in motion.

2. In order to make possible objections impossible, we take other properties of matter besides inertia. The atoms are of themselves indifferent to every state of aggregation, and yet they must necessarily be in one of them, namely either in the solid or liquid or aeriform or in a super-gaseous state. Here one cannot say: The essence demands to be liquid with the capacity of becoming solid; for it is wholly and entirely indifferent to both states. For these conditions depend 1°. on the distance of the atoms from one another. Of themselves, however, the particles have no determinate distance. 2°. On the relation of molecular attraction to expansive force, i.e., on the preponderance of the rotating motion over their progressive motion, or vice versa.[1] Now, however, no atom demands a determinate speed in rotating or progressive motion. Therefore the relation of cohesion and expansion does not depend on matter; its essence is wholly indifferent to every relation of these. It can also be designated as experimentally demonstrated that every substance, even the so-called permanent gases, can be converted into every form of aggregation. If, then, the atoms had existence by virtue of their essence, they would have to exist undetermined, i.e., neither gaseous nor liquid, nor solid, nor in any other form. But if they were produced by a (free) cause, then this could let them begin to exist in the form in

which it willed, with the destination of assuming other forms through external influences.

3. Matter is indifferent to every number and size of the atoms and to every shape of the molecules. And yet the smallest particles cannot be without determinate size, number and shape. Therefore they are from another.

(p. 19) 4. In order, however, to be independent of all physical views exposed to objection, let us consider the locality of matter. Every atom must necessarily be at some place in space. Of itself, however, it is wholly indifferent to each, thus to infinitely many places. Therefore it cannot exist of itself. For if the existence demanded by the essence manifested itself at place *a* before and independently of every external influence, then the place *a* would have to be demanded by the essence, which is absurd. And this absurdity is repeated as many times as atoms are supposed to have existence at a determinate place by virtue of their essence.

Indeed it would be pure chance if A were originally at place *a*, since, if no external cause determined this place, it could just as well have been originally at innumerably many other places. Such an external cause, however, is excluded if the atom is through itself alone, by virtue of its essence. But the probability of its being at place *a* can be calculated quite exactly from the ratio of the one favorable case to the infinitely many possible ones. It is namely = $1/\infty = 0$: an improbability which, according to mathematical rules, is wholly identical with the certainty of the non-occurrence of the case in question. A is therefore, without a localizing cause which is not given with its essence, quite certainly not at *a*. But for the same reason not at *b*, *c*, *d*, and so on. Therefore nowhere, if it is supposed to exist by virtue of its essence and consequently to be originally at a place by virtue of its essence. But a body must be at some place. Therefore this can only be determined for it from outside, and its existence, which demands some place, must be given it from outside.

5. However one may conceive the inertia of the primordial atoms, in any case it belongs to every matter equally, and none can surpass another in self-determination to rest and motion. If, then, their essence demanded existence, say, at rest, then all atoms would have to have been originally at rest, and in that universal rest it would then have remained for all eternity, especially since no atom of itself demands a lesser distance from one than from a third, and therefore their wholly homogeneous mass offered not the slightest occasion for a motion through disturbance of its equilibrium. Only by an atom’s being at some time moved or brought out of the position of equilibrium could a further general motion be achieved.

Had the essence determined the atoms to an existence in motion (which indeed is against the essence of matter), then, given the equal mobility of all matters, all would have had to have the same speed, direction and form of motion. But with this again an eternal standstill *(p. 20)* of the world-processes would have been given. For then a disturbance of the equilibrium, by which they are conditioned, would have been impossible.

6. In particular, all matters would then have had that form, speed and direction of motion on which electrical activity depends, or all that on which thermal or chemical, etc., motion depends. Now, however, the processes of nature are maintained through the transformation of these forces into one another, and through differences in the intensities of motion, so that it is not to be doubted that, when once all bodies shall have equal heat-motion, the course of nature falls prey to an eternal death.

Furthermore, with the exclusion of external influence of motion, it remains without any sufficient reason that electrical motion should appear before chemical, or vice versa, potential energy or tension before actual; and yet matter, if its essence demanded an existence in motion, must originally appear in one of them. And this absurdity includes infinitely many in itself. For matter can of itself have infinitely many directions, velocities and forms of motion (elliptical with innumerable variations, oscillating with infinitely many modifications, etc.). If, then, it is supposed to have its motion of itself, it must also originally receive of itself one single determinate direction, speed and form, wherein lies a manifest contradiction, which recurs as often as one of the infinitely many possibilities is given out as actual.

Therefore the essence of matters cannot be the ground of motion. But neither can it be the ground of the rest of matter. Therefore also not of its existence, because this cannot be without rest or motion.

Should one wish to give out as possible, between the two members of the alternative, a third — that the essence demands matters at rest but endowed with attractive force, which then initiated motion — then this has already been answered in the first proof of God's existence. Here we add further that the forces of attraction require a certain distance of the matters in order to become active. Now, however, matters can have infinitely many distances from one another, and without an external cause it is pure chance that they find themselves precisely in the sphere corresponding to the effect, which is relatively very small. And this all the more, as the atoms could be placed in infinite space in infinitely many ways. Were they even infinitely many, *(p. 21)* still the possibility of motion points to empty spaces; but these empty spaces could in and of themselves — since the atoms are, after all, not as many as there could be, and thus infinitely many other quantities of them just as well as the present ones are possible — have an infinite variety of size, and with this the atoms would move into infinitely many different distances from one another, in which they could not act upon one another. In fact our solar system is so little filled with matters that, if one disposed the parts of the mass of the system regularly within the sphere which the orbit of the outermost planet, Neptune, determines, the matters would be so rarefied (removed from one another) that they could no longer act upon one another.

7. Thus, then, it would be beyond all doubt that matter does not exist by virtue of its essence, is not through itself, but is produced by another. This would already suffice

a) for the complete annihilation of modern atheism, which appears almost only in the form of materialism, namely declares matter to be the only being that is through itself.

But how one arrives, b), from the conditionedness of matter at a Creator, the following consideration shows. If matter cannot be of itself, it must be produced by another. This other cannot again be matter, since, like all matter, this matter too would again have to be from another, and this other, if it is material, again from another, until one comes to an other which is not matter. Therefore an immaterial being, and indeed not, say, a world-soul, but a pure spirit, must be the cause of the existence of matter. For if it were immaterial in the sense in which a soul is that is bound to matter, dependent on matter in being and acting, then this soul would have released its matter either from itself through emanation, or produced it through an activity. The former is absurd, since from the simple immaterial nothing material can flow; the second is absurd, because the activity of such a principle depends on matter, thus presupposes it, and therefore cannot first posit it.

If, then, a spirit produced matter, it produced it either from other matter or from its own substance or from nothing. The first is impossible, because no other matter was yet there; for we must state the cause of all matter, even of that which was to serve as matter for others.

(p. 22) But neither could the spirit produce matter from its own substance, since out of the spiritual, wholly indivisible substance nothing at all, least of all matter, can be made.

Therefore only out of nothing (*ex nihilo sui et subjecti* [out of nothing of itself and of a subject]) could he make matter, i.e., he had to create it. Since, further, creation has no existing object of activity — which indeed is first to come to be through it — it cannot be conceived as a transitive activity, but must be conceived as an immanent activity. The immanent activities of spirit, however, are only knowing and willing. Therefore a personal spirit, endowed with knowledge and will, is the last cause of the world. Such a one, however, we call God.

[1] Cf. Secchi, l.c., I, p. 67 ff.

§ 3. God's Existence Is Proved from the Various Grades of Perfection.

1. Among the things of the world there are gradations of perfection, and therefore a most perfect among them. The less perfect are certainly finite and therefore not of themselves, i.e., by virtue of their essence. For above them up to the infinite, and below them down to nothing, there are infinitely many grades of essences just as possible as the existing ones. If, then, the essences of these few existing things demanded to be realized, then for exactly the same reason (or still more urgently in the case of the more perfect essences) infinitely many grades of things would have to exist. This, however, is in fact not the case; and were it so, then above and beside all the things of the world there would also exist an infinite being, since this in any case has more necessity of being, namely God. Therefore at least the grades standing below the most perfect being need a cause. Since now causes must be equal to or more perfect than their effects, the most perfect being must be the cause of all the degrees of being standing below it. Therefore there is a highest being which is the cause of the things of the world standing below it. This, however, is God, and indeed

a) a personal God, who freely selected some out of all possible things,

b) Creator, since his selection decided between being and nothing,

c) infinitely perfect, because otherwise, according to the above, he could not be of himself and would need a cause, and so could not be the last cause. *(p. 23)* Indeed, of the infinite alone one cannot conclude that, if its essence demands to exist, for the same reason all others demand to exist.

2. Both the individuals of one and the same species and also the species and genera are, the one more perfect than the other. Wherever a difference of degree exists, there is an (at least relatively) highest. The highest, however, is always the cause of all less perfect beings. For if one considers

a) the gradation within the same species, then not all the variously perfect individuals of the same species can have their being of themselves. For to be of oneself means to be by virtue of one's essence. Since now the essence in beings of the same species is exactly the same, all would have to have wholly equal being; a gradation would be impossible. Several of them therefore have a cause, which in any case cannot be less perfect than its effect. This is now either α) a *causa univoca* [univocal cause] (of the same kind and name as its effect), and then only the highest of the species can be the cause of the lower. Thus the greatest heat, that of the sun, is the cause of all lower degrees of warmth, the most perfect man the cause of all other men. Now this species is either αα) the highest of all genera, and then the highest is the cause of all things which have the same essence with it, and, as will be shown immediately (under b), mediately the cause of all species and genera; or it is ββ) not the highest, and then it has a cause in a higher, and (according to b) finally in the highest.

But if they have β) a *causa aequivoca* [equivocal cause] (of a different name), then this must be sought in a higher species or genus, which again leads to a highest genus as the cause of all the rest.

For if we consider b) the gradations of all the genera themselves, then it is again clear that the genera cannot all be of themselves. For there is no reason at all why beings existing through themselves should be variously perfect. As a reason one could only adduce that it lies in their essence to be variously perfect, i.e., they are precisely variously perfect essences which demand existence. But if some of these graded essences demand existence, then all possible essences demand existence for the same reason, and then there also exists an infinitely perfect being, God. But since all possible beings do not in fact exist, not all existing ones can have their existence of themselves, but must in part have been produced. Naturally this does not hold of all, since otherwise everything would be produced, and yet no producing cause would exist. Since now the cause cannot be less perfect than the effect, the lower genus can be produced only by the higher, and so finally all can be produced only by the highest. The highest degree of perfection in the world is therefore the cause of all lower degrees; but a highest being which has produced the world we call God.

3. In still closer adherence to St. Thomas, one can set forth the same proof in somewhat the following formulation. What a thing has by virtue of its essence, it cannot possess in a higher and lesser degree than another which has the same essence; for the essence is one and indivisible, without gradation; if one adds something, then one has a new essence, but not the *(p. 24)* former one in a higher degree. Just as, when one adds a new unit to a number, the former number does not remain in a higher degree, but a new one arises. Successive essences behave, as Aristotle remarks, like successive numbers. No man can have human nature more than another; the one can be called more a man than the other only in a figurative sense, inasmuch as accidental perfections resulting from human nature are more developed in the one than in the other. If the essences of those perfections exist, then they too cannot be greater and smaller. For the essence of wisdom, power, etc., is only one. Wisdom, therefore, which exists by virtue of this essence, is not capable of increase. If, then, any reality is possessed by different beings in a higher and lesser degree, then either all, or at least all with the exception of one, have it not through their essence; rather it lies outside the essence and must therefore have another cause. I say that, with the exception of one, that reality cannot be grounded through the essence; for every essence has a determinate degree of perfection, and the being which possesses this degree can have it through the essence itself. Only those beings which possess the reality in a lesser degree than corresponds to the essence cannot have it through the simple realization of the essence. Now, further, the cause must always be more perfect than its effect; therefore the being with the perfection in the highest degree must be the cause of those perfections in a lesser degree, presupposing that the cause is to be sought within the same genus, is a *causa univoca*.

Let us apply this to being. There are very different degrees in the perfection of existences. All which possess a perfection in a lesser degree therefore do not have it by virtue of their essence; rather it is caused in them. Only in one can it be uncaused, essential, and this can only be the most perfect in being, because only this can be the cause of the more imperfect. But there must be an uncaused self-existent, because not all being can be caused. Nor can the cause lie outside the genus of that which is to be produced, since outside of what is there is only nothing. Therefore there exists a being which has being by virtue of its essence, to which being is essence, which is being itself and the cause of all that is. This we call God.[1]

Against this demonstration a not contemptible objection arises. What, after all, is to be understood by the being whose gradations are considered? Existing, or the merely possible reality of things, or at least the reality that abstracts from existence? If one understands existing, then it is not true that it belongs to the various things of the world in various degrees; for it is just as absurd to say that man exists more than the animal as that Socrates is more a man than Plato. But if one understands the reality of the variously perfect things, then there are indeed gradations in it, but nothing common to all except the indeterminate concept of being or something. Being-something, however, belongs

(p. 25) to every thing by virtue of its essence, and there is none, however low it may stand in the scale of beings, which would not be something by virtue of its essence, namely that which the essence signifies. If now this being belongs also to God by virtue of his essence, it does not follow that he exists.

To this it is to be replied that what is to be understood is the existence determined by the essence, the existence of a determinate reality, which therefore itself grows and diminishes with the degrees of the reality from which it is not distinct. In fact man has more existence than the animal, and this more than the plant, although in the concept of existence all things agree. There is, therefore, a gradation in existing (which would not be possible if existence were essence to everything), and therefore a highest existence, which is the cause of all existences.

[1] Cf. Kleutgen, *Philos. d. Vorz.* [Die Philosophie der Vorzeit, The Philosophy of Former Times], vol. 2, n. 920 ff.

§ 4. The Teleological Proof of God's Existence.

The oldest and most vivid proof for God's existence concludes from the order of this world, specially from its purposive arrangement, to an intelligent author, and is accordingly called the physico-theological or teleological proof of God's existence.

According to that twofold point of view under which one can consider the arrangement of the world, it receives two different formulations, which can, however, easily be reduced to one another.

A. Every ordered work requires an intelligent orderer. The arrangement of the world, however, exhibits a truly astonishing order. Therefore it requires most urgently an intelligent orderer. *Nil agit propter finem nisi causa intelligens.* [Nothing acts for an end except an intelligent cause.]

Or B: A cause which employs determinate means for the attainment of determinate ends must be intelligent; now, however, in the arrangement of the world the finest and most effective means are ordered to the attainment of the highest and most manifold ends. Therefore an intelligence is the cause of the arrangement of the world.

If the first argument is distinguished before the second by the immediate evidence of its minor premise, then conversely in the second the major premise is far clearer than in the first. Namely, it would hardly be denied by anyone that whoever employs determinate means for the attainment of determinate goals must have understanding, in order to know the end as such and to propose it to himself, and to know and select the means accordingly as purposive; what is denied is that means are really employed in nature in order to *(p. 26)* attain ends. It is indeed admitted that objectively certain arrangements further certain ends, but according to the materialists no one has intended these ends. Our eye is admittedly arranged rather purposively for seeing, but it was not arranged so in order to see; rather, because it happens to be so arranged, we see with it.

In the first of the syllogisms set forth above, on the other hand, the minor is so evident that only frivolity can carp at the order, specially the objective purposiveness of the arrangement of the world. But more serious misgivings arise against the major premise; for experience teaches too clearly that even without any influence of an intelligence an ordered relation, even that of purposiveness, forms itself of itself here and there. And theoretical consideration shows evidently that even by blind forces an ordered combination of elements can at some time be brought about. For order is not a product really distinct from the ordered, but one of all the possible arrangements of the parts, of which they, if the parts are set in motion by any cause whatever, must necessarily assume one. And so blind forces too can, indeed must, at some time create an ordered combination.

And nevertheless we hold quite decidedly that both A. the order of this world demands an intelligent author, and also B. that in nature purposive means are employed with deliberation for the attainment of determinate ends. And indeed for the proof we can

1. rely on the immediate evidence of both propositions. Everyone who does not approach the consideration of the arrangement of the world with the express intention of fending off God cannot help A. demanding an intelligence as the author of this wonderful and grandiose order; he beholds B. immediately, in the artful arrangement especially of the life-processes and their organs for their openly evident ends, the deliberating calculation of a being acting according to ends.

2. Naturally we do not wish by this to ascribe to these spontaneous exercises of human thought the same immediacy as to the intuition of the first principles; they are and remain conclusions, whose premises, to be sure, are not always actually found in consciousness; it is precisely the task of science to bring them actually into consciousness and to examine, or rather establish, their probative force. And indeed those formulations of the teleological proof of God's existence rest first

(p. 27) a) on an argument from analogy. Exceptionless experience in one's own life and that of others teaches everyone that without intention and deliberation no purposiveness and no order is to be attained, and that the

necessity and the degree of intelligence are exactly proportional to these. If, therefore, we demand with the greatest urgency a highest intelligence for the most astonishing order and purposiveness in nature, by a conclusion *a minori ad majus* [from the lesser to the greater], then the consequence can be called into question only if one shows by positive reasons the incorrectness of the proportion laid at the basis. Now, however, there are

α) no such reasons, and the materialists know how to bring forward in their stead only abuse, such as accusations of anthropomorphism, dualism and the like.

β) And precisely the unscientific character with which they reproach us by such catchwords is on their side. For the scientific method does not bring in arbitrary, somehow conceivable forces for the explanation of phenomena, but employs, as long as possible, the nearest causes, those connected with known ones. Is it not regarded as one of the highest merits of the exact modern sciences that they explain the motion of the heavenly bodies not by arbitrary unknown and extraterrestrial forces, but by attraction, which also governs the petty happenings here among us? It is therefore unscientific, in the explanation of order, to reject the cause that lies nearest to us, the best known and most suitable, intelligence, and to appeal to unknown "primordial forces" and "primordial dispositions" and the like.

b) If, therefore, we claim for the explanation of order through intelligence even only the value of a hypothesis, it has all the marks which secure for a scientific assumption the preference over all other attempts at explanation. It is not merely free of contradiction in itself, and stands in contradiction with none of the facts to be explained, but explains all phenomena in the simplest and most vivid way, as will become still more clearly evident from the refutation of the objections and from the discussions on the essence and the attributes of God and his relation to the world.

3. When the materialists give out order as one of the possible combinations of the elements, producible even without a special cause, their only reason for it is that this combination *(p. 28)* is factual because it could be so. Pure possibility, however, is not a sufficient reason for actuality: *A posse ad esse non valet illatio.* [From "can be" to "is," the inference is not valid.] Now, admittedly, we do not have pure absolute possibility, but an actuality, the motion of the elements, which must bring to light some arrangement, but produces a determinate one purely by chance. But if pure chance is claimed as the ground for the actuality of an event, then there speaks for it only a more or less great probability, which can easily be estimated approximately from the ratio of all possible cases to the cases favorable for the occurrence, but calculated more exactly with the help of combinatorial analysis.

Even without mathematical knowledge it is clear to everyone that the probability is the smaller, the more possible and the fewer favorable cases there are for the occurrence of the event. The number of possible cases of the arrangement of the elements depends on the number of the elements themselves and on the possible positions which each can assume individually. If these elements are to be arranged not merely according to one law, but according to several at once, then the possible cases are thereby made more and the favorable fewer, thus the probability for so complicated an order far smaller. If now this order is not merely to come about once, but to endure and, when disturbed, to restore itself, and even to maintain itself without end, then for this chance event the number of possible cases — since in every moment a destruction of the order would be possible — is infinitely increased, or that of the favorable ones vanishingly small; the probability for a chance production of such an order is a minimum, i.e., quite certainly it does not occur.

If we apply this to the order of the world, then the number of the atoms is incalculably great; in infinite space each atom can assume infinitely many positions and situations relative to others. The number of the laws and their interlocking with one another is, for all its simplicity, unfathomable; the order of nature is founded, by virtue of its arrangement,[1] upon eternal duration, not rigid but mobile. Therefore in manifold respects the probability for its chance occurrence is = 0, i.e., quite certainly it did not come about by chance.

(p. 29) The highest principles of the calculus of probabilities here indicated are more or less known to all thinking men; therefore they do not, indeed, deny to individual very imperfect arrangements with very few elements the possibility of a chance origin, but they are convinced that not even *one* organ of life is possible without intelligence, let alone the unfathomably grandiose order of the world with its ever-recurring regularity.

4. The detailed calculation of the probability for the chance origin of the order of the world we have given in "Natur und Offenbarung" [Nature and Revelation], vol. 17; we give here a short outline of it.

Let the inconceivable number of the atoms (which we there determined at $15 \cdot 10^{73}$) be a. Their various positions relative to one another are, as the number of their possible permutations, $= a\ (a-1)\ (a-2)\ (a-3)\ \ldots\ldots\ 3 \cdot 2 \cdot 1 = a!$ Now, however, each element can have infinitely many positions already in a linear direction in finite space, infinitely more in infinite space, again infinitely more on the infinitely many lines of an infinite plane, and once more infinitely more in the infinitely many planes which are possible in infinite space. The probability for the chance occurrence of even one ordered combination would accordingly be

The probability that one event *and* another occur simultaneously is obtained by calculating the probability for each individually and multiplying the values obtained with one another. Accordingly the probability that the elements exhibit not merely one law, but unfathomably many (n), is =

That this arrangement now occurs not merely *once*, but the first time *and* the second time *and* the third time, etc., without end, for this the probability is

Therefore, by approximate estimate,

Now a proper fraction becomes ever smaller the more it is multiplied by itself, so that, if the numerator is very small in relation to the denominator, already after a finite, sufficiently long continued multiplication the product is set = 0. Since now in our case a, and still more $a!$, is very great, W would quite certainly, with mathematical exactness, be = 0, even if we took ∞ as a finite very great number. But every proper fraction raised to the power ∞ is quite exactly = 0. If $W < 1/2$, the event is already *(p. 30)* regarded as improbable; but if W = 0, then according to the concept of mathematical probability it *certainly does not* occur.

5. Against this exposition the materialists will object that the order of the world did not produce itself all at once, as the calculation assumes; only after infinitely many intermediate members, which for lack of purposiveness did not obtain permanence, could the present arrangement come out, which has precisely only that minimum of purposiveness without which it would collapse (Schopenhauer). Since, moreover, one has eternity at one's disposal, all combinations had to play themselves out gradually.

This objection assumes either a consistently progressing process of development, or so-called "blind trials of nature." In the former case the probability is exactly the same as that for the production of order at one stroke.

For here too the probability for each new law which is introduced by the new development must be calculated individually, and the small fractions of probability obtained multiplied with one another. For what is asked is the probability that with the conformity to law in the 1st stage of development there is *also* combined that of the 2nd, 3rd, 4th, etc. The product so obtained, however, has exactly the same factors as that calculated above.

Even without calculation everyone sees that the probability for a *consistent* development upward of the atoms to a determinate order by pure chance is rather still smaller than for the immediate hitting upon this order.

But if one assumes *blind trials*, then there lies

a) already a contradiction in this, inasmuch as *blind chance* is incompatible with *trials* which strive after a goal. In fact the process, if it was not guided, could already after the first confusion have ended in eternal rest through neutralization of the chemical and through equalization of the physical forces.

b) Mathematically, on this supposition, the question is put thus: What probability is there that an order comes out the 1st time, or *at least* the 2nd time, or *at least* the 3rd time, etc.? If the probability for the first order taken by itself is W1, for the 2nd W2, for the 3rd W3, etc., then the probability that it comes out at least the *n*th time is W = 1 – (1 – W1) (1 – W2) (1 – W3) ……. (1 – Wn). But now the probability for a single order with only *one* conformity to law was already = 0; therefore W = 1 – (1 – 0) (1 – 0) (1 – 0) … *in infinitum* = 0.

(p. 31) But that in the present world only a minimum of purposiveness exists is evidently false, as already the aesthetic disposition of the world, observed throughout over and above utility, shows.

6. The greatest weight, however, materialism lays on the conformity to law of the forces of nature, which, to the exclusion of all chance, by virtue of immanent purposive activity, demanded this order.

But this is

1°. in its universality false; for it is clearly evident that innumerable arrangements of nature could, without prejudice to the mechanical, physical and chemical forces of the atoms, either not be there at all or be quite different. What A. v. Humboldt says of astronomical laws: “We know as yet no inner necessity, no mechanical law of nature, which makes the said six elements of the planetary orbits and the form of their orbits dependent on one another and on their mean distances,” holds with unspeakably more urgent necessity of the organic and psychic arrangements of nature.

2°. With that excuse the necessity of an ordering cause is not removed, but only shifted from one point to another; namely from the ordered results into the forces demanding the order, for which our calculation above can be repeated exactly, and at some points even strengthened. For since, absolutely speaking, infinitely many atoms with infinitely many different properties and forces, and indeed at (threefold) infinitely many points of space with infinitely many different velocities, directions and forms of motion, can exist, it is evidently left to pure chance that precisely these few atoms exist with these quite determinate properties, mutual positions, with this intensity, direction and form of motion, which had to produce the present order through their development.

7. Since, then, the order of the world cannot be ascribed to chance, but must derive from a special cause, this is to be sought either a) in the nature and law-governed manner of action of the matters, or b) in an orderer standing above them.

Now, however, the former is inadmissible, while the latter demands a higher intelligence distinct from the matters. Therefore . . .

The conformity to law immanent in the nature of matters can be understood in a threefold way. α) The elements of the world are material *(p. 32)* atoms with forces which blindly but necessarily achieve order. β) The elements are animated and intelligent. γ) The elements are only moments of one and the same primordial force. All three assumptions, however, are absurd.

The first leads, as we have already seen, to the chance theory; and even if the existence of those law-governed forces were conceded, without a cause which sets them in motion, and gives the motion a determinate direction, form and speed, and which brings them into a determinate distance from one another, neither beginning nor progress of the development would be possible.

The second assumption is hardly made by anyone, at least not in earnest; but it is in any case monstrous and absurd. For the atoms give not the slightest sign of intelligence and freedom, but act according to strictly measured mechanical laws. And again, their existence in finite number and with determinate law-governed

properties could be explained only by a selecting and determining cause lying outside them, which would have to have life and intelligence at least as necessarily as they.

The third, pantheistic assumption is absurd, as will become more clearly evident in the refutation of the doctrine of identity. For the present let this suffice. Either that primordial force drives the atoms forth out of itself with natural necessity, or it posits them with consciousness and freedom. If the former is the case, then it is pure chance that precisely such a primordial force exists as demands these few elements with determinate properties, etc., and for the probability of its existence exactly the same calculations as above can again be repeated. For the order is then considered, instead of in its results, in a very special primordial force demanding it, in whose place, however, infinitely many other and different primordial forces with quite different demands could exist. But if the primordial force posits the atoms with conscious freedom, then it can posit them not in itself, but only outside itself; for that which thinks cannot be extended and manifold. But an intelligence which freely posits the atoms of the world outside itself is that which the teleological proof of God's existence seeks.

There remains, therefore, only the second member of the alternative made above, namely the existence of an orderer of the world standing above the matters. He must, however, be conceived as a free spirit, since he, as remarked above, had to determine the number of the finite atoms, measure out their properties and forces, fix the point of time of the beginning of the motion *(p. 33)* of the world, decide between the infinitely many positions and situations of the atoms, between different directions and velocities of their motion, and lay out the whole development of the world beforehand in thought, all of which presupposes deliberation and choice.

8. Since the choice of the orderer of the world did not take place between existing favorable and unfavorable elements — the unfavorable ones do not exist, at any rate not as many of them as would be possible — but between existing and possible ones, he has produced the former.

The same results also from the essential constitution of the elements themselves, which is so much emphasized by the atheists. It cannot be denied that some laws of the order of the world are demanded by the essence of the matters themselves, or at least are co-determined by the essence under external influence. Therefore the adequate principle of order determined the essence of the elements, or: the cause which determined the essence of the elements is the last ground of the order. But only the Creator can act determinatively upon the essence of things.

But should one nevertheless wish to assume a demiurge, who used the favorable elements offered him for order, then he too would indeed have to be intelligent, but above him a creating intelligence would then still have to be assumed as the cause of the selected atoms, and this we call God.

9. According to what has been said so far, the two forms of the teleological proof of God's existence which we touched on at the beginning are to be formulated thus.

A. Even if one grants that a very imperfect order can at some time come about incidentally, and even a more perfect one through blind forces as its proximate cause, still the complicated order of the world must have a cause of its own (*causa per se* [a cause through itself], not *per accidens* [by accident]), and this, on account of its innumerable contingencies, must in the last instance be determined by a freely choosing intelligence.

B. That the purposive arrangements in the world are really intended and determined for their ends by an intelligence results in a similar way. That the purposiveness is not there by accident is proved by the determinations of probability made above. Now the ends which are attained in the world are all contingent, i.e., innumerably many others are just as possible and could be achieved in their stead, and each individual end could be attained in very different ways. Thus, e.g., instead of the existing organisms *(p. 34)* innumerably many others, individually or specifically or generically different, could exist. Instead of the present functions of life and their organs, innumerably many others can be thought, through which the same

or at least similar goals would be attained. Therefore a freely creating intelligence has set these determinate goals and selected the means corresponding to them, i.e., the purposiveness in nature is intended by an intelligent being.

[1] Even if not by virtue of the matter and of the living energy with which it maintains itself.

§ 5. Refutation of Some Objections.

1. The reproaches which the materialists make against the order of nature come down to petty, short-sighted or malicious insinuations, by which the force of our proof is not in the least impaired. Even if things contrary to purpose in nature were demonstrated, even if, as is passionately asserted, the contrary-to-purpose were the rule and the serviceable the exception, could the existing purposiveness then come about by chance? Just as little as a book that is full of slips of the pen. One must be astonished at the frivolity and ingratitude which, in the face of the grandiose, wise and blessing-dispensing arrangement of the world, presumes to carp at individual arrangements, especially as we still know the whole so little, and every new advance of science is a brilliant justification of the order. Would it not be wiser then to confess our ignorance? In fact, however, all those criticisms are only distortions. With respect to a proximate end, which we happen to have in our short-sighted eye, many a thing may appear purposeless, indeed contrary to purpose; but nothing can be brought forward which would not have its end in the whole and so represent a still higher order of ends.

2. The materialists have very much to report about the *wastefulness* in nature. “In order that a few organisms may come to development, nature lets millions and millions of germs perish; in order that some animals may have nourishment, thousands and thousands must die an agonizing death.” —

But even if there lay in this a purposeless waste, there would still be combined with it again as many purposive arrangements as there are beings, most purposively formed or at least so disposed, that are wasted. Can, now, because of one fault amid incalculably many orders of ends, the *(p. 35)* whole arrangement be ascribed to blindly ruling forces? But since, further, ends are also attained by it, namely the development and conservation of other, mostly higher beings, one can still never call the arrangement contrary to purpose, but at most less purposive; that the present arrangement of the world is not the best conceivable, we gladly admit.

But in the present case not even a lack of perfect purposiveness is to be conceded. For the only end of those many organisms which are sacrificed is not those few individuals which come to development, or which live on them. Besides the value, namely, which every being has in and of itself, which is represented by the individuals, the position which it has in the whole, and which is determined by the species and genus, must also be taken into view. If a species is a necessary or at least very important member in the whole of the world, then never too many means can be employed to preserve even only some individuals, on which the continuance of the species depends, since on these means the whole arrangement of nature, or at least a determinate division of it, is dependent.

Even if so close a real connection of this or that organism with the whole cannot always be demonstrated (e.g., of the tapeworms, for whose difficult preservation nature musters a countless number of germs), the ideal belonging-together with the whole of the world is all the more evident. For nature is so conspicuously disposed for richness and manifoldness of its formations that one can, as it were, grasp with one’s hands its aversion to gaps and leaps and its endeavor to exhaust the whole domain of the possible within certain arrangements, and that this brought imaginative naturalists and philosophers to the thought of a gradual development of all beings from one organism. To this ideal whole of the world belong also the most imperfect, apparently most useless organisms as integral members. From this standpoint it appears not merely justified, but very wisely arranged, that even under the most unfavorable conditions life still appears, and that against the unfavorableness of the conditions an indestructible quantity of germs is mustered, not simply for the development of some individuals, but for the preservation of the whole species, thus for the

representation of the idea of the royally, grandiosely furnished whole. Of course the same end, the preservation *(p. 36)* of the species, could also have been attained in another way, as it is in fact attained otherwise in other classes, say through the particular kind of external covering, armament, etc.; but in order to realize many and manifold modes of development, this one too is found, which moreover shows that grandiose nature does not need to be so sparing and stingy with its means as we impotent, limited men of short life-span.

3. But if phenomena still occur which do not fit into these considerations, then yet another ideal end in nature is not to be overlooked: the independence of the beings of nature and of the order of nature. The intelligent author does not intervene immediately in every individual occurrence of his creation, but on the contrary lets the general laws so much run their own course, as if he wished to conceal his influence as much as possible. And precisely so the world shows God in his wisdom and power all the more emphatically, the more he was able to set it upon itself without assisting influence. This universality of the laws according to which the world governs itself independently brings with it that in individual cases the law does not further its proximate end, but impairs it. But here too the ordering wisdom shows itself again, in that such disturbances can never harm the whole, often even balance themselves out and serve a higher end. A shiftable, living order, however, manifests a higher wisdom than a rigid, mechanically exactly determined arrangement, with which we usually have to content ourselves in our works.

4. From this point of view the objection, admittedly very weighty, concerning the purposeless pains of animals that are killed, or are incurably sick, also loses its sting. That animals, namely, are endowed with sensibility is for them as for the whole of the world, according to general laws, a very wise and beneficent arrangement, and pain specially is the mightiest lever for preserving the organism from damage or, when it is damaged, for seeking remedy. The question now is: What is better, that there be no sensation at all, or that in individual individuals, or at some time (in death) in all, it become contrary to purpose? For the individual it might well sometimes be better to lack the sensation which brings it almost only pains; but nature is neither cruel nor unjust when it sacrifices a being, which is a pure means, for the whole. In men, *(p. 37)* however, that useless pain is placed under the moral order, and is here all the more serviceable to an end, the more purposeless it appears, physically considered.

Of course the pains of infant *children* are not explained by this; but neither do we presume to be able to interpret all the ends of the Creator. The numerous ones that are evident show us a highest wisdom, which certainly will also have arranged most wisely that which we cannot recognize in itself as purposive. Cf. also what we shall remark in treating the *providence* of God.

5. Against our calculations of probability the following objection can be raised: For a disordered combination one obtains the same small probability as for order. Therefore the latter is not taken into account at all in the calculation.

In the ordered combinations there are 1°. numerous relations (laws) which are not found in the disordered ones.

2°. For a disordered combination the relations cannot be taken up into the problem at all *before* the throw; rather one can at most ask: How great is W if any relations whatever of the elements are to come out? Of these there are indeed ∞, but each is favorable, thus $W = \infty/\infty = 1$. After the throw one knows the relations that have come out, but now they can no longer be the object of the calculation, unless one regards them as laws; for their occurrence W was as small as for just as many laws of order. In the case of order, however, the problem remains the same before and after the throw.

3°. That one should beforehand hit by chance upon the relations of the combination coming out by chance at the first throw, and take them up into the conditions of the calculation — for this $W = 1/\infty$.

4°. It is evidently far more improbable that a combination with even *one* conformity to law should arise of itself, than that a wholly irregular one should come out. Now, however, the world is ordered in conformity to law according to innumerably many relations. Therefore the chance origin of the given world is infinitely more improbable than that of an irregular one.

§ 6. Critique of Atheistic Cosmogonies.

The teleological proof of God's existence, far from being weakened or even only obscured by the atheistic theories of the formation of the world, receives from them still more emphasis and clarity, in that we bring the *(p. 38)* propositions asserted in it to a more special and vivid application to them. From antiquity, at most the cosmogony devised by Epicurus and put into verse by Lucretius deserves to find mention and discussion among the scientific attempts of this kind.

A. In order to make the origin of the world comprehensible without the gods, who are not to be disturbed in their blessed rest and may not concern themselves about earthly things, Epicurus assumes infinitely many atoms of infinite variety, size and shape, and lets them move downward in infinite space from eternity by virtue of their essential constitution. By chance some deviate from the general direction, whereby a general confusion arises. Out of this there first worked itself out a tolerable order, which, however, on account of many defects had to make room again for a new chaos. After innumerable vicissitudes, in which order gained more and more ground, there finally came to light the present world with its durable arrangement.

But 1. The assumption of infinitely many and infinitely different atoms is absurd and incorrect. For

a) infinitely many things cannot exist.

b) There exists in fact, of all possible elements, only a very small number, and still smaller is the number of the specifically different substances. For even if still far more than the 70 presently known should be discovered, they will still always be countable.

c) Infinitely many atoms would fill infinite space; for, if there were still more room, then still more would be possible, and their quantity would not be infinite. But if all room is filled, then motion is no longer possible, unless the atoms were penetrable or compressible. But since the natural penetrability and compressibility of bodies is explained by their atomistic constitution, these properties can no longer belong to the atoms themselves.

Since, then, the atoms, their species and their places are necessarily finite, they cannot be of themselves, i.e., by virtue of their essence, which is indifferent to every number and every space, and *(p. 39)* also not by virtue of pure possibility, because then all conceivable substances would have to exist.[1]

2. It is absurd and incorrect that motion downward should belong to the atoms from eternity by virtue of their essence, as we have already discussed. Therefore an external cause had to give them the direction downward, if in that chaos a "down" were already present; in any case it is not there as an attracting point for falling bodies, as Epicurus, after all, must imagine it without a moving external cause.

3. It is pure chance, i.e., without any cause and therefore in a high degree absurd, that a) somewhere, b) at some time, c) some atoms or other, d) in some direction or other, deviate from the original direction.

4. It was great chance, of infinitely small probability, that a) even the most imperfect order formed itself out of the confusion.

b) That the order dissolved again; infinitely many imperfect orders, among them also many states of complete neutrality, could indeed have attained permanence.

c) That out of chaos order again arose, and so on.

d) That a progress took place in the developments.

5. It is absurd to let organic beings arise in this way. For

a) Either they demand (according to the vitalists) a special principle of life distinct from the matters and their forces, and then their origin from the combination of matters is evidently impossible. Or one believes one can explain life in a purely mechanical way, and then one must invoke the wonderfully complicated arrangement of the elements in organisms for the explanation of the wholly peculiar constitution of the life-processes. For the chance coming-together of matters into so complicated an order, however, one has scarcely a greater probability than for the purposive formation of the whole of inorganic nature.

Therefore b) a spontaneous generation in the sense of the materialists, who let organisms arise out of purely inorganic forces, is absurd. But that formulation of spontaneous generation, too, which lets organisms arise without parents according to a law laid into matters, is *(p. 40)* not in fact present in nature now, thus still less in the beginning, when as yet no organic matter was there to co-operate in the production of life.[2]

6. It is a new chance, multiplied without limit, that not merely one organism arose, but

a) innumerably many;

b) so many living beings different according to individuality, variety, race, species, genus, family, order, class, etc., be it that they came to be all at once, be it that they came to be only gradually;

c) that they all belong together unitarily both ideally and really interlock with one another.

7. It is eminently absurd to explain the origin of the simple and still more of the spiritual principles of knowledge in animals and men, and the whole spiritual endowment of man, from a blind coming-together of matters.

B. The modern theories of creation try to avoid as much as possible the many chances, i.e., effects without cause, such as that old theory harmlessly assumed and expressed. But if one takes away the modern natural-scientific garment which is supposed to cover those nakednesses, it appears that one has scarcely got beyond Epicurus. The foundation of all is formed by the so-called Kant-Laplace hypothesis, which seeks to explain the formation of the heavenly bodies with the help of astronomy and geology, and Darwinism, which seeks to explain the origin of plants, animals and men with all their species, genera, etc., with the help of paleontology, botany, zoology and anthropology, without God.

According to this we are to think of the whole mass of the solar system, and consistently of the whole universe, as originally an enormous ball of gas, in which here and there denser nuclei formed, which now could attract one another and set the whole mass in rotation. Through the progressive concentration and diminution of volume, the speed of rotation, and with it, according to mechanical laws, the flattening at the poles and the swelling at the equator, had to increase to the point that a ring detached itself, which then, on account of disturbance of the equilibrium at individual points, tore apart to form smaller rotating balls (planets). The main ball repeated this process *(p. 41)* again and again on account of accelerated velocity. But on the torn-off balls too something similar could take place, and rings and satellites form. After the earth had gradually cooled down from the fiery-liquid state, into which the mass had come through the heat produced by the concentration, and after various chemical revolutions offered a sufficiently neutralized crust, the first most imperfect organisms appeared through spontaneous generation, in the form of monera or Bathybius or protamoebae, etc.

From these Darwin now lets the whole manifoldness of the plant and animal kingdoms, and finally man himself, arise through the chance appearance of individual favorable properties (variability) in one or another individual and through their heritability, in combination with the struggle for existence, in which the more favorably organized alone could maintain themselves (natural selection).

This hypothesis likewise contains, apart from the natural-scientific misgivings,[3] the most monstrous absurdities, if it wishes to set aside the influence of a Creator.

For 1. The assumed gaseous primordial state of matter is the purest chance. For the atoms are of themselves indifferent a) to every state of aggregation, and again indifferent

b) to the innumerable gradations within every form of aggregation; in any case they can have infinitely many distances from one another in the gaseous or super-gaseous state, and this all the more as

c) their finite number can spread itself out in infinite space.

2. This holds not merely if one takes into consideration the spatial distance of the molecules in the different state of aggregation, but remains true also if one takes into account the real conditions of the latter, cohesion and the expansive force opposed to it. Cf. above, p. 18.

3. It is absurd, because pure chance, that denser nuclei form. For

a) The atoms, since they are in fact and necessarily finite, can have in infinite space infinitely many distances from one another, in which they cannot attract one another at all.

(p. 42) b) It is the purest chance that some nuclei formed at some places, especially as all the particles were equally distant from one another and all attracted one another uniformly.

4. It was great chance that the rotation, instead of being stopped or slowed by the surrounding mass, carried the latter along into ever faster rotation. For the quantity of motion of the nucleus depends on its mass and velocity, both of which admit infinitely many modifications and therefore offer in their products still more possibilities, and again more in their relation to the surrounding mass.

5. It was pure chance that the acceleration rose to the degree that the torn-off planets assumed elliptical orbits of slight eccentricity, while infinitely many elongated ellipses or hyperbolas or parabolas were possible, which would have endangered the continuance of the system or even had to result in a dispersion of the whole mass in cosmic space without return.

6. It is pure chance that the ecliptic is purposively inclined to the equator of the planets, since the mechanical process admitted no inclination at all, while any chance disturbances could have produced infinitely many different angles of inclination.

7. It was pure chance that without an external cause the rings suffered condensation at places and tore apart.

8. Given the completely uniform distribution of matters in the primordial gas-ball, it was great chance that in the tearing-off precisely such substances, in such quantity and proportion, came to our earth as were even capable of an ordered further development, let alone could work themselves up to the reception, formation, conservation and further development of organisms. For innumerable combinations of matter were possible on earth, which could have brought about either

a) a complete neutralization with eternal rest, or

b) never-ending chaotic revolutions, or

c) innumerable other courses of development.

C. With respect to the origin of the first organisms we have already remarked what is necessary against Epicurus. But the differentiation and upward development of these according to the Darwinian conception, too, differs from the Epicurean only in some measure in this, that what the old philosophy let form itself simply by chance, the English theorist lets arise through chance forces and constitutions in *(p. 43)* combination with chance facts. But, as was already demonstrated above, the probability is quite the same for the one as for the other favorable case, namely = 0. Specially we remark against Darwin:[4]

1. It is pure chance that, without an intelligent cause, there accrue to organisms

a) favorable properties, and precisely these rudiments capable of development — a chance which repeats itself innumerably many times, as often as even the smallest perfecting has occurred at any point of transition;

b) that these properties were inherited. This chance too must repeat itself innumerably many times, indeed, given the eternal capacity for propagation, infinitely many times. For just as well or even sooner a standstill of development, or a regression in the organic process, was possible at infinitely many points.

2. Purely by chance, because without significance in the struggle for existence, there are found in organisms innumerable perfections, such as beauty, symmetry, in men unselfish dispositions, feelings and impulses. And even those favorable for the struggle did not have to have precisely this form and arrangement through the struggle, since this could just as well have developed innumerable other equally favorable or more favorable or less favorable contrivances.

3. The theory abolishes the essential difference between animal and plant, between man and animal. Now, however, it is an absolute impossibility (because the material can produce nothing simple, the more imperfect nothing more perfect) that a sensitive soul should be produced by a plant, whether this has a special principle of life or not, and still more that an animal soul should be transformed into a human soul. Therefore the doctrine of descent could be extended to animals and men only insofar as the sensitive and even the rational souls were already potentially contained in the lowest formations and only on account of undeveloped organization could not yet exercise their higher faculties. But with this it is asserted that at bottom all beings of nature are more or less developed men. But then

(p. 44) a) there is not the least factual difference between an animal and a child, especially if the latter, as in cretinism, cannot come to development. Then the undeveloped man is just as devoid of rights as plant and animal, or else these too must be treated as persons.

b) To assume rational souls in irrational nature, without their manifesting themselves even in the least, is against every scientific method, which demands that causes may be assumed only according to the demand of the effects.

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[1] Cf. above, p. 17 f.

[2] Naturphil. p. 137 ff.

[3] Naturphil. p. 132 ff.

[4] Cf. Naturphil. p. 144 ff.

§ 7. The Existence of God Is Proved from the Agreement of All Peoples.

One could, with several moderns, call this proof — adduced since the oldest times to the shame of the atheists — the *moral* proof, inasmuch as it rests on authority, a source of proof of only moral certainty; but the name seems less suitable, since it easily makes one think of the ethical proof, which is taken from the moral order. Another designation too, *historical* proof, does not sufficiently distinguish it from the demonstration of God from his governance in human history. Our heading characterizes it sufficiently. One can formulate it thus:

There is no people which does not have in its language the name for a higher being, which does not have some religious customs or other. But name and veneration of God presuppose the conviction of the existence of God.

Therefore all peoples cherish the conviction of the existence of God. The truth of the major premise is not overturned by more recent reports about allegedly atheistic peoples. For

a) it is still incumbent upon the reporters to furnish the proof that the peoples in question possess no religious ideas, words, ceremonies whatever, since for the present we are certain by induction that all peoples, even those which have not yet been explored, have some knowledge of God.

b) But should a people really be so brutalized as it is represented to us in those reports, then naturally just as little *(p. 45)* an idea of God can be found among them as any other somewhat more supersensible knowledge. We argue, naturally, only from the conviction of those peoples who lead a human life with human culture.

c) By those sporadic exceptions, even if they were conceded, the moral universality, which alone we claim, is not impaired, any more than by the denial of God now appearing more massively among the more educated peoples. That precisely the more educated profess atheism in the greatest numbers has quite evidently its ground not in education, but derives in the last instance, with slight exceptions, from the moral depravity and the crude arrogance of the school years, in which the atheistic educated form their religious convictions.

That the atheism of the educated is not to be ascribed to a deeper knowledge of the causes of things could be proved already by the one striking fact that precisely the physicians, whose science, mostly only empiricism, must declare itself almost wholly at a loss before the causes of the life-processes and the phenomena of disease, furnish the strongest contingent to atheism. However, we can leave the positive deniers of God wholly out of consideration here, since they do not abolish the moral universality of the consciousness of God, while their reasons are already refuted in the preceding proofs.

That religious veneration presupposes the conviction of the existence of God, as our minor premise asserts, is clear; but can one say the same also of the name of God? First of all, the name presupposes the idea of God as a higher being; but God, a highest being, designate conceptually not something possible, but an existing being. Therefore the name and the idea of God include a more or less firm assumption of the existence of a God. Only in positive deniers of God, who have received the idea of God from others, does a judgment about non-existence coexist with the idea of God. But no language would have the name for an existing higher being if people had generally had the conviction that such a being does not exist. Elves, nymphs, witches would never have been named if the peoples in question had not believed in their existence.

All peoples, therefore, agree in the assumption of a higher being.

(p. 46) The concordant judgment of the peoples is a sure criterion of truth, unless causes lying outside reason had brought about that agreement in judgment.

These external causes, however, are to be excluded in our case. Therefore that judgment is infallibly true.

The major premise of this syllogism can be assumed as sufficiently proved from Logic. We only indicate the proof here. If all men, under the most various conditions, with the most various upbringing, legislation, education, etc., pass the same judgment, then this can owe its origin only to a constant, universal, inner ground, namely human nature. This nature, now, is twofold, a rational and a sensitive. If, then, the judgment does not stem from the sensitive, irrational nature, then it rests on the rational nature. But what proceeds from rational nature alone cannot be false, unless reason strove of itself, by virtue of its nature, into error — a presupposition which, as formal skepticism, makes the knowledge of truth impossible.

It would therefore only have to be demonstrated that the general assumption of a divine being does not stem from irrational causes. Those causes which usually lead men into error are bad will, passions, sluggishness in investigation in difficult questions, ignorance, deception of the senses and the like. But in our case these causes would rather have had to lead to the opposite view.

For human passions, pride and sensuality, resist mightily a just and omniscient God; but even the most degraded peoples and the proudest philosophers have not been able to deny the existence of God, but have only, for the sake of the passions, falsified the idea of God; hence the origin of polytheism and pantheism.[1] The question at issue is so simple that long investigation is not needed. For that, e.g., an ordered work

requires an intelligent author is evident even to the crudest man; the astonishing order of the world every man must see and admire; and if he is still a man at all, ask after the cause: whereby a proof of God's existence is furnished.

The senses very easily mislead man into holding that which he does not *(p. 47)* see, hear, etc., to be non-existent. But sooner did one conceive the Godhead sensibly than that one denied it.

Other causes of this universal judgment, which the atheists invent, such as upbringing, legislation, priestly or philosophical influence, hardly need a refutation, since they evidently presuppose the idea of God and, according to the evidence of history, have made use of it. Is it even conceivable that the human race let itself be determined by apparent reasons or by none to believe a proposition which was more difficult to accept theoretically and to hold fast practically than all the sacrifices which legislators, deceivers, etc., wished to carry through by it? Should not at least riper age, higher education, finally have discovered the so burdensome deception? Admittedly, upbringing, family, state are not possible without God in the long run. But from this it does not follow that God was invented, but that he exists, because family and state are institutions of nature.

With more plausibility, fear, the inclination to the supersensible, the great helplessness of man in combination with the desire to raise his lowliness and procure for himself a higher dignity, are given as the occasion for the origin of the idea of God. For it cannot be denied that religious conviction is not a little furthered by these. But one would have to demonstrate that these are irrational motives. Furthermore, these causes, according to the nature of the matter and the evidence of experience, serve not so much to furnish a ground for the existence of God, but they are incentives for man not to disregard the reasons for the existence of God. Fear at mighty catastrophes in nature and in life is the extraordinary, and the feeling of the utter wretchedness of man in suffering is the ordinary means to destroy that false security and self-sufficiency which supposes it can do without God, and to tear him away from attachment to the sensible, which does not think of God, and to revive his natural and better impulses toward the supernatural.

For my conviction there lies in this itself a proof for the existence of God. For without God human life is completely worthless. The whole glorious arrangement of the world, with the glorious endowments of man himself, has no higher goal than a little pleasure, which in the best case is very momentary, but for most is embittered by harsher pain, and for many unfortunates does not exist at all. Everything that is said of higher goods, such as doing good, working for humanity and the like, has in the very best case no other value than to prepare for some others besides oneself a little pleasure, and indeed only sensual pleasure, which has exactly the same *(p. 48)* value as that of the animal. For only very few are capable of higher enjoyments, and can procure them for themselves, and this mostly at the expense of their fellow men. And this is supposed to be the goal of the universe? With natural necessity man is driven to the knowledge of the infinite and goaded to strive after it by the constant dissatisfaction in the enjoyment of earthly goods, and for this he is to receive in the best case a little lust of the flesh? Then man, the noblest work of art in the world, where everything attains its end, for which it is organized, is a monstrosity, a cutting discord in the harmony of the universe.

To be raised out of such an unseemly and degrading position, man might well wish with more ground and reason than what atheism strives for, namely to set himself upon himself, to make himself the goal of his striving and consistently of the striving of all, and so proudly to decline submission to a higher power.

Fear, as an act of the will, can surely not possibly be the ground of the conviction of the existence of God; only if objective reasons, be they even only apparent, are present, can the fearful will determine the intellect to conviction. But were the reasons not valid, then that conviction could not have maintained itself universally with better insight, with the growth of self-confidence.

The same holds of the ignorance of natural causes, which is supposed to have induced man to invent a highest spiritual cause. It would have to be demonstrated that this is an invention without reasons.

Admittedly, people erred in antiquity in that they often referred individual phenomena immediately to a divine being; but that people erred in the assumption of a God at all cannot be asserted without *petitio principii* [begging the question].[2]

Man has, admittedly, an ineradicable inclination to the supersensible; regularly unbelievers fall into superstition. The world, precisely, is not to be comprehended without supersensible principles.

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[1] Even if these systems, considered in the light of truth, destroy the idea of God, they nevertheless bear witness to belief in God, since they considered these errors compatible with the idea of God. Moreover, all polytheists assume a highest God.

[2] Cf. the detailed exposition of this proof on the basis of comparative religious science, Apologetik I, p. 35 ff.

§ 8. The Ontological Proof of God's Existence.

Various attempts have been made to prove the existence of God a priori from his concept, or rather to show it as immediately given with it. Against this St. Thomas[1] remarks that the proposition "God exists" is indeed immediately evident in itself, but not with respect to us. Existence, to be sure, belongs to the essence of God, and whoever beholds this essence sees existence in it; but

(p. 49) we have merely an abstractive knowledge of the essence of God and must therefore first demonstrate his existence. Those attempts are directed toward demonstrating his existence from this abstractively conceived essence, as from the concept of the most perfect being, of the being through itself, etc.

Famous is the ontological proof — i.e., the one taken from being itself — of St. Anselm, which he sets forth in the 2nd chapter of his Proslogion, and which in syllogistic form runs somewhat thus: In my mind is the idea of a being so great that no greater can be thought. Therefore this being exists. The consequence he proves thus: A being which is not merely thought but also exists is greater than that which is merely thought. Therefore that which is so great that no greater can be thought must also exist.

But herein an unjustified transition is made from the thought of existence to actual existence, and the greater perfection which even the most imperfect thing has, if it exists, over the most perfect which does not exist, is confused with the perfection which one essence has over another. The most imperfect mineral which exists is more perfect than a merely possible man, for the latter is nothing in the domain of the actual, but the former is after all something.

Accordingly one would have to answer the individual propositions of the argumentation, and indeed the first consequent: "Therefore this being exists" — *Distinguo* [I distinguish]: In the idea of the greatest conceivable being the idea of existence is included, *Concedo* [I grant]. It now also actually exists in consequence of my idea, *Nego* [I deny].

"A being which also exists is greater than that which is merely thought" — *Distinguo*: It has a more perfect essence, *Nego*. It has that advantage which the existing has over nothing, *Concedo*. *Dist.* the consequent: "The greatest conceivable being must also exist," i.e., have either thought or actual existence, *Conc.*; actual, *Subd.* [I subdistinguish]: if it exists, *Conc.*; if I merely think it, *Nego*. Should one insist that the advantage of existence over nothing is after all a high perfection and therefore also to be thought in the most perfect being, then we gladly concede this; only, a pity that through the thinking of this advantage the advantage itself does not become actual.

(p. 50) In another way Scotus[2] tried to dress up the proof (*colorare* [to color it], as he himself says). It is possible that a most perfect being exist. But if it did not actually exist, then it would not be possible that it exist. For it could exist neither through itself nor through another. Not through itself, because what is through itself always is; therefore it would have to be already, and would no longer be possible. Nor through production by another, for this would have to be equally perfect, and an infinitely perfect being is *ex hypoth.* [by hypothesis] not to exist. Therefore the most perfect being, if it is to be possible, must exist.

But herein inner possibility is confused with outer possibility. Inwardly possible is everything whose essential marks are compatible with one another, which includes no contradiction. And in this sense a most perfect being is always, even now, possible. Outwardly possible is that for whose existence a sufficient ground is given, be it that this is to be sought in an effecting, sufficiently powerful cause, be it that it has the ground of its existence in itself, i.e., that it exists by virtue of its essence. In this sense of outer possibility, an infinitely perfect being would no longer be possible if it did not exist, as the above demonstration showed.

To the first major premise, therefore, one must answer in due form: "A most perfect being is possible" — *Dist.*: Inwardly, *Conc.* Outwardly, *Subd.*: If its essence, through which it is to exist, is real, *Conc.* If it is merely thought, *Nego*.

To the minor premise: "If it did not actually exist, it would not be possible" — *Contradist.* [I counter-distinguish]: It would not be inwardly possible, *Nego*; not outwardly, *Concedo*.

Descartes gave the ontological proof the following form. What is contained in the clear and distinct idea of a thing must be affirmed of it as true. Now, however, in the clear and distinct idea of the most perfect being existence is contained. Therefore it must be affirmed of it as true.

Descartes, admittedly, laid the chief weight on the psychological compulsion to think God as existing, and insofar his argument is not a purely aprioristic one. But Spinoza, following Descartes, derived the existence of his infinite substance purely from the concept of the highest being, to which existence belongs.

(p. 51) Admittedly, in the idea of the most perfect being existence too is contained, but only as actual existence if the being itself is actual; but by my thinking it as actual it does not become actual. Existence may be affirmed of the most perfect being only in the order in which it is, namely thought existence if it is merely thought, actual existence if it is actual.

Leibniz finds Descartes' proof insufficient because it has not demonstrated the possibility of the most perfect being; yet "every being must be held to be possible until its impossibility is proved." But in order to give the ontological argument positive probative force, he puts the *ens a se* in place of the most perfect being or of the *ens realissimum* [most real being]. "To exist through its essence" is for him, however, as much as "to exist through its possibility." Since now, further, "nothing can hinder the possibility of that which includes no limits, no negation, and consequently no contradiction, this alone suffices to know the existence of God a priori."

The negative reason which Leibniz adduces for the possibility of the *ens a se*, namely that the contrary has not been proved, is evidently too weak to ground a proof of God's existence upon it. Likewise little weight can be laid on another turn of the same, which proceeds from his favorite proposition, that of sufficient reason: No sufficient reason for non-existence is given, therefore existence is to be assumed rather than nothing. — Let us therefore come at once to his argument proper, which, under the modifications indicated, he holds to be a geometrical one.

"A being which exists through its essence is possible" — *Dist.*: Inwardly, *Conc.* Outwardly, *Subd.*: If the essence is real, *Conc.* If it is merely in thought, *Nego*.

"The essence of the thing constitutes its possibility" — *Dist.*: its inner possibility, *Conc.*; its outer, *Subd.*: in the finite being, *Nego*; in the necessary being, *Subd.*: if it is real, *Conc.*; if it is merely thought, *Nego*.

"To exist through its essence means to exist through its possibility" — *Dist.*, i.e.: A being through itself has in itself the sufficient ground for its being able to be there, *Conc.*; for its being there, *Subd.*: If the essence is real, *Conc.*; if it is merely thought, *Nego*.

"Therefore in the self-existent being actuality is given with possibility." *(p. 52) Dist.*: With its inner and outer possibility, *Conc.*; already with its inner, which alone I know, *Nego*.

The essence of a thing, as the sum of its constituting marks, is the standard for the inner possibility of a thing, i.e., for the compatibility of the marks of its concept, and therefore one can well say that the essence constitutes the inner possibility. But it quite certainly does not constitute the outer in the contingent being, whose essence still requires an effecting cause in order to exist; the essence of the necessary being is indeed conceptually the ground of its existence, thus of its outer possibility; but if we have merely the concept of a necessary being, then it also demands only the concept of the included existence; if the essence is to make actual existence possible, it must itself be actual.

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[1] p. 1, q. 2, a. 1.

[2] I, dist. 2, q. 2.

§ 9. Kant's Critique of the Proofs of God's Existence.

1. Kant is of the opinion that the existence of God can be known only as a postulate of practical reason from the moral law, but cannot be apodictically proved by theoretical reason. In the "Critique of all Theology from Speculative Principles of Reason"[1] he declares: "I maintain that all attempts at a merely speculative use of reason with regard to theology are entirely fruitless and, by their inner constitution, null and void; but that the principles of its use in nature lead to no theology whatever, and consequently, if one does not take moral laws as the ground, or use them as a guide, there can be no theology of reason at all. For all synthetic principles of the understanding are of immanent use; but for the knowledge of a highest being a transcendent use of them is required, for which our understanding is not equipped at all. If the empirically valid law of causality is to lead to the primordial being, then this would have to belong to the chain of objects; but then it would, like all appearances, itself again be conditioned. But even if one permitted the leap beyond the limits of experience by means of the dynamical law of the relation of effects to their causes, what concept can this procedure procure us? *(p. 53)* Far from any concept of the highest being, because experience never offers us the greatest of all possible effects (as that which is to bear witness to its cause)."

But 1°. This demonstration lacks, already in a formal respect, one of the most essential logical requirements: adequate division. Neither on a purely a priori nor on a purely empirical way can the existence of God be proved; and to know this, the great detours which Kant goes here were not needed. On a purely a priori way the so-called ontological proof seeks to prove the existence of God. That this is not valid we have seen above. But it is an evident error when Kant asserts that all proofs of God's existence lead back to the ontological. All which we adduce add to a universal a priori principle an empirically given fact, the existence, contingency, order of the world. And so our demonstration lies as a third member in the middle between the two possibilities set up by Kant.

2°. That the law of causality has only empirical validity and thus also leads only to an empirical first cause is again an evident error; for the principle "What comes to be requires a cause" has absolutely universal validity and is evident *ex terminis* [from the terms], as Epistemology and Metaphysics show.

If the principle of causality is an analytic one, then it by no means follows that it has merely immanent significance, is merely a regulative principle of our subjective thinking: it is a law of being of eminently objective validity. We must not only think a cause for every effect, but know quite evidently that no effect can be without a cause. Indeed, if from the world no conclusion of objective validity to an author can be drawn, then it is not to be seen how our conclusions from the moral world are supposed to be valid; for the moral world too is given only empirically like the physical. And if the laws of thought, which he too has after all applied in the critique of reason in general, have no objective validity in themselves, then this whole critique is of purely subjective significance.

3°. Admittedly, in the empirical world no infinite effect is to be observed: but every effect, even the smallest, finally leads to a necessary being, which on account of its necessity must be infinite. And so the last part of

the Kantian objection too is wholly and entirely untenable.

(p. 54) 2. Against the cosmological argument is directed the antithesis of the fourth antinomy of Kant's transcendental ideas. "Suppose, on the other hand, that there were an absolutely necessary cause of the world outside the world; then this, as the highest member in the series of the causes of the changes of the world, would first begin the existence of the latter and their series. But then it would also have to begin to act, and its causality would belong in time, and precisely therefore in the sum of appearances, i.e., in the world; consequently it itself, the cause, would not be outside the world, which contradicts the presupposition."

1°. To this we can first answer indirectly. That a necessary cause, existing through itself, must exist is as evident as it is evident that not everything can be contingent, i.e., from another. Whether this cause is now in or outside the world can be left undecided for the time being; but in any case Kant's antithesis, "There exists no absolutely necessary being at all, neither in the world nor outside the world as its cause," is quite evidently false; wherefore also, quite evidently, his further assertion that "from the same ground of proof from which in the thesis the existence of a primordial being was concluded, in the antithesis its non-being is concluded, and indeed with the same rigor," is a palpable error.

2°. This would suffice completely to annihilate every objection raised from Kant against our demonstration. Yet we answer directly, although only in the discussion of the essence of God can the causality of the necessary primordial being be treated more thoroughly.

The first cause, precisely because it is not again conditioned but necessary, stands wholly and entirely outside the series of appearances, and its causality does not fall in time; it does not begin to act, but is unchangeably in eternal activity; it is thus not in, but outside the world. From this, however, it does not follow that its effects must be from eternity, as we shall see later. Moreover, even the eternity of the creation of the world would do no harm to the force of our proofs of God's existence.

3. Against this Kant urges: "But if one once begins the proof cosmologically, by taking as the ground the series of appearances and the regress in it according to empirical laws of causality, then one cannot afterwards leap off from this and pass over to something which does not belong in the series as a member at all. For in *(p. 55)* exactly the same meaning something must be regarded as condition in which the relation of the conditioned to its condition was taken in the series which was to lead to this highest condition in continuous progress. If now this relation is sensible and belongs to the possible empirical use of the understanding, then the highest condition or cause can conclude the regress only according to laws of sensibility, consequently only as belonging to the time-series, and the necessary being must be regarded as the highest member of the world-series."

1°. This proof resembles roughly the following: A possesses a watch which he borrowed from B; B borrowed it from C, D from E, and so on. Therefore the watch was never made by a watchmaker, but always came into the respective possession by borrowing. "For in exactly the same meaning something must be regarded as condition in which the relation of the conditioned to its condition was taken." If the first possessor too had not borrowed it, "a leap (μετάβασις εἰς ἄλλο γένος [a passing over into another genus])" would take place!

As the borrowers can lend the watch further only by virtue of an original making of it, so too the things of the world can unfold causality only by virtue of an original creation; and precisely therefore it is absolutely necessary that the causality of the first cause be quite other than that of the intermediate causes.

2°. Since synthetic judgments a priori are an absurdity, and absolute validity belongs in particular to the principle of causality, we must demand for the series of causes in the world a cause existing through itself. This, as necessary and unchangeable and uncreated, stands outside this series, and is thus an extramundane cause. It is an absolute demand of reason, where empirical causes prove insufficient, to posit an intelligible one. But not all causes can be empirical, i.e., produced.

4. Kant believes, further, that he can invalidate the cosmological proof by trying to show it to be identical with the ontological. “All illusions in inference are discovered most easily if one sets them before one’s eyes in scholastic fashion. Here is such a presentation. If the proposition is correct: every absolutely necessary being is at the same time the most real being (which is the *nervus probandi* [the nerve of the proof] of the cosmological proof), then it must, like all affirmative judgments, be capable of conversion at least *per accidens* [accidentally]; thus: some most real beings are at the same time absolutely necessary beings. Now, *(p. 56)* however, one *ens realissimum* is in no respect distinguished from another, and what therefore holds of some contained under this concept holds also of all. Consequently I shall (in this case) also be able to convert it simply, i.e., every most real being is a necessary being. Because now this proposition is determined merely from its concepts a priori, the mere concept of the most real being must also carry with it its absolute necessity; which is precisely what the ontological proof asserted and the cosmological would not acknowledge, but nevertheless laid at the basis of its conclusions, though in a disguised way.”[2]

One cannot suppress astonishment at the confidence with which Kant presents his miserable confusions of concepts, and at the credulity with which they are repeated by thousands.

1°. The palpable difference between the ontological proof and the cosmological lies in this, that the former concludes from a thought infinite being to its existence, but the latter, from the idea of a necessary being which has been known as existing through inference, demonstrates its infinity.

2°. In our proof there is no concluding from the concept of the most real being to its absolute necessity. If by a logical conversion, from the identity of all necessary beings with some infinite beings, the identity of some infinite beings with some necessary ones also follows of itself, then this is no deriving of the one concept from another. Only if subject and predicate happen to be convertible concepts, as is in fact the case here, can it seem as if the predicate of the converted proposition were derived from its subject; for a universal converse proposition can then be set up, in our case: Every infinite being is necessary. In fact, however, this derivation has not been undertaken by us: before one has proved that infinite and necessary are convertible concepts, it would be just as invalid as if one believed one could derive the concept of man from the concept of freedom by inferring freedom from the concept man and then, by conversion of the proposition “Every man is free,” inferring: “Some free beings are men.”

(p. 57) 3°. If its necessity were really inferred from the concept of the most real being, then this would naturally have to be understood in the same order of things as the infinity. If, namely, the infinity is only thought, then we have merely a thought necessity of existing; if this is to be a real one, then the infinity from which it is derived must also be demonstrated as real. This is precisely where the ontological proof fails, that it passes from one order of being to another: from thought infinity and existence to actual existence, as we have seen above. Kant thus himself makes himself guilty of the principal and proper confusion of concepts of the ontological proof, the “confusion of the logical possibility of a concept of all united reality with the transcendental.”

5. The remaining objections of Kant are directed against the principle of causality and the principles of reason in general, and rest on the false presupposition that only subjective significance belongs to them, and that they have objective validity only in the world of sense. We wish to touch on only one more, which suffers from a particular misunderstanding. From the “whole nest of dialectical presumptions” which “keep themselves hidden in this cosmological argument,” we single out “the false self-satisfaction of reason with regard to the completion of the infinite series, by finally doing away with all condition, without which, however, no concept of a necessity can take place, and, since one can then comprehend nothing further, taking this for a completion of one’s concept.”

Admittedly, the absolutely necessary being must be without any condition; but we do not do away with the conditions, but conclude with absolutely compelling consequence from the series of conditions to a

thoroughly unconditioned, as the only possible completion of our concept. We do not give out something uncomprehended for the completion of this concept; rather we see with all clarity, and everyone who is still able to think at all must see, that not everything can be conditioned by another, that therefore at the beginning of the conditions an unconditioned must stand.

6. What Kant brings forward for the "discovery and explanation of the dialectical illusion in all transcendental proofs of the existence of a necessary being" rests solely on his false, self-annulling conception of the capacity of reason. "The *(p. 58)* ideal of the highest being is, according to these considerations, nothing other than a regulative principle of reason, to regard all connection in the world as if it sprang from an all-sufficient necessary cause, in order to ground on this the rule of a systematic unity, necessary according to universal laws, in the explanation of it; and it is not an assertion of an existence necessary in itself. But it is at the same time unavoidable to represent to oneself, by means of a transcendental subreption, this formal principle as constitutive, and to think this unity hypostatically . . .; which substitution reveals itself by this, that if I now consider this highest being, which with respect to the world was absolutely (unconditionally) necessary, as a thing for itself, this necessity is capable of no concept, and therefore must have been found in my reason only as a formal condition of thinking, but not as a material and hypostatic condition of existence."

1°. It is clear that we must not merely think a highest being as the concluding unity of the manifoldness of the world, but that it must actually exist as the ground of the actual world. For an existing effect also requires an existing cause. Kant himself admits that we are compelled to conclude so; if he nevertheless calls this necessary conclusion a subreption, then he denies to reason the capacity to know truth at all. For if it could happen even in only one case that we are compelled to think something without its being objectively so, then the evident can be false, and reason lacks every possibility of distinguishing truth from error.

2°. Kant wishes to let the conclusion on the basis of the principle of causality hold only for the empirical world: but if no universal necessary validity belongs to this principle, then its application in the sensible world too is unreliable: for here it is no more evident than for the supersensible world. Its evidence is indeed much stronger than even the existence of the sensible world. And so finally one must consistently doubt everything, if one can in any way object to a conclusion that rests on the principle of causality. If Kant is thus pushed onto the standpoint of the skeptic and idealist, then of course there is now no longer any demonstration against him; but all his demonstrations too are only a subjective play with thoughts, which lacks all objective significance.

(p. 59) 3°. Thoroughly false is the assertion that the necessity which is predicated of the highest existing being is capable of no concept. In the treatment of the essence of God we shall vindicate a very intelligible content for this concept. But even if we were unable to grasp the concept of a necessary existence, it must be admitted as the absolutely demanded cause of the contingent things of the world.

Kant also seeks to reduce the teleological proof to the ontological; but here the fallacy lies still more obviously on the surface than in the casting of suspicion on the cosmological argument; wherefore we consider it lost labor to follow his expositions on this point.

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[1] Krit. d. r. Vern. [Critique of Pure Reason], Part II, Div. II, Bk. II, Ch. 3, Sec. 7. **[Tr.]** I.e., Transcendental Doctrine of Elements, Part II, Div. II (Transcendental Dialectic), Book II, Chapter 3 (The Ideal of Pure Reason), Section 7 (A 636/B 664 ff.). Kant's words are rendered here from Gutberlet's German quotation.

[2] l.c., Sec. 5.

Chapter Two. The Essence of God.

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(p. 60)

§ 1. Concept.

Since the essence distinguishes the thing from every other, and is that which must first be apprehended of the thing if it is to be apprehended at all, our discussion of the existence of God as a being distinct from the world and from everything presupposes some knowledge or other of the essence of God. It is now our task to determine this essence more precisely and so to prepare the way for a more perfect knowledge of God. The essence is twofold. The *metaphysical* essence, whose constituents are formed by our mind, and are thus for the most part metaphysical parts, i.e., parts not really distinct from one another; the *physical* essence, whose constituents are not laid apart by the mind, but are stated as they are found in the thing, and which are thus for the most part physical, i.e., really distinct, parts of the essence. Naturally there can be no talk of physical parts in God's essence; physical essence designates in him the essence as it is in itself, metaphysical essence that conception of God on the part of our mind from which we can derive his physical essence. To come to know the physical essence of God, i.e., to investigate the whole infinite content of being of the divine essence, is the goal of the whole of natural theology.

In order, however, to set forth this whole content, we must proceed from the determinations of the divine being at which we arrived in the proofs for God's existence, in that we knew him, e.g., as necessary being, first cause, intelligent being, etc.; and the question now is whether one of these can be taken as the metaphysical essence, i.e., whether one of those marks not merely *(p. 61)* determines God precisely, distinguishes him from all others, but can also serve as the fundamental determination from which all the other attributes of God can be derived, and so his physical essence be constructed.

§ 2. The Essence of God Consists in Aseity.

1. Many Scotists (so too, recently, Palmieri) take the *infinitas radicalis* [radical infinity] as the metaphysical essence, from which infinity then follows with its whole content. This opinion hardly differs from the nominalist one, which immediately makes the sum of all perfections the essence of God, i.e., states the physical essence where we are asking for the metaphysical. Those Thomists too who place the divine essence in the highest intellectuality must, if they do not wish to make an attribute or a faculty, or rather an activity, the essence, place it in the highest degree of immaterial being, i.e., of remoteness from potentiality, in the purest actuality; with which indeed a very precise expression for the physical essence is given, but one which for several reasons cannot serve as the starting point for the knowledge of the physical essence. Still much less can we use the essence which Platonists assume, the ἕν [One] or ἀγαθόν [Good], to which being is related only as a property; especially since the proofs for the existence of the "One" and of the "Good" are at the least too subtle to be able to be used generally.

2. If, on the other hand, we place the essence of God in being-through-itself, or being-necessary, or, as the Thomists say, in being itself, then we have found this mark through our proofs of God's existence; through it God is also distinguished from everything else, and from it follows, as will become evident, the whole infinity of God with all its individual perfections; and it thus corresponds to all the requirements that are made of a metaphysical essence. Whether a true ontological dependence of the divine attributes on aseity also exists may be left undecided, and does nothing to the matter; for *a parte rei* [on the side of the thing] there exists in the absolutely simple no dependence at all of the one on the other. Either, therefore, one may not speak of a metaphysical essence in God at all, or one must let that mark count as such from which the

other attributes *(p. 62)* follow in our knowledge of God; aseity serves us in any case as the metaphysical essence of God.

3. Being-through-itself, however, is not to mean that God is produced through himself, i.e., through his essence, or that his existence has flowed (even if necessarily) from his essence, but that he exists by virtue of his essence, without external cause, that his essence must necessarily be conceived as existing. With this, then, it is given that existence belongs as inwardly and necessarily to his essence as, say, rationality and sensitivity to man; therefore one says in the same sense, God's essence is his existing, as man's essence is rationality and sensitivity.

In singling out aseity before all the other fundamental determinations of the divine essence found through the proofs of God's existence, we do not wish thereby to detract from the usefulness of these for the proof of the infinity of God; on the contrary, we wish to have them, like the concept of the first cause, of the *movens immobile* [unmoved mover], etc., included.

§ 3. God Is Infinitely Perfect.

If one calls perfect that "to which nothing is lacking of what is necessary in order to attain its goal," then one naturally has in view only such things as have a goal to attain. This definition is not applicable to the purely possible essences, which are nevertheless also called perfect, as a perfect circle, a perfect ellipse; nor to actual beings which are there for their own sake. Thus a work of art is called perfect, not because it can attain an end distinct from itself, but because it corresponds to its idea. God is absolutely his own end; therefore still much less can his perfection be determined with reference to his goal. Rather, the more general definition must be applied: Perfect is that to which nothing is lacking of what it must have. What a thing must have is determined first by its essence, but then by accidental properties to be taken from experience. But since the self-existent being has everything that it has through its essence, its perfection is determined exclusively by the concept of the essence, and with this the perfection of God is evident *ex terminis* [from the terms]; for all reality demanded by the essence *(p. 63)* must be had by that being which has all its reality through its essence. In created beings (positive) imperfection is therefore possible because they can be deprived by external influences of reality which lies outside the essence but is otherwise present in actuality; were they to lack something which lies in their essence, then they would be what they are and also not be it; for through the constituents of the essence each thing is what it is.

But we wish to exclude from God not merely positive imperfection, by ascribing to him relative perfection, i.e., perfection restricted to some genus of beings and demanded by the concept of this genus; rather his infinity demands absolute perfection, i.e., perfection confined to no genus of being, extended over, or better, exalted above, all genera of what is, and thus excludes every imperfection, even a merely negative one, every non-being. To the negative imperfections belong also limits, i.e., negations of further perfection. Every limit in the degree of every perfection, too, is denied in God with infinity; and we therefore assert that God possesses all possible perfections in the highest, infinite degree.

To this infinity of God several proofs of God's existence have already led us. Here we give the derivation of it from the concepts of God gained there, in connection.

1. There can indeed be no infinitely perfect creature from which we could conclude to the infinity of the Creator; but the manner of the original production of the world, out of nothing, through creation properly so called, requires an infinite power, as will be shown later.

2. God is not merely the cause of the actual world, but also the ground of the ideal domain; in any case the domain of the possible, of the true and good, is subservient to him, because through its laws he rules the world and spirits. The ideal domain, however, is without limits not merely in the multitude of possible things, but also in the degree of their perfection. Now, however, the ground and the foundation, the ruler, must

always be more perfect than that which is grounded, the subject. Therefore the perfection of God has no limits. For had it limits, then beings would be possible only as far as those limits reach; a being which was more perfect than *(p. 64)* those limits determine could not be thought at all, would be impossible. Now, however, the thinkability and possibility of beings has no limits, in perfection as in number.

On the other hand one could object that this proof presupposes the unity of God, which is later in turn proved from infinity. For if several last principles of the ideal world exist, then they can, through their combination, be infinite and the ground of the infinity of that order.

But 1°. the unity of God is not proved from infinity alone;

2°. precisely the unitary order of all truth points more emphatically than even the unity of the world to one primordial ground of it;

3°. the actually infinite perfection which the existing ground of all merely possible perfection must have cannot be composed of a multiplicity, as will be shown more precisely in the treatment of the simplicity of God.

3. The Creator of the world is also its goal. The goal of the rational creature, however, is an infinite good, as can be proved by induction and by the infinite extension of the higher appetitive faculty. Therefore God must be the infinite good.

4. The moral order presents itself to us with absolute power and as of infinite value. For the command which goes out to us in obligation is an almighty one; to no good of the world, however high, may we subordinate virtue. This power and this value, however, the moral order does not have of itself; for considered in itself it can present itself only as fitting, advantageous, etc. Therefore it must be commanded by an absolute power, set in relation to an infinite good. But outside God there can be no infinite good, no absolute power, least of all if they are not found first in him, the first cause. Therefore . . .

5. All change proceeds from God without change in him. But a being which changes without change of its own must

a) be an act of infinite efficacy; for only such a one can, merely by the fact that it is, without new actuality in it, produce all its changes.

b) It must have the true and the good wholly in itself; for only an intellect and will which is wholly the true and the good can, in *(p. 65)* resolving something consciously and freely, remain unchanged by everything else.

c) If God freely resolved this course of the world, he could have resolved infinitely many other worlds instead. On account of his unchangeability in changing, however, the knowledge of these would not first have become actual in him then; rather he must already now actually know all possible worlds, thus all possible being. But only the infinite intelligence can know actually and simultaneously all possible being. Therefore . . .

6. a) God must be at least as perfect as the world of which he is the cause. But he can just as well be one, two, three grades, etc., up to infinity, more perfect. In order, therefore, not to stop arbitrarily at a finite grade of perfection, with which infinitely many others have quite equal claim, infinite perfection must be ascribed to him. For in self-existent beings the degree of their perfection is determined not by the allotment of a definite measure on the part of a cause, but by their concept and their essence, i.e., by that which they can be by virtue of their essence. Now, however, the cause of the world can, by virtue of its essence, have any degree of perfection whatever that stands above that of the world, its effect; if, then, the determination of a finite degree of perfection in that necessary being is not to be left to pure chance, or a finite degree assumed with the greatest arbitrariness, infinity must be ascribed to it.

b) If one ascribes merely a finite perfection to the self-existent essence of God, then this determinate finite degree of perfection demands existence. This, however, is absurd; for it demands it either as finite being, or as this determinate finite being, or as being in general.

As finite being it can α) certainly not demand existence more than infinite being does, and therefore, if finite being must exist, then still much more infinite being. Therefore an infinite being exists. β) If it demanded existence as finite being, then evidently each and every finite being would have to exist, which is neither possible nor actual.

But neither can it, a degree of finite perfection, demand existence as this determinate finite essence, e.g., as angel or man; otherwise all individuals comprehensible under this essence *(p. 66)* would have to exist, thus, e.g., infinitely many angels, men and the like. This, however, is neither possible nor actual.

But still far less can a finite essence demand existence because it has being at all. For then α) all being would have to exist, which is absurd. β) Then an infinite being too would have to exist, which is what we wish to have. Therefore no finite being can be through itself, but the *ens a se* [being from itself] is infinite.

c) Only through the assumption of an infinite God is chance excluded in the existence of God.

α) For if he is finite, then with the same right and for the same reason all possible finite beings which can be thought between the most imperfect and the most perfect can and must exist; and it would thus be absolute chance if this one alone existed. But if the author of the world is infinite, then it is not the case that for the same reason and with the same claim all finite beings must exist, as is already clear on account of the infinite difference, and becomes still clearer from this, that if an infinite being contains existence in its essence, finite essences do not for the same reason demand existence too.

β) With every finite degree of perfection which one ascribes to the Creator, one can say that he could just as well be more perfect, and, so far as the perfection of the world posited by him does not demand it, also less perfect; it is thus not merely arbitrariness on our part, who do not know the determinate degree, to assume that determinate finite degree, but also in itself the purest chance that this precise one exists without any reason particular to it. But if God is infinite, he evidently cannot just as well be still more perfect.

Nor just as well less perfect; for the infinite which exists has in itself the sufficient reason for its existing and existing before all possible beings. The wholly unique and privileged position which the infinite occupies already makes impossible the question why precisely it, precisely it alone, precisely with this perfection, exists.

Mathematically this can be expressed in the following way. On the assumption of a finite God, there is given as the reason why precisely he exists, and not also the innumerable finite beings of ever higher perfection, or *(p. 67)* why he exists precisely with this degree and not rather with the innumerably many other degrees of perfection which would be just as (and perhaps still more) possible: “That is just the way it is,” i.e., pure *groundless chance*. According to the principles of the calculus of probabilities, however, the chances for the presence of this favorable chance can be calculated.

Possibilities there are infinitely many; favorable, only *one* case, i.e., with infinitely many possible degrees of perfection for the cause of the world, it is fact only in one case that he possesses the determinate degree ascribed to him. Therefore the probability that this favorable case is present is $W = 1/\infty = 0$. But if $W = 0$, then the case quite certainly does not occur.

Now someone might of course object that the case that God has infinite perfection is also only one, and therefore the probability that he has precisely this is also = 0.

But it is not true that infinitely many cases are *possible*. For if the infinite essence can demand existence, then not for the same reason all other possible essences; therefore it is not *chance* that precisely it exists, as it

would be chance if precisely a finite essence existed. Furthermore, as will be shown, only *one* infinite is possible. Therefore the probability that precisely this one exists = 1/1 = 1, which according to mathematical principles designates the expression of the certainty of the existence of a case.

7. From the *grades of being* it was inferred in the proofs for the existence of God that existing is God's essence. With this, however, his infinity is given. For everything that a being is by virtue of its essence it cannot be in a higher and lesser degree, but it must be it according to the whole and full concept of the essence. Since, e.g., man is essentially man, one man cannot have this being-man more than another, but each has it according to the full concept of humanity; were something lacking in it, he would precisely not be man. But being-wise, e.g., can belong to him more or less; not everyone needs to have wisdom according to its full concept, because it is precisely not his essence. Likewise, because to no contingent being is existing its essence, but only a contingent realization of an essence whose perfection was measured out to it by an external cause, none has existing according to its full and whole concept. But God must have the whole of existence as perfectly and undiminished as man has being-man. The whole of existing must therefore belong to God.

This can now be understood in a twofold way: 1°. He is the sum of all existing things. 2°. He is the whole fullness *(p. 68)* of being, infinitely perfect being. The first conception, however, is impossible, since the proof of God's existence here taken into account[1] demonstrates God's being as above all that exists. Therefore there remains only the second conception: God is infinitely perfect.

[1] p. 22 ff.

§ 4. More Precise Determination of the Infinity of God.

I. God contains all perfection, although in different ways.

1. When we said that by virtue of his infinity all or infinitely many perfections belong to God, this is not to be understood as if a determinate sum of infinite realities, or an infinite multitude of finite or infinite perfections, dwelt in him; we shall rather show that he is metaphysically simple and thus possesses only one single perfection of infinite intensity, which, to be sure, is equal to infinitely many perfections. What was meant, then, is that his perfection is equivalent to infinite perfections, i.e., that there is no true perfection, nor can any be thought, which the infinite being would not have in itself. This follows not merely from his infinity, but also from his property as first cause of everything that is and can be. For the cause must contain in itself in some way the perfection of its effect, which indeed has everything solely from the adequate cause.

2. In a twofold way, however, the cause contains the perfection of the effect: either *formally*, i.e., according to the same concept as the effect (*causa univoca* [univocal cause]); thus the humanity of the father is in the son; or in a higher way, *eminently*, but *virtually*, equivalent to the perfection of the effect (*causa aequivoca* [equivocal cause]). Thus in the artist the whole perfection of his work dependent on him is found, not according to the same species, but virtually, in his insight and power.

Some of the perfections, now, which we abstract from creatures belong to God formally, i.e., according to their proper concept, not merely in a transferred sense; though not in the same species as to these, on which more immediately below. These are the so-called *pure* perfections *(p. 69)* (*perfectiones simplices* [simple perfections]), which in their concept neither include an imperfection nor exclude a higher perfection, such as wisdom, will, etc. The *mixed* perfections (*perf. mixtae*), because they contain an imperfection in their concept or conflict with a higher perfection, can belong to the infinite, which possesses all and only perfection, not according to their proper concept, but at most in a transferred sense, such as hearing, speaking, inferring, etc. (anthropomorphisms). But what these mixed perfections[1] have of true perfection, what they accomplish, their value, God possesses in a pure perfection which accomplishes and is worth the same (*virtualiter*

[virtually]), or rather is still infinitely better (*eminenter* [eminently]) than those realities clouded by non-being. Thus God, through his immediate beholding of all truth, is able to accomplish far better the same thing which our limited, progressing thought accomplishes in inferring. His intelligence contains inference eminently and virtually.

II. All perfections are predicated of God and of creatures only in an analogous sense.

1. When we ascribed the pure perfections of creatures to God formally, this must not be understood as if they represented common genera, under which the infinite and the finite would then be contained as species properly so called. On the contrary, God is contained with no creature under the same genus. The concept of the pure perfections, e.g., of power, of wisdom, does indeed belong properly to God and to creatures, but not to both in the same way, and so an essential moment is lacking which belongs to univocal predication. If one and the same concept is ascribed with truth to several, but to the one in a different way than to the other, then one has merely an analogous, not a generic (or specific) concept. Of this kind is being and all other perfections which are ascribed to God and to creatures. In God they are through themselves and infinite, undistinguished from all his other perfections, indeed the one divine being itself; in creatures they are produced, finite, distinct from the essence and the other realities either really or at least objectively. Therefore one could in a true sense say even of the pure perfections that they belong to God only eminently.

(p. 70) Yet this analogy is still to be determined and demonstrated somewhat more precisely.

2. That the indeterminate and most general concept of being cannot be predicated univocally of God and creatures follows from the analogy of this concept in general. Since the concepts finite and infinite, by which one distinguishes, e.g., God and creatures, must include that of being in order to signify something and not nothing, that which is common to both, being, does not stand above the differences, but belongs also to that by which they are distinguished, i.e., they are distinguished in (determinately thought) being itself. Since, however, (indeterminate) being is not ascribed to both purely arbitrarily, but both quite properly *are*, being is predicated of them not equivocally, but analogously. Since now finite being is what it is just as essentially only through inner dependence on infinite being as through assimilation to it, the *analogia attributionis* [analogy of attribution] and *proportionis* [of proportion] belong to being. To be sure, the former mostly coincides with metonymy, as when one calls both the man and the food healthy, and the latter with metaphor, as when one says “laughing” of man and of meadows: such an analogy resting on mere transfer may not be ascribed to being, as some have done. Not for this reason is God called being, wise, good, because he produces beings which possess being, wisdom, goodness; nor are creatures called beings because they are like God in the corresponding perfections; but quite properly and truly God and the creature are being, wise, good, etc. This analogy therefore approaches univocal expression so closely that the view of the Scotists, who declare being to be univocal and not analogous, need not appear so striking; and even Suarez, who defends analogy, declares that if from analogy the total lack of community of being between God and creatures followed, he would rather assume univocity. And so our proofs for analogy too are meant only to show that being and the other perfections, predicated of God and of creatures, deviate in some points from synonymous or univocally predicated concepts.[2]

(p. 71) 3. Although indeterminate being is predicated analogously even of different creatures, they nevertheless agree in much determinate being, namely in the genera and concepts, and these are therefore predicated univocally of them. Not so when we predicate determinate being, a determinate perfection, of God and of creatures. For since every divine perfection essentially includes the whole essence of God and every other perfection, the concept of no individual reality can be thought in him objectively separated from being and the other realities. But if such a perfection were to appear as a common genus, then it would have to abstract objectively from the other perfections in God just as in the creature, and might not include the whole being.

In other words: That which appears as genus is indifferent to every difference which determines it to the species standing under it. The generic concept *tree* is completely indifferent to the specification into an apple tree or pear tree. But if one has, e.g., wisdom, which is predicated in common of God and of men, then it is indeed indifferent to the determination "human wisdom," but not to the other, "divine wisdom"; for no concept of any perfection whatever can in God be objectively distinguished from the others and from the divine being and be opposed, as a determinable element (genus), as a metaphysical part, to the determining difference. More on this under the simplicity of God.

4. Since the common genus is necessarily a universal and abstract concept, it excludes individuality and existence. In God, however, no reality can be thought which would not include individual existence in its concept. Therefore nothing can be abstracted from him and conceived as a generic concept.

5. It is against the essence of the (universal) generic concept that it be identical with the concept standing under it. But every perfection, e.g., wisdom, which as genus is supposed to be common to God and creatures, is identical with the divine perfection standing under it (divine wisdom). For

a) divine wisdom is, on account of its infinity, the whole of wisdom, besides which no other is thinkable. The particular concept, wisdom, therefore exhausts the generic concept wisdom completely, and nothing remains over for another species, say human wisdom. The latter must therefore belong to a quite different order from divine wisdom, which is wisdom itself and alone.

b) Because in God not even metaphysical composition is admissible, the wisdom thought of God includes the whole divine essence, and a wisdom which as a generic concept would abstract from this essence cannot be abstracted from God.

(p. 72)

III. The incomprehensible essence of God we can bring nearer to our understanding in a threefold way: a) that of causality, b) of negation, c) of eminence.

1. If God has nothing in common with creatures, then we cannot define him in the strict sense, i.e., cannot form a distinct idea of his essence; he is incomprehensible for us, his essence ineffable. Every definition, namely, consists of a common genus requiring determination and a differentiating element. These two moments, however, cannot be distinguished in God. And yet there is for us no other means of thinking him than to apply to him too the representations which we have taken from creatures, and then to determine more closely how they belong to him differently from creatures. We shall therefore use those general representations in the concept (the definition) of God after the manner of the indeterminate generic concept, and, in order that they may a) belong to God, b) distinguish him from everything, and c) be able to raise him above everything, we must free them from their imperfections which adhere to them in the finite.

In thus a) transferring the perfections of the effects to their cause, we make use of the *way of causality*, which has its justification in this, that the cause must somehow contain the perfections of the effects, or that the effect must be somehow like the cause. *Omne ens agit simile sibi.* [Every being produces something like itself.] Therefore this way is also called the way of likeness or of analogy in the wider sense. Thus we call God wise, mighty.

In further excluding from those perfections the limitation, their contingent and accidental being in creatures, their distinction from the essence and other perfections, their mutability, potentiality, etc., we arrive b) by the *way of negation* c) at the goal of our knowledge of God, the conception of God as the being exalted above all being: superwise, supergood. Therefore the Fathers of the Church can call God πανώνυμος [all-named], ἀνώνυμος [nameless] and ὑπερώνυμος [above every name].

2. This concept of the infinite thus gained is by no means different from our other concepts in its subjective constitution and its individual objective marks; by negating the limits and negations in our finite realities, *(p. 73)* we obtain the concept of an infinite being standing above all things. Every finite intellect, therefore, which can form the concept of being and of negation and connect the two with one another, is able to think the infinite without an innate idea and without vision.

3. If one now asks whether this concept is one proper to God, the question is to be answered in the affirmative if properness is opposed to universality or commonness. The exaltedness of God, which we determine through analogy and negation, separates God from everything outside God, and the concept gained on these three ways belongs to God alone. But it is not proper to God if one understands by this a concept whose marks are taken from God himself, which would thus represent God in his wholly peculiar being, in himself. For this it would be required that we behold God himself, which is possible to no finite being, let alone to our intellect bound to the senses. Our knowledge of God is therefore an *abstractive* one, i.e., one to which we are not determined by the presence of the object (in vision), but which we compose out of realities abstracted from creatures in such a way that they belong to God alone.

4. If one wished to object against this concept of God that it is false because it represents God otherwise than he is in himself, then it is to be replied that for a false concept it does not suffice that the manner of knowing be different from the manner of being — otherwise every knowledge of an object which in being stands below or above the knower would be false — but rather the knowledge must 1°. represent its object itself otherwise than it is, and 2°. the difference must be positive, not merely negative (inasmuch as it does not exhaust the whole object). 3°. The intellect must judge that the object has in itself the manner of being as that of the knowing.

Now, however, 1°. merely our manner of knowing is different from the being of God; 2°. even if imperfectly, it nevertheless represents its object, that which God is; 3°. we do not assert that those abstracted realities are in God as we think them, but that they are united in him in absolute unity.

5. If all reality belongs to God and to creatures only analogously, so that God cannot be conceived (alongside any creature) as part of the extension of a universal concept, then, strictly speaking, one may assert no reality *(p. 74)* of God, or at least the affirmative propositions which predicate a reality of God require a closer explanation. For the predicate of the affirmative proposition is particular, and thus, e.g., “Man is wise” means as much as: he is some wise one or other; and accordingly “God is wise” means as much as: God is some wise one or other, he belongs to the genus of the wise. More correctly one would resolve it: God is *the* Wise One, i.e., he is the only one who possesses the whole of wisdom. But this, after all, one does not wish to assert expressly when one says simply: God is wise. One wishes precisely only to say that wisdom belongs to God, and takes the predicate merely in absolute supposition, which abstracts from the subjects in which it is found at all, not in personal supposition. The rule that in affirmative propositions the predicate is particular is taken from statements about finite subjects, although even here isolated exceptions occur, as: “Man is (a) sensitive rational being,” instead of “*the* sensitive rational being.”

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[1] **[Tr.]** The original has “diese gemischten Unvollkommenheiten” (“these mixed imperfections”), evidently a slip for “Vollkommenheiten” (perfections); translated according to the sense.

[2] See Metaphys. p. 4 ff.

§ 5. Errors concerning the Essence of God.

I. Pantheism.

Our theistic world-view, which explains the existence and constitution of the world through a personal, supramundane and extramundane God, is diametrically opposed by the pantheistic, which identifies God and

the universe. The many-shaped forms of this monster can be reduced to three main groups, according as a) a false conception of the divine essence, or b) of the world, or c) of the relation of the two to one another, gave the proximate occasion for the confusion of beings so different as world and God. Accordingly one can distinguish a theological, a cosmological and an emanationist pantheism.

a) The Vedanta school among the Indians, by stressing the reality of Brahma too one-sidedly, declares the whole world to be deceptive appearance (Maya), from which one must free oneself ideally and really through asceticism. And the Eleatic school among the Greeks, by conceiving God as the one unchangeable being (ἓν τὸ ὂν καὶ πᾶν [Being is one and all]), likewise could grant no reality to the many and the moved. The exaggerated realism of the Middle Ages conceived God's essence as the sum of all universals, and thereby declares God, implicitly or expressly (David of Dinant), to be the formal being of all things. According to Spinoza there is only one infinite substance, with the two infinite attributes of thought and extension. All the things of the world are only modes *(p. 75)* of this substance. According to *Fichte* the indeterminate Ego posits itself, and, determining itself, the Non-ego, the world. With *Schelling* the absolute being, the indifference of subject and object, of spirit and nature, divides itself into the difference of those two moments, which now develop ever further, until they grasp themselves again in consciousness. *Hegel* goes back still further and lets ever more perfect forms of existence develop out of the indifference of being and non-being, through opposition and closer determinations, up to absolute being. This whole process of the world's becoming is God; therefore his system is at the same time cosmological pantheism.

b) The world itself was conceived as self-existent being by the old *Ionian* school, which let the world arise through the development of a primordial element, a primordial force, e.g., of fire (Heraclitus), of water (Thales), of all four elements (Empedocles), etc. To the Stoics (and already before them to the Pythagoreans) the world is the development of a world-spirit or a world-soul. According to *Giordano Bruno*, the uncreated living world-matter is the pregnant mother of all forms. Here belongs also the modern *pessimism* of *Schopenhauer*, who explains the world's becoming from the irrational will to existence, and of *Hartmann*, who explains it from the blind impulse of the "Unconscious."

c) The world is explained by *emanation* from God, namely:

α) From an indeterminate, *impersonal* being, by the *Indians*, among whom the three world-gods Brahma, Vishnu and Shiva emanate from the Parabrahma; the *Persians*, who let the mutually hostile gods Ormuzd and Ahriman, and from them all things, flow out of the Zaruane Akharene;[1] the *Egyptians*, whose Kneph is the primordial being from which eight higher gods emanate, and from these twelve lower ones. With the *Neoplatonists* there emanate from the primordial Monad first the ideas and the world-soul; with the *Cabbalists*, from the incomprehensible non-being, the primordial man and the ten concentric circles of light (Sephiroth), which represent successive regions of the world. Some *Gnostics* let everything arise from Σιγή [Silence] and Βυθός [Depth]. In more recent times *Jak. Böhme* lets the primordial object determine itself out of an incomprehensible groundlessness (*Ungrund*), and Weiße out of *infinite possibility*, in order then to let the world proceed from it with necessity.

(p. 76) β) From a *personal* God the world is made to proceed more or less pantheistically, namely:

αα) the whole world, by the younger *Fichte*, according to whom the infinite spirit releases the ideas as its primordial positions out of its being, where they already had will, into existence of their own.

ββ) The world of spirits (semipantheism), by the Arabian Aristotelians and a part of the Gnostics, who let the Aeons emanate from God in ever lower perfection, until the last is imperfect enough to create the material world as Demiurge.

Refutation of Pantheism in General.

The fundamental error to which all pantheism comes down is the identification of concepts and realities which stand in the sharpest contradiction with one another, and every pantheism must consistently lead to the "identity of opposites," which Hegel designates and asserts as the essence of all things and the ground of all becoming. More specifically:

1. Already through most of our proofs for God's existence God has been shown to be a supramundane, personal being distinct from the world, and with this especially cosmological pantheism, which is indeed the purest atheism, is already refuted. In particular it was shown that the material world cannot be of itself, that an extramundane intelligence has ordered it, that a free being has chosen out of the infinite possibilities, etc.

2. God is infinite, one, simple, unchangeable, as will be shown in what follows. The world, however, is finite, contains a multiplicity of extended things, is changeable.

3. All pantheism which denies the freedom of God in the production of the world must

a) let as many and as perfect things of the world proceed from God as are possible at all. For if individual ones are not chosen out of all the possibilities, it would be the purest chance, because without any sufficient reason, if only a determinate number with limited perfection proceeded from the primordial ground of all things. And conversely the principle of sufficient reason requires that, if the sufficient reason for something is present, this too *(p. 77)* must itself be, and that, if the same sufficient reason is given for several, the one must be there as well as the others.

Now, however, it is evident that the number and perfection of the things of the world is limited; but equally possible alongside these are infinitely many with infinitely different perfection, upward and downward.

b) If the world is a necessary consequence, development or emanation of the divine essence, it must be just as infinite as this itself. And conversely, only with the greatest arbitrariness can one assume the absolute chance that precisely such a finite primordial being exists before innumerable other possible ones, which by virtue of its essence demands the present finite number of the things of the world.

Against this it cannot be objected that we do not know the whole world and therefore can assert nothing about its intensive and extensive magnitude. For it is evident that every being which comes under our observation can be multiplied and perfected to infinity; that the number of genera, species and individuals observed on earth could be infinitely smaller and greater, etc.

Nor can one say that in the course of infinite times all possibilities can come to be realized. For

a) at every moment, e.g., now, infinitely many other states are possible;

b) there is no reason at all why the state of this determinate perfection is realized precisely now, and another earlier or later; for all are at every time quite equally possible;

c) among the quite equally possible states there are also some contradictorily or contrarily opposed to one another, e.g., that it rains or that the sun shines. These cannot occur at the same time; and therefore the absolute possibility of each of them is repeated infinitely many times, namely at every moment at which not it but its opposite exists. As often as the one opposite exists, the other could absolutely exist too.

Therefore even in infinite time not all possibilities come to be realized; and yet without a determining cause there is no reason why the one opposite should occur before the other.

If one wishes to reply to this that each individual state is determined by the preceding one as to its time and perfection, the further question arises *(p. 78)* why this preceding one appears at this time and in this perfection, etc. The question accordingly arises: Why did that state which proceeded immediately from the primordial being have, instead of the infinitely many possible in number and perfection, precisely this determinate finite constitution?

To this only two answers can be given which could seem to remove chance: 1. The development begins from the lowest state and progresses to the most perfect (Hegel). 2. The development begins from the most perfect and sinks ever further down (Gnosticism).

But with this one makes the development all the more impossible. For a) in and of themselves both cases are equal, “a going upward” and “a going downward”; therefore each of them is chance and without reason.

b) Easier, to be sure, would be a falling away from the infinite, thus the way downward more probable; but it is contrary to the actual progress in the formation of the world.

c) Either one assumes a continuous development, or one by leaps. The former is not actual, since α) in the actual formation of the world enormous leaps, “catastrophes,” upward and downward, have been and are observed; and β) discrete gradations must be made, because it is a question of change in the number of individuals and faculties.

Therefore the development of the infinite began with a determinate finite number of beings with determinate finite perfection, i.e., the state of the world proceeding immediately from God either rose by a finite magnitude above zero, in order to go upward from there, or it stood by a determinate magnitude below God, in order to fall away from there.

The former was impossible, since

α) infinitely many other states could equally well have made the beginning; β) the tempo of the progress, and with it the exponent of progress, evidently admits of infinitely many variations; from this, however, there result infinitely many variations of the first term of the progression. For if the development proceeded more rapidly, we should still have the present state with a smaller initial term, and conversely.

But if, secondly, the development began from a state of the world which was not continuously connected with God’s infinity, then this state had to have a determinate distance from it. This distance, now, is either infinite or finite. If it is infinite, then the first state of the world is itself finite, and then there are infinitely many finite ones which are equally possible. If the distance is thought of as finite, this would still be possible only insofar as the first world itself were thought of as infinite; for two finites cannot make up an infinite. But then there are again infinitely many such infinite worlds, different in number and perfection, e.g., such as stand 1, 2, 3, 4 degrees of perfection distant from the infinite God. Therefore again no reason why the beginning was made with the one state rather than with the other.

4. The development of the world took its starting point from a determinate finite value of its perfection and extension; it progresses in finite gradations and is now in *(p. 79)* a finite stage of its development. Therefore the number of its stages of development is finite, the development of the world itself temporal. Pantheism, however, must let it begin with the necessity of essence and therefore from eternity.

5. With the divine freedom pantheism denies all contingency and still more all freedom of action. For all that happens in the world is, according to it, necessary development of the necessary being.

Now, however, the contingency of being and happening in the world is the most manifest fact (see the preceding proofs), which can be cast into the shade at most only by the evidence of the fact that we possess freedom of choice.

Refutation of the Individual Main Forms of Pantheism.

A. Of Theological Pantheism.

1. Various representatives of this system confuse the infinite being which God is with the universal being which belongs to all things. Both are indeed called the whole of being simply, but God because he is the whole of being, the infinite fullness of being without any limitation whatever; universal being, however,

because it is merely being and nothing more, thus without any closer determination and without any other reality than just being. Both are called absolute being, but God because existence belongs to him not dependently on others but independently, and because perfection belongs to him not with respect to any genus, but above every particular genus of being, without limitation. Universal being, however, is called absolute because it is a transcendental concept, and, free from every closer determination, standing above all particular genera, must be thought as the most abstract entity. Both are necessary, but universal being in the ideal domain, God in the real.

Hardly two concepts can be so poles apart from one another as the being of God and abstract being. The idea of the former has the greatest comprehension and the least extension; that of the second infinitely great extension with the smallest possible comprehension.

If, therefore, *(p. 80)*

a) abstract being is one and unchangeable, it does not follow that infinite existence cannot posit many changeable existences outside itself.

b) If universal being is in all things and is predicated of them, God's being is so individual that it does not even admit of the multiplication in several individuals which is required for a universal concept.

c) That being is indeed so indeterminate that it embraces subject and object, spirit and nature; indeed even nothing, thought as *ens rationis* [being of reason], can and must be subsumed in an analogous sense under the most abstract concept of being. But the more abstractly it is thought, the further it removes itself from actuality, and it can therefore neither "lay itself apart," nor "divide itself," nor "drive opposites out of itself," nor "determine itself more closely." If one lets these processes take place in the thought of an existing spirit, then this form of pantheism combines with the absurdity of idealism besides; and if one takes the identity of opposites seriously, then with the denial of the principle of contradiction one has the most consummate scepticism. For this reason, and because of the manifest monstrous absurdities of the systems of Fichte, Hegel and Schelling, we believe we should do our readers an injustice if we entered upon them more closely.

2. On the other hand we cannot withdraw from a critique of Spinozism, not because it would be difficult to refute it, but because of the sensation it has made and still makes.

a) His demonstration of the unity of substance rests on a wretched confusion of concepts.

α) Substance is an *ens per se* [being through itself], whose concept can be formed by itself, without another, whereas everything whose concept cannot be formed without another is accident, modification of substance. Now if there were created substances distinct from God, their concept could not be formed by itself, not without God. They would therefore not be substances, but modifications of the substance of God.

Here the very different concepts of substance and cause, of accident and effect, are confused with one another. Substance is *ens per se*, i.e., *in se* [in itself]; but not necessarily *a se* [from itself]; for there can be produced beings which exist in themselves, not in *(p. 81)* another, e.g., man, tree, etc., and which consequently are not accidents but substances. To be sure, the concept of a produced being, if it is expressly thought relatively, i.e., as effect, cannot be thought without another, the cause; but one can well think it without another in which it inheres. Inherence in a subject constitutes the concept of accident, but not the relation of a thing to its cause.

β) Two substances which have nothing in common with one another cannot produce one another; for *ex nihilo nihil fit* [from nothing nothing comes]. But if they have something in common with one another, they are not two, but one substance. For two different substances cannot have an attribute identically.

To be sure, the cause must have something in common with the effect; for the whole being of the effect comes from the (adequate) cause. The effect therefore has 1°. likeness with the cause, and therefore a logical

identity with it, but no real unity; 2°. real dependence on it; and in this relation the cause too has a share as correlative; but this does not make them one substance, but essentially presupposes two correlatives. For the rest, the effect can also be thought absolutely, i.e., without these two relations to the cause, and so it always remains true that its concept can be formed without another concept, which Spinoza requires as belonging to the essence of substance.

γ) *Omnis determinatio est limitatio.* [Every determination is a limitation.] If, therefore, the divine essence embraced only one thing, not all things, it would not be infinite. Indeed, every substance is infinite in its kind.

To be sure, in finite beings, whose perfection does not span all genera of being, their closer determination is obtained by stating the determinate finite grade of being which the genus indicates, thus by limitation. The infinite being, which stands above all particular genera of being and of perfection and nevertheless includes them all in itself, has its determinateness precisely in this, that it is unlimited, i.e., that, standing above all the limiting categories of being, it somehow comprises them all in itself.

Every substance is infinite in its kind insofar as it has the essential perfection of the kind undivided. Every man is wholly man, not more or less man. The qualities, such as wisdom, *(p. 82)* strength, can be greater or less, but not the substances.[2] But the kind to which a substance belongs need not be infinite. Man, the animal, are finite kinds of substances.

Now one could, however, conclude from this infinity of God's being that he makes all being outside himself impossible. For infinite being demands all being; and if there were yet another being beside it, the sum of the two would be greater than the infinite alone, and this could therefore not be designated as the greatest thinkable.

Outside the infinite there can of course be no perfection in the domain of the infinite; for then the former would not have all infinite perfection. Also this extra-divine perfection, because of the same denomination and kind as the divine being, would have to admit of being added to it and yield a greater perfection, which is absurd.

But finite perfections the infinite tolerates outside itself; for they contain nothing new which God would not already possess in a much higher degree. Finite things can indeed be added to God in number, and they increase the number of existing things. But their perfection agrees univocally with God in no genus, indeed not even in being; therefore they cannot be added to one another; for every summation requires things of the same kind. Gold coins cannot be added to wisdom to produce a greater perfection; there is neither more gold through the combination, nor more wisdom. Since, however, the two do after all still agree in something, say in the concept of value, gold and wisdom have more value than gold or wisdom alone.

Further, God already contains all the perfection of all finite beings in a higher degree, and therefore nothing in perfection can be added to his. If there were a gold coin which equalled or surpassed in value all possible lower coins, one would not have more monetary value if one received those lesser coins in addition. This would of course be possible only if the material from which the worthless coins were stamped could serve for nothing at all which the gold coin did not already accomplish; that is of course hardly possible, at most with a play-penny of pasteboard. Creatures, *(p. 83)* however, can do absolutely nothing at all which God could not do by himself, except fail and sin, which, added to God's perfection, certainly does not increase it.

b) Positive refutation of Spinoza.

α) The unfalsified concept of substance belongs not merely to one, but to innumerably many things, which

αα) immediate inner and outer experience teaches us to know as distinct, and as existing not in another but in themselves.

ββ) Where experience cannot penetrate, there science demonstrates an uncounted multitude of smallest substances (atoms).

γγ) The most superficial reflection shows that one substance cannot at the same time have different, still less opposed, mutually exclusive modifications, such as existence in separate places, rest and motion, round and angular shape, simplicity and composition.

β) In particular, extension and thought cannot be attributes of one and the same substance. For

αα) thought, as psychology shows, presupposes an unextended substance.

ββ) Either the substance is wholly extended and wholly thinking, or partly thinking and partly extended. But both are absurd: the former, because then precisely the same substance under the same respect (namely in its whole being) would have to be conceived as extended and as unextended, because thinking. The second Spinoza cannot assume, because he asserts that each divine attribute represents the whole divine essence; and it is also unacceptable, because otherwise the infinite and simple would be composed of parts, which is absurd, as will be shown still more clearly under the simplicity of God.

γγ) Extension cannot be called an infinite attribute representing the whole essence of God. For it is a mixed perfection, which is not capable of being heightened to infinity, since with the perfection contained in it the imperfection mixed in also grows, and it always retains in its concept the opposition to a higher perfection.

(p. 84)

B. Of Cosmological Pantheism.

1. Already through most of our proofs for God’s existence God was shown to be a supramundane, personal being, and with this this form of pantheism, which is the purest atheism, is already refuted. In particular it was shown that matter cannot be of itself, that an extramundane intelligence has ordered it, that a free being has determined the world and its constitution, etc.

2. God cannot be thought of as world-soul, i.e., the world is not animated

a) by a principle of life distinct from it, and b) not by a life which would be immanent to it.

a) What is through itself can neither itself be composite, still much less be part of another. Therefore the world, which is supposed to be of itself, cannot consist of soul and matter; nor can the uncreated spirit, which is necessarily infinite and independent, be an essential part, an informing principle, and thus, like a soul, essentially ordered to matter.

b) α) Uncreated life is infinitely perfect, therefore spiritual life, which is incompatible with the extension and dividedness of the things of the world.

β) Matter is essentially inert, capable only of activity directed outward, and can therefore not possess self-motion and immanent activity, in which life essentially manifests itself.

γ) Either one conceives the last elements of the world, the atoms, as animated, or the larger bodies, or the world as a whole. The former is impossible, since

αα) in order to explain the formation of bodies from them and their activity, one has to think of the atoms as endowed not with immanent and living activity, but only with activity going outward, or rather merely with inertia, and

ββ) because their immanent activity is asserted purely arbitrarily, since it is never observed or demanded by the facts.

Nor can the larger bodies be thought of as essentially living. For

αα) with this every distinction between living and lifeless beings would fall away;

(p. 85) ββ) most bodies exhibit merely activity going outward, show themselves thoroughly inert, are therefore certainly lifeless, or else their life is asserted wholly arbitrarily.

But the whole world cannot be animated, as was already shown under α) and β). The world does indeed show immanent activity insofar as this is not directed to something outside it; but still it is always only one part that acts on another; it is indeed not determined to the world's workings from without, but drives itself, yet always only one part through another, one force through another, so that in the end one must indeed come to a living being as first mover. This first, self-existent, infinitely simple, unchangeable life, however, must stand outside matter and outside the limited, composite and changeable world.

C. Of Emanationist Pantheism.

1. From the absolutely simple essence of God a) nothing can be torn away, nothing can flow out.

b) What flows out of him (is not produced) must be and remain something divine, and can therefore not be as changeable, composite and defective as this world is.

2. From the infinite nothing can be detached, namely a) nothing infinite, because otherwise the former would not remain infinite; b) nothing finite, because there is nothing finite in it.

3. Since the emanation does not occur by chance, but is demanded by the essence of God, it belongs to the development of the divine essence, and further, everything that happens in the world is only the development of an outflow inseparable from God himself. And so emanation shows itself not distinct from immanent evolution, which we have already refuted.

4. The theogonic process, which is frequently made to precede emanation, contradicts all the attributes of God, especially his absolute unchangeability and his purest actuality.

II. Dualism.

In order to express the odium which the absurd and mythical dualism of antiquity includes, the monists and materialists, for lack of proofs, like to revile as dualistic that one true world-view *(p. 86)* which sharply separates matter and spirit, world and God. Without that tactic the reproach of dualism has no significance at all, unless one lays down *a priori* that unity is simply to be preferred to duality and multiplicity. But then no polarity in the forces of nature may be assumed either, no sexuality in organic beings, no duality of mutually attracting atoms, no distinction between subject and object, finally no difference of being and non-being. Not according to catchwords, but according to what is objectively given, is the truth of so important a question to be decided.

To be sure, our mind, by virtue of an immanent disposition which is still more sharply developed through the observation of nature and the contemplation of the wisdom of the Creator, must give preference to the more unitary and simpler explanation of the given facts; but precisely this methodological requirement theism satisfies better than materialism. For if the latter does not wish to adopt the evidently absurd doctrine of the All-One, contradicting the facts, and declare, e.g., all atoms to be one substance, then in explaining the world it can penetrate no further than to a countless number of elements co-ordinated with one another and connected with one another by determinate laws. We, however, know only one last simple principle, which in its causality and perfection unitarily comprehends all the beings of the world, even the most diverse. Before its infinity the whole world and the finite differences of its beings vanish so completely that there can be no serious talk either of a co-ordinating dualism between God and the world, or between matter and spirit in the world.

The old dualism, in its mildest form, placed an eternal, self-existent matter beside the Creator; or rather, after the idea of creation had been clouded or lost, God was for the most part made merely to order matter already present. This error has already been refuted on various occasions, and also finds its new refutation in what follows, in the discussion of the stricter dualism.

Best known is the dualism of the Parsees, who assumed a highest good principle, Ormuzd, and a highest evil one, Ahriman; as well as the dualistic world-conception of the Manichaeans, who called all things either essentially good (light) or essentially bad (darkness), *(p. 87)* and accordingly also traced them back to different authors. Against this we show:

Dualism is A. absurd in itself, B. absurd in its presuppositions, and C. it does not explain what it is supposed to explain.

A. It is absurd:

1. to assume two self-existent beings; and

2. if they existed, the one would have to be just as necessary, infinite, good and perfect as the other.

3. Since evil is the lack of a perfection which belongs to a being,

a) an infinitely evil being would have no perfection at all; it would be nothing.

b) Since it has that lack of perfection by virtue of its essence, this would be supremely suited to it. But what is suited to a thing is good for it and perfection; and so the infinitely evil being would have to be infinitely good.

B. Absurd is the presupposition:

1. that there are essentially bad things. For every thing has at least a) an essence which, because it gives it its being, is supremely suited to it, therefore good for it. b) *A posteriori* too it is established that all the evils in the world are good for something.

2. Therefore the presupposition is false that a good God could not be the author of evils. It does not conflict with the goodness of God to permit moral evils and to use physical ones themselves as means for higher goods. And if we could furnish no other proof of this, it might already suffice that

C. the dualistic hypothesis all the more fails to explain the origin of evil. For

1. the good principle must abhor all evil, and, since it is just as mighty as the evil principle, annihilate it or not let it happen at all; and conversely the evil principle must make all good impossible. There thus arises the absurdity a) that the good, because willed by omnipotence, must be necessary, and, not willed by omnipotence, can be impossible; and b) that evil likewise must be necessary and can be impossible.

2. Only thus, therefore, could the existence of the mixture of good and bad, which is indeed found in one and the same creature, *(p. 88)* be explained: that the one principle yields something to the other, or, as Bayle thinks, that they mutually bind themselves not to disturb one another, or rather to be active together in the production of a being.

But a) two principles essentially hostile to one another can make no such agreement with one another. Or b) if it does not conflict with an infinitely good being to let the evil one work evil for an evil end, or even to bind itself to this by a contract and to work with it, then neither does it conflict with its goodness, or still less, to let evil in the world arise through finite beings and to draw from it a higher good.

In support of dualism one can adduce the principle: Opposite effects require opposite causes. Or, as the ancients said: *Omne agens agit simile sibi.* [Every agent produces something like itself.] Therefore, as the good in the world must be traced back to a good principle, so the evil to an evil principle.

This principle holds, to be sure, of the proximate, particular causes, and with necessity only of the natural forces acting without freedom; but not of the more universal ones, least of all of the last cause, when it is a question of the production of evil. Naturally the proximate special causes of phenomena must be just as diverse as these themselves; for they are indeed specially arranged for them. But if a cause stands higher in force and capacity, it can achieve so many more and so much more diverse effects, the more lower causes it is equal to. Thus the one sun is able to produce the most manifold, most opposite effects, health and sickness, death and life, etc. Since, now, free causes can extend their power of choice to an infinity of objects, one and the same will can be cause of the most opposite (contradictory and contrary) effects.

As regards evil in particular, it can have no cause at all which would not be good; for only what is, therefore what is good, can act and be cause.

(p. 89)

III. Polytheism.

There is only one God.

When we predicate unity of God, we do not mean by this the self-evident transcendental unity which belongs not merely to every existing, but also to every possible being. For with this it could very well be compatible that the Godhead, as a generic concept, could be ascribed to several species of gods, or, as a specific concept, to several individuals, and finally to each of these individuals, and each could be called a god.

With the unity of God we assert that there neither are nor can be several gods of the same nature, still much less several gods of different nature.

The mystery of the most holy Trinity is not touched by this assertion, since in it not several gods but only one God, not several divine natures but only one, is revealed, which is neither specifically nor numerically different in the three divine Persons, but is really one, individual and a single being; and this is precisely the unity of God of which philosophy treats. But it can be proved *a priori* that there cannot be several gods, and *a posteriori* that there are not several.

1. If there are several infinite beings, they are either specifically, or rather generically, or merely numerically different. But both are impossible.

If the infinite beings belong to different species, then: a) the infinite is not above all species and genera, as its absolute perfection requires, but is restricted precisely to a determinate species, and therefore finite.

b) The specific difference is in several, or at least in one, an (essential) perfection, which is therefore lacking to the one or to several; wherefore at least one is not infinite. In other words: If they differ in their essences, then the essence of the one must contain something which the other does not have. This something, however, is a reality whose lack in the other abolishes its infinity.

(p. 90) Against this it could be objected: The perfections by which they differ are of equal value, and therefore abolish the infinity in none. — But this is as little thinkable as that, as we shall see, the unchangeable infinite could exchange one perfection for another of equal value.

Furthermore, the simply infinite is in every respect so determinate and perfect that not the least thinkable reality can be lacking to it. Therefore the one must have precisely the same perfections as the other infinite.

c) What is said immediately below about the impossibility of several gods of the same essence also excludes several specifically different deities.

If there are several gods of equal infinite essence, then the realities of the individuals can be added. For all the conditions of addition — distinctness of the summands, agreement in one concept under which they can be subsumed, and comprehension by the mind — are given here. The sum must naturally be greater than the

perfection of one summand by as much as the perfection of the other summands amounts to. Therefore none of the individual gods is infinite, since there is an infinite which is greater than he.

Against this it cannot be objected that the individuals can all be infinite under some particular respect, but the sum under every respect. For God is precisely the absolute, under every respect infinite.

2. On the presupposition of several gods, contradictory and contrary opposites would have to be able to be verified at the same time. For, e.g., the creation of the world by God is just as possible as the non-creation; the one god can therefore will to create the world at this moment, under these circumstances, with these arrangements, but the other can will precisely the opposite. Since now both are almighty, the opposite too would have to exist at the same time.

3. Only as many gods may be assumed as are proved, not merely because the more would be the purest arbitrariness, but also because it would be contrary to every scientific method. For the exact explanation of the facts admits only as many causes as are precisely necessary to explain them sufficiently; what goes beyond this is relegated to the domain of fiction. Now, however, one *(p. 91)* God suffices to explain the world in its being and acting. Therefore polytheism belongs to the realm of fiction.

For there is for us no other way at all of knowing God than inference from the given phenomena to a necessary, unchangeable, intelligent being; in short, all proofs of God's existence lead to God as the first cause of the world. Whatever, therefore, is not demanded by the world and does not follow from the essence of the first cause may not be assumed in God. Since now quite certainly the essence of God at least does not demand a plurality of gods, their number is to be determined from the magnitude and constitution of the effects. Now, however, the arrangement of the world not merely demands no plurality, but rather points to unity.

4. For that unitary order and conformity to law governs the whole world, from the atom to the stellar system, from lifeless nature to social life, is not denied by the deniers of God, but rather too strongly emphasized. The monistic world-conception indeed asserts that the whole is as if "cast in one mould." Certain it is that the further research penetrates, the more unity and interlocking of the things and forces of the world come to light. That co-ordination and subordination of all beings and their activities must also be assumed already *a priori*, if the world is to be able to subsist at all.

This unity can now in general be explained in a twofold way: through a multiplicity of causes which come to an understanding among themselves, and through a single cause. But if this one cause suffices, then the multiplicity with its agreement is pure fiction and contrary to all exact research, which always strives after the simplest explanation by the fewest and most suitable causes. So St. Thomas is to be understood when he says: *Illud quod per se unum, potest esse causa unitatis convenientius, quam multi uniti, unde multitudo melius gubernatur per unum, quam per plures* [That which is one through itself can be the cause of unity more fittingly than many united; hence a multitude is better governed by one than by several];[3] and Aristotle, who refers to the Homeric: Οὐκ ἀγαθὸν πολυκοιρανίη· εἷς κοίρανος ἔστω [The rule of many is not good; let there be one ruler].[4]

5. If one once goes beyond the one cause of the world demanded by the facts, one thereby enters the domain of arbitrariness and haphazard. Every determinate number of gods is assumed without ground, and with the same right one assumes any *(p. 92)* greater number whatever; only with an infinite number could one call a halt. This alone would be, if fiction, yet at least *consistent* fiction. But infinitely many gods, surely, not even the most fantastic polytheism assumes. But neither can infinitely many things exist, and especially not infinitely many gods; for besides them there are still finite beings, which, added to the gods, give a greater number, and thus do not let the gods be infinite. Divine and creaturely *perfection* can of course not be added to one another so as to strengthen each other, but one God and one creature are undoubtedly *two beings*, which can be counted together.

One could seek to weaken this proof by admitting indeed our ignorance with regard to the number of the gods and declaring every closer determination to be arbitrariness, but nevertheless asserting the possibility of 2, 3, 20, etc. gods, and declaring: if they exist, then we must accept the fact, which is sufficiently grounded through the aseity of the individuals, as it is. To this we reply:

a) The absolute possibility of several gods does not exclude that their assertion, even taken quite indeterminately, is the purest arbitrariness, which is tolerated in no science.

b) It is not merely the existence of the individuals that is to be explained, which might perhaps be done through their own essence, but also that precisely these, and not also those innumerable others which are just as possible, exist. If we are to accept this as a fact, we are being asked to accept mere chance as the cause which determined the number. The probability, however, that purely by chance only a finite number (a) of gods, and not the infinitely many (∞) possible ones, exist, is = a/∞ = 0; i.e., quite certainly this cannot be the case by chance.

A mathematician will perhaps object that 1/∞ is still more = 0 than a/∞, and that therefore it is also certain that one God does not exist. — To be sure, he cannot exist by chance, like that plurality of finite gods; rather he exists by virtue of his essence, and *one* God is *demanded* by the existence of the world, of which he is the cause.

Should one wish to set the Trinity of the divine Persons against our assertion that between the *one* and the infinitely many infinites all intermediate numbers are the purest arbitrariness and therefore not present, we reply that this *Trinity* is not haphazard, but has its determining ground in the manner of the procession of *two* Persons. For since the Son is begotten as (personal) Wisdom and the Holy Spirit is breathed as Love, the number of proceeding Persons is closed with the knowing and willing of God. In general, chance is invoked for the number of gods only *(p. 93)* when they stand beside one another without relation to one another, with completely equal claim to existence. For only then can one say: If some exist, then for the same reason infinitely many must exist likewise.

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[1] **[Tr.]** I.e., Zarvan akarana, “boundless time,” in the Zoroastrian (Zurvanite) tradition; the spelling is the author’s.

[2] Cf. Metaphys. p. 56 f.

[3] I q. 103 a. 3.

[4] **[Tr.]** Homer, *Iliad* II, 204, quoted by Aristotle at the close of *Metaphysics* XII (Λ), 10.

§ 6. The Simplicity of the Essence of God.

I. God is physically simple.

The concept of simplicity is by no means a negative one, as Hobbes takes it when he asserts that one may ascribe to God no fineness or thinness; but a very positive one, as already appears from this, that we can gain it immediately through reflection on our inner spiritual acts, which are certainly nothing negative. To be sure, we can also form the concept of simplicity through negation, and, since the composite is more sensibly graspable and clearer to us, we quite commonly do so even in the definition, by conceiving the simple as not composite, not consisting of parts. According to the difference of composition and of parts, one also distinguishes different simplicity. *Physically* simple is called that which does not consist of physical, i.e., really distinct, parts; *metaphysically* simple, that which has no metaphysical parts, i.e., such as are really one and distinguished only in thought. Both kinds of simplicity belong to God in the highest degree.

Natural unity with physical composition exists between the essential constituents of composite natures, e.g., between body and soul; according to the atomists, between the atoms constituting the molecule, and between the integral or essential parts of the atom thought of as extended or composite; according to the Peripatetics, between prime matter and substantial form, between the substance and its absolute accidents, i.e., those

really distinct from it, e.g., the faculties; according to the Thomists, between essence and existence; according to many theologians, between nature and subsistence; according to some philosophers, between essence and individuality, etc. All these kinds of composition are therefore excluded from God if it is proved that he is physically simple. But should some of them rather be counted among metaphysical composition, then their absence in God will be demonstrated in the following thesis, *(p. 94)* from which in general the present one follows *a fortiori*. For the sake of greater clarity, however, we treat physical simplicity separately first.

1. Simplicity is a pure perfection. It does not consist in a mere negation (of parts), but in a positive determination by virtue of which the simple being does not splinter its reality into parts, but has it wholly together. Now the infinite must contain all perfection.

2. In particular, God has been demonstrated from the order of the world as an intelligent being. But the composite, as psychology demonstrates, cannot think.

3. God is the cause of the physically simple spirit; he must therefore himself be simple, presupposing that simplicity is a pure perfection. Cf. 1.

4. In fact, were God a composite being, he could not be infinitely perfect; for composition, as a mixed perfection, essentially excludes many perfections. Not merely is the composite incapable of thinking, willing and positing such spiritual acts, but it can exercise no immanent activity at all. For if its being results from a plurality of parts, then necessarily the activity which belongs to it as composite must also result from partial activities. But only actions going outward, not immanent ones which remain in their subject, can complete one another mutually through direction to a common goal. Now, however, it cannot be doubted that immanent activities are in general more perfect than those going outward. The infinite being, therefore, if it were composite, would lack a great number of perfections (of the immanent activities), which, to say the least, stand higher than those which it would actually have (the transitive activities).

5. What is physically composite consists of parts really distinct from one another, thus of things which, considered in and of themselves, represent separate realities. But realities which of themselves are separate, or at least distinct, i.e., are several things, do not become one (composite) thing without an external cause uniting them. For if they were one of themselves, then they would demand to be one either a) by virtue of their essence or according to their concept, or b) through their physical

(p. 95) constitution or activity they would become one, as when a body comes to be out of substance and physical accident, out of substantial form and matter, or through the attraction of many atoms.

a) If the parts demanded essentially to be one, it would be an absolute impossibility that they should not be one; they would therefore not be several, but one reality. b) Should immanent forces put them into connection with one another, then

α) these are assumed as the cause of the one divine being, and God is no longer the first cause, but the parts with their forces are.

β) The forces and their exercise are either essential to them or not. If they belong to them essentially, then they are essentially dependent, i.e., their essence demands another in order to constitute the whole and to be itself perfected. Therefore their existence is not from themselves; for what is independent of every other in becoming is so also in existence. The union therefore comes here too from an external cause, which connects the parts through the concreation of those uniting forces. But if the forces are not demanded by the essence, then they, and with them the union itself, come from without.

γ) As regards the atoms, they can act on one another only at a determinate distance, and this must be still more determinate in order to act attractively, unitingly. Of themselves, however, they have no determinate place and no determinate distance. Moreover, attraction, according to the mechanical view, results from

rotational motions, into which a body can be put only from without. Therefore the first cause does not arise through attraction.

6. The parts of which God is thought to be composed are either necessary and infinite realities, or contingent and finite ones, or mixed of both kinds.

If they are necessary and infinite, then they are

a) not parts, i.e., imperfect things needing completion. Therefore

b) a single one of those infinite realities would be the divine essence; the rest would, since the infinite cannot be multiplied, not be possible at all, and would in any case no longer belong to the already infinite God.

c) A necessary reality, since it exists solely through itself, by virtue of its essence, is independent of all others, and can therefore not *(p. 96)* have the dependence of the part on the whole and on other parts.

But if the parts are finite and contingent, they can constitute no infinite, necessary being. Not the former, because the infinite cannot result from the addition of finites; not the latter, because what results from the contingent is still more contingent than its contingent constituents. For the contingency which touches the inner essence remains also in the combination. Since now, moreover, the combination itself and its kind, taken absolutely, can be and not be, what is composed of contingent things is more contingent than the parts.

But should the parts be partly necessary and infinite, partly contingent and finite, then we have united the absurdities which were demonstrated in the two preceding assumptions. For a) one infinite, necessary reality would be God.

b) An infinite reality cannot, as a part, need completion by a finite one; a necessary one cannot have a relation of dependence on a contingent one as the other part to be connected with it.

c) Infinite and finite cannot form one composite essence. If a true composition of the essence is to take place, its reality and perfection must result from the reality and perfection of the parts in such a way that these are summed. Summing, however, is possible only with such things as agree in some being or other. Thus one can well add horses to horses, but not to birds; money to money, but not to wisdom. Now, however, the infinite agrees with the finite in no generic concept (*univoce* [univocally]). Also, the intensity of the reality of the infinite is so great that nothing can be added to it.

7. Against this an obvious objection arises, namely that we have taken the parts as simply infinite, but have left out of account the possibility of realities which are finite under one respect, infinite under another. With this possibility the parts can indeed complete one another mutually, because they present a finite side, and constitute an infinite, because they include an infinity in themselves. In this way God could be composed of a multiplicity of perfections which are in infinite degree what they are according to their concept, but are finite insofar as *(p. 97)* they do not include the other perfections. Thus God's power would be infinite, but finite insofar as it is not wisdom.

This possibility is to be altogether denied. For either the parts are contingent; then they cannot constitute the necessary being; or they are necessary; then they must be simply, i.e., under every relation, infinite. The possibility of infinity under one relation and of finitude under another has place only in the domain of what is thought, or, in the domain of what exists, only with respect to the intelligible order. Thus a line, a series, can be finite under one respect, infinite under another; the intellect, finite in itself, has a certain infinity with respect to the possible acts and objects. In the former case the mind makes finite that which is in itself infinite, by thinking limits in it; in the other case the mind gives infinity to what is in itself finite, though *cum fundamento in re* [with a foundation in the thing]. Such making-finite and division our mind must undertake in God too; but with this, as will be shown, not even a metaphysical, let alone a physical, composition is conceded.

II. God is metaphysically simple.

1. When it was said above that that essence is composed of metaphysical parts which consists of constituents differing merely in thought, this requires a closer determination. For the manifold perfections of God also differ in thought, and yet these are no metaphysical parts composing God's essence. For to the concept of a part there belongs essentially incompleteness, the need of completion by another, namely by another part, through which it receives, and by the whole, in which it receives, its completion and consummation. The metaphysical parts, now, into which thought decomposes a whole in order to compose it again out of them, can contain only an incompleteness and need of completion with respect to the concepts. Conceptual incompleteness, however, is *indeterminateness*. The completion, therefore, which one metaphysical part offers to the other is closer determination, and therefore one can reduce metaphysical composition to a combination of concepts, of which the one behaves as less *(p. 98)* determinate and thus determinable and in need of determination, the other as more determinate and determining. Since now the more universal is also more indeterminate (consists of fewer marks), and needs restriction to a determinate essence through distinguishing (determining) marks, this metaphysical composition is found most commonly in the combination of a more universal generic concept with a determining difference for the determination of the essence in the definition.

Likewise the nature is more closely determined by the concept of personality in the order of being-for-itself; the potential essence is conceived as realized through existence, as a single being through the principle of individuation; the substance is more closely characterized by its modal accidents as by contingent determinations; the subject is placed by its essence, as by a (metaphysical) form, in a determinate class of beings.[1]

2. But in order that the determining part too may really be a part, it too must be capable of determination and be determined in the composition; and this is in fact the case. First, it is determined in the combination, since this is more determinate than both partial determinations. Furthermore, under another conception it is precisely the determining concept that is the indeterminate one and in need of determination. As one commonly gives the definition of man, "sensitive rational being," one conceives sensitivity as the universal concept, *genus*, and rationality as the specifying difference; and this because in human life man is first compared with the beings with which he has sensitivity in common, but before which he has rationality in advance. But if one compares him, from the metaphysical standpoint, with the pure spirits, then rationality becomes the universal, common mark, but sensitivity the difference.

Likewise one will find that the nature determines the individuality and the person, the essence the existence, the substance the accident, in that the former concepts indicate the order of beings in which the latter are found.

3. If, then, determinability is an essential mark of all metaphysical parts, it nevertheless does not suffice, but *(p. 99)* must be explained still more precisely. For if one keeps merely determinability in view, it seems not impossible to assume it in God too, since this composition and imperfection keeps solely within our concepts, and one unreservedly speaks in God of essence and existence, of nature and person, etc. As the narrowest determination of metaphysical composition there must still be added the *indifference* which the parts have towards one another, so that concepts which demand one another, which must essentially be together, cannot be designated as parts. Thus the concept man is metaphysically composed of the generic concept "sensitive being" and the difference "rational being," of nature and personality, of essence and existence, etc., because the concept of sensitivity does not necessarily demand that of rationality, his essence existence, his nature its own personality. Conversely, for the opposite reasons, no metaphysical composition of the constituents mentioned takes place in God. For

a) God is not composed of genus and difference. α) The genus is the concept common to several beings, and can therefore be specified by the difference just as well to this as to that species contained under the common genus; the generic concept therefore demands no determinate difference, but behaves equally indifferently towards all differences. Now, however, in God, who through his essence is everything that he is, no determination is indifferent towards others, but each demands the others essentially, namely by virtue of the essence, which demands all determinations equally necessarily.

β) The genus as universal concept cannot exist, but needs for existence a specification through the difference. Were there now in God a generic concept indifferent to the difference, God himself would be indifferent to existence and non-existence; for he would be indifferent to that without which existence is impossible.

God cannot, e.g., be defined as infinite wisdom, in such a way that wisdom would designate the perfection common to God and creatures, but infinity would contain the difference of the two. For infinity and aseity demand one another mutually; aseity, however, demands wisdom like every other perfection; therefore the wisdom of God is not outside the difference, infinity, *(p. 100)* but it is contained in that in which the difference between God and creatures lies, i.e., in wisdom itself God and creatures are different. And so no perfection is predicated univocally of God and creatures, but all are predicated analogously.[2]

b) In God there is no composition of essence and existence. For his essence, the *esse a se* [being from itself], demands existence. In creatures too the actual essence is undistinguished from existence. A (metaphysical) composition takes place only insofar as the essence does not demand existence, did not have it in the state of possibility, and can always lose it again. But the divine essence cannot be thought as merely possible at all; it is necessarily realized. Existing is as necessary and essential to the divine being as rationality and sensitivity to man. As, therefore, there exists no difference between man as the thing defined and his definition, so neither between the divine essence and its existence.

c) God is not composed of nature and personality. His nature essentially demands to subsist as person. For it is a contradiction that the infinitely perfect and absolutely independent and self-standing being should be thought otherwise than *sui juris* [in its own right], not as an *integrum et completum* [something entire and complete]. Metaphysical composition exists between the created nature and being-a-person insofar as the nature does not necessarily have its personality in itself, but can be the nature of another. This possibility, however, the divine nature excludes, since it is necessarily independent.[3]

d) In God there is no difference between nature and individuality. For this difference can have place only where the universal nature does not necessarily exist as a single being, and does not necessarily appear individualized in one, but can be there in many. Now, however, the divine nature cannot be thought as an abstract universal, but must necessarily exist and consequently necessarily be a single being, and on account of the unity of God can be there only in one individual.

(p. 101) e) In God there are no accidents.

α) God's infinite perfection requires that his substantiality be neither in need of nor even capable of any perfecting. Every accident, however, is by its essence destined to give to a substance a perfection, even if only an accidental one, which it does not have of itself. And even if this accident is only a modal one (or one differing from the substance only in thought), the substance to which it is ascribed is always thought as imperfect of itself and in need of perfecting. Such a conception, however, destroys the essence of the infinite substance.

β) Being-an-accident is no pure perfection, for it conceptually excludes the evidently higher perfection of being-in-itself. It can therefore not be ascribed to God. Certainly it is a higher perfection to have substantial knowing and willing than to possess, through acts, habits or faculties, the perfection which knowing and willing contain.

Therefore an accidental perfection cannot be infinitely perfect either. For the more it grows, the more its imperfection grows too, namely the need to be borne by its substance.

γ) Every accident is either produced by an external cause, or conceptually demanded by the essence of the substance, or proceeds from the substance with natural necessity (*per dimanationem naturalem* [by natural emanation]). The first is impossible in God, because on account of aseity he is and has everything that he is and has through his essence. No accident can be conceptually demanded by the substance of God; for only a finite substance demands in its concept to be the bearer of an accident, because only it, being imperfect in its substantial being, needs manifold perfecting and development through accidental determinations and activities. The pure concept of substance, however, as it must be found in the infinite, is only being-in-itself, and everything that it demands can be only something existing in itself, substantial.

But neither can accidents arise in God through natural outflow from the substance of God. For what arises in this way is, if that process is not to be purely logical, really distinct from the substance.

4. In order to sum up all the preceding proofs and to conduct a general one which comprehends in itself all cases of metaphysical composition, we can say: Metaphysical composition requires parts which as such are capable of perfecting or even in need of it, and yet do not necessarily have this perfecting through the other parts.

(p. 102) In God, however, the infinitely perfect being, nothing which would be in need of perfecting, or only capable of it, can be even thought; and because he is and has, by virtue of his essence, what he is and has, the concept of every reality which one thinks in him demands the concept of every other reality thought in him; for all are equally demanded by the essence.

Therefore there is in God no metaphysical composition. Designations such as “God is being itself, wisdom itself,” etc., express the absolute simplicity of the divine essence very characteristically. For besides its being said thereby

a) that being, wisdom, belong to him according to the whole content of these concepts, thus in infinite degree,

b) that they are not ascribed to him as contingent properties, but constitute his essence,

there is thereby designated c) quite especially the most complete identity between the subject which has being, wisdom, and the being, the wisdom.[4] Metonymically one also calls a man goodness itself, wickedness itself, etc., in order to express his essential, inseparable unity with these properties.

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[1] We speak, of course, only on the presupposition that in all these cases only a metaphysical, not, as many assume, a physical composition takes place. See above, p. 93.

[2] See above, p. 69 ff.

[3] If the mystery of the most holy Trinity distinguishes nature and person, the nature does not thereby become dependent on another, but it is proper to the Father, who is only it itself, [and] to the Son, who is nothing other than that *una summa res* [one supreme reality]. — **[Tr.]** The phrase *una summa res* is from the Fourth Lateran Council (1215), cap. 2, *Damnamus ergo*, against Joachim of Fiore: “una quaedam summa res . . . quae veraciter est Pater et Filius et Spiritus Sanctus.” The note as printed names only the Father and the Son.

[4] **[Tr.]** The original reads “dem Sein der Weisheit” (“the being of the wisdom”); a comma (“dem Sein, der Weisheit”) appears to have dropped out, and the sense requires it.

§ 7. Distinction of the Concepts through which We Apprehend God.

1. From the physical and metaphysical simplicity of God it seems to follow that all distinctions of concepts must be kept away from the divine essence; and yet these are employed without hesitation, in that one universally distinguishes between the divine essence and its attributes, between divine wisdom, justice, goodness, etc., between the knowing of the divine intellect and the love of the divine will. And one must

make these distinctions, since it would quite certainly be false to say: God knows with the will and loves with his intelligence; punishment is an act of his mercy, pardon an act of his justice.

2. A real distinction, such as exists between several realities, cannot be contained in the difference of the concepts, on account of the physical simplicity of God, but at most a logical one, which belongs to concepts that designate the same thing, only under different respects. This, however, divides into the *(p. 103)* purely conceptual (*distinctio rationis ratiocinantis* [distinction of the reasoning reason]), and the conceptual which has a foundation in the thing (*dist. rationis ratiocinatae* [distinction of the reasoned reason]). The former exists between concepts which objectively consist of precisely the same marks, are inwardly "identical," and differ only subjectively, through clarity, external designation and the like. Such a distinction exists, e.g., between the thing defined and its definition; between *Mensch*, *homo*, ἄνθρωπος; between some synonyms of the same language which offer no objective difference in the marks of the concepts.

To this distinction that which exists between the different concepts of the realities in God is evidently not to be reckoned; for the concept of wisdom, of the knowledge of God, consists objectively of quite other marks than that of power, of love; namely God's wisdom is conceptually just as different from his power as creaturely wisdom from creaturely power; for this is what the expression means: the pure perfections of creatures are contained in God formally; according to their concept, their own form, determinateness, essence, they are found in God.

Therefore the different concepts of God's perfections cannot in any sense be designated as synonyms either, since these differ either in no marks at all (as *erkiesen* and *erwählen* [both: to choose]) or at least not in all (as *Frau* and *Weib* [woman], *Mädchen* and *Jungfrau* [girl, maiden]).

3. There would thus remain for the different perfections of God only that distinction which is indeed made by the thinking mind, but with an objective ground in the object. Concepts which are distinguished in this way are predicated of one another insofar as they are objectively identical, i.e., consist indeed of different marks, but nevertheless represent the same thing, only under different respects.[1] This, now, fits quite precisely the different concepts in God, which always express the same reality, namely the simple divine essence, only under different respects, with different marks, such as wisdom, power, justice, essence; so that one can thus say: the divine essence is power, wisdom; and consequently also: God's power is wisdom, if by this no inner (formal), but an objective (material) identity is to be asserted.

(p. 104) But nevertheless a significant difference exists between the identity, or rather difference, of such concepts in God and in creatures. For this objective identity and conceptual difference has place precisely in creatures between the metaphysical parts of one and the same thing; if, therefore, the (logical) difference of the concepts in God had a foundation, then either he would not be metaphysically simple, or one would have to predicate metaphysical simplicity of creatures too, even of physically composite ones, since they too can be decomposed into metaphysical parts, e.g., man into rational and sensitive being. Further, all kinds of conceptual distinction with objective foundation can be reduced to the distinction between genus and (generic, specific, individual) difference, between essence on the one hand and existence, personality on the other, etc., namely to the cases in which a metaphysical composition takes place, which is not possible in God.

4. Do the distinctions in God, then, not belong to this kind of distinction either, and thus to none of all the kinds? Strictly speaking to none; which, however, need not be at all surprising, since the division of distinction is made with regard to creatures, and therefore, strictly speaking, none of its members is applicable to God.

Even if in God the proper objective foundation of a distinction, namely the capacity of one reality for perfecting by another, and still more its need of it, and the indifference of one reality to actual perfecting by the other, has no place, the subjective ground of all distinction, on the other hand, namely the limitation of

our apprehension over against an object which is distinguished by intensive or extensive perfection, makes itself urgently felt.[2] If we could think out and through, by one exhaustive concept, the whole perfection of an object just as clearly and distinctly as we grasp the individual concepts clearly and distinctly after dividing its reality, then the distinction would evidently be useless and would have to be dropped. But it becomes the more urgent, the weaker our power of comprehension proves itself over against the object. If the object is actually an infinite one, then the manifoldness of its conceptions is unavoidably necessary, if we wish to have any even approximately clear representation of it at all.

(p. 105) 5. Yet the division of the one infinite perfection into many concepts does not take place arbitrarily on that account, although in God himself, considered in and of himself, none of those points of support for it is given, as in creatures. The foundation lies outside God, in creatures and in their relation to God. And this relation brings it about that this norm, even if an external one, excludes arbitrariness in the decomposition of the one divine perfection into many perfections. For

1°. First, the intensively infinite perfection of God is equivalent to all possible perfections of creatures. And this extensively infinite perfection must always be kept in view where it is a question not of infinity in itself, but of its value; as when one wishes to set God's perfection in determinate relation to the creaturely, to compare them with one another not merely with respect to infinity and finitude, but with respect to determinate perfections which we observe in creatures. So too the circle, considered in itself, is incomparable with a broken line; but if its relation to the circumscribed or inscribed polygon is to be established, then one must consider it in its value, in which it equals a broken line of infinitely many sides. If God is to be compared with the creature with respect to wisdom, then the value of the divine essence, in which wisdom too is contained, must be taken into account. If a comparison is to be made with respect to duration, then God's indivisible eternity must be taken in its extensively infinite value, in which it equals infinite time.

2°. The equivalence of the one divine reality with all possible perfections in creatures results still more closely from the dependence of these on the divine essence. All true perfections in creatures have their being, their possibility and thinkability from this, that each in its particular way images, represents, the divine essence. Each particular perfection of the creature is therefore contained in God as its exemplar and foundation; God therefore has in himself what creatures have, not, to be sure, as distinct perfections like these, but in the one infinite reality.

3°. The existing perfections are all produced by God. But the cause must in some way contain formally *(p. 106)* or virtually (or eminently) the perfection of the effect. Therefore all perfections which we abstract from creatures must belong to God in one of the ways indicated, and consequently be predicated of him.

6. We therefore have an objective ground for representing God's essence to ourselves through manifold concepts; we can therefore apply that distinction, provided only that we always hold fast that everything we ascribe to him distinctly is indeed in God, but that he is it not through distinct realities or perfections, but through one infinite, altogether simple reality, and that the foundation of the distinction lies ultimately outside God, in us, namely in the weakness of our apprehension over against an object of such high thinkability.

This reason proves the need of distinction in the concept of God for all finite beings; but for man there is a still more urgent one. Our intellect, as Aristotle remarks, behaves towards the most intelligible object, God, as the eye of the night-owl towards the light of the sun.

Our spiritual knowledge, needing the senses, is essentially wrapped in a certain twilight. The proper object of our cognitive faculty, which belongs to a sensitive-spiritual nature, is not the pure intelligible, as it is the first and proper object of pure spirit, but the intelligible in the sensible, namely the essences abstracted from the sensible, such as being, force, unity, etc. Through combination of the concepts thus gained we must seek to represent to ourselves the purely spiritual, of which we have no intuitive, simple idea; and so it is essential to

our knowing to think God, in particular, through a multiplicity of concepts.

7. Wrongly, however, would one conclude from the fact that our composite knowledge of God does not agree with its object, the most simple essence of God, that this knowledge is false. It follows indeed that it is not adequate, indeed is highly imperfect, but not that it is a false one. For knowledge can become false at all only through judgment; as long as we merely apprehend, form an idea, our knowledge is always true, since it is necessarily the expression of what it expresses, and therefore essentially agrees with its object.[3] Truth is violated only by this, that *(p. 107)* we refer the idea through a judgment to an object whose idea it is not; e.g., transfer the imperfect apprehension of the object (the *objectum formale* [formal object]) to the object in itself (*objectum materiale* [material object]) and then assert that the manner of our apprehension is proper to the object, or that it has nothing other than what we have just thought of it.

If, therefore, we judged that God is through different realities what we think of him through different concepts, our judgment would be false. But while we use different concepts of God, we rather judge, or at least remain conscious of the judgment once made, that all this is in him only one reality.

Likewise our knowledge of God with respect to each of the many concepts is indeed not conformed to its material object, for none represents the whole being of God as it is in itself; but each is conformed to its formal object, i.e., to the particular respect under which it is thought in each individual case. God is indeed quite certainly wise, mighty, good; if, therefore, we apprehend him under these respects, our apprehension agrees with its formal object, which by everyone's admission suffices for the truth of knowledge, and must suffice, if nearly all our knowledge, namely all that contains precisive concepts, is not to be false. In other words: In order that knowledge may be called false, no negative difformity from the object, i.e., imperfect representation of it, suffices; but there must be a positive difformity: something must be ascribed to the object which does not belong to it, or something denied of it which belongs to it; neither the one nor the other is done by our composite knowledge of God.

One can propose and solve the same difficulty, with St. Thomas, somewhat differently: Knowledge, it is said, is false if it apprehends its object otherwise than it is. Now, however, God is simple, our knowledge composite; therefore it is false.

To this St. Thomas replies: The major premise is true if the "otherwise" refers to the object; it is not true if the subjective manner of knowledge is meant. Now, however, merely the manner of our knowledge is other than God; but the (formal) object of the knowledge, that which we represent to ourselves, is really in God. If agreement of the manner of the subjective act with the object were required, then only like

(p. 108) by like, the divine by an infinite act, the angel by a purely spiritual act, the human only by sensitive-rational faculties, the material only by matter. All this, however, is supremely absurd. Rather, what is known is known after the manner of the knower, so that what stands above the knower suffers through his knowledge of it, and what stands below him receives a higher being in the knower. Therefore, in human knowledge, God's infinite being must necessarily be much disfigured, yet not falsified.

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[1] Cf. Logik, p. 26 f.

[2] Metaphys. p. 69 f.

[3] Erkenntnißth. [Theory of Knowledge] p. 141 f., and above, p. 73.

§ 8. God Is Absolutely Unchangeable.

1. Everything that God is and has, he is and has through his essence. Therefore there can be in him no state, no activity, which is not demanded by the essence. But what the essence demands is just as absolutely necessary as the essence itself. Therefore every state and every activity which is and can be in God is absolutely necessary in him. But what a being has necessarily, it can neither lose nor receive, but has always.

Therefore God can receive absolutely nothing new, cannot lose anything possessed; he is absolutely unchangeable.

This can be made still clearer by analogy. All reality in God is demanded by his real essence as necessarily as, e.g., the essence of the triangle demands the Pythagorean theorem and the whole of trigonometry. Because of this necessary connection with the essence of the triangle, the propositions of trigonometry are absolutely unchangeable in the ideal domain. Therefore in the real order everything that God is and has is as unchangeable as his essence, because it is in God only insofar as his essence demands it.

2. God has already been demonstrated as the unchangeable mover of all things. One might well object that the essence of God could nevertheless demand a faculty which, however, could exercise itself in actuality only when some object for it is posited; with which a non-temporal realization of the essence, and yet a change, would be given. Thus God's essence demands intellect and will; but these faculties can exercise themselves towards temporal objects only when these exist.

(p. 109) But it must be considered,

1°. that all objects which can stand over against the divine faculties are what they are through God's essence; their being as well as their truth and goodness is eminently contained in the divine being; therefore already from eternity the divine essence, as object, must determine all its faculties to their acts without time and change.

2°. Those objects present themselves to the divine faculties either from eternity or only in time. In the former case the faculties grasp these objects without change; for the potentiality of the faculty would then be prior only conceptually (*in signo rationis priori* [at a prior moment of reason]), not really, to the actualization by the objects. But if they appear only in time, then they are not through themselves, but their existence and its time are freely determined and chosen by another, and in the last instance by God. Before they could stand over against the divine faculties, therefore, they had to be known by God's intellect, willed by his will, produced by his power.

3°. Those objects are from eternity in their ideal being, in which they stand over against knowing and willing. For what is true and good is so perhaps in its physical actuality only in time; but from eternity it was true that this actuality would be.

3. The simply infinite is absolutely unchangeable; for the simply infinite is absolutely only one; but if it changed, there would be several infinites differing among themselves: the infinite at the beginning of the change would be different from the one becoming in the course of it, and again another at the end. In fact a being which has those different states in itself at once, without change, would be more perfect than that in which they appear one after another. But God is the most perfect being. In other words: The greatest possible perfection, thinkable at all, must belong to the simply infinite. Now, however, we can think a being which from eternity has everything, is everything and effects everything that it can be, have and effect, and is thus simply unchangeable.

4. If God were changed, he would either receive a reality, or lose one which he had, or exchange one for another. In the first case he would not have been infinite before the change; in the second, no longer infinite after the change. An exchange *(p. 110)* of different realities is not possible in the infinite, since it necessarily always has all realities.

Against this one might object that certain realities cannot be together at the same time in one and the same being, and consequently can appear in the infinite too only one after another, by exchange; e.g., contradictory and contrary opposites, such as creating and not creating.

Were this really the case, it would only follow that the simply infinite is impossible. But it is possible and actual; and therefore the objection is indirectly shown to be void. That opposition of realities is possible only

in the finite, but not in the infinite; a finite reality, because it is also burdened with non-reality, can have an opposite which is still real; but infinite perfection, because it is only reality, can have an opposite only in nothing. In it all finite oppositions are overcome; for the one infinite perfection contains all different, even opposed, realities virtually enclosed in itself. For the higher a reality stands in degree of perfection, the more lower ones it outweighs in value. The highest perfection, the infinite, must therefore virtually equal all lower ones. What, therefore, it can have of opposed realities, it has not one after another, but at once; it is unchangeable. Therefore the one infinite reality must necessarily, without changing in itself, be sufficient to show itself just and merciful, to reward and to punish, to resolve upon creation or non-creation, etc.

5. Some have believed that they could not unite the differences in God's temporal effects with an absolute unchangeability in himself. Cajetan, e.g., assumes that a reality could accrue to God (from eternity) which would become necessary only on the condition that it was posited, but which, like the act of creation, also could not have been posited. God's unchangeability would therefore not be absolute, since another act could also have been posited, which would have produced another reality in God, but only a factual one, conditioned by the resolve once taken.

But with this a real composition is carried into the essence of God; he is then a physical composite of absolutely unchangeable and absolutely changeable, i.e., of necessary and contingent, realities. Such a unity, however, is not thinkable in itself, and, as was shown, not possible given God's simplicity.

The absurdity is not removed, but if possible still strengthened, by the assumption of others that those contingent realities did not remain contingent, but *(p. 111)* were taken up into the absolutely necessary essence of God. For what by its essence is and could not be, is and remains contingent; and if the contingent cannot form a unitary composite with the necessary, still less can it take on its essence.

6. The absolute unchangeability in the interior of God which has been explained must not, however, be confused — as we are very prone to do — with an inactivity or indifference of God's will in different resolves, especially with regard to hatred and love. The just man he loves from his inmost heart with infinite tenderness, and the same man, when he sins, he abhors with infinite, most inward hatred, without changing in himself; the one infinite act accomplishes precisely everything, even opposites, but both in all truth without change.

§ 9. God's Temporal Activities and Relations Do Not Conflict with His Unchangeability.

1. When God produces an effect in time, the causality in God cannot first appear in time; rather, the reality which in time produces the effect must have been in God from eternity. And in eternity, too, it cannot be something contingent, like its effect, but a necessary being, like the being of God, namely God's essence itself. That one, eternal, unchangeable reality must therefore be able to have manifold, different, contingent and temporal effects. For since everything that God produces in time is contingent and changeable, but he himself is absolutely necessary and unchangeable, one of the two follows: Either the Infinite, the Almighty, can produce nothing — and this is absurd and contrary to the facts — or it must be admitted, even if we cannot see the possibility of it, that an indivisible and unchangeable eternal act can posit many temporal, contingent objects outside itself, and thus take manifold, changeable, efficacious directions in time. Our inability to see this possibility directly and intuitively stems for the most part from the difficulty which our mind encounters in the consideration of the infinite. If we saw clearly the absolute fullness and wholeness of the infinite act in itself, we should also behold its sufficiency for every efficacy that can be thought.

(p. 112) This universal sufficiency is brought somewhat nearer to our intuition by the consideration, already indicated and supported by observation, that the higher beings and realities include in themselves, in greater simplicity, the most manifold perfection and efficacy of the lower, and accomplish far more by few acts than

the lower by their many. The more a being rises in the graded series of being, the simpler, more undivided, and yet more energetic and extensive its working becomes; the more acts of the beings standing below it does its activity equal in value. The highest being must therefore combine the highest simplicity with the most extensive efficacy; it must be able to accomplish with one act everything that all possible lower beings can achieve through all the activities possible to them.

2. All relations into which God enters in time with creatures are, on his side, merely external; inner and real they are only on the side of creatures. Not as if he did not exercise very real influences on them — for he produces their whole being and bears and conserves it continually. He is their real Creator, Conserver and Beatifier; but since no new reality can accrue to him, he can take on no real foundation, the first condition of a real relation, and consequently not the real relation itself either.

But neither can God have a real relation to a creature from eternity, 1°. because no real term of it has yet been posited; for creatures come to be only in time.

2°. Even if a creature existed from eternity, still

a) the relation would be a contingent one, and would therefore have to have in God a contingent reality as the real foundation of the relation. For the relation is not really distinct from its foundation, but only conceives relatively what the foundation is absolutely; thus, e.g., the relation of causality is only conceptually distinct from the absolute foundation, the producing. If, therefore, the real relation is contingent, then so is the foundation. But in God there is nothing contingent.

b) Nor can the one divine essence furnish the real foundation for a real relation to creatures, because otherwise *(p. 113)* God would have to be conceived as relative according to his whole being. Now, however, the idea of God is essentially absolute, especially over against the creature, which, if the divine essence had a necessary relation to it, would then have to exist just as necessarily as God himself.

c) God can indeed have (as Father) an essential, real relation to a term of the same essence (his Son), because this does no injury to absolute independence and infinity; but it would be otherwise if he had an inner necessary relation to the creature.

§ 10. God Is the Purest Actuality (actus purissimus).

This proposition sums up, in the proper expression of the Schools, the infinity, simplicity and immutability of God.

For it says

1. that in God there is no potentiality, but only actuality;

2. that his actuality is the highest, most perfect;

3. that he is himself his infinite actuality.

The first lies in his unchangeability. The second is given with his infinity, and the third is demanded by his absolute simplicity, by virtue of which he is everything that he has.

Because of his unchangeability there is in him no potency, but only actuality; because of his infinity all potentiality possible at all is actualized in him, he has the purest actuality; because of his metaphysical simplicity there is not the least difference between the subject which has and the form which this has; therefore he *is* the purest actuality.

With this we should also have found a precise formulation of the physical essence of God, which the Theodicy has to derive from the metaphysical essence. Cf. above, p. 60.

Chapter Three. The Life of God.

Chapter Three. The Life of God.

(p. 114)

§ 1. God Has Infinite Life and Is Life Itself.

1. That God is a living and personal spirit needs, after all that has been said so far, no further proof. The degree of perfection of life we judge, since life consists in self-motion, by the degree of immanence of the activities. This, however, has its further ground in the perfection of being; for the more perfect a being is, the more independent it can be of external influences, the more it can remain with itself. Since, now,

a) God has infinite being and is being itself, he has and is infinite life, is life itself. In fact the being of living beings is indeed living being; it is their life. This, however, holds still more in the absolutely simple being. Therefore . . .

b) On the lowest grade of self-motion stand the plants, which unfold themselves indeed through their own principle of life, but one which is completely determined by nature as to direction and intensity. Higher in life stand the animals, which are stimulated to activity through the knowledge they have gained of things, thus already more through themselves. Higher still stands spiritual life, which also determines for itself the goal of its activity. But even so it is not wholly independent in determining its goal either, and its vital activity, such as knowing and willing, is dependent on the truth and goodness lying outside it; and these acts lie outside the self of created spirits, are not they themselves. God, however, is to himself the object and goal of his activity; the truth and the good he is himself; his thinking and *(p. 115)* willing is his being. Therefore he possesses life in the highest degree; he has infinite life, and on account of his metaphysical simplicity he is life itself.[1]

[1] Cf. St. Thomas, p. 1 q. 18 a. 3.

§ 2. The Knowledge of God.

A. Explanation.

1. When we ascribe knowledge (*Wissen*) to God, we take the word first in its widest meaning, in which it designates the same as knowing. Of course it must then also be predicated of God in the narrower meaning, in which, as sure, certain knowing, it is opposed to mere opining or even doubting. But science in the narrowest sense too, which requires a conscious knowledge from grounds and with it insight into the systematic connection of truths, cannot be lacking to the infinitely perfect being; only this grounding and systematizing knowing needs, precisely on account of God’s purest perfection, a closer, purifying determination. Insofar as a sure knowledge is not possible without insight into the grounds, whether these lie in the immediately evident object itself or are contained in other truths, God too must know from grounds. This is demanded by the unshakable firmness of divine knowing, considered subjectively, and by its greatest possible, infinite perfection, taken objectively. For subjective certainty is impossible without grounds; and objectively a knowledge which did not know, or even excluded, the grounds on which a truth rests would be highly imperfect, indeed positively false.

2. But grounding knowledge can also include a great imperfection, as is actually the case with our intellect, which needs the senses, indeed with every finite intellect. For

1°. with us the knowledge of the ground and of what is grounded, when the latter is not immediately evident, is accomplished through different acts;

2°. the act which has what is grounded as its object is caused, in the proper sense, by the other, which grounds it;

(p. 116) 3°. the grounding procedure, inference, if the syllogism does not have a purely formal significance, presupposes a real ignorance with regard to the conclusion; for an inference which lets nothing new be known has a purely formal significance.

In God, however, we can assume only an uncaused act, without presupposition of any ignorance whatever, through which he necessarily knows from eternity all truths and all their grounds. He knows indeed that one truth follows from another, but in him the knowledge of the one does not follow from the knowledge of the other; the dependence and the difference is in the objects, not in the acts of God. In other words: God knows the premises of all possible inferences, knows all consequences and conclusions, and thereby knows all syllogisms; but he himself does not infer, but knows all this through one act of immediate beholding.

Under these restrictions we can and must ascribe to God science in the strict sense of the word, and indeed the most consummate science, since he must know all truths and their all-sided systematic connection in their very last and most unitary ground, infinitely clearly and surely. To him, therefore, belongs that highest grade of science which is called wisdom in the most eminent sense.

3. Not only inferential thinking, but even combining and separating judgment must be kept away from God's infinite perfection. Not as if God's infinite insight did not extend to the identity of all ideas to be combined with one another through an (affirmative) judgment, and to the truth of all negative judgments — but he himself does not judge. For with us the necessity of judging arises from the imperfection of knowledge, which does not see through, by one act, the whole object contained in the idea, and therefore, for the sake of a sharper and more determinate apprehension, ascribes to it (as it is set down in the subject of the proposition), through the predicate, in different propositions, different respects, marks, determinations, and denies others of it. Infinite insight, however, beholds in one act all possible determinations and marks of the idea and all possible oppositions into which it can enter with others; and therefore God knows what can be known through all possible judgments: he knows all judgments, but does not perform the acts of judging, taken in the strict sense.

(p. 117) 4. There would thus remain only the most fundamental of all operations of thought, the idea, which can be ascribed to God as a pure perfection. But even if the idea as such includes no imperfection, manifold imperfections still adhere to the ideas of the finite, especially of the human, mind, which must be removed in order to ascribe this activity of thought to God.

Above all, there can be in God no multiplicity of ideas in the sense that he would have to represent the different objects of thought in himself through different acts. In order, however, to prevent misunderstandings, one must keep in view the different meaning of the word idea. The idea, just like thought, representation and the like, designates both subjectively the act of thought and objectively what is thought. In the objective sense there can and must be many different ideas in God; for in God too the idea, the concept of man, is other than that of the tree, of the stone; but all these infinitely many *rationes objectivae* [objective notions] he thinks through one subjective idea, one act of thought. For if the act of thought is finite, it can shape itself only into the ideal expression of one, or at least only of a limited number, of things; but the more perfect its subjective (spiritual) nature is, the stronger is also its representative power, the less it needs to multiply itself in order to think the many. Thus the number of ideas (taken subjectively) decreases in the realm of spirits — indeed already, if one takes into account the different grades of endowment and mental development among men — in the measure in which the perfection of the subject increases; therefore the highest perfection of the idea must have the least multiplication in its train. The infinite spirit must think everything with one idea.

It hardly needs to be remarked that in God the idea is to be conceived not as a habit distinct from actual thinking, not as accidental activity, but as the purest actuality, as the substantial divine essence itself.

B. Division of the Divine Knowledge.

1. The absolutely simple and one knowledge of God thus explained we must, in order to bring it nearer to our understanding, divide in manifold ways with regard to the difference of its directions to its objects (terminations). *(p. 118)* The most obvious division is into necessary and free knowledge.

The object of the latter is everything which in its being depends on the free will of God, thus everything which ever has existence outside God, whether these be free or unfree beings. God's necessary knowledge extends to everything which has absolute necessity, whether in the domain of what exists or in the purely ideal domain. To this belongs, therefore, first the divine essence, to which alone necessity belongs in the order of existences; then the being of the possible essences and the truth of their relations, which have absolute necessity in the domain of the possible. What is merely physically or morally necessary always depends in the last instance on a free resolve of God, is only conditionally necessary, and thus belongs under the first member of the division. What would happen under given conditions belongs indeed, as not realized, to the merely possible; but nevertheless this too is to be assigned to free knowledge, because it does not have the absolute necessity of the possible essences and their relations. This object has been granted a place of its own beside the free and the necessary, as conditional knowledge, or knowledge of the conditioned; which, however, is properly fully justified only in the following division, as will be shown immediately.

2. Famous is the division into: *scientia simplicis intelligentiae* [knowledge of simple understanding], *scientia visionis* [knowledge of vision], *scientia media* [middle knowledge] or *futuribilium* [of conditional futures] or *conditionatorum* [of conditioned things]. It differs essentially from the first in this, that it does not embrace the whole object of the divine knowledge, as that does, but only the secondary object, namely everything which is not God himself.

The *scientia simplicis intelligentiae* extends to the purely possible, which we do not see, but merely understand, think. The *scientia visionis* extends to everything existing outside God, and has its name from this, that we see (with the eyes) what exists. God, of course, beholds the possible just as distinctly as what exists. In both names, therefore, there lies a kind of anthropomorphism. The *scientia media* embraces, as its other names clearly indicate, that which would happen if certain conditions were posited, which, however, possibly are never posited. Only in form, not in substance, do those impossible conditional propositions belong here which refer to the domain of the absolutely or conditionally necessary; *(p. 119)* thus, e.g., the proposition: "If this figure had more than two right angles, it would be no triangle," is known from the essence of the triangle, thus by *scientia simplicis intelligentiae*. What would happen if the sun approached the earth by half, God knows by *scientia simplicis intelligentiae* and *visionis*, in the essential or at least existing properties of matter and its forces.

There thus remain for the *scientia media* only the conditional free actions, in which one cannot conclude with certainty from the nature of the will and of the condition to this or that determinate expression of will. E.g., "If Peter came into these circumstances, he would deny the Lord," cannot be known infallibly from the constitution of Peter's will and from the nature of the circumstances. The object of the *scientia media* can therefore be designated more precisely as the free actions which would follow if the free will existed and were placed in certain circumstances.

In fact this member occupies a middle position between the first two, and therefore the designation which came into use through Fonseca and Molina is not to be rejected. The *sc. media* stands in the middle because, though distinct from both members, it nevertheless has something in common with both. With the *scientia simplicis intelligentiae* it has in common that, like it, it goes to non-existing objects; but it differs from it insofar as the former embraces the domain, removed from contingent existence, of the purely possible

essences, absolutely necessary in this domain, whereas the latter has as its object precisely contingent, indeed merely conditional and as such unrealized, existence. With the *scientia visionis* it agrees in having as its object what is contingent and as such conditioned; but it differs from it insofar as its object would exist, but does not exist, because the conditions are not posited, whereas the *scientia visionis* grasps the conditions of the contingent as realized, and therefore the contingent as existing.

3. Further, there is still of importance for philosophical insight into the knowledge of God the division into speculative and practical knowledge. Practical knowledge not merely knows its object, like speculative knowledge, but also realizes it. Not as if any knowledge as such could produce its object; but insofar as with the one knowing of God the will to produce the object is also joined, this knowledge itself is called practical; where such a will does not follow the knowledge, it is called speculative.

(p. 120) 4. To be sure, in contrast to human or creaturely knowing, one is accustomed to call the divine knowing the cause of things, declaring: We know things because they are, but they are because God knows them; or: Things are not the cause of the divine knowledge, but the divine knowledge is the cause of things; and still more strongly: God does not know them because they are, but they are because God knows them. These expressions, however, need manifold explanation.

Above all it must be held fast that no knowledge, not even the divine, makes its object, but presupposes it in order to know it. Since true knowledge must place itself in agreement with its object, a knowing which did not already presuppose its object could only be called a false one. In fact, if the knowledge were first to produce the object, it would already be complete in its being, and would therefore already have its object before the object was. But a knowledge which apprehends as being what is not is a false knowledge, which is much less possible in the infinite spirit than in the creaturely.

But it is just as certain that things cannot be the cause of the divine knowing, as they are with us. Since with our being all our thoughts are not already given, at any rate not always in actuality, the transition from not-thinking to (actual) thinking must be stimulated from without; and indeed this stimulation must proceed in some way from the object, because otherwise there would be no reason why through a determinate act this object rather than any other whatever should be known. The purest actuality, however, which suffices to itself for every activity, is independent of every external influence, and can therefore not be determined by things to know them. The principle that every activity is specified by its object has indeed universal validity, but it can still find application only where specifically different acts are really present. In God, however, there is only one act of knowledge, which has its specifying determination through his essence as its proper object. Since, now, he must know all knowable objects through this one act, it equals infinitely many acts directed to specifically different objects; it contains *virtualiter* [virtually] or *aequivalenter* [equivalently] infinitely many acts, which must be thought of as specified by their objects. But with this no specifying influence of these on the *(p. 121)* act of God itself is given. They can therefore be conceived only as *termini* [terms] or conditions of the divine knowledge, insofar as the divine knowledge really goes to each individual object in its distinctness from every other.

It would remain only to explain in what way, conversely, the divine knowing is the cause of things, and that notwithstanding that every knowing does not make its object, but presupposes it.

Already of a human artist one can say that it is not his work of art that is the cause of his knowledge of it, as holds with regard to those who first come to know it through seeing it, but conversely his knowledge (in connection with the executing will) is the cause of the work. But for him too it is true that the knowledge of the existing work through seeing it is caused by the work. And the knowledge of the ideal work, too, which causes the existing one, is for its part determined by the ideal objects, and thus presupposes them. It is similar with the knowledge of God. The *scientia simplicis intelligentiae* is (when the will is added) the cause of existing things; but this knowledge itself for its part presupposes the possible things as its objects. The

scientia visionis, which goes to existing things, does not produce them, but presupposes them in their existence. But even of possible things one can say that God does not know them because they are, but conversely that they are because God knows them, notwithstanding that every knowledge presupposes its object. For, as already remarked, no object distinct from God can exercise a causal or even merely specifying influence on his acts of knowledge. Through his essence, therefore, the primordial exemplar of all that is, he must be determined to know everything, even the ideal essences. Not, therefore, because these are, but because his essence is and is known, does he know these essences.

C. Proof.

I. God is a thinking, free spirit.

That intelligence belongs to God needs, after all that we have so far come to know of God, no more detailed proof. For it is *(p. 122)*

1. immediately evident that thought, purified in the manner explained above, is a pure, indeed the purest, perfection, and therefore cannot be lacking to the infinite.

2. Through the teleological proof of God's existence God was demonstrated immediately under the concept of a higher intelligence.

3. God, as the cause of intelligent beings, must himself be intelligent.

4. The finite perfection and the finite number of existing things, while infinitely many with infinitely many gradations of perfection are nevertheless possible, demands a choice on the part of their cause. But a power of choice is possible only in an intelligent being.

5. Even the possible essences are thinkable for us only insofar as they have first been thought by God.

II. God knows himself most perfectly.

1. That God's knowing goes to his essence, that he has self-consciousness, hardly needs to be specially remarked; this already results from his spirituality, since it is characteristic of spirit, in contrast to everything material and sensible, to return into itself and, through grasping itself, to manifest the highest grade of immanence of activity, i.e., of life.

2. Since, now, God can only be a pure spirit, his essence must be the first and immediate object of his knowing. Our mind cannot behold itself immediately in itself because its spiritual knowing, corresponding to its sensitive-spiritual nature, must be stimulated by the sensible. Now, sensible knowing is of course accompanied by consciousness of its own activity, but only the immaterial principle can know itself, its ego, in its acts. With pure spirit, conversely, its spiritual essence is the first and immediate object of knowledge, because the completely proportioned and most intimately present one. For since in knowing the object must be received and represented in the knower in some way (the ancients said: in an intentional way), or more precisely, the knower must shape himself into the expression of the object, an intelligible thing is evidently the more proportioned, and therefore the first and pre-eminent object of knowledge, *(p. 123)*

a) the more it is already, by its nature, similar to the principle of knowledge;

b) the more intimately it can be united with it or received into it.

The essence of pure spirit, however, is certainly most similar to its immaterial principle of knowledge, and most intimately united with it. Now God is the purest spirit. Therefore . . .

3. The *perfection* of knowledge depends further on three moments:

a) a subjective one, the perfection of the representative power;

b) an objective one, the perfection of the intelligibility of what is to be represented; and

c) the relation of the two to one another, namely the intimacy of the presence of the object in the knower. For an object is known the more perfectly, the more penetrating the understanding, the more intelligible the object, and the more perfectly it can be received into the understanding and represented by it.

Now, however,

a) God is infinitely perfect also as intellect;

b) his essence is infinitely intelligible; and

c) it is most intimately present in the divine intellect. Therefore God knows his essence in the most perfect way.

a) The first part of the minor premise is already clear in and of itself, and follows especially from this, that God's intellect is his life, his life his being, but this is infinite.

b) God's essence is infinitely intelligible. For

α) since a thing is known and knowable insofar as it *is*, what is infinite in *being* is also infinite in its intelligibility.

β) An object is the more intelligible, the more it removes itself from materiality.

For since knowing is a specifically spiritual activity, but is accomplished only through an assimilation of the knower to the known, the degree of remoteness from materiality must be the measure of the knowability of the object.

Now, however, God is infinitely immaterial; for his absolute unchangeability, simplicity, independence and self-activity remove him infinitely far from the constant flux, the fragmentation, the inertia of matter.

(p. 124) γ) The two preceding determinations of intelligibility consider it in and of itself, without regard to a determinate finite understanding. For it does not hold for our knowledge that we could know the most immaterial most perfectly. And for pure spirit too the most perfect being is not the most knowable; on the contrary, it is not even possible for any finite spirit with purely natural powers to know the Infinite in himself. In and of itself, however, it is true, and holds without restriction with respect to the infinite spirit, that the intelligibility of the object grows with its fullness of being and immateriality. In finite beings the proportionality holds only so long as the immateriality and perfection of the object do not exceed those of the subject. For the first norm for the degree of knowability of the object on the part of a *determinate* subject is, according to the *nature* of knowing, always the likeness between subject and object. We can therefore formulate the proof for the infinite intelligibility of the essence of God generally thus:

δ) The intelligibility of an object stands in direct proportion to its perfection and immateriality, provided that this does not exceed the perfection and immateriality of the knower, or that, if these properties grow without limit in the object, they also increase in equal measure in the subject. Or more briefly: The intelligibility of an object is the greater, the more perfect and spiritual it is in itself and the more proportioned it is to the principle of knowledge.

Now, however, God's essence is not merely infinitely perfect and spiritual in itself, but also infinitely proportioned to the divine intellect, since both are infinite and not merely similar to one another, but completely coincide, indeed are wholly identical. For God's essence is wholly and entirely wisdom, and his knowing is a purely substantial one.

c) With this, however, the third condition for the perfection of knowledge, the intimacy of the presence of the object in the principle of knowledge, is also given in God in the greatest possible degree, since his essence does not first need to be received as an intelligible object into the divine intellect, nor does it merely appear

as substance in its act, but is wholly and entirely identical with it.

III. God knows everything possible (*scientia simplicis intelligentiae*).

God therefore knows his essence in the most perfect way. The highest degree of perfection of knowledge is the adequate *grasp* of the object, the *comprehensive beholding*, through which the whole object is exhausted according to its whole knowability. *(p. 125)* For comprehensive beholding includes that the thinkability of the object is exhausted wholly and entirely, not merely considered in itself, but also relatively, according to all possible relations outward. The divine essence, however, has the necessary relation of imitability by infinitely many beings, in such a way that a determinate degree of the representation of it constitutes a determinate finite essence. For every finite being is what it is only insofar as it is, in its determinate way, an image of the primordial exemplar of all being, the divine essence. In grasping his essence adequately, therefore, God thereby knows all possible essences. But these too he knows, each individually, comprehensively, thus not merely in itself, but also according to all its possible relations, with all its possible states, changes, activities, and whatever else can be thought in and alongside the essence. All possible essences, however, with all their possible absolute and relative determinations, form the whole domain of possibility, namely the object of the *scientia simplicis intelligentiae*. Therefore God knows everything possible.

IV. God knows everything which exists and happens outside him (*scientia visionis*).

For the sake of clarity one can divide the object of the *scientia visionis* A. into substances and B. into accidents, which latter can be comprehended under the concept of happening.

A. All substances existing in the world

1. are either produced immediately by God, and then he not merely knows them, but his knowledge is, as was explained above, the cause of their existence. If he has not produced them himself, then they

2. still cannot come to be without his concurrence, as will be shown later, and so again his knowledge is the cause of their existence. 3. If God knows all happening, as will be proved immediately, then he also knows the processes through which substances come to be, and with them the substances themselves.

B. All happening is either necessary or free. 1. The necessary is precisely determined, as to its existence, constitution and intensity, by the nature of the acting cause and by the circumstances in which it finds itself. Whoever, therefore, completely knows the constitution *(p. 126)* of all necessarily acting causes and foresees the circumstances, i.e., the relations to other causes, knows the whole course of the (necessary) world-process; and the understanding which needs to make no inference, no “calculation,” beholds it immediately.

God, however, knows most exactly a) the nature, constitution, the dispositions and forces of all causes in the world; b) he knows all circumstances in which they ever find themselves. For the whole course of nature is at every moment the necessary consequence of the preceding state, and so in the end the original first disposition of the forces of nature determines the whole later course of necessary happening in the world. The first arrangement, however, is a work of the ordering wisdom of God. Therefore . . .

It is true that the course of the world can be modified by so-called chance influences, “disturbances.” But these too do not escape the knowledge of God. For

1° there are no properly chance disturbances; for they too proceed from necessarily acting causes, and are therefore known together with the nature and position of these in the workings of nature.

2° Only the interventions of free beings can be designated as accidental to the process of nature. But, for one thing, these are so slight and powerless over against nature that by and large they leave the course of nature

untouched. Insofar, however, as men really work upon and use nature, the happening in nature concerned can no longer be known in the way indicated, but recourse must be had to the knowing of free actions.

2. Free actions cannot be known with certainty from the constitution of their causes and of the circumstances in which they find themselves. For it is precisely the essence of free will that under any given inner or outer circumstances whatever it is not determined to some decision, but can determine itself at pleasure to this or that action or to none at all. It is hard to comprehend how those who let the decision of the will be determined and knowable from the nature of the divine concurrence assigned to the will can uphold the freedom of the decision. If, therefore, there are other ways of explaining the knowability of those acts for the divine intellect, it is in any case advisable not to assume such "mysteries."

(p. 127) It is not to be denied that the penetrating gaze of God, who searches hearts and reins, who knows the most secret inclinations, wishes and needs of our being, to whom all influences of circumstances and their power of attraction or repulsion upon our will in every mood are known, can know our decision from its causes with the highest probability; but infallible certainty he cannot gain from them. For it is and remains essential to free will, even under the most urgent attraction or repulsion of the objects, under the most violent desire or aversion, to determine itself at choice. To be sure, choice is not wholly lawless; rather the goodness or the evil in the object is law for the appetition of the will; but it can necessitate only the will which, in the light of universal knowledge, possesses an infinite elasticity and range, when it presents itself as infinite good or evil, and not even then if it is not applied to the appetitive faculty through immediate beholding. Since, however, these conditions for the decisions of the will do not and cannot exist naturally, God must know free actions in another way than through consideration of the will and of the circumstances in which it finds itself. We must therefore also furnish the proof of the *scientia visionis* with regard to free actions in another way, and content ourselves for the present with having shown the existence of this knowledge from the infinite perfection of the divine knowledge.

a) The infinite perfection of the divine knowledge requires that it extend to everything that is and is knowable. Therefore it must also embrace the free actions of creatures.

That God knows the present and past acts of free beings is immediately given with this, and is disputed by no one, and can be denied only if one holds real ignorance possible in God, and greater ignorance than even in men. The real difficulty lies in the *future* actions, of which one can say: they are not yet, and therefore not yet knowable either; but it is no imperfection not to know that which is still nothing, is not yet an object of knowledge.

But b) even if the physical being of future actions is not yet, their intelligible being, the truth of their existence, does not first come to be at the moment in which they happen; already before, from eternity, it was truth that, e.g., Adam would sin at that *(p. 128)* fateful moment. But it is a positive imperfection in knowing, a deplorable ignorance, not to know, for the moment at which it is true, something which is and is true. Therefore God knows from eternity all free actions which ever have existence.

c) If God did not already now know the future actions, he would learn them at their occurrence, with which a real change in God would be given. For one cannot say here, as with other acts of God, say with creation, that the change takes place merely in the term of the divine act, not in the act itself. For in reality the term of the divine knowledge does not change when the free action happens; for the term of the knowing is the truth of the occurrence of the action at a determinate moment. Since, now, the knowledge of an action is a reality really distinct from non-knowledge, the temporal origin of the knowledge is a real change; since, now, at its occurrence the object remains completely the same, then, on the assumption of a new knowledge in God, his act of knowledge would have to suffer a change in itself.

d) God's unchangeable eternity knows in itself no past and future; only the changeable things outside him stand to one another in the relation of being past or future. Not with respect to God's eternity is an action

future, but with respect to a point in time at which it is not yet. God behaves in precisely the same way towards future things as towards past and present ones; without the least change in himself he co-exists with things when from future they become present or past. If, therefore, one does not wish to deny God the knowledge of past or present actions, one may not deny in him the foreknowledge of future ones either.

Strictly speaking, we cannot speak at all of a foreknowledge in God, any more than of a memory. For only he now remembers an action with respect to whose knowledge and present being it is past, and only he knows something in advance with respect to whom this happening is future. Only insofar as we place God anthropomorphically at our standpoint situated in time can we speak of a remembering or a foreknowing of God. More on this under the eternity of God.

(p. 129) e) Because God's knowledge of future actions is precisely only a beholding of what is present, the difficulty which seems to arise from the compatibility of the infallible foreknowledge of the free action with its contingency and freedom does not mean much. It is said: What God foresees with infallible certainty must necessarily happen; otherwise the divine knowledge could indeed become false. But if the action happens necessarily, it is no longer contingent, still much less free; and therefore either freedom must be given up with the fatalists, or the divine foreknowledge with Cicero.

Precisely the same argument can be made with regard to the free action which is presently seen by a man (or which we remember): What is seen with unerring certainty must necessarily happen; if it could also not happen, my unerring seeing could deceive me. But if this demonstration is evidently sophistical, then so is that about God, since God does not foresee the future, but beholds it (as present to his eternity).

The captiousness in the argument lies in this, that one takes the historical necessity which follows from the action's having occurred for an antecedent necessity caused by the infallible knowledge. Of course, if the action is actual at some moment, it is necessary that it be actual then; the happening, not the knowing, makes this necessity. The knowing is merely the sign that this determinate free decision has taken place; if, therefore, it indicates correctly and surely, as does the infallible divine knowing, then it is certain that that decision has taken place. But if it has taken place, then it is metaphysically impossible that the will should decide otherwise.

If the knowledge of God made free actions necessary, then so would the eternal truth of their occurrence, which precedes their occurrence. For if it is true from eternity that a free action happens at this moment, then it must occur then with absolute necessity. Had the free will decided otherwise, it would be necessary that another decision had taken place, and this would then be known by God with infallible certainty.

The truth of the propositions which state the free decisions depends on the decision itself; not because it is true from *(p. 130)* eternity that the will will once decide so does it decide so, but because it decides so, therefore it is true from eternity. Should someone nevertheless wish to argue: What is true from eternity must happen with the absolute necessity proper to truth, the answer is obvious; but precisely so it is with the foreknowledge of God: the will does not decide so because God foresaw it, but he foresaw it because it decides so.

Indeed, one can go still further and say: If the foreknowledge of God makes the happening necessary, then so does the unchangeable truth, given with the happening, that something has happened. For one can then argue in precisely the same way as is done in the objection against God's foreknowledge. What has happened can with absolute impossibility not be made not to have happened; it has therefore happened absolutely necessarily; it was therefore not free. This way of inferring is quite evidently absurd. Therefore the other too. For as the unchangeable truth of having happened depends on the happening, and not conversely, so the infallible knowledge of God also depends on the occurrence of the action, not indeed as on its cause, but as on its term and its condition; for knowledge, and especially the *scientia visionis*, does not make its object, but presupposes it as given, as was shown.

f) Finally one can also prove the *scientia visionis a posteriori*.

α) As far as a religious consciousness can be traced in history, so far also reaches the conviction that the future is unveiled to the Godhead. This conviction makes itself known in the existence of prophets, soothsayers, oracles, etc., and more generally in the theoretical and practical acknowledgement (in *prayer*) of a divine *providence*.

β) Hardly any other historical fact stands so firm as the fulfilment of prophecies under circumstances which exclude pure chance just as much as human calculation of the causes and circumstances.

(p. 131)

V. God knows the conditionally future free actions (*scientia media*).

The greatest difficulties are offered by the conditionally free acts, the object of the *scientia media*. For the acts which would be posited if certain circumstances were given never have existence as such; they can therefore not be known according to a being which they once have in time, like really future actions. But not even that conditional being which has its truth in the dependence of the consequent clause on the condition in the conditional proposition seems to be present in the objects to which the *scientia media* refers. The proper being of conditional free actions, the truth of the conditional proposition, lies, according to the essence of the conditional proposition, in the dependence of the consequent on the antecedent. But if we have, e.g., the proposition: If Adam were created, equipped with these properties and placed in these circumstances, he would transgress the commandment of God — then there exists no connection at all, no necessary consequence, between the conditions and the decision; for this decision follows in no way from the conditions, as was shown above. And yet, in order that a proposition be not merely probable but certain, its truth must be necessary; thus in the conditional proposition the conditioned must be unable to be otherwise under the given conditions.

But if one looks closely, this difficulty is not peculiar to conditional free actions, but touches equally the really future, indeed also the present and past facts known with certainty even by men. For in order that, e.g., the proposition “Peter was crucified in Rome” be certain, its truth must be necessary. Now, however, the execution of St. Peter was the freest work of Nero.

The difficulty vanishes if one holds fast the distinction made above between antecedent and consequent or historical necessity. The propositions which state a contingent or free fact have no antecedent necessity, i.e., none effecting or demanding the fact; but only from its happening does it follow that it must have happened and cannot be made not to have happened. In the same way there exists here a necessary connection between condition and conditioned; but it is not posited by virtue of the condition, not necessarily through the condition, but through the free decision of the will, which indeed does not occur, *(p. 132)* but would occur if those conditions came about. For presupposing that under those circumstances the will would freely make this decision, it is and remains unchangeably established that it would decide so. The connection between antecedent and consequent clause in such propositions is indeed a necessary one; but the necessity is not caused by the circumstances; rather it comes from the metaphysical impossibility that the will under the circumstances should not decide as it really would decide.

Those who let God know the absolutely future actions from the decree to concur with them must, if they admit the *scientia media* at all, assume for all the infinitely many conditional free actions just as many so-called *decreta conditionata* [conditional decrees] of concurrence. According to them, then, the connection between antecedent and consequent clause is an inwardly necessary one, i.e., the decision depends on the nature of the total conditions. Since we do not see how freedom can be brought into harmony with this, and since the conditionally future free actions offer still much less than the absolutely free actions a point of attachment for their knowability, we must here, still more than with those, rely wholly and entirely on the

unqualified perfection of the divine knowing, in order to demonstrate that it must refer to them too, however obscure the manner of the knowledge may remain.

Proof *a priori*.

1. What the free being would do under determinate circumstances is not a conditional but an absolute truth, valid from eternity; for it would not first become true when the creature had so decided, but it is true from eternity that it would so decide. To be sure, the truth of the decision depends on the being of the decision, but not on an actual, but on a conditional deciding; if it depended on the actual occurrence of the decision, then the truth concerned would never be, as the decision too never occurs.

The infinite knowledge, however, must embrace all truth, as long as and insofar as it is true. Therefore God knows from eternity also the truth, e.g., of the proposition: If Peter had not come into danger, he would not have denied the Lord; i.e., he knows the conditionally future actions.

(p. 133) 2. From the fact that the being to which the *scientia media* refers is not an actual but only a conditional decision, it would wrongly be concluded that this is no determinate and therefore no knowable being at all; being-conditional is precisely also a being. If the truth and the being of the conditionally future actions were nothing determinate, then propositions of the form: “If Paul had had no apparition, he would not have been converted,” would have no meaning, or at any rate one could think nothing determinate by them.

In fact the conditional proposition states a determinate truth if the condition is a determinate one, the conditioned is determinate, and the connection between the two is a precisely determined one; for in these three elements consists the essence of the conditional proposition: in the first two its matter, in the last its essentially constituting form.

That the condition is determinate is plain to see; and indeed it is left to our choice to think it as determinate as we ever wish or as is required. We do indeed think of the will in individually quite determinate circumstances in order to make its decisions.

But the decision itself is also quite determinate. For when we called it above a conditional one, this is not and cannot be meant to say that it would not really be posited and thus be precisely determined like every individual being, but only that its occurrence is dependent on circumstances. The occurrence of the decision must even be a quite determinate one. For under the given circumstances a choice must be made with absolute necessity between positing or omitting an act, and in the case of positing, between contrarily opposed or merely specifically different acts; in every case a decision must follow, and indeed each is in itself just as precisely determined as the really future acts of the free will.

But the dependence of the consequent on the antecedent, too, is a very determinate one in the conditional propositions in question. It can in general be determined in a twofold way, namely through the condition, which causally conditions the conditioned (with antecedent inner necessity), or through the conditioned, which by its occurrence under given circumstances creates a historically necessary connection between condition and conditioned. Not in the former, but certainly in the latter way, the relation of dependence is determined not merely *(p. 134)* in the so-called impossible conditional propositions of which there is question here, but also in all which state an absolute, actual occurrence of a free action under certain conditions. Through the determinateness of the (hypothetical) decision, already demonstrated in the second member, a determinate relation of dependence is posited just as decidedly as through the absolute decision, e.g., in the proposition: If Adam comes into these circumstances, he will sin.

Therefore condition, conditioned and the dependence of the two on one another are sufficiently determinate in the propositions which form the object of the *scientia media*; the propositions state a precisely determinate truth, which cannot be unknown to the infinite insight of God.

3. The same thoughts can also be reduced to logical principles. Every proposition is either quite determinately true or quite determinately false, provided that it is not meaningless or cannot be taken in several senses. If it is capable of several interpretations, then it must be distinguished, i.e., decomposed into its different meanings, which are then again quite determinately true or quite determinately false, or must again be decomposed, until one at length comes to determinately true and determinately false propositions.

In fact every proposition either asserts something or it asserts nothing. If it asserts nothing, then it lacks the essence of a proposition, has no meaning, and does not belong here. But if it asserts something, then it is either objectively so, or it is not so, as is asserted. If it is so, then it is determinately true; if it is not so, it is false. At most one can say that it is not quite so as is asserted; then the object underlying the assertion contains constituents of which some are as is asserted, and thus are true, but the others not, and thus are false. And so there remains no middle term between the truth and falsity of a proposition, provided that it has a meaning and only one meaning. If we apply this to the proposition: "If Adam were placed in these circumstances, he would sin," it has a very clear and, according to the preceding explanations about the kind of relation of dependence between antecedent and consequent clause, only one sharply determined meaning. It is therefore either true or false. If it is true, the intellect which knows all truth knows it. If it is false, then its contradictory opposite is true, namely the proposition: "Although Adam were in these circumstances, he would not sin"; and then this proposition is the object of the infinite knowledge, namely of the *scientia media*. Thus God knows of every conditional free action whether it would occur or not; i.e., the *scientia media* belongs to him.

4. As it follows from the unchangeable eternity of God that he has future free actions present precisely as he has present and past actions, and that the *scientia visionis* must therefore refer to them too, so the same absolute unchangeability *(p. 135)* of God requires that he actually behaves in the same way towards the conditionally future decisions of the created will, is present to them just as to those which have really happened or are still to happen.

It is, as Suarez remarks, a dispute about words if one does not generally admit the presence of God in the ideal spaces and the coexistence of eternity with the ideal periods of time. Evidently the purest actuality behaves in itself precisely as it would behave if the ideal spaces and times were realized. To St. Augustine the presence of eternity in the ideal times before the world was so settled that he uses it as proof for the presence of God in the ideal spaces.

If all possible times were realized and all possible combinations of circumstances occurred; and likewise, if in the existing time all circumstances that can be thought in which free beings can find themselves came about, and besides the existing free beings infinitely many others were created, the perfection of the divine knowledge would change just as little as that of the divine essence. But then the conditionally future free actions would be as present to him as the really future, past and present ones now are. If, therefore, one does not wish to deny him the *scientia visionis*, one must also ascribe to him the *scientia media*.

5. It conflicts with the idea of an infinite wisdom to make a resolve at random and to leave its outcome to blind haphazard; the idea of a divine providence requires that all of God's ordinances attain with infallible certainty the goal set by it. For this, however, it is absolutely necessary that God know infallibly what every free being would do under any circumstances whatever. Therefore the *scientia media* belongs to God.

For the understanding and proof of the minor premise it is to be remarked that, before God resolves upon the creation of free beings and the realization of determinate circumstances for their working, he knows, not by *scientia visionis*, but only by *scientia media*, what they would freely resolve upon. Only after the resolve are their free actions really (absolutely) future; but if he has not yet taken this resolve, then the question is put to his wisdom: What would this creature do if it had to choose at this time, in this place, equipped with these aids, over against these hindrances? Would it decide for or against the attainment of the goal of the world? If,

(p. 136) therefore, God does not know the conditionally future actions, he can at most try whether it turns out well if he resolves upon the realization; but his resolve itself is a blind game of hazard; he must leave it to favourable chance whether the creature's decision turns out in his sense or against his intentions. Given the essential constitution of freedom, one being can frustrate all God's plans; an infallible providence is impossible.

Nor can one say that, when he has taken the resolve of realization and has known the creature's decision through the *scientia visionis*, he can change his resolve, or at least modify his further plans accordingly. The former is absolutely impossible; for the foreseeing of an action presupposes its happening; but if it happens, it cannot not have happened. The latter makes God's providence all the more a groping about in uncertainty by trial. What the Book of Wisdom says of the uncertainty of human foresight would hold more or less of the divine too.[1]

Against this demonstration the obvious objection arises that it assumes a before and after in the simple, unchangeable eternity of God, and thereby falls to the ground. God indeed knows from eternity the free actions of creatures, and can therefore direct them infallibly to his goals.

Our demonstration does not assume a temporal before and after, but conceives God's resolves as just as eternal as his knowledge. But the resolves are after all not necessary in God; he could just as well have resolved to create nothing at all and no free being at all. We can therefore think of God without the resolve of creating the world, and now put the question: Did God know, independently of a resolve, what free creatures would do if they were created and placed in certain circumstances, or did he not know it? If he did not know it, well then his resolve was blind and unworthy of God, as was shown. If he knew the decision, he could know it only through the *scientia media*.

There is a manifold priority: besides the temporal, also that of mere origin, as is found only in the divine Persons, and that of nature, as exists between cause and effect, insofar as the existence of the one presupposes the existence of the other, although they are together in time. Nor can we think any priority of nature in God, since a causal relation between different divine perfections or activities *(p. 137)* is not possible, already on account of his metaphysical simplicity. And yet it lies in the concept of some perfections which we must transfer in the proper sense from creatures to God that they stand to one another in the relation of priority and posteriority of nature, as, e.g., knowing and willing. If one does not wish to abolish the concept of willing, of resolving, one must also in God think the knowledge of what is willed as preceding. But since this priority has its ground not in the thing but only in the manner of our knowledge of God, one is accustomed to say that the one reality is with respect to the other not *in signo naturae priori* [at a prior moment of nature], but only *in signo rationis priori* [at a prior moment of reason]. In this relation the *scientia media* and *visionis*, or rather the *scientia media* and the resolve of creation, stand to one another.

Proof *a posteriori*.

Not merely in the Christian, but in every religious consciousness, if it lays claim to this name at all, the conviction of the extension of God's knowledge to the conditionally future free actions is included as an integral moment. This shows itself

1) theoretically,

a) in the belief in an absolutely unerring universal wisdom of God, to which no truth is unknown, which remains in debt of the answer to no question that can be put to it;

b) in the firmest trust in an infallible divine providence, to which it is not unknown what we would do if it had placed or should place us in this or that circumstance, e.g., what would have become of us if we had taken up another state of life, whether we would reach our goal if we lived longer. This conviction finds its clearest expression in prayer.

2) Practically this religious conviction shows itself

a) in the petitions which childlike trust directs to God, to turn away all evils from us and to grant us that which is best for us. For in this it is presupposed that God knows that these or those states, which will not occur, since they are indeed to be averted, would be evils for us.

Further, in order that he may grant us what is better, God must know that circumstances into which we never come, since they are indeed to be replaced by better ones, would not profit us so much as these others. That it is here pre-eminently a question of conditional future free decisions appears from this, that the object of our prayers must in the first place be our salvation, with respect to which free *(p. 138)* actions are goods or evils. Enlightened souls expressly pray: If this or that good, e.g., long life, happiness, etc., should be harmful for my salvation, then do not give it to me.

b) The questions, too, which are directed to the Godhead in oracles, auguries, etc., make no distinction between actual and conditionally future actions. For those asking wish to arrange their resolves according to the answer of the oracle. These are therefore for the Godhead not always actually, but only conditionally future. Likewise the resolves of others which one wishes to know often depend on circumstances which will not occur, but would only occur if the oracle had answered otherwise or the questioners themselves had freely brought them about. Cf. especially David's question concerning the free resolves of Saul and of the inhabitants of Ceila in case he himself should remain in Ceila (whereas in fact he did not remain).[2]

It is clear that, from our philosophical standpoint, we wish to claim for these examples, as also for similar facts from profane history, no other weight than that of a testimony to the religious conviction of peoples that what the free being would do under certain circumstances is not unknown to the divine wisdom.

D. The Principle of God's Knowledge.

One can distinguish a threefold principle of knowledge. The subjective principle of knowledge is the cognitive faculty, the understanding; one can call it *principium quod (cognoscit)* [the principle which (knows)]. Objective principles of knowledge there are two: the form of knowledge (*species intelligibilis* [intelligible species]) and the means of knowledge, which we commonly call simply principle, axiom.

The form of knowledge has in common with the means of knowledge that both determine the subjective principle to know something, with the difference that the species which determines to knowing is not itself known, whereas the means of knowledge must be known in order to know something through it. The form of knowledge is more of a subjective nature (one can call it *principium quo* [the principle by which]), namely the state of the cognitive faculty through which the faculty, of itself indifferent to every object, receives its determinateness to know and to know a determinate object. While the act of knowledge (the

(p. 139) idea) represents a determinate object, images it ideally, the form of knowledge must be conceived as a (habitual) state through which the understanding is determined to know and to represent precisely this object in itself. Since knowledge is a representation of the object, i.e., the mind in knowledge must make itself into the ideal image of the object, the form of knowledge too, which determines the mind to this image, must itself be an image of the object. In the faculty of abstraction the human mind possesses the capacity to draw, after the likeness of the sensible image gained from the external object, a spiritual one, which, insofar as it acts determiningly on the understanding, is called *species impressa* [impressed species], while the state brought about by that determination is the *species expressa* [expressed species], the idea.

The means of knowledge (*principium in quo* [the principle in which]) is of a purely objective nature, namely a truth, an intelligible, through which another object is true (if the knowledge is *a priori*), or at least can be shown as true, made intelligible (in knowledge *a posteriori*). Thus the essence is the principle of knowledge of the attributes, or also conversely; the universal proposition the principle of knowledge of the particular, and conversely.

If we apply these discussions to God, it is evident that his essence alone can be the principle of knowledge in the threefold meaning of the word. For

1. The divine cognitive power, like its act, is his essence, which is purest knowing. His essence is wholly knowing, and his knowing is essential and substantial. According to scholastic terminology one calls the divine cognitive faculty now *ratio divina* [divine reason], now *intellectus divinus* [divine intellect]; according to German usage one can speak only of the divine *Vernunft* [reason], hardly of the divine *Verstand* [understanding].

For in German one does after all understand by *Verstand* a lower cognitive faculty than *Vernunft*, even if one does not admit the specific difference between the two faculties as Kant or other German philosophers assert it. Conversely, according to the strictly scholastic distinction, one would have to ascribe to God *intellectus* (the faculty of immediate intuition) rather than *ratio* (the faculty of inferring). In German one can best speak in God's case of *intelligence*, which precisely in its general sense, like *intellectus*, can abstract from the mediacy or immediacy of knowing, but nevertheless in the narrower sense points to an immediate knowing.

(p. 140) 2. The form of knowledge of the divine knowledge is again only his essence. Through it he is determined once and for all to know everything knowable. As purest actuality it excludes

a) that subjective indifference in which the creaturely cognitive faculty finds itself of itself; namely, God's knowing does not pass from the state of rest or of not-knowing, as in the creature, to the state of knowing, for which something distinct from the knower would have to co-operate; but God's cognitive power is, by virtue of the purest actuality of his being, necessarily and eternally in activity. But also

b) the objective indifference of the cognitive faculty to this or that object is abolished in God through his essence. It does not need, at every new knowledge of a new object, to determine the cognitive faculty to the ideal assimilation with the object, like the forms of knowledge of our mind; but as the archetype of all being, of everything true, of all intelligible objects, it determines by itself alone, eternally and unchangeably, God's intelligence to the ideal expression (image) of all objects.

The likeness of this divine form of knowledge is adequate only with the essence, and therefore it is *species propria* [proper species] (which in its being corresponds completely to the object) only for the knowledge of the essence itself; for the knowledge of extra-divine things God's essence is *species aliena* [alien species]; whereas conversely we know created things, at least the spiritual-material ones proportioned to our nature, through a *species propria* of them, but God through an alien form of knowledge. From this, however, one may not conclude that God's knowledge with respect to creatures is an abstractive one, as ours is with respect to God; at least as regards the clarity of the divine knowledge determined by this "alien" form of knowledge, it is the most immediate beholding. Of course finite realities can determine only to a very imperfect knowledge of the divine essence; but the divine essence, which eminently includes all finite perfections in itself and is the most consummate archetype, and in particular has an infinite representative power also with respect to its finite images, can also determine the divine intellect, as "alien" form of knowledge (of finite things), to the clearest beholding of them in itself.

The perfection of the beholding to which the understanding is determined by the proper species, the divine knowledge therefore undoubtedly has with respect to finite things, even if it is determined to it by an "alien" form of knowledge. Whether one may call it alien at all, or whether this name does not belong to it, can therefore only be a dispute about the word.

A similar dispute about the word is the question whether God's knowledge is determined by a form of knowledge at all. Aureolus urges that the form of knowledge serves to unite the object with the faculty, *(p. 141)* and presupposes a determinable faculty; therefore it could not be thought in God, whose essence, and in it everything intelligible, is most intimately united with the cognitive power, and who must therefore be

thought as determined of himself necessarily to actual thinking. Capreolus, Ruiz and almost all the Scholastics (Suarez too is not opposed in substance) assert, however, a true form of knowledge in God too. For, as Ruiz remarks,[3] if one cuts away from the concept of the species the imperfections adhering to the finite form of knowledge — that it is an accident, exercises a causality on the faculty and takes the place of the object — there remains the pure perfection that it determines the understanding, on the part of the object, to its knowledge and specifies this.

If one wishes to leave these differences of opinion aside, one can perhaps say: By nothing other than by his essence can the cognitive power of God be determined to knowing and to knowing this object.

3. The *means of knowledge* of God can again only be the divine essence. With respect to the knowledge of the divine essence God can have no means of knowledge at all, since it is indeed the first object of the divine knowledge, beheld immediately in itself; see above, p. 122.

At most, therefore, the divine essence can be the means of knowledge for the objects distinct from it, and again among these the one a *medium* for the other. It was already remarked above that God's knowledge does not need, or even admit, a means in the sense that through the knowledge of the one the knowledge of the other would be caused in him: he does not know the one from the other with a dependence of divine acts on one another, but he knows the dependence of the objects on one another and of all on his essence as their objective principle of knowledge. Whether one can nevertheless admit the divine essence and the principles of knowledge distinct from it as means of knowledge may be left undecided; this much is certain, that if there is a means of knowledge for God, it is only his essence, in which and from which he knows everything that is. In and from it he knows not merely the purely possible things, as ideal images of them, but also everything existing, which, both in its possible being and in its existence, must be reflected by the mirror of an infinite principle of knowledge such as the divine essence is; not merely what absolutely exists, but also everything which would be if certain conditions were posited: *(p. 142)* God's essence is precisely not merely the ground of all being, but also of all truth and intelligibility.

Only one must guard here against a misunderstanding. If the divine essence is designated as the sole means of knowledge of all being distinct from him, it seems to follow from this that he does not behold finite being in itself at all, but only in his essence, and that therefore his knowledge with respect to it must be called a mediate one.

To know something in itself has a double sense: It can mean as much as to know it from itself, so that what is known is the ground of knowledge; and in this sense God knows only his essence in it, but not the other things in them. But to be known in itself can also mean: the being proper to the thing is known as it is in itself, and not, say, merely its image, its cause, its effect; and so God knows not merely his essence, but in it also everything in the being proper to it.

In a certain sense one can even say that God knows his essence from and in finite things. For these are a true image, true effects of the divine being, and are therefore suited to mediate a knowledge of God from them, as indeed there is for us no other natural way at all of knowing God. Now God must see his essence reflected in creatures infinitely more perfectly; but nevertheless one will better say that he knows that his essence is contained in things and is knowable from them, than that they are means of knowledge for him, that God knows his essence from creatures. For it is always the divine essence through whose adequate grasp God knows all being dependent on it.

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[1] Wis. 9:14.

[2] 1 Kings 23:7 [Vulgate numbering; = 1 Sam. 23:7–13].

[3] *De scientia Dei*, disp. 4, sect. 2.

§ 3. The Will of God.

1. That a will must be ascribed to God results directly from the teleological proof of God's existence, which shows that the cause of the world intended certain ends. Intention, however, includes, besides the act of knowledge, also the will to attain those ends through determinate means.

2. Willing is also an altogether pure perfection, and therefore cannot be lacking to the infinitely perfect; not to willing in and of itself, but to the appetition of a needy being, there clings the imperfection that it is directed to a good not possessed and wishes to attain something for itself. A willing is thinkable *(p. 143)* which with the greatest unselfishness wishes only to give good to others, but wills for itself no good still to be attained, but only the good already possessed.

3. Further, willing is the necessary consequence of knowing, the will the necessary consequence of intelligence. Even if there should be no evident contradiction in a being's merely knowing but being unable to desire, in any case such a knowing would be useless. To be sure, this ground of usefulness cannot be urged in the case of God, since he does not need to have dealings with the external world; but all the more urgent becomes the ground which was taken from his absolute perfection. For it is surely a great perfection to be able to maintain that reciprocal relation; it would be the highest positive imperfection not to be able to desire the things which he knows outside himself, not to be able to love his infinitely lovable essence, which he beholds.

4. Now, to be sure, the necessary connection mentioned between knowledge and will seems to involve a dependence of the latter on the former which may not be assumed in the absolutely independent and simple being. But there is a relation of dependence without any imperfection, as exists, e.g., also between the divine Persons. That dependence is namely to be thought without any temporal priority, without a contingent, real influence of the knowledge on the will of God. For in God there is not a difference of two faculties, but only the purest act, which with respect to the true is called knowing, with respect to the good willing. We ascribe these faculties to him because he really possesses them in the simplest indistinction; and since they belong to him as pure perfections *formaliter* [formally], i.e., according to their proper concept, they must also be thought in that relation of dependence. For it lies in the concept of the will that knowing lights the way before it, that it thus has a certain dependence on the understanding. But in God no dependence of the will on something alien is thereby assumed, but on his own essence, with which understanding and will are identical. The will is with respect to the understanding *in signo rationis posteriori* [at a posterior moment of reason], as the ancients express it.

5. Everything that was said above about the essentiality, actuality, etc., of the divine intellect holds for the same reasons also of the divine will.

(p. 144) 6. Particular modifications of the human appetitive faculty are the affections, of which those that are produced by sensible representation must naturally also be of a sensible nature, and therefore cannot be ascribed to God. The spiritual affections, which mostly bear the same names as the sensible ones, can indeed belong to him according to this their general subjective nature; but many are to be excluded from God's most perfect willing for special reasons, on account of the imperfection proper to their object. First, the whole class of affections which have their seat in the so-called *pars irascibilis* [irascible part] of the subject and regard the good as difficult to attain (*bonum arduum* [arduous good]), evil as difficult to remove, such as hope, boldness, fear, anger, etc. Of the affections which arise in the *pars concupiscibilis* [concupiscible part], those cannot be in God which are awakened through the representation of a future good or evil that could befall God himself, such as longing and shrinking back. Those which are aroused by the representation of a good or evil without relation to possession, future or present — love and hatred — can be predicated of God's will without hesitation. Over the good which he has present he can rejoice and delight; but he can be sad over no evil, whether his own or another's.

If, nevertheless, some of the acts of will here excluded are generally ascribed to God, this comes from the fact that in one sense or another one can still think them purified of all imperfection, as, e.g., longing; or one simply uses an anthropomorphism, such as the older, childlike language of Holy Scripture employs so frequently and boldly; the *tertium comparationis* [point of comparison] is in each individual case not hard to find.

7. The necessary, first and in a certain sense only object of the divine willing is his essence, the highest good.

For finite goods he cannot will and love for their own sake, but only for the sake of the infinite good. They are indeed only good through their relation to the infinite good. Since, now, God's love, illumined by infinite insight, loves things only according to their true value, he must love them on account of their relation to the highest good. Only our imperfect insight can stop at the goodness which things have in themselves and abstract, in knowledge and love, from their inner relation to God. With this it is not said that God loves only his essence and not *(p. 145)* finite things as well; they are indeed really good and therefore really the object of sincere divine love, but good only on account of the highest good, God, and therefore also loved by him only on account of the highest good.

8. But the question can be raised whether God can will one good on account of another at all. Certainly the act of his love which extends to the one good cannot be the cause of the love for another, since there can be in God no different acts, still less acts caused by one another; but he can

1° on account of the lovableness which an object has through another good, love it on account of this.

2° He can will that one good be on account of another, for another, so that the whole dependence is not in the act of God but in the objects. Because of the finitude of our acts, the intention of the goal must be carried out by another act than the choice of the means; and therefore not merely the means depends on the end, but also the choice of the means on the intention of the end. God's infinite act of will, however, reaches at once the end and the means leading to it.

Just as God does not know one thing through another, but only sees that the one is intelligible and true through the other, so he does not love the one because he has loved the other, and does not will the one because he has willed the other; but by one act he loves the goodness of the one (his essence) in the goodness of the other (finite goods); by one act he resolves that the one be for the other.

9. A similar analogy between knowing and willing also teaches us how the beautiful thought so frequently expressed by St. Thomas is to be understood, namely that God does not love things because they are good, but that they are good because God loves them; whereas conversely we love things because they are good. *Deus omnia quae sunt amat; non tamen eodem modo sicut nos. Quia enim voluntas nostra non est causa bonitatis rerum, sed ab ea movetur sicut ab objecto, amor noster, quo bonum alicui volumus, non est causa bonitatis ipsius, sed e converso bonitas ejus vel vera vel aestimata provocat amorem, quo ei volumus bonum conservari quod habet et addi quod non habet et ad hoc operamur. Sed amor Dei est infundens et creans bonitatem in rebus.* [God loves all things that are; yet not in the same way as we do. For since our will is not the cause of the goodness of things, but is moved by it as by its object, our love, by which we will good to something, is not the cause of its goodness; but conversely its goodness, whether real or supposed, calls forth the love by which we will that the good it has be preserved to it and that the good it has not be added, and to this end we work. But the love of God infuses and creates goodness in things.][1] If we keep in mind the explanation given under the knowledge of God of the proposition: God does not know things because they are, but they are because he knows them,

To be sure, the will of God does not first make the good which it loves and wills, but presupposes it; his goodness is the proper object which he wills and loves when he produces finite goods, and these are good because God loved his essence and willed its representation through finite goods. When they are there, then

God loves them also because they are good, not, to be sure, stimulated to love by them, but determined by his goodness, which shines forth in them. He loves them even before they are, because they are good, but only in the order in which they are so: as ideal representations of his goodness. But that they represent his goodness ideally has its ground not in the divine love, but in the nature of things; and therefore it cannot be said of finite goods in their ideal state that they are good because God loves them, but neither, in the strict sense, that God loves them because they are good, but because *He* is good and loves his goodness, and those goods have a share in his lovableness. But in this way God also loves the finite existing goods, once they are, because they are good; for they are really lovable and must therefore necessarily be loved by God; but that they have this real lovableness comes from the loving will of God, which willed their existing goodness.

As, therefore, the *scientia simplicis intelligentiae*, but not the *scientia visionis*, is the ground that things are, but the existence of things the ground of the *scientia visionis*, so the divine love for the ideal representations of the divine goodness is the ground of their existing goodness, but their existing goodness the ground that they are loved by God as such. Thus it remains true that love presupposes its object, and true that things are good because God has loved them. The proper ground of God's love naturally always remains the highest good; other goods become ground, or better object, of the divine love only through their relation to it.

10. It is customary to say: God loves creatures with infinite love. This needs explanation. The love of God is infinite if its act is considered subjectively; for so it is identical with his infinite essence. His love towards creatures is also infinite objectively, insofar as the proper ground of his complacency in them, his goodness, is a motive of infinite moving power, and he loves his goodness in finite things; the good, too, which his love ultimately wills for them is infinite, and therefore his benevolence is infinite. Participation in the highest good is the good for which he destines all finite beings. But nevertheless the love cannot be called simply infinite. Not the love of *(p. 147)* complacency, because every finite good participates only very defectively in the infinite lovableness; not that of benevolence, because no finite being can attain and possess the infinite good in an infinite way.

11. A similar distinction also gives the answer to the question, which St. Thomas treats,[2] whether God loves all things equally. The intensity of the divine love (thus the subjective act) is equally great towards all, because infinite; but the good which he gives to his creatures out of benevolence is greater in the more perfect than in the less perfect, and he has more complacency in the better than in the less good. And so the infinite act of God nevertheless has different finite terminations and effects of his love.

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[1] I q. 20 a. 2. *(p. 146)* then the obvious difficulty which arises against the present assertion will easily be solved. It will be said: It is essential to the will, just as to the understanding, not to posit its object but to presuppose it; the will must necessarily have a good to which it is directed; this must be there before the act, as *causa finalis* [final cause] which moves the will. A will which wills nothing good is a will which does not will, a motion which is without any goal and so without any direction.

[2] *Loc. cit.*, a. 3 [I q. 20 a. 3].

§ 4. The Freedom of God.

I. More precise determination of the divine freedom.

1. Freedom is opposed both to external *compulsion* and to inner necessity. That God is free from all external compulsion needs no proof in view of his absolute independence and unlimited power. Even the human will can suffer no compulsion in the acts elicited by the will itself, since it is an inner contradiction that an act be at the same time elicited by the will as inner principle and forced by external violence against the striving of the inner principle. Compelled acts can only be those which are forced, against the inclination of the will, upon a faculty distinct from it but subject to its command. Since, now, God's simplicity excludes all faculties distinct from the will, this is a new reason why absolute freedom from every compulsion belongs to God.

2. But freedom from inner necessitation too, *freedom of choice*, belongs to God in the most perfect way and in the highest degree. In order to conduct the proof of this, the concept of freedom must be determined more sharply. The usual definition — the capacity of the will, under all given circumstances, to act or not *(p. 148)* to act, to do this or that, even the opposite — is at first applicable without restriction only to human freedom, because it is set up with regard to this. It

1° does not exclude the possibility of deciding also for evil, which conflicts with the holiness of God. But it is obvious that this sad possibility does not belong to the essence of freedom, but stems only from the weakness of human insight and of the human will. One can easily think of beings which love the good so decidedly that their freedom of choice can exercise itself only within the good. The human will itself, in the future state of the most intimate union with the highest good, can no longer let itself be determined by any apparent good as motive of its action, but can choose only between this and that true good.

2° The indifference of the human will to this or that decision is an indifference of the faculty to these or those acts. In God, however, there is only one act without any potentiality. But that indifference to different acts, too, is essential not to freedom in general, but only to that of the finite will. Essential to freedom is indifference to this or that object; if, now, the will must occupy itself with different objects through different acts, as is proper to all finite beings, then indifference to different objects brings with it indifference to different acts, and thus potentiality. This potentiality is therefore, though not accidental to the finitude of the being, yet accidental to its freedom as such. An infinite being which reaches all its objects through one act of infinite efficacy can exercise indifference to different objects without indifference of acts.

3° The human will is free also with respect to the infinite good, and even with respect to its happiness insofar as this is found in the infinite good, and with it in regard to all the means leading thereto. But this comes only from the abstractive knowledge of the infinite good, which is indeed natural to every finite spirit, but accidental to freedom. The finite spirit too can be raised to intuitive knowledge, and then it too loses freedom with respect to the infinite good, but remains free in the choice of finite goods. Therefore God’s freedom too need not extend to the infinite good; only with respect to finite goods do we ascribe freedom to God, *(p. 149)* and not even with respect to these if they stand in necessary relation to the highest good. Thus as images of the infinite good in the metaphysical order, and as its effects and creatures in the physical order, God loves them as necessarily as he loves himself, in the degree in which they represent the infinite good in themselves. Only in their production, and in their further perfecting insofar as this is not demanded by the production and its goals, does freedom remain to him.

4° The human understanding cannot survey with one glance the manifold motives and even the different objects of choice; therefore, in order to choose rationally, indeed in order to be able to choose at all, it needs deliberation. But evidently this does not belong to the essence of freedom, and can fall away in a being which grasps adequately, through one act, all the goods among which there is to be a choice, and all the motives.

5° Purely external to human freedom too is the fact that we can always take back our choice afterwards. The possibility of this change depends either on changed circumstances which we could not foresee, or on better insight into the motives, or also purely on our pleasure without motives, thus on fickleness. Since, now, these grounds fall away in God, he cannot give up again his resolve once freely taken, without, however, the free choice being able to become unfree thereby.

II. God is free with respect to finite things.

1. Freedom of choice, with the closer determinations given above, is a pure perfection, which God must possess according to its pure concept (*formaliter*), not merely on account of his infinity, but also, more specifically, because he has given it to man.

2. It is evident that the present world is one of infinitely many possible ones. For both as regards the perfection and as regards the number of existing beings, it is very slight in comparison with the infinitely many gradations of perfection which are thinkable from nothing up to the infinitely perfect, and in comparison with the infinitely many beings which are possible on each of these grades. That, therefore, this number with this perfection exists must have a ground. It cannot lie in the things, because *(p. 150)* these have nothing in advance of the infinitely many others, have no more necessary relation to existence and to the author of the world than those. Therefore the ground why precisely this world exists lies in God alone. But not in a necessary demand of his essence, whose infinity demands this imperfect world not more, indeed perhaps still less, than infinitely many other better ones. Therefore the ground is to be sought only in the free will of God, which chose this world before all others.

3. In other words: Were God not free in the production of the world, there would be in his will a necessitation to something determinate. This determinate thing, however, can be either everything, or nothing, or some things. To produce everything possible God cannot be necessitated, since it does not in fact exist, and cannot even exist, at least simultaneously. But neither is God necessitated to produce nothing, since he has indeed produced something. To some things he cannot be restricted unless there is a ground either on his side or on the side of these few. His infinite essence, however, behaves quite equally towards everything finite, and therefore demands everything or nothing. Should the ground of the restriction to some things lie in these themselves, then these would in some way be distinguished before everything possible, e.g., be the most perfect of all. Now, however, to the few to which God's production is supposed to be restricted there belongs above all this world; but this has nothing whatever distinguished before everything possible; it is not the most perfect. Furthermore, it is again impossible that God should be restricted to the most perfect, because he cannot make the most perfect at all; for nothing created can be infinitely perfect; but before one has reached the infinite, one has as yet no most perfect. Therefore God is not necessitated to produce something determinate, but he can produce at pleasure what he wills.

4. One can seek to wriggle out of the compelling evidence of this proof by the assertion that all possible things with all possible perfections can exist, not indeed simultaneously, but gradually; a succession which has had no beginning and will have no end must necessarily realize all possibilities gradually.

By no means. For among the possibilities there belong also the simultaneous ones. For at the present moment innumerably many *(p. 151)* other, more perfect beings would still be possible; even if these should exist later or had already existed, still they do not exist now, which is surely also possible; that, therefore, precisely now these alone and not also those exist must have its ground, i.e., it must be freely so determined. Likewise there must be a ground why the others exist precisely yesterday or precisely tomorrow, since they were possible from eternity. That they are realized precisely in this order of succession, whereas they could have as many different temporal orders as infinitely many elements can be permuted, must again have a ground, namely a free will which chose precisely this time for each.

Further, at every moment innumerably many contrary and contradictory opposites are possible; but only one of them can ever exist at the same time; that, therefore, this one exists first, then the other, and not conversely, must be freely determined.

Against this a twofold objection will again be raised.

1° The world can indeed be infinite, and therefore all possibilities can be exhausted at the same time; and

2° it depends on the connection in the series of causes that first this possibility, then the other, is realized. That, e.g., this body is first warm and then cold depends on the influence of the fire, which later goes out. The same holds of all successive realizations of possibilities.

Let us begin with the latter. But that this fire burns, while it could also not burn, that it burns precisely now, while it could burn at infinitely many other moments, must have a cause; that this cause acted, and acted precisely then, again a cause; until we finally come to the first cause of all causes. That this now realizes precisely this one among infinitely and again infinitely many possibilities can, as was shown, have its ground only in the free choice of God.

When in the first objection reference is made to the simultaneous existence of all possibilities in the infinite world, one has recourse to an *asylum ignorantiae* [refuge of ignorance]. But it is positively impossible that all possibilities should be realized simultaneously even in different places. For at every place an infinity is possible; that, therefore, precisely these few beings exist here comes from a choice. And if one should wish to assert here again that gradually all possibilities could be exhausted at every place, then there must always be a

(p. 152) cause there which determined that precisely now, precisely these realities are precisely here. Cf. also what was said against the necessary doctrine of development of the pantheists, p. 76 ff.

5. In every act two moments work together, a subjective and an objective one, in that the former, as efficient cause, conditions the existence of the act, the latter, as formal or final cause, the specification of the act. Now if the acts of will of God through which he produces finite beings were necessary, then he would be determined to the willing either from the side of the subject, i.e., by the essence of God, which demands that willing, or from the side of the object, which exercised a compelling attraction on the will. Neither the one nor the other is the case.

a) God's *essence* does not demand that God produce finite things. For

α) since all possible things behave quite equally towards the divine essence, it would have to demand that *all* exist, the one as well as the other, the more perfect still much sooner than those presently existing. But that all exist is not possible and not actual.

β) The divine essence demands with necessity every pure perfection; but freedom with respect to finite things is at least a perfection. Indeed,

γ) necessitation with respect to finite goods would be a great imperfection, which presupposes either a need in the divine essence, or an error in knowledge, as if he needed them although he does not, or a perversity in the divine will, which would necessarily desire what is nevertheless known as not necessary.

δ) The divine essence does indeed demand necessity in its acts, but still only with respect to their subjective side, their existence; their specification and their direction are determined by the nature of the objects. Therefore God must indeed necessarily will; but what he must will, that to which his willing is directed, is determined by the object. And so the question is referred back to the second moment:

b) *Objectively* too there exists for God no necessitation to will finite goods.

α) The object of the divine willing can in and of itself be only the infinite good. For *(p. 153)*

αα) the proper and proportioned object of the infinite will can only be something infinite;

ββ) the good which is the object of the will is at the same time the final cause which stimulates the will, moves it, draws it to itself. The absolute will of the infinite, however, can be thought as moved only by an infinite good.

If, therefore, a finite good is to become the object of the divine willing, it can do so only through its relation to the highest good. Insofar, now, as all finite goods have the necessary relation of imitation of the highest good, and, if they exist, of outflow from the highest good, God loves them necessarily. But before they exist, they have, as pure nothing, no real relation at all to God, and therefore need to be loved not in the physical

order, i.e., as existing objects, but only in the metaphysical, i.e., as possible.

β) The holiness and order of the divine will require that he will everything on account of the infinite good. Necessarily, therefore, he wills only what has a necessary relation to it. Finite goods, however, have no necessary relation to the infinite good. For the relation which comes into consideration in willing is that of the means to the end. If God, therefore, desired them necessarily, they would have to be necessary means to make him happy. But he is already completely blessed through the infinite good, and therefore does not need finite goods.

γ) The will is necessitated to desire only when an object completely fills its capacity, wholly and entirely fulfils its longing, as it were overpowers its driving force. Therefore even the finite will, whose capacity and striving power is objectively infinite on account of the knowledge of the good in general, can be determined to necessary willing by no finite good. So much the less, then, the will which is objectively and subjectively infinite. If this were the case, we should have, since the good is the true cause of willing, an effect without sufficient cause; the infinite would be overpowered by the finite.

Against this it will be objected that for God the good cannot be a cause, since nothing can act upon him. To be sure, no finite good distinct from him can act upon him. But if we ascribe will to God, then what lies in its concept must also *(p. 154)* be retained. To the concept of the will, however, belongs that it is determined to willing by a good. Therefore we must also conceive the will of God as determined by a good, though by such a one as does not lie outside him, but which he himself is, the infinite good. Further, in this determination all contingency must be excluded, and so it must not be said: God's will is determined by the infinite good alone; but: it is determined by it to will everything that it wills.

III. The freedom of God does not stand in contradiction with his unchangeability.

1. The great difficulty of uniting the freedom of God with his absolute unchangeability and the necessity of his activity must be no reason for denying the former; on the contrary, the freedom of God is so necessary a presupposition of the contingency and finitude in the world that one would rather have to give up, with some, the unchangeability, which is not so evidently provable, than freedom, if an irreconcilable contradiction existed between the two. But this contradiction cannot be demonstrated, and we can in any case reject it indirectly through the reflex principle that truth cannot be opposed to truth, even if we cannot demonstrate their compatibility positively.

2. Directly the following can be remarked by way of reconciliation. In order that a true contradiction be present, the affirmation and negation must refer to the same thing under the same respect. Now, however, necessity and unchangeability are asserted of the divine act considered subjectively, insofar as it is identical with his essence; but contingency of the direction of this act to contingent objects. To be sure, the act, considered subjectively, could not be necessary if it had no necessary object at all; but this it has in his essence. With the same necessary act with which he necessarily wills himself, he also wills, in a contingent termination of the act, contingent things; and it would be quite the same act in itself if he had not willed contingent things.

3. If one now asks further by whom the contingent direction of the act is caused, we answer: by the necessary *(p. 155)* act itself, which remains quite the same in itself whether he directs it to these or those or to no contingent things at all. For it lies in the infinite efficacy of the divine act that it can effect everything without repetition or multiplication of the activity.

"But with this freedom is moved out of God into the direction of his act, and thus into things themselves." By no means. Only the indifference and contingency are placed outside God; but the free choice of this or that contingent direction lies in God himself.

But, it is said, the real causality which created the world is really the same as the divine essence, and is therefore connected as absolutely necessarily with the necessary essence, is as much given with it, as, e.g., the Pythagorean theorem with the essence of the triangle. Further, every reality in God is demanded by God's essence as necessarily as the theorem mentioned by the essence of the triangle. Now, however, the resolve to create the world, and creation itself, is something supremely real, and therefore at least as necessary as a geometrical theorem.

Further: God's resolve to create the world is either a reality or it is nothing. If it is nothing, then God's freedom in creation is also nothing, and a nothing can effect nothing either. But if it is a reality, then this evidently would not have been if that resolve had not been taken, and before the resolve (*in signo rationis priori*) this reality was lacking in God; therefore, if God is to be unchangeable, i.e., to receive no new reality, the resolve would have been necessary.

To this it is to be replied that the causality which is exercised in creation is something real only in God and in the creature; in between there is absolutely nothing to be found. In God it is necessary, because his essence; in the creature it is only as necessary as the creature itself, namely hypothetically, if it exists. If, therefore, the creature does not exist absolutely necessarily, then that reality too which lies in the causality, and which is not really distinct from God's essence, cannot have a necessary direction to the creature, i.e., it is not necessarily causality. The captiousness lies in this, that one already conceives the divine reality as causality, and consequently thinks the contingent as produced; causality is naturally *(p. 156)* necessarily causality; but the divine reality need not be causality.

We gladly admit that everything that is in God himself is as necessary in him, is as necessarily demanded by his essence, as the Pythagorean theorem by the essence of the triangle. Therefore the free will in God is demanded by his essence with absolute necessity, and necessitation just as necessarily excluded. Relations, however, also conform to the constitution of the term; therefore the divine essence demands that God will himself necessarily, but contingent things not necessarily. The resolve of God to create the world is indeed something real; but the same reality, namely the divine essence, would be there even if the world were not created. The direction of the resolve to the world depends, without possibility of change, on God's will; it is nothing real in God, but only in the produced term.

The free resolve of God is by no means a nothing. For entitatively it is the essence of God; terminatively, the reality produced by the efficacious resolve. Without the resolve, considered subjectively, something would indeed have been lacking in God; therefore he had necessarily to take a resolve, to will something; but nothing would have been lacking in him if the resolve had been directed not to this world but to the non-existence of the world.

Chapter Four. The Attributes of God.

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(p. 157)

In what sense there can be talk of attributes in God at all, i.e., of determinations resulting from the essence, has been sufficiently shown under the essence and simplicity of God. To carry out here their manifold divisions, which occur among theologians and philosophers,[1] lies outside our plan. For us there still remain to be treated here especially two classes of attributes:

1° those which belong to him with regard to himself: truth, goodness, beauty;

2° those which belong to him with reference to other things, of which only immensity and eternity, which are proper to him with regard to space and time, are specially discussed here.

[1] Cf. Suarez, *De Deo*, l. 1, c. 9.

§ 1. God Is the Infinite Truth.

Truth is taken in a threefold sense: *ontological* truth is predicated of things which agree with their concept; *logical*, of cognitions which agree with their objects; and *moral*, of speech which agrees with the inner mind.

1. Ontologically something is the truer, the more it agrees with its concept, and the more perfect the concept, and thus the thing itself, is. Now God's being agrees most precisely with the most perfect concept, that of the infinite. Therefore he is infinitely true, and, like being itself, so the infinite truth.

(p. 158) He is also the first truth, because all true being has its being from God, and its agreement with its concept is ultimately judged according to its agreement with the ideas of God.

2. God's knowing not merely agrees with its object, but is identical with it, with his essence; it is therefore infinitely true; but his knowing is his essence; therefore he is the infinite truth. He is also the first truth, insofar as his essence contains the archetypes of everything true which we know, and all necessity and certainty of knowing has its last ground in the necessity of his essence.

3. God is also infinite truthfulness, since he is holiness itself. See the following paragraph.

§ 2. The Goodness of God.

1. God is infinitely good in the threefold sense of this concept: 1° insofar as goodness is taken in the transcendental sense, in which every being is good because it has a suitable being. And indeed

a) good considered in himself, on account of his infinite perfection, which is suited (good) to him in an infinitely high degree. But he also has

b) an infinitely great suitability for everything that is and can be, and is therefore good for others in an infinitely high degree.

For α) God is the infinite archetype of all things, through which they are what they are. Their likeness to him is indeed not infinitely great — that it cannot be in the finite — but still always as great and as essential as it can ever be. For assimilation to God is for the creature not merely external, but through it the essence of every thing is founded; and should it become still more like God than it is, it would no longer be what it is, but become another, higher being. As suited, therefore, as its very own being is to the thing, so suited to it is God's being as its primordial exemplar; and since naturally nothing can be more suited to the thing than its very own being, God too, through the likeness, is fitting, good, to it in an unsurpassable degree.

(p. 159) But he is also good to all things β) as efficient cause. All their real being, their dispositions, faculties, their development, even their activity, have their ground in him; and as suited, therefore, as their physical being is to them, so good is its author for them; and since nothing can be more suited to the thing than its realized being, and no more inward influence on a thing is possible than the creating, conserving and concurring influence which God bestows on the creature, he has the highest degree of goodness for creatures.

γ) But he is infinitely good for them quite especially through this, that he has set himself, the highest good, as their last end, through the possession of which every being is to attain its highest consummation in the degree most corresponding to its nature. Not merely by destination is he their highest good, but he also leads them to himself through inner and outer means, so that he is their highest good in the eminent sense.

This essential dependence of all finite goodness on God, and innermost relation of his goodness to creatures, the ancients expressed through the proposition, not to be misinterpreted: *Deus est omnis boni bonum* [God is the good of every good]. If only one holds fast the real distinctness of the divine goodness and the created, one cannot, for the rest, think the immanence of God's goodness in that of creatures inwardly enough. Even propositions which sound apparently quite pantheistic, like the above, contain the deepest truth, if only, as was said, one does not identify the divine and the creaturely. If one keeps this confusion away, and expresses the relation of the primordial goodness to the derived through the category of causality, one must say: God's goodness is not *causa materialis* or *formalis* [material or formal cause] (not an essential constituent) of finite goodness, but certainly *causa exemplaris, efficiens* and *finalis* [exemplary, efficient and final cause] of all good.

2° God is infinitely good in the moral sense of the word, in which (moral) goodness designates agreement of the will with the norm of morality. For he is the infinite good, the norm of morality itself; his will is essentially directed to the infinite good, indeed absolutely identical with it. To him, therefore, holiness, which designates the most perfect degree of moral goodness, belongs in the highest measure.

3° God is also infinitely good insofar as goodness designates the inclination of the will to bestow good (more precisely, *kindness*).

(p. 160) To be sure, God cannot be infinitely inclined to bestow good in the sense that he must produce a creature of infinite perfection or infinitely many perfect creatures; this is impossible both on the side of creatures, which can exist neither in infinite number nor in infinite perfection, and on the side of God, whose freedom would be impaired by such a necessitation of his will; indeed, his kindness would itself be wholly annihilated if he had to produce the impossible, which at bottom is nothing.

If, therefore, God is to be inclined to do good, precisely this inclination requires that he measure out to every being, with freedom, a determinate measure of goodness (perfection). This inclination is infinite with regard to the motive and the last end. For the inclination to do good is the greater,

a) the higher the good which moves the will to beneficence; b) the more strongly this is loved by the will; c) the greater the good which is bestowed.

Now, however, the good which moves God to every activity is his essence, the infinite good, which his will embraces with infinite love. An infinite good he can indeed communicate to no creature as its essence; but still every gift of God is in a certain sense an infinite good, since in every good he communicates himself, the infinite good. Himself he communicates, because every gift to the creature is a means of attaining consummation in the infinite good. For this reason too the infinite good is bestowed with every good, because each is good only through participation in the infinite good, and in God's intention and affection that relation of the gift to the infinite good predominates. Besides, what he gives he gives with infinite love; goodness, however, is measured less by the gift than by the love of the giver.

2. In a special sense God's goodness has no limits towards rational creatures. Not merely because the motive of his love for them is a quite special representation of his infinite essence in their spirituality and in their spiritual faculties, and because he has destined them to a quite proper participation in the highest good in knowledge, love and enjoyment; but especially also because he has made it possible for them to increase without limit the actual *(p. 161)* bestowal of divine benefits, and so that possession of the infinite good. In the unlimited elasticity of free will we have the possibility of approaching the infinite good ever more without limits, if only we will, of striving after an ever higher degree of the possession of God.

With still greater right it can be said that the goodness of God in the supernatural order is infinite. It is infinite

a) because he frees us from infinite evil, sin;

b) because he has given an infinite ransom for it;

c) because he really gives himself, the infinite good: α) in the Incarnation, β) in the mystery of the altar, γ) in the beatific vision.

3. The proof given above can also be reduced to a very well-known principle: *Bonum est diffusivum sui* [The good is diffusive of itself].

The good is essentially communicative, whereas evil and nothing are niggardly, can and will communicate nothing.

But God is infinitely good; therefore he has an infinite inclination to communicate his goodness, is infinitely kind.

The principle of the communicativeness of goodness, however, itself needs explanation and proof. First, it is clear that everything that is seeks to communicate itself. For what is has an essential impulse to activity, even if it were no other than that of self-exercise and self-assertion in being against a hostile environment, which, at least in the present order of the world, whose subsistence is founded on the conflict of its parts, is lacking to no being. But besides, every being is there in order to attain a determinate end, and therefore to act for it. Only he who is purest activity, whose being is acting, has no end to attain, but enjoys it in infinite activity and rest.

Every thing, therefore, essentially has a striving after activity. Doing, however, follows the constitution of being, whose outflow, exercise and expression it is. Therefore the striving after activity coincides with the striving to reveal oneself, to posit oneself outward, thus to communicate one's being.

Further, it follows from the essential destination of every being to activity that with the increase of the perfection of being the striving after activity also grows, and conversely, the more imperfect a being is, the more it approaches nothing, the less energy *(p. 162)* for activity it has. But the more perfect a being becomes, the better it becomes; and therefore with the goodness of the being its striving after activity grows, i.e., its striving to communicate its being, i.e., its goodness. Now, however, God is good in infinite degree; therefore he has an infinite impulse to act, to communicate himself, his goodness; i.e., he is infinitely kind.

§ 3. God Is the Infinite Beauty.

1. This proposition could be accepted as an immediate inference from the infinity and causality of God, since beauty is evidently a perfection and, as it seems, a pure perfection. Only sensible beauty, which rises on a material ground, would have to be excluded from God's essence as a mixed perfection. For the rest, he is the cause and archetype of everything beautiful (*mundum mente gerens pulchrum pulcherrimus ipse* [himself most beautiful, bearing a beautiful world in his mind], Boethius), and therefore himself infinitely beautiful.

2. This is also placed beyond all doubt if one takes as basis the old definition of the beautiful, derived from the effect: *pulchra sunt, quae visa placent* [beautiful are those things which please when seen]. For it is evident that a thing can delight beholding the more, the more perfect it is, and that therefore the most perfect being will also most enrapture the (spiritual) eye.

3. According to the well-known conception of the beautiful as *splendor veri* [the splendour of the true], too, God must be called infinitely beautiful. For not only is he the infinite truth, but he also has an infinite intelligibility, with which he shines towards knowledge. The radiance with which an object shines into the faculty of beholding, i.e., its knowability, grows with remoteness from potentiality, more specifically with its immateriality. God, however, is purest spirit and purest actuality.

4. What precedes proves, to be sure, that God must be the infinite beauty in and of himself and for God's own beholding, as well as for a spirit which beholds him as he is in himself, but not also that he is so for us in our present knowledge.

In fact it follows from the dependence of our spiritual knowledge on sensible knowledge that something pleases our beholding the better *(p. 163)* the more luminously it renders the spiritual sensible; hence the definition of beauty: representation of the idea through the form.[1] Now one easily sees that God can be represented through sensible forms either not at all, or in any case less intuitively, than the ideas of finite things. And again it is connected with the constitution of our knowing in this life that beauty is defined as unity in multiplicity,[2] which definition seems to be inapplicable to the metaphysically simple essence of God. But

a) even if God admits no multiplicity in himself, he does so in the concept which we form of him. And according to this concept he also presents himself to our beholding as infinitely beautiful. For according to it he unites with the greatest unity thinkable an infinite multiplicity. He is the absolutely simple cause, the unitary archetype, the one last end of everything that is and can be thought; as an *actus purissimus* [purest act] he contains virtually an infinity of perfections.

b) Even if the essence of God itself admits of no representation through a finite form, still his attributes, through which we represent his essence to ourselves, can be made intuitive. Thus his wisdom, goodness, power, mercy, greatness shine towards us most brightly from his works, and these rays can be still more concentrated by the burning-glass of art.

5. The definition of the beautiful, "representation of the idea through the form," is evidently set up not for the beautiful in general, but only for what is beautiful to us. For solely because we do not behold the spiritual idea in its purity, and so cannot rejoice in its sight, must it be brought to our beholding through a sensible form. It is therefore really the value of the idea which gives the beautiful the property of pleasing. In fact, the higher the idea which, with equal intuitiveness, comes before us for contemplation, the greater the aesthetic enjoyment. If, therefore, one had to define beauty not for our beholding bound to the senses, but more generally and especially for pure spirits, one could place it in the perfection of the idea beheld. For pure spirit, in its beholding, the height of what is beheld is alone decisive: an idea enraptures the beholder the more, the higher, more spiritual, more perfect it is. And therefore God is the greatest beauty, at least for the spirit which beholds him. The beholding of this most beautiful of all objects constitutes its highest beatitude.

For us too those works of art and phenomena of nature are the most beautiful which represent God most clearly to our beholding. From this follows *(p. 164)* at first, of course, only that those representations are beautiful. But at the same time we also see that there is another representation of God, not through manifold and sensible forms, but immediate beholding of the divine through purely spiritual acts. Whether this is possible to a creature in a natural or only in a supernatural way does not matter here. Absolutely speaking, therefore, God must be designated as the most beautiful good, and every finite good as the more beautiful, the more perfect it is, provided that the perfection of the beholding of him to whom it is beautiful keeps pace

with the perfection of its being. For this must be held fast, if we do not wish to confuse good and beautiful with one another, that delight in the beautiful must be mediated by beholding. *Pulchra sunt quae visa placent.*

6. The other, already more general definition of beauty, "unity in multiplicity," too, must and can be still further generalized. It comes only from the limitation of our mind that it must bring what is unitary to clear beholding through manifold acts. But after multiplicity the fundamental need for unity makes itself felt the more vividly. One therefore understands the pleasure which our mind finds in unity in multiplicity, in multiplicity which is led back to unity. But at the same time we recognize that a spirit can find still more pleasure in unity if it does not first need to decompose the fullness of its content into a multiplicity in order then to unite the multiplicity again. If it beholds the rich content of an idea all at once, the pleasure must be a more concentrated, more intensive one than ours in the united manifold. Our pleasure grows with increasing unity and multiplicity; but the latter is conditioned by the fullness, by the inner richness, of the object. For the spirit not needing division, therefore, merely unity and the possibility of multiplicity, i.e., the perfection of the object, will be the measure of beauty. And so again, according to this definition too, God is the most beautiful, because he unites the highest fullness of being with the highest unity, i.e., with metaphysical simplicity. Of course this holds only for the spirit which beholds that fullness and unity of God. We know that God is the most beautiful spirit of all, and that he comprehends in himself most perfectly the objective conditions of beauty; but we do not behold him in these conditions; therefore a work of art in which he is intuitively represented, in which, e.g., the multiplicity of human destinies is united by divine providence, can delight us more than he himself.

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[1] Metaph. p. 137.

[2] Ibid., p. 141.

§ 4. The Immensity and Omnipresence of God.

I. Definition.

1. Immensity includes omnipresence. The latter means the actual in-existence of God in all actual spaces and things; the former, however, such a constitution of the divine essence that 1° its presence is not restricted to the actually existing things *(p. 165)* and spaces, and 2° also cannot be restricted to existing ones, even if their number were increased without limit, but 3° can and must be present to all possible ones. Omnipresence is therefore finite, temporal, contingent, changeable, like the things existing outside God; immensity, however, is infinite, eternal, necessary, unchangeable; it is the absolute essence of God, which of itself demands to be present to everything that is and can be. Omnipresence is only a relative determinateness, a contingent termination and corresponding denomination of the divine essence, which can accrue to it only with the existence of things; immensity is an essential, unchangeable attribute of God. With immensity, therefore, omnipresence too is proved.

2. The ancients distinguish a threefold presence of God in things: *per potentiam* [by power], *per praesentiam* [by presence] and *per essentiam* [by essence]. By the first they understand the power and authority through which God is present in the whole world just as, or in a still truer sense than, the king in his whole kingdom, in which he exercises ruling power. *Per praesentiam* designates the presence of all things before God's sight; as we have "present" the things which fall at once into our field of vision, so one must say of God, for a far more urgent reason, that all things are present to God and he is present to things. The designation is not quite fitting, especially as a member of the division of presence, wherefore others better say *per scientiam* [by knowledge]. *Per essentiam* God is in things insofar as his substance (not merely its activity) fills and penetrates them. We treat here at first only the last; the first two are discussed under the knowledge of God and his ruling power, but are comprehended, as kinds of presence, in the essential presence which we prove

here.

3. But something can again be substantially and essentially present in different ways: *circumscriptive* [circumscriptively] and *definitive* [definitively]. In the first way that which is formally extended, the body, is in space, insofar as it is whole in the whole place, and with its parts in the corresponding parts of space. Spirits, which have no extension, must, if they occupy an extended space, be whole in the individual parts, but also whole in the whole space, because otherwise they would not even be present once at each place, but as many times as there are parts in the space, i.e., in continuous space infinitely many times. Only this presence, which one calls the definitive, can belong to God, the purest spirit. *(p. 166)* Commonly, however, one takes *definitive* in a secondary meaning, in which it means the same as *circumscriptive* (understood negatively); namely one designates by it that definitive presence at a place is just as much bounded by it, does not go beyond it, as circumscriptive presence. In this sense no definitive presence in space can be ascribed to God, unless one takes as the adequate place of his omnipresence the existing space, the whole actual world, and for his immensity the whole realm of the possible. Not unsuitably, with reference to God, a third has been added to the two members, and it is said that God is in space *repletive* [repletively].

It is also customary to divide the immediate nearness of one being to another, "its contact" with it, into *contactum quantitatis* [contact of quantity], such as is proper to bodies, and *contactum virtutis* [contact of power], which belongs to spirits. This division, however, seems to rest on the Thomistic view that spirits could be present to a body in space only through force and activity; in order to prevent misunderstandings, one could ascribe to God a presence *per contactum virtutis et essentiae* [through contact of power and of essence]; only then the *contactus essentiae* would again have to be explained in the way that the presence *per essentiam* was.

II. God is omnipresent and immense.

1. To be present to a thing, at a place, is a pure perfection, which is to be esteemed the more highly, the greater the number of things, the more extended the space, which a being can fill at the same time by its presence. That the being itself should thereby go apart, and fill different parts of space with different parts of its substance, does not belong to the essence of being present, but is accidentally connected with it in bodies, which on account of their formal extension occupy their space only *circumscriptive*. The definitive presence of spirits excludes that imperfection. Even if an imperfection is connected with this, namely that it is restricted within determinate limits, this again is essential to its finitude, but not to presence.

But since all pure perfection belongs to God in the highest degree, he is 1° present in things and spaces, and indeed in all; 2° his presence is not restricted to a finite number and extension; 3° he demands to be present to all possible things and spaces; i.e., he is omnipresent and immense.

(p. 167) 2. Immensity belongs to truth. For 1° there is no place at which, e.g., the principle of contradiction would not be true; 2° truth, its power and validity, is restricted to no finite space, but it demands 3° to rule with all-power all possible spaces, bodies and spirits; no point of space, no place where a thinking spirit can be, where something can exist or happen, can withdraw from its validity; it determines all thought and being. Now, however,

a) nothing can have a perfection which would not also belong to the infinitely perfect being, whether *formaliter* or *eminenter*. A perfection can belong to it only *eminenter* only when it is mixed with imperfection. But it is obvious that the peculiarity explained is the purest perfection. See under 1. Truth as such can indeed contain no imperfection, with the exception of its lack of independence in existing; for although *in genere entis* [in the genus of being], namely considered as entity and perfection, no imperfection, no non-being, can adhere to it, still it can have physical being only in the thinking mind and in existing things. Therefore it has indeed validity, content, everywhere; its metaphysical being is immense; but one cannot say: here, everywhere, truth exists. Since, now, God has physical being, in the transfer of the

immensity of truth to his essence that imperfection falls away of itself, and it can and must therefore be predicated of him *formaliter*.

b) This all the more, since metaphysical being too has its ground in God, who

α) accordingly cannot be less perfect than what is grounded, and

β) cannot be thought as removed from what is grounded.

c) Precisely because truth has in itself only possible being and yet rules everything, all possible spirits, things and spaces, a real being must exercise that power through it; its prerogatives are therefore prerogatives and perfections of that existing being. This being is therefore immense, almighty, eternal, unchangeable, infinite; it is God. Therefore God has the (ideal) immensity of ideal truth in his existence.

d) If God actually rules spirits and being and becoming through truth, he must be in things and spirits. *(p. 168)* For truth is in things as their innermost essence and in spirits as form of knowledge; but at the same time the same truth is also in God, as its archetype and foundation; therefore things and spirits are in God, and for the same reason all possible beings must be in him and thus he in them; he is therefore immense.

3. God must be either at a point, or at an extended, limited place within existing space, or in the whole world, or nowhere, or immense. Now, however, all members except the last are inadmissible. Therefore immensity remains.

If God were at an indivisible point, this would be determined for him either by his essence, or he could choose it for himself. The former is impossible, because

a) of itself every being, but infinitely more absolute being, is quite indifferent to every place;

b) because otherwise God would be more imperfect than the human soul, which occupies an extended space at the same time, at least within the brain.

The second too, that God should choose the point for himself, presupposes a great imperfection in God, namely the necessity of moving, or at least transferring himself, from one place to another, if he wishes to be there.

Precisely the same (with the exception of the reason under b) holds of the restriction of God's presence to a finite space, even if it were the whole existing space of the world. For the existing things have absolutely nothing in advance of the infinitely many possible ones, on account of which precisely they should be present to him. Since God could have created, or can still create, immeasurably many other worlds, he can and must be present to those for the same reason as to the existing ones, without any change whatever in his presence.

If one says God is nowhere, this means: he has no relation at all to space and to the things in space; and this can designate a great perfection, namely pure immateriality and exaltedness above everything created. But it is clear that it is a still far higher perfection to remain infinitely exalted above everything spatial and created and nevertheless not to leave it outside oneself, as was discussed above of ideal being, of truth. To be nowhere, i.e., to have no relation to space, *(p. 169)* becomes a perfection only through this, that a presentiality belongs to the immaterial which is at least equivalent to the bodily; otherwise nothing, which is also nowhere, would have a perfection which existing bodies lacked. The equivalent of bodily filling of space, however, is the definitive or repletive presence of the immaterial.

In fact, if God had to be nowhere in the negative sense explained, without compensation by a positive reality, this would be demanded either by his immateriality, which raises him above all spatiality, or by his infinity, which removes him from everything creaturely. But immateriality demands merely not to be enclosed dimensively in space. For the human soul occupies an extended space in spite of its immateriality; and pure spirit too can (at least *per accidens* [accidentally], i.e., through acting on body and space) be present in this,

and at the same time in any case not be confined to a smaller part of it than the human soul.

The infinity of God does indeed demand that no finite space of the world contain him, but not that he be nowhere in it; on the contrary, actual infinity demands all perfection in infinite degree. Therefore he must not merely be present in the world, but already so actually determined that infinitely many things, if they existed, would have to be present to him. He is therefore immense.

One could still add to the members adduced in the proof one which St. Augustine touches when he says that before the creation of the world God was nowhere, but in himself. That, then, is the positive perfection which is added to the complete non-spatiality expressed by being nowhere.

But what is being-in-himself supposed to mean? Surely not presence in himself, since every being is identical with itself, but not present to itself. St. Augustine means to say that the external termination of God's infinite presentiality cannot exercise itself if nothing exists, and that he is then in a certain sense nowhere. But that he is purely negatively nowhere, St. Augustine asserts so little that he even extends God's presence to the ideal spaces.

4. If one holds fast the absolute independence of God from all relation to spatiality, then God is indeed near to no creature and to no place, but just as little far. For God works in creatures and in space their innermost being and all their activity. But where a being works, there it is present. For

a) the activity cannot be removed from the substance, but what is effected can be so only when the cause does not act immediately upon it. The activities of God, however — creation, conservation, concurrence — admit of no intermediary, but go immediately to their term.

(p. 170) b) The connection of the cause with its effect is a more real and more inward presence than spatial absence of distance.

c) The causality of God extends not merely to the physical being and working of the creature, but is also the ground of its inner thinkability and possibility, and thereby even of ideal space, which precisely represents the mere possibility of receiving bodies. Let one make the impossibility of action at a distance doubtful with subtle reasons; that the radically fundamental cause could be far from its effect, the ground far from what is grounded, not even the subtlest Scotist, to my knowledge, has yet dared to assert.

Since, now, God's power is not merely restricted to the existing spaces and creatures, but can extend to infinitely many, and, as regards the ideal domain, his essence-creating activity already actually extends to it, God's presence is without limits, and already now in itself as if he filled all creatures, all spaces.

With this the question too is already settled, which is answered differently, whether God already exists in the ideal spaces outside the world. Certain it is: 1° that God's presentiality already now behaves precisely as it would be if he filled those spaces and beings were present in them. 2° The actual presence of God is only a real relation on the side of creatures, i.e., God is really present at a place only when the place is real, i.e., when something is there to which he is present.

3° There is no point of ideal space of which one could not say now, when it is empty: Here too is God; just as well as one must say of the completely empty spaces which must be assumed between the last atoms: Here too is God.

Of course, through the fixing of a determinate point in ideal space, which is contained in the "here," it no longer remains purely ideal; therefore one can in a certain sense say: God is not yet in the space which is still purely ideal; but one can just as well, and perhaps with more reason, say: He is already in ideal space.

Besides what has been said, a special reason demands this. As every determinate possible essence is a particular imitation of the divine essence, an image of a determinate divine perfection, so ideal space, as the possibility of the extension of bodies, represents specially the immensity of God. This, therefore, is the

radical and exemplary ground of ideal space, and must therefore also be (not, as some have believed, identical with it, but) most intimately connected with it, present in it.

Some truth, therefore, even if with exaggeration, lies in the opinion of the great Newton and others, who identify the immensity of God with ideal space. The same view returns with some modification in Ulrici and Lotze, when these assert that God mediates the action of the *(p. 171)* atoms or beings of the world upon one another, which without transmission by this central force would have to go into the distance.

If these scholars do not wish, in occasionalist fashion, to let the activity of the atoms be transmitted by God's activity, then the essence of God must be thought as a real, extended medium which transmits the activities much as, say, the air conducts the vibrations of a sounding body to the ear. But it is quite mistaken to assert that things are already not far from one another through the fact that they exist in the one divine immensity which connects them with one another. For atom A exists in another part of God's immensity than atom B, or another part of God's presence co-exists with atom A than with atom B. In itself, to be sure, God's immensity is one, undivided, and therefore the immense God is everywhere whole with his infinite presentiality, exalted above all things. But the same does not hold of actual being-present, which is divisible, bounded and manifold, since it is indeed determined by the existing things. No thing, therefore, co-exists with the whole presence of God, or with the same part of it as another, unless both are already at the same place. Through God's presence, therefore, things do not become near to one another nor far; on the contrary, their nearness and farness determines the nearness and farness of the different partial places of God.

But if the whole actual presence of God does not co-exist with one or several individual places, still much less does immensity. For even if this is essentially one and indivisible, still in value it equals infinitely many presences; formally it is simple, but virtually manifold and divisible. But not in itself (formally), but its value must be considered when one compares it with finite extensions, in order to see whether it surpasses them or not. So considered, however, its value is infinite, and no creature, however great, can measure itself with it, let alone that two atoms could have an adequate coexistence with the whole immensity and thereby become without distance from one another.

As the points of the circumference of a circle all co-exist indeed with the undivided centre, but do not on that account give up their own distance and spatial relation to one another, so creatures and spaces over against God. For the indivisible centre can be connected with every point of the circumference by a particular radius, different from every other, which designates the coexistence; and therefore the centre — not because it is undivided, but on account of its central position, i.e., of its value in the circle — is to be esteemed outside (and above) the points of the circle, virtually equal in value to the infinitely many points. In the same way the one undivided immensity is to be treated in its comparison with finite places.

Attention must, however, be drawn to a great difference between the presence of God in things and the coexistence of the centre with all points of the circle. This coexistence is not without distance, but includes a distance which is far greater than that which neighbouring points of the circumference have.

(p. 172) But there can be no two creatures which exist so near to one another, so much in one another, as God exists in every creature; indeed God is in a certain sense nearer to the creature, penetrates and embraces it more intimately, than the creature itself. For 1° no creature can work in another so profoundly inwardly as God, who produces the innermost essence and every reality, however slight, not merely in its physical being, but even grounds the inner possibility of the essence. 2° No creature can make itself so wholly present to another as God to the creature, who on account of his metaphysical simplicity penetrates it in absolute wholeness. And the creature itself, which always has metaphysical parts, is completely present to none of them; and in none of its faculties is the totality of its force, at most that of its substance. Even if two bodies compenetrate one another in a supernatural way, if a spirit penetrates a body or even another spirit, they are indeed in the same place, but their substances are outside one another.

Still more intimate unions, exalted above all human representations, God enters into with his rational creatures through sanctifying grace, through the hypostatic union, through the beatific vision.

§ 5. The Eternity of God.

I. Explanation.

1. To the concept of eternity belongs above all

1° a duration without beginning and end. But a motion which had no beginning and no end would always last only infinite time, but no eternity. Therefore there belongs

2° to the concept of eternity: duration without change. But this too does not suffice. For if a created spirit existed from eternity, its substance would last without change for an infinitely long time, but would nevertheless not on that account be eternal in the proper sense. For it can after all suffer changes in its acts; and even if we excluded these by assuming an eternal, unchangeable vision of God, still it does not become simply eternal, because it can also not be, and thus being can follow upon non-being and conversely.

(p. 173) There must therefore be added 3° the absolute impossibility of a change, in order to have eternity properly so called.

Eternity in itself, i.e., according to its proper essence and concept (*formaliter*), has therefore nothing in common with time. For the absence of beginning and end too, if time has such, is quite other than that of eternity; eternity excludes beginning and end with absolute necessity; the endlessness of creatures, as well as their beginninglessness, if they are capable of it at all, is always only a contingent one, dependent on the will of God. But even duration itself, which is common to time and eternity, cannot after all be predicated of both in the same sense. For duration (at least the divine) is not really distinct from existence; it is indeed only continued existence. But existence is not proper to God and to creatures in the same sense, but is predicated of both only analogously.

2. Therefore the representation of eternity as a time without beginning and end is at the least very superficial. No more admissible is the representation of time as a part of eternity; on the contrary, to the incomparability of the two explained above there is added the fact that thereby the finite is made a constituent of the infinite. This is namely just as absurd as if one wished to make a creature, which is really one with its duration (existence), a part of the Creator, in whom there is still less a difference of his duration from himself. In other words: If one conceives time as part of eternity, one must think of real, not of ideal time, which equals the whole of eternity. Real time, however, is nothing outside the things which endure in change; but God's eternity is also identical with his essence. Therefore again time can as little count as part of eternity as the creature can be a part of God.

3. In spite of this incomparability of time and eternity we cannot avoid comparing the temporal duration of creatures with the duration of God, as we also compare the infinite essence of God, which agrees with the finite in no genus of being, with the perfections of creatures, indeed must apprehend God's undivided being through them. As we are entitled to the latter by the infinite content of the divine being, which is equivalent to infinite perfections of creatures, so *(p. 174)* we can and must, in putting eternity and time together, consider the former in its value, which equals infinite time.

Time flows along beside eternity, and thus co-exists with eternity. Since, now, eternity considered in itself is quite indivisible, it must co-exist wholly and undivided with every particle of time. If, therefore, one did not admit a decomposition of eternity into its values, it would follow that all particles of time were equally long (because they co-existed with the same undivided eternity) and that all even lasted eternally. As it is, however, the value of eternity equals infinitely long time, and each particle of time co-exists only with as long a part of eternity as it itself lasts. Eternity co-exists indeed wholly with every part of time, because it has

no parts; but its duration is not exhausted in its value by the individual duration of time. God's immensity, too, in-exists wholly in every smallest space; but because it is equivalent to infinitely great extension, its extension is not exhausted by its presence, e.g., on earth; it can indwell infinitely many other spaces.

Very apt is the comparison which St. Thomas[1] takes from the circle. The indivisible, immovable centre co-exists wholly with every point of the circumference. But not for that reason does any point of the circumference have the whole value of the centre, or even of the whole circumference. In the describing of the circle, or in circular motion, no single new position can occur in the circumference which would not lie opposite the centre, in which the centre would not occupy its central position. It is therefore equivalent to every circumference, even to an infinite one, if such were described.

4. By attending to the value of eternity, which must be kept in view over against time, one can easily judge a view which lets creatures already exist in God's eternity. It would still be passable to say: "They exist in eternity," insofar as they co-exist with a part of eternity resolved into time, or even their time constitutes a part of this flowing "eternity." But the little word *already* makes the proposition quite false; for through this temporal particle creatures are lifted out of their existence beginning in time, e.g., now, and conceived as already co-existing, before their temporal existence, with beginningless eternity or with a beginningless ideal time. To be sure, in order to be known by God from eternity, they must also in a certain sense be present to God's gaze from eternity; but not their physical being, but its truth, which does not first come to be in time but is eternal, is required in order to be beheld by God.

(p. 175) Similarly is to be judged the proposition with which one is accustomed to prove God's foreknowledge: God already co-exists with the future. To be sure, eternity co-exists without change with past and future; it is therefore already now so, i.e., already has that duration with which it will co-exist with the future. From this it does indeed follow that God already knows the future, and indeed must know it just as well as the past and present. But in saying "already" of God's eternity, one conceives it not in its undivided essence but in its temporal value; and one says that the present part of God's (extensively) infinitely long duration, i.e., the temporal present, co-exists with the future. That, however, is just as absurd as to say: The present is future, and conversely.

II. God is eternal.

1. That God

a) can have no beginning and no end follows from his necessity. For what is absolutely necessary must always be, both *a parte ante* [on the side of the past] and *a parte post* [on the side of the future].

b) Succession and change are immediately excluded by his unchangeability. But his infinity too is incompatible with flowing being, since with it he always possesses wholly, has together and must have, all his being and his life and his activity in intensive, not extensive, fullness.

2. Eternity in the sense explained above belongs without doubt to the possible essences, to the ideal domain, to truth.

Now, however, God's existing essence is, on account of its necessity, wholly identical with his ideal or possible essence. He is also truth itself. Therefore . . .

3. Were God not eternal, nothing would exist, and nothing would be possible either. For were there not a necessary being from eternity, then still much less a contingent one, which in the end is only through a necessary one. Were God, therefore, not eternal, there would once have been nothing at all. But if there was once nothing, then nothing could come to be either: no necessary being, because this must always be; no contingent one, because it would have no cause. Therefore there would now be nothing, and there could never be anything, if a necessary being, God, did not exist from eternity. But a necessary being existing from

eternity is also without the possibility of a change. Therefore God must be eternal.

[1] *C. gent.* I c. 66.

Chapter Five. The Works of God.

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(p. 176)

This treatise is very suited to place the preceding discussions on the attributes of God in a brighter light. In particular we gain from the consideration of the works of God a clearer concept of the power, goodness and wisdom of God. For power is the formal principle of God's activity outward. By virtue of it God can, on account of his infinity, produce everything which includes no contradiction in itself; that he cannot make the latter is no limitation of his power, but says only that God cannot make nothing, which is indeed the essence of the contradictory. Yet God, on account of his other attributes, *potentia ordinata* [by his ordained power], can by no means realize much which he could by virtue of his absolute power, as, e.g., to annihilate the human spirit.

Naturally the power of God must be conceived not as a faculty but only as actuality, and not as a force going outward but as his essence, specially as his willing. For not only does his simplicity exclude such a particular force, but the perfection of his will also requires that it be efficacious when God wills.

§ 1. Creation.

The activity most corresponding to God's absolute power is creation, in which he acts absolutely, i.e., independently of any matter. Still more, however, will the following proposition show that it is the most proper prerogative of omnipotence.

(p. 177)

I. The creative power is an infinite one.

It might seem as if the unfolding of God's power precisely in creation could not be infinite. For since creation is a production out of nothing, but what is produced out of nothing does not have possibility and existence essentially united, and is thus contingent and finite, only a finite effect can be posited through creation. But there is a significant difference between the proposition: God unfolds in creation an infinite power, and the other: God posits in creation an infinite effect.

The former says that the activity of God, considered in itself, is infinite in creation, and is identical with the second proposition only if by effect is understood not the external product of God's activity, but the activity itself, which, however, is more precisely called effecting. The product is finite, but the producing activity is infinite.

But this infinity of God's activity, as distinct from its external product, is not peculiar to creating, but belongs to all activities of God; for all, considered in themselves, are identical with the divine essence and consequently infinite. The effect, however, can require an infinite power in a twofold way:

1° insofar as it is infinite in itself; such infinite productions are found only in the activities of God inward, which are made neither out of nothing nor out of matter lying at hand, but are begotten or poured forth from the substance of the agent;

2° the external effect can require omnipotence insofar as it is indeed finite in itself, but the particular manner of its production excludes finite power.

Here, therefore, the infinity lies not merely in the activity considered subjectively, but in a certain way in the finite product, considered not in itself (*in facto esse* [in its having been made]) but *in fieri* [in its becoming], namely in view of and taken together with the particular manner of its coming to be.

For the production of a work four causes in general work together:

1° the final cause, for the sake of which something happens; 2° the efficient, by which it happens; 3° the material, the matter, out of *(p. 178)* which it is made; 4° the form which it receives, or (outside it) the exemplar after which it is made.

The final cause, as also the exemplary, act only ideally on a spiritual efficient cause, moving and guiding it in the execution of the work. The formal cause is not active in the production, except insofar as it coincides with the exemplary in the way indicated. As inner form it constitutes with the matter the already finished being, and the introduction of the form is the proper essence of production. For every producing happens either *ex nihilo sui et non subjecti* [out of the nothing of itself but not of the subject], when the work itself as such, with the form to be produced, was not yet there; or *ex nihilo sui et subjecti sive materiae*, out of the nothing of itself and of the matter, i.e., when it itself as such was not there and also no matter out of which it was made: this latter is creating.

1. Therefore only two causes remain active in production: the efficient and the material. Both, however, do not work together in such a way that they simply sum their realities; but the activity of each is so peculiar that they cannot be added together at all. While the efficient cause alone is an activity in the proper sense, the influence of matter as such consists in a certain surrender to the efficient cause, in a pliancy and suitability for the reception of the form. What the co-operating matter lacks of these properties must, if an equally perfect work is to be produced, be supplied by the force of the efficient cause. The efficient cause must therefore unfold so many times more force as the matter is more unsuited for the work to be produced; or in other words: the force of the efficient cause, with equally perfect effect, stands in inverse ratio to the suitability of the matter. If the latter is unsuited in an infinite degree, the efficient cause must exert an infinite power. Matter reaches the greatest unfitness when it vanishes. Therefore the efficient cause which produces a work without matter must unfold an infinite force. Therefore the creative force requires the omnipotence of God.

The same thought can also be expressed with St. Thomas, putting for matter and form the more general determinations, potency and act: In the actualizing of a potency so much the greater power is required, the greater the distance between the potency and the actuality to be produced. In the act of creating, *(p. 179)* the potentiality to be actualized, nothing as potentiality, has an infinite distance from the actual being to be produced. Therefore an infinite force is necessary to carry out this actualization.

Against this two difficulties arise, which, however, come back to a single one.

1° The distance between nothing and finite being is not an infinite but a finite one, namely as great as the finite reality produced itself is (Scotus). Moreover, it is farther from nothing to the infinite than from nothing to the finite, and therefore the latter distance is not so great that no greater could be thought.

Then 2° nothing is not infinitely unfit for the production of a work, since there is a greater unfitness, namely that which a matter at hand has with positively contrary properties, which put obstacles in the way of the efficient cause, or form a positive opposition to the properties of the being to be produced. For then these must first be removed before one even comes to the standpoint of nothing.

The 1st objection we have already forestalled by the fact that we did not claim in the proof the absolute distance between nothing and finite being, but (in the 2nd argument) the distance between nothing as potency and the actual being to be effected with its help. The potentiality of nothing, however, is = 0, i.e., infinitely small. To be sure, in absolute distance it is farther from nothing to the infinite than from nothing to the finite, but not with respect to the fitness of the latter, since the infinite cannot be a reality to be produced. For the rest, one infinite too can be greater than another in a determinate respect. In the 1st argument we set up no proportion between nothing and being, but between the fitness of nothing and the fitness of a reality, and this

ratio is obviously not a finite one.

This can be shown quite exactly mathematically; and we can the less dispense with this mathematical consideration, as it shows with how little right Scotus holds the foregoing demonstration of St. Thomas to be inconclusive.

As was said, cause and matter do not work together as summands, but, as common usage already shows and mathematics proves more exactly, as factors toward the common work as product. The effect is therefore to be represented, if v designates the efficient *(p. 180)* cause and m the matter, by $m \cdot v$ and not by $m + v$. If the latter were the case, m could become = 0 and there would still remain a reality = v as effect; but since the effect $w = m \cdot v$, then, when m becomes = 0, v must become = ∞, in order that w still remain a finite quantity. How correct this conclusion is can be seen from the fact that, when v, the cause, becomes = 0, a finite w remains only when m is set = ∞, i.e., not when the matter is infinitely great, but when it has an infinite suitability for the production of the work. But matter is suited in an infinite degree for a work when this is already finished, when the potentiality has approached the act to a vanishing distance, when the actuality is already there, in which case, to be sure, a producing cause has nothing more to do.

One can express this still more exactly as follows. There is a twofold ratio: an arithmetical one, which states by how many units one quantity is greater than another (difference), and a so-called geometrical one, which expresses how many times one magnitude exceeds the other (quotient). Since, now, as was said, efficient and material cause do not constitute the effect as units of the same kind to be added, one cannot say that the one must increase by as many units as the other decreases, and conversely, but that so many times greater power must be exercised as the matter becomes more unfit. If, therefore, we bring these relations into an equation (proportion), we must, if v, v' designate two different forces, m and m' the corresponding matters which they alter, set up the (geometrical) proportion $v/v' = m'/m$, but not $v - v' = m' - m$; and consequently $v \cdot m = v' \cdot m'$, not $v + m = m' + v'$. If now m' decreases until it becomes = 0, then, in order that $v' \cdot m' = v' \cdot 0$ remain equal to the finite vm, v' must be taken = ∞; for only ∞ . 0 is equal to a finite quantity.

That mv or $m'v'$ can in fact be set as expression of the reality to be produced can be proved thus. The proportion $v/v' = m'/m$ holds only when there is question of the same effect to be produced. But if one has effects of different perfection (w, w'), the proportions hold: The effects are related in their perfection, with equal efficient causes, as the matters (with respect to fitness), and with equally fit matters, as their efficient causes. Let one now take a third effect w'', on which a cause acts which is equal to the force of the first effect, thus = v, and which is produced from a matter which is as fit as that of the second effect (w'), thus = m'.

Thus w has the force v and the matter m;

w' has the force v' and the matter m';

w'' has the force v and the matter m'.

(p. 181) Therefore the proportions hold:

$w/w'' = m/m'$, since both have equal forces;

$w''/w' = v/v'$, since both have equal matters.

If one multiplies both equations by one another, whereby again a correct equation must result, one has:

$(w \cdot w'')/(w' \cdot w'') = (m \cdot v)/(m' \cdot v')$;

therefore $w/w' = (m \cdot v)/(m' \cdot v')$.

Now let m' designate that degree of fitness of matter which is in nature actually the least, and let it be set as unit of fitness; likewise let v' designate the least force in the actual world and be taken as unit of force. Then we have

$w/w' = (m \cdot v)/(1 \cdot 1) = m \cdot v$, or

$w = (m \cdot v)\, w'$, where w' now designates the least effect, the unit of effect, and w, any effect whatever, is expressed by $m \cdot v$ units of effect. Therefore $w = m \cdot v$ units of effect.

If matter and force are compared with respect to the same effect, i.e., if $w = w'$, then also

$mv = m'v'$,

or $m/m' = v'/v$, as above.

It is here, to be sure, assumed that the geometrical ratio between force and matter is a simple one, and yet it is not excluded by the above remarks that it is more complicated, that, e.g., the forces grow with the unfitness of the matter in the square, in the cube, in the logarithm, with the root, so that, e.g., the proportion would run

$m/m' = v'^x/v^x$

or $m/m' = \log v'/\log v$, etc.;

in general $m/m' = f(v')/f(v)$,

where $f(v)$, $f(v')$ designate a function of v, v'.

But this does no damage to the full validity of the proof, since then with respect to $m \cdot f(v) = m'\, f(v')$ one concludes just as with respect to $m \cdot v = m' \cdot v'$.

With this the 2nd objection too is already removed, which denies the infinity of the unfitness of matter on the ground that a matter with contrary properties is more unfit than no matter. For it has resulted that, when the fitness of matter is set = 0, *(p. 182)* the force must be infinite; therefore it can matter little to us whether there is a still more unfit matter or not; at most it could then be concluded from this that a still greater force is required than the creative, in order to work upon such a matter; but in any case the creative must be infinite. To be sure, there can be nothing which would be greater than the infinite; but that is true only insofar as it is infinite; insofar, however, as it is finite, it can decrease and increase. No one, surely, can deny that the infinite creative force must be greater when it is directed to an angel than when it is directed to an atom.

Accordingly we have no hesitation in declaring a positively contrary matter, under certain circumstances, more unfit than nothing, indeed infinitely more unfit, so that a new creative power is required in order merely to come to the standpoint of nothing. For if there is an inner impossibility that the contrary properties pass over into those to be attained, then creative power is first required to annihilate it, and only then can the creative activity begin anew in order to posit the desired reality.

But it always remains true that the greatest unfitness belongs to nothing in and of itself, because with nothing precisely nothing at all can be done, because it offers no point of attack at all, whereas the contrary matter can after all be worked upon, and so a beginning can after all be made toward the work to be attained. In other words: The overcoming of difficulties effects merely a relative unfitness; nothing is by its nature absolutely unfit.

2. Since creating is essentially production *ex nihilo sui et subjecti*, only substances can be the object of creation. Accidents, which according to their concept exist in another as subject, also come to be, according to this their essence, in another, the substance. Therefore they are also produced only in the substance with the help of the subject bearing them, which is precisely called production *ex subjecto* [out of a subject]. Likewise incomplete substances too, substantial forms, which exist and come to be only in matter, arise only in, with and out of matter; they too, therefore, are produced out of matter, not created.

Now, however, every finite being has only an accidental activity. A being whose activity is identical with its substance has its existence too coinciding with its essence; its essence is existence, is absolutely necessary being, God. All finite beings must therefore unfold accidental activities in acting. But through accidental

activity no substance can be produced. For the accident must necessarily inhere in a subject. As long, now, as the accident inheres in the active subject, it still has its bearer; but as soon as it is to posit something outside *(p. 183)* it, there must above all be a subject there which receives and bears the activity. But what is made with the help of a bearing, receiving subject comes to be *ex materia* [out of matter], and thus is not created.

Against this it cannot be objected that not the efficient accident is posited outward, but its effect; but the effect need not necessarily be an accident, since, e.g., substantial forms are produced through generation, thus through accidental activity, or at least can be so produced.

This objection is without significance because evidently the effect of an accident cannot be more perfect than the accident itself, if it is to be its adequate cause, and thus to create without matter. One can indeed say that the accident does not produce the effect by itself alone, but the substance through the accident, and many perfections of the substance are found again in the accident. But being-in-itself cannot possibly be in the accident, and thus this perfection cannot be communicated to the activity. But the activity is also not a mere instrumental cause, which would produce only under the direction and motion of the substance as principal cause; but the activity as such is the principal adequate cause, and can therefore of itself produce only something accidental, not something substantial. But it does not do this either in the production of substantial forms; for if it generates them with matter and in matter and out of matter, then the adequate cause is an accident (the activity) and a substantial principle, matter. But it is quite possible that an incomplete substance be generated through the co-operation of activity and incomplete substance, but impossible that an accidental activity be the adequate cause of a substance. Therefore only the Infinite, whose activity is his substance, can produce substances, i.e., create.

3. We have presupposed in the previous proof that the activity which is to produce an external work must be a transitive action going outward; but now perhaps an immanent activity (which is directed to the agent as its perfection and remains in it) could produce that external effect, as indeed creation cannot be thought otherwise than as a mere: God wills it, and it is.

(p. 184) But even if creating in itself can only be immanent activity, still it must be equivalent to a transitive activity, since it is to effect something external; and therefore our 2nd argument remains fully in force. But the activity too, considered in itself and thought as an act of will, excludes the possibility of creating from the power of a finite being.

a) It appears purely impossible that an immanent activity, if it is finite, should be of equal value with one going outward; only an infinite will, which must include all perfections in equivalent fashion, lets us grasp the possibility that its immanent activity is virtually transitive in it.

b) A being which acts by mere willing is in fact almighty. For if its willing suffices for acting, its producing extends to everything which it can will. But its willing is infinite, since it can extend both to infinitely many beings and to beings so perfect that they have a limit only in the infinite. It can therefore also produce infinitely much and perfect without end, and must therefore possess an infinite power.

One cannot say that it finds a limit of its power in its own perfection, insofar as according to the principle of causality it could produce nothing more perfect than it itself is.

For α) even if it could produce only beings as perfect as or more imperfect than itself, even these are possible in infinite number and gradation and can be willed. It would therefore be able to produce infinitely much, and would therefore have infinite power.

β) This limit is inadmissible because the willing of a more perfect being requires no more power than that of an imperfect one, but rather still less, because the more perfect, as the better, exercises more power of attraction. If, therefore, willing suffices for something to be, its power must extend to everything possible.

Therefore γ) the principle of causality adduced is a new reason against the finitude of the creative will. If a finite being could create by mere willing, then the creatures which stand above it, and which it could nevertheless will and thus create, would be more perfect than their cause; and this absurdity would recur as many times as there are beings above it, namely infinitely many times.

(p. 185)

II. A creature cannot serve even as an instrument of creation.

From what has been said it is immediately certain only that no creature can create as *causa principalis* [principal cause]. But a further consideration shows that the activity of a finite being as instrument of creation is also excluded.

According to the definition which St. Thomas gives of the *causa instrumentalis* [instrumental cause], the matter is very clear. For if the instrument only disposes the subject for the activity of the principal cause, then the creative activity, which excludes an existing subject, can admit absolutely no instrument.

Since, however, this conception of the instrument is held by some to be too narrow, we will use only those moments in the concept of instrument which are altogether indisputable: that it

1° does not posit the whole causality in the production of the effect, but the principal cause at least co-operates;

2° that it acts in physical dependence (for we speak here of physical, not of moral causes) on the principal cause. The first moment can be the less objected to, since in our case the creature, if it exercised the whole causality alone, would have to unfold an infinite force, as was shown.

1. Should a creature be an instrument of creation, it would have to exercise a part of the creative power; but this is in itself an infinite power; and the infinite cannot be divided.

2. In fact, God as principal cause unfolds either an infinite force or a finite one. If it is infinite, then it alone suffices to produce the effect, and no room remains for the activity of the instrument. But if it is finite, it cannot become infinite through the addition of a finite force of the creature.

3. But if one seeks to withdraw from these reasons by seeking to determine the relation of the principal cause to the instrument not by their union in the causality itself, but in the effect, we argue thus: Either the activity of the instrument goes to the whole effect or to a part of it. If it goes to the whole effect, it is no instrumental cause, but a created principal cause; for precisely in this lies the peculiarity of the activity of creatures, that they produce the whole effect in physical dependence on the concurrence of the *causa prima* [first cause]. But *(p. 186)* a part of the effect the creature cannot produce, since substantial being, the existing especially of simple substances, admits of no division.

4. We can sum everything up thus: Either the instrumental cause produces the whole creature out of nothing, or a part; and in both cases it exercises either the whole causality alone, or only a part of it.

If the former, it would be a principal cause; for that it acts only in dependence on God makes it indeed a *causa secunda* [secondary cause], but not a *causa instrumentalis*. In the second case the existing even of simple substances would have to be divided, which is absurd.

If the whole causality proceeded from the instrument, then it would 1° be no instrument, and 2° would have to unfold an infinite causality. If it exercises only a part of the causality, then the infinite creative power would be divided into two finite parts, which is impossible; or if the divine share remains infinite, it makes the finite share of the instrument superfluous.

§ 2. The Glory of God is the End of Creation.

The end or purpose is that for the sake of which something is willed. It has, therefore, a relation to the one willing, whom it determines to will, and is in this respect final cause; and a relation to the means which is willed for its sake, which is directed to it; and in this sense it is called end in the proper sense of the word.

Now, even if no shadow of causality can act upon the absolute will, still it is essential to every will to be stimulated, determined to will, by a good, and to direct its working to an end. God's will, too, which is indeed true will, must therefore be thought as determined to will by a good; but not contingently, changeably, by a finite good; rather, his infinite goodness is the object by which he is unchangeably determined to will everything that he wills. He must also direct his working to a good, but, in accordance with his holiness, to the highest.

1. If, therefore, God wills to create the world, he is determined and moved to it by his goodness. His goodness is accordingly the end to *(p. 187)* which he must refer creation. Now the end set before one is in general either first to be produced through the willing and working (*finis efficiendus* [end to be effected]), or already there and only to be attained. Since, now, God's goodness neither needs first to come to be nor can be increased, it can be set before creation only as *finis obtinendus* [end to be obtained]. For himself, however, he cannot will first to attain his goodness through creation, since he possesses it in absolute simplicity, or rather is it himself; to creatures, therefore, the attainment, the possession of God's goodness must be set as end. This, however, can be no physical taking possession, but only an ideal having of the highest good.

But how can finite beings have the infinite in themselves? a) The lowest stage of this ideal having-in-oneself is the essential likeness of the creature to the divine essence (goodness). Therefore God must above all destine things in their being to the representation of his goodness. A higher stage of likeness to God lies in development to higher perfection by means of the activity of creatures.

This objective representation of God's goodness, however, is the external glory, the objective glorification of God. Therefore he must destine all creatures to his glorification.

b) In a more proper and more real sense, but always in ideal fashion, the goodness of God is attained by rational creatures. For besides the fact that they too represent God's goodness in objective fashion, through their spiritual being and doing, more perfectly than irrational nature, they can through knowledge and love really take up and grasp the highest good in themselves. But in the acknowledgment and love of the highest good consists the formal glory of God. Therefore God had to create spirits in a special way for his glory.

c) The human spirit gains the knowledge and love of God from creatures; the objective glory of God which they bear in themselves becomes formal through its acknowledgment on the part of the human spirit. Man also needs irrational nature as the general material substratum for all spiritual activity. Thus the whole world serves the formal glorification of God by spirits, which in this sense are the subordinate end of the world; and the whole world is directed to the glorification of God as last end.

(p. 188) 2. When we said just now that God's goodness is not the purpose of his activity in such a way that he could attain it for himself, this does not exclude that he can and must intend a *bonum sibi* [good for himself]. For it is essential to the intelligent cause, which acts according to purposes, to intend not merely a good in general, but an object which is good for itself. Since, therefore, God's goodness, which alone can be God's purpose and motive, can neither first be produced nor increased nor first attained through his creating, the external representation, the communication of it to beings outside him, must be the end of creation. The representation of the divine perfection, of the inner glory and greatness of God, by creatures, however, is the glorification of God.

The communication naturally cannot be understood pantheistically, as if God's being became the being of creatures, but, according to the nature of the case, thus: that the God-like creatures let God's inner glory, goodness, wisdom, power, beauty shine forth in their being and doing, and at a higher stage take him up into

themselves in love and knowledge. This, however, is the external glory of God.

One could indeed object against this that it is surely impossible that one thing be God's motive and intended purpose, and another the purpose actually attained by God; for then one would have to say that God intends something which he does not attain. But now his inner goodness moves him, and he intends his inner glory, but attains merely the very slight degree of external glory which the world can show him.

To be sure, God can attain only finite glory through creation, and this too he intends; but he intends it as his good; it is for him only a means over against the proper last end, which is his inner goodness; or more exactly: the external glory and his inner goodness are the one complex good which he wills, the former as *finis qui* [the end which], the latter as *finis cui* [the end for whom]. If, now, his external glory in fact changes nothing in his inner goodness, it nevertheless is and remains a good of God, and as a good of God of infinite value it moves his will, is the object of his intention.

3. The knowledge and love of God constitute not merely the formal glory of God, but also the last end and the beatitude of rational creatures.[1] As the natural striving implanted by the Creator *(p. 189)* and the natural constitution of reason and will show, they can find the rest of their striving only in the highest good. If, therefore, the Creator is not to contradict himself, he must have destined them to the beatifying knowledge and love of the infinite good. Now, however, this knowledge and love, as beatitude of creatures, is a good of infinitely less value than the same acts insofar as they are glorification of God; in the former relation they are precisely a good of creatures, in the latter a good of God.

Since, now, God esteems and wills every good according to its true value, he intends in the knowledge and love of creatures toward him his glory more than the beatitude of creatures.

4. The wise man must set before his works the highest end which they are by their nature enabled to attain; for wisdom practises no waste in the application of means to the attainment of its purposes; in any case the wise author of a work may give it no other destination than that which its nature demands. For the nature of a being is precisely a determinate sum of forces for attaining a determinate end; we mostly have no other means of knowing the end of a being than to investigate its natural endowments.

Now, however, creatures are in their innermost essence images and representations of the divine essence, and as effects of God essentially manifestations of the goodness, wisdom, power, greatness and beauty of God; and thus their highest development is the highest degree of the (objective) glorification of God possible to a nature. In particular the final perfection of spirits, most perfect knowledge of the highest truth and most perfect love of the infinite good, is the formal glory of God, and as such a higher good than their own perfection. Therefore they must be ordered by God to the glory of God as the highest end attainable by their nature.

5. Against our determination of the end of creation a not insignificant difficulty seems to arise from the personality and independence of rational beings. Persons can never be treated as means; it is an essential right for them to determine their end for themselves, and to make irrational nature serviceable to themselves as means. But if God's glory is their end, then God treats them as means, which can be as little permitted to the author of the moral law as to any other moral being.

(p. 190) Further, if God willed creatures only on account of his goodness, his love toward rational beings would be no disinterested love of friendship, but he would love in them only himself, would seek only to attain his glory through them; his love would be most self-interested and selfish.

God does not treat rational creatures as means; for it is proper to the means as such to serve the purpose wholly and entirely without regard to its own welfare; even if its annihilation is required for the attainment of the purpose, it can be deprived of its existence. But God wills so to attain his glory through spirits that they themselves thereby become perfect and blessed. For their highest happiness is his highest glory, and

conversely. If in this he must have his glory in view more than the welfare of creatures, this is simply demanded by the nature of things, against which God may not act. Then, too, he does not use them for his glory as one uses a means; but he wills only that they themselves strive after it, and with free choice, and so set their end before themselves. For that creatures should set themselves any end they please quite independently of God cannot belong to them in spite of their personality. At most those could be regarded as means in the hand of God who will not strive freely after God as their end, and therefore through their punishment bring God's justice, power and wisdom to representation, and so must glorify God against their will. But not God, but they themselves have thrown away their personality, by subordinating themselves, contrary to nature, not to their true end, the only one worthy of spirit, but to a created good.

To be sure, God wills that irrational creation serve man as its proximate end; but neither it nor he himself is his own property, but the essential and substantial and inalienable property of God, the author of both. But property can be destined, and destine itself, only in subordination to its master and only for its master.

But if God wills and loves creatures on account of his goodness, this is not identical with the other proposition: He loves himself in creatures. One must well distinguish the motive of love from the object of love, even if they frequently coincide. To be sure, God can be determined to love toward creatures only by his infinite goodness; but on that account *(p. 191)* they and their goodness are really and truly the object of his love; for they actually have that intimate relation to infinite goodness by virtue of which they are both good and lovable in themselves, and can be loved on account of the infinite goodness.

It is with the divine love toward creatures quite similar to what it is with knowledge.

God does not know creatures in them, as if they acted determiningly on his knowing as on ours; but he knows them in the being which they have, determined through his essence, through which alone they are knowable for him. And as, therefore, his knowledge of creatures is not more imperfect but infinitely clearer, so too the love of God toward creatures, because it is stimulated by the goodness of God reflected in them, is not less but infinitely more intimate and tender than if it were determined by the very limited lovableness which creatures have considered absolutely in themselves. Our love too, which loves our fellow man only for God's sake, is, as the example of the saints shows, far stronger and more ready for sacrifice than the love which stops at his human excellences.

But the love of God is also the most disinterested of all, since it only bestows good on creatures without itself receiving anything real for itself. That he can love and do good only with regard to his infinite goodness follows from the unchangeable nature of things, against which the will of God cannot and may not act.

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[1] *Ethik*, p. 3 ff.

§ 3. The Conservation of Creatures.

I. Explanation. Difference of Conservation from Creation.

1. One distinguishes a twofold conserving: an indirect or negative one, which keeps off influences harmful to a being, and a direct or positive one, which holds and bears the being in its being. Thus nourishment conserves life directly and positively; clothing and dwelling, indirectly and negatively. Imperishable substances, such as spirits and primordial atoms, can be conserved by creatures neither positively nor negatively, but must always be borne positively in their existence by God.

(p. 192) Perishable beings, such as composite bodies, must in many ways be conserved negatively, so that they are not destroyed by stronger forces; this conservation natural forces can exercise, which, however, herein stand in the service of the providence of God, which created all things for one another and leads them all to their end, even when they are applied immediately by created intelligent beings as means of protection.

But positive conservation too providence carries out in many cases through created forces, as when, e.g., it conserves the life proper to the plant through heat, air, water and other substances. But the being so conserved, together with the forces conserving it, and even imperishable beings, still need positive conservation by God.

2. Everything created namely depends wholly and entirely in its innermost being on God, and needs for its continuance the same creative influence which first put it into existence. God must exercise not a merely momentary influence, but a steadily continued one, in order that created being may not merely begin but last. Very significantly, therefore, the conservation of all being proper to God is called a continued creation; which, to be sure, must not be so misunderstood as if God repeated the creative act at every moment after being had sunk back again into nothing. Such a conception of conservation as continued creation is no less senseless than it contradicts the facts. It is senseless, since it imputes useless activity to the all-wise and lets it work by innumerable acts what it can attain just as well or still better by one act. I say: by one act it is better able to conserve being than by the innumerable ones which correspond to the individual moments of duration; but properly this kind of conservation is impossible. For continuous duration cannot be resolved into indivisible moments, and if it is thought resolved into such, their number can be no finite one.

3. If God's creative activity set in at distinct parts of the creature's duration, these acts would have to be repeated not by moments, but by (smaller) still extended particles of time. But then, by virtue of one act of God, the creature can exist not merely for a moment, but for a while. But if creation can conserve existence for even the shortest particle of time, it is able for the same reason to do so beyond the longest time. In other words: Since in continuous magnitude, as in *(p. 193)* time, there are in and of themselves no actually distinct parts, but they must be distinguished by an external cause, the repeated setting-in of God would depend either on his will or on the neediness of the creature, which could hold itself alone precisely only so long and not longer. If the terms of the creation to be repeated depended on God's free will, he would have to be accused of the greatest folly if, without any reason, he produced several times over the duration which he could posit at once.

But the neediness of the creature cannot be the reason for the repetition of the creative act and for the division of its duration into smaller periods; for if it can hold itself by virtue of God's creative will for 1 second, it can just as well last 2, 3, 10, etc. Obviously every duration which one concedes to it is assumed purely arbitrarily, plucked completely out of the air; only if one thinks duration as composed of infinitely many indivisible moments does one have a no longer arbitrary point of reference for the division of time and for the necessity of the repetition of the Creator's intervention. But then God himself, in order to produce the smallest finite duration, must create infinitely many times. But in finite time an act can be posited infinitely many times only if the repetition happens with infinite speed. But acts which follow one another with infinite speed are in fact a single uninterrupted, a lasting act. And so it is clear *a priori* that conservation can be thought as continued creation only in such a way that it is conceived not as repetition, but as the steady influence of the creative will.

4. But the facts too do not permit conservation to be conceived as "repeated" creation. For experience proves that things do not continually sink back into their nothing and continually emerge from it, but have a steady, coherent existence. I grant that we cannot observe the continuity of duration with our external senses. If the short particles of existence followed one another rapidly, we could as little observe their interruption as we can perceive with our coarse senses the atomistic division of matter, or the rapid vibrations of sound and ether individually. But our self-consciousness shows us clearly that we last, do not sink back into nothing in order to emerge from it again. Here a deception is impossible, because existence and *(p. 194)* consciousness are inseparable. If we were not for even one moment, consciousness too would have to vanish in this moment. We could also not remember our earlier being, in any case could not acknowledge earlier being as ours, since in truth we would no longer be those whom we were before the annihilation.

5. Conservation, therefore, can in no way be thought as repeated creation; in any case the conservation which we intend to assert and prove is not to be thought so. How it is to be conceived, however, will be set in clearer light by the proofs themselves. But already now it is clear that conservation, which effects duration, must be related to creation, which posits the beginning of being, as the continuation of being to its beginning; and that thus both acts are conceptually so different that the creative act includes an essential relation to the beginning of existence, the conserving activity to its continuation. Whether they are really distinct from one another will appear afterwards.

II. Creatures require the continued conservation of God.

1. In order to remain independent of the disputed question whether the continuation of continuous extension is really distinct from its beginning, we put our argumentation in the following dilemma. Either the existence of the 2nd, 3rd, 4th, etc. moment is really distinct from the created existence of the 1st moment, or not. If it is not really distinct, but exactly the same existence, then it is produced creatively in exactly the same way as that of the 1st moment. The existences of all following moments are then only one existence, really identical with that of the 1st moment, and are thus subject to God's creative influence with just as much metaphysical necessity as they are identical with that one, and that one subsists only through creation.

But if the existence of the 2nd and following moments is really distinct from that of the 1st, then, since it too is contingent and thus produced existence, it also needs a new causality, really distinct from the creative causality of the 1st moment. Mark well: I do not say a new cause, but a new causal influence, which is not given with the creative one essentially directed to the 1st moment. This causality, however, can be no other than that which also posited the first moment. For even if *(p. 195)* numerically distinct from the 1st existence, the 2nd existence nevertheless has exactly the same perfection, is specifically exactly the same reality as that of the beginning, especially since, if one assumes real distinction, i.e., interruption in existence, it must begin anew.

At most one could say: When the being once exists, it is easier to continue its existence than to let it begin wholly out of nothing; indeed, when the being once exists, there is no reason at all why it should cease; one would rather have to demand a positive cause in order to comprehend its perishing.

This misgiving would be well founded if the existence of the 1st moment exercised a real influence on that of the 2nd, if this had a real connection with the 1st. Now, however, by supposition there exists no real connection at all between the individual moments, since they are different realities; their whole connection is an external one, that of chronological sequence, which includes not the least causality, neither a material nor an efficient nor any other. As certainly, therefore, as every new effect demands a new causal influence, so certainly there is need of no reason that the existence of the following moments, which is supposed to be really distinct from the beginning, should pass away, but there is need of one that it should remain in existence.

One could object against this dilemma that its first member is not admissible at all, and that instead another, which contains the truth, has been left out. For if the whole duration of existence is an undivided reality, then God needs only to posit the beginning, and the one existence unrolls of itself, in such a way indeed that God himself cannot divide it into several, in any case cannot let it cease without positive destruction. But the truth in fact lies in the middle between the two members given in the dilemma. Continuous magnitude has indeed no actual physical parts, but it has potential ones. Of itself it gives no point of reference for thinking it composed of 2, 3, 4, etc.; but it lies in its essence that it can be decomposed by an external cause into any number of parts really distinct from one another. Therefore the Creator can divide and break off the duration of the creature at pleasure.

From this it would always follow that the actually one existence of the creature is borne during its whole duration by an uninterrupted influence of God. But that duration is not given with the beginning, and

consequently that the interruption of duration demands no positive act of destruction but only a ceasing of the creative activity, follows precisely from the necessity of the steady influence of the Creator demonstrated in the dilemma; for the adequate disjunction of the dilemma cannot be contested, since certainly no middle is possible between real and not real distinction. The true state of affairs, therefore, is this: that the existence which stands under the creative influence of God, *(p. 196)* in itself one, lasts, according to the alteration of this external influence, either only a moment, or some time, or eternally.

2. One can also set forth the above dilemma somewhat differently. Either existence simply, as it already exercises itself in one moment, thus already in the beginning, is less reality than a continued existence, or it is an equally great perfection, and is distinct from it only by an external relation of time. In the first case, then, continued existence, as more reality produced, also needs more causality; and indeed, according as 2, 3, 4, etc. particles of time contain the first reality 2 times, 3 times, 4 times, etc., the causality of the 1st period of time, namely the creative deed, must also be posited 2, 3, 4 times. But since no interruption takes place in duration, the creative influence too must work steadily as long as the creature exists, i.e., it must be sustained by God.

But if continued existence is distinct from beginning, momentary existence only by external relation, not really in itself, then it is posited by the Creator exactly as the beginning existence is, as long as it exists.

3. One could object against the foregoing: Between the existence of the first and the existence of the following moments there is, as Suarez thinks, neither a merely conceptual distinction nor yet a real one such as there is between *res* and *res* [thing and thing], but a modal one, such as there is between a *res* and its *modus* (*distinctio modalis* [modal distinction]). In the second moment, therefore, there is not exactly the same reality as in the first; but the continuation is a modal accident, which can proceed from the existing substance.

But it remains that the existence of the substance in the second moment is the same as in the first, and here receives something in addition. Whether this new element can proceed from the substance itself may be left undecided; but the substance itself must after all first have its being before it can exercise it. But it has this in the first moment from the Creator, and therefore in the second too, where the being indeed remains the same.

4. It might seem as if, according to our conception, the activity of God were less efficacious than that of creatures, which not seldom so consolidate their effect that they no longer need to hold it further. But if one looks rightly, one will find that the quite peculiar, incommunicable activity of God shows itself most brightly precisely in this, that it alone can conserve what it has created.

(p. 197) If an effect can be produced only by a determinate cause, as the created substance by God, it is able to continue to exist without the influence of that cause only if the subject which undergoes the influence can either make the effected being its own, hold it fast, or if the cause permanently communicates to it the principle by which it effected the being. With respect to God’s creative influence, however, neither is the case. Not the latter, because the principle of creation, God’s omnipotence, cannot be communicated to any creature. The subject which receives the effect is here nothing; but nothing can hold fast nothing, appropriate nothing to itself. The same holds of the metaphysical essence, of which one can say that it receives being in creation; for it too can as little hold anything fast, appropriate anything, as nothing, since in the order of actuality it is not distinct from nothing. Its efficacy in the metaphysical order is indeed very strong; it demands with necessity its constitutives, relations, properties; but as a contingent essence it can demand no being with such energy; it is, whether it have it or not have it, quite indifferent to it, and so cannot hold it fast, cannot appropriate it. But neither can the actualized essence, i.e., created being, be that subject which would appropriate and hold fast the received being. For this being is precisely that which is to be held fast; it cannot, therefore, be assumed as that which holds fast. And so nothing is and remains the subject which receives being, not the produced being. The produced being can indeed still undergo very efficacious influences from

God and hold them fast, but these are not creative ones; for these necessarily have nothing as subject, or, to speak without image, necessarily presuppose that nothing is there which receives the activity. In this case, therefore, neither is being held fast, nor does nothing appropriate it.

To be sure, the accidental effects of creatures are able to continue even when the efficient cause ceases, since they are always directed to an existing subject, which receives them and holds them according to its essential determination, and under certain circumstances holds them fast permanently. But through creation substances are posited, which essentially can be received and held fast in no subject. They are, of course, able according to their essence to exist in themselves; *(p. 198)* but precisely on account of their being-in-themselves they are thrown upon themselves, set, as it were, on their own feet, made independent of every natural causality; that a quite different influence of the first cause is required for this than for permanently conserving an accidental effect, in which natural causes can relieve the first cause, is obvious.

5. St. Thomas[1] sets up generally the proposition that a lasting influence of the cause on the lasting effect must take place if the cause is not merely cause of its becoming, but also of its being. Now through creation existing is not merely initiated, but produced; therefore the creative power must act lastingly on the being of the creature. On the other hand, if the effect continues after the activity of the cause has ceased, the cause is not cause of being, but only of becoming.

The truth of the major premise follows from the total dependence of produced being. Never and nowhere does a produced being have its existence of itself, but only from another; and indeed it has at every moment exactly as much being as it just receives; if its cause effects only its becoming, it just begins to exist; if it is to last, other causes must enter, unless the first extends its influence beyond becoming to finished existing.

Creation, however, can extend not to becoming, but only to finished being. For creation taken passively, being created, is no becoming, no change in which one could distinguish particles of time (distinct from the beginning), succession and gradual preparation for being; but it must be accomplished in an indivisible moment; for between nothing and substantial being to be created there is no intermediate being which could serve as transition; in this moment the creature is not yet, in the following one it is. Therefore the efficacy of the creating cause is directed not to becoming but to being. If one now adds that substantial being, insofar as it is from God, is at every moment of its existence altogether one and unchangeable, then the author of being must also be cause of the duration of being.

6. Suarez[2] gives the cited principle of St. Thomas a somewhat different turn, saying: If an effect so necessarily demands a determinate cause that it can be replaced by no other, then this cause must conserve the effect during its whole duration. Now in creation God can be replaced by no other cause. Therefore he must conserve his effects permanently with his creative power. Naturally this reason proves only on the presupposition that the effect which is posited through creation remains essentially, and consequently at all times, dependent in being and in need of the creative influence; this, however, follows, as we saw, from the complete identity of substantial being in the first and in the following moments.

(p. 199) 7. To what has been said the authority of very significant thinkers is opposed, an Aureolus, Henry of Ghent and others, who assert that the conserving activity is distinct from the creating. And it seems evident that even a quite different being could take over conservation from that which produces the being.

To this it is to be replied that such a relieving of causes can take place only where there are parts in being, as on the way to being, in becoming; and even there the relieving is only apparent; in truth the activity of the different causes is directed to the production of different, successive realities; no wonder that the activities themselves are different. But if there is question of a being lasting unchanged, such as is posited by creation, it cannot be produced by different causes relieving one another. For several causes really distinct from one another and following one another in time must also have several causal activities; but such activities, which develop a true causality, must necessarily also produce several successive effects really distinct from one

another. Therefore the entry of a conserving cause in place of the producing one could be thought only thus: that the first effect (being in the 1st moment) passes away again, and a second causality produces being in the 2nd moment. In this process we would have no conservation of a being once produced, but continual new creation of a being ever again annihilated, in which creative conservation, as was already shown, does not consist. But with such a conception of conservation a special reason besides speaks for the impossibility of the entry of a new cause after the creating of the first, and this is the exclusiveness with which creative power belongs to God.

With the same right and with the same necessity with which conservation is separated from the first production, one can and must also assume real distinctions in conservation itself, and indeed as many as there are indivisible moments to be pointed out in the duration of the conserved being, namely infinitely many. But that is an absurdity which even the opponents of the non-distinction of creation and conservation do not accept.

The major premise is evident. For between the moments following on the 1st moment of existence there is no closer connection with one another than that of the 2nd moment with the 1st. If, therefore, the existence of the 2nd moment admits or demands a causal activity which is really distinct from that for the 1st moment, then the existence of the 3rd moment again demands a new causal activity, or at least admits it. But with this we have not *(p. 200)* a steady conservation, but, because infinitely many moments can be pointed out in every particle of time, infinitely many conservations in the smallest duration. Will our opponents grant this? Certainly not.

But mark well that, according to the view which we are combating, the decomposition of duration into infinitely many indivisible existences, and with it the decomposition of the one conservation into infinitely many conservations, would have to be thought as completely carried out. For according to them creation goes only to the beginning of existence and thus lasts only a moment. The 2nd moment, therefore, according to them already demands a new activity. Between the beginning of existence and its next continuation the gulf is certainly not wider than between the beginning of the continuation and its continuation, and thus not wider than between all parts of duration. Consequently it is precisely so too with the causality in creation and that in conservation. In fact, if by virtue of creation existence can not merely begin but also last for even the smallest time, then at least for this time conservation is not distinct from creation, and the generally asserted proposition, that conservation must be distinct from production, is false; and it is more than arbitrariness to assert that creation can let existence last 1 second, but not 3 seconds, 5 minutes.

Therefore one can let creation extend only to the beginning of existence, as one moment. But this beginning moment is connected with the following moments exactly as these are among themselves. These are not produced by activities which would be distinct from one another; therefore the beginning activity, production, is not distinct from the conserving activity either. For only there can and must a new causality be assumed where a new being, really distinct from the earlier, is produced. There is, therefore, absolutely no real distinction between creation and conservation. To express this quite significantly, one says: If the contingent being did not exist through creation, it would enter into existence through conservation. This is quite right if one takes into account the powerful efficacy of conservation, which is indeed identical with the creative efficacy; but it contains the absurdity that conservation takes place where no creation has taken place, that being continues without having begun, that conservation, which conceptually refers only to continued being, should have beginning being as its term.

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[1] *S. th.* p. 1 q. 104 a. 1.

[2] *Metaphys. disput.* 21 s. 1 n. 7 sqq.

§ 4. The Concurrence of God.

I. Explanation of the Concept.

1. As causality is twofold, a physical and a moral one,[1] so two or more beings can unite either the one or the other with one another, the one *(p. 201)* work together with the other; or more exactly, moral causality is always only a moral co-operating with a physical cause; it does not produce the effect immediately through physical influence or co-influence upon it, but determines, through requests, representations, commands, etc., an (intelligent) moral being to become the physical cause of some effect. Since, however, there lies in this less a co-ordination of two homogeneous causes than rather a subordination of the physically acting cause under the moral one, one speaks here less properly of a concurrence than when two physical causes direct their activity to the same end. When, therefore, the concurrence of God with the actions of creatures is named simply, one understands by it a physical influence which God exercises on the effects of created causes; and this all the more, as the moral influence of God extends only to a determinate class of beings, namely the rational, and not to all their actions, but only to those which he can positively will (command, counsel, etc.), namely the morally good, whereas with the evil ones he does not co-operate morally, but works against them through threats, prohibitions, etc. The physical influence of God, however, extends to all actions, even the evil ones, to all beings, even the irrational and lifeless, and is therefore called the general concurrence of God (*concursus generalis*).

2. It must not seem strange that God lets his concurrence be given to an evil action, and therefore seems to will it, while on the other hand he works against it, and thus does not will it, indeed hates and abhors it. This willing is namely directed to a quite different (formal) object than the not-willing; for in the morally bad action one must distinguish from its malice, which consists in the opposition to the law, the physical reality of the action itself, which is something good. Thus the blow with which the murderer kills his enemy can be carried out physically very powerfully and skilfully, and thus be very good, and could in this respect (e.g., for the soldier) become the material substrate of a meritorious action; and this action God wills, at least it alone he helps to carry out; but the opposition to the law he does not support, but rather abhors it.

If one wished to object against this: If God really abhorred the opposition, he would not help to posit it, as he does by his concurrence; we reply that God by no means *(p. 202)* helps to posit the opposition; it is posited wholly alone by the evil will of man, and for this he needs absolutely no divine assistance; only for the production of a real effect does the creature need a concurrence; but sin is nothing real, but either a mere privation, the lack of agreement of the action with the norm of morality, or, as positively willed opposition to the law, it is always a mere logical, external relation; for the material action, not merely the external but also the internal, remains quite the same, whether it agrees with the law or does not agree.

If one wished to consider the support of an action good in itself, but incidentally wrongly directed through the malice of the creaturely cause, as contrary to the holiness of God, one would thereby declare the permission of sin in general unholy. It will be shown later that this is inadmissible.

3. If, according to the concept and usage of language, there can be talk of concurrence in the strict sense, as was already remarked, only with homogeneous, co-ordinated causes, this applies to the divine concurrence insofar as it unites efficient, physical influences with the corresponding causalities of the creature. The co-ordination, however, is not strictly preserved, since a) the activities on both sides are directed not to different parts lying side by side in the effect, but both exactly to the same whole effect, and therefore b) the influences on both sides can be thought only through subordination to one another. This subordination could now be thought in two ways: either, first, so that God only bestows the forces for a determinate activity, or also stimulates them, but then lets the creature alone carry it out; or, secondly, so that the creature carries out its activity, even after receiving and having stimulated forces, only in dependence on and under the influence of the Creator. We assert the subordination not merely in the former, but also in this latter sense.

4. On account of this subordination of the created cause under the divine, the working together of the two agrees rather with the relation of two non-homogeneous causes, specially of the end with the efficient cause, still more with the union of the principal and the instrumental cause. The two do not exercise their influence on the effect independently side by side; one cannot ascribe one *(p. 203)* part of the effect to the principal cause and another to the instrument; but the activity of both is directed to the whole effect, only that the former carries it out not alone but only with the latter, and the latter in total dependence on the former.

A great difference, to be sure, obtains here: the instrumental cause as such becomes in the hand of the principal a mere means through which the latter acts; but creaturely causes retain their relative independence over against the first; God only helps them, whereas there, conversely, the instrument helps (by serving).

One could therefore rather compare the concurrence of God to a teacher who guides the hand of his pupil in writing; it is not he who is writing, using the hand of the child as an instrument, but the child is to write, guided, of course, and supported by the hand of the master. Still nearer to the concurrence of God might come the bearing, guiding help which the mother gives to the child whom she is teaching to walk. Only God supports and bears our actions not from outside, but in their innermost being.

5. When we ascribe the effect wholly to the concurrence of God as well as to the creaturely activity, this is meant only to signify that no division of the work and of its result takes place; naturally, however, God does not effect the whole with such a totality that the creaturely cause would become superfluous or would do nothing, and conversely.

The causality is really a composite one, but one that interlocks as a unity. The force which God exercises in it is indeed so mighty that, if *per absurdum* [by an absurd supposition] the creature did not co-operate, it would nevertheless produce the effect. But it is precisely absurd that God should exercise a co-operating activity, directed to supporting and bearing the creaturely cause, when such is not present. Through God’s concurrence the creaturely activity does not become superfluous; superfluous for God’s power, to be sure, for he can by himself alone effect everything that he effects through and with creatures; but the creature’s activity is not superfluous for the creature itself, if it is to be and act at all, nor for God’s goodness and wisdom, if he wills to manifest these attributes not merely through his own activity but also through that of his creatures. The proof for the general concurrence of God will, moreover, set its relation to finite working in still clearer light.

(p. 204)

II. Creatures require the concurrence of God in all activities.

1. The creature is in its innermost essence wholly and entirely contingent, dependent on the first cause and its conserving influence. Therefore not merely its substance, but also its affections, properties and activities must be subject to the same divine influence. The activities of the creature must therefore continually, with essential necessity, be borne and conserved by the first cause; precisely in this bearing and conserving influence, not in an efficacy of God running alongside finite causality, lies the divine concurrence.

2. In fact, all accidents, and thus also the activities of the creature, are either merely conceptually or really distinct from its substance. In the former case they are really one with the substance and are thus subject to the same conserving and bearing influence as the substance itself; indeed, if the resting substance needs the divine influence, then still more the active one.

But if the activities are really distinct from the substance, still they must in any case

a) as its manifestations and outflowings, share with it the constitution of its peculiar, profoundest being, contingency, which is removed only by the conserving, bearing influence of God.

b) The (absolute) accidents really distinct from the substance proceed from the substance through a certain exercise of it, which is indeed not efficient causality, but must nevertheless be called a true causality, a real emanation. This emanation, as not really distinct from the substance, needs, like the modal accidents, the divine concurrence, and naturally no less in its conclusion, in activity, than in its beginning.

3. One can consider activity in three moments: in its starting point, i.e., its subject; in its term, the effect; and in the transition from the one to the other.

In the active subject it is dependent, with and in this, on God's conserving influence. The same holds of the term altered by the activity, which must be conserved by God after as before the action of the activity. The transition itself, as accident, cannot subsist in itself, but has its existence either in the active subject or in the effect or in both, and thus cannot withdraw from their dependence on God.

(p. 205) 4. The accident, and thus also activity, essentially contains a twofold dependence on another: it exists not in itself and not of itself; it is therefore in another and from another. The former dependence leads to the substance in which it inheres; the latter to an efficient cause which determines its contingency to being. This cause, however, cannot be the substance. For

a) the substance is rather the material cause of the accident, in any case not the efficient; its efficient causality is directed to an external (or internal) effect which it produces through the accident.

b) This contingency the accident has indeed in common with the substance, or, more exactly speaking, has it from it. Not the substance, therefore, but the influence of God, which also holds the substance in being, thereby removes the contingency of the accident too.

III. Solution of some Difficulties.

A special difficulty is offered by the concurrence of God with the free decisions of creatures, especially with their morally bad actions.

1. For if the divine *concursus* is to be a precondition for every free decision of the creature, then either God decrees his concurrence to a determinate action, and then the creature can choose only this one and no other; or he leaves it indifferent, and then the creature cannot come out of indifference to a determinate decision.

But one must conceive the *concursus* neither as a precondition of the creature's activity nor as an influence of God following upon its decision and conforming to it, but as a bearing, holding force, under whose influence all free decisions take place. As long as the will is undecided, God gives no determining *concursus*, none determined for a particular decision, but supports and holds the capacity to choose.

With the transition to the choice of something determinate, which is accomplished under the bearing influence of God, the *concursus* too, insofar as it now bears this determinately chosen action, passes over into a determinate one. Moreover, as Suarez remarks, the determination, decision of the will is not distinct from the activity of willing or of the willed (internal) *(p. 206)* activity. And for this reason alone the concurrence of God with the willing of the creature cannot precede or follow its self-determination to willing. But insofar as another, especially external, activity depends on the decision of the creature's will, to which God has bound himself by an inviolable law of his providence to concur, one can say in a true sense that the creature's decision acts determiningly on the concurrence of God. This *concursus* to the (external) activity does indeed follow the decision, but not that one under which the decision itself takes place.

If, thus, the concurrence of God may not be conceived as a predetermination (*praedefinitio*, *praedeterminatio*) of the will, still far less as *praemotio physica* [physical premotion] in the sense of the Thomists, since a motion of the will properly so called by another, outside the will, appears incompatible with freedom.

For whoever moves an agent draws or drives it by his causality toward a determinate goal, without which a motion *in individuo* [in the individual case] cannot be thought, and thus does not leave it that indifference with which the free being, at every moment of its activity, over against all possible conditions and under any external influence whatever, determines the direction of its willing for itself, moves itself toward its freely determined goal.[2]

2. Against the concurrence of God with morally bad actions it can be objected that, if God effects them as co-cause, he also wills them; for what one does freely one also wills. God, then, does not merely permit sin, but wills it.

But a) God is not the sole principle of the sinful action, and one cannot say that he effects it; rather the creature, borne and supported by God, effects it; what he does in it, the supporting, he also really wills.

b) The activity of God is directed not to the sinfulness of the action, to its contradiction with the moral law, but to the material element of the action, to its physical being. That contradiction, as a mere *relatio rationis* [relation of reason] and still more as a mere *privatio* [privation] (a nothing that ought not to be), needs no assistance from God. But the physical being of the action is something good, which God effects and must will if he does not wish to abolish freedom.

But, one says, if God does not effect the contradiction with the law, then neither does he effect the harmony with it; he is then no longer the author of moral goodness. Certainly; but because it is easier to sin than to do good, God must therefore influence good actions more than bad ones.

(p. 207)

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[1] *Metaphys.*, p. 76.

[2] **[Tr.]** Gutberlet here takes the Molinist (Suarezian) side against the Báñezian doctrine of *praemotio physica*. The translation renders his position as stated, without comment on the controversy.

§ 5. Divine Providence.

In the wider sense of the word one understands by the providence of God that world-order through which God sets befitting ends for the whole universe as for its individual parts, or determines the beings of the world in their constitution, number and mutual dependence in correspondence with the ends to be attained; i.e., bestows on them and conserves for them the means necessary or at least useful to them for the attainment of these ends, whether internal, such as their natural forces, or external, such as the furtherance which can accrue to them from the whole course of the world and from the other individual beings of the world.

That there is a divine providence in this sense has been demonstrated *a posteriori* in the teleological proof of God, and is *a priori* as certain as it is certain that God is infinite wisdom, which cannot contradict itself, which can create nothing without an end, which can admit no frustration in its plans. But this would be the case if it did not endow the things of the world with such natural endowments and forces by which they could attain the ends set by it, or if it did not assign to the course of the world such a direction and arrangement by which the development and exercise of those forces and endowments for the attainment of their ends would be furthered. Scarcely any difference is found between the concept of the government of the world and that of providence in this wider conception; only that the latter designates more the immanent acts of the divine thinking and willing, the former, however, their execution in the world.

In the stricter sense providence is essentially an act of the goodness and love, not merely of the wisdom, of God. In the above definition the end which the divine government of the world strives for is left undetermined; it is not said whether it is a good of God or a good of creatures; if it is conceived as the welfare of creatures, then one has providence in the narrower and proper sense of the word, which coincides conceptually with the divine solicitude.

That, now, the divine government of the world does not pursue its own ends regardless, but that God directs everything to the welfare of "his own," follows

1. From experience and observation. For all beings of the world are equipped with such natural endowments and forces, and placed *(p. 208)* in such conditions of existence, in such relation to other beings, to the laws of nature and their course, that they can not merely exist, or live, but develop and come to the perfection befitting them. Whoever does not regard the world with the prejudiced eyes of pessimism will have to call this equipment not a meagre one, but a rich, liberal, royal one.

This proposition of experience suffers, to be sure, exceptions, which in detail are brought into harmony with divine providence by the following *a priori* proofs. In general all exceptions can find a satisfactory explanation through two remarks.

a) The welfare of irrational nature is essentially subordinated as means to the welfare of rational nature. Kind providence, therefore, has to further the welfare of the former only insofar as it serves man; and therefore providence in the narrowest sense extends only to rational creatures, whose welfare does not serve another as means but is intended as end.

Insofar, however, as the beings of nature can serve man according to the divine ordinance only by developing and perfecting themselves, divine providence is also concerned for their welfare; but this must recede entirely when they can serve man only through annihilation or other impairment. Further, what is necessary or even only useful for man is not the development of every single individual of every species and genus, but only the genus itself, whether immediately, or mediately as an integrating member in the economy of nature necessary to man. Therefore providence has indeed taken care most vigorously for the conservation of genera and species, but not for that of every individual; indeed it sacrifices to the whole numerous individual beings, or at least their germs. From the same principle providence sacrifices whole classes of lower beings to the higher ones which live and develop on them; the former serve man mediately by sustaining the beings which immediately further man's welfare; but they too could not do this if they had not first attained their natural formation, which providence makes possible for them.

In short: Kind providence must bestow on all its creatures, or make possible for them, the perfection natural to them as a good due to them. But to irrational beings, by virtue of their innermost nature, all their good belongs only with regard to man, *(p. 209)* and therefore to the lower only with regard to the higher. Therefore it is not contrary to providence to sacrifice irrational creatures to man, and the lower to the higher. This sacrifice, however, is much mitigated by the naturally necessary annihilation or injury which they would in any case have to suffer some time, even without serving man.

They sacrifice to man, therefore, only a somewhat longer existence, a somewhat longer life; which, however, is of no significance at all, not merely for beings which have no knowledge, but also for the animals, which know and desire no future, but only the moment, only *esse hic et nunc* [being here and now].

b) If providence seems to let man too, whose welfare and beatitude is nevertheless an independent (even if subordinate) end, lack what is necessary, we could first remark that such evils have their ground less in the arrangement of the world than in the more or less evil will either of those who suffer, or of others who do not help them according to the will of providence or even harm them, or in general disproportions which, though now difficult to remove, nevertheless gained entrance and continuance through human perversity. Chiefly, however, it is to be emphasized that the sufferings which providence permits or even sends demonstrate no lack of love, but, in view of the great physical and moral goods which according to God's intention they are to procure for man already in this life, but especially in the other, are one of the most efficacious means which the goodness of God uses to make us happy.

A special difficulty is offered by the sufferings of children not yet of age, which can neither be conceived as means, as with irrational beings, nor acquire a relation to the moral order through the will. But even if providence cannot intend them as means, at least in the case where they have become completely purposeless, it can nevertheless permit them without prejudice to its wisdom and goodness. They follow, namely, from a very purposeful and beneficent arrangement, the constancy of the laws of nature and man's faculty of sensation. If in individual cases the sensitivity (to pain) no longer has any purpose for the welfare of the individual, these sufferings have their explanation and their purpose in the general purposeful arrangement from which they result *per accidens*; and so they are in the best harmony with the wisdom of the Author. But neither are they contrary to his *(p. 210)* goodness, since it is an extraordinary good for the child, for which it will praise kind providence eternally, to enjoy an eternal beatitude after this brief pain.

2. *Probatio dilectionis exhibitio est operis* [The proof of love is the showing of the deed], remarks Gregory the Great. Now, however, God has given us life, a good which includes an infinity of benefits. But this gift is not merely a sign but at the same time a motive of his love. God not only in fact loves his creatures, but he must love them. Every cause loves its effect as something of itself, as a second self, the more so, the stronger the influence which the effect undergoes from it, the more it takes up into itself, as it were, of the being of the cause, the more intimately it remains bound to it in dependence, the more like it is to it. Now creatures receive from God not, say, merely an accidental or substantial form or a part of their essence, which already stimulates men to so great love for their works, parents for their children, but their whole innermost being; indeed even their thinkability and possibility has its last ground in God. They undergo this creative influence not transiently, but remain always in essential inner dependence on the bearing hand of the Creator. They have the most essential likeness to their Creator; for only through this are they what they are, that each one is a determinate representation, an image, of the infinite being. This is no mere agreement in form, size, in properties, on account of which parents already love their children so much, but an inner likeness, which, to be sure, on account of the infinity of God and the necessary finitude of creatures, can be no likeness of essence.

Therefore God must love his creatures with a love which far surpasses all created love.

But he would not love them truly and earnestly if he did not wish them well, i.e., make the attainment of their ends possible for them through natural endowment and arrangement of the world.

3. This reason has all the greater weight as God bestows on living, and especially on rational, beings their endowments in the form of strivings, or at least not without strivings, through whose fulfilment they attain not only their natural development, but also their welfare, their beatitude, and through whose non-fulfilment they do not merely become stunted, but unhappy. If, therefore, there would already lie a lack of goodness and love in it if God let his creatures *(p. 211)* become stunted, did not make their development possible for them, it would be true cruelty if he implanted in them unfulfillable impulses toward beatitude, if he equipped them for unhappiness.

4. This, however, is all the less thinkable, as it is diametrically opposed to the most tender and most vigorous love which God has especially toward rational creatures, and would also impute a flagrant self-contradiction to infinite wisdom. For since God himself has planted these natural impulses and given them the determinate direction toward the welfare of the creature as toward their natural object, it is he who drives and urges the creature toward its beatitude. But if he does not make the attainment of this goal possible, or, what is the same, has made it impossible through his arrangement of the world, then he himself continually holds his creatures back from the goal toward which he draws them with irresistible urge.

5. God does not pursue his ends in the world independently of, or even against, the good and welfare of creatures; but wise and kind providence wills to attain its glory only through this, that the beings of the world attain their own natural ends. For the greater the perfection which creatures possess from the beginning and

to which they develop, the more the (objective) glory of God is reflected in them, and conversely. The more rational beings are perfect and blessed in the knowledge and love of the highest good, the more they glorify God. Every higher degree of God's glory is attained, if the malice of creatures does not thwart God's loving plans, only through a corresponding increase of the perfection and beatitude of creatures: their highest good is the absolutely highest good, known and loved by them, i.e., honoured and enjoyed by them.

Therefore, without real difference, the representation of God's goodness and the communication of his goodness are given as the end of creation. Only through this does God represent his goodness outside himself (glorify himself), that he communicates it to beings outside himself, makes them perfect and blessed.

6. The holiness, justice, wisdom and goodness of God demand that he prescribe a moral order to rational beings, protect it, and bestow on man the necessary incentives and means for its observance. In fact man also feels himself obligated to the moral order, and finds in the voice of conscience, as well as in the sanction of the natural law, the mightiest incentive, as well as, *(p. 212)* in the better elements of his nature, in the sense of honour, of order, etc., and in the domestic and social institutions created by God, the most vigorous means for the observance of the law. Nor is to be overlooked the spiritual intercourse of friendship and love between God and his creatures, given with the spiritual nature of God and of man himself, and its necessary consequence, prayer, through which the moral being can draw down upon itself special assistance, as in all needs, so especially in spiritual needs, temptations, darkness, etc.

Now, however, moral perfection, which is attained through the observance of the moral law, is the greatest perfection and the most solid happiness of the rational being already in this life, but still more in the consummation beyond. Therefore God has provided in pre-eminent fashion for the welfare of his own.

7. With this the opponents of providence are refuted: first the fatalists, who ascribe all events in nature and in human life to an inevitable destiny (ἀνάγκη [necessity], *Fatum*), which even God cannot alter. Then, however, also the so-called Deists (the French Encyclopaedists and their English kindred spirits), according to whom God gave the world a determinate arrangement in the beginning, but further leaves it to itself and its laws; so that everything is to be explained from necessarily acting causes or by chance.

The Creator cannot leave his works to themselves, but must exercise a continued influence on them; it is he who continually bears them and guides and governs them according to the laws ordained by him, or according to free decisions. For not merely are natural forces and laws to be ordained, but their course and application in the world are also to be determined, in order that order may exist, and specially that the welfare of creatures may be provided for. Therefore God's intervention in the course of the world, namely as the answering of prayer, which the Deists so greatly abhor (Tyndall), has nothing miraculous in itself, or at least is not necessarily against the laws of nature. For providence, which gave the natural forces a determinate direction from the beginning, at the same time ordained then that, with regard to prayers, without violation of any law of nature, certain harmful natural events should remain far from the one praying, or favourable natural events should serve his welfare. The application of the laws of nature, which mostly *(p. 213)* is not necessary, must be well distinguished from the laws of nature themselves, which cannot be suspended without miracle. If God's providence, on account of devout prayers, lets no fire come to a building, or, through an arrangement made originally, say through a rain falling at the same time, does not let it break out, then no miracle has happened, no law of nature has been violated, which would be the case if God suspended the natural efficacy of fire.

8. One could still raise the question whether God in his providence directs everything to the "best" of his own, as he does to their welfare. It is clear that God does not ordain the absolutely best for creatures, or even can ordain it; for then he would have to make the best arrangement of the world and bestow on the individual beings the best endowments and aids for the attainment of the highest degree of perfection and beatitude, which leads to an absurd and impossible optimism; this also finds an actual refutation in the many evils and

sins of the world, which God, if he willed, could prevent through his arrangement of the world. But among the means which God is accustomed to bestow according to the present, freely willed and freely determined, not absolutely perfect order of the world, for the order of salvation freely determined for each individual being for the attainment of a finite degree of beatitude, the aids which God gives to those who are of good will, especially to those who ask him for them, are the best. But to those who abuse his graces he often gives the merely sufficient measure of means; although for them too God in many respects ordains the best, especially insofar as what he wills for them is better than everything which they would gladly will.

9. Herein is at the same time contained the answer to a misgiving which fears that through the loving ordinances and guidance of providence our efforts, especially prayer, would be made useless, or at least the trust in our own energy diminished, and so the door opened wide to sloth by the foregoing doctrine. One must consider that precisely our energy, for which God bestows on us the capacities, stimulation and support, is the chief, indeed the only, means by which providence leads us to our end; and that in proportion to our well-meant efforts, already according to the natural connection of things, the aids, such as good habits, help from others, the fruits of our diligence, increase and consolidate themselves. The true state of affairs, therefore, demands of us that *(p. 214)* in our endeavours we put our trust wholly and entirely in God, since he alone gives all capacities and all prospering, but on the other hand develop our energy as if all success depended on it alone.

§ 6. The Relation of Providence to the Evils of the World; Pessimism.

1. The fundamental thought of modern pessimism is: In the world pain, displeasure, predominates; but as non-satisfaction, displeasure cannot be a purpose of reason; rather, as it is essentially irrational, so the world must owe its origin to an irrational act, namely to the irrational, blind and unconscious force which, striving after existence, drives the world out of itself. This force is, according to Schopenhauer, an altogether irrational will to life; according to Hartmann, the Unconscious, which acts only partly rationally, as in the formation of the organs. While, therefore, according to Schopenhauer this world is the worst of all possible ones, so bad that if it were still worse it could not subsist at all, it is according to Hartmann still the best among the possible ones, even if worse than none. Therefore the best and only possible thing is negative beatitude, painlessness, return into nothing, which according to Schopenhauer is of course possible only for the individual, according to Hartmann for the whole world too. This return is to be striven for, according to the former, by quietistic immersion in Nirvana, best of all by ascetic death by starvation; according to the latter, by restless intervention in the course of the world, whereby pain is momentarily mitigated and the possibility given of hurling the whole world back into nothing by a common exertion of force.

The basic features of these modern systems are already contained in Buddhistic Brahmanism, which lets the illusion (Maya) of this world, full of deceit and pain, arise out of the overflowing Brahma, which alone is real; out of which asceticism must lead back again into nothing (*nirvana* = blowing away).[1]

2. To the general and particular absurdities of this pessimism, insofar as it is pantheism, we need not return here. The other foundation too, that the present life alone is the standard for judging the beatitude of man, we have already withdrawn from it. The further assertion that the sole *(p. 215)* real measure of value of the world is pleasure and displeasure, while morality and right are merely “subjective ideas of consciousness,” to which value belongs only as means to beatitude, is already in and of itself so monstrous that it suffices for its refutation to state it; still, the true relation of morality to beatitude will be discussed in the Ethics.

Nor will we lay any special weight here on the fact that pessimism makes itself guilty of quite enormous exaggerations regarding the misery of this world, proceeding only from passionate rancour and self-disruption or other irrational motives; let only this be remarked, that it knows no intermediate state between pleasure and displeasure, which is nevertheless the usual and normal one, and declares the state of positive enjoyment to be the normal and alone acceptable and reasonable one. But when Schopenhauer says:

“Every human life is tossed back and forth between pain and boredom,” this, extended to all, is evidently false; restricted to himself, it contains a very strong self-accusation. For not the arrangement of the world, which offered him enough material for rewarding and sweet occupation for himself and others, but his perverse will bears the blame that he was bored.

3. There do indeed occur human lives which seem to be composed only of sufferings; but precisely these exceptional cases prove, more compellingly than the general unsatisfiedness of life, the existence of a better future; but the way in which pessimism seeks to remove misery leads to consequences which throw very glaring lights on the value of the system.

4. Here we are occupied only with the proposition: Because displeasure is essentially irrational, the world in which it predominates must owe its origin to an irrational act; i.e., we have to set forth the relation of wise and kind providence to the evils of this world.

I. Physical evils do not contradict the goodness and wisdom of providence.

1. It would indeed be contrary to the goodness of God if he intended the sufferings and pains of his creatures for their own sake as end. For that would mean: his will stops at the evil of the creature as such; he has his pleasure in the suffering of the creature as *(p. 216)* such; and this is surely excluded directly by the love which he has toward creatures.

But it is compatible with love to use evils as means for the attainment of far higher goods. For certainly he does not act, e.g., against self-love who submits to manifold toils, privations, pains, in order to procure for himself more estimable goods, such as honour, possessions, health; those parents who procure for their children higher goods of body and soul through strict discipline, restriction, punishment, have greater love for them than those who permit them all enjoyments.

Now there is indeed the difference between men and God, that we find before us such an arrangement of nature in which we must procure many goods for ourselves through evils, and therefore the bearing and inflicting of evils is not against love toward ourselves and others; but God could give us those goods without evil; therefore, as it seems, he would have had to give them to us without pain and suffering, if he loved us.

But this is simply to be denied; for in the present arrangement too absolutely no lack of love is to be pointed out; just as the bearing of toils, even when one can reach one’s goal without toil, can be a higher degree of self-love, insofar as heroic virtues are practised in it which would otherwise be impossible. Likewise God, by removing all sufferings from this world, would have made many virtues impossible, such as fortitude, patience, compassion, etc.

Therefore loving providence can employ sufferings as means for the attainment of higher goods.

2. With this, however, the wisdom of God too is justified; to be sure, if pain were the last end and not a means, it would be “essentially irrational”; but if it is compensated by higher goods, then that “unsatisfiedness” falls away; an individual subordinate striving is indeed not satisfied; but the higher rational striving, which longs for the goods which are acquired through pain, is given full satisfaction.

II. The moral evils in the world are compatible with the goodness, the wisdom and the holiness of God.

To be sure, God’s holiness can intend moral evil, sin, neither as end nor as means. Not as end, because otherwise he would negate himself, the ground of the moral order, both of its content *(p. 217)* and of its obligation. But not as means either, in order to attain higher goods, such as the revelation of his justice and mercy; for since whoever wills the end must also will the means, he would in this case have to will sin really and earnestly, just as earnestly as he wills those goods. But this not even the will of the creature may do, let alone holiness, goodness and wisdom itself. One can indeed investigate whether certain actions which,

referred to one end, are sin, may not be permitted with regard to another; but there lies a contradiction in saying that one may commit a sin in order to attain a good purpose. God would have to will not an indifferent action but a true sin if he wished to use it as means. But this is not merely against his holiness, but also against his goodness and wisdom, because he would will an infinite evil of his creature without being able to compensate it by a higher good.

1. But the permission of sin does not conflict with the wisdom of God; for God knows how to prepare remedies out of poison; he can attain corresponding goods out of sin, such as for the creature various exercises of virtue — penance, humility, patience — and for himself the revelation of his justice and mercy. These goods, then, are not the reason why he permits it, but the necessary condition without which he could not permit it. Sin, namely, is not taken up into the original plan of the government of the world insofar as this depends on God alone (*voluntas antecedens* [antecedent will]), but he is first compelled by the malice of the creature to come to terms with it (*voluntas consequens* [consequent will]), to refer it to an end. Were there no such end, he could not permit it.

2. Were the permission of sin against God's goodness, then either he could create no free beings, which is diametrically opposed to his goodness, or he would have to heap such aids upon them that, in spite of their fallibility, they nevertheless did not fail. But then God would become, in the dispensing of his graces, the slave of the creature's malice; for the worse and more malicious the creature, the less inclined to co-operate with the sufficient and abundant aids given, the more graces would have to be given so that it should not sin. But such a dependence of God on the evil will of his creature the goodness of God obviously cannot demand.

(p. 218) Now, however, the whole government of the world offers not the least indication that God behaves otherwise in regard to sin than as permitting; on the contrary, it can be positively shown that he merely permits it. For he forbids sin under the severest punishments with absolute power, and has vigorously provided through conscience and external institutions for the fulfilment of his law. He therefore in no way wills sin, neither in itself nor as means to an end.

3. But that God's holiness too can let sin happen follows easily if one applies the generally required criteria for a permitting which is not culpable and does not contradict morality:

1° the action must not be intended;

2° it must not necessarily follow from one freely willed; or 3° the agent, if it follows necessarily or is at least foreseen, must not be obligated to omit the willed action on account of that consequence. Now, however, God

1° does not will sin, but abhors it.

2° From the creation of beings that are free and equipped with all sufficient aids, sin does not necessarily follow.

3° No reason can be found which would oblige God not to give freedom, or to annihilate it, because he foresees that it will be abused. For even the human father, who has a special duty to keep his child as far as he can from all evil, especially moral evil, and to whom it is not left, as it is to the universal director of all things, to draw good out of sin, can nevertheless allow it a freedom of movement with which it will foreseeably commit many sins. And although every man is bound by the duty of love to keep all evil from his fellow man as far as practicable, still someone can for weighty reasons hand over to another a weapon of which he foresees that he will use it to his harm, even for murder, provided only that it is not designed merely for illicit injuries. Should it, then, be contrary to the holiness of God if, for the weightiest reasons, he gives and leaves freedom, which according to its whole essence is destined for good and for beatification, because he foresees that it will be much abused?

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III. The distribution of the goods of life is also in harmony with the goodness and wisdom of God.

We by no means wish to assert that in this life the good are rewarded as they deserve and the wicked punished as they deserve; on the contrary, from the manifest fact of insufficient sanction, which forces itself upon one irresistibly especially in individual cases, where the good have only to suffer for their virtue and the wicked draw almost nothing but enjoyment and advantage from their evil deeds, we conclude that the just God will bring physical goods and evils into the fullest harmony with moral goodness and badness in another life. This retribution beyond cuts off from the outset all complaints about the distribution of earthly goods. But even for this life the ordinance of God by which he does not exclude the wicked from his benefits and does not exempt the good from the evils of this life is a most wise and kind one. For

1. The wisdom and goodness of God demand that such an unchangeableness be given to the physical order as makes human life in general, and moral activity in particular, possible. But should requital according to merit and demerit take place already here, the order of nature would have to be interrupted by miracles daily, hourly, indeed at every moment; God could not "let his sun rise upon the just and the unjust, nor let it rain upon the devout and the sinners."[2] The demanded exceptionless safeguarding of the moral order by the physical would bring about the destruction of both.

2. It is not in accordance with the wisdom and goodness of God

a) to grant the wicked no time and incentive for penance, no reward for the good that they too do; by their punishment to punish with them their relatives, friends, dependants who are good; always to uncover secret crimes at once by open punishment, to the detriment of social intercourse, of public decency, and of modesty and dread of sin. Likewise

b) to take from the good, through sufferings, the occasion for practising the noblest virtue; to turn their thoughts from the future true goods to these sensible ones; to pervert their high-hearted and magnanimous disposition into slavish self-interest. But all this would have to occur if God already here rewarded and punished everything.

(p. 220)

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[1] **[Tr.]** "Buddhistic Brahmanism" (*buddhistischer Brahmanismus*) is the author's expression; it is translated as it stands.

[2] **[Tr.]** Cf. Matt. 5:45. The opening quotation mark is missing in the original; the quotation is freely adapted.

§ 7. Optimism.

1. In direct opposition to pessimism, Leibniz asserts that this world is the best. He was misled into so strange an opinion, contradicting the most manifest facts, by his false view of freedom of the will. For if the free will, as he believes, must always choose the greater good, then God has selected the best out of all possible worlds. This optimistic world-view, therefore, also falls with the clarification of the essence of freedom of the will in general, of which in the Psychology.[1] Here it can be specially remarked that Leibnizian optimism also removes all contingency in the world, and so in its consequences coincides with determinism and fatalism.

For since according to Leibnizian principles the sufficient reason why one thing is selected before another must lie in that thing itself, and thus what is chosen can be neither a smaller nor an equally great good as what is not willed, God therefore preferred the creation of the world to non-creation because the former is better than the latter. But if this is so, then he could not will non-creation: creation is necessary. For the same reason he chose this world with these beings and this course, because all this is better than the contradictory opposite. But then he could not will this, but had to will determinately these things of the world and this

course of the world. Therefore the whole world and what happens in it is necessarily so ordained, is and could not be ordained otherwise; i.e., everything in the world follows with unalterable necessity. Therefore optimism leads consistently to fatalism.

2. God not only did not have to, but could not even, create the best world. For the best, i.e., most perfect, would be that in which all possible beings in all possible genera and species existed in all possible quantities. But now not all possibilities can be realized at the same time; for, e.g., opposite states cannot gain actuality at the same time.

3. Leibniz demands in his optimistic conception of the world and of nature that all degrees of perfection be realized, that all empty *(p. 221)* spaces be filled. Between the graded monads there always exists only an infinitely small difference in perfection; they stand spatially only infinitely little apart from one another.

But 1° if all spaces are filled, then motion in the world is no longer possible.

2° All existing beings are either equal to one another, or are distinguished by a finite degree of perfection. The infinitely small cannot exist; it belongs to the ideal order.

3° Even if the gradation of the beings of the world is in general a continuous one, there are nevertheless in it such strongly marked leaps that not a finite but an infinite, further essential difference exists between the members on this side and on that side of the point of transition. Living organisms are distinguished essentially, not merely in degree, from minerals; animals essentially from plants; man essentially from animals. The distance, finally, of the Infinite itself from the highest finite is quite properly an infinite one.

4. God had, therefore, to select freely from all possible worlds one of determinate finite perfection, and the freely chosen one can in manifold respects be called the best.

1° Because it is directed to the highest and noblest end for which a being can be destined, to God's infinite perfection. Now even if it proclaims God's glory only in a determinate finite degree, still it is

2° arranged in the best way for the attainment of this degree fixed by God, and attains it with absolutely faultless exactness. For the wise man must employ the best means for the attainment of his ends. And if perhaps, in view of the unfathomable power and wisdom of the Creator, many other arrangements of the world are still thinkable which would glorify God in the same degree as the present one, still there is no better one for this determinate purpose than the present one.

Some add further that the world is the best also in this sense, that in it all possible beings are represented according to genera and species. Now even if this conception is still very far removed from a "best world," since above the highest genus of spirits up to God there still rises a whole infinity, and a new infinity opens up between the lowest being and nothing, indeed between all existing genera and species infinities *(p. 222)* of genera and species can lie, still such considerations, undertaken with a dispassionate eye, show how altogether senseless and mendacious is pessimism's conception of the world; the more exactly we study the whole world and explain it from the alone true, theistic standpoint, the more shall we too, like the Lord in view of the new creation, have to say "that all is very good."[2]

[End of the Theodicy.]

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[1] *Psychol.*, p. 189 f.

[2] **[Tr.]** Cf. Gen. 1:31. The opening quotation mark is missing in the original.